Transportation Security Administration Freight Rail Security Programs

Scott GortonTSA Freight Rail Security Division

What We DoWhat We Do

• Focus on people (travelers, workers, crews, vendors)

• Inspect baggage (checked and carry-on)

• Inspect cargo (on passenger planes and cargo planes)

• Aircraft security• Airport perimeter

security • Transit, rail, surface

transportation

Major Focus Areas of TSA

• 452 commercial airports

• 2 million airline passengers daily

• 361 major seaports

• 51,000 ports of call by 7,500 foreign vessels

• 3.9 million miles of public roads

• 140,000 miles of major railroads

• 25,000 miles of commercial navigable waterways

• 2.2 million miles of pipelines

TSA’s Responsibilities Encompass the U.S. Transportation System

TSA Organization

Assistant Administrator

Ports & Intermodal

Highway

Airports

General Aviation

Cargo

Pipeline

Freight Rail

Mass Transit

Office of Transportation Sector Network Management

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FREIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTAION SECURITYNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FREIGHT RAIL TRANSPORTAION SECURITY

STRATEGIC GOALReduce the risk associated with the freight rail transportation of potentially dangerous cargoes and increase the resiliency of the freight rail network.

STRATEGIC METHODOLOGY

Partner with industry and government stakeholders to identify and implement programs and processes to achieve measurable risk reduction through

collaborative and regulatory initiatives.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Reduce the Vulnerability of Cargo

Reduce the Vulnerability of the Network

Reduce the Consequences of Attack

Freight Rail Security Program Goals

Raise the security baseline Reduce the risk associated with the transportation of

Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials Assess freight transportation operations and assets Provide assistance in the implementation of security

risk mitigation strategies

On-going Projects in Freight Rail

Rail Corridor Comprehensive Reviews TIH Risk Reduction Security Action Items Tank Car Tracking Rail Security Rule Dispersion Modeling Tank Car Consequence Training Bridge Criticality Assessments Ammonium Nitrate Studies

Rail Corridor Reviews

TSA’s process that identifies operational practices in an HTUA rail corridor that may result in heightened risk

Comprehensive reviews involve assault planners as well as State and Local officials and their first responders

This process is the baseline for the Security Action Items and Risk Reduction Program

Strategy for TIH Risk reduction

Goal

Achieve a significant reduction in the objectively measured risk of “Toxic-by-Inhalation” rail cargoes through HTUA

• Industry agreement achieves DHS goal over two years

Strategy• Secure chain of custody for TIH shipments • Minimize standing, unattended TIH cars and trains in HTUA • Reduce TIH train delays in HTUA • Establish secure storage area standards for TIH rail cars in

HTUA

11

2007

2008

FY 09

25%

50%

55%

44.72%

59.06%

82.26%

Freight Rail TIH Risk Reduction

Actual vs. Baseline GOAL

TIH Risk Reduction Verification System

Security Action Items

• June 2006, DHS/DOT issued industry best practices called “Security Action Items”:• These 24 practices were distributed to rail carriers and Federal

partners• Security measures for TIH rail carriers• Items address three operational areas: system security, access

control and en route security

• Initiated surveys to ascertain industry implementation in September 2006

• Three supplemental Security Action Items agreed upon with industry in November 2006, for a total of 27

Tank Car Tracking

o Part of the requirements of the Transportation Security Rail Rule

o Carriers must report location of single TIH car within five minutes

o Carriers must report location of all TIH cars on system within thirty minutes

o FY 09 FRSGP - GPS

Rail security rule – Major Provisions

49 CFR Part 1520 1520 Protection of Sensitive Security Information Adds definitions for rail centric terminology to

the SSI rules

Part 1580 – Rail Transportation Security Subpart A—Scope, Definitions, Authority 1580.5: Inspection Authority

Subpart B-Freight Rail Provisions 1580.100: Applicability 1580.101: Requires Rail Security Coordinator 1580.103: Location and Shipping Information 1580.105: Reporting Significant Security

Concerns 1580.107: Chain of Custody and Control 1580.109: Preemptive Effect

Subpart C-Passenger Rail Provisions 1580.201: Rail Security Coordinator 1580.203: Reporting Significant Security

Concerns

Applies to rail carriers, hazmat shippers,

and hazmat receivers

Applies to passengerand mass transit operators

Shipment Cycle

• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE

• (OUTSIDE HTUA)

• SHIPPER TO CARRIER • CARRIER SWITCHING • CREW CHANGES

• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE

• (IN HTUA)

• CARRIER TO RECEIVER• (IN HTUA)

• REGULATORY • VOLUNTARY

• CARRIER TO RECEIVER• (OUTSIDE HTUA)

• CARRIER TO CARRIER• INTERCHANGE

• (OUTSIDE HTUA)

• Assess Unattended Cars, Dwell Time Reduction• Chain of Custody Rule

• H

• T

• U

• A

Dispersion ModelingDispersion Modeling

MissionTo identify a scientific and computer based methodology supported by industry, government and academic community that TSA can use to predict the behavior of a TIH (chlorine) release after an attack on a 90 ton DOT Specification 105J500W tank car in a densely populated urban area.

Where We AreValidating • Consensus building• Release testing for both Chlorine and Anhydrous

Ammonia has been conducted• Consolidation of data, release of preliminary results,

and peer review in Summer of 2010

Tank Car Consequence Project Steps

Identify threat and threat scenarios for TIH tank cars – done with FBI help

Determine expected attack hole size in the tank car from a variety of breach tactics – NSWC analysis done, testing in progress

Problems likely with source release conditions (release amount, release rate, chemical phase of released cloud – aerosol, vapor, pooling)

Understand importance of topography, building and structures when modeling a dense gas

Validate with release testing Where We Are:

Weapons testing conducted in Spring 2010 Possibility of developing additional scenarios Formal program consisting of industry and government created

to work on the development of a stronger tank car

Training for Railroad Employees

Freight Rail Security IED Detection and Recognition Training

Bridge Criticality Assessment

Provides the ability to identify the nation’s most critical freight railroad bridges

Provides fact-based, analytical, defendable, and reasonable risk assessment results

Aligns with DHS’ goal of risk-based decision making Augments other critical TSA freight rail assessment

initiatives currently underway (e.g., Corridor Assessments, Comprehensive Reviews)

Intuitive tool for assessing risk to freight railroad bridges

TSA/TSWG Ammonium Nitrate Detonability Review and Assessment Project

Can AN in bulk quantities in rail and highway transportation be “weaponized”?

Weaponized - Using hand carried objects to cause catastrophic explosion related to destruction of property and persons

Task 1: Literature Review and Evaluation – Studies, tests,

accidents

Task 2: AN characteristics

Task 3: Conduct Gap analysis

Task 4: Periodic Project Review Meetings –

Project stakeholders

Project Tasks

Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP)

In FY 2009, the FRSGP funded:

• Security training for frontline employees,• Completion of vulnerability assessments, • Development of security plans within the

freight rail industry and• GPS tracking systems for railroad cars

transporting toxic inhalation hazardous (TIH) materials.

Email us at: freightrailsecurity@dhs.gov

More Information at:http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/freight_rail/index.shtm