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TREND DOCUMENT (2019)

This trend document was elaborated by ngo-federatie at the kick off of the Future 2030 Trajectory in May 2019.

TREND 1: THE GEOGRAPHY OF DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................ 2

THE GEOGRAPHICAL SHIFT ......................................................................................................................................... 2

REDEFINING CHALLENGES .......................................................................................................................................... 2

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING ...................................................................................................................................... 4

RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................................................. 4

TREND 2: THE CHANGED POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................................... 5

CHANGED GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................. 5

CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS ............................................................................................................................... 5

THE RETURN OF REALPOLITIK ...................................................................................................................................... 5

SHRINKING CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE .................................................................................................................................. 6

THE AID SECTOR IN EXISTENTIAL CRISIS .......................................................................................................................... 6

REDEFINING CHALLENGES ........................................................................................................................................... 6

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING ...................................................................................................................................... 7

RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................................................. 7

TREND 3: REACHING PLANETARY BOUNDARIES ............................................................................................... 9

PLANETARY BOUNDARIES ........................................................................................................................................... 9

REDEFINING CHALLENGES ......................................................................................................................................... 10

RESOURCES ........................................................................................................................................................... 11

TREND 4: THE COMPLEXITY OF DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................................. 12

WICKED PROBLEMS ................................................................................................................................................ 12

MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS .......................................................................................................................... 12

REDEFINING CHALLENGES ......................................................................................................................................... 13

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING .................................................................................................................................... 14

RESOURCES ........................................................................................................................................................... 14

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TREND 1: THE GEOGRAPHY OF

DEVELOPMENT The geography of development is fundamentally changing. Economic, social and environmental evolutions have

redrawn the global map of poverty and development. This geographical shift initiated a new policy agenda

towards global development (see Trend 2) and a lively debate on the necessity of new concepts to explain and

understand the changed geography of poverty and development: the global poor no longer live in what was once

called the Third World, developing countries or the ‘Global South’. What are the consequences for international

development?

THE GEOGRAPHICAL SHIFT The gap between Northern and Southern countries is closing For the first time since the Industrial Revolution inequality between individual world citizens has dropped. The

global income Gini across individuals fell from 69,7 in 1988 to 62.5 in 2013.[2] This trend is mainly because of

decreasing levels of between-country inequality. In other words, there has been an economic convergence

between countries, which was primarily driven by economic progress in a limited number of countries – China

and India – which are highly populated. But also Sub-Sahara-Africa and South-America saw progress as illustrated

by the transitioning of a number of countries from LIC to MIC status.

From between-country to within-country inequality Although between-country inequality decreased, within-country inequality increased. Both within ‘northern’ and

‘southern’ countries this trend has been observed. The trend is in particular visible in upcoming economies such

as India, China and Russia. In contrast, in countries with already high levels of within-country inequality (mainly

low-income countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and South-America) the Ginis did not increase – or even dropped.[3]

The global gap between the poor and the wealthy remains On the individual level the global distribution of wealth remains extremely polarized, with 8 people having the

amount of wealth equivalent to the bottom half of the world’s population.[4] The country of residence still

predicts more than half of an individual’s income.[5] In other words, the main indicator for development still

remains the place where children are being born. More in general, a historical and persistent inequality gap

remains between the global ‘North’ and ‘South’: the poorest Americans are still much better off than the poorest

of the poor in absolute terms.

The bottom billion is decreasing, yet is complemented by a new class of poor The proportion of the global population living in extreme poverty has dramatically fallen.[6] However, a class of

new poor have been growing: the ‘vulnerable non-poor’. They are no longer extremely poor, but are

characterized by precarious jobs and limited rights. In addition, this new class of poor does not only emerge in

‘traditional’ developing countries but also in the US and the European Union.[7]

The bottom billion remains at the bottom Increasingly the extreme poor are located in fragile contexts, where the poverty trap is feeded by a complex mix

of economic stagnation, violent conflict and failed state institutions. These pockets of poverty are persistent. It

is projected that 80% of the world’s poorest will live in conflict-affected and fragile countries by 2030.[8]

REDEFINING CHALLENGES This geographical shift implies a redefining of challenges and the capacities needed to tackle them. In particular

the following new challenges are worth noticing[9]:

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• From poverty reduction to fighting inequality: “It is increasingly clear that every nation is ‘developing’,

and concern for inequality now shows sufficient potential as a politically actionable agenda that it might

gradually displace poverty eradication as the overall goal of ‘development’.”[10] But does this mean

that world poverty is becoming a problem of national rather than international distribution, with

between-country inequality declining, and within-country inequality on the rise? And does this mean

that national domestic taxation and redistribution policies should become more important than

ODA?[11]

• A shifting rural-urban balance: rural population totals are expected to remain relatively stable, whereas

the urban population is expected to grow dramatically in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. As a consequence

populations living in slums will also increase. Also worth noticing is the fact that coastal populations are

expected to grow: with the increased impact of climate change they will become more vulnerable.

• Shifting instability and conflict: from a long term perspective the world has become more

peaceful compared to the Cold War period. Nevertheless, in 2017 still 90,000 battle deaths have been

counted, a decrease of 32% compared to the latest peak in 2014 when the Syrian conflicts was at is

highest.[12] However, the nature of violence and conflict is shifting and goes well beyond battle-related

deaths: political and criminal violence becomes more enmeshed and half of most conflict-affected and

fragile contexts are classified as middle income. High inequality rates in countries like Mexico and South

Africa result in increased levels of violence.[13]

• Dealing with fragility. As highlighted above the majority of extreme poor live in fragile places. The

international community has not yet found more effective ways to adapt their efforts to these fragile

contexts. Until now their response has been to shift and increase humanitarian aid. However, there is a

need to adapt to a diversity of fragile contexts (compare for example a conflict-affected country such as

Jemen versus MIC countries such as South-Africa or Mexico with high levels of criminal violence) in order

to tackle the root causes instead of the consequences of fragility.[14]

• Terrorism: There has been a dramatic increase in the number and fatality of terror attacks in recent

years. This rise is projected to continue. The complex web of anti-terror laws will continue to impact the

humanitarian sector.

• Populations on the move: longer wars and protracted crises as well as the consequences of climate

change will lead to a further increase of refugee flows, to a large extent to neighbouring countries of

conflicted and fragile states. This will impact on the instability of hosting countries. The situation in

refugee camps fails to improve. These camps are increasingly located in cities.

• Demography: the global population continues to grow, and is primarily driven by countries in Sub-

Saharan Africa. Yet, the rate of growth will begin to decline. In all regions, except Africa, the 65+ age

group will be the fastest growing.

• ‘New’ social and health issues: there is a gradual shift from traditional ‘northern’ social and health

issues (Ageing, obesity, alcohol and tobacco addiction, mental illness, the illicit drug trade and road

traffic accidents) towards southern countries. In these countries they kill considerably more people

than, say, malaria.[15]

• New agents of change: large sections of the global population have seen their conditions improve over

the last decades. Factors such as a rising middle class globally, increased connectivity, improved health

care, increased literacy and urbanisation, have contributed to more vocal citizens and an ‘associational

revolution’ world-wide. Furthermore, there is great potential in young people, women and an

increasingly ‘globalised population’ as ‘new’ agents of change (see also Trend 2).

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GUIDE TO FURTHER READING The geographical shift:

• Sumner, A. (2019), Five facts about global poverty that may surprise you

• Vervliet, E. (2016), Anno 2016 is ontwikkeling niet meer wat ze is geweest

Role of NGOs in MICs and fragile contexts: • Acropolis (2017), Guidance on fragility

• Oxfam IBIS (2014), p. 8-9

• Maxwell, S. (2013) Is there a future for Northern NGOs in a world of MICs (blog)

• Independent review of the new deal for Engagement in fragile states

Redefining challenges: • Green, D. (2019), What are the consequences of the shift from a two hump to a one hump world?

• Sumner, A. (2019). The Future of Development Co-operation: Not the end, just the beginning of a

new era?

Urbanization: • ICSC, Exploring the future, p. 13

RESOURCES 1. This trend document starts primarily from the thesis of Horner and Hulme that summarizes recent

research on trends in international development towards a new geography of development. See Horner,

R. and Hulme, D. (2017). ‘From International to Global Development: New Geographies of the 21st

Century Development’. Development and Change, 0(0): 1-32.

2. Horner & Hulme. (2017). p. 6.

3. Horner & Hulme. (2017). p. 17-18.

4. Horner & Hulme. (2017). p. 19.

5. Milanovic, B. (2013). ‘Global Income Inequality in Numbers: In History and Now’. Global Policy 4(2): 198–

208.

6. Horner & Hulme. (2017). p. 2

7. Horner & Hulme. (2017). P. 19.

8. OECD. (2018). States of Fragility Report 2018. Highlights. p. 1-14.

9. The Spindle, Partos & Perspectivity. (2018). Adapt, Counteract or Transform. The future of Dutch

development cooperation. p. 45-46.

10. Bond. (2015). Tomorrow’s World. How might megatrends in development affect the future roles of UK-

based INGOs? p. 9.

11. Sumner, A, and Mallett, R. (2014). The future of foreign Aid: Development Cooperation and the New

Geography of Global Poverty. Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire & New York. p. 5)

12. Petterson, T. And Eck, K. (2018). ‘Organized violence, 1989-2017’. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 55(4),

p. 535-547.

13. OECD. (2018).

14. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). Global development trends and changes. Overseas Development

Institute.

15. Green. D. (2015). Fit for the future? Development trends and the role of international NGOs. Oxfam. p.

3.

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TREND 2: THE CHANGED POLITICS OF

DEVELOPMENT The politics of development are changing: together with shifting geographies (see Trend 1) changing geopolitical

trends, the return of realpolitik, a shrinking space for civil society, and fundamental critiques on the aid sector

are setting the scene for a different political agenda.

CHANGED GEOGRAPHY Based on a changed geography of poverty and development (see Trend 1) international development is

increasingly substituted by a global development agenda.

The SDG framework offers for the first time a global development agenda that goes beyond the North-South

divide and transcends the aid sector.[1] This new ‘beyond aid’ paradigm increasingly questions the relevance and

effectiveness of aid relative to other actors and approaches of international cooperation.[2] As a consequence,

the new agenda identifies new actors and suggests sending financial aid flows into other directions (see further).

Furthermore, concepts such as the Global South and the divide between developed and developing countries no

longer hold. In fact, these concepts have been criticized for their neo-colonial connotations from in the

beginning.[3] The limits of the world are the limits of our language. In order to explain why the work of the aid

sector will still be relevant in the future, the sector will need a new vocabulary and conceptual framework. One

that does justice to a changed geography of global poverty and development.

CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS World’s economic and geopolitical power will continue to shift, from West and North to East and South.[4]

As the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar, new power hubs and a greater diversity of decision-making

fora are gaining in importance. Furthermore, “regional communities like the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU) will become more important as hubs of cooperation”.[5] The role of

the EU as a key player will diminish at the same time. The most direct effect of this geopolitical shift on the aid

sector is the rise of ‘new’ donors who not necessarily follow the same rules of the game set by the OECD

countries.

THE RETURN OF REALPOLITIK The populist roar forms an important driver of potential change for the international development sector.[6]

First of all, increasing populism and nationalism are driven by the observation that globalisation has profited

more non-Western – especially the upcoming economies – than Western countries, with increasing discontent

among the middle classes in the US and much of Europe because of the virtual stagnation of median incomes

over the past 30 years.[7]

As a consequence, the Western liberal values that supported much of the voluntaristic international

development agenda that emerged after the end of the Cold War have been replaced by political realism and

realpolitik in which the primacy of homeland security and the pursuit and protection of national interests has

been reaffirmed.[8] For international development the most direct risk of this return of Realpolitik can be found

in the further instrumentalisation of aid for internal and foreign policy purposes.

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SHRINKING CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE An undeniable trend is the crackdown on civil society worldwide referred to as ‘shrinking space for civil

society’.

It encompasses diverse strategies of governments to suppress civil society activism, ranging from regulations,

often related to restrictions on international funding of CSOs, to outright repression.[9] While these strategies

are mostly deployed in developing countries, the shrinking space can also be felt to different degrees in EU

member states, such as Poland, Hungary and Romania.

The Arab Spring has set in motion another wave of legislative constraints. “Governments around the world took

notice of these mass movements and initiated measures to restrict civil society in the hopes of preventing similar

uprisings on their own soil”.[10] Yet, the arguments and justifications used by governments to enact restrictions

are of a different nature:

1. protecting state sovereignty;

2. promoting transparency and accountability in the civil society sector;

3. enhancing aid effectiveness and coordination;

4. pursuing national security, counterterrorism, and anti–money laundering objectives”.[11]

THE AID SECTOR IN EXISTENTIAL CRISIS In the aid sector the aid effectiveness debate has dominated all other debates for more than a decade now.

In 2005, the initial Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness was like opening Pandora’s Box: from then on the sector

has been in a constant defence against attacks like ‘Dead Aid’ from Dambisa Moyo. This has changed the highly

political objective of international solidarity into a technocratic exercise in demonstrating value for money.

Furthermore, the strong dependency on public funding comes with strong managerialism, financial instability

and competition logic. More importantly this financial dependency also potentially impinges on civil society’s

autonomy.

REDEFINING CHALLENGES The highlighted political evolutions and shifts define new challenges for the aid sector.

• Changing Donors – competing with the ‘new’ donors. New aid donors such as the BRIC and MINT

(Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) emerge while the ‘traditional’ Western governmental aid

agencies are becoming less influential in setting the development assistance agenda.[12] At the policy

level of OECD-DAC donors already a shift towards foreign trade and investment interests as important

determinants for ‘development’ cooperation can be observed as a consequence of this rise of new aid

donors.[13] This is also the case for new development models such as South-South cooperation and

trilateral development (partnership between OECD-DAC member, new donor – e.g. Brasil of South Africa

– and the recipient country). Although they have advantages (more equal partnerships, promoting

OECD-DAC standards to new donors) these new models also risk to be used as foreign policy tools

(instead of focusing on development).[14] In addition, an important question remains how these new

donors will relate to civil society, both at home and abroad, and what potential effect this may have on

the functioning and role of western civil society.

• Changing Donor Priorities – follow the money? The changed geography of development (see Trend 1)

should explain shifting priorities from MICs to LICs and fragile states. However, although global ODA has

increased over the last couple of years, the amount of ODA going to LICs has declined.[15] For example,

ODA to conflict-affected and fragile states fell by 7% and ODA to Sub-Sahara Africa fell by 13% between

2011 and 2016. However, aid to MICs has been stable or even increased. This can be explained by the

prioritisation of national interests and commercial objectives, which is also translated in the promotion

of blended finance and private sector instruments.[16] Furthermore, a substantial part of the increase

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in global ODA flows is due to in-donor spending – more in particular in-donor refugee costs – and an

increasing share of ODA is dedicated to humanitarian aid (increased by 66% since 2010). Lastly, an

increasing amount of ODA is diverted towards national security interests – mainly migration and the

war on terror – as illustrated by the 3.1 € billion EU Trust Fund for Africa, of which 90% are ODA

funds.[17] In sum, the financial flows reflect the new geopolitical setting (political realism) and the new

donor priorities, i.e. a gradual re-focus on national interests (trade, security, migration control,

humanitarian response).

• Changing Ideologies – the instrumentalisation of aid. The emergence and rise of nationalist and

populist movements and politics affects the international development sector in various ways. It

undermines multilateralism through their lack of trust in international organisations and their

withdrawal from international arrangements (such as the Paris Climate Change Agreement).[18] They

might also form a threat to the international humanitarian and development system by questioning the

impartiality of aid, international humanitarian law, and hard-won reforms in the sector.[19] As

explained above OECD-DAC donors are increasingly marrying ODA with national economic and security

interests in reaction to these populist dynamics. Clear illustrations of this trend are for example the UK,

the Netherlands and Canada.

• Changing civil societies – retaking the public space. Current civil societies are confronted with at least

two important trends. Firstly, although a shrinking space for civil society can be observed, the Arab

spring and several other popular upraisals in for example Sub-Sahara Africa (Third Term protest) but

also in Europe (Youth for Climate) illustrate the power of the people to resist. They also question how

the traditionally organized ‘mainstream’ civil society will catch up with new types of mass civil

movement, mostly formed by the youth and led by non-mainstream activists (musicians, artists, …).

Secondly, within the aid sector a high dependency on donor funds comes with a high level of

technocratisation and potential instrumentalisation. New approaches – such as the ‘buen vivir’ school

or the ‘global public goods’ and ‘human security’ agendas – try to counter this a-political turn, go beyond

‘classical’ development approaches, and as such, aim at presenting new political alternatives.

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING • SDG's:

o IDDRI (2018), NGO mobilisation around the SDGs

o Brems, D. & Lamsens, J. (2016). De EU als ontwikkelingsland (MO* paper)

o Vandemoortele, J. (2018), Van simpele Millenniumdoelen naar warrige Duurzame

Ontwikkelingsdoelen (MO* paper)

• New movements: Gumede, W. (2017), New generation of civil rights movements emerges

• Buen vivir:

o The Guardian (2013), Buen vivir: the social philosophy inspiring movements in South America

o Gudynas , E. (2016), Buen vivir: Komt het goede leven uit Zuid-Amerika? (MO* paper)

• Human security: Kaldor, M. (2011), Human Security

RESOURCES 1. Verbrugge, B. and Huyse, H. (2018). Donor relationships with CSOs at a crossroads? HIVA. p. 15.

2. Janus, H., Klingebiel, S., and Paulo, S. (2015). Beyond Aid: A conceptual perspective on the

transformation of development cooperation. Journal of International Development, 27, p. 156.

3. Horner, R. and Hulme, D. (2017). From International to Global Development: New Geographies of the

21st Centrury Development. Development and Change, 0(0): p. 4.

4. Bond. (2015). Tomorrow’s World. How might megatrends in development affect the future roles of UK-

based INGOs? p. 7.

5. ICSC (2016). Exploring the future. p. 9.

8

6. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). Global development trends and changes. Overseas Development

Institute. p. 7.

7. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). p. 13.

8. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). p. 13.

9. Verbrugge, B. and Huyse, H. (2018). and Rutzen. (2015). Civil society under assault. Journal of

Democracy, Volume 26, Number 4, p. 28-39.

10. Rutzen. (2015). p. 30.

11. Rutzen. (2015). p. 31.

12. ICSC (2016). Exploring the future. p. 15.

13. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). p. 14.

14. McEwan, C. and Mawdsley, E. (2012). ‘Trilateral Development Cooperation: Power and Politics in

Emerging Aid Relationships’. Development and Change 43(6): 1185–1209.

15. For ODA data: see OECD. (2018). Development Cooperation Report 2018. Joining forces to leave no one

behind. OECD Publishing Paris.

16. Meeks, P. (2017). Mixed messages: the rhetoric and the reality of using blended finance to ‘leave no-

one behind’. Eurodag. p. 3.

17. CONCORD. (2018). Aidwatch 2018. Security aid, fostering development, or serving European donors’

national interest?

18. Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017). p. 16.

19. The Guardian. (2016). Western populism is a fundamental threat to the humanitarian system

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TREND 3: REACHING PLANETARY

BOUNDARIES In the past, challenges related to the environment used to be the work of specific sectors and organisations. In

recent decades, climate change and planetary boundaries have become a concern for organisations beyond the

environmentalists (Bond 2015), as the effects of its changes impact on every area of our existence.

PLANETARY BOUNDARIES Crossing certain environmental thresholds will induce irreversible disruptions. In 2009 a team of 28 scientists

presented the concept of planetary boundaries.[1] Outside these contours there would be an increasing risk of

irreversible and abrupt environmental change. The group identified nine vital categories and indicated that

humanity has already overstepped the boundaries in three categories: climate change, biodiversity

loss and interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles.

The traditional linear economic growth model, based on the consumption of fossil energy, is not sustainable.

Furthermore, nature conservation as a whole is often made subservient to economic development, which

amounts to biodiversity loss, depletion of water reserves and other natural resources and air pollution.

The evolution of how our development model contributes to the transgression of planetary boundaries can best

be illustrated by the models of the ‘great acceleration’. These graphs illustrate how the acceleration of the impact

of human activity induced accelerated reaction of the earth system.

Image: Estimates of how the different control variables for seven planetary boundaries have changed from 1950

to present. The green shaded polygon represents the safe operating space. Source: Steffen et al. 2015

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http://www.futureearth.org/sites/default/files/articles/great-acceleration.jpg?itok=-11Nrb2U

REDEFINING CHALLENGES Imagining the future of international development today is difficult in isolation from the sketched planetary

boundaries and the impact of our economic model of growth on the natural environment.

Environmental change impacts on other domains of society. It generates both physical as well as societal impacts in fields in which international development is active, such

as agriculture, migration, health safety, ...

The physical impacts of climate change are, amongst others:

• Increased droughts and floods. They in turn impact agricultural production, the further destabilization

of ecosystems and species extinction and the access to water and the tension this generates.

• Desertification is a worldwide problem directly affecting a third of the earth's land surface or over 4

billion hectares”.[2]

• Changes in infectious disease transmission patterns are a likely major consequence of climate

change.[3]

Some of the human impacts of climate change are:

• Food and water security under pressure: Climate change affects all dimensions of food security and

nutrition: food availability, access, utilization and stability.[4] The food insecurity and climate change

vulnerability map offers visual future scenarios of who is impacted most given different levels of

emissions and adaptation. Desertification, in particular, will directly affect 250 million people, while,

more indirectly, it will affect the livelihoods of some one billion people who depend on land for most of

their needs and usually the world's poorest in over one hundred countries.[5]

• The rise of longer term environmental migration as well as the displacement of millions of people due

to natural disasters. “Future forecasts vary from 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050,

… with 200 million being the most widely cited estimate”.[6]

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• Conflict over and increased prices of finite or limited resources. Scarcity can push prices up and further

generate unequal social impact. NGOs campaigning on the negative social and environmental impact of

resource extraction might feel further restrictions on their space for action, as scarcity and pressing

demand increase.

The impact of environmental and climate change is uneven. Environmental red lines concern us all, but they

threaten in particular the resilience of the most marginalised people in society, regardless of the development

level of the country. At the same time, countries most vulnerable to climate change are all situated in sub-sahara

Africa and the Caribbean.[7] The climate change agenda “produces stark numbers. The number of deaths caused

by climate change has been projected to rise from 400,000 in 2012 to close to 700,000 annually by 2030, with

over 98% of these deaths occurring in developing countries”.[8] The true cost of adapting to climate change in

developing countries could range between $140 and $300 billion per year in 2030, and between $280 and $500

billion per year in 2050.[9]

Given these multifold challenges, it is necessary to adapt, across fields from spatial and infrastructure planning

and urbanisation to food security, public health and disaster relief. As NGOs we must collectively secure our

ability to support adaptation and climate-induced natural disaster relief, including through rapid deployment of

resources, and to add weight to climate mitigation efforts at all levels.

As a consequence, environmental challenges pose a daunting question with regard to the priorities and

approach of development cooperation. On the one hand, we must be conscious of the fact that climate change

can annul centuries of efforts at the level of development. On the other hand it poses the question how we will

secure that rapid economic development worldwide takes the form of sustainable development. To give an

example, how will we assure that one and a half billion people that have no access to energy at the moment will

instantly make the leap to clean energy?

More fundamentally this puts into question the ideological underpinnings of linear development. Hence, the

shift from MDG’s to SDG’s where the focus on sustainability is prominently put forward in the attempt to achieve

crucial development goals. Another example is the attempt to integrate the idea of self-governance

arrangements and communal management (the commons) in development cooperation instead of focusing on

privatization.[10]

RESOURCES 1. https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/plane…

2. https://www.unccd.int/frequently-asked-questions-faq

3. https://www.who.int/globalchange/summary/en/index5.html

4. https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/climate-impacts

5. https://www.unccd.int/frequently-asked-questions-faq

6. https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change-0

7. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/verisk%20inde…

8. https://www.bond.org.uk/sites/default/files/resource-documents/tomorrow… page 5

9. http://www.unepdtu.org/-/media/Sites/Uneprisoe/News-Item-(pdfs)/UNEP-GA…

10. https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2016/179cogola… &

https://www.afd.fr/en/commons-towards-new-narrative-development-policie…

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TREND 4: THE COMPLEXITY OF

DEVELOPMENT The Sustainable Development Goals set the agenda for the coming decennia of development policy. Increasingly

the implementation of these goals becomes a complex process in which collaboration between multiple

stakeholders across the globe is deemed necessary to deal with the complex and wicked problems of our time.

WICKED PROBLEMS Sustainable development is increasingly being understood as a complex or ‘wicked’ problem. Systemic,

intractable and enduring issues like poverty and inequality, conflict and violence, climate change and

environmental pollution, underlying the 2030 Agenda, have no short hand solution. In addition, trade-offs and

sometimes even conflicting ambitions between the different SDGs make it all the more complex. The realisation

of the SDGs will need to strike a balance between economic, environmental and societal sustainability, which are

all three interconnected. Last but not least: the efforts but also the benefits of realising the 2030 Agenda should

be spread among the global stakeholders in a just and fair way.[1]

Conflict and uncertainty are key words when dealing with complex or ‘wicked’ problems. First of all, wicked

problems are about conflicting worldviews because their solution is value-driven: stakeholders all around the

world have different and sometimes contradictory views on how sustainable development should be achieved

and what it should look like. Therefore, wicked problems are primarily political problems. Second, wicked

problems are unpredictable: because of their complexity, it is impossible to know and predict how they will

evolve and how to bring about their solution. This makes them different from ‘structured’ or ‘tame’ problems:

they cannot be broken down into manageable sub-problems for which tested solutions exist. Their

unpredictability creates uncertainty.[2]

MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS Collaborative governance through multistakeholder partnerships is identified as a key element to deal with

the complex challenges of our time. Empirically, it can be observed that national and international policy on

sustainable development is no longer the monopoly of national governments: during the last decades policies

affecting sustainable development around the globe have increasingly been designed and implemented by

complex networks of state, societal and economic actors. Normatively, it is argued that these multi-stakeholder

networks are indeed a crucial condition in order to achieve the 2030 Agenda, to the extent that SDG 17 has been

specifically dedicated to the revitalisation of such a global multi-stakeholder partnership for sustainable

development.

In particular collaboration between state, civil society and private sector actors is new and challenging. For a

long time NGOs and other civil society organisations have used CSO coalitions, platfoms and other forms of

partnerships to scale up their impact. Currently, however, there is a push to initiate partnerships beyond civil

society and partner with public and private sector actors.

The shift towards public-social-private partnerships comes with potential power imbalances and

accountability challenges. Multistakeholder partnerships can hide a variety of relationships between different

and unequal partners: local-international NGO, local NGO-local government, NGO-donor, NGO-private sector,

and so on. Each partner has another constituency to which it is accountable. Because of power imbalances

between stakeholders in the partnership there is a risk that upward accountability (towards the more powerful

players, more in particular, the funding agents) will downplay downward accountability (towards the end-users

and affected citizens).

Multistakeholder partnerships can be initiated top-down or bottom-up. There are many reasons why

partnerships arise: because of self-interest (own interests depend upon the action of others), because of the

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particular context (more complex problems demand a multi-actor approach), because of mutual understanding

(joint objectives), or because public policy demands so (initiated by the government). These motives behind the

creation of multistakeholder partnerships are important as they can sometimes explain the willingness to engage

and the ownership of the stakeholders.

Internationally, this trend towards donor-initiated forms of multistakeholder partnerships takes different

forms:

• Comprehensive Approach: Different multilateral actors and bilateral donors have implemented

comprehensive approach initiatives. The aim is, under the label of ‘whole-of-government approach’, to

establish more coherence between different departments of foreign policy such as diplomacy, defence,

trade, migration, private sector and development cooperation.[3]

• Private sector: Different donors have adopted reforms or budget lines to strengthen the role of the

private sector as a partner of development cooperation.

REDEFINING CHALLENGES Although there is a large consensus on the empirical evidence that multistakeholder partnerships are on the rise,

there is much less consensus on their effectiveness. It can be argued that collaborative governance between

state, civil society and private sector actors can have both positive and negative effects:[4]

The question then is how Belgian NGOs can maximize the added-value of their participation in multistakeholder

partnerships while also avoiding the potential risks.

Potential value: • Strenghthening of democratic decision-making through increasing bottom-up democratic participation;

• More just and effective policies through inclusion of the affected actors;

• The establishment of bridges of communication;

• Widening the scope for political empowerment.

Potential risks: • Co-optation and instrumentalisation of civil society;

• Reduction of transparency and accountability (who is accountable for what?);

• Fragmentation of development cooperation policy (policy implementation spread across a variety of

executing actors);

• Unequal patterns of political inclusion, influence and empowerment.

In addition, the above-mentioned evolutions towards a comprehensive approach and to private sector

involvement will demand continuous attention of NGOs in the near future.

• Comprehensive Approach: What does a Whole-of-Government approach imply for civil society actors.

Some donors aim to integrate a broader Whole-of-Society approach in their comprehensive approach

initiatives. Should NGOs take up a pro-active role in this process or is a reluctant position more

appropriate?

• Private Sector: NGOs and the private sector work already together in many different ways, and probably

even more innovative ways of partnering will see the light in the near future. In other words, in the short

term, the sector is truly in an experimental phase. However, what kind of relationship between public,

private and civil society actors is desired in the long run? Are we then on the right track and does

everyone agree on the desired outcomes?

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GUIDE TO FURTHER READING Multistakeholder partnerships

• Craps, M. et al. (2019), A Relational Approach to Leadership for Multi-Actor Governance

• Vaes, S. & Huyse, H. (2014), Discussion note: Development cooperation, NGOs & private sector

Wicked problems • Vandenbroeck, P. (2012), Wicked Problems

Complexity and system thinking • Green, D. (2015), Fit for the future? Development trends and the role of international NGOs

• ODI (2014), Best Fit

• ODI (2008), Complexity

• COTA (2016), Changement et complexité

Governance networks • Acropolis (2017), Governance Networks

• Acropolis (2018), Comprehensive Approach

• Doing development differently, The DDD Manifesto

Adaptive management • Bond (2016), Adaptive Management

Downward accountability • Berghmans, M. et al. (2017), What is negotiated in negotiated accountability? The case of INGOs

RESOURCES 1. Head, B. (2018), Forty years of wicked problems literature: forging closer links to policy studies, Policy

and Society.

2. Acropolis (2017), Governance Networks, p. 4.

3. Acropolis (2018), Comprehensive Approach

4. Acropolis (2017), p. 8.