Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of...

Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of AfricaAuthor(s): Saadia TouvalSource: The Journal of African History, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1966), pp. 279-293Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179955 .

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Journal of African History, VII, 2 (I966), pp. 279-292 279 Printed in Great Britain

TREATIES, BORDERS, AND THE

PARTITION OF AFRICA

BY SAADIA TOUVAL

I

THE partition of Africa and the delimitation of its borders are generally considered to have been arbitrary acts, imposed by the European powers without reference to local conditions. Many European writers, until

recently, used to view the Africans as simple savages and passive objects of the scramble. Many present-day African nationalists tend to view the African people as the passive victims of the scramble. Thus, although divided on almost everything else, they both seem to agree about the

passivity of the Africans in relation to the scramble and the partition. One wonders, however, whether these interpretations correspond to what really happened: were the Africans passive or did they influence the outcome by being involved in the process?

Professor J. D. Hargreaves called a few years ago for an investigation of the African role in the partition.1 He, and others, have made some very valuable contributions to such an investigation by throwing light on

African-European relations in the period immediately preceding the scramble.2

Another aspect of the African role in the process and its influence on the partition is discussed in this essay. Accepting as a fact that the ultimate decisions on the allocation of disputed territories and the delimitation of borders were always made by Europeans, one is tempted to speculate whether in any way Africans influenced such decisions. If it can be shown that in some cases, even indirectly, Africans did influence such decisions, then, perhaps, the generalization that territories were allocated and borders were drawn without any reference to local conditions may have to be

qualified. A convenient way to examine these questions seems to be through a

discussion of the treaties concluded between representatives of European powers and African rulers at the time of the scramble. Such treaties provide us with a connecting thread between the African societies and the European decisions concerning the partition.

It is not intended here to examine the moral and legal problems connected with the treaties. The treaties, being part of the process of European colonial expansion, must be judged accordingly. The legal questions are

1 'Towards a history of the partition of Africa', J. Afr. Hist. I, I (1960). 2 Especially: J. D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963);

K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford, I956); C. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and its Rulers (Oxford, I96I).



manifold. There were different kinds of treaties-economic and political; some were made by representatives of European governments, and others on behalf of private bodies. The treaties as a whole, and many of their provisions, can be called into question on legal grounds: the sovereign international personality of the signatories can be disputed; it is usually unclear whether the making of the treaties conformed to the constitutional processes of the societies concerned; the powers of the signatories are often questionable; and the territorial limits to which the treaty is supposed to apply are doubtful. Although both the legal and the moral issues concerning the treaties are important and interesting, they fall outside the scope of this essay, which will deal only with the political meaning attached to treaties by Europeans and Africans, and the use made of the treaties by them.

Our discussion will start with a brief examination of some European attitudes to the treaties, which is followed by an analysis of some African attitudes to them. Next, we turn to the effect of treaties upon the territorial settlements and border delimitations. Finally, in conclusion, an attempt will be made to assess the influence of the African involvement upon the partition, and some qualifications will be offered concerning the arbitrariness of the border delimitations.

II

Let us first turn to the question of what the treaties meant to the Europeans concerned in making them.

European motives for making treaties with African rulers were manifold. Foremost among them was the expectation that such treaties could be used to support claims for international recognition of territorial pretensions.

No doubt a large number of the treaties can be considered fraudulent. Some were forgeries concocted by agents sent to conclude treaties who failed to accomplish their mission. But there is good reason to consider as

genuine at least some of the treaties concluded at the time of the scramble. Since one of the objects of the treaties, from the European point of view,

was that they should be used in support of territorial claims in negotiations with rival European powers, the governments concerned were interested in presenting as convincing an image of the genuineness of their treaties as possible. Treaties invoked in support of a territorial claim were not always closely scrutinized by the competing European government, but, when a treaty was subjected to scrutiny and found wanting, the negotiating position of the government presenting the treaty was seriously weakened.3

3 The examination of treaty rights was accorded much attention by the Niger Com- missioners charged with negotiating Anglo-French boundaries in West Africa in 1898. See G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origin of the War, I (London, I927), I38-40. On the other hand the British claim to 'Mount Mfumbiro', based on Stanley's alleged treaties, was apparently not subjected to examination by the Germans, and the 'mountain' was mentioned as falling within the British sphere by the

280 SAADIA TOUVAL



TREATIES, BORDERS, AND THE PARTITION OF AFRICA 281

Conscientious treaty makers therefore used to take elaborate precautions in order to ensure that their treaties were undisputable. The proper procedure required both translating the treaty and explaining it to the African signatories through interpreters, and the certification by witnesses that this had been done. Further precautions, sometimes resorted to, included attempts to ascertain that the signatory was the real chief or ruler, and not a 'straw chief' put up for the occasion, and also attention to the constitutional and ceremonial details of the act.4 Lugard, when trying through treaties to obtain supplies and facilitate his communications in East Africa, used to impress upon the Africans the significance of the

undertaking by entering into blood-brotherhood by traditional ceremony with the principal signatory, in addition to the formal conclusion of the written treaty.5

The complications which could ensue when a treaty was not absolutely faultless, and concerned an area for which the competition was particularly keen, are exemplified by Lugard's treaty with Nikki, near the present Nigeria-Dahomey border. The French, who obtained a treaty at Nikki a few weeks after Lugard obtained his, challenged the validity of Lugard's treaty on the ground that Lugard had never seen the king and that the persons who signed the treaty, claiming to represent the king of Nikki, were not empowered by the king to act in his name. The French argument was supported by a written repudiation of Lugard's treaty, in which the king of Nikki accused the Muslim faction in the town of acting improperly in his name without his authority. A further fault with Lugard's treaty was that the name appearing in the treaty as that of the king, was not the king's true name. Lugard subsequently added another name to his copy of the treaty (but apparently not to the other two copies), but even this was probably not the king's real name. Finally, the French cast doubt on the treaty because of Lugard's using a form marked 'For Moslems', in a treaty with a ruler who was not a Muslim. Lugard argued in reply that the French obtained their documents improperly, by an implied threat of force. Moreover, Lugard pointed out that the king had confirmed to the inter- I890 Anglo-German agreement. It remained a geographical and political puzzle for a number of years, until it was established that there was no mountain by that name, though a plain, not far from the supposed location of the imaginary mountain, carried that name. See W. R. Louis, 'The Anglo-German Hinterland Settlement of 1890 and Uganda', Uganda Journal, xxvII, I (March I963); P. Jentgen, Les frontieres du Ruanda- Urundi et le regime international de tutelle (Brussels, I957), 22-3. For the 1890 Anglo- German agreement see Sir Edward Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Africa by Treaty, III (London, I909), 899-906.

4 For example, the missionary Helm, who witnessed the signing of the Rudd concession by Lobengula, the Matabele ruler, signed a certificate 'that the accompanying document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to the Chief Lobengula and his full council of Indunas and that all the constitutional usages of the Matabele nation have been complied with prior to his executing the same'. Quoted by P. Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London, 1958), I24.

5 F. D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, ii (London, I893), 579-81. For examples of the blood-brotherhood ceremonies, see The Diaries of Lord Lugard, ed. M. Perham and M. Bull (London, 1959), I, 315-19; II, 334-5.

i8 AH VII



preter that the three men who signed the treaty were empowered by him to do so, and that he fully agreed to the treaty. But, on the other hand, it appears from Lugard's diary that the man alleged to be the king, who

spoke to the interpreter, was hidden behind a screen, and his identity can therefore be doubted. In the course of the negotiations with France, the British representatives admitted privately that the many faults of Lugard's treaty seriously weakened their position. In the end, Nikki was allocated to France.6

Formal certification that a treaty was translated and explained to the local ruler did not ensure, of course, that the treaty was really genuine. Interpreters did not always faithfully explain the treaty to the Africans.

Referring to Major Claude Macdonald's investigation of the treaties concluded by the Royal Niger Company, Dr Flint explains that the position of the interpreters 'was a difficult one, for they had to steer a course between a demanding European employer and an arbitrary African despot'. One African interpreter explained to Macdonald the dilemma he faced in

obtaining the signature of an African ruler to a treaty: 'I was not aware that "ceding" meant giving over the rights of government, and I dare not have made this suggestion to him... '7 It happened, moreover, that an African ruler would denounce a treaty, on the grounds that its contents were misrepresented to him. Such a tactic was apparently employed by Lobengula, the Matabele ruler, who, according to Mr Philip Mason, often

repudiated agreements which were 'unpopular with his people and which led to results that they had not expected and he had only feared; in such a case he would say that he had not understood the paper he had signed and he had never agreed to it'.8

At the time, European attitudes concerning the genuineness of the treaties were rather ambivalent. On the one hand, they tended to doubt and ridicule the propriety of the 'treaty game'. On the other hand, they sometimes, perhaps too seldom, took the treaties seriously, considering that the treaties

imposed upon them also some obligations. The French review Politique Coloniale expressed the doubter's point of view when it exclaimed at the time of the exasperating Anglo-French negotiations on Nikki: 'And what, in any case, is the value of these scraps of paper which are triumphantly brought back by all the travellers who take the trouble to ask for them?'9

More balanced doubts were expressed by Lugard when he noted in his

diary the reasons why he refrained from using the treaty forms he was

given when he made a treaty with Eiyeki (Waiyaki), a Kikuyu chief:

I now presented him with a flag, and explained its use. I also made a treaty, but as I do not believe in the printed treaty forms of the Company by which a man

6 Diaries of Lord Lugard, iv (London, 1963), chap. 4 and passim; M. Perham, Lugard, I (London, 1956), 532-41, 670-1, 702; J. E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1960), 224-6. For a different example, of British claims in the Cameroons to which objection was raised because of improperly obtained treaties, see H. R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons (New Haven, 1938), 46-48, 50, 58-60.

7 Flint, 139. 8 Mason, II8. 9 Quoted by Perham, Lugard, I, 540.

282 SAADIA TOUVAL




gives all his land and rights of rule to the Company in exchange of their 'Govt. and protection', I made out my own treaty form. This Company's treaty is an utter fraud. No man if he understood would sign it, and to say that a savage chief has been told that he cedes all rights to the Company in exchange for nothing is an obvious untruth. If he has been told that the Company will protect him against his enemies, and share in his wars as an Ally, he has been told a lie, for the Comp. have no idea of doing any such thing and no force to do it with if they wished.10

Implicit in Lugard's criticism of the standard treaty forms, and in the

special treaty he formulated, is the feeling that the treaty is a mutual

obligation. In any event, whether for reasons of self-interest or otherwise, at least

some of the treaties were made in such a manner as to ensure that they be

regarded as genuine.

III

What did the treaties mean to the Africans? Considering that the treaties often stipulated the cession of rights and acceptance of European 'protection', and that they were often translated and explained to the Africans, one is bound to ask why African rulers entered into such compacts.

One possible explanation is that they were coerced. The coercive measures may have been the explicit threat of superior force. This apparently was the situation when the ruler of the Mossi, newly installed by the French after their military victory which led to the deposition of the former ruler who refused to acknowledge their protection, signed a protectorate treaty with France.1 In other cases, even when no superior force was in evidence, an implied threat of force may have played a role in the adherence of African rulers to treaties. Yet, it would seem that the actual use of force, or a threat of force, played a role relatively rarely. The Europeans' agents normally travelled with only a light escort, and the actual power relationship at the time and place the treaty was signed was often in the African ruler's favour. Nevertheless, it can still be assumed that a measure of coercion might have played a role, as the Europeans' mere reputation for power might have sufficed to overawe the African ruler.

Probably, in a great number of cases, the European emissaries obtained their treaties through the combined effect of coercion and inducement, the stick and the carrot. We can view such methods of persuasion as ranging from cases in which the implied threat of punishment in the event of refusal was preponderant, to cases in which the carrot was the major inducement, while the possibility of punishment by European power in the event of refusal seemed to the African ruler remote and unlikely.

10 Diaries of Lord Lugard, I, 318. Cf. ibid. 158. Lugard's doubts as to whether African rulers understood the treaties were also expressed in his The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, I922), 15.

n E. P. Skinner, The Mossi of the Upper Volta (Stanford, I964), 149-51. I8-2



The inducements offered in soliciting treaties varied. Sometimes, sovereignty was ceded in return for goods or money, such as the cession of the small island of Mussa by the Sultan of Tajura to the British East India Company for the price of ten bags of rice.12 More frequently, probably, the inducements were not merely economic, but also political and military in nature. Thus Lobengula, the Matabele ruler, granted the Rudd Concession for exclusive mineral rights in return for a monthly subsidy of ?Ioo, one thousand breech-loading guns, and an armed steam- boat on the Zambezi.l3 The Royal Niger Company apparently obtained

many of its treaties among the pagan peoples of Northern Nigeria through the combined inducements of lucrative subsidies and a promise of protection from Fulani conquest.14 A more elaborate argument was presented by Lugard to Sekgoma, chief of the Tawana in Ngamiland. In return for

Sekgoma's agreement to revise the terms of a mineral concession which had been granted to the British West Charterland Company, Lugard offered on behalf of the company to support his boundary claims against the rival British South Africa Company, and to advise him in his delicate relations with the latter. Lugard also gave him some modest presents- a writing case, and notepaper stamped 'Ngamiland'.15 The prospects of extensive political and military benefit probably induced the Emir of Muri, on the Benue, to agree to a protectorate treaty with France.l6

It may be argued that, despite the translation and explanation of the treaties, the African chiefs did not fully grasp their meaning. No doubt

many chiefs signed treaties they did not understand.7 But, as there were chiefs who refused to make a treaty, and others who signed only after

pressure or persuasion,18 we can assume that the meaning of the under-

taking was not beyond their comprehension. Many chiefs must have been aware that by attaching their signature to the paper produced by the white man they were signifying the establishment of some new relationship with him, different from the relationship which had existed hitherto. African rulers in the interior were not acquainted with European political institu-

12 Sir Edward Herstlet (ed.), A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions at the Present Subsisting between Britain and Foreign Powers, xiII (London, I877), 6-8.

13 Mason, 124. 14 Flint, 137-9. 15 Perham, Lugard, I, 594-6. 16 Flint, I75-7; A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa Past and Present (London, 1958),

38, 45-6, i58. 17 For example, one wonders what the people of Edadama thought of the treaty they

concluded in a state of drunkenness with Sir Harry Johnston. From Johnston's description of the affair, it seems he made a gross understatement when he summed up, saying that '... the proceedings were altogether too boisterous for serious treaty making'. See Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Story of My Life (Indianapolis, 1923), 194-5. For Johnston's views on treaty making in general, see ibid. 258.

18 Among those who refused were, for example, the rulers of Bornu and Mossi, as well as certain chiefs in Northern Cameroons. See Flint, 171; Skinner, 144-8; and Rudin, 84, respectively. Among those who made a treaty only after pressure or persuasion were Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda, the emir of Yola, and chief Sekgoma in Ngamiland. See Diaries of Lord Lugard, II, 27-45; Flint, I77-9; and Perham, Lugard, I, 594-6 respectively.

284 SAADIA TOUVAL




tions and diplomatic practice. But this does not mean that they were

politically innocent. African societies did not exist in a political vacuum, and their leaders usually had political experience gained in dealing with

neighbouring societies, with tribal authorities that were superior or subordinate to them, and with rival groups or individuals. Therefore they were aware of some possible implications and uses of their newly created relationship with the white man. Thus, when European emissaries came and offered various inducements in return for treaties, their offers often fell upon politically sensitized ears. Although, probably, most African rulers did not fully comprehend the meaning of the treaties, they felt their

political significance, and often tried to take advantage of the inducements offered. Dr Margery Perham speculated about reactions and attitudes of Africans in the Niger region to Lugard's treaty-making expedition, asking why, in contrast with some other parts of Africa, the Borgu and Yoruba rulers there seemed so anxious to make treaties:

The answer is probably that the Niger region was a restless place, with conflicts between its southern, mainly negro, peoples and the Hausa states of the north, between Muslim and pagan, between slave-raiders and the weaker tribes. In 1894 while much would be known in the interior about Europeans, who had so long been visiting the coast, it would be mainly to their credit as traders, rather than to their discredit as conquerors. It was probable that the treaties were assumed to be alliances, to confer prestige, possibly to bring protection and certainly to promise a supply of guns and trade goods.19

Lewanika, the ruler of the Barotse, was apparently even more anxious to make a treaty with a European power. Being much worried about Matabele raids, Lewanika sent a message in 1883 to Chief Khama in Bechuanaland, as he had heard that Khama's people had secured immunity from such raids by allying themselves with the British. Khama replied recommending such a link but, despite several appeals by Lewanika, a treaty of protection was signed only in I890. When, finally, in 1897 Robert Coryndon arrived as the first British Resident, the Barotse were disappointed that he was not accompanied by a larger force.20

The political benefits African rulers hoped to obtain, and sometimes actually obtained, through treaties varied. Some, such as the Yoruba ruler of Kishi, hoped that the treaty would help them preserve a precarious status quo, vis-d-vis pressures from Africans and Europeans alike.21 Others may have had more far-reaching plans of taking advantage of their European alliance to strengthen their position in conflicts of long standing with rival African rulers. Mandara, chief of Moshi in Chaggaland, had

19 Perham, Lugard, I, 518. 20 A. J. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London, I964),

I6I-5. 21 Diaries of Lord Lugard, iv, 134-7. The treaty may have been a factor helping Kishi

to remain under Yoruba rule, and thus influencing its ultimately being allocated to the Western Region of Nigeria.



apparently great hopes concerning the benefits of his association with Sir Harry Johnston.22 Another African polity which used its alliance with a European power to the best of its advantage, for the extension and en- hancement of its influence, was Buganda.23

One of the early Buganda attempts to make its treaty relationship with Britain serve its own interests was Kabaka Mwanga's demand that his treaty with Lugard should explicitly state that the tributary states would continue to pay tribute to him.24 European alliances also served the opposite purpose of throwing off a superior's yoke. Thus Dr Kimble relates how in 1893 the British concluded treaties of 'friendship and freedom of trade' with several tribes 'who wished to assert their independence of Ashanti... and although these did not grant the full protection the chiefs had asked for, such subtle distinctions were not generally appreciated'. Kimble cites Sir Francis Scott, who concluded these treaties on behalf of the British, who wrote in his report that 'Africans would find it difficult to understand "how anyone who had received a flag and 'made paper' with 'the white man' can be otherwise than under his protection" '.25 On other occasions, African rulers concluded treaties with Europeans in the hope of obtaining protection against slave raiders.26

Sometimes African rulers played the delicate political game of trying to preserve as much of their independence as possible, by playing off the European powers against each other. Thus, when the emir of Yola felt threatened by the French expedition led by Lt. Mizon, he appealed to the Royal Niger Company for protection, and later also reluctantly signed a treaty with the company. But shortly thereafter, probably hoping thus to reduce the company's interference, he signed a treaty with the French as well.27 Similar hopes of reducing British influence, in this case by enlisting the Germans, probably motivated Mwanga's invitation to Emin Pasha in

1891 to come and visit his country.28 An assessment of alternative European orientations, undoubtedly influenced by Sir Harry Johnston's explanation of them, induced Arab rulers on Lake Nyasa to conclude treaties with Britain.29

One of the more comprehensive advantages derived by an African ruler from a European alliance is demonstrated by the treaty concluded between the emir of Muri, on the Benue, and the French emissary, Lt. Mizon. The emir was presented with a gift of arms. Mizon's men fought on the emir's side in a war against a neighbouring people who had been his traditional enemies. The treaty with France also helped the emir to resist

22 But finally mutual suspicions led to hostility. See R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for Africa (London, 1957), 59-70.

23 For a recent discussion, see A. Roberts, 'The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda', J. Afr. Hist., III, 3 (I962).

24 Diaries of Lord Lugard, II, 37ff. 25 D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana (Oxford, 1963), 281 and n. 6. 26 This was probably a factor with some of the treaties concluded in Nyasaland. See

Oliver, I60-I, 205-6. 27 Flint, 177-178. 28 Diaries of Lord Lugard, II, 48, 57. 29 Oliver, 16I-2. Cf. Johnston, 243.

286 SAADIA TOUVAL




pressure from the Royal Niger Company, which was apparently trying to undermine his authority among some of his vassals.30

What has been implied in some of the previous examples should perhaps be emphasized: on occasion the initiative for treaties came from Africans, who sought the protection of certain European powers against what seemed to them at the time a much greater evil. In addition to the examples cited already, one may mention the Somalis, in what subsequently became British Somaliland, who sought British protection against Ethiopian attempts to extend their authority into areas used by them for grazing. Another example is the Mogho Naba Wadogo, the Mossi ruler, who, after being defeated by the French, appealed in I897-98 to the British for protection, invoking a treaty he had signed with a British agent in I894.31

All this should of course not be taken to imply that the Africans were in any way pleased with the situation in which they found themselves. The situation was not of their making, and often not to their liking. But what I hope the above analysis does demonstrate is that they were not passive victims, but were rather trying to make the most of a difficult situation.

However, probably only a few were as far-sighted as Lobengula, whose predicament is eloquently described in a passage quoted by Mason. It is a description of how Lobengula was at a certain point so hard pressed both internally and externally that he appeared likely to welcome a British alliance. And he concluded such an alliance, while at the same time tragically predicting its disastrous consequences, likening England to a chameleon, gradually preparing to get at a fly, and himself to the fly which is ultimately swallowed by the chameleon.32

IV

At this stage, it is right that we should ask what was the effect of such treaties upon the territorial settlements which resulted from the scramble.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stated that, only when a European power concerned decided so, were treaties taken into consideration in connexion with the territorial settlements. Sometimes such a European decision to take into account or invoke a treaty between itself and some African ruler was prompted or influenced by an appeal by the Africans concerned. Yet the decision whether a treaty should be taken into consideration was ultimately a European one.

In trying to evaluate the effect of the treaties upon the territorial settlements, we shall limit our discussion to disputed territories and frontier regions. At the same time, however, we should recognize that, in the case of territories that were not in dispute at the end of the nineteenth century,

30 Flint, 175-177; Kirk-Greene, 38, 45-6, 158. 31 The initiative of the Somalis was recently emphasized in a Somali government

publication. See Somali Republic, Ministry of Information, The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives (London, 1962), 23, 37. On the Mossi, see Skinner, I47-I52.

32 Mason, I2 -2, 105.



treaties concluded there probably helped to win general recognition of the primacy of respective European powers in these territories, and thus that the treaties played a partial role in determining territorial allocations.33

When a European government referred to treaties concluded with Afri- can rulers in support of its territorial claims, its argument was usually two- fold: that it had acquired rights through the treaty, and that it had entered into obligations toward an African people which it could not honourably relinquish. Both arguments can, of course, be questioned. The native ruler often did not fully comprehend the nature of the rights which by the treaty he conferred. And the European power often did not intend to fulfil the obligations which it undertook. The reference to the treaties by European governments can therefore be regarded as hypocritical. But the important point here is that treaties were often resorted to in justification of territorial claims.

In the territorial negotiations between European powers, treaties were useful in conferring bargaining advantages. One kind of a bargaining advantage was that treaties endowed territories with exchange value. A

territory in which a power had obtained a treaty could be 'ceded' to another power in return for a counter-concession. Claims to territories in which no treaties were concluded, or where such treaties were contested as faulty, were considered weak. The value of the concession of abandoning such weak claims was much smaller, and the counter-concession which could be elicited from the rival power was such as the rival considered commensurate.34

Sometimes a territory claimed by one power by virtue of a treaty was

subsequently occupied by a rival. But the rights which the first power obtained by the treaty could still be used for bargaining purposes. The British treaty with the ruler of Mossi is an example. As already mentioned, the Mossi ruler fled to British territory after being defeated and deposed by France, and asked Britain to assist him to regain his position. Such assistance was not granted. But the treaty with him was a card in Britain's hand in the negotiations with France in I898.35

Another kind of bargaining advantage was derived from treaties in border negotiations. The limits of a territory claimed could sometimes be extended by reference to the borders of an African polity towards which the

power claiming the disputed territory had entered into treaty obligations. One example of such a situation, the results of which are evident on the map, is the deflexion of the Kenya-Tanganyika border near Mount

Kilimanjaro. In that region, it was agreed between Britain and Germany in 1886, and subsequently confirmed in 1890, that the border between their

respective spheres would pass 'midway between Taveita and Chagga'. The 33 For example, the British claim at the Berlin conference to exclude the Niger from

international control was based on treaty rights British agents acquired in the region. See S. E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference, 1884-1885 (London, 1942), 125-6, 223-4.

34 Cf. Salisbury's views on the rules for such bargaining, Gooch and Temperley, I,

I32, I40. 35 Ibid. I33, I4I, I50.

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line thus respected British rights to Taveta, which rested at that time upon the treaty concluded there by Sir Harry Johnston, whereas the German claim to Chagga rested on Karl Peters's treaties.36 The Anglo-French agreement of I890, delimiting their respective spheres on the Niger, stated that the British sphere will include 'all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto', with which the Royal Niger Company claimed a treaty.37 The border between Nigeria and Dahomey, as agreed between Britain and France in I898, also contained deflexions to take account of treaties between Britain and African rulers.38 To cite another example: in I904, as part of a comprehensive settlement between England and France, the line which is now the border between Nigeria and Niger was amended so as to include the territories of the sultanates of Tessawa and Maradi and Zinder, with which France had treaties, within the French sphere.39

A territorial settlement in which the territorial limits of an African polity were accorded great significance was the delimitation of the border between Angola and Northern Rhodesia. In I89I it was agreed between Britain and Portugal that a section of the border between their respective possessions in Central Africa would follow the western border of the Barotse kingdom. However a difficulty soon developed, as the two sides disagreed about the westward extent of that kingdom's territories. In I903 the dispute was submitted to the arbitration of the king of Italy. His award and definition of the western limit of the Barotse Kingdom was based upon an assessment of the territorial extent of the effective authority of the Barotse ruler.40

Of course, a European government invoking in territorial negotiations treaty obligations toward Africans acted in its own interest. But it considered it in its own interest in such cases to try to preserve the territorial integrity of African polities. In this way, therefore, indigenous African political circumstances indirectly influenced border delimitations.

When, despite treaty obligations, a territory was ceded to a rival power, special arrangements were sometimes made to provide for the needs of the local African population. An example of such special arrangements were the grazing rights accorded in the i897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty to tribes from British Somaliland. By the agreement, Somali tribes were permitted to graze their stocks in territory which Britain had claimed earlier by virtue of her treaties with Somali tribes but which in i897 fell outside British territory.41 A different arrangement, conceding the right of individual self-determination, was embodied in the Anglo-French convention of 1904. Under this convention, the Iles de Los and a small area of Gambia were

36 Oliver, 87-8. For the i886 Anglo-German treaty see British and Foreign State Papers, LXXVII, 1130.

37 Quoted by Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria, 5th ed. (London, I955), I56. 38 Gooch and Temperley, I, 141. 39 Gooch and Temperley, II, 348-50. For the text of the agreement, see ibid. 374-84. 40 Wills, 164, I67-8. Another dispute in which the limits of the territory of an African

ruler were in question was between France and the International Association of the Congo, and concerned the territorial extent of the authority of King Makoko. See Crowe, 158-60. 41 S. Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 63, I56.



ceded to France. Article VII of the convention proffered the right to persons born in the territories transferred to France to opt for British citizenship.42 Provisions for resettlement of people affected by the transfer of territories from one sovereignty to another were included also in the Anglo-Belgian agreement of I915, concerning the Uganda-Congo border, and the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1927 regarding the new Kenya-Italian Somaliland border.43 The reasons why in some cases such arrangements were made varied. But treaty obligations toward the Africans affected were a justification.

Often European governments in their territorial negotiations took no account of the treaties they had concluded with African rulers. Yet there were cases in which the question of treaty obligations was raised by the Africans concerned, who appealed to the European government to honour them. Such appeals were often of no avail. Dr Kimble quotes a report on the attitude of a chief whose territory was divided between the Gold Coast and Togo: I myself gave myself and people to the Governor it is not the Governor that asked me.. If the Queen says she does not like me I take my freedom...I gave it to you whole, now you want to divide my land... If the English want to 'dash' any of my people to their friends they must first come to me and we will talk.44

The vicissitudes of the king of Kiama in Borgu (north-western Nigeria), and his appeals to his British 'protectors' who had forsaken him, are a different example of unheeded appeals.45

On other occasions African appeals did prove effective. A case which received considerable attention at the time was that of Chief Khama of Bechuanaland. In 1895 Khama visited London with two other chiefs to

appeal against the British government's intention to transfer his territory to British South Africa Company rule. They were received by Chamberlain, and in the end reached agreement with the government by which a strip of territory claimed necessary for the construction of the Rhodesian railway was ceded to the company; the rest of his territory remained a British

protectorate.46 Although the decisions whether and how to use the treaties were

European decisions, and although the reflexion of African political circumstances transmitted by the treaties to European cabinet rooms was often distorted, the treaties did sometimes influence the shape of the partition. And, through the treaties, indirectly, African rulers sometimes helped to influence the disposition of their territories.

Yet it is important to remember that the polities which were sometimes taken into account in the drawing of borders were not usually analogous

42 Gooch and Temperley, II, 380. 43 S. B. Jones, Boundary Making (Washington, I945), 42. 44 Kimble, 280, n. 3. 45 Perham, Lugard, I, 708-9. 46 Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1957), 500-I; J. L. Garvin, The Life of

Joseph Chamberlain, III (London, I934), 40-1.

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TREATIES, BORDERS, AND THE PARTITION OF AFRICA 29I

to 'nation-states'. Such polities could be segments of larger ethnic groups devoid of an effective common political authority. Or they might contain people of different stock. The Bakongo, Yoruba, and Somalis are examples of the former; Buganda, the Barotse kingdom and some Nigerian emirates of the latter. One may wonder therefore whether subsequent criticism of the division of the ethnic groups by borders had any basis in indigenous political ideas and practice, or whether it was induced by concepts which were wholly of European origin.

V

If the Africans were not the passive objects of the partition, but if their relationships with Europeans played a role in the process, then we may have to qualify our views concerning the arbitrariness of the partition. If by 'arbitrary' we mean that the final decisions on how to divide the conti- nent and delimit the borders were made by European governments, then the commonly accepted view about the arbitrariness of the process remains valid. But we should be on guard not to accept uncritically the generalization, which is widely taken as an implication of the above, that the borders were drawn by European statesmen, assisted by draftsmen, in complete disregard of African realities and local circumstances.

It has been estimated that approximately 30 % of the total length of African borders follow straight lines.47 Such straight lines can be assumed to have been decided upon in complete disregard of local needs and circumstances. This leaves about 70 % of the total length of African borders which do not follow straight lines, and which were defined mostly in terms of geographical features. Such definition of borders does not preclude the possibility that consideration of local circumstances influenced the decisions on the location of the border.

We have seen above that treaties were used in support of territorial claims, and that frontiers of African polities were sometimes incorporated into European-drawn borders.48 Therefore the disregard of indigenous political circumstances was not universal.

A few examples, chosen at random, seem to indicate that on some occasions considerations regarding the local economy and communications were taken into account.

Among the more interesting attempts to find suitable borders between the newly acquired European possessions in Africa was the mission of Sir Harry Johnston to the Rio del Rey area in 1887 with a view to finding a suitable river to mark the border between the British and German spheres. Johnston's recommendation, resulting from the survey, was that a small stream by the name of Ndiang be selected, since it formed an ethnic as

47 S. W. Boggs, International Boundaries (New York, I940), I57. 48 Another interesting case, though occurring later than the period with which this

essay is concerned, is the rectification of the Ruanda-Tanganyika border, so as to in- corporate the whole of the Ruanda kingdom within the Belgian mandated territory. See Jentgen, 39-40.



well as an economic boundary.49 Another example of a boundary recom- mended on the basis of a local survey was the line between Uganda and the Sudan. The boundary proposed by Col. J. R. L. Macdonald was considered by him to constitute the commercial watershed between the Nile route and the Uganda Railway route.50 Again, misapprehension of Uganda's external communications apparently influenced the decision to have it administered separately from the East Africa Protectorate, and led in I902 to the transfer of what was Uganda's Eastern Province to Kenya.51 Thirdly, the ludicrous shape of the Caprivi strip is the result of an Anglo-German agreement that German South-West Africa should have free access to the Zambezi, which people believed at that time would become an important communication route between the interior and the Indian Ocean. Finally, communication problems of the French administration between the Niger and Zinder brought about the rectification of the Niger-Nigeria border by the Anglo-French agreement of I904.52

Some territorial agreements included specific provision for subsequent modification in the light of local requirements.53 The task of examining local conditions was usually assigned to a demarcation commission, which

surveyed the border and marked it on the ground. Modifications recom- mended by such commissions were of a minor nature, but they nevertheless constituted an attempt to take local conditions into account and thus to diminish the arbitrariness of the border.

Such delimitations of borders may have been wrong. The criterion for

selecting a border might have been a bad one, or it might have been mis-

applied, or the decisions might have been based on erroneous information. But the facts to be noted are that attempts were occasionally made to take local conditions into account, that the decisions often involved a choice between alternatives, and that the choices and decisions were often reasoned and considered ones. All this does not mean that the borders were

good ones; but perhaps they are not as arbitrary as they are often supposed to be.

We have not set out to prove that African borders in toto were not arbi-

trarily drawn. But we hope to have given sufficient reason why the

generalization that the Africans were passive objects in the process, and that local conditions were disregarded, seems untenable. No doubt the

problem deserves careful study in the light of archive material. Further-

more, comparison with the processes by which borders were delimited in

Europe, and elsewhere, may help to place the partition of Africa in a better

perspective. 49 Oliver, 104-7. But it seems that his recommendations were disregarded. 50 Oliver, 336. 51 Ibid. 52 Gooch and Temperley, II, 297ff., 38I-4. 53 For example: article vi of the Anglo-German agreement of I890 (Hertslet, Map of

Africa by Treaty, II, 899-906); the Franco-German protocol of 1885 concerning the Dahomey-Togo border (Jones, 40); the Anglo-Belgian agreement of 927 concerning the Congo-Northern Rhodesia border (Jones, 190-I, I95-6).

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SUMMARY

The article questions the contention that, in the process of partition and the delimitation of borders in Africa, no account was taken of local conditions. The possibility of indirect African influence on the process is examined. At least some of the treaties concluded between Europeans and African rulers were genuine, and regarded as a contractual obligation by both sides. There were cases of African rulers seeking to promote their political interests by entering into an alliance with Europeans. Such treaties were sometimes utilized by European powers in their negotiations with rivals, to support their territorial claims. There were some attempts to define colonial borders so that they coincided with the frontiers of traditional African politics. Thus, treaties between African rulers and Europeans played a role in the process of the partition. In this connexion, it is important to remember that traditional African polities were often polyethnic, or encompassed only a segment of an ethnic group, and did not correspond to the modern European concept of 'nation states'. There were also occasions in which questions regarding the local economy and communications were considered when borders were delimited. The considerations employed may have been wrong. But it seems necessary to modify the generalization that local circumstances were disregarded in the border-making process.



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