The Accounts of Livy and Polybius on the Battle of Lake Trasimene

Jean Charl du Plessis

14143054

MPhil in Ancient Cultures

Module 6: Greek and Roman Historiography

Lecturer: Dr Thom

September 2011

Index

1) Research problem

2) Introduction

2.1) Outbreak of the 2nd Punic War and Hannibal’s Invasion of Italy

2.2) The Battles of Ticinus and Trebbia, 218 BC

3) The Ancient Sources: Polybius and Livy

3.1) Polybius

3.2) Titus Livy

3.3) Polybius vs Livy

4) The Road to Lake Trasimene

4.1) The trek through the marshes

4.2) The Generals

4.2.1) Hannibal Barca

4.2.2) Gaius Flaminius

5.) Reconstructing the armies

5.1) Roman army of Polybius and Livy

5.1.1) Infantry

5.1.2) Cavalry

5.2) Livy and Polybius’s Armies

5.3) The Carthaginian Forces

6.) The Battle of Lake Trasimene

6.1) Flaminius; Impetuous Commander or Scapegoat for Roman defeat?

6.2) The Battle Site

6.3) The Trap

6.4) The Aftermath

7) Conclusion

Research Problem

Our two main sources for the accounts of the Battle of Lake Trasimene, is the Greek

historian Polybius who lived in the 2nd century BC and the Roman historian Livy who

lived during the middle of 1st century BC and died early in the 1st century AD. But how

do the accounts of the Battle of Lake Trasimene compare when we estimate the

similarities and differences of the writings of these two historians?

To answer the question, this research paper will reconstruct the Battle of Lake

Trasimene by studying the accounts of both Livy and Polybius. It will then compare both

ancient authors and look at the differences and similarities between them. Both these

accounts will also be compared with modern studies of the battle and try and establish

how accurate the ancient historians described the events that took place on that dark

day in Roman history.

Introduction

Outbreak of the 2nd Punic War and Hannibal’s Invasion of Italy

In 218 BC war had been reignited between the two superpowers of the western

Mediterranean world when Hannibal Barca besieged and sacked the city of Saguntum

who was allied to Rome (Healy 1999: 6). With Carthage’s navy severely reduced after

her defeat in the 1st Punic War, Rome foresaw no way for Carthage to invade Roman

territory and expected to take the war to Carthaginian held territory in Spain and Africa

(Healy 1999: 44). Rome raised two consular armies and prepared to send the one to

Spain and the other to Africa. Hannibal however did the unthinkable and assembled and

army of 38 000 foot and 8 000 horse (Polybius; The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III,

60 p 143}). He marched through Spain, southern Gaul and crossing the snow-capped

Alps in the heart of winter and invaded Italy. Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps was a

tremendous feat and both Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 50 -57})

and Livy (The History of Rome{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 31 -37}) go to great lengths

to describe the difficult crossing. When Hannibal reached the other side of the Alps his

army was vastly reduced in number due to hardships of the trek over the mountains and

fighting with hostile tribes in the passes. According to Polybius (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 56 p 135}) he had 12 000 African, 8 000 Iberians and no more than

6 000 horse when he reached the Italian side of the Alps. Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 38}) however mentions a variety of sources with the

highest stating 100 000 infantry and 20 000 cavalry and the lowest to 20 000 infantry

and 6 000 cavalry which corresponds with Polybius’ account (which it very well might

have been).

In his invasion of Italy Hannibal planned to break-up the Roman confederacy by

defeating Rome in the field. His hopes were to cause Rome’s allies to desert her and so

weaken Rome by depriving her of her great sources of man-power and resources (Healy

1999: 12).

The Battles of Ticinus and Trebbia, 218 BC

Hannibal’s invasion of Italian soil had caught Rome completely by surprise. The consul

Scipio had to turn his fleet and army around and return to Italy, abandoning the invasion

of Spain. Marching north from Placenia, Scipio met Hannibal on the banks of the Ticinus

218 BC. It was more of a cavalry skirmish than an actual battle but victory fell to the

Carthaginians when Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry outflanked the Romans and drove

enemy from the field (Perez 2009: 18). Hannibal sought to follow up his victory with yet

another to help cement his fledgling alliance with the Celts. He marched on the Roman

encampments on the Rivers Trebbia and Luretta. Early on a cold December morning,

Hannibal lured the Roman army out of camp and onto the plain between the two rivers.

Hannibal’s well fed and warm soldiers met the Roman force who had just crossed the

freezing river, barely able to hold their arms and had yet to breakfast. The Roman army

however held their own against the Carthaginians until Mago, Hannibal’s brother, led

2 000 crack troops into the rear of the Roman soldiers. Mago kept his force hidden in a

ravine close by and at the given time sprang his ambush (Perez 2009: 18). Of a Roman

army of 40 000, 15 000 – 20 000 lost their lives. Our ancient sources are not clear but

Hannibal’s losses were very few, his Gallic allies who occupied the centre of his line

suffered the most casualties (Healy 1999: 51). Hannibal had won his first major victory

against the Romans. The Romans were slowly realising that Hannibal was not just a

young upstart with a motley crew of mercenaries. With the campaigning season over

and Italy already in deep winter, Hannibal decided to remain in the Po valley, staying

with his Gallic allies who could support the upkeep of his army (Healy 1999: 51). With

the melting of the snows and the coming of spring, Hannibal would continue his war on

Rome.

The Ancient Sources: Polybius and Livy

Before we analyse the Battle of Lake Trasimene and compare our main sources of the

battle we need to take a look at the ancient authors themselves. Our primary sources

for the 2nd Punic War and consequently the Battle of Lake Trasimene are the ancient

historians Polybius and Livy. In fact, much of our reconstruction of the history of the

Middle Republic of Rome is dependent on these two authors. Neither of these two

authors lived during the 2nd Punic War but had access to writings of contemporary

sources who were very much part of the events that took place during Hannibal’s

invasion. We know this because both Polybius and Livy makes mention of these sources

(Cottrell 1960: 15). One of these sources was the Greek Sosilos, who travelled with

Hannibal as his biographer. There is also a certain Silenos who accompanied the

Carthaginians on the march, recording the events. Mention is also made of a Roman

prisoner of war, Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who during his time in captivity learned much

of the Carthaginians and the events of their travels, such as the number of men lost

during the crossing of the Alps (Cottrell 1960: 15). These sources however did not stand

the test of time and are no longer in existence. The accounts of Polybius and Livy are

thus vital to our knowledge of the 2nd Punic War.

Polybius

Polybius was born around 200 BC, a mere two years after Hannibal’s defeat at Zama. A

native from the city of Megalopolis in the Peloponnesus, he was a prominent political

figure and a cavalry commander in the Achaean League during Rome’s war with Perseus

of Macedon (Lendering 2009: 10). When friction arose between the Achaean League

and Rome after Macedon was defeated, Rome demanded the extradition of 1 000

Achaeans as political hostages to assure the co-operation of the League and Polybius

found himself to be one of these political hostages (Lendering 2009: 10). Arriving in

Rome in 168 BC, he would remain there and call the city home until he finally died in

120 BC falling from his horse, at the advanced age of 80 years old (Evans 2007: 23).

During his time as hostage in Rome he became friends with one of Rome’s most

prominent and leading figures, Scipio Aemilianus. The two remained friends long after

Polybius’ time as hostage ended and the ancient author makes mention of their bond as

friends: “Our friendship and intimacy grew so close that it was well-known, not just in

Italy and Greece, but also in the countries beyond” (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book 31. 23. 3}) Scipio Aemilianus was the son of Liucius Aemilianus Paullus, the victor

of Pydna but also the adoptive grandson of Scipio Africanus, the victor of Zama and the

man who defeated Hannibal Barca. As adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus, Scipio

Aemilianus must have heard firsthand accounts of the 2nd Punic and in so would have

surely passed it on to Polybius who took down the accounts in his Histories. Polybius

had in his new friend, valuable information of the 2nd Punic War.

As an historian Polybius was well respected in antiquity (Evans 2007: 22). Polybius was

the first historian to regard the history of the Mediterranean as one organic whole and

its events connected to one another other. Polybius’ reason for this interconnection of

historical events was the rise of Rome as a superpower. “Previously the doings of the

world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative,

results, or locality; but history has become an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and

Africa have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end”

(Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book 1. 3. 3-4}). According to Polybius it was

Rome’s destiny to became a superpower and rule over the know world. He had thus

decided to record the events of Rome’s rise from the beginnings of the 1st Punic War in

246 BC to the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and in doing so created the concept of

World History, creating a new genre concentrating on the Roman Empire as a whole

rather than simply a single historical event such as the Peloponnesian War or the events

in Sicily. Polybius’ World History comprised of 40 books but only books 1 – 6 has

survived in more or less complete form (Lendering 2009: 12). Polybius today is known

for his objectivity, rationality and search for the truth and this makes him one of the

most important historians of antiquity (Lendering 2009: 12).

Titus Livy

Livy was born in northern Italy in the town of Padua near Italy between 64 – 59 BC and

died somewhere around 17 AD. Unlike Polybius, Livy does not seem to have held any

local or national office or to have served in the military (Evans 2007: 40). It is thus likely

that he came from rich family who could support him financially while he dedicated his

time to writing (Evans 2007: 40). This free time Livy devoted to the writing of the History

of Rome, a Herculean task which stretched from the very beginnings of Rome and its

mythical founders Romulus and Remus, down to the reign of Augustus in 9 AD (Evans

2007: 40). When it was completed it comprised of 142 books. Of these 142, only 35 have

survived into modern time and what we can consider intact. Of these 35 intact books,

Books 1 – 10 deals with the foundation and early history of Rome. Books 21 – 24, deal

with the period from 218 BC, the outbreak of the 2nd Punic War, down to 167 BC and the

3rd Macedonian War. For the remainder of Livy’s History of Rome we are very much

reliant on summaries of the other books, made during antiquity (Evans 2007: 40). It is

Books 21 – 22 that are of particular interest to this research paper since it deals with the

invasion of Hannibal and the events of the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Livy himself paid

particular attention to the period of the 2nd Punic War, stating that it was the most

memorable war that had been waged up to his time. “I consider myself at liberty to

commence what is only a section of my history with a preface which most writers would

place at the start of their works, namely, that the war I am about to describe is the most

memorable of any that has ever been waged.... No states or nations ever met under

arms in greater strength or wealthier in resources” (Livy; The History of Rome {trans.

Baker 1823: Book XXI, 1-2}).

Livy’ reason for writing the History of Rome is similar to that of Thucydides; he believes

that it can serve as a form of education and better the future by learning from the past

mistakes. It is interesting that Livy appeals to his reader as an individual as well as the

state, to learn from the past and reverse the morally decaying lifestyle of Livy’s own

time by reading history. “The study of history is the most efficacious remedy for a sick

mind. In history there is a record of the infinite variety of human experiences clearly laid

out for examination, and in that record will be found both examples for the reader and

the state which are suitable things to take as models and rotten things to avoid” Livy

(The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Preface to Book I}).

Even though Livy held no political position his writings must have been very influential

as he travelled through Italy reading his works to political elite including the emperor

Augustus himself. We are also told by the biographer, Seutonius, who wrote onthe early

emperors of Rome, that Livy was tutor to the young Claudius, the would-be emperor (41

– 54 AD) around the year 8 AD (Evans 2007: 41). For Livy to have read his works to

Augustus and to have tutored the young Claudius must have been popular among

Rome’s ruling elite and he must have been considered a leading authority on the

subject.

Polybius vs Livy

When studying the writings of Polybius and Livy it is hard to decide which historian is

the more reliant author for us to reconstruct the past. Many modern scholars view

Polybius’s account of the Punic Wars to be the more reliant of the two (Lendering 2009:

12) (Fields 2010: 91). Fields (2010: 91) commends Polybius’s accounts of the Punic Wars

for its “inestimable value of sticking to the facts rather than using large doses of

imagination” when compared to Livy.

There are three aspects which puts the account of Polybius at an advantage when

compared to that of Livy. First of all, we know that Polybius was born just after Hannibal

was defeated and the 2nd Punic War came to an end. The events of the war were still

fresh in the minds of many people and Polybius would have had access to the accounts

of primary sources from people who lived through the invasion and experienced the war

itself allowing for contemporary sources to reconstruct the events. Secondly, Polybius

had a working knowledge of warfare. We have seen that Polybius served as cavalry

commander of the Achaean League (Lendering 2009: 10). He also had firsthand

experience on how the Republican Roman army functioned and fought from Rome’s

campaign against king Perseus as well as his time accompanying Scipio during the 3rd

Punic War (147 -146 BC) and bore eyewitness to the destruction of Rome’s great enemy.

(Evans 2007: 22). In the year 133 he was present at Scipio’s siege of Numantia and was

eye witness to much of the war with the Celt-Iberians (Lendering 2009: 12). Since the 2nd

Punic War and especially the study of the paper on the Battle of Lake Trasimene,

revolves around warfare, his military expertise are invaluable. It is fact that for much of

our knowledge of the Roman army of the middle Republic we are reliant on Polybius

with his entire Book 6 devoted to the organization and tactics of the Roman Republican

army of the late 3rd to middle 2nd Century BC (Healy 1999: 29). His account of the middle

Republican Roman Army is often considered more reliable than that of Livy (Sekunda

2001: 40).

Thirdly, Polybius is known for his geographical knowledge. He travelled to many of the

places he wrote about which Lendering (2009: 12) states as one of his ‘virtues’. His

travelling through the Alps in search of Hannibal’s route is but one example of it

(Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 48. 12}). Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 3 59. }) himself, makes mention of his geographical

knowledge; “...to acquire even better knowledge and something closer to the truth

regarding lands about which we used to know very little... I underwent the perils of

journeying, through Africa, Spain and Gaul and voyaging on the sea beyond these places.

I did this mostly in order to correct the errors of former writers...”.

Both authors however are essential to our knowledge on the Punic Wars and the one

should not be discarded in favour of the other. On studying a topic of the Punic Wars

both should be consulted as valuable sources on a topic which can be regarded as one

of Rome’s most fascinating periods of her long history.

The Road to Lake Trasimene

Before we can discuss the Battle of Lake Trasimene we need to look at the events that

took place before the battle. As evident in all Hannibal’s victories, it was not simply his

tactics on the battlefield that allowed him to gain such success against the Romans but

that his victories were connected with the events that transpired before the actual

battle. Hannibal knew that battles were not only won with soldiers but that victory lay in

the planning of the events that were the prelude of the battle, forcing the enemy’s

hand. Hannibal was a master at this and in keeping the enemy off guard by choosing the

most unlikely route to march, forcing an enemy onto unfavourable ground, playing on

the weakness of commanders and doing the unpredictable was all part of why Hannibal

was so successful.

The trek through the marshes

After Hannibal’s victory at Trebbia the campaigning season had already come to an end

and he was forced to winter in Cisalpine Gaul in the Po Valley (Polybius: The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 77. Pg 191}) (Livy; The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823:

Book XXII, 1. 1}). Both historians emphasise the unhappiness of the Gauls with the

presence of the Carthaginian army in the country for long winter. The situation became

so dire that Hannibal had to dress in disguises so he could not be recognised and flaunt

any assassination attempts on his life (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book

III. 78. 1 Pg 191})(Livy; The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 1.}). Livy and

Polybius give reason for the Gauls’ unhappiness as the army feeding off their land.

Hannibal’s army was entirely dependent on their allies to feed and shelter them. For the

small Gallic towns and villages to supply an army of 30 000 over the winter months must

have been extremely strenuous on their fragile agricultural economy and their

unhappiness can be understood. Livy describes the situation as follows: “The Gauls had

rallied to him (Hannibal) through the prospect of booty and spoil, but when they found

that instead of plundering other people’s territory their own had become the seat of war

and had to bear the burden of furnishing winter quarters for both sides, they diverted

their hatred from the Romans to Hannibal” (Livy; The History of Rome {trans. Baker

1823: Book XXII, 1. 1}). For Hannibal to retain the Gallic tribes as allies, it was thus

imperative for him to move his army out of Cisalpine Gaul and into Roman territory

where his army could raid and ravage the land of the enemy instead of exhausting the

supplies of his allies. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 80. 1 Pg 197})

tells us that once the weather permitted, Hannibal gathered his forces and marched on

Etruria and arriving in the country discovered the consul Flaminius encamped at

Arretium. Livy (Livy; The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}) however

says that Hannibal only moved from his winter quarters upon learning that the new

consul Flaminius was encamped at Arretium. Prior to his arrival at Arretium, Flaminius

and his co-consul for the year 217 BC, Servilius Geminus, mustered their allies and own

legions and sent supplies to Ariminum and Arretium which would serve as their bases

for the new campaign season. An interesting fact arises from the pages of Polybius

where he states that Rome appealed to her Sicilian ally, Hiero II, the tyrant of Syracuse

for military aid. Hiero answered by sending 1 000 light armed troops and 500 Cretan

archers to strengthen the consular armies (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book III. 75. 4 Pg 187}). A number of these additional forces surely played a role at

Trasimene but they are not mentioned in the account of Livy.

Marching from the Po Valley towards Roman territory, Hannibal had two routes to

choose from by which to enter Etruria. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823:

Book XXII, 2. 1}) states that the first was a much longer route but the road was easy to

travel. The second road was shorter but led through the marshes of the Arno. Polybius

(The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 78. Pg 193}) tells us that Hannibal chose the

second route to “take Flaminius by surprise” and that the army protested upon learning

that Hannibal was planning on taking the route through the marshes but assured them

the guides found a route, with the “ground solid” and through shallow waters. The route

was believed to be unsurpassable but once again we see Hannibal doing the unthinkable

and taking the route most unexpected and catching the Romans off guard (Healy 1999:

53).

Polybius and Livy both give a detailed account of the crossing of the marshes (The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 193}) (The History of Rome {trans. Baker

1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}). Both historians describe the column of march in a similar

fashion; the veterans, (the Spanish and African troops) in the van, the Gauls in the

centre and the cavalry in the rear under the command of Hannibal’s brother Mago. In

the van the baggage train accompanied the Africans and Spaniards. Knowing that the

road would be difficult, the Gauls were placed in the centre so that they could not

desert once the route became too difficult. With the veterans in their front and the

cavalry at their back they had no-where to escape. Both Polybius and Livy’s accounts

states that the Gauls were the ones who suffered the most and lost the most men due

to the difficulty of the trek through the marshes. Both authors claim that the nature of

the Gauls was the reason for their suffering. According to Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}), the Gauls could not stand “fatigue and exertion”

and “as a nation they were unable to stand that kind of thing”. Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 195}) again states that the Gauls had to be in the

centre due to their “softness and aversion to labour” and thus were forced to continue

being in the centre of the column. We do however find a difference in the accounts of

Livy and Polybius when it comes to the Gauls’ suffering through the marshes. Livy chiefly

blames the Gaul’s suffering on their nationality. It is possible that Livy holds a prejudice

as most Romans did towards Gauls. Ever since the sack of Rome by Brennus and his

army in 390 BC, the Gauls were Rome’s nemesis and natural enemies (Jones 2007: 17).

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 195}) paints a slightly

different picture. He states that the Gauls suffered the most due to the fact that they

were stationed in the middle of the column and that by the time the veterans had

already passed through the marches, the ground was no longer solid underneath their

feet.

“The Spanish and Africans for their part, as the marshes were still firm when they

marched over them, got across without suffering seriously, being all inured to fatigue

and accustomed to such hardships, but the Celts not only progressed with difficulty, the

marshes being now cut up and trodden down to some depth, but were much fatigued

and distressed by the severity of the task, being quite unused to suffering of the kind”.

When Polybius mentions the Gauls’ “softness and aversion to labour” and the Africans

and Spaniards as “inured to fatigue and accustomed to such hardships” it is more than

possible that he refers to the veteran status of the troops and does not make a

stereotype of the Gallic nation. The Spanish and Africans were professional soldiers,

veterans of many campaigns in Spain and hardened by the march to Italy. The Gauls

never had a standing army and although brave warriors, were still farmers and

tradesmen first and foremost. Their suffering was thus not because they were Gallic as

Livy would have us believe, but because of the poor conditions of the marshes after

Hannibal’s veterans had already passed and because of the Gauls were brave armatures

and not professional soldiers or veterans of many campaigns used to the hardships of

war-time.

Another interesting fact that is omitted by Livy but which we can find the account of

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 193}) is that the baggage train

was placed with the veterans. Polybius gives the reason for this so that the veterans

“might be kept supplied with food”. It is possible to conclude that the Spaniards and

Africans could keep their strength up with fresh supplies having ready access to food

and that the Gauls did not have this luxury while going through the marshes.

It is thus understandable that the Gauls would suffer more during the trek and their

suffering was circumstantial and not due to their genetic make-up of being Gauls.

The trek through the marshes was severe and the whole army suffered. Both Polybius

and Livy say that the lack of sleep took the heaviest toll on the soldiers as at night they

could not find a dry place to sleep. The majority of the baggage animals perished and

many horses lost their hooves due to the constant exposure to the water (Livy: The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}) (Polybius: The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 195}). The dead beasts of labour were the only source of

comfort that many could find to rest their weary bodies upon and escape the water.

Others stacked the baggage upon top of each other and fashioned beds out of these

(Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}). The accounts of the two

historians differ on the amount of days the trek through the marshes took. Polybius says

it lasted three full days and three nights (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book III. 79. Pg 195}), while Livy states that it took Hannibal four days and three nights

to cross the marshes (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}).

Hannibal, himself was not spared the suffering of the marshes. According to Polybius

and Livy, he rode the last remaining elephant (the others perished either in the crossing

of the Alps or the harsh winter that followed the victory at Trebbia where they were

used for the last time in battle) so that “he might be a little higher above the water”.

Even so, Hannibal contracted an infection in his eye, during the crossing of the marshes,

and since the conditions in the marshes did not allow for treatment Hannibal lost the

eye (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1}) (Polybius: The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg 195}).

The Generals

Before we continue to the battle we need to look at the opposing commanders at the

Battle of Lake Trasimene and who they were to get a better understanding of what

happened on that fateful day.

Hannibal Barca

Hannibal at the tender age of nine, accompanied his father to Iberia where he spend the

majority of his youth learning the trades of war first hand from his father, Hamilcar. He

later served under Hasdrubal the Fair, his father’s successor, with distinction as a

military leader in Iberia, winning the respect of his fellow soldiers by demonstrating

courage in the midst of danger, as well as tactical skill, when strategy was required. Livy

(The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 4. 3-5}) makes mention of Hannibal

as a young commander:

“The veteran soldiers imagined that Hamilcar, in his youth, was restored to them; they

remarked the same vigour in his looks and animation in his eye, the same features and

expression of countenance; and then, in a short time, he took care that his father should

be of the least powerful consideration in conciliating their esteem. There never was a

genius more fitted for the two most opposite duties of obeying and commanding, so that

you could not easily decide whether he was dearer to the general or the army; and

neither did Hasdrubal prefer giving command to any other, when anything was to be

done with courage and activity; nor did the soldiers feel more confidence and boldness

under any other leader.”

In 221 BCE Hasdrubal the Fair, fell victim to the blade of an assassin and Hannibal was

chosen by the army in Spain to succeed him as ‘supreme commander’ (Perez 209: 16).

The decision was confirmed by the citizen assembly back in Carthage. Hannibal was a

mere 25 years of age (Healy 1999: 8). The newly appointed general had now inherited

his father legacy and as supreme commander had a free hand in Spain. He immediately

followed in his father’s policy of military conquest, expanding Carthaginian territory

northwards to the Ebro River (Healy 1999: 8). His youthful years he spent alongside his

father learning first-hand military life and his time serving under his brother-in-law, had

groomed him for his new position of supreme commander. He had become well

adapted to military life both in the position of command and the hard life style of a

soldier. Even our ancient historians, writing from the Roman perspective could not but

admit the talented abilities of the young general. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker

1823: Book XXI, 4}) writes of his astonishing physical prowess;

“His body could not be exhausted, nor his mind subdued, by any toil. He could alike

endure either heat or cold”.

While Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 48. Pg 117}) wrote: “...he

pursued his plans with sound common sense”.

Both historians also commend his ability of reading his enemy’s characteristics and

playing against their strengths and taking advantage of their weaknesses (Polybius: The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 81. Pg 199}) (Livy: The History of Rome {trans.

Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3. 1}).

For the ancient historians, who are Roman sympathisers, to admit to such talents of

Rome’s enemies, especially those who they considered of ‘barbarian’ stock, is testament

to their admiration of Hannibal.

He was an educated man, speaking fluent Greek, the Lingua Franca of the

Mediterranean world as well as Latin, the tongue of his enemy and he mastered a

number of other languages as well (Mosig 2009: 7).

His arms and dress were not much different from the common soldier, clearly showing

himself as one of his men. He shared with his men the hardships of war, sleeping on the

ground and eating the same food (Cottrell 1960: 23) (Mosig 2009: 7). He also shared the

risks of battle with his fellow soldiers, proving his skill as a soldier and not only as a

commander far removed from danger;

“He was at once and by far the first of the cavalry and infantry; and, foremost to

advance to the charge, was last to leave the engagement” (Livy: The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 4. 3}).

Evidence of his reckless daring can be found at the siege of Saguntum where he suffered

a severe wound from a spear that pierced his thigh (Campbell 2009: 22).

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 17. 8}) makes mention of Hannibal’s

daring and encouragement to his soldiers in battle:

“He pressed the siege energetically, sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by

personally sharing in the hard labour of the siegeworks, and sometimes calling out to the

troops and recklessly exposing himself to the danger”.

Polybius also highlights one of his most remarkable feats, one often overshadowed by

his victories in the field and the crossing of the Alps. Hannibal kept together, with sheer

will and charisma, a multi cultural army in the field, far removed from their homes for a

period of 16 years, keeping the soldiers’ loyalty with never a mutiny or desertion;

“...free from sedition towards him (Hannibal) or among themselves ... the ability of their

commander forced men so radically different to give ear to a single word of command

and yield obedience to a single will”. (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book II.

19. 3-5})

Modern historians too sing his praises. Cottrell (1960: 23) compares him with Napoleon

in that he could sleep under any circumstances any time of the day by simply wrapping a

military cloak around him, while Havell (2003: 213) compares him with Julius Caesar in

his ability to force-march his troop at tremendous speed and appear where the enemy

expected it the least. Fields (2010: 58), among countless other modern scholars,

considers Hannibal as one of the greatest military leaders of all time.

In many regards, a resemblance can be draw between Hannibal and Alexander the

Great. As Alexander had Philip as a father, so did Hannibal have Hamilcar. Both had

brilliant military fathers who brought them up in the arts of war. From a young age

these men learned from brilliant strategists and hard military men who knew how the

minds of soldiers worked. These skills were then transferred to the next generation from

father to son. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book I. 46. 6}) considered

Hamilcar as the greatest general on either side during the 1st Punic War. Hannibal surely

learned much from the military genius of his father. Hamilcar had not known defeat as

commander in Sicily during the 1st Punic War and became the saviour of Carthage by

defeating the mercenaries during the Truceless War (Mosig 2009: 6). As we have seen

he also restored Carthage’s fortunes after her defeat in the first war with Rome by is

conquests in Iberia (Perez 2009: 15).

Hannibal’s numerous victories on Italian soil; Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae, to name

only the major battles, speaks volumes of his military ability and sets him above the

commanders, produced by Rome, before Scipio Africanus.

Gaius Flaminius

When we read the accounts of Polybius and Livy on Flaminius, consul of 217 BC and

commander of the Roman forces at Trasimene, he comes across as an incompetent and

foolish man, an anti-senatorial demagogue and popularist. Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 1.}) goes as far to say that Flaminius cold not even be

considered a consul of Rome and that the year 217 BC had only one consul in the person

of Cn. Servilius. Livy writes that Flaminius did not enter upon the consulship in Rome

and was therefore without “legitimate authority” and without “religious sanctions”. Livy

(The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3.}) continues describing the man as

having an “overbearing temper”, “self-willed”, “impetuous and headstrong” with no

respect for religious affairs, “the senate or the laws”. His lack of military sense is pointed

out when all members in his war council begs him to reconsider from his chosen course

in pursuit of Hannibal.

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 80. Pg 197}) writes on Flaminius; “a

thorough mob courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war

and exceedingly self-confident”. He continues by saying that Flaminius’ character made

him and his army the perfect victim for Hannibal’s ambush due to his “boldness and

blind anger” (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 81. Pg 199}).

Healy (1999: 53) and Traver (2001: 163) however believe that Flaminius’s reputation has

fallen victim for the need of a scapegoat and an explanation for Rome’s humiliating

defeat suffered at the Battle of Trasimene.

Flaminius was a ‘new man’ who took the stage of Roman politics as tribune in 232,

proposing the settlement of veterans of the First Punic War on the recently confiscated

land of Senones south of the Po Valley (Traver 2001: 162). He was opposed by the

senate but succeeded in getting the bill passed by taking the matter to the plebeian

council (Traver 2001: 162). Many modern historians sees his actions regarding the

distribution of what used to be Celtic lands to be the cause for the last Celtic invasion

which was brought to an end at the Battle of Telamon 225 BC.

In 227 he served as the first praetor in Sicily and his conduct and administration was

considered exemplary (Develin 2007: 273).

In 223 Flaminius was elected consul and following up the victory at Telamon, invaded

the country of the Insumbres (Havel 2003: 209). His success of the land distribution in

Cisalpine Gaul had earned him the hatred of the nobility and senate and in midst of his

campaign he was recalled to Rome. His “disregard of the senate and laws” as Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3.}) wrote, rings true in this case;

Flaminius ignored the summons and pressed on the invasion (Havel 2003: 209). After an

initial defeat he rallied his men and Gallic allies and fell upon the Insumbre tribesmen,

catching them by surprise and gaining a decisive victory. Flaminius was rewarded with a

triumph by the people but forced to abdicate the consulship by the senate after the

celebrations (Havel 2003: 209) (Develin 2007: 274).

In 221 he was appointed the ‘magister equitum’ (master of the horse) of Fabius

Maximus, making him second in command in Fabius’ army (Develin 2007: 274). Develin

(2007: 274) points out that Flavius must have been a talented and capable man to have

obtained this position.

As censor in 220 he completed the military road northwards and the highway was

named after him; Via Flaminia (Havel 2003: 210).

Looking at the evidence, a much more capable man emerges from history than what

Polybius and Livy would have us believe. He was a reasonable commander at the very

least; his victory over the Insubres was no small feat as Traver (2001: 136) and Healy

(1999: 53) state. His appointment as master of the horse and second in command during

the dictatorship of Fabius in 221 also supports his abilities as a military man. As a

champion of the middle and lower classes, as Cary and Scullard (1975: 122) describes

him, he incurred the hatred of the senate and along with it, the disdain of the historians

of the time and became a convenient scapegoat for the defeat at Lake Trasimene.

Reconstructing the Armies

The Roman Army of Polybius and Livy

Infantry

Both Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book VIII.8.3-8.}) and Polybius (The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book VI.19-42}) describe the Roman manipular army. Livy’s

account depicts the Roman army of the latter half of the 4th century BCE and Polybius’

that of the early 2nd century BC. Despite small differences, both Livy and Polybius’

accounts are very similar. It must be understood that Livy describes the Roman Legion

during a particular conflict during the Latin War whilst Polybius gives the formal

organization of the standard Roman army almost 200 years later. Livy gives the strength

of a Roman Legion as 5 000 men while Polybius gives the number as 4 200. Head (1982:

39) however gives an explanation for the difference in number. He recalls certain battles

such as Pydna and Cannae where the Legions numbers were bolstered from 4 200 to

more than 5 000 to cope with large enemy threats. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton

1979: Book VI.21.9-10}) himself mentions that the Legions at Cannae were increased

from 4 200 to 5 000.

Both Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book VIII.8.5.}) and Polybius (The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book 6.22-24}) describe the Roman legion as divided into

distinct lines of battle, all formed up behind a lightly armoured screening force of

skirmishers. The first line was the Hastati. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book 6.23-24}) states that they were ordered to arm in the “full panoply”. Polybius says

they used the large scutum shield, which Rome adopted either from the Celtic tribes in

the north or the Samnite during the latter half of the 4th century (Sekunda 2001: 25).

Their offensive arms included the Spanish Gladius sword (Gladius Hispaniensis) and each

soldier carried two Pila javelins. It is still under debate whether the Gladius was adopted

after the First or Second Punic War. Polybius mentions that the sword was adopted after

the war with Hannibal but Walbank (1967: 704, 754), in his Commentary on Polybius,

suggests an earlier adoption of the Gladius before the Second Punic War. As for armour,

they wore a brass helmet with purple and black feathered plumes. Although Polybius

does not describe the helm, we know from archaeological evidence that the Attic, Italo-

Corinthian and especially the Celtic Montofertino helmets were very popular during the

Punic Wars (Mc Nab 2010: 35)). They wore a small bras breast-plate known as a

pectorale. Those who owned property above 100 000 asses however, wore the lorica

hamata or chain-mail armour of Celtic design. They also wore a greave or ocreae on

their left leg.

Livy describes the Hastati as “in the first bloom of manhood just old enough for service”.

As for their armament Livy mentions the following: “They were called the light armed

companies, as whilst one-third carried a long spear (Hasta) and short javelins, the

remainder carried shields.” Livy is thus not very clear on their armament. It seems that

only two-thirds carried shields. Because of their name, Hastati (meaning spearmen), it is

likely that all carried spears, not only one-third. The short javelins mentioned might

have been carried by all Hastati or only the one-third without shields. Unlike Polybius he

does not describe the rest of their armament.

The second line was the Princeps, “men in the full vigour of life” as Livy (The History of

Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book VIII.8.}) describes them. Again we have to rely on

Polybius for their armament as Livy simply states that they were armed with “superior

weapons”. Polybius says that these men were armed in the same fashion as the Hastati.

The third line was known as the Triarii, “veterans of proven courage” as Livy calls them

but he does not go into greater detail on their equipment. Again we must rely on

Polybius for the armament of the Triarii and he tells us that their armament differed

from the Hastati and Princeps only in their offensive arms. Instead of the pilum javelin,

they carried the long hasta thrusting spear. Polybius states that when the battle came to

the Triarii, they locked their shields together and moved on the enemy as a phalanx. The

Triarii fought in a different formation and fashion than the other first two lines as

Polybius describes the Hastati and Princeps fighting in a loose open formation. Within

this final line of the Legion we do however find a big difference in the account of Livy

when compared with that of Polybius. Along with the Triarii, Livy describes two more

classes of soldiers; the accensi and Rorarii. Livy does not go to great detail in describing

to them any tactical element or their purpose. We know from other Roman sources that

the Rorarii were a Roman light armed troop or skirmisher and the Accensi unarmed

baggage carriers (De Lingua Latina 7.57-58) (Head 1982: 39). According to Sekunda

(2001: 40), the Accensi and Rorarii have no place in the Roman Legion and he rejects

Livy’s account of the manipular Legion. Head (1982: 39) however has a different view of

Livy’s account. He claims that the Accensi were added to the Legion when Rome was in a

state of emergency, bolstering the legions with well needed manpower from the

baggage carriers. It is also possible that the Rorarii were stationed in the rear to cover

the vulnerable flanks of the phalanx operating Triarii. All hoplite phalanxes, while nearly

impenetrable from the front, were very vulnerable from attacks from the side or rear. It

could be that the Rorarii provided wing support to cover the vulnerable areas of the

Triarii as the earlier Peltasts did for the Greek and Macedonian phalanxes but could

have fallen away by the time of Polybius’ Legion (Gabriel 1990: 90).

Livy and Polybius describe the screening force of skirmishers in a similar fashion. While

Livy calls them Leves, Polybius calls them Velites. The difference in name could be due to

the fact that the Velites were only formally created in 211 BC according to Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book 26.4.9.}) and can be seen as a light troop

reform. How exactly the reform differed from the Leves is not possible to tell. If we are

to believe Livy’s account, the Velites would not have served at Trasimene.

Cavalry

When we take a look at the cavalry forces of Rome we are almost entirely dependent on

Polybius as Livy makes little mention of them. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book 6.25.1-9) tells us that the legions were each assigned 300 cavalry each. It is

interesting to note that that the military demands of the Second Punic War saw the re-

introduction of the Equites Equo Privato (citizens who provided their own cavalry to

supplement the state provided forces) to help combat the cavalry advantage that the

Carthaginians enjoyed (Sekunda 2001: 20). For a description of the equipment of these

horsemen we once again turn to Polybius. The Romans reformed their cavalry, arming

them in the same manner as the Greek Cavalry. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton

1979: Book 6.25.11) wrote “The Romans, when they noticed this, soon learnt to copy the

Greek arms; for this too is one of their virtues, that no people are so ready to adopt new

fashions and imitate what they see is better in others.” From this description, the

Roman horsemen were clearly modelled after the Greek cavalry. When exactly this

reform in the Cavalry took place is unknown but Head (1982: 161) claims it’s reasonable

to assume that it took place after the Romans fought the Hellenistic cavalry of Pyrrhus.

The Mettius Curtius relief which can now be found at the Capitolini Museum in Rome, is

an imperial copy of the 2nd century BCE. The relief shows the Eques Marcus Curtius as a

cavalry man in full Greek panoply of arms and armour of Polybius’ description. A Greek

Attic helm is clearly visible and for body armour the soldier wears a Greek Cavalry

Cuirass (Head 1982: 161) (Sekunda 1996: 20). Another archaeological example of

Polybian Cavalry is the Aemilius Paullus Monument. Here a cavalryman can be seen

armoured in the more flexible chain-mail or Lorica Hamata (Healey 1999: 43). The main

offensive weapon of the cavalryman was the Greek cavalry spear or Xyston (Head 1989:

161). It does however appear on some reliefs that the Roman version of the Xyston is

shorter that the contemporary Greek types. The Aemilius Paullus relief seems to portray

the cavalryman with the Spanish sword as a secondary side-arm (Head 1989: 161).

Livy and Polybius’ Armies

As we can see the description of the three main battle lines of the Legions of Livy and

Polybius do not differ all that much apart from some equipment of the Hastati and the

final line battle line. As mentioned, the Legion described by Livy, differs over 200 years

from the one described by Polybius and it is reasonable to assume that the Roman army

has adapted and changed its armament over the period of 200 years. The army Polybius

describes is much closer to the period of the 2nd Punic War than that of Livy. Polybius’

account is also a much clearer description of the equipment used by the Legions and he

gives a much more detailed account of how the Legion functioned during battle.

Polybius’s own military knowledge and experience is reflected in the great detail of the

weaponry and functions of the soldiers he describes. His account is therefore the more

preferred account in reconstructing the Roman army at Trasimene.

The Polybian Manipular Army: The Triarius is kneeling

in the foreground while the Princep of Hastatus prepares to throw his Pilum. On the right is a

Velite with a Parma shield and wolf skin as described by Polybius. (Picture by Rick Hook

@Courtesy of Osprey Publishers)

The Carthaginian Forces

Reconstructing the army of Hannibal is a more difficult matter. First of all no

Carthaginian records or writings survived the destruction of the once great Punic city.

Our accounts of their forces are therefore dependent on the writings of their enemies

and other foreign sources who are often bias towards other nationalities such as the

description of Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 2. 1} of African

peoples who are of nature cowards and the Gauls who as a nation “cannot stand”

hardship and labour. Polybius, on whom we rely so heavily on the military affairs of the

middle Republic, experienced the Republican Roman army firsthand but never saw the

army of Hannibal. Secondly, the Carthaginian army throughout its long history

depended on a variety of different nationalities and subject peoples for its military man-

power and from conflict to conflict, the army almost never looked the same. Diodorus

(11.1.5; 19.106.2-5; 13.80.2-4) mentions Libyans, Ligurians, Campanians, Iberians, Celts,

Greeks, Etruscans and troops from Corsica, the Balearic Islands as well as Oscan tribes,

all serving in the armies of Carthage during their wars with the Sicilians Greeks. It seems

that these troops all fought in their styles customary to their country and armed in their

own native fashion. The Carthaginian army was thus a melting pot of different cultural

groups and many different fighting systems. The army of Hannibal was no different.

There is mention of a variety of African nations and tribes; Moors, Libyans, Liby-

Phoenicans and Numidians (Wise 1982: 10-12). From the Spanish Peninsula came

numerous tribes; Celt-Iberians, Balearics, Lusitanians, Ilergete, Bastetani, Contestani and

Oretani to name but a few (Perez 2009: 16-17). Hannibal had received well needed

reinforcements from numerous Celtic tribes from northern Italy. These included the Boii

and Insumbres. A large amount of Ligurians; an independent mountainous people very

much influenced by Celtic culture, also served in Barcid armies (Perez 2009: 19). As the

war in Italy raged on, Hannibal supplemented his losses with new Italian allies such as

the Brutians, Campanians and Samnites (Perez 2009: 20). At the Battle of Zama,

Hannibal’s veterans comprised of a large amount of Italians (Perez 2009: 20).

As we have seen Hannibal arrived on the other side of the Alps with a skeleton of his

former army and his infantry numbered 12 000 African and 8 000 Spaniards and the

cavalry 6 000 (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 56 p 135}). We are

unfortunately not given a clear description of the arms of these soldiers and for much of

their arms and armour we rely on archaeological finds. Polybius (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 144.4}) mentions the Iberians/Spaniards as dressed in white linen

or woollen tunics with a crimson border, which was their national dress. Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXVIII, 2.) briefly describes the Iberians in war;

“...The Romans hurled their pila at them. The Spaniards stooped to avoid them, and the

sprang up to discharge their own, which the Romans who were in their usual close order

received upon their overlapping shields; then they closed up foot to foot to fight with

their swords”. The Spaniards thus fought in a similar fashion to the Romans; discharging

javelins and then closing with the enemy and fought with swords. Livy (The History of

Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 8.) also mentions the deadly Iberian javelin,

phalarica similar to the pilum. Greek and Roman authors mention two types of Spanish

infantry; the Caetrati, who was a lighter troop type, using the small buckler type shield

and the Scutarii, who carried a large scutum, similar to the Roman shield (Fields 2010:

20) (Pezer 2009: 17). In general, the Spaniards can be described as swordsmen.

Archaeological evidence indicates two types of swords very popular among the Iberians;

the curved Falcata and the straight bladed Gladius Hispaniensis (Head 1982: 148) (Perez

2009: 16, 17).

The African troops have proven more difficult to reconstruct. Many modern historians

have identified the African infantry of the Carthaginians with a Macedonian phalanx

(Healy 1999: 21) (Wise 1982: 10). This is due to two factors; Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 1.33.6}) referring to them as a phalanx unit and the

translation of the Greek word lonchophoroi (Polybius’ word to describe the African

troops of Hannibal), as pike-men. The African Infantry as a phalanx must however be

revaluated (Head 1982: 144). When Polybius refers to a phalanx, it must not be

interpreted as the Macedonian styled infantry formation of the Hellenistic states armed

with the sarissa pike. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book 15.12.7}) is simply

referring to an infantry unit as he also refers to the Hastati as a phalanx and his

description of the Hastati clearly does not resemble the Hellenistic pike formation. As

for the translation of lonchophoroi, Head (1982: 144) states that it cannot be

interpreted with pike-men. He refers to several accounts of where Hannibal used his

‘lonchophoroi’ in missions not fitting for pike-armed troops of a phalanx such as

screening duties, seizing hills and often serving along other light armed troops (Head

1982: 144). The weapon is also described as being thrown and the Macedonian sarissa

pike, being 6 m in length is impossible to throw (Head 1982: 144). At the Battle of Lake

Trasimene, Hannibal’s whole army was hidden in the forests and hills around the lake.

To have hidden several units of phalanxes (the majority of his army still composed of

Africans) who fight as a tightly packed formation of soldiers operating as a single unit

seems unlikely. A phalanx is also known for not being able to operate in rough terrain

(Sekunda 2001: 36) and thus for the Africans to have successfully launch an attack upon

the Romans from the forests and hills suggests that they were not a phalanx troop.

Head (1982: 144) associates the Africans more with the Hellenistic thureophoroi, a troop

equally adapted for skirmishing duties as well as going toe to toe with the enemy. This

theory of Head is supported by Perez (2009: 15) who describes the Libyans in a similar

fashion as thereophoroi. One of the most convincing evidence that the Africans did not

serve as a Macedonian styled phalanx is the fact that they were rearmed after the

battles of Trebbia and Trasimene with Roman arms and equipment (Polybius: The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 87.3}) (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker

1823: Book XXII, 46.4). For troops who were trained and fought for many years as a

Macedonian styled phalanx to simply change their equipment and fighting style does

not seem realistic. If they were thereophoroi styled troops, as the evidence suggests,

their fighting style did not differ all that much from the Roman troops and the adoption

of the arms would have served their purpose much better than if they changed their

panoply from that of a phalanx and having to learn an entire new way to fight.

As we have seen, Hannibal’s army was swelled with Gallic reinforcements after his

victories at Ticinus and Trebbia (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 66.

Pg 161}). The Celtic or Gallic infantry of Hannibal were far from the equal of his African

and Spanish veterans and as Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III. 79. Pg

195}) pointed out they were suffering more than the other troops during the long

marches due to the fact that they were not veteran soldiers. Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 85. Pg 209; III, 74. Pg 185}) also points out that in most of

Hannibal’s major battles, the Gallic troops are the ones who took the highest casualties

and this helps to reflect their inferiority to Hannibal’s other veterans. Both Polybius and

Livy state that the Gaul used similar large shields to the Spaniards but that their swords

differed. The Gallic sword was much longer and only good for slashing and not thrusting

(Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 114. Pg 281) (Livy: The History of

Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 46}). It seems that the Gauls often fought with the

bare minimum of clothing or even completely naked. At Cannae, Polybius says they

fought naked and Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 46.4) states

that they fought naked from the waist up. At the Battle of Telamon 225 BC, Polybius

(The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book II, 29. Pg 281) mentions the Gaesetae Gauls

undressing and fighting naked as well. The famous statue of the ‘Dying Gaul’, which was

copied from the Greek original celebrating Pergamon’s victory over the Galatians in 230

BC, also depicts the Celtic warrior as naked (Jones 2007: 27). It is interesting to note that

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book II, 33.) writes of the Celtic sword as of

poor quality; “The swords of the Celts are such that only the first cut is dangerous; then

the swords become bent and assume the shape of a strigil... the next blow is entirely

without effect”. Archaeological evidence and modern studies have however proved the

high quality of Celtic swords and their metal work in general (Jones 2007: 28, 36)

(Wilcox 1985: 20) (Buchwald 2005: 172). Polybius’ account must be discredited. It seems

in general that Polybius was not well informed about the Celtic people as he describes

them as having “no knowledge whatsoever of any art or science”. Again modern studies

provide us with a different picture of the Celts; the Coligny Calendar has proven Celtic

mathematical ability and provides a more accurate calendar than that of the Romans at

the time (Jones 2007: 34). Insumbrian Celts minted coins 50 years before Rome and

their trade routes connected with Africa and far away China (Jones 2007: 41, 42). They

were credited with building the first highways and roads of Europe, the invention of

soap and contrary to popular belief, were a literate nation (Ross 1975: 56) (Jones 2007:

30, 31). Polybius appears to be another proveyer of cultural bias towards the Gauls as

Rome’s traditional enemy.

Gallic Infantry (©Courtesy of Johnny Shumate)

Hannibal’s cavalry are not described in great deal with the exception of the Numidians.

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 71. Pg 177}) says that they were “all

men of great endurance”. There is also a passage in his Histories giving indication that

these horsemen acted as skirmishing cavalry; “the Numidians easily scattered and

retreated, but afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring – these being

their peculiar tactics” (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 72. Pg 179}).

Polybius tells us that the Roman cavalry had great difficulty in dealing with these hit and

run tactics (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 72. Pg 179}). Livy

describes them as follows: “horses and riders tiny and lean; the horsemen were without

armour, and without weapons apart from the javelins they carry”. He famously calls

them “by far the best mounted troop in all Africa”. At the battle of Cannae, Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 46.4) does however mention that they

wore armour.

As for the Spanish cavalry, neither Polybius nor Livy gives any real description of them.

We rely on a surprisingly numerous amount of vase paintings depicting Spanish cavalry

in order to reconstruct these troops (Martinez 2007: 40). They appear to have been

armed in a similar fashion as the infantry with the small buckler and falcata but also

carried a lance and could thus act as good shock cavalry (Wise 1982: 22) (Martinez 2007:

40).

With Celtic cavalry we have the same problem as with the Spanish cavalry as Polybius

and Livy makes very little mention of them. At the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Livy does

however mention a Gallic cavalryman named Ducarius; "Digging spurs into his horse he

charged into the dense masses of the enemy, and slew an armour-bearer who threw

himself in the way as he galloped up lance in rest, and then plunged his lance into the

consul; but the triarii protected the body with their shields and prevented him from

despoiling it”. It is safe to assume that Ducarius is a heavy cavalry troop from the

description of him charging “into the dense masses of the enemy”. Other ancient

sources describe Celts as good quality cavalry. Strabo says the following on Celts as

horsemen: “Although they are all naturally fine fightingmen, yet they are better cavalry

than as infantry, and the best of the Roman cavalry is recruited from them” (Ross

1972:93). This is testament to their skill as cavalry. Horses at the time were an expensive

commodity and it is likely that the Celtic cavalry would be high nobility, chieftains and

their retinue and as such would probably have been well equipped and armoured in

chain mail (Wilcox 1985: 23).

The Spanish and Gallic cavalry seems to have been used as heavy cavalry by Hannibal

when we read Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 115.1}) and Livy’s (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXI, 46.2; XXII, 46.1) accounts of the Battles of

Cannae and Ticinus; both authors describe them as meeting the Roman and Allied

cavalry as head on and this supports the idea of them being heavy or shock cavalry.

It is interesting to note that Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 49.1})

mentions that Hannibal and his army, before crossing the Alps, had all their old and

worn equipment replaced. The man with whom Hannibal arranged to have the

equipment replaced was a Gallic chieftain and the Carthaginian army were thus clothed

in Gallic trousers, tunics and boots which were much more suited to the cold of the Alps

than the short tunics and sandals of Africa and Spain.

Hannibals Army; a Spanish Iberian and Celt-Iberian in the

foreground with an African ‘lonchophoroi’ behind them. In the backdrop rides a Numidan

cavalryman (left) and a Celtic Horseman (right) (©Courtesy of Johnny Shumate)

The Battle of Lake Trasimene

Flaminius; impetuous commander or scapegoat for Roman defeat?

After crossing the marshes, Hannibal arrived in Etruria and we are told by Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3) and Polybius (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 80. Pg 197}), that he sent out scouts to obtain information on the

area as well as on the enemy, who were encamped at Arretium. According to Livy (The

History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3), the plains of Etruria were among the

most fertile of all Italy and produced “every kind of produce”. Polybius also mentions

that the country was “rich in booty”. Even today, modern Tuscany provides some of the

most fertile lands for agricultural produce in the entire Italian peninsula (Cotrell 1960:

96). We are told by both authors that Hannibal had learned that the consul Flaminius,

was hot tempered and over confident (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book

III, 80. Pg 197}) (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3). Upon

learning of this fact, Hannibal sent out troops to raid and pillage the country side and in

particularly in sight of the Flaminius in the hope to agitate him and lure him from the

fortified city. As we have already seen both authors are heavily critical on Flaminius for

despite the pleas of his war-council, he refused to wait for his co-consul to arrive with a

supporting army (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3) (Polybius:

The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 82. Pg 201}). Healy (1999: 53) however

disagrees that this is how the events transpired. He states that Flaminius was in fact

patient and waiting for the aid of his colleague (Healy 1999: 53). He bases it on the fact

that Hannibal was raiding the territories right in the sight of the Roman army but the

consul refused to march out of Arretium and engage Hannibal’s troop. Livy (The History

of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3) and Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979:

Book III, 82. Pg 201}) clearly states that Hannibal marched his army right past Arretium

and still Flaminius remained in the city and did not attack Hannibal on his march. Healy

(1999: 53) states that Flaminius was acting as a sound general and waited for Hannibal

to pass his forces and then would follow on the enemy’s heels and drive him towards

the oncoming army of his co-consul Geminus. Hannibal would thus be caught between

two armies with no hope of escaping (Healy 1999: 53). This seems to have been a known

Roman tactic and we see it applied only a few years earlier at the Battle of Telamon in

225 BC, where the Gallic forces were caught between two consular armies (Havell 2003:

209) (Wilcox 1985: 33). If Flaminius was as hot tempered and impetuous as Livy and

Polybius claim, he surely would have attacked Hannibal while the Carthaginians were

raiding around Arretium or at least while they were marching past the city and there is

thus credit in Healy’s hypothesis.

Hannibal’s scouts must have known of Geminus army, just as he was informed that

Flaminius was encamped at Arretium, and his strategy was undoubtedly to lure

Flaminius from his camp and force battle before Flamnius and Geminus’ forces could be

united (Healy 1999: 53).

With Hannibal and his army already on the march southwards, Flaminius assembled his

troops. Livy’s (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3}) account states that

as soon as Flaminius mounted his horse, the animal threw him to the ground and that

those around him saw it as a terrible omen. He continues by saying that the Legionary

standard could not be pulled from the ground and again this was seen by the officers as

a bad omen (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 3}). Polybius’s

account however completely omits these occurrences and hence they should be taken

cautiously. It is likely that if these events took place that Polybius would have mentioned

them. It might be more anti-Flaminian propaganda on the part of Livy, showing that the

man was ignorant towards the divine warning or that he did not enjoy divine support.

The Battle Site

Upon arriving at Lake Trasimene, both Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823:

Book XXII, 4.1}) and Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 82. 9}) tell us

that Hannibal found the perfect place for an ambush. Polybius (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 82. 9}) describes the area as follows; “The road led through a

narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on each side of it lengthwise. The

defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a steep hill difficult to climb and behind it lay

the lake, between which and the hillside the passage giving access to the defile was quite

narrow”.

Livy’s (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.1}) account seems

remarkably similar to that of Polybius’; “He had now reached a position eminently

adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake comes up close under the hills of Cortona.

There is only a very narrow road here between the hills and the lake, as though a space

had been purposely left for it. Further on there is a small expanse of level ground flanked

by hills”

The battle site is situated below modern day Passignano and the local tourist agency

hands out a touring map of the battle site with a marked route explaining the events

that took place on that terrible day in 217 BC. Anyone who visits the village of

Passignano, situated high on the hills, will have a clear view over the battle site and it is

from here that Livy and Polybius’ description of the battle site starts to become clear.

The modern rail way track runs through a narrow defile with the lake on one side and

cliffs on the other. It is most likely that this is where Flaminius marched his army

through and into Hannibal’s ambush. The tack then leads through a small open area,

hemmed in between the lake and surrounding hills. Both Livy and Polybius’ accounts of

how Hannibal stationed his army along the hills are almost identical. Both accounts

have Hannibal and his Spaniards and Africans occupying the hills running adjacent the

lake and these are the hills in Livy’s passage; “Further on there is a small expanse of level

ground flanked by hills” (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.})

(Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 203}). Where the road exits

the “small expanse of level ground flanked by hills” Livy (The History of Rome {trans.

Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.1}) tells us Hannibal stationed his Balearics and light troops.

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 203}) gives a similar

placement but he calls them slingers and ‘lonchophoroi’ (most modern translations call

them pike-men). The Balearic Islands were renowned for their slingers and many

ancient historians such as Vegetius and the African Florus have written testaments of

their skill with the sling (Fields 2010: 24). We may make the reasonable assumption that

Livy’s Balearics are in fact Polybius’ slingers. We have also attempted to show earlier in

this paper, that the ‘lonchophoroi’ were a type of light troop and not pike-men and thus

coincides with Livy’s light troops. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book

XXII, 4.1}) continues by writing that Hannibal placed his cavalry behind low hills to cover

the mouth of the defile “so that when the Romans had entered it they would be

completely shut in by the cavalry, the lake, and the hills”. Polybius (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 203}) also tells us that Hannibal sent his cavalry to cover the

entrance of the defile but he also includes among them Hannibal’s Gallic troops; “ the

cavalry and Celts... he placed them in a continuous line under these hills, so that the last

of them were just at the entrance to the defile”. Livy however does not mention the

placement of the Gauls at all. He does mention them later in the battle so we know that

Livy was aware that they took part in the conflict but his reason for omitting them is

unknown (Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.1}). Polybius’ (The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 203}) account reads that Hannibal did the

placement of his troop by cover of night and quietly awaited Flaminius’ arrival the next

day.

Modern day view of Lake Trasimene and the battle site

(author’s collection)

The Trap

We are told by Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 205}), that the

following morning Flaminius left at the break of dawn, with Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.}) mentioning “in a still uncertain light”. This must have

been an important factor in helping to keep Hannibal’s forces hidden among the hills

and trees. Polybius makes no mention of whether or not Flaminius sent out a scouting

party but Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.}) explicitly mentions

that Flaminius failed to do so. This was a major blunder on the part of Flaminius and had

he sent out scouts beforehand the ambush might have been discovered and the

massacre of his men avoided. Ambushes in war are common but only between a few

dozen men and the scale of the ambush at Trasimene is unprecedented. It might be

assumed that Flaminius thought it impossible for Hannibal to conceal an entire army of

30 000 men and thought it unnecessary to send out a scouting party. Both authors

mention that the vision of the Roman army was obscured because of a dense fog that

arose from the lake (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 205})

(Livy: The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.}). Livy goes into a little more

detail than Polybius by saying that the Carthaginians being higher up in the hills were

not affected by the fog and had a better view of the Roman army marching past. Livy

(The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.1}) and Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 83. Pg 205}) both write that when the vanguard of the

Romans came into contact with the enemy and the entire column had passed through

the defile Hannibal gave the signal for his entire force to attack. Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 205}) describes the shock and surprise of the Romans

by the sudden attack of the Carthaginians; “The sudden appearance of the enemy took

Flaminius completely by surprise, and the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very

difficult to see, and their foes were charging down on them from so many places from

higher ground, the Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any

effectual measure to set things right, but could not even understand what was

happening.”

Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 4.1}) writes: “The shout of battle

rose round the Romans before they could see clearly from whence it came, or became

aware they were surrounded. Fighting began in the front and the flank before they could

form line or get their weapons ready or draw their swords”.

The ambush was thus perfectly executed and the Romans only discovered the

Carthaginians when it was too late. There now follows a very interesting passage in

Livy’s (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 5.1}) account; the historian

refers to Flaminius’ conduct and actions during the battle which is very contradictory of

the previous descriptions of the consul. He describes Flaminius as cool and calm as could

be expected under the circumstances and riding among his soldiers calling out

encouragement to his troops. This is very different from Livy’s usual criticism of

Flaminius as a leader of men. Polybius’s (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84.

Pg 205}) account completely omits any such ‘general’ like behaviour from Flaminius and

simply says that the consul was completely caught by surprise and that he was in

“utmost dismay and dejection” and his actions betrayed his soldiers and caused their

deaths.

Thanks to Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book VI, 40 -41}) we can place the

Roman soldiers in their order of march. In Book VI.40 Polybius describes the Roman

army on the march and also setting up of their camps. The march was led by the

extraordinarii, an elite force comprised of the very best of the Socii (Rome’s allies). This

was followed by the fist Socii Legion and its own baggage train. Then came the first

Roman Legion, also followed by its baggage train. The second Roman Legion and their

baggage train as well as that of the second Socii Legion, followed upon the first Legion.

Finally the second Socii Legion brought up the rear of the infantry. The cavalry normally

marched on the flanks of the baggage train in their own respective divisions or directly

to the rear of their respective division. We can thus roughly place each Roman

contingent along the battlefield of Trasimene.

Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 5}) continues his narration of

the battle by describing the chaos among the Roman soldiers and that the Triarii, Hastati

and Princeps were all mixed up, instead of fighting in the normal lined order and that

men did not fight in their usual cohorts or under their designated standards but were

“grouped by chance”.

Both authors write that Flaminius was killed during the battle. Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 205}) simply states that the consul was slain by some

Celts. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6}) however gives a much

more detailed account of the death of Flaminius. He goes as far as to name the Gaul

who took the consul’s life as well as the manner: “Distinguished by his armour he

(Flaminius) was the object of the enemy's fiercest attacks, which his comrades did their

utmost to repel, until an Insubrian horseman who knew the consul by sight - his name

was Ducarius - cried out to his countrymen, "Here is the man who slew our legions and

laid waste our city and our lands! I will offer him in sacrifice to the shades of my foully

murdered countrymen." Digging spurs into his horse he charged into the dense masses

of the enemy, and slew an armour-bearer who threw himself in the way as he galloped

up lance in rest, and then plunged his lance into the consul; but the triarii protected the

body with their shields and prevented him from despoiling it”. The details on the consul’s

death should not be taken as hard facts; it seems unlikely that had the details been

known, Polybius who lived much closer to the time of the battle and still had access to

primary sources would have omitted such important detail on the death of a consul of

Rome.

Polybius does not mention the position of the consul during the march but since

Flaminius was killed by Gauls, we may assume that the consul took his position

somewhere towards the rear end of the marching column, as this is where Hannibal’s

Gauls and Cavalry were positioned (Polybius: The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III,

83. Pg 203}).

After the death of the consul we find the accounts of Livy and Polybius differ to some

respect. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6}) states that the

Romans went into a “general flight” and that “neither lake nor mountain stopped the

panic-stricken fugitives”. Polybius paints a different picture of the Roman soldiers:

“...but deeming it, as they had been brought up to do, their supreme duty not to fly or

quit their ranks”. The accounts stand in sharp contradiction to one another and it

appears that Polybius wants to use propaganda to portray the Romans as brave and

honourable even in the face of death and defeat. It is more likely that Livy’s account is

more accurate and that in the chaos of ambush, without being organised in any

formation for battle and without leadership, that the Romans would have tried to flee

the field.

In reading Livy’s account we come across yet another interesting occurrence that is

completely omitted in the account of Polybius. Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker

1823: Book XXII, 5}) writes that the fighting was so intense that none of the combatants

realised that that a massive earthquake struck Etruria and levelled entire towns and

changed the directions of streams and caused many landslides throughout Italy. It

seems strange that Polybius who goes to great pains to give detailed accounts on the

countries he travelled and the events surrounding Rome would omit the earthquake

which from Livy’s account seems to have had a big impact on Italy. Its effects would

surely still have been felt in Polybius’ time and would be a well known event if it was as

big as Livy tells us.

Both authors describe the Romans who were completely surrounded and with their

backs to the lake, had nowhere to go but into the water. Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6}) and Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book

III, 84. Pg 207}) describes the horrors which took place in the shallows of the lake and

the accounts are remarkably similar; some men tried to swim to safety but drowned due

to the weight of their armour while others were butchered by the Carthaginian cavalry.

Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 207}) mentions that many

Romans begged their comrades to help them end their own lives.

Livy (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6}) and Polybius’ (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 207}) accounts mention that the vanguard of 6 000

troops broke through Hannibal’s light troops and worked their way up into the hills. A

large amount of these would have been the ‘extraordinarii’ composed of the very best

of Rome’s allies who led the army on the march. The majority of the remainder of the 6

000 must have also been allies or Socii of Rome if the column of march was consistent

with Polybius’ description of the Roman army on the march. The vanguard, according to

both authors, had no idea of what was happening in their rear and only once they had

occupied the high ground of the hills and the mist had disappeared did they come to

realise the disaster which had befallen their comrades. Polybius’ (The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 207}) account differs slightly from Livy’s and he writes that

the 6 000 escaped to a nearby Etruscan village. Hannibal sent Maharbal, his cavalry

commander, in pursuit of them and surrounded the village with his Spaniards and

‘lonchophoroi’. The ‘Spaniards’ might refer to the Spanish cavalry since Maharbal is

always referred to as a cavalry commander and the ‘‘lonchophoroi’ as light troop

support for the cavalry. Livy’s (The History of Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6})

account mentions no village and he writes that Maharbal took the entire cavalry force in

pursuit of the 6 000. Livy’s account also has the cavalry only catching up with them the

next day when the 6 000 surrendered themselves due to starvation and misery.

Polybius’ account states that directly after the battle Maharbal and his force surrounded

the village and from how it reads, it appears that this took place on the same day as the

battle. The terms of surrender also differs in the two accounts. Livy (The History of Rome

{trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 6}) states that the Romans surrendered on condition that

they would each be allowed to depart with one piece of garment. Livy says this promise

was met with “Punic faith” and Hannibal threw them into chains. Polybius (The Histories

{trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 207}) simply says that the 6 000 surrendered on

condition that their lives would be spared and his account holds no promise of them

being released. Polybius’ (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 85. Pg 209})

account however does mention that Hannibal informed the prisoners that Maharbal had

no authority to promise them safety and after proclaiming this “launched out into an

invective against the Romans”.

As with the aftermath of the Battle of Trebbia, both accounts state that Hannibal once

again kept the Romans in chains but set free the Socii troops without Ransom (Polybius:

The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 85. Pg 209}) (Livy: The History of Rome {trans.

Baker 1823: Book XXII, 7}).

The Aftermath

Hannibal had struck a major blow against Rome and the slaughter at Trasimene had cost

Rome many good soldiers and a consul. As for the details of the casualties, the sources

are unclear. Polybius (The Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 85. Pg 209}) says that

the Roman prisoners amounted to more than 15 000 and that 15 000 were slain (The

Histories {trans. Paton 1979: Book III, 84. Pg 207}). As for the Carthaginians he gives

their number of Casualties to 1 500, the majority being Gauls. Livy’s (The History of

Rome {trans. Baker 1823: Book XXII, 7}) account agrees with the Roman losses at 15 000

men. The casualties of the Carthaginians, he however puts at 2 500. He continues by

saying that many more died on both side after the battle due to wounds. He also states

that about 1 000 Romans escaped and were dispersed across Etruria.

The normal consular army consisted of two Roman Legions along with two allied legions

and would put the standard consular army at 16 800 infantry. At the very most it could

amount to 20 000 per legion during emergencies where a legion comprised of 5 000

men as described previously in this paper. In addition the Romans supplied 6 00 cavalry

while there allies supplied another 1 800. Flaminius also had some reinforcements from

Hiero in the form of Cretan archers and light troops (Polybius: The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III. 75. 4 Pg 187}). We may assume that these reinforcements of 500

Cretans and 1 000 light troops were split between the consular armies giving Flaminius

an additional 750 men. This tallies the total of the Roman army at approximately 23 000

troops at the very most. Therefore the high casualty rate and prisoners taken according

to the ancient authors are exaggerated at best. Polybius’ 15 000 dead and 15 000 taken

prisoner already totals more than the entire Roman army. The amount of casualties was

something often exaggerated by ancient authors. Livy himself states that other accounts

of the battle gave the casualties as much higher than that of his account but that he

believes them to be exaggerated.

The road to Rome now lay open to Hannibal but he did not march on the city. Instead he

stuck with his strategy of trying to break down the Italian confederacy by alienating

Rome’s allies from her and in doing so weakening Rome (Polybius: The Histories {trans.

Paton 1979: Book III. 86. 8 Pg 213}).

Conclusion

From reading the accounts of Polybius and Livy on the Battle of Lake Trasimene, this

research paper attempted to reconstruct what happened on that early spring morning.

The reasons for Hannibal’s success become obvious once we have read the two

accounts; the Romans failed to send out a scouting party, the battle ground was a

perfect place for Hannibal to set-up an ambuscade and the uncertain light and the thick

mist obscured the Roman’s visibility and allowed Hannibal to keep his forces well hidden

among the trees and hills. These factors allowed the Carthaginians to catch the Romans

completely off-guard and the majority of them were slaughtered before they could even

draw their weapons.

Throughout the both accounts we do find numerous minor differences and small

contradictions such as the time it took Hannibal to cross the marches, the exact details

of the capture of the 6 000 by Maharbal and the casualties of the Carthaginians after the

battle. In regards to the bigger picture however, the accounts of Polybius and Livy on

the events concerning the battle, are remarkably similar. What we can say with some

certainty is that on the affairs of the Roman military, such as the composition of the

Roman Legions and their Allies, their armament and tactics we have in Polybius a much

more detailed and complete account than that of Livy. We have also seen how both

authors accounts have occurrences which must be questioned and cannot be taken as

fact; the character of Flaminius is one such example. We have also seen that Polybius’s

account of Gauls as a nation is not to be trusted. Livy narrates details such as the death

of the Consul and speeches which should be taken with a pinch of salt as well as the

event of the earthquake during the battle. What does become apparent from comparing

both accounts is that they complement each other; each account at some or other time

fills in the gaps left out by the other source or gives a slightly more detailed description

of certain events. From Polybius’ description of the crossing of the marches provides a

reason why the Gauls suffered more that the other troops due to a more detail account

than that of Livy. Livy mentions the failure of Flaminius to send out a scouting party

which helps to explain why the ambush was so successful whereas Polybius omits this

from his account. Livy also explains why the mist did not affect the Carthaginians

because of them occupying higher ground whereas Polybius simply says a mist obscured

the vision of the Romans. Polybius again gives a more detailed account of Hannibal’s

placement of his troops when he includes the Gauls while Livy omits them when he

describes the layout of the Carthaginian forces. While Polybius describes the

appearance of the Iberians, Livy describes their fighting style. The process again is

reversed when we look at the Numidian cavalry where Livy gives a description of their

appearance and Polybius of their fighting style as skirmish light cavalry. The two

accounts complement each other for example in the description of some light troops

when Livy simply calls them slingers and Polybius gives them an identity as Balearics. In

the description of the battle site we find that Cottrell (1960: 99) prefers the account of

Livy to that of Polybius as he finds it to be more descriptive and clear.

It becomes clear that both accounts paints a much more descriptive picture of the battle

and we must rely on both accounts be a better understanding of the battle. From

reading both authors one obtains a much more informed account of the Battle of Lake

Trasimene. It is thus imperative for any historian who wishes to study the events

surrounding the Battle of Lake Trasimene or the Punic Wars for that matter to study the

accounts of both authors. Whereas the question might always remain; ‘which authors

gives a more accurate account?’ it is certain that a much more accurate account will be

obtained by comparing the two and studying the accounts of both authors.

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