Transpersonal Psychology Review - Dwight Turner … · venues, there are pros and cons – in terms...

TranspersonalPsychologyReviewVolume 17, No. 1, Summer 2015

Transpersonal Psychology Section

Editor: Ho Law, Empowerment Psychology Network, Empsy Ltd. and School of Psychology,University of East London. E-mail: [email protected].

Book Review Editor: Grace Warwick. E-mail: [email protected].

Consulting Editors: Professor Les Lancaster Liverpool John Moores UniversityProfessor Chris Roe University of NorthamptonElliot Cohen Leeds Metropolitan University Ingrid Slack The Open University Stuart Whomsley Division of Clinical PsychologyJohn Rowan Independent Consultant

The Transpersonal Psychology Review aims to encourage lively and constructive debate, alwaysseeking to recognise the positive qualities of contributions as well as discussing any limitations orareas of dissent. We ask that any criticisms authors make of the work of others should be asconstructive as possible, without losing the force of the critique itself.

All contributions should be sent by e-mail attachment to Ho Law at [email protected] andshould conform to the ‘Notes for Contributors’, located on the inside back cover.

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ONCE again, I am writing the editorialthis year at 15:00 on Sunday, 19 July(BST) in Peterborough, UK. So

another year has gone by. Reading my lasteditorial, I first reported my fond memoryabout our annual conferences. So I do notneed to repeat myself about how much Ienjoyed the 18th Annual TranspersonalPsychology Section Conference last year, andhow special the conference is to me. Instead,I shall let Harold Randall, my colleague fromDemark, tell us about his experience ofattending the Conference. Harold presentedthe conference report from his own perspec-tive, and yet provides a complete coverage ofthe conference presentations, includingthose parallel sessions that he did not mangeto attend!).

Those who attended the conference lastyear would know we changed the venue andheld it at The University of Northampton.There were a few colleagues who asked mewhat happened to the regular venue that weused to hold our conference, at Cober HillScarborough. It was clear that over the years,many of us have developed a strong connec-tion to the conference and hence to theplace that it was held. Indeed there was quitea passionate debate at the conference aboutthe change of its venue – some participantseven advocated that to hold the conference,the place would need ‘a soul’. The discussioncontinues well beyond the conference withinthe Section Committee. On balance weobserved that when comparing the twovenues, there are pros and cons – in terms ofits access, provisions and so on. In terms of number of participants, there was nodecrease in number – it seems that adifferent location attracted some new

participants, though lost some past atten-dants for various reasons…

Anyway, for those who are still yearningto return to Cober Hill Scarborough, youmay be pleased to know that once again, our Annual Conference will be held there this year on 18–20 September. See www.kc-jones.co.uk/transpersonal2015

As the last year’s conference theme wason ‘Contextualising Mindfulness: Betweenthe sacred and the secular’, its report, work-shop and papers have been presented, thereis no Special Section on Mindfulness in thisIssue. For those who are interested to jointhe Mindfulness Reading Group (MRG),which was set up in September 2013 at theUniversity of East London (UEL), you maylike to know that in the future, the monthlyMindfulness Reading Group (MRG) meet-ings will be held at The British PsychologicalSociety (BPS) London office between12:00–13:30 on ?. The meeting is open toboth BPS members and non-members.

Although the initiative was partly trig-gered by my departure from UEL in Junethis year, it was mostly due to my ongoingprofessional commitment to promotepsychology as I see the move as a way toimplement some of the BPS strategic goals1–5 (See www.bps.org.uk/strategicplan).

The proposal to launch the meetings asinterdisciplinary CPD events received unani-mous support from both the Psychotherapyand Transpersonal Psychology SectionsCommittees. It forms a unique CPD eventand represents an interdisciplinary andcross-sectional collaboration. The exactdates will be announced through the Mind-fulness Interest Group email-list. If you wishto join the Group email-list and/or simply

Transpersonal Psychology Review, Volume 17, No. 1, Summer 2015 1

Editorial

It is time again… to eternityHo Law

timgri

Sticky Note

When do the meetings take place?

keep in touch, please contact me. Dr JamesWalsh and I used to take on the role of facil-itator for the meetings. I shall continue withthis role and coordinate at the BPS LondonOffice. However, more volunteers would bewelcome so that we can take turns to facili-tate. If you want to be a volunteer, please letme know (see contact details at the end ofthis article).

Back to this Issue, as said, we start withthe Conference report by Harold Randall;followed by Elliot Cohen’s paper which notonly summarises his workshop on the ‘Holdand Release’ practice as a new way into medi-tation and mindfulness, but also provides atranspersonally-informed discourse on thepractice from traditional Daoist, Kabbalisticand Vedantic perspectives. In the search ofhis Afrocentric spirituality, Dwight Turnershares with us in his paper with hiscolleagues – the sacred dream and journeythat took him back to the top of VictoriaFalls in the Zambezi River – which opens upa broader discussion and initiates a call foran intercultural approach to the Transper-sonal to include the ‘spiritual other’.

Last Issue reported on some key aspectsof Ken Wilber’s work and the possible misun-derstanding and misinterpretation byHartelius and Ferrer (2003) by John

Abramson. A debate is ensured, as it openedup a series of discussions. This Issue reportson the on-going unfolding conversationsbetween Hartelius and Abramson. Mike Rushin his paper on The contribution of WesternEsotericism to Transpersonal Psychology,discusses its implications and the potentialfor a re-synthesis of the two traditions.

In this Issue, we have introduced a specialSection that includes papers from individ-uals and independent scholars who offertheir specific insights on topics that theyhave personal experiences and/or particularexpertises in. It starts with Emma Shacklewho shares with us her unique and personalexperience in and observations on being atwin. In her paper – Twins and the Transper-sonal – she argues that twins are not single-tons and their voice should be heard.

Stephen Sayers offers an interestingaccount of the past and the future beingassimilated to the present in his paper onTime and Eternity. And finally, we end thisIssue with a beautiful poem by John Rowanon The Ordinary Mystic.

Ho [email protected]

2 Transpersonal Psychology Review, Volume 17, No. 1, Summer 2015

Editorial

FROM MY EXPERIENCE, arriving at aTranspersonal Psychology Conference islike entering a mountain tunnel.

Suddenly the light changes. Just as suddenlybright spots begin to appear, above and tothe sides. Each of them one after anotherspills in through one’s window, then fadesinto the background, as another delivers itsbonne bouche. One can change tracks, butnot direction. Forward thrust may be felt tovary at times, but one is drawn steadily alongby the gentle nurture of a deeper current. Weare engrossed. There is seriousness, there islaughter. There are both cognitive and medi-tative heights, and there are floatingmoments of pleasure. Eventually the tunnel’send becomes perceptible. One continuesunperturbed. By the end of the tunnel, newlygathered morsels lay loosely enfolded underthe pre-frontal bonnet that had opened andclosed, opened and closed, like an excitedchattering chipmunk, as one rolled along.This body of expansive information, thisportmanteau of electrolytes, one carries forthto encounter normal traffic again.

That is one way to look at it. Butmetaphor itself can be like air pouchesunder one’s feet. Yet I am less inclined tocompare the booty from a TP Conference tomorsels that have been gathered into abaggage compartment like a picnicluncheon prepared for the alimentary canal.The experience is definitively more of aspiritual character.

It happens every time; may be to theorganisers’ credit; I am not sure. But one

thing is certain, they are the architects of thepassageway. The presenter-vehicles passingalong that passageway are those for whom itwas designed, and those who fulfil its yearlyarchitectural genius, like the water in awater trough.

The 18th Annual TranspersonalPsychology Section Conference, 2014,converged with the expressed purpose ofdistinguishing where mindfulness practicemay be understood to appear along the spec-trum of the sacred and secular. To submit asingle, more specific statement of itspurpose: to determine how the experienceof mindfulness, which has its origin in anEastern, sacred context, has come to differ, ifat all, in terms of method and accomplish-ment by its application in secularly orientedforms of therapy and other health practiceshere in the West, particularly the UK.

As one of the attendees of the confer-ence, I can say that the conference has morethan lived up to the tunnel analogy above. Asto whether the basic quest was achieved, nothaving regarded the results of the Confer-ence Feedback Forms or heard from theviews of others, I can relay only my ownjudgement, which has passed from ‘convo-luted’ to ‘maybe’ to ‘apparently’. Despite acomposition of 50 trillion cells and a superfi-cial nature of dualistic parts – two feet, twoeyes, two ears, etc. – presenting oneself to allof the paper/workshop sessions was notmanageable. What is recallable after a weekor two of normal traffic, which includedtransition through an elevation of 30,000


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The 18th Annual Transpersonal PsychologySection Conference 2014 – A personal experienceH.W. Randall

feet, is another confounding matter. Whilethe sequence of events that surfaced inpersonal, mental space has naturallyspiralled into cosmic space, some highlightsof the presentations, with an attempt toaccount for them with equanimity, aided bythe Book of Abstracts, may be recapitulatedas follows.

It began with warm exchanges of experi-ence, warm coffee, and warm, official,opening announcements [by the SectionChair]. Following this, in the hush ofanother room [for a paper presentation on‘Mindfulness is not meditation, just self-awareness’ by John Rowan], in the companyof many attentive ears (silently propelledvehicles). the term ‘mindfulness meditation’was right off charged to be a misnomer;instead of mindfulness being taught by thecounselling services, it was (and still is)rather ‘self-awareness’ through meditationthat was being cultivated without any realattempt to convey whatever may lay in theconcept of ‘beyond the ego’. ‘Mindfulnesshas nothing to do with meditation nortranspersonal levels (of experience)’ – thesubtle, and causal levels. ‘What effect didthat have on you?’ is yes/no thinking and haslittle to do with third tier thinking.

In the same venue, the next paper[‘Mindfulness--Awareness through Concep-tual Analysis: An Approach by the TibetanBuddhist Gelug School’ by Unjyn Park],which drew on an acquaintance with theTibetan Buddhist Gelug School, posited thatmindfulness used as meditation in coun-selling tends to focus on stress reduction,and it is thereby extracted from its original,soteriological context; it may developconcentration, but it would tend to focus onthe personal domain and not necessarilydevelop a better understanding of thebroader reality in which we are immersed;personal stress reduction is not the samegoal as development of spiritual awareness.

Two other papers were presented in aneighbouring room, in parallel to the abovementioned two. One presenter [Anita SianHickish on ‘A Phenomenological Investiga-

tion of Trance Mediumship: Toward anunderstanding of meaning making’] – along-time practitioner of Aikido – spoke ofembodying the immanent in transpersonalwork; of techniques that help unification ofour being by minding the body andembodying the mind; that embodiment isboth personal and transpersonal. The otherpaper [‘Care & compassion – Two sides ofone coin perhaps?’ by Alex Gardner]focused on behaviours that are central forhuman inter-identification and the survivalof humanity; it posited care and compassionas two sides of the same underlying attitu-dinal or belief process; that while they maybe intrinsic, emotional fatigue can resultfrom activities such as fund raising, etc.; andthat the two processes, rooted in Agape, canbe regarded as ‘spirituality in action’.

I found some coffee and cup-in-handreturned to the same venue to peruse andappreciate the many, intricately fine, infor-mation-rich poster presentations. Forpurposes of conciseness here, I shall takeadvantage of the axiom ‘a picture is worth athousand words’ and leave it at that.

In the Keynote that evening the questionof whether mindfulness training truly can besecular was (again) posed [by Tamara Russellon ‘Can mindfulness training really besecular?’]. Some of the ways in which mind-fulness has been ‘adapted’ to the needs ofcertain clinical groups as well as healthcarestaff has had positive results in groups witheating disorders and bipolar illness.; the‘Body-in-Mind Training Framework’, theproduct of the presenter – a practitioner ofTai-Chi – was described as a ‘body-basedmindfulness’

Then came dinner, conversation, andwine. The wind currents of the tunnelchurned out a harmonious tune as the lightstended toward a merged wholeness.

Saturday, 07:00, the Keynote presenter ofthe previous evening led a few attendees inTai-chi exercises. Shoes wet, red-faced,refreshed, but deeply relaxed, we headed énmasse for breakfast. At 09:15 I and manyothers embarked on a presentation that


H.W. Randall

posited (again) significant differencesbetween sacred and secular uses of mindful-ness [‘Intention and presence in the practiceof IRECA: mindfulness as a means, not anend?’ by Chris Pike] Mindfulness used incounselling seeks positive effects at the phys-iological level. The role of intention is,however, underplayed; using a middle-eastern healing modality, activation of theleft-frontal lobe was found to result from‘genuine treatment’, while nearby randomevent generators issued non-random results,compared to placebo and non-treatmentcontrols.

Next was a paper on studies of spiritualistmediums [‘What can we learn from anexploration of the phenomenology of Spiri-tualist Mental Mediumship?’ by Chris Roe &Liz Roxburgh], who claimed experiencesbeyond the personal domain, such as contactwith the spirits of the deceased; comparisonswere to be made with Brazilian research intoSpiritism; this area faces the challenge ofaccounting for such experiences in conven-tional terms; while questions of well-beingcontra pathology and transcendence ofbeing contra self are held in balance, thestudies are believed to inform our under-standing of consciousness and Higher Self.

Related to the same area of inquiry, oneof the two sessions running parallel to theabove two explored why psychedelics andpossession are traditionally, rarely combinedwhen Shamans communicate with spirits ofthe dead [‘Psychedelic Possession: Incorpo-rating incorporation into plant shamanism’by David Luke]; the other paper reported ona study using Q-methodology to explorepractitioner understanding and use ofLoving Kindness Meditation [‘Under-standing Loving Kindness Meditation; A Q-study with practitioners’ by Kim Sheffield].

After the infusion of two cups of coffee,spirituality (contra spiritualism) was directlytaken up. two papers proposed ways in whichspirituality may be understood and devel-oped. The first [‘Spirituality in Person-Centred Perspective’ by Tony Lawrence]considered the relationship between spiritu-

ality and person-centred therapy; it cited thenineteen propositions of Carl Rogers,purported to describe individual develop-ment from pre-self to post-self stages; thesewere in turn discussed in relation to othertranspersonal theories of spiritual develop-ment. Subsequent to this was a report [‘Spir-ituality as an Integration of Psychology andReligion: Problems and Possibilities’ byFraser Watts] arguing that while mindfulnesscan be practiced for both religious,moral/transcendent as well as secularpsychological interests, it thirdly can be culti-vated as simply ‘spiritual’, embodying bothimpersonal-religious and practical-secularpurposes.

Both of these papers were paralleled by aworkshop [‘The Hold and Release Practice: ATranspersonal Exploration’ by Elliot Cohen]that taught a simple ‘Hold and ReleasePractice’, developed by the presenter, that canbe used as preliminary practice for teachingsitting meditation in general; the techniquehas its roots in Daoist culture, including Yin-Yang cosmology, Daoyin, and Qigong.

The purposeful use of mindfulness forsecular purposes was argued in a positivevein in an after-lunch Keynote entitled:‘Mindfulness: Sacred or Secular – does itreally matter?’ [by Michael Chaskalson]. Thespeaker, an advocate of Mindfulness basedstress reduction (MBSR) and the use ofmindfulness in workplace settings, posited:‘At the moment of experiencing, there is noego-self’; and (if I understand my notescorrectly) ‘Mindfulness is about being moreaware of yourself, others, and the worldabout you’.

Late afternoon moved one’s attention toa consideration of the reticence that someteachers have shown in teaching religiouseducation (RE in the UK). Even so, RE hasbeen asserted to contribute to communityrelations; mindfulness practice was regardedfor its possible contribution to cross-culturalexchange; the concept of mindfulness wasinvestigated among RE teacher trainees, whodiscussed how it could be used on a personalbasis and within the primary classroom.


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A parallel workshop cited evidence forhow the impact of creative activities can bepersonally empowering, and how theytogether with mindfulness interventionshave fostered mental health; in this interestmulti-modal exercises were introduced andexplored [by Jessica Bockler on ‘Creativity &Mindfulness for Health’].

The evening Keynote, [‘Mindfulness andthe transpersonal traditions: Beyond reduc-tionism’ by Geoffrey Samuel’] the Directorof the Body, Health and Religion ResearchGroup, led us in a consideration of thecomplex, sacred origins (pre-Vipassana;Theravada vs. Vajrayana) of MBSR; medita-tion is the core of Buddhism, and its tradi-tions are ‘beyond reductionism’.

The annual panel discussion followingthe Keynote was vibrant. Then came dinnerwith wine, which poured over into merri-ment and volunteered entertainment, asper tradition. There were guttural echoesfrom Tibet accompanied by guitar, melo-dious Celtic notes on the violin, and full-barrelled baritone plus tenor lullabies fromScotland. In such a gathering, no clam-ouring sense of aesthetic judgement coulddampen the urge to cast outward upon theenvironment one’s inspiration.

Sunday, for some, began with clinicalparapsychology in the UK [‘Clinical parapsy-chology in the UK: Counselling for Anom-alous experiences’ by Rachel Evenden & LizRoxburgh]; about how clients with anom-alous experiences (AEs) report to secularcounselling services; how they may be bettersupported by specialist training of the thera-pists, especially in light of their havingexpressed a need for such preparation. Thiswas followed by a Paper [‘Monkeys’ paws,poppets, sheep and goats; or, the necessarycomponents of successful spells’ by Char-maine Sonnex] reporting on interviews ofprofessed Pagans, recruited online, andtheir experiences, including spell-casting asa positive art of healing; about how effective-ness of such healing requires ethical ‘intentspecificity’, in order to disallow unintendedresults; how it has been observed that people

cannot be made to do what they normallywould not; and, stressing the importance ofnot being manipulative, how one must askfor a subject’s permission to cast a healingspell - all of which implements ‘focus’.

A parallel session [‘The CompassionateUniversity: Policy, Rhetoric, or Reality?’ byScott Buckler] started with an introductionof Salzberg’s assertion that the culminationof mindfulness is the development of lovingkindness and compassion; while focusedattention and open monitoring tend to beprevalent as mindful practices, the principleof compassion has acquired focus in sectorsincluding business, environment, healthcare, science, and research; the tensions andprospective solutions regarding the develop-ment of a ‘compassionate university’ wereexplored. In the other parallel Papersession, [‘Searching for Afro-Spirituality:Creating a space for African spiritual tradi-tions and meaning within the Transpersonal’by Dwight Turner, Jane Calaghan, & AlasdairGordon-Finlayson] it was posited that a trueperennialist theory of spirituality wouldsubsume the forms of spirituality found inalternative world cultures; the complicatedrelationship between God, the spirits, ances-tors, and humanity in African spiritualitywere explored; from the perspective ofAfrica, without the input from cultures otherthan the major western and eastern reli-gions, the concept of the transpersonalcould seem to have a ‘neo-colonial cloak’.

Finally, the Keynote on Sunday evening[‘From caves to laboratories: Buddhist medi-tation practices in contemporary society’ byPeter Malinowski] focussed on the shift ofthe study of meditation ‘from caves to labo-ratories’. Starting with the ‘cave’, thepresenter relayed the message of one of histeachers, Lama Nydahl: mind cannot befound, it is not a thing; it is not a matter ofimproving health; ‘forget it!’ Then thepresenter moved over to the laboratory.From another source (apparentlyacquainted with the cave), structuring interms of identifying neural mechanisms ofattentional control, as in meditation, is the


H.W. Randall

result of ignorance. Big claims for MBCT?Not so, such claims are not supported by thelab data. Attempts have been made tomeasure the effects of mindfulness using amultimodal approach, which in particularincluded neurophysiological tools, such asEEG. The presenter stated he does notdistinguish between focused attention andopen monitoring, as they ‘both are alwaysthere’. He reiterated the claims of otherinvestigators that secular interests look to thetechnique of mindfulness (meditation) toaccomplish specifiable ends; in contrast tothis, the learning and experience of mindful-ness was originally believed to lead toBuddhahood; and, in the terms of anothersource, Buddhism is like a clear crystal – putit on a blue surface, and it will become blue.

The tally of the reports as representedhere seems to comprise three groups: (1)those who emphasise the difference betweenthe sacred origins and the secular uses ofmindfulness practice as distinct and essen-tially non-unifiable; (2) those who suggestthat both lay on the same continuum, andfor that matter practical use may move onecloser to the ends realised by thoseapproaching it as sacred; that by applyingwhatever constituent techniques they use todefine or identify mindfulness practice in asecular context, results have been shown tobe positive; and (3) those who do not makeclear their relationship to mindfulness asmeditation or practice.

Of group 1, there were apparently fivePapers; group 2, eleven papers; and group 3,five papers.

The conference was to address three(four) interrelated questions: (a) ‘To whatextent is mindfulness practice promulgatedin therapeutic and social contexts true to itsroots in the spiritual traditions?’; ‘Have thebounds of the term ‘spiritual’ become soelastic as to be of little value?’; (b) ‘Whatimpact is the widespread incorporation ofwhat is at core a spiritual practice having oncontemporary society?’; and (c) ‘Is the popu-larisation of meditation practice leading to adistortion of the root traditions from which

it has been extracted?’Group 1 suggested that in answer to ques-

tions ‘a’ and ‘c’, secular practice is not trueto mindfulness roots; that ‘mindfulnesspractice’ has tended to change meaning byits importation to the west from its lands oforigin. Group 2 would not seem to deny thatposition, at least directly, but they wouldaddress question ‘b’ by emphasising that theway they understand and apply mindfulnesspractice has positive results.

Commentary – mostly questions‘The result of ignorance?’ But isn’t that whyone studies… the mind? And why is it point-less to do so… in the see-it-as-an-object waythat some in the west do? Studying the‘mind’ seems like a larger order of interestthan studying the direct and indirect effectsof meditation on personality and brain – thebehavioural and neurophysiological.

The secular interest in ‘mindfulnesspractice’ would seem to be initially that ofenabling one to face practical aspects ofone’s life, for which an increase in the devel-opment of self-awareness seems primary. Thesecular interest offers a means to ends thatare specifiable.

In contrast, the sacred interest in mind-fulness practice is or remains that of tran-scending the practical aspects of life; ofexploring how our lives may be understoodand experienced in terms of that which maybe universal, or in any case how one canrelate to whatever may lay beyond concep-tual apprehension or conscious appercep-tion, with which we associate spiritual originsand ties.

The question remains: will the positiveresults from the secular applications natu-rally and eventually become the same asthose who have an acknowledged interest in developing an understanding of theuniversal context of humanity?

The overall result as represented hereappears to contribute to situating mindful-ness between the sacred and the secular.However, if it is correctly to be regarded on ascale, then should there not be some mark-


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ings on the scale that indicate steppingstones, if not thresholds?

My understanding and practice of mind-fulness is that of an experience generallyentered after entering a meditationalprocess by other means or techniques. It isan advanced form of meditation, and as suchits practice would follow acquaintance withother forms of meditation practice, given theright interest and openness.

Should the differences of forms of medi-tation, all of which can have a constructiveeffect, not be acknowledged within thecontexts of so-called secular applications?

Developing concentration by focussingon either an external or internal object ofthe senses, perfecting an art of a physicalnature, developing an ability to remain openand consciously ride on the wave of anemotion, etc.; as all who read the Transper-sonal Review would know, there are differentways to approach an essentially internalexperience that may begin with the personaland lead toward the beyond-personal. If notby the term ‘mindfulness meditation’, thenhow is the experience of advanced medita-tors in the East to be represented?

Shouldn’t ‘mindfulness meditation’ bedistinguished from ‘mindfulness practice’?

If one enters meditation with an under-current of fear or apprehension, would notthe meditative experience tend to bedifferent than if one entered the meditativeprocess with an undercurrent of love and/orpositive regard?

How can one put down in writing what isin the ‘mind’? – a generalised expressionfrom B. Dylan.

When can language ever capture and faith-fully represent such internal experiences tothe point of conveying it to a non-practitioner?

Lastly, I offer my apologies to those whomI may have misrepresented. A lot of informa-tion was dished out at the conference, and itseems that only bits of it still cling to thestructure under the pre-frontal bonnet. Allcorrections, complaints, and comments, evenon the punctuation, will be welcomed.

Note: Conference details have been addedby Editor in square brackets.

H.W. [email protected]


H.W. Randall

THE HOLD AND RELEASE PRACTICE(HRP) appears remarkably simple, ifone is to consider and relate to it only as

a physical exercise – comprising, as it does,of three main movements (see figure 1–3).

However, the physical components of theexercise (what one does with one’s body)may be considered as constituting merely an

outer form or expression, whereas thevarious levels of inner form and activity(what one does with one’s breath and mind)are what give the technique its potency – itssemiotic-charge and transformative poten-tial. The movements themselves initially takethe form of a kinaesthetic learning activity,with the intention of allowing the meditator


The hold and release practice: A new wayinto meditation and mindfulness Elliot Cohen

I initially developed the ‘Hold and Release Practice’ (HRP) whilst working with enhanced-care service usersin the NHS and private practice (between 2005-2009). The HRP was subsequently developed andintroduced to BA(Hons) Psychology & Society undergraduates between (2011–2014) and toInterdisciplinary Psychology MA students at Leeds Metropolitan University (2013–2014), and to over 100participants at various ‘Yoga Manchester – Meditation for Beginners’ workshops (from 2013 onwards).More recently the practice was offered as a workshop during the 18th Annual Transpersonal PsychologySection Conference, ‘Contextualising Mindfulness: Between the Sacred and the Secular’ (10–12 October2014). This short and seemingly simple practice, serves as an embodied and experiential introduction tothe relationship between posture, breath and mind, and is also a potent ‘preliminary practice’, precedingand supporting any style of sitting meditation practice. In addition to outlining and describing thetechnique, this paper will provide transpersonally-informed, reflexive interpretations on the practice –inspired by traditional Daoist cultivation techniques, Kabbalistic and Vedantic perspectives. It is hopedthat in addition to being of use to novice meditators that HRP will also serve as a useful supplement forthose with an established practice.

Figure 1–3: Please supply a caption

to achieve a gentle yet poised posture. One may initially see some commonali-

ties with Edmund Jacobson’s (1938) earlywork concerning ‘progressive relaxation’through consciously tensing and thenrelaxing different muscle groups – one keydifference however is that the HRP does notrequire any tensing, and achieves its aimpurely through a shift in posture and accom-panying associations/visualisations.

The HRP is also a way to vividly experi-ence what Herbert Benson (2009) describesas the ‘relaxation response’, through itsdeliberate contrast with what may beperceived (initially) as a ‘stress response’.

As the HRP begins with one’s body andposture it would be appropriate to refer toCatherine Kerr’s recent work on mindfulness-based somatic awareness, and her observationthat ‘mindfulness starts with the body’ (Kerret al., 2013) – as the body (and one’s breath)is always anchored in the present moment.

This focus on the body also provides uswith an opportunity to recall and reflectupon the earlier, pioneering work ofWilhelm Reich (1976), concerning bio-ener-getics and his early descriptions ofpsychophysical rigidity – ‘body armouring’and the importance of being able to identify,loosen and release these restrictive,damaging blockages.

I have found that the HRP is particularlyuseful for introducing mindfulness-basedapproaches (Kabat-Zinn, 2013) to begin-ners – as it simultaneously allows new medi-tators to achieve a comfortable, uprightposition whilst experientially discovering forthemselves the fundamental relationshipsbetween posture, breath and mind.

A posture practiceA comfortable and upright posture (arequired foundation for any effective medi-tation practice) is often difficult for newmeditators to achieve. One is commonlyadvised not to slouch too far forward (oftenresulting in torpor or sleepiness) or arch toofar backwards (commonly leading to backpain and an associated agitated state of

mind) – thus achieving an embodied‘Middle Way’, much like the Buddha’s medi-tation instructions to his struggling discipleSona (a former musician):

‘Sona,’ he said, ‘I have heard that you arenot getting good results from your practiceof mindfulness and want to return to the laylife. Suppose I explain why you did not getgood results, would you stay on as a monkand try again?’

‘Yes I would, Lord,’ replied Sona.

‘Sona, you were a musician and you used toplay the lute. Tell me, Sona, did you producegood music when the lute string was welltuned, neither too tight nor too loose?’

‘I was able to produce good music, Lord,”replied Sona.

‘What happened when the strings were tootightly wound up?’

‘I could not produce any music, Lord,’ saidSona.

‘What happened when the strings were tooslack?’

‘I could not produce any music at all, Lord,’replied Sona

‘Sona, do you now see why you did not expe-rience the happiness of renouncing worldlycraving? You have been straining too hard inyour meditation. Do it in a relaxed way, butwithout being slack. Try it again and you willexperience the good result.’

Sona understood and stayed on in themonastery as a monk and soon attainedsainthood.

(Sona Sutta, A.iii.374f, Buddhanet Accessed 4 September, 2014)

What is important, in relation to the HRP, isthe Buddha’s use of opposites and extremes


Elliot Cohen

to skilfully demonstrate the ideal state – thiswill be later explored with reference toDaoist teachings concerning the dynamicrelationship between Yin and Yang and theHebrew letters (Beit and Aleph).

Practice outline of the hold(Embracing, Bowing)The first position one adopts is the holdingposition, where (whether one is seated on acushion or a chair) one crosses one’s armsover one’s chest, while placing the handsupon opposing shoulders (see figure 1) – thisresembles both the ‘brace position’ that oneadopts when an aeroplane is making an emer-gency landing, and also the posture theMevlevi Sufi adopts (while standing) beforehis dance (or ecstatic movements), as part ofthe عامس Sama ceremony – ecstatic movement(as a form of رکذ Dhikr – devotional acts).1

Rather than the ‘brace position’ I wouldprefer this to be thought of in a more Sufimanner as an ‘embrace’ position – as one isliterally left holding, embracing oneself.

As part of the inner practice, at the pointof extension and subsequent return, onemay use one’s arms, hands and imaginationin tandem, to visualise gathering up all thevarious disparate aspects or fragments ofoneself, or of one’s life, into one’s being andcentre2 – where it is held and contained. Atthis point one allows the weight of theelbows to naturally lower the body(including the head), allowing it to bow intoa semi-foetal position (see figure 2).

During the practice I have found that it isimportant to consider (and record) not onlypeople’s experiences – ‘how I experiencedthe movements/what I felt’, but to also takeinto account people’s associations – ‘what Iassociate this with/what this reminded meof’. By including participants associations itis hoped that we are able to understand the

effects of the technique in more holisticdepth.

When performed with student groups (N = 32 in; 36 in; 30 in 2011; 2012; 2013respectively) at Leeds Metropolitan Univer-sity, as part of the Psychonautics (navigatingthe mind) module, meditators commonlyreported two quite distinct ‘feelings’ and‘associations’ while in the second position(see figure 2):

1. ‘I feel safe, protected, cocooned’2. ‘I feel a little trapped, like I can’t breathe

properly’

Although the vast majority of meditators expe-riences were in the first category, I was keen toaddress the issues raised in the second.

Firstly, whether pleasant or unpleasant,the posture is temporary (held for only two orthree minutes) – in this sense one mightunderstand the position as helping one tocultivate qualities of ‘patience, forbearance’and ‘equanimity’ (Wallace, 2011, p.167),which should all be integral qualities under-lying and supporting any meditation training.

Secondly, the sensation of not being ableto breathe properly (and perhaps some ofthe resulting associations with being‘trapped’) is primarily due to our habitualpredisposition to breathe from the chest (orin particularly stressful situations the throat);the position of the arms across the chestappears to inhibit a full inhalation – howeverwith a slight shift in focus one can effectivelyand quite dramatically reverse this feeling.

The position of the arms across the chestis actually and naturally moving the centreand sensation of breath, from the chest intothe belly. In effect the hold and bow position(see figure 2), should encourage one to movethe breath deeper into the body and the belly– this is the identical place one typically


The hold and release practice: A new way into meditation and mindfulness

1 For some beautiful footage of the Sama ritual the reader may wish to visit and view the following link:http://vimeo.com/87064606 accessed 3 October 2014.

2 Analytically-inclined readers may appreciate certain parallels with Jung’s writings on Individuation, and relatedLurianic Kabbalistic teachings regarding ‘gathering the sparks’ of holiness – the curious reader may consultDrob, S.L. (2000). Kabbalistic metaphors: Jewish mystical themes in ancient and modern thought. Lanham, Maryland:J. Aaronson.

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focuses on in Yoga (abdominal breathing)and the ‘preferred location’ of focus duringDaoist meditation (Kohn, 2010, p.2). Thisshift in attention from the chest into the bellyleads to a natural deepening, lengtheningand gentling of the breath, and also providesa sense of release (when contrasted withrestricted chest or throat breathing). Thisposition is held for only a short time – two tothree minutes is sufficient.

Practice outline – The releaseThe following release movement is doneextremely slowly with close attention paid toevery sensation and association. The handsare released from the shoulders and slideslowly down the outside of one’s upper arms,then down the legs until the hands arepalms-down, just above (or if one prefersupon) the knees. One then begins a verysteady and conscientious process of movinginto an upright position. One continuesuntil one ‘feels’ perfectly upright, poisedand balanced (see figure 3). After reachingthe fully-upright position one is free tosimply sit with bare attention, or to graduallymove into one’s familiar practice.

Meditators have consistently reportedvery vivid and pleasant sensations during thismovement into the final, resting position:

1. ‘I felt so relaxed’2. ‘I felt so free’3. ‘My mind felt really still and calm’

The shift in posture and the subsequent re-opening of the chest area (physiologicallyand psychologically) provides a strong sensa-tion of release and the feeling of opening-allowing one to feel as though one is nowbreathing with one’s whole body (from boththe belly and the chest). It is a relatively swiftmethod to induce a ‘relaxation response’(Benson, 2009) and many meditatorsreported that it wasn’t simply a matter ofthem feeling physically more relaxed, orbreathing deeper/gentler, but that theirminds also felt calmed and centred by thispractice. It is in this manner that one can

begin to demonstrate the way one’s postureaffects one’s breath, and the way one’sbreath affects one’s state of mind. TheDaoist scholar and cultivator/meditatorProfessor Livia Kohn has insightfullyobserved:

In all cases, the breath is a bridge betweenbody and mind, as an expression of mentalreality, closely linked to emotions, nervousconditions, and peace. The more the breathis deepened and calmed, the quieter themind becomes and the easier it is to suspendthe critical factor and enter into the serenityof the meditative state. (Kohn, 2010, p.2)

The HRP’s kinaesthetic properties may alsobe related to, and supported by a relativelyrecent experiment conducted by Carney,Cuddy and Yap (2010) concerning ‘powerposes’. The research team explored how byadopting certain ‘power poses’ (typicallywith one’s arms raised above one’s head in aheroic or victorious manner), participantswould actually begin internalise what theposture signified, and to feel more confidentand self-assured – due to its particular perti-nence I have taken the unusual step ofincluding the abstract in its entirety:

Humans and other animals expresspower through open, expansive postures,and they express powerlessness throughclosed, contractive postures. But can thesepostures actually cause power? The results ofthis study confirmed our prediction thatposing in high-power nonverbal displays (asopposed to low-power nonverbal displays)would cause neuroendocrine and behavioralchanges for both male and female partici-pants: High-power posers experienced eleva-tions in testosterone, decreases in cortisol,and increased feelings of power and toler-ance for risk; low-power posers exhibited theopposite pattern. In short, posing in displaysof power caused advantaged and adaptivepsychological, physiological, and behavioralchanges, and these findings suggest thatembodiment extends beyond mere thinkingand feeling, to physiology and subsequent


Elliot Cohen

behavioral choices. That a person can, byassuming two simple 1-min poses, embodypower and instantly become more powerfulhas real-world, actionable implications.(Carney, Cuddy and Yap, 2010, p.1363)

These findings point to the bi-direction-ality of body language- in that our physicalposture and movements (features of non-verbal communication) don’t simplycommunicate and indicate aspects ofourselves to others (revealing whether wemay be feeling - scared or self-assured), butthat our postures are also speaking toourselves (and that, whether consciously orunconsciously, we are listening).

In 1999, while attending teachings of theTibetan Buddhist master Sogyal Rinpoche, Iwas conscious of how he spent a great deal oftime talking about the importance of takingan ‘inspiring posture’ during meditation –imagining one is a king or a queen, or evena mountain, and to sit in manner thatconveys this majesty or solidity. This advicecertainly transformed my practice and it ishoped that the HRP may be utilised as amoving practice that embodies and commu-nicates (to oneself and others) a sense ofrising and opening up, in confidence, andsitting with authentic presence.

Transpersonal perspectives andreflections on the HRP The HRP rests on a keen awareness ofcontrast, between first being in a closed andthen open posture. Meditators’ respective,accompanying associations are as importantas the postures, and I am always keen toconsistently record reflections followingsittings, and encourage others to follow theset procedure in order to replicate theseresults for themselves.

The holding positions may be seen as adeliberately exaggerated embodiment ofbeing in a stressful state; although it isimportant to note that the position itself istypically adopted due to its comforting prop-erties. A foetal or semi-foetal position iscommonly observed during times of stress oras a result of some trauma. Whilst working in

the Grafton ward of Manchester St. Mary’sPsychiatric unit (during 2003–2004) I wouldoften observe patients (particularly newpatients) in this all-too-familiar posture.

On the one hand it is typically/tradition-ally interpreted as a symbolic act of, orattempt at regression – to return to thewarm, safe prenatal environment of thewomb. It may equally be understood from anevolutionary or comparative psychologicalperspective, as an inbuilt defensive mecha-nism – in that vulnerable prey can often beobserved (when neither ‘fight’ nor ‘flight’ ispossible) attempting to roll into a ball inorder to protect themselves – retreatingwithin as opposed to retreating without.

But one may, and I believe should, alsotake a more transpersonal view and under-stand it not merely as an attempt to return toa pre-birth state, or a form of atavistic regres-sion, but rather the psychophysical expres-sion of a wish to initiate a process of re-birth.In this way the movements themselves canbegin to take on a deeper, more personaland spiritual significance, whilst being simul-taneously rooted in ancient wisdom tradi-tions – in this instance I have utilised Daoist,Kabbalistic and Hindu concepts (and Iwould actively invite and encourage addi-tional insights from the reader).

I do not believe this to simply be a mereprocess of ‘reading in’ to these postures, butrather if one conscientiously follows thepractice these connections and resonancesappear to present themselves; to be intu-itively and experientially ‘read out’(Lancaster 2007) by practitioners.

To this end, what now follows are series of Transpersonally-informed reflections(Anderson & Braud, 2011) and reflexiveinterpretations (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009)– that is to say ‘Ways of seeing which act backon and reflect existing ways of seeing’ (Clegg& Hardy, 1996, quoted in Alvesson & Sköld-berg, 2009 p.271). It then remains up to thereader and practitioner to test and establishfor themselves the usefulness of these reflec-tions and connections (and for this purpose Iam keen to enter into correspondence).



Daoist insightsThrough my ongoing immersion in Daoisttraditions3, including my work with theNorthern School of Daoist Studies (2009-2013) and the British Taoist Association(2008–2014), some clear connectionsbetween the HRP and traditional Daoistcultivation appear to have emerged.

We have already explored the manner inwhich the second position one adopts (seefigure 2 – holding-bowing) is evocative of thefoetus. In Daoist traditions of 內丹Neidan –Inner Alchemy [pill], one of the ultimategoals is to cultivate the immortal [sacred]embryo – 聖胎 Shengtai (see figure 4). Thisinner-alchemical process is described inRichard Wilhelm’s (1962) famous transla-tion of ‘The Secret of the Golden Flower’,for which Carl Jung (his close friend)provided the foreword and commentary.

-----------------------------Insert Figure 4 hereFile: Figure 4 EC 11------------------------------

This embryo may be understood to repre-sent the cultivation of an immortal, fully-realised potential, and authentic Self. I havepreviously written about both the signifi-cance and symbolism of this idea from ananalytical perspective:

A Jungian may view as particularlyintriguing that the Daoist’s visualisations ofconceiving and gestating the immortalembryo, centre beneath our navel (in thelower dantian); beneath the original, simul-taneously physical and symbolic mark ofseparation from our mother (from themother). This psychological separation, orfreedom, from the mother would likely beunderstood by Jungians as being part of theheroic journey towards selfhood; and whatbetter way to symbolise this process than by‘symbolically’ giving birth to one’s self.(Cohen, 2011, p.112)

The long and complicated processes ofDaoist cultivation include introducing thepractitioner to the technique of embryonicbreathing. Embryonic breathing is under-stood to be the key in regulating anddirecting the Qi around the body to ensurehealth, longevity and eventual realisation.

It begins by instructing the practitionerin normal abdominal breathing, or 佛家呼吸Fo Jia Hu Xi – Buddha breathing (Yang, 2003,p.68) which can naturally occur as a result ofthe second posture in the HRP (figure 2). Asone inhales the abdomen gently expands,and as one exhales the abdomen slowlycontracts – ‘…normal abdominal breathingis able to bring a beginning practitioner to astate of deep relaxation’ (Ibid. p.71).

As the traditional visualisations includegenerating and raising the qi from the belly(lower dantian), up the spine, into the head(upper dantian – or third eye) this ascent ismirrored in the lifting/straightening of theposture (from figure 3 to figure 4).

In almost all Chinese arts of cultivation,Daoyin (a form of Daoist Yoga), Qigong andthe more recent TaiChi the practitionerseeks to harmonise his/her breathwork withhis/her movements and mind in order tolocate one’s centre and discover themeaning of ‘stillness in movement’(Horwood, 2008, p.6).

The British-born Daoist priest Shi Jing(the chair of the British Taoist Association)reflects on the purpose of Daoyin in his writ-ings on the Eight Brocades:

So these teachings are not just a philosophy,they are a practical instruction on cultiva-tion! Lao Tzu also talks about returning tothe state of a little babe. The deep abdom-inal breathing, the expansion and contrac-tion of the lower dan tian, the effortlessbreathing of the babe. Tao Yin is part of thatreturn to simplicity and natural stillness.(Shi Jing ND, pp.4–5).

The effectiveness of the HRP may be further


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3 Primarily the Quanzhen (Complete Reality) Longmen (Dragon’s Gate) tradition.

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understood through the ancient Chineseprinciple of Yin and Yang, and the theme ofcomplementary, mutually-defining opposites:

In Chinese worldview, the cosmos is gener-ated from the undifferentiated Dao throughthe interaction of Yin and Yang, two princi-ples or ‘pneumas’ (*qi) that are aspects ofthe functions of the Dao itself. Theircontinued hierogamy engenders everythingwithin space and time, giving rise to thematerial and spiritual manifestation. Thecosmos is not static but in constant change.

The term yin originally denoted the shady ornorthern side of a hill, where yang was itssunny or southern side. This early definition,found in sources of the Spring and Autumnperiod, was later expanded to include allthat is shady, dark, and cool, and all that issunny, bright and warm respectively. Thenotions of Yin and Yang were thus applied to various complementary entities andphenomena, such as female-male, dark-light, night-day, low-high, earth-heaven,passive-active and so on. (Baldrian-Hussein,2008, p.1164).

Following in this description, one may nowunderstand that it is precisely throughfeeling off-balance (through bowingforwards), feeling closed and constricted thatone is able to tangibly appreciate and differ-entiate a feeling of being upright, balancedand released. As Yin and Yang alternates, sotoo the HRP is not a static posture, but anactive movement that can symbolise (and insome cases initiate) a transition from onepsychological state to another.

Within the iconography of Yin and Yang,one can observe the seed of Yin within Yangand vice versa – the example I often give tostudents is to remember a time where theylaughed until they cried (or cried until theylaughed). This also serves to remind us (inthis case) that the potential for equilibrium

can often be found precisely within thepreceding imbalance. Yin and Yang may beunderstood as opposites that are not neces-sarily in opposition, as is illustrated in thesecond verse of the Dao De Jing:

…having and not having arise together. Diffi-cult and easy complement each other. Longand short contrast each other; High and lowrest upon each other; Voice and soundharmonise each other; Front and back followeach other. (Gia-Fu Feng and English 1996)

We might also reflect that we may come toknow and achieve a suitable posture formeditation by first deliberately adopting anunsuitable posture for meditation.

Kabbalistic insightsAs a result of ongoing Transpersonal group-work with the Hebrew letters (from 2008-2014) and my work facilitating the JewishMeditation group Ohr Menorah (2012–2014)4,the hold and release practice has also takenon, and resonated with particular Kabbalisticprinciples. It is perhaps also appropriate thatmy very first introduction to Kabbalah (in1994), was through the work of Perle Epstein,which included a comparative study of Daoistand Kabbalistic meditation techniques:

Taoist meditative practice also compares thehuman body to the macrocosm, focussingon the spine as the source of divine energy,which can be evoked by a combination ofvisualisation and breathing. Like theKabbalist, who ‘stirs the world above’ bysitting down to his meditations here below,the Taoist reflects the outer world throughthe harmonising of mind, breath and body.(Epstein, 1978, p.70)

As the Hebrew letters are considered to be thetools of creation (Lancaster 2005), byembodying the letters one may symbolicallyengage and participate in the creative process.



4 The group’s 2012 launch was reported in a press release from the Movement for Reform Judaismhttp://news.reformjudaism.org.uk/press-releases/a-new-light-for-menorah.html accessed 13 October 2015.

The first and last positions of the HRP,strongly resonate with, and are reminiscentof two particular Hebrew letters – ב Beit andא Alef, and may be interpreted as consti-tuting a movement from Beit to Aleph.

בBeit appears with a firm base, opening ononly one side (the left side – the same direc-tion one reads Hebrew, from right to left),with its top-half bent over. The letter Beit istraditionally understood to be a feminineletter, related to the Divine Attribute (Heb:Sefira) of understanding (Heb: הניב Binah)which may be associated with thebelly/womb (Heb: ןטב Beten), and also ahouse (Heb: תיב Bayit) (Matt, 2004, p.1855;Ginsburgh, 1990, p.40).

Although the second letter of the Hebrewalphabet, Beit is the very first letter of theTorah (the letter that initiates the process ofcreation), as the famous first words of thebible in Hebrew are תישארב Bereshit –‘In/With the Beginning’ (Genesis i.i).

In the holding – bowing position (seefigure 2) one is keenly aware of one’s firmfoundation, upon the cushion or the chair –one’s curled shape is strongly reminiscent ofthe letter Beit, symbolising the beginning ofa creative/transformative process. One isconscious of and firmly within one’s body –which in Kabbalistic terms is understood tobe the house/temple of the soul. It is alsosignificant that in the second position, thehead is naturally lowered towards the body,as this precedes and anticipates the releaseaspect (third movement) of the practice,which will constitute the subsequent embod-iment of the letter Alef:

The first word of the Torah, תישארב, spells תיב the head of the house’. The‘ ,שארintention of creation, the Divine act ofbuilding, is that the head, the secret of theletter alef – the revelation of G-d’s AbsoluteUnity – comes into His house, the letter beit.(Ginsburgh 1990, p.44).

From the firm and directed, closed andconstricted letter Beit one straightens intoan upright position, led by the head, thatevokes the letter alef.

אAlef is upright and open on all sides –

appearing primarily as a letter of balance;between God and Man, Heaven and Earth,and ‘The secret of the ‘image’ in which manwas created’ (Ginsburgh, 1990, p.26), andalso returns us to our previous description ofYin and Yang:

Aleph is thus a Jewish version of the Yin-Yang symbol of complementary tendencies.Aleph embraces the ambiguity and thebalance of form and emptiness, separate-ness and unity, oneness and ‘thousandness’.The Zohar describes this situation: ‘Crying isenwedged in my heart on one side, while joyis enwedged in my heart on the other side’(interestingly both laughing and crying usethe same muscle, the diaphragm.) (Seidman2011, Chapter 1).

According to a central Kabbalistic text, theSefer Yetzirah (book of formation), Alef repre-sents the element of air (Lancaster, 2005,p.182) and this further relates to its tradi-tional association with the respiratory systemand diaphragm (Ginsburgh, 1990, p.26) –indeed one of the most immediate sensa-tions accompanying the movement from thesecond to third position in the HRP, is thevivid sense of air/breath entering andanimating the entire body (but with a partic-ular focus on the diaphragm and belly). Theletter Alef is a silent letter, and as such may beunderstood as being the letter of the breath,and in Genesis it is the divine breath thatanimates Adam:

Then the LORD God formed the man of dustfrom the ground and breathed into hisnostrils the breath of life, and the manbecame a living creature. (Genesis 2:7).


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5 Primarily the Quanzhen (Complete Reality) Longmen (Dragon’s Gate) tradition.

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From a Kabbalistic perspective therefore themovement from Beit to Alef does not onlysymbolise a personal rebirth but may beseen as a re-enactment of the process ofcreation itself.

Vedantic insights – A concluding tale oftwo birds.My study of Vedanta, in 2010 with SwamiDayatmananda, mainly centred on theMundaka Upanishad. In this scripture is founda very brief but profound tale of two birds:

Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to thesame tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit,the other looks on without eating. (3rdMundaka, First Khanda – Müller, 1962, p.251).

It is further taught that the first bird who eatsthe fruit occupies the lower branches, whereasthe second bird that looks on, occupies thehigher branches (Hariharananda, 2008).

This lower bird represents the ordinaryself/mind, engaged in constant activity, flit-ting from branch to branch, ‘tweeting’ and‘flapping’ through its existence; stoppingonly occasionally to look up to the still,silent, second bird who sits serenely in theupper tree canopy. One might also say thatthis first bird represents ordinary cognition,consensus consciousness – our daily mentalprocesses and activity.

The higher, second bird represents thetranscendent self; the Atman, who silentlywitnesses but is ultimately beyond the firstbird’s worldly existence. In this way thesecond bird may be thought of as repre-senting the transcognitive realm – above andbeyond our ordinary thoughts and feelings.

The story continues that each time thelower bird tastes bitter fruit it yearns andgradually begins to ascend to the place of thehigher bird.

The light from its plumage is reflected on thefirst bird and the latter’s own plumagestarts melting away. When the first birdfinally reaches the branch on which thesecond is sitting the whole vision changes. Itfinds that all along it had been the secondbird. The apparent duality existed onlybecause it had deserted its true self for thefruits of the tree. Its former self was only adistorted reflection of its true self. (Hariha-rananda, 2008, p.9).

For those who are familiar with the Chakras(the psycho-spiritual centres discussed inRaja Yoga – Badlani, 2008, p.240), this storyalso reminds us of an ascent from lower levelsof being up to higher levels of realisation.

The HRP (moving from figure 2 to figure3) enacts a ‘rising above’ one’s previous posi-tion/situation, with the focus moving fromthe Manipura chakra (centred around one’sbelly and navel) in the second posture, to theAjna or Sahasrara chakra (located in the thirdeye region or just above the crown of thehead) in the third posture – as the majority ofmeditators’ also reported experiencing agenuine sense of stillness and serenity in thefinal upright, resting position.6

Concluding remarksIt is my sincere hope that this practice will beable to serve a multitude of different func-tions – from helping new meditators inachieving a comfortable and conduciveposture for any sitting practice, and that it mayalso constitute a supplementary practice thatprecedes one’s familiar meditation sitting.

I would also ideally like the HRP to bethought of as a ‘practice’ as opposed to a ‘tech-nique’. The word ‘practice’ suggests somelevel of continuity, discipline and cultivation;whereas ‘technique’, to me, seems to connotesome sort of trick, or short-term strategy.



6 Additionally, one may notice certain physical parallels with yogic Pranayama and the use of the bandas, whichtranslates from the Sanskrit as ‘lock’ but can also mean to tighten or hold (Rachman 2014) – where a particularposture is held/locked while the breath is also consciously restricted. The feeling of release effected byunlocking the banda is not too dissimilar, in principle, from the feeling of release in the HRP, and both areintended to help align the body and restore a sense of flow and equilibrium.

In our age of speed, shortcuts and ‘quickfixes’ the HRP should represent a need toslow down, gather ourselves - determining tobegin again and rise up.

AcknowledgementsMy sincere thanks to my wife, Zhang Zhilu,for agreeing to pose for the various HRPpositions (in figures 1, 2 and 3) and forhelping me with all the various Chineseterms and characters.

Profound thanks to Professor LesLancaster and the Kabbalah group,including Ohr Menorah at Menorah Syna-gogue (Cheshire Reform Congregation) forall our work with the Hebrew letters, and toRabbi Danny Bergson for discussing thispaper with me in some depth.

I extend my gratitude to the BritishTaoist Association and the contributingmembers of the Northern School of DaoistStudies for all your playful insights.

An additional thanks to the ManchesterVedanta study circle and to Matt Ryan fromYoga Manchester.

Thanks to all the members of the BritishPsychological Society’s Transpersonal Sectionand attendees of the ‘Hold and ReleasePractice workshop’ at the 2014 conference.Particular thanks to Harris Friedman, DavidLuke, Ho Law (for drawing my attention tothe significance of the Chinese commentaryin figure 4), Jackie Miller, Harris Friedman,and Tamara Russell for your questions,suggestions and encouragement.

A final thanks to all our Undergraduateand Postgraduate students at Leeds Metro-politan University/Leeds Beckett Universitywhose feedback and enthusiasm has beeninvaluable.

Dr Elliot [email protected]


Elliot Cohen

Anderson, R. & Braud, W. (2011). Transforming selfand others through research: Transpersonal researchmethods and skills for the human sciences and human-ities. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

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Baldrian-Hussein, F. (2008). Yin and Yang. In F. Pregadio (Ed.) The Encyclopedia of Taoism,Volume 2 (pp.1164–1166). London: Routledge.

Benson, H. & Klipper, M. (2009). The relaxationresponse. New York, NY: Harper Collins.

Carney, D., Cuddy, A. & Yip, A. (2010). Power posing:Brief nonverbal displays affect neuroendocrinelevels and risk tolerance. Psychological Science, 21,1363–1368.

Cohen, E. (2011). Daoism, psychology and psychoso-manautics. In L. Kohn (Ed.) Living authentically:Daoist contributions to modern psychology(pp.101–122). Magdalena, NM: Three Pines Press.

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Reich, W. (1976). Selected writings: An introduction toOrgonomy. Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd.

Seidman, R. (2011). The oracle of Kabbalah: Mysticalteachings of the Hebrew letters. New York, NY: St Martin’s Press.

Shi Jing. (1999). Eight Brocades Tao Yin and Meditation.London: The British Taoist Association.

Wallace, B. A. (2011). Stilling the mind: Shamatha teach-ings from Düdjom Lingpa’s vajra essence.Sommerville, MA: Wisdom Publications.

Wilhelm, R. & Jung, C.G. (1962). The secret of the goldenFlower: A Chinese Book of Life. FL: Harcourt Brace.

Yang, J. (2003). Qigong Meditation: Embryonic breathing.Boston, MA: YMAA Publication Centre.

IntroductionAS A black transpersonal psychotherapistworking in multi-cultural London, I amoften blessed to find myself working withclients from within my own community.Having trained at a centre where thespiritual was greatly valued, and undertakenmy own research into my own spiritualbeliefs, researching Buddhist, Taoist andMuslim teachings, to name but a few, I wasoften left with a sense that something wasmissing. On closer inspection it was a moreafrocentric understanding of spirituality thatI felt was absent for myself, one that wouldenhance my personal spiritual identity.

A deeper consideration of the problemhere left me with a real sense that such anAfrocentric cultural paradigm has had little tono real acknowledgement within the Westernworld of the traditional transpersonal. Thisrevelation was especially surprising given theoften clear, yet also often unacknowledged,influences that African ontologies have hadon the transpersonal over the years. Forexample, Jung on his worldly travels visitedAfrica and, even allowing for his personalprejudices, was clearly influenced by thenumerous and diverse spiritual practices heencountered on his visits (Stevens 1990). Inthe more modern era the works of the mysticDaskalos (Joseph 2012), and the under-standing the roles of spirits in our daily lives,have clear connections to those often experi-

enced on the African continent. Yet, besidesthe interesting work of the likes of Mazama(2003), within the transpersonal movement Iam often left asking where is the black,African or Caribbean voice when it comes tooffering a perspective of our collectivespiritual experience? And does an afrocentricperspective on spirituality have a space withina global spiritual tapestry?

Another criticism perhaps is that the main-stream transpersonal has taken on a morewestern-centric outlook on the spiritual, andone that can sometimes appear as anothertype of dualism that echoes many of those thathave plagued western philosophical thoughtsince the time of Plato. The cost of this is thesilencing of the many alternative voices thathave something different to say about relation-ship to the spiritual; for example the richheritage of Maori spiritual thought, includingthe linking of mind, body and spirit to theland (Van De Port, 2005); or the incrediblerelationship of God, spirits and humanity thatis prevalent in many African religions (Mbiti,1989). It is this continued ignorance of otherforms of spirituality threatens to coat thetranspersonal in the type of neo-colonial cloakthat, in places, it has worked hard to avoid.

To emphasise this point, Asante (1984)suggests, the flaw within the traditionaltranspersonal its overreliance on the wisdomof the major religions, and thereby the exclu-sion of many other forms of spirituality. His

Searching for afrocentric spiritualitywithin the transpersonalDwight Turner, Jane Callaghan & Alasdair Gordon-Finlayson

The aim of this paper is to show, via the lens of a culturally specific dream, how the transpersonal couldbenefit from broadening its approach to spirituality to include the wisdom of African spiritual beliefs.Considering some of the reasons for its lack of prominence, together with an exploration of some of therichness held within African spirituality, this paper suggests that a more Cosmopolitan approach to theTranspersonal is needed to avoid the creation of a spiritual Other. [This paper was based on thepresentation at the 18th Annual Transpersonal Psychology Section Conference on 10–12 October 2015,The University of Northampton.]


idea brings into focus the idea of transper-sonal narcissism, echoing the idea of Ferrer’s(Hart et al., 2000), where the transpersonal,and spiritual experiences, are defined by anincreasingly narrow set of criteria. Thisthereby creates what I would term a spiritualOther, where one is humanity increasinglymakes judgements on what is spiritual andwhat is not for the rest of us. The numerousspiritual experiences revered by the manyalternative world cultures should also beencouraged forward, as then they couldinform such a spiritual whole. The inclusionof an African ontology is essential to this.

But how did this come to pass? One theoryfor this is the spread of the Western religionsduring colonial times often led to the suppres-sion, exclusion or the dilution of religions andreligious practices judged by Western religionsas ‘unchristian’. For example, Candomble, areligion born in West African and transportedto South American by slaves, only survived as areligion in Brazil by incorporating a numberof Christian practices into its means ofworship, and the influence of the merging ofthese practices is still seen within its cere-monies today (Van De Port, 2005).

Another problem for the transpersonal isthe sheer number of spiritual practices andreligions on the continent of Africa. As a conti-nent where there are 53 nations (includingthe islands off the African coastlines butconsidered to be African), and hundreds oflanguages spoken by numerous tribes, andtribal groups spread across the continent. Thistherefore means there is no one religion thatcovers all of Africa, unlike say Catholicismacross parts Europe (where even here thereare differences), meaning that at best in anyunderstanding of African spirituality what onemust aim for is an understanding of the mainways of spiritual worship across Africa.

Perhaps though the most interestingperspective on the absence of an acknowl-edgement of afrocentric spirituality within thetranspersonal is that it would involve a worldlypsychological shift downwards. Using the signof the cross as a metaphor, this would involvea change of direction away from the more

Western tendency to move from the West tothe East, or from the left and right, and wouldencourage a movement downwards, downthrough the chakras towards the more earthlyand emotional aspects of ourselves that havebeen ignored in some spiritual practiceswhere the emphasis is placed on transcen-dence of the egoic self, and not I will suggestthe incarnation of spirit.

Overall though, my argument involvesmore than reaching for a Perennialist under-standing of the spiritual (Ferrer, 2000;Oldmeadow, 2010), where the similaritiesbetween religious paths are recognised in thequest for an understanding of the universalexpression of spirituality. What I am questingfor here is a recognition and acceptance offorms of spiritual expression that currentlyperhaps reside outside of the perennialnorm. And this is where a more cosmopolitanperspective is perhaps more useful.

The main ideas within cosmopolitanismfor this paper revolve around the interestingconcept of the understanding and acknowl-edgement of cultural others, where we don’thave to agree with them, be it their ideas orsocietal habits, but we do have to accept theirright to their own point of view (Appiah,2006; Snee, 2013; Pollock et al., 2000). Thiswould allow for an acknowledgement that weare all the Spiritual Other in some way orform, a necessary step on the path towardsthis search for this mythical universality(Pollock et al., 2000). The taking of a morecosmopolitan consideration of spiritualitytherefore allows for a positioning of otherforms of spirituality; Afrocentric, Maori,Aboriginal and many others, alongside themore established and understood spiritualbeliefs of the East and the West.

To understand African spirituality, it iswise to underline just how much religionand spirituality sit as cornerstones withinmany African cultures. For example, withinmost traditions there is a strong belief in ourconnection not just to family and commu-nity, but also to our ancestors, the spirits thatguide us, and then unto God itself. Inselecting just a small cross section, Mbiti


Searching for afrocentric spirituality within the transpersonal

(1989) in his detailed text where he stressesthat for Africans this is a religious universe,also outlines how ‘for many peoples like theBachwa, Bemba, Lugbara, Nuer and others,(they) refer to human beings (or specialgroups of them) as ‘the children of God’, or‘sons of God’, or ‘people of God’…’ (p.49).He also stresses how God appears throughnature and in animals within many Africantraditions. Following on from this, there is adistinct link between the ideas of using myth and symbols within the world ofpsychotherapy (Jung 1964) and the positionof the same within African spirituality. Forexample, Imbo states ‘there is an ethno-philosophy in the proverbs, myths, folk tales,sculptures and traditional cultures’ (1998, p.xi). Okpewho (1983) also talks about theimportance of myth to an African ontolog-ical sense of being, for example within theNdembu of Zambia, where there are a ‘forestof symbols’ in their ritual life. He then goeson to expand on his idea whilst stating ‘thesymbolic activities of a non-literate culturebear such a kinship with the kind of rationalexercise found in literature culture, have weany right to judge the one any less scientificthan the other…?’ (1983, p.30).

Next, spirits are often considered to bedivinities that have been created by God andthrough whom God acts. For example, asMbiti (1989) states ‘the Ashanti have apantheon of divinities through whom Godmanifests Himself. They are known asAbosom; are said to ‘come from Him’ and toact as His servants and intermediariesbetween Him and other creatures’ (p.75).

It is also important to acknowledge theimportance in African cultures of the role ofthe ancestors and their continued influenceover us. For example, Sangomas of SouthAfrica, or traditional healers, are oftencharged with offering access to individuals totheir ancestors. But as Thornton (2011)states, ‘healers are not ‘possessed’ by spirits,but rather claim to ‘possess ancestors’ or tohave ancestors. This is not simply a claim tospecial spiritual access, but is also a claim toan identity and a specific cultural and intel-

lectual heritage’ (p. 26). This importance isalso relevant across most of Africa. Anotherexample comes from Kwame (2014), whoduring a TED Talks discussion on religion,explores his own roots and the Ghanaianritual of pouring a portion of his drink on theground and offering respect to the ancestorsbefore a meal or event. Taken together, ouridentity is therefore formed by the recogni-tion of who we are in the eyes and via ourrelationships with all these differentconscious and metaphysical levels of being.

At this very basic level, an afrocentricontology is therefore one that is hugelycommunal, and allows for an identity which isformed out of our relationship to ourspiritual others who sit around us at all times.Although similar in ways to the ideas of socialconstructionism here in the West (Andrews2012), where identity is formed through theinfluence of culturally pre-determined socialconstructs upon the individual, there is adistinct variation in the ideas of just whatmetaphysically helps us to form this identity.As Harris though states in returning us to ourafrocentric perspective, ‘consciousness deter-mines being. Consciousness in this sensemeans the way an individual (or a people)thinks about relationship with self, others,with nature, and or with some superior ideaor being’ (Asante, 2008, p.113). In my view,these more collective experience of spiritualillumination, experiences that sit alongsidethose of American Indian and Aboriginaltraditions, have much in common with saythe experience of a Christian Mass, thecollective chanting of Buddhist priest or thewhirling of Sufi Dervishes in that they arerelational. Where they differ though is in theencouragement of understanding out rela-tionship to others, other parts of our past andpresent, other parts of the world around us,and therefore in totality other aspects of God.

The dream I need to clearly state though that the verybrief examples of African spirituality are notmeant to reduce or simplify the Africanspiritual experience in any fashion as, as previ-


Dwight Turner, Dr Jane Callaghan & Dr Alasdair Gordon-Finlayson

ously stated, it is almost impossible to trulyunderstand the range and diversity of Africanspiritual traditions. The hope here is to openthe transpersonal to an exploration into theuniqueness of an African heritage often over-looked by the ‘major’ religions. An awarenessof this heritage, for example when consideredin connection with this author’s dream, thenallows clients from a more afro-centric back-ground access to a deeper sense of themselvesvia their own aspect of the unconscious via themyths and stories located within their owncollective unconscious heritage.

In order to encourage this explorationfurther let me present a modified version ofthe dream, below. This appeared in anarticle I published several years ago which Iwould like to reprint here. The dream reads:

I’m standing at the top of Victoria Falls inthe middle of the Zambezi River. I’m on arock in the middle of this massive waterfall.To my left all I can see is water, tumblingover the edge and into the depths far below,and to my right the same. I look down. All Ican see is billions of gallons of water racingaway from me, further and further awayfrom me, so I jump. Feet first I jump down,my back to this thunderous wall of water,and I fall, I keep falling, feeling nervous atfirst, but then gradually more relaxed withwhat I’ve done.

Then, suddenly, I land on a wooden platformimbedded into the waterfall.

As I look around I notice a waterwheel to myleft turning slowly as the water tumblespast. I realise this is a house built into thewall of the waterfall, so I walk inside. Twonaked people, one male one female, bothwhite, spot me and run away in differentdiagonal directions as I walk towards them.I don’t call out to them, I just let them go,before making my way back outside. AgainI’m back on the platform, at its edge, thewaterwheel to my side, and ready to jump.

So I do.

And again I fall feet first downwards, withmy back to the waterfall, its raging noisetremendous, its torrent of water sprayingme delicately. And even though I’m falling,even though I feel nervous, I know,somehow, that everything is going to bealright. (Turner, 2007)

As a transpersonal psychotherapist who hasundertaken years of transpersonalpsychotherapy, it seemed strange lookingback at the lack of a cultural understandingof this dream in my previous work. It is adream that could be explored from withinthe more traditional therapeutic angles ofmetaphor and the use of symbols so commonto Jungian analysis (Jung, 1964; Stevens,1990) where the metaphors are explored formeaning by the client and the analyst, androoted in a Greek mythological paradigm.

This is a dream that has followed me fora number of years, and been explored on avarious occasions both by myself in solitudeand within my own psychotherapeuticjourney to varying affect. During this time,the meanings given to this dream haveranged from this author needing to connectwith his deeper unconscious, to the attain-ment of one’s natural power. For myselfthough, the most powerful aspect of thisdream was its metaphorical premonition ofmy undertaking my own spiritual journey,with this author travelling to East Africa onesummer. From Dar Es Salaam, in Tanzania, Ithen undertook a train ride on the Tazaratrain line, where I was unable to access a firstclass cabin as they were all booked by afamily from South Africa. I was thereforeplaced in second class with five other menfor the duration of my journey where I metthree Tanzanian men and two Zambians, allof whom were travelling to Zambia for a reli-gious conference. This lovely coincidencegifted me a journey therefore punctuated bysome in depth conversations about religionand spiritual beliefs across East Africa.

On arrival in Zambia, I said my farewellsbefore undertaking a number of bus journeysdown to Livingstone, via Lusaka. Several


Searching for afrocentric spirituality within the transpersonal

hours outside of Livingstone, the bus brokedown at the side of the road, where I met andtalked for several hours with two Catholicnuns who were also travelling to the Falls onholiday before returning to Italy to retire.Another lovely coincidence. On my arrival atthe falls, several days later, the first thing I didwas to walk along the wall opposite the actualwaterfalls, and to find a place to sit and medi-tate. It was then that for me I was at my mostemotional, whilst I sat there opposite thepower of God itself, whilst tourists meanderedpast in the woods behind me, and rainbowsdanced across the scene before. Given thepower of the dream, and the spiritual connec-tions, for myself this was a myth in a dreamthat took me on a life changing journey to apoint where I could sit there and watch aschildren played in the waters of the Zambezi(the author was far too cowardly to jump).

Conclusion For this author, accessing this dream via amore afrocentric ontology was especiallyimportant as it presented within its use ofmetaphor a journey full of self-discoverywhere some of his own unconscious colonialshackles fell away, and led to the undertakingof his own life changing spiritual journey toMosi-ao-Tunya (otherwise known in the Westas Victoria Falls). It is this understanding ofAfrican spirituality, together with this by nomeans unique experience that I feel is impor-tant for the Transpersonal to acknowledge if itis to truly engage with its spiritual (br)other.

Dwight [email protected] Dr Jane Callaghan ????????@?????????Dr Alasdair Gordon-Finlayson????????@?????????


Dwight Turner, Dr Jane Callaghan & Dr Alasdair Gordon-Finlayson

Andrews, T. (2012). What is social constructionism?The Grounded Theory Review, 11(1), 39–46.

Appiah, K.A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a worldof strangers. London: Penguin Books.

Appiah, K.A. (2014). Is religion good or bad (this is a trickquestion). New York, NY: TEDSalon.

Asante, M.K. (????). Afrocentricity: The Theory ofSocial Change. ??????: ?????

Asante, M.K. (2008). An Afrocentric Manifesto (Second).Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Asante, M.K. (1984). The African American mode.The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 16(2),167–177.

Ferrer, J.N. (2000). The perennial philosophy revis-ited. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 32(1).

Hart, T., Nelson, P. & Puhakka, K. (2000). Transper-sonal Knowing: Exploring the horizon of consciousness.Albany, NY: Suny Press.

Imbo, S. Ouoch. (1998). An introduction to Africanphilosophy. USA/UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publi-cations Ltd.

Joseph, D. (2012). Swimming with the Whale: Teachingand Practices of Daskalos and the researchers of truth.Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation.

Jung, C.G. (1964). Man and his Symbols. UK: Picador.Mazama, A. (2003). The Afrocentric Paradigm. Eritrea:

Africa World Press Inc.Mbiti, J.S. (1989). African Religions and Philosophy (2nd

Edn). Nigeria: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

Okpewho, I. (1983). Myth in Africa. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Oldmeadow, H. (2010). Frithjon Schuon and the PerennialPhilosophy. Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom Books.

Pollock, S., Bhabha, H., Breckenridge, C. &Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Cosmopolitanisms. PublicCulture, 12(3), 577–589.

Van De Port, M. (2005). Candomblé in pink, green andblack. Re-scripting the Afro-Brazilian religiousheritage in the public sphere of Salvador, Bahia.Social Anthropology, 13(1), 3–26. Retrieved 19 May2014 from www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0964028204001077 .

Snee, H. (2013). Framing the Other: Cosmopolitanismand the representation of difference in overseasgap year narratives. The British journal of sociology,64(1), 142–62. Retrieved 17 September 2013 fromwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23488705.

Stevens, A. (1990). On Jung, UK: Penguin Limited.Thornton, R. (2011). The transmission of knowledge

in South African traditional healing. Africa,79(01), 17–34. Retrieved 8 October 2014 fromwww.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0001972000087921.

Turner, D.D. & Turner, D., 2007. The Smoke thatThunders : A personal perspective on how theabsent father hinders the growth of black men inthe new millenium, 85–91.

References

timgri

Sticky Note

Please can you supply the emails for the authors?

timgri

Sticky Note

There are two references to Asante in the text and one incomplete reference in the list, please could you supply the complete reference for them both?


Introduction WHEN I WAS in my late teens, I becamecurious about religions other than the one inwhich I had been raised. I pondered howfortunate I was to be born into the ‘right’tradition, and wondered what would havehappened had I been born into some otherspiritual community – would I have believedas ardently that it was the correct way? Whichone of these possible versions of myself wasright? In the midst of these ruminations, Ifound a magazine on a coffee table whilewaiting for an appointment, and flipped itopen to a figure that illustrated FritjofSchuon’s (1953/1984) perennialist model:six traditions—labeled Hinduism, Buddhism,The Chinese Tradition, Judaism, Christi-anity, and Islam—were represented asvertical wedges of a triangular mountain,

and halfway up the mountain’s flank wasdrawn a horizontal line. Below the line,where the traditions diverged most widely,was the word exoteric. Above the line, wherethey converged into a single point, was theword esoteric. I took it in in a glimpse, andthe vision seized me. Later I listened tolectures by the comparative mythologistJoseph Campbell (e.g., 1949/1968), whichseemed to affirm my earlier conversion towhat I did not yet know to call perennialism.

I found comfort and meaning in thesimple affirmation that those of otherspiritual traditions were walking a path thatled where mine led. It seemed humane,kind, honorable. It felt deeply true. I couldrespect a God who looked at the heart, anddid not quibble over outer forms of practice.Then I went to graduate school, and saw for

A startling new role for Wilber’s IntegralModel; or how I learned to stop worrying and love perennialism – A response to AbramsonGlenn Hartelius

Critics of Ken Wilber’s work are unfailingly charged with misunderstanding his views. In a recent paperby John Abramson (2014), published in this journal under the title, ‘The misunderstanding andmisinterpretation of key aspects of Ken Wilber’s work in Hartelius and Ferrer’s (2013) assessment,’Hartelius and Ferrer’s paper, ‘Transpersonal Philosophy: The Participatory Turn,’ appearing as Chapter10 in The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology, has met with this same charge. Thispaper argues that what Abramson (2014) has done is (1) to attempt to inflate semantic issues into theappearance of substantive ones, (2) to conflate Wilber’s assertions with the logical arguments that wouldestablish those assertions, (3) to critique the authors for using points made by Wilber himself, (4) to subtlyassert the rightful primacy of Wilber’s model by implying that any debate about it should take place on theterritory of its assumptions, (5) to lodge complaints that the authors have failed to co-create somecompromise between participatory and integral approaches, and (6) to hold out the prospect that a fullaccount of Wilber’s work would ‘comprehensively dispel’ (p.4) the misunderstandings to which Harteliusand Ferrer (2013) are allegedly subject. Through this retort, Abramson (2014) has attempted to create theappearance that Wilber’s work remains a viable framework for enterprises such as transpersonalpsychology – something that seems highly unlikely. This paper further argues that Wilber does not offer agrand scholarly theory of everything, but a problematic metaphysical theory that may nevertheless continueto serve a limited popular audience.

myself that however appealing a perennialistmodel might be, its metaphysical claimswould not stand up to critical scrutiny and itsattempt at inclusiveness held the seeds ofhierarchical dogmatism. Schuon’s simplemodel served me well as a first approxima-tion, but I gradually relinquished it in favorof participatory thought, which seemed toaccomplish similar ends in a manner bettersuited to the needs of a transpersonalapproach to psychology.

Participatory philosophy has been wellreceived by some as a cogent, alternativetranspersonal framework within which toconsider human spirituality (e.g., Dale, 2014;Daniels, 2005; Ferrer, 2002; Heron, 2006;Lahood, 2007). In this stance, the world is anopen-ended living system that is continu-ously co-creating itself (cf. Varela, Maturana,& Uribe, 1974). Building on insights fromromantic philosophy (cf. Sherman, 2008;Tarnas, 1991), a participatory view holds thatthe mind is not separate from the materialworld – it is not in some other dimension,nor is it sequestered from a separate objec-tive reality (Skolimowski, 1994). Instead,mind and nature are woven from the samefabric (cf. Bateson, 1979) – mind is made ofthe same stuff as the world, and conscious-ness in some form penetrates through all ofphysicality (Chalmers, 1995; De Quincey,1994; Heron, 1992). When a human mindknows the world, it is not peering in fromanother sort of reality: it is a located aspect ofthe world that is engaged in knowing itself(Velmans, 2008). Because the knower isalways located (cf. Haraway, 1988), andbecause whatever spiritual forces may beabroad in the world exist in this dimensionand not some other, each spiritualencounter is also a situated event (Ferrer,2008) – and therefore by definition likely tohave its own specific character (Kripal, 2003;Irwin, 1996). The diversity of humanspiritual experience, then, does not reflectimperfect interpretations of an encounterwith the same transcendent reality, butpersonally or communally shaped under-standings of distinct spiritual encounters

(Dale, 2014; Ferrer, 2002; Irwin, 1996, 2008).Participatory thought does not attempt toimpose a rubric to which all such events mustconform – however awkwardly; instead, itseeks to outline a philosophical contextwithin which the diversity of spiritual tradi-tions, experiences, and phenomena can beaccepted and celebrated while simultane-ously offering grounds for critical discern-ment regarding spiritual phenomena(Duckworth, 2014; Ferrer, 2009; 2011b;Ogilvy, 2013).

Until the arrival of participatory thoughtin the transpersonal field just after the turnof the century (Ferrer, 2002), Ken Wilber’sevolving philosophical framework was attimes seen as the primary philosophicalfoundation of transpersonal psychology(Rothberg, 1986). In the 1990s, seriouscritiques of Wilber’s model were publishedfirst in the journal Revision, and latercollected into Rothberg and Kelly’s (1998)book, Ken Wilber in Dialogue. Ferrer (1998)wrote a review critical of Wilber’s (1998)book, The Marriage of Sense and Soul, and thenpublished a paper outlining shortcomings ofa perennial philosophy (Ferrer, 2000) –an approach that Wilber had explicitlyemployed in some of his work prior to thatdate. Ferrer’s work met with some resistancefrom Wilber, who reportedly made efforts toimpede its publication within transpersonalliterature (Ferrer & Puente, 2013); shortlythereafter, Wilber announced his departurefrom the transpersonal movement – likelyfor complex reasons.

Given the prominent role of Wilber’swork within transpersonal psychology, andthe at times heated scholarly debate thatsurrounded the introduction of participa-tory thought as an alternate philosophicalframe, it seemed fitting that the chapter onparticipatory philosophy in The Wiley-Black-well Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology(Friedman & Hartelius, 2013) brieflyreprised this history and both recounted andextended some major critiques of Wilber’swork from a participatory perspective(Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). Abramson’s


Glen Hartelius


A startling new role for Wilber’s integral model

(2014) response to this work purports tooutline ‘the misunderstanding and misinter-pretation of key aspects of Ken Wilber’swork’ by the authors of that chapter.

There is a goal that Ferrer and Harteliusshare with Wilber and Abramson, namely thedevelopment of ways to situate the study ofthe whole person, including human spiritu-ality. What is perhaps most troubling, both inWilber’s work and Abramson’s (2014) argu-ments, is that despite this commonality thetenor of discourse appears to have more incommon with political debate than withscholarly argument. That is, Wilber andAbramson have attempted to score rhetor-ical points in ways that at times seems disin-genuous, rather than engaging forthrightly.One problem with this style is that refutationof such arguments requires going throughthe issues with considerable care and detail.This could give a casual reader the veryimpression that Abramson (2014) hasexpressly set out to convey: namely, that thecritiques offered by Hartelius and Ferrer(2013) – most of these stemming from thework of Ferrer (e.g., 2000, 2002, 2011a) – arecomplex and subject to technical debate,rather than simple points that strike at theroot of Wilber’s system.

A second unfortunate element is therepeated charges that Wilber’s points havebeen overlooked, misunderstood, or omitted,and that the offered accounts of his work areinaccurate and misleading. Ferrer hasresponded to Wilber’s work at length both inhis 1998 review and extensively in his 2002work, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory (e.g.,pp.66–69; 179–181; 223–226). After nearly adecade of silence, Ferrer (2011a) dedicatedan entire essay to respond to Wilber’s mostrecent revision of his model (Wilber-V),concluding with an explicit call to dialogue.Wilber has not responded to any of theserejoinders or invitations to clarify hisperspectives. Abramson’s (2014) tut-tuttingabout Ferrer dropping the dialogical ball ismisplaced and seems an attempt at discred-iting a critic. In addition, Abramson’s argu-ments are insubstantial, and the outcome is

that the case he has made against thesecritiques of Wilber is very thin indeed.

What Abramson (2014) has done is (1) toattempt to inflate semantic issues into theappearance of substantive ones, (2) toconflate Wilber’s assertions with the logicalarguments that would establish those asser-tions, (3) to critique the authors for usingpoints made by Wilber himself, (4) to subtlyassert the rightful primacy of Wilber’s modelby implying that any debate about it shouldtake place on the territory of its assumptions,(5) to lodge complaints that the authorshave failed to co-create some compromisebetween participatory and integralapproaches, and (6) to hold out theprospect that a full account of Wilber’s workwould ‘comprehensively dispel’ (p. 4) themisunderstandings to which Hartelius andFerrer (2013) are allegedly subject. Hispurpose seems to be to deflect or dilutethese critiques and demonstrate ‘to thosewith only an acquaintance with Wilber’swork that Hartelius and Ferrer have a case to answer’ (p. 4). Through this retort,Abramson (2014) has attempted to createthe appearance that Wilber’s work remains aviable framework for enterprises such astranspersonal psychology – something thatseems highly unlikely.

The first part of the following response is organised in the same manner asAbramson’s (2014) paper: six sections and aconclusion, each addressing the correspon-ding section in Abramson. This is followedby a discussion section that examines theissue of whether the charge that Wilber hasbeen misunderstood is valid or whether thiscan more coherently be understood as partof a strategy to deflect legitimate criticism. Aconcluding section considers the possiblefuture role of Wilber’ s work.

1. A single nondual realityAbramson (2014) opened with an assertionthat Hartelius and Ferrer ‘appear to haveoverlooked’ Wilber’s rejection of criticismthat ‘his work involves a perennialist versionof a single nondual ultimate reality’ (p.4). As

evidence for this position, Abramson beganwith a quote from the fictional characterJoan Hazelton, drawn from what appears tobe a section of writing that did not make itinto Wilber’s (2002) novel, Boomeritis: ‘Idon’t know a single major theorist who actu-ally believes that’ (Wilber, 2007b, p.6; citedin Abramson, 2014, as Wilber, 2002c). Whileit seems unusual to use the dialogue of char-acters in a novel as evidence for scholarlyargument – and it should be noted thatdespite this, Ferrer (2011a) has respondedbriefly even to this obscure passage – thereare problems beyond this fact. First, thecharacter quoted in this case is not speakingabout a perennialist version of a singlenondual ultimate reality, but characterising‘’an increasingly intense commitment to asingle absolute universal truth’ (Wilber,2007b, p.6; cited in Abramson, 2014, asWilber, 2002c). The issue of whether or notthere exists universal truth is distinct frompostulations of an ultimate nondual dimen-sion. Second, even if this bit of dialogue didreflect Wilber’s position on the somewhatdifferent matter of a perennialist ultimate,an assertion of this sort would not changethe fact that his model is dependent on anondual dimension that is entirely indistin-guishable from a perennialist ultimate.

Abramson did also provide a quote inwhich Wilber (2000) argued against criticsidentifying him with perennialist philosophyby claiming, in Wilber’s words:

the only item of the perennial philosophythat I have actually defended is the notionsof realms of being and knowing… . Most ofthe other aspects… such as unchangingarchetypes, involution and evolution as fixedand predetermined, the strictly hierarchical(as opposed to holonic/quadratic) nature ofreality etc. — I do not believe are universal ortrue. (p.158)

This claim is problematic. First, the issuehere is not what Wilber has defended, but whathis proffered model necessarily relies upon –

and his model relies upon a nondual ulti-mate that, as noted, is very much identicalwith a perennialist ultimate. Second, the‘other aspects’ referred to by Wilber (2000),such as ‘unchanging archetypes, involutionand evolution as fixed and predetermined,’and ‘the strictly hierarchical … nature ofreality’ (p.158) are not, in fact, characteristicof perennialist approaches other than earlierversions of his own work. Read literally, this isnot even a direct denial by Wilber that hiswork is perennialist in nature, much less asubstantive defense against the simple obser-vation that his model remains essentiallyperennialist in structure.

Abramson (2014) continued with theclaim that Wilber’s work does not postulate asingle nondual reality. This is an inflation of semantic differences, playing on anextremely minor point. Abramson againcited from a sidebar to Wilber’s (2002) novelto demonstrate Wilber’s position (2007a)that ‘ultimate reality is nondual—it is ‘nottwo, not one’’ (p.15), a position consistentwith the traditional teachings of AdvaitaVedanta (e.g., Whitfield, 2009). The issue isclearly directed at reference to a singlenondual reality. Yet this was merely to distin-guish Wilber’s position from the ontologi-cally pluralistic views of Ferrer (2002, 2008,2009, 2011b). That is, within Wilber’sthought it is the nondual – whatever itsnature – that is the only final or completedestination for all humankind, even if mostspiritual traditions remain unaware of this.The particular phrasing did not reflect afailure to understand that such a nondualdimension could be described as neither onenor two, or from either an absolute or rela-tive point of view. Abramson might as rele-vantly have complained that the title ofWilber’s 1999 book, One Taste, should actu-ally have been, Not One Taste, Not Two Tastes.To attempt to parlay this very small matterinto some substantive point of misunder-standing is misleading.

In a rather more surprising twist,Abramson (2014) claimed that ‘Wilber’s and


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Ferrer’s position on a single truth… is verysimilar’ (p.5). As evidence for this,Abramson offered a 36-word quote fromFerrer (2002), which he compared in astrained way with his interpretation ofWilber’s thought. Yet any wider reading ofthe two theorists will quickly demonstratethat it is futile to argue that an ultimatenondual reality – from whatever perspec-tive – is somehow the same as ontologicallyrich multiplicities of embodied enactions.This argument fails entirely.

Abramson (2014) then turned to Ferrer’s(2002) treatment of Murti (e.g., 1955/2013),offering short critiques of Murti’s critics suchas Streng (1967), Richards (1978), Tuck(1990), Huntington (1989/2007), andGarfield (1994) – several of which arelacking in his reference section. A completeconsideration of these debates is well beyondthe scope of this response, but Abramson’spurpose here is to suggest that Murti hascontemporary supporters, and that some ofhis critics have misunderstood him. Whatcan be said is that Abramson (2014) pursuedthese arguments in much the same way asthose illustrated above, basing broad conclu-sions on very limited samples. He is correctin noting that there are a few contemporarysupporters of Murti’s absolutist perspectives,but this does not mean that the issue is anopen one within wider scholarly circles anymore than the fact that the existence ofclimate deniers is evidence that the reality ofglobal warming is still up for any real scien-tific debate.

2. Wilber’s division between subject and object

Abramson (2014) claimed that Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) have overlooked Wilber’sstatements that subject and object are notnecessarily separate. In fact, the relevantpassage draws on Ferrer’s (2002) critique ofperennialism. Ferrer pointed to the simpleand logical fact that a perennialist modelrequires an objective, transcendent ultimatethat is apprehended deep within personalsubjectivity. That ultimate must be objective

in order for it to be the consistent destina-tion of all traditions. However, if that ulti-mate is objective in nature, then bydefinition it is distinct from the subject whoperceives it. If Abramson does not believethat Wilber’s work is perennialist, then thiscritique would not apply to Wilber’s work.However, if the structure of Wilber’s work isindistinguishable from the structure of oneor another version of perennialism asoutlined by Ferrer (2002), then Wilber’sassertions alone are not sufficient to changethe fact that it can legitimately described asperennialist, nor to override the shortcom-ings of such a model.

There is a slightly different facet to thisissue also. What Hartelius and Ferrer (2013)pointed out was that it is through Wilber’spostulated nondual ultimate that his subjec-tive and objective quadrants are unified. IfWilber’s post-metaphysical has truly movedaway from a metaphysical ultimate, then thenondual can no longer serve as the unifyingdimension out of which both subjective andobjective quadrants equally arise, and one isback to the overtly Cartesian situation inwhich these two domains are entirely distinct;in this situation the subjective will again bedevalued in a modernist context. In otherwords, without a nondual dimension thatserves to place subjective and objective quad-rants on equal ontological footing, Wilber’sAQAL model does not redeem the reality ofthe interior quadrants from a moderniststance. On the other hand, if the nondual isretained as the vehicle for resolving this issue,then Wilber’s system is still deeply metaphys-ical, as well as remaining subtly Cartesian (cf.Ferrer, 2002). Neither strategy fully resolvesthe problems inherent in the Cartesiandynamics of modern philosophy, and one hasthe additional handicap of resting on a meta-physical base.

3. Wilber’s 2002 critique of FerrerThere is a complaint expressed byAbramson (2014) that Wilber’s 2002critiques of Ferrer have not been addressed.The first problem here is that the section

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quoted as Wilber’s (2007b) words are againthe dialogue of the fictional character, JoanHazelton, who does not name Ferrer at all.To suggest that this outtake from a novel iscritique of Ferrer that requires a specificscholarly response is mistaken.

Yet since Abramson (2014) has raised theissue, it is possible to set aside the unusualprovenance of this quote and respond to theargument. What Wilber (2007b) wrote wasthat ‘pluralism plus history is genealogy,’suggesting that pluralism itself is static, that history ‘moves beyond pluralism,’ andthat genealogy ‘transcends and includes’pluralism (p.9). However, even if a recon-structive genealogy of history and worldviewsmight be able to situate various types ofpluralism or universalism, there are anumber of competing genealogies – ofwhich Wilber’s is just one. The implicationhere is that Wilber’s genealogy is the actualgenealogy – which is another way of sayingthat a pluralistic system is only meaningful ifit is situated within Wilber’s integral model.This is not a substantive critique, but theimposition of a meta-narrative – a Wilbergenealogy – which the narrating fictive char-acter has just said that one should not do.

4. The universality of Wilber’s Kosmic habits

In this section, Abramson asserted thatHartelius and Ferrer (2013) were incorrectin claiming that all of Wilber’s kosmic habitsare universal. In fact, Hartelius and Ferrermade no such claim. The phrase quoted byAbramson as evidence for this complaintdrew on Ferrer’s (2002) description of ageneral type of perennialism – structuralistperennialism – that could be applied tosystems other than Wilber’s as well.Abramson (2014) then went on to acknowl-edge that in Wilber’s model, some deepstructures are universal – which is preciselythe mark of structuralist perennialism.However, Hartelius and Ferrer did not makeany claim that all of Wilber’s kosmic habitsare universal. It is not clear how Abramsonarrived at this objection.

The larger issue here is not whether all ofWilber’s kosmic habits are universal, butwhether any of them are universal. A system inwhich the actions of some individuals orgroups can, through their repeated actions,create some sort of deep structure that nowmust be navigated by all humans (cf. Ferrer,2011a; Rowan et al., 2009) reveals the persist-ence of the subtle Cartesianism that has beenFerrer’s (2002) consistent critique of perenni-alist systems. If even some cultural habitsbecome kosmic habits that others arerequired to negotiate, then these habits arenot merely ontologically real, but objectivelyreal in a Cartesian sense. Ferrer (2002, 2011a)acknowledged that cultural habits may createnew options or pathways for cocreative partic-ipation, but explicitly rejected the notion thatany of these new potentials can becomemandatory. The fact that Wilber has intro-duced more flexibility into his system byallowing that ‘kosmic habits can be localrather than universal’ (Abramson, 2014, p.9)does not solve the deeper issues associatedwith the subtle Cartesianism inherent in thestructure and assumptions of his model.

5. Wilber’s Kosmic habits and the upper left quadrant

Here Abramson (2014) reported that Wilber‘is incredulous that Ferrer… can deduce thathe has shifted the ontological status ofkosmic habits to the inner realm (upper-leftquadrant) of an individual’ (p.10). Thiscomplaint is highly disingenuous, almost tothe point of dishonesty.

As context, the issue here is that whenWilber described the deep structures ofreality leading to Gebser-like stages of civili-sation as pre-given ontological structures,these so-called deep structures were rightlycritiqued as metaphysical. In order toprotect them from this critique, Wilberreplaced these pre-given ontological struc-tures with levels of being that are collectivelyconstructed by humans. It would seem thatthis necessarily moved such structures fromthe right-hand quadrants (objective) to theleft-hand quadrants (subjective).


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The veracity of this observation is furtherreinforced by a passage, cited by Harteliusand Ferrer (2013) from the most recentmajor Wilber (2006) book, in which he stated,

The great chain of being… which representsthe essence of those premodern traditions, isactually dealing with realities and phenomenathat are almost entirely in the upper-leftquadrant. (p.44, emphasis in original).

There are three reasons to read this asWilber’s own opinion, and not – as Abramson(2014) has claimed – referring to howpremodern traditions assigned themselves.First, Wilber has made a direct claim hereabout the status of premodern traditions.Second, his language is very particular,claiming that such phenomena are almostentirely in his upper-left quadrant. Surely, nopremodern tradition made any claims aboutbeing ‘almost entirely’ within individualsubjectivity; this is Wilber’s assignment.Third, Wilber (2006) continued on, saying,‘This [referring to the upper-left quadrantassignment] is not a negative put-down, but apositive address: these folks were consum-mate phenomenologists’ (p.44). It is clearthat, within the constraints of maintaining hisposition that all phenomena occur in all fourquadrants, Wilber has placed thesephenomena ‘almost entirely’ within thequadrant representing individual subjectivity.

In fact, Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) werecareful to stop after this point and offer amore generous reading of Wilber, suggestingthat since the quadrants are interconnected orperhaps even entangled through the nondual,it seemed possible that assigning a particularphenomenon to a quadrant does not neces-sarily reduce it to that quadrant. There areproblems here, however. First, Wilber has nothimself suggested such an interpretation, andsecond, if assigning spiritual phenomena‘almost entirely’ to the upper-left quadrant isnot a reduction, then it is hard to see howmodern science is reductionistic by assigningreality only to the right-hand quadrants, asWilber has frequently claimed.

In the end, Wilber cannot have it bothways – at least not within the structure of hisAQAL model that, for all its revisions,remains subtly Cartesian (cf. Ferrer, 2002).By simple logic, either his Kosmic habits (deep structures) are subjectivelyconstructed, and therefore not metaphysical,or else they are assertions about the objectivenature of reality, and therefore metaphysical.In the first case they are reduced ‘almostentirely’ to the left-hand domain of subjec-tivity; in the second case, they are unaccept-able in a modern scholarly context – asWilber has himself acknowledged.

6. Wilber’s definition of Integral Post-Metaphysics

There is something refreshingly revealingabout Abramson’s concerns that a specificpassage of Wilber was omitted from Harteliusand Ferrer’s (2013) paper. It is true that thepaper omitted Wilber’s definition of integralpost-metaphysics. This was not an extensiveaccount of every aspect of Wilber’s integralpost-metaphysics, and the particular passageoffered by Abramson was not quoted – apassage deeply embedded within the tech-nical concepts of Wilber’s complex worldviewthat would scarcely be accessible to anyoneoutside of Wilber’s adherents. This is a lucidexample of how Wilber and his supportersinsist that the debate with Wilber’s ideas beconducted within a comprehensive under-standing and presentation of Wilber’s writ-ings. That is, any discussion of Wilber’s workshould be situated on the cartography ofWilber’s worldview – an apparent attempt todictate that, in order to debate with Wilber,one must be familiar with all of his writings,up on his very latest change of opinion, andthat one must cite and address everythingthat Wilber or any of his supporters believeshould be cited or addressed.

To demand that any debate aboutWilber’s work be situated within Wilber’smodel is to assert by implication thatWilber’s meta-narrative has superior legiti-macy. This is foundational to Wilber’s work,for he seems to have positioned himself as

one of the ‘few people’ (Abramson, 2014,p.11) who can legitimately talk aboutnondual reality. He is among those few whoare at a higher evolutionary level, and whosenarrative is therefore privileged beyond thatof those whose misfortune it is to be classi-fied, in Wilber’s system and by virtue of theirdisagreement with him, as on a lower rung,or at the level of an inferior meme. Whileevery reasonable effort should be putforward to understand Wilber’s writingswithin the larger context of his model andhis contemporary thought – which changesmore rapidly than that of most writers – themeta-narrative that Wilber’s work cannot becritiqued except by readers who agree that itsays what Wilber claims it says, is one thatdeserves to be rejected.

Abramson’s conclusionIn his conclusion, Abramson (2014)suggested that there should be some co-creative participation between Ferrer andWilber – apparently Abramsontl transper-sonal version of pleading for everyone to justget along. Although dialogue betweendiverse viewpoints is commendable andFerrer (2011a) explicitly offered threespecific directions to move forward thedialogue with Wilber, co-creation does notimply compromise with every unworkablealternative. ‘Being participatory’ is not somenew ‘thing,’ some new transpersonal cult,but a call to move beyond transpersonalcults. It especially does not mean that anapproach eschewing ultimate knowledgeneeds to come to terms with one that assertsitself as the ever-changing vehicle ofunchanging ultimate knowledge.

In fact, the point of a participatoryapproach is precisely not to engage incompetitive debates about ultimate reality,but to largely set such debates aside in favorof an avowedly limited perspective thatallows for the legitimacy of spiritual experi-ence without resorting to absolutist claims(Ferrer, 2002; cf. Friedman, 2013); given hisreflections on Murti and Wilber, it seemsthat Abramson would deem such absolutist

claims licit. Participatory is not vying withWilber – whether or no his works are peren-nialist in either claim or substance – forbeing the top dog in defining ultimatereality within a transpersonal or integralcommunity. In my view, it is proposing aframework within which transpersonal workcan move forward to do good scholarshipand research on spiritual, mystical, andother exceptional human experiences withina scientifically-informed society, free fromthe impediments of metaphysical claims toprivileged knowledge about ultimate reality.

Has Ken Wilber been misunderstood byHartelius and Ferrer?Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) argued thatWilber’s work continues to be perennialist inits structure; to degree that Abramson (2014)accurately reflects Wilber’s views, his papersupports this claim. For example, Abramsonattempted to defend Murti’s (1955/2013)absolutist, essentialist model of ultimatereality, explicitly equating this perennialist-like ultimate with Wilber’s view. Abramson(2014) cited Wilber as suggesting that the‘Mystery’ has no specific qualities, thendescribed Wilber’s nondual as having thevery specific qualities of the Self of AdvaitaVedanta; Abramson then equated this sameMystery with the quite different but also veryspecific quality of Buddhist dependent origi-nation known as Emptiness – which isprecisely a perennialist strategy. He acknowl-edged that Wilber’s model sees some deepstructures of reality as universal, which is botha metaphysical assumption and characteristicof structuralist perennialism.

Neither Wilber nor Abramson (2014)seem prepared to accept the notion that ifone makes perennialist claims, it is reason-able that one’s work will be characterised as perennialist. True, Wilber (1997) hasdistanced himself from traditional perenni-alism, but this is not the same thing as beingnon-perennialist. Wilber (1997) has clearlyarticulated what has been aptly characterizedas a neoperennialist stance (Ferrer, 2002);while the latter is perhaps more apt as a


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term, this does not in any way detract fromthe critique by Hartelius and Ferrer (2013)that his work is perennialist in nature, andsubject to the limitations of such systems.

Wilber’s protestations about having hiswork identified as perennialist deservecareful attention. This strategy is similar tothat used by President Bill Clinton when hestated emphatically he had not had sexualrelations with Monica Lewinsky. As he lateracknowledged, he took the position that ifshe orally copulated him, it was her who washaving sexual relations with him, not theother way around – even though in anyconventional understanding, Clinton was infact plainly involved in sexual relations withLewinsky. His statement appeared to conveya plain and simple message that was contraryto the actual facts. Though the context isphilosophy and not sexual misconduct,Wilber has similarly denied that his work isperennialist on the basis of his own narrowand unconventional technical definition ofperennialism. In any ordinary usage of theterm, his system is accurately and usefullydescribed as perennialist.

The same can be said of Wilber’s claimthat he is post-metaphysical. Ferrer (2011a)has demonstrated in detail the manner inwhich Wilber has defined metaphysical in avery limited way, so that he can claim to bepost-metaphysical – while his postulatednondual dimension remains clearly meta-physical to any informed reader not lookingthrough Wilber’s customised lens. Though itis entirely valid to create and use technicaldefinitions for specific terms or constructs,Wilber has complained that his work is misun-derstood whenever critics employ commonlyascribed scholarly meanings, rather thanusing his own idiosyncratic definitions.

If Wilber’s unique definitions were supe-rior for advancing scholarship, then hisconcerns might be more worthy of a hearing.Because they are unconventional in a waythat seems designed merely to turn asidecritiques of his work, they fail to convince.There are undoubtedly occasions on whichWilber’s work has been legitimately misun-

derstood, but upon careful review it does notseem that there are significant instances ofthis by Hartelius and Ferrer (2013). Thereare clear points of difference on assump-tions, definitions, and conclusions, but thesedo not appear to be misunderstandings.

Given the frequency of this charge ofmisunderstanding, it seems fair to askwhether supporters of the Wilber model areactually requiring something more thanunderstanding. The fact that Wilber hasrarely accepted critiques openly (Ferrer &Puente, 2013; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998;Rowan, Daniels, Fontana, & Walley, 2009),has been perceived as intolerant of the opin-ions of others (e.g., May, Krippner, & Doyle,1992), and has attempted to block publica-tion of work by critics (cf. Ferrer & Puente,2013) suggests a stance in which perhapsanything short of agreement will be charac-terized as misunderstanding (cf. Rothberg &Kelly, 1998). While it is impossible to knowall of the motivations for the claims thatWilber’s work is misunderstood, the patternsof response are consistent with a belief that ifonly a reader understood Wilber’s model inits entirety, they would surely find itcompellingly true; conversely, if there isdisagreement, it must be because the modelhas not been understood in its fullness, in itslatest iteration, or through the lens of someobscure passage.

While Wilber and his supporters seem tohold a peculiarly adversarial stance towardcritics, Wilber’s model has neverthelessproven inspiring for thousands of readers.Perhaps it is time for the integral model tobe considered in a different light.

A startling new role for Wilber’sintegral modelWilber’s model was and is a developedversion of what Ferrer (2002) has calledstructuralist perennialism. When the modelwas met in scholarly circles with critiquesthat it relied on metaphysical assumptionssuch as an objectively real nondual ultimate,Wilber began what has been a series ofmaneuvers to position his work in ways that

side-stepped this and other critiques. Thishas complicated what was otherwise a ratherstraightforward way of representing anumber of personal, social, cultural, andnatural-world variables in a simple andconcise manner – even if it fails to integratethem as well as it purports to do. Yet the newand convoluted version is no less perenni-alist than the simpler one – this being saidwith the disclaimer that the term perenni-alist is being used in its broader and moreconventional sense rather than in Wilber’sspecialised sense. While a perennialist modelhas certain necessary shortcomings relativeto applications within modern psychology orreligious studies, it is still perfectly service-able as a meaning-making frame.

In fact, there is something intuitivelyattractive about the notion that a person froma different spiritual tradition is involved in aprocess very much like one’s own quest. It isan easily-grasped approximation that allowsthe individual to feel resonance with those ofother paths within the simple language oflived experience. In this first-approach appli-cation, perennialism is a humane and rela-tional alternative to prejudice, orthodoxy, andreligious extremism. With its postulatednondual dimension it is an affirmation of thevalue of lived experience, of interconnected-ness, of spirituality. Relieved of the notionthat his work will usher in an entirely new era,Wilber’s model is a sophisticated version ofperennialism that serves these worthy humanpurposes quite well.

Wilber’s construction teaches as much bywhere it falls short as by where it succeeds.For example, the moment the sharedspiritual goal of humanity is characterised inany way – even as nondual – this seeminglyinclusive model immediately transforms intoa hierarchical ranking of different spiritualpaths (Ferrer, 2002). This suggests that artic-ulating any specific universals in human spir-ituality may be quite difficult indeed. Even ifthe ultimate spiritual goal is ineffable butremains factually the same for all traditions,it must be in some sense objective; this inturn requires that it must have specific qual-

ities that would confirm some spiritual pathsas actually superior to others. Furthermore,if the qualities of this goal can only be perceived within the deep interiority of great mystics or saints or synthesizers,then spirituality is necessarily authoritarianin structure – emancipation, liberation, orredemption requires submission to aspiritual reality defined by others. Onemight say that Wilber’s model has shone alight on perennialism in a way that shows theneed for a philosophy that would go quitebeyond both postmodernism and perenni-alism – a need that might go unrecognisedwithout the work that Wilber has done.

Something similar is true of states ofconsciousness, for if attainment of spiritualgoals involves the achievement of a partic-ular state, then a perennialist frame permitsno diversity of phenomenology (Ferrer,2011a); it imposes an arbitrary conceptualframework on phenomenological experi-ence that necessarily claims to supercede anytraditional interpretation, while simultane-ously denying that a framework is beingimposed. It discounts contradictory data asevidence of faulty interpretation—meaningthat the interpreters are not using the desig-nated perennialist frame. Perhaps more seri-ously, any description of an ultimate state willnecessarily be simplified and generalised soas to fit with the descriptions of multipletraditions. In this case, it may become moredifficult to distinguish simple embodiedstates from those that may require manydecades of intensive spiritual practice toachieve, if they are achieved at all. This, inturn, may inflate the descriptions of easilyaccessible states in such a way that beginnerswho achieve them may think that they aremuch farther along the spiritual path thanthey actually are (e.g., Blackstone, 2006;Krystal, 2003). In this way a perennialistapproach to ultimate states may fosterspiritual inflation and discredit more cred-ible research on such phenomena.

Wilber’s body of work also demonstratesthat any model overtly situated on a meta-physical claim is unlikely to be suitable for


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the purposes of contemporary scholarshipor science. Metaphysical systems arecurrently out of fashion because there is noway to support them with publicly observableevidence. Once hidden causes or concealeddimensions of reality are called on toaccount for how the world appears toexternal senses, it is difficult to offeranything other than verbal arguments thatthe nondual is a better causative agent thanthe caprices of Zeus or Baal or the FlyingSpaghetti Monster. This fact does notprevent people from many cultures andlevels of education from believing in andacting based on providence, luck, smallsuperstitious practices, or the blessings ofsaints. Yet the context of scholarship, specifi-cally, does not allow for metaphysically-basedsystems. Nor does Wilber’s (e.g., 1990, 1995,1997) proposal for his version of a radicalempiricism solve this, for it does not meetthe standards necessary for a credibleresearch method for obtaining informationfrom inner domains (Ferrer, 2002).

As critics have pointed out, Wilber’smodel is imperfect in a variety of ways (e.g.,Ferrer, 2000, 2002, 2011b; Lahood, 2010a,2010b; Rothberg & Kelly, 1998). A numberof the basic representations of facts inscience and research are more flawed thanshould be acceptable from even a popularauthor (Falk, 2009). As Hartelius and Ferrer(2013) observed, it is still thoroughly meta-physical and perennialist in its structure,which makes it of minimal use in a scholarly

context. But as an approximation for apopular audience not overly concerned withphilosophy, conceptual consistency, or accu-racy in every detail of scientific fact or theory,it does offer an inspirational vision thatpromotes the validity of inner experienceand human spirituality, and espouses therelatedness of various spiritual traditions.

Wilber’s integral model is a myth for themodern world – in the best sense of thatterm. It draws on the language of scienceand psychology, but it is not scientific, and itis not a psychology in any conventionalsense. As a philosophy it is unique but notnovel. As a guide to spirituality, it is moreconceptual than practical – yet it doesconvey the passionate effort of one man tomake meaningful sense of life within moder-nity. It is no shame that Wilber’s model fallsshort on the likely-impossible task ofproviding a valid theory of everything (cf.Wilber, 2000). Rather than attempting whatit does poorly – such as convoluting itself totry to be many things that it is not – perhapsWilber’s integral model should embracewhat it does well, and leave it at that.

Glenn Hartelius [email protected]

AcknowledgmentsI wish to thank Jorge N. Ferrer for generousassistance in the preparation of this manu-script. I also wish to thank Michaela Aizer forher contributions to the paper.

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IntroductionI would like to thank Hartelius for hissubstantial and informative response to myarticle, ‘The misunderstanding and misinter-pretation of key aspects of Ken Wilber's workin Hartelius and Ferrer's (2013) assessment’.It opens the debate I have requested and mythanks to the editor for the opportunity ofcontinuing this here. I would also like toacknowledge Hartelius’ gripping style ofdelivery during which I have been variouslylikened in my manner of writing � to Bill Clinton’s denial of having sexual

relations with Monica Lewinsky about myinsistence that Wilber does not assert asingle nondual ultimate.

� Compared to a climate change denierwhen I contended that Hartelius andFerrer had missed the point about T.R.V.Murti’s and Wilber’s ‘absolute’.

� Accused of almost reaching the point ofdishonesty when I identified Wilber’scomplaint that Ferrer can deduce that hehas shifted the ontological status ofKosmic habits to the inner realm (upperleft quadrant) of the individual.

Hartelius has therefore employed sex,ecology and (lack of) spirituality in his criti-cisms. I respond to these below in the firstpart of my response to Hartelius, but for thepresent, although I realise Hartelius’ ‘sex’comment was no doubt said tongue in cheekthere is nevertheless something in it, andperhaps more than Hartelius realises.However, the opposite applies to his remarksconcerning ‘ecology’ and ‘lack of spiritu-ality’. Besides responding to Hartelius(2015) I intend to attempt to move thedebate on by setting out some of my own crit-

icisms of Wilber’s and Ferrer’s work.Hartelius characterises me as a supporter

of Wilber in the sense that he suggests I amwedded to his views and am, for example,willing to unearth ‘a passage deeplyembedded within the technical concepts ofWilber’s complex worldview that wouldscarcely be accessible to anyone outside ofWilber’s adherents’. In this instanceHartelius conflates the need to be clearabout what is being discussed i.e. Wilber’sdefinition of integral post-metaphysics, andthe ease with which such a definition can beaccessed. Hartelius refers to this as ‘a lucidexample of how Wilber and his supportersinsist that the debate with Wilber’s ideas beconducted within a comprehensive under-standing and presentation of Wilber’s writ-ings’. But this is not the case; I just identifywhat Wilber means when he refers to inte-gral post-metaphysics. I go along withHartelius insofar as Wilber’s definition ishard to find but his inflationary extension ofthis is unwarranted.

I agree, of course, that Hartelius is enti-tled to present whatever his interpretation ofmy motivation in writing my article might be.But I insist my motivation is to overcomemisunderstandings I perceive of Wilber’swork and I suggest that, in the case of consid-ering integral post-metaphysics, starting witha definition is reasonable. As to whether I ama supporter of Wilber’s work and wedded to his views; I am the former and am not the latter. I am a supporter of Wilber’s viewspartly because, as Ferrer has to some extentintimated, he is a genius7 in the field of transpersonal psychology8. And by‘supporter’ I mean it is worthwhile makingan effort to understand, in the first instance,

The Emperor's New Clothes: Ferrer isn’twearing any – Participatory is perennial. A reply to HarteliusJohn Abramson

Wilber’s work in the terms he presents it butcertainly not an unqualified acceptance thatHartelius attributes to me. I am not weddedto Wilber’s views because although I almostinvariably find them stimulating they can, on investigation, appear misconceived.Examples of two such instances are:� Wilber’s technique of ranking spiritual

states and stages (e.g. nondual higherthan theism) is flawed.

� Wilber has, I argue, fundamentallymisunderstood the relationship betweenspiritual states and stages ofdevelopment (cf. the Wilber-Combsmatrix; Wilber, 2006, p.88–93). Insofaras I am correct about this, an importantimplication of this misunderstanding is that Wilber is largely misguided in one current area of his work i.e.promulgating a ‘Fourth Turning ofBuddhism’ (cf. Wilber, 2014).

The Emperor’s New ClothesAn elucidation of these criticisms of Wilber’swork will be the subject of later sections. Butfirst some areas of disagreement withFerrer’s work will be discussed intertwinedwith relevant rejoinders to issues raised byHartelius (2015).

In my opinion, from a certain definitionof perennialism9, Ferrer’s depiction of themystery is arguably perennialist. Since theparticipatory paradigm involves intimateparticipation with the mystery, my argumenttherefore extends to attributing perenni-alism to Ferrer’s participatory turn. As bothHartelius and Ferrer make clear, ‘perenni-alism begins with the assumption that thereis a single truth underlying various tradi-tions’ (Hartelius and Ferrer, 2013, p.190).

And Ferrer’s depiction of the Mysteryincludes precisely this assumption:

There is a way, I believe, in which we canlegitimately talk about a shared spiritualpower, one reality, one world or one truth… a common spiritual dynamism underlyingthe plurality of spiritual insights and ulti-mates. (Ferrer, 2002, p.190; cited inAbramson 2014, p.5; emphasis added)

In my 2014 article, I used this quote tocompare Wilber’s and Ferrer’s position on asingle truth. But now I wish to draw itsarguably more startling significance i.e. as apointer towards the perennial nature ofFerrer’s account of the mystery. Harteliusrejected my proposition of a linkage betweenWilber and Ferrer’s position on a single truthbased in part on a complaint that I based thison ‘a 36-word quote [as above] from Ferrer(2002)’ (Hartelius, 2015). Hartelius impliesthat this was an isolated comment by Ferrer,but similar references connecting themystery to a single truth are very common inFerrer’s writing e.g. ‘There is a way, I believe,in which we can legitimately talk about ashared spiritual power, one reality, one worldor one truth…’ (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008,p.156; Ferrer, 2005, p.127); the mystery is the‘generative power of life, the cosmos, and/orthe spirit’ (Ferrer, 2011, p.2); ‘the mysterythat is source of all’ (Ferrer, 2002, p.xiv); ‘theMystery out of which everything arises’(Ferrer et al., 2005, p.311; Ferrer andSherman, 2008, pp.40,137,152; Ferrer, 2006);‘a mystery out of which everything arises’(Ferrer, 2013, p.102); ‘the ultimate unity ofthe mystery’ (Hartelius and Ferrer, 2013,p.197); the participatory approach does not


The Emperor’s New Clothes: Ferrer isn’t wearing any – Participatory is perennial

7 ‘As I believe Wilber himself would admit, his particular genius manifests not in invention, but in the integrationof others’ ideas.’ Ferrer (2011b, p.13)

8 Many scholars within transpersonal psychology continue to make use of Wilber’s work, or at least to criticise it,notwithstanding his now longstanding disassociation from the field in favour of integral spirituality.

9 i.e. perennialism In the sense of all religions stemming from ‘one truth’ which I agree with Hartilius is thegenerally held view of perennialism. Specifically this one truth is broadly as described under the heading ofperspectivist perennialism, which is one of five types of perennialism’s described by Ferrer (2002, pp.78–79)i.e. ‘many paths and many goals’, but excluding Hick’s (1992) depiction of ultimate reality as Noumenal. A more complete account of how I choose to define perspectivist perennialism is developed below.

seek… [to refute] …an ultimate beyond allpossible ultimates… rather it rejects dubiousperennialist equivalences among religiousultimate’s’ (Ferrer, 2011a, p.19).

The above analysis and the weight of theabove quotes from Ferrer and Harteliussuggest that ‘In any ordinary usage of theterm, … [Ferrer’s] system… is accurately andusefully described as perennialist’. Thisquote is from Hartelius, 2015, and relates tohis justification to tie Wilber’s system toperennialism. However, as will now beapparent, this same justification by Harteliusapparently ties Ferrer’s account of themystery to perennialism. After all as Harteliussays ‘if one makes perennialist claims, it isreasonable that one’s work will be charac-terised as perennialist’ (Hartelius, 2015).

The question might naturally arise of whyan explicit perennialist charge has not, to myknowledge, previously been made in relationto Ferrer’s account of the mystery. However,George Adams’ review of ‘The participatoryturn’ (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008) can beinterpreted to go some way towards this:

… in terms of the work still facing Ferrer,there is the challenge of clarifying his posi-tion regarding the nature of the spiritualreality which is the object of religious expe-rience. Ferrer declares that his approach isfree of any ontological objectivity (‘no pre-given ultimate reality exists’ (Ferrer andSherman, 2008, p.142)), but he frequentlyuses terms such as ‘mystery,’ ‘spiritualpower’, ‘reality,’ and other designations thatimply that there is some sort of spiritualreality out there (or in here), however variedare its expressions. In other words, there isan implied ontological objectivity in Ferrer’smodel, even if it is an objectivity that avoidsessentialist reifications and that cannot bedivorced from the elusive variability and

radical creative undeterminacy of thesacred. Further clarification of Ferrer’sunderstanding of this sacred reality is calledfor, however challenging that task might bewhile operating from a participatory model.(Adams, 2011).

Compare Adams’ assessment that Ferrer:

… frequently uses terms such as ‘mystery’, …‘reality’, … that imply that there is some sortof spiritual reality … In other words, there isan implied ontological objectivity in Ferrer’smodel. (Adams, 2011)

with Hartelius’ comment about perenni-alism’s shared spiritual goal, or ultimate ofall possible ultimate realities:

Even if the ultimate spiritual goal [of peren-nialism] is ineffable but remains factuallythe same for all traditions, it must be insome sense objective.10 (Hartelius, 2015)

Hartelius’ point is that the assertion ofperennialism of one truth, or an ultimatespiritual goal, for all traditions necessarilyimplies that this one truth/ultimate spiritualgoal ‘must be in some sense objective’. Inother words an objective one truth/ultimatespiritual goal is perennialist. But Adamscharges Ferrer with an implied objectivity ofFerrer’s account of the Mystery which is thesame, according to my analysis, as Hartelius’implying the Mystery is perennialist.

T.R.V. Murti’s absolute, Ferrer’s mystery andperspectivist perennialism’s ultimate realityI argued that Ferrer’s account of the mysteryis perennialist, which Ferrer associates withWilber’s work, which in turn is associatedwith T.R.V Murti’s absolute. I will nowconsider how this impacts on Hartelius’


John Abramson

10In my opinion the sense in which perspectivist perennialism, as defined here, is objective should be related tothe perspective of the two truths of Buddhism. Using that perspective, the sense is conventional rather thanthe ultimate. That is, although I agree with Hartelius and Ferrer (but only from a conventional perspective)that perspectivist perennialism does imply a single truth – as indeed my analysis suggests that so does themystery; neither perspectivist perennialism or the mystery suggest one truth from an ultimate perspective. (cf Abramson 2015, p.5).

assertion that I am a ‘climate change denier’when I contended that Hartelius and Ferrerhad missed the point about T.R.V. Murti’sand Wilber’s ‘absolute’. As a starting pointfor this, Ferrer introduces the role of theabsolute in perennialism:

[P]erennialists often assert that, becausemultiplicity implies relativity, a plurality ofabsolutes is both a logical and a metaphys-ical absurdity: ‘The absolute must of neces-sity be one and, in fact, the one as assertedby so many metaphysicians over the ages’(Nasr, 1996, p.19). This commitment to amonistic metaphysics is closely related tothe perennialist defense of the universalityof mysticism. As Perovich (1985), a perenni-alist philosopher, puts it: ‘The point [of theperennial philosophers] in insisting on theidentity of mystical experiences was, afterall, to bolster the claim that the most variedmystics have established contact with 'theone ultimate truth’ (p.75). (Ferrer, 2000,pp.17,18)

There is an apparent confusion hereconcerning Ferrer’s, Nasr’s and Perovich’suse of the term absolute, at least as far as Murti/Wilber understand the termabsolute, and similarly how I define absolutein the context of the ultimate realities ofperspectivist perennialism. T.R.V. Murti’saccount of ‘the absolute’ is of an absolutebeyond all possible absolutes (1960,pp.320,321,327). Thus there is a two stagestructure of absolutes according to Murtiand this is mirrored in both:a) Ferrer’s account of two stages of

ultimate realities stemming from themystery, and

b) Perspectivist perennialism’s accountdepicting different dimensions i.e. God,Nirvana, Brahman, Allah, Tao, Nondualetc. of the same ultimate reality11

(cf. Ferrer’s 2002 illustration on p.79)

All three systems i.e. Murti’s, Ferrer’s, andperspectivist perennialism’s have an ultimatebeyond all possible ultimates, which forMurti is an absolute that is beyond all Hinduand Buddhist religious absolutes, for Ferreris the mystery, and for perspectivist perenni-alism is what Ferrer describes as a ground ofbeing (Ferrer, 2002, p.78). All three alsohave multiple ultimates that are sourcedfrom these i.e. multiple absolutes (Murti),multiple ontological ultimate’s (Ferrer) andusing Ferrer’s terminology, many goals ofperspectivist perennialism. Examples ofMurti’s ‘second stage’ absolutes are theabsolutes of Advaita Vedanta in Hinduism,and Vijñanavada and Madhyamika inBuddhism. These three examples fromMurti are included in the multiple ‘secondstage’ ultimate realities of Ferrer’s participa-tory model and perspectivist perennialismexcept they are referred to as ultimate reali-ties rather than Murti’s reference to them asmultiple absolutes. The participatory andperennial models also encompass additionalultimate realities to that recognised by Murtie.g. God, Allah.

I conclude from the above analysis that � there is congruence between the two

stage structure of the account of ultimate realities in Ferrer’s work and in perspectivist perennialism. Thiscongruence can be extended to Murti’ssystem but with the import caveats thatMurti refers to absolute rather thanultimate reality and he restricts ‘secondstage’ ultimate/absolute realities to thosein the Hindu and Buddhist religions.This supports my contention that Ferrer’saccount of the mystery is perennialist12.

� Ferrer’s (Ferrer, 2000, pp.17–18) aboveuse of the quote by Nasr that mentions‘The absolute must of necessity be one’ isproblematic because it should bequalified to relate to the ‘absolute that is



11This is another way of referring to an ultimate reality that is beyond any religious ultimate realities. 12On one of Ferrer’s definitions of perennialism i.e. perspectivist perennialism’s; but one such definition issufficient to label Ferrer’s account of the mystery as peennialist.


beyond all religious absolutes’. That is,Ferrer, following Nasr, has conflated the‘absolute that is beyond all religiousabsolutes’ with the multiple absolutes ofthe different traditions.

� this is a further reason to support thecontention I made in Abramson, 2014,pp.5–8 that Ferrer’s dismissal of Murti’s‘absolute’ is almost wholly unwarrantedi.e. Ferrer appears to overlook that hisaccount of the ‘one truth’ mystery that isthe source of all ontological ultimaterealities is structurally very similar toMurti’s ‘the absolute’ that is the source ofall Hindu and Buddhist absolutes. I havemore to say about Ferrer’s dismissal in alatter section.

In discussing perennialism Harteliusappears, like Ferrer, to have conflated the‘ultimate reality beyond all possible ulti-mates’, which he refers to as an ineffable ulti-mate spiritual goal, with the multipleultimate realities of the different traditions.

Ferrer pointed to the simple and logicalfact that a perennialist model requires anobjective, transcendent ultimate that isapprehended deep within personal subjec-tivity. That ultimate must be objective inorder for it to be the consistent destinationof all traditions. (Hartelius 2015).

Besides the conflation I have referred to,Hartelius also apparently fails to realise he ismisapplying conventional logic in relation to ultimate reality. As I mentioned inAbramson, 2014, p.5 Hartelius and Ferrerhave failed to understand that drawing anabsolute and relative distinction is an essen-tial element in understanding ultimatereality and as Mipham, 2005, p.99, cautions

us, failure to do this will result ‘in hopelessconfusion’13 if we fail to differentiate conven-tional from ultimate perspectives on reality.With both a lack of such differentiation andconflation present in the above quote byHartelius, it will take some unpicking.

As Hartelius implies, it is ‘simple andlogical’ reasoning that would lead to aconclusion that a perennialist modelrequires an objective transcendent ultimate.But simple and logical reasoning in relationto ultimate reality is precisely what Miphamwarns us will lead to confusion. The premise,for example, of a) perspectivist perenni-alism, b) Murti’s account of the absolute andc) Ferrer’s account of the mystery is thattheir respective understanding of an ulti-mate reality beyond all other ultimatescannot be directly known14. To assign objec-tivity to this ultimate by conventional logic isfanciful. As Ferrer would say in respect of themystery e.g. Ferrer, 2002, p.180 (citing Sells,1994); and as Murti would say in respect of‘the Absolute’ e.g. Murti, 1960, p.320; and ascan also be said of the ultimate beyond allpossible ultimates of perspectivist perenni-alism; nothing can be said of these ultimates– including that.

In the light of the preceding analysis it isinformative to review Ferrer’s opinion aboutthe key differences between the participa-tory model and perennialism:

[H]ere is where participatory thinkingradically departs from perennialism, I main-tain that there is a multiplicity of transcon-ceptual disclosures of reality. Perennialistserroneously assume that a transconceptualdisclosure of reality must be necessarily‘one’, and, actually, the one metaphysically

John Abramson

13The context in Abramson, 2014 was Wilber’s account of what Hartelius and Ferrer described as a singlenondual reality – but Mipham’s sentiment applies equally to Hartelius’ account of a ‘transcendent ultimate’.

14In this connection it is notable that Wilber claims nondual emptiness is an ultimate beyond all possibleultimates i.e. the very ground of all other ultimates. As Buddhist texts make clear, nondual emptiness can bedirectly known through, for example, meditative equipoise. But I agree, with Hartelius and Ferrer that, in myterminology, nondual emptiness is a ‘second stage’ ultimate reality, intrinsically undifferentiated in its spiritualefficacy with other ‘second stage‘ ultimates. This is consistent with the point made here i.e. all ‘second stage’ultimates can be known (usually in higher states of consciousness) but the ‘fist stage’ ultimate that is beyondany of them cannot be known, by humans at least, in its entirety.

envisioned and pursued in certain tradi-tional spiritual systems. Put somewhatdifferently, perennialists generally believethat plurality emerges from concepts andinterpretations, and that the cessation ofconceptual proliferation must then result ina single apprehension of ‘things as theyreally are.’ (Ferrer and Sherman, 2008, p.139).

Ferrer is precisely wrong about his claim thatparticipatory thinking radically departsfrom perspectivist perennialism. This is sofor the simple reason that the transconcep-tual disclosure of reality in perspectivistperennialism is multiple and indeed parallelsthat of the participatory model. What isapparent here is lack of differentiationbetween transconceptual disclosure of reali-ties on the one hand and an ultimatebeyond all possible ultimates on the other.Ferrer could conventionally refer to the latteras ‘one’ in perspectivist perennialism. But asI have been at pains to point out, this is nota difference with the participatory model; itis a similarity i.e. the mystery can be conven-tionally referred to as ‘one’ and as the manycitations I provide in the ‘The Emperor’sNew Clothes’ section testify; Ferrer doesexactly that.

T.R.V. Murti’s model of ultimate orabsolute realityAs Murti (1960) explains, transconceptualdisclosure of reality depends on the traditionthat is practised to enable one to disclosethat reality. The analogy he uses is the way‘the centre of a circle is reached from theperiphery by different radii’ (p.327) andeach tradition is attempting to reach thecentre of the circle i.e. ‘the absolute’, by itsexclusive radii. Murti further explains thatthe centre of the circle can be approachedbut not reached by any of the possible radiii.e. authentic paths, but that ‘personsadopting different radii may genuinely feelthat they are on the right path to the centreand others are not. For each votary may seethe centre looming ahead of him; but hecannot, from the nature of his predicament,

see that others also may be reaching thecentre through their particular modes ofapproach.’ (p.321).

Murti’s model is consistent with the firstand second stage ultimate realities that Ihave referred to previously i.e. Murti’s‘centre of a circle’ would correspond to theunknowable ultimate beyond all possibleultimates and different radii of the circlecorrespond to, for example, the ultimaterealities of the traditions. Interestingly, givenFerrer’s critical view of Murti’s absolute e.g.Ferrer, 2002, pp.102,103; Murti’s modelseems appropriate to describe the relation-ship between Ferrer’s account of the mysteryi.e. ‘centre of the circle’, and the ontologi-cally real ultimates stemming from themystery i.e. ‘the possible radii’.

Murti’s model is one way of pointing toultimate reality. In the context of thisresponse to Hartelius it helps illustratessome import commonality between Murti’s,Ferrer’s, and perspectivist perennialism’saccount of reality. I will now introduceanother such model has, I argue, some addi-tional explanatory advantages over Murti’smodel; albeit it is rather more complex.

A model of ultimate reality using theproperties of infinity This model uses some properties of infinityto provide a pointer to ultimate reality. Itpresupposes no mathematical knowledgeand only requires an appreciation of certainproperties of infinity that are illustrated inthe following two citations:

Spatial infinity is beyond conception…neither reason nor imagination can grasp it,for any conception necessarily limits whatis, by definition illimitable… The science ofmathematics accepts the notion of infinityeven though it is beyond and apparentlycontrary to reason. It is a concept acceptedwithout being understood: a baffling yetnecessary idea, something known aboutwithout in any real way being known. (Hill,1997, p.46)



… what Cantor’s research demonstrates isthat there are multiple infinities, multiplekinds of infinities, infinities that can be rigor-ously differentiated, infinities that are greaterthan other infinities. (Sallis, 2012, p.199)

Reasons for the effectiveness of choosing theproperties of infinity as a pointer to ultimatereality include:� infinity is unbounded (Hill, 1997, p.46).

In that respect it is like the absolutewhich has no boundary (Murti, 1960,p.285, n.3).

� infinity is beyond reason (Hill, 1997,p.46) and again, this is a property of theabsolute (Murti, 1960, p.135)

� there are multiple kinds of infinity(Sallis, 2012, p.199) and there aremultiple kinds of absolute (Murti, 1960,Chapter 13).

� there are infinities that can be rigorouslydifferentiated (Sallis, 2012, p.199) andthere are Absolutes e.g. the absolutes of Advaita Vedanta, Vijñanavada andMadhyamika, that are rigorouslydifferentiated (Murti, 1960, Chapter 13).

� there are infinities that are greater thanother infinities. (Sallis, 2012, p.199) andThe absolute (Murti, 1960, p.320) isbeyond (or greater than) all religiousabsolutes.

Thus the properties of infinity, which areestablished by rigorous mathematical proof,appear to be a useful guide to the propertiesof absolute reality. Indeed, Infinity isreferred to extensively in some Buddhistscriptures that refer to absolute reality. Someextracts from ‘The Flower Ornament Scrip-ture’ and Thomas Cleary’s commentary,gives a flavour of this:

Yet another function of the scripture, oftenunsuspected or considered gratuitous hyper-bole, is to affirm the infinity of the path.(Cleary, 1993, p.51)

… the real potential of humanity is so muchgreater than imagined as to be virtually infi-

nite, even if that infinity can never embracethe infinity of infinities. (Cleary, 1993, p.52)

By transcendence of all perceptions ofform… they attain to and abide in the realmof infinity of space, aware of infinite space.Totally transcending the realm of infinity ofspace, they attain to and abide in the realmof infinity of consciousness, aware ofboundless consciousness. By totally tran-scending the realm of infinity of conscious-ness, they attain to and abide in the realm ofnothingness, aware of the absence ofanything at all. ([trans] Cleary, 1993, p.724)

Murti’s account of the absoluteHartelius’ depiction of me, and thoseholding the opinion I express on this issue,as akin to climate change deniers demands arobust response. As I indicated in Abramson(2014), I believe Ferrer’s dismissal of Murti’s(and Wilber’s) account of the absolute,although apparently well argued and wellsupported by other scholars, is radicallyflawed. Once the blinkers Ferrer is unawarehe is wearing are removed, his argumentsare exposed as a full explanation of just oneside of what has been widely recognised forcenturies among scholars and practitionersas an unresolved issue.

Some 25 per cent of my 2014 article wasrelated to Murti’s absolute and this materialwas summarily dismissed in Hartelius’ 2015response. Hartelius’ adopts the tactic offailing to address the points I make in ascholarly manner and instead responds withan unsubstantiated claim that the case Imake is akin to that of a climate denier. Thisdoes no service to an informed debate and Iwill therefore attempt to put a further reasonfor Hartelius and Ferrer to look again at theevidence I have presented.

One of the notable scholars that Ferrer2002, p.103) cites in his dismissal of Murti’saccount of the absolute is Jay Garfield(1994). Indeed Garfield, together with manyother distinguished scholars15 is opposed to Murti’s account of the absolute. ButGarfield16, together with many other


John Abramson

scholars who are opposed to Murti’s abso-lutist views, nevertheless recognises the legit-imacy of the polarised views regarding anabsolute in Buddhism (e.g. Thakchöe, 2007,p.90; Newland and Tillemans17, 2011, p.4). IsHartelius saying these scholars, not tomention Capriles (2009), Chatterjee (1962),Coward (2003), Hookham (1992), Lindtner(1982), Sebastian (2008) and Sprung (1979)whom I mentioned in Abramson (2014, p.6)are all, by taking an interpretation of anabsolute in Buddhism seriously, are akin toclimate deniers?

The Wilber-Combs lattice ismisconceived (Part 1)In this section I critique a key aspect ofWilber’s work i.e. the Wilber-Combes Lattice.The issue that Ken Wilber and Allan Combs(independently) addressed that resulted inthe Wilber-Combs Lattice was the wayWestern stages of development (e.g. Hy andLoevinger, 1996; Cook-Greuter, 2011) relateto Eastern spiritual states (e.g. using Wilber’sterminology, gross, psychic, subtle, causaland nondual states of consciousness). Thebackground to Wilber’s and Combs’ work onthis was presented in a previous issue of thisjournal by Michael Daniels in Rowen et al.,2009, pp.12–16. I will therefore just give avery brief resume of this.

For the purpose of my critique I wouldjust note that in the two decades leading upto the turn of the century, Westernresearchers such as Wilber and Combs inte-grated western stages of development18 witheastern states of consciousness by stackingthe latter on top of the former. This impliedthat someone experiencing a higher stage ofconsciousness would necessarily have had tobe at among the less than 1 per cent of the

population thought to be at the highest levelof development. Remarkably, this odd impli-cation did not prevent this ‘stacking’ modelprevailing through the 1980’s and 1990’s.But then it became apparent to Wilber (andindependently to Combs) that a higher stateof consciousness can be experienced at anystage of development (Wilber, 2006, p.89) –and they jointly promulgated the Wilber-Combs Lattice that reflects this (see table 1).

Thus the Wilber-Combs lattice representsa considerable advance in terms of anexplanatory model compared to the clearlyflawed earlier model. For example it illus-trates that although anyone can potentiallyexperience any state of consciousness, theywill always report that in the terms of thestage of consciousness that they haveattained. However Daniels (Rowen et al.,2009, pp.13–16) raises an important objec-tion regarding the particular structure stagesin the above model. He points out that thebottom five are Piagetian (p.14) whereas thetop five are taken from Aurobindo’s work.And he is adamant that Wilber (2006) givesno justification for including the Aurobindostages. Wilber appears to be making a similarmistake to that when he stacked eastern stateson western stages. That is, Aurobindo’s stagesof development are intimately related to thesequential states of psychic, subtle, causal andnondual and therefore it appears Wilber is once again stacking states on stages by introducing the five Aurobindostages onto those of recognised westernPiaget/Loevinger stages of development.

The Wilber-Combs lattice ismisconceived (Part 2)Just as Wilber (2006) explains how he andCombs missed something that, in retrospect,



15e.g. the nine scholars who together with Garfield comprise the Cowherds (2011) among many others. But as Ipoint out (Abramson,2014) there are many contemporary scholars who accept Murti’s account of the absolute.

16e.g. see Garfields foreword to Thakchöe, 2007, or Garfield, 1994, pp.vii,viii where Garfield suggests Murti’sinterpretation of Nagarjuna is as valid as his.

17Newland and Tillemans refer (p.4) to the 15th century Madhyamika Gorampa, who had similar views to Murtion the absolute.

18the highest stage of development in the Western models at that time was ‘somewhere around… Loevinger’sintegrated’ (Wilber, 2006, p.88).

was obvious i.e. that the attainment of statesand stages can be achieved independently ofeach other, I suggest their Wilber-Combslattice has overlooked another apparentlyobvious error in its construction. Althoughthey correctly note from the evidence ofeminent researches such as Cook-Greuter(2011) that stage development is sequentialand that stages cannot be skipped; they failto recognise that this un-skippable stageprogression can occur independently within thegross, subtle and causal realms. Wilber says asmuch in his book ‘one taste’:

… that ego and soul and spirit can in manyways coexist and develop together, because

they are relatively separate streams flowingthrough the waves in the great nest of being.And there can be, on occasion, rather unevendevelopment in between these streams…. Thisis why some early cultures apparently showedadvanced psychic capacities but rather poorfrontal development. (Wilber, 2000, p.275).

In addition, the evidence Wilber uses fromwestern researchers to support hiscontention that stages of developmentcannot be skipped are almost wholly withinthe gross realm. Thus for example in somerecent results from Cook-Greuter (2011,p.59) only 0.06 per cent of the protocolscame from Stage 10 (i.e. the subtle realm).


John Abramson

State-stages

Gross Subtle Casual Nondual

Structure-stages

Supermind * * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

* * * *

Overmind(previously Causal)

Meta-Mind(previously Subtle)

Para-Mind(previously Psychic)

High Vision-Logic(Higher Mind)

Low Vision-Logic

Pluralistic

Rational

Mythic

Archaic

Table 1: The Wilber-Combs lattice (adapted from Wilber, 2006).



If my reasoning stands up to scrutiny, itseems to imply that there should be threerelatively independent sets of Wilber-Combslattices in respect of a person’s developmentof their ego in the gross realm, their soul inthe subtle realm and their spirit in the causalrealm. It would answer Daniels’ point about why Wilber has added Aurobindo’sstages of development on top of those of Piaget/Loevinger because only thePiaget/Loevinger stages would be in the firstof the three Wilber-Combs lattices andAurobindo’s stages would be appropriatelysplit up between the other two.

It would also help explain why enlighten-ment, contra Wilber, is substantially the samefor, say, the historical Buddha as it is for anenlightened person today i.e. it is onlydifferent in terms of ego stage development.It also has radical implications for Wilber’scurrent work on his proposed fourth turningof Buddhism. But exploring that is foranother day.

John [email protected]

ReferencesAdams, G. (2011). A review of the participatory turn:

Spirituality, mysticism, religious studies. Journal ofContemporary Religion, 26(1), 123–166. Retrieved2 April 2015 from www.academia.edu/3794506/Review_of_The_Participatory_Turn_by_George_Adams.

Chatterjee, A.K. (1962/2007). The Yogacara Idealism.Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.

Cleary, T. (1993). The Flower Ornament Scripture: Trans-lation of the Avatamsaka Sutra. Boston, MA:Shambhala.

Cook-Greuter, S.R. (2011). A report from the scoringtrenches. In Pfaffenberger, A.H., Marko, Paul,W., Combs, A. (2011) The Postconventional Person-ality: Assessing, Researching, and Theorizing HigherDevelopment. Albany, NY: State University of NewYork Press.

Coward, H.G. (2003). T.R.V. Murti. New Delhi:Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Ferrer, J.N., Romero, M.T. & Albareda R.V. (2005).Integral Transformative Education: A Participa-tory Proposal. Journal of Transformative Education,3(4), 306–330.

Ferrer, J.N. & Sherman, J.H. (2008). The ParticipatoryTurn: Spirituality, Mysticism, Religious Studies.Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Ferrer, J.N. (2000). The perennial philosophy revis-ited. The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 32(1),7–30.

Ferrer, J.N. (2005). Spiritual knowing: A participatoryunderstanding. In C. Clarke (Ed) Ways ofKnowing: Science and Mysticism Today. Exeter:Imprint Academic.

Ferrer, J.N. (2006). Embodied spirituality, now andthen. Tikkun, 21(3), May/June.

Ferrer, J.N. (2011a). Participatory spirituality andtranspersonal theory: A ten-year retrospective.The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 43(1), 1–34.

Ferrer, J.N. (2011b). Participation, metaphysics, andenlightenment. Transpersonal Psychology Review,14(2), 3–24.

Ferrer, J.N. & Puente, I. (2013). Participation andspirit: An interview with Jorge N. Ferrer. Journal ofTranspersonal Research, 5(2), 97–111.

Hill, J.S. (1997). Infinity, Faith, and Time: ChristianHumanism and Renaissance Literature. Montreal:McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Hookham, S.K. (1992). The Buddha Within. NewDelhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

Hy, L. & Loevinger, J. (1996). Measuring Ego Develop-ment. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lindtner, C. (1982/2011). Nagarjuniana: Studies inthe Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna. NewDelhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.

Mipham, J. (2005). The Adornment of the Middle Way.Boston, MA: Shambhala.

Murti, T.R.V. (1960). The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism: A study of the Madhyamika system.[Revised edition]. London: Allen & Unwin.

Nasr, S.H. (1996). Religion and the order of nature. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perovicha, A.N. Jr. (1985). Mysticism and the philos-ophy of science. The Journal of Religion, 65, 63–82.

Rowan, J., Daniels, M., Fontana, D. & Walley, M.(2009). A dialogue on Ken Wilber’s contributionto transpersonal psychology. TranspersonalPsychology Review, 13(2), 5–41.

Sallis, J. (2012). Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of theElemental. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Sebastian, C.D. (2008). Recent Researches in BuddhistStudies. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

Sprung, M. (1979). Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way.New York: Routledge

Thakchöe, S. (2007). The Two Truths Debate:Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the middle way. Boston,MA: Wisdom.


John Abramson

The Cowherds. (2011). Moonshadows – ConventionalTruth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Tillemans, T.J.F. (2011). How far can a MadhyamikaBuddhist reform conventional truth? Dismal rela-tivism, fictionalism, easy-easy truth, and the alter-natives. In The Cowherds (Eds) Moonshadows –Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy(pp.151–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilber, K. (2000). One Taste: Daily Reflections on Inte-gral Spirituality. Boston, MA: Shambhala.

Wilber, K. (2006). Integral spirituality: A startling newrole for religion in the modern and postmodern world.Boston, MA: Shambhala.


ABRAMSON HAS ANSWERED thecurrent paper (Hartelius, this issue)with a response entitled, ‘The

Emperor’s New Clothes: Ferrer isn’t wearingany – Participatory is perennial’ (this issue).This brief further rejoinder to Abramson willconsider which pieces of discussion appearto be settled, which remain, and which aresomewhat new. It will also review what Ferrerhas meant by his use of the term mystery andhow this differs radically from a perennialistultimate or absolute.

Abramson begins with comments aboutthe images that were employed to illustratecertain points in my response. While Iconsider these among its least importantaspects, it is unfortunate that Abramsonseems to have taken these as characterisa-tions of himself; this is not the case. I havecompared Wilber’s protestations at havinghis work identified as perennialist withClinton’s denial that he had sexual relationswith Ms. Lewinsky; I have compared thesignificance of Murti’s absolutist perspectiveswith that of climate deniers; I characterisedas ‘disingenuous, almost to the point ofdishonesty’, Wilber’s incredulity when hisshift of the status of his Kosmic habits‘almost entirely’ to the upper left quadrantwas noted, given that this statement wasquoted directly from Wilber’s own mostrecent major book. On reflection, thesecomparisons seem fair; yet none are charac-terisations of Abramson. His responses aremost appreciated.

It also seems necessary to point out that Ihave no particular opinion aboutAbramson’s motivations, nor about his levelof commitment to Wilber’s ideas. However,Abramson seemed to suggest repeatedly, and

a bit unreasonably, that our brief review ofWilber’s work might lack validity unless weconsidered very specific sections of Wilber’swriting. For example, Abramson (2014)listed as one of our six major ‘misunder-standings’ of Wilber’s work the fact that wehad omitted specific passages in whichWilber offered definitions of integral post-metaphysics (pp.10–11), putting this omis-sion forward as part of the evidence that wehad ‘a case to answer’ (p.4). Had the originalpaper to which Abramson responded(Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013) been focused onintegral post-metaphysics, then Abramson’srequirement that it start with Wilber’s defini-tions, however obscure, would be morereasonable. However, the title of that paperwas, ‘Transpersonal philosophy: The partici-patory turn’; accordingly, it focused prima-rily on participatory thought and the contextand local history out of which it arose.

Of the six alleged misunderstandingslisted in the titles of Abramson’s (2014)numbered sections, the only one thatAbramson maintains in his response is thecomplaint that Wilber’s specific definition ofintegral post-metaphysics was omitted fromour paper, a matter that has just beenaddressed. On the other hand, agreementappears to have been reached on the rathercentral contention that Wilber’s workremains perennialist in nature, even in itslatest iteration – at least from a conventionalperspective. Given that Abramson protestedsuch a characterisation in various waysthroughout his initial critique, his reversalon this point is quite significant. It seemsthat dialogue does produce progress.

In addition, Abramson has agreed thatperspectival perennialism does imply a

Participatory thought has no emperor and no absolute — A further response to AbramsonGlenn Hartelius

single objective ultimate when viewed from aconventional perspective. He also seems toaccede that appeal to a nondual ultimate isnecessary in order to reconcile an experien-tial Cartesian divide between subject andobject, and that an objective perennialistultimate is not credible. He has not raisedfurther charges regarding Ferrer’s failure toaddress Wilber’s critiques; the account ofFerrer’s thorough responses to Wilber’scomments seems to have silenced thisconcern. There is also no further protestregarding the fact that if any of Wilber’sKosmic habits are universal, then they arenecessarily objective in character – at leastfrom a conventional perspective – andsubject to Ferrer’s critique of the subtleCartesianism that pervades any perennialistapproach. Nor does Abramson rebut thepoint that it was Wilber himself who assignedhis Kosmic habits ‘almost exclusively’ to hisupper-left quadrant.

It would seem, then, that the two mainissues remaining in contention fromAbramson’s initial critique are, (a) hisconcern that ultimate reality cannot becorrectly understood from a conventionalperspective, and (b) his assertion thatMurti’s absolutist model should be consid-ered seriously as representing a correct viewof ultimate reality. This central concern withultimate or absolute reality carries over intoAbramson’s relatively new thesis – namelythat Ferrer’s positions are also perennialistin nature. It is gratifying that Abramson hasdeveloped these remaining points in greaterdetail, in service of the discussion.

It is possible to note, in brief, thatHartelius and Ferrer both hold that ultimateor absolute reality is a fictive construct that isof little use in contemporary scholarship.Abramson, while noting that “nothing canbe said of these ultimates,” continues fromthere to say quite a bit about the nature ofultimate reality, including setting forthMurti’s model, and then proposing his ownmodel of ultimate reality based, interestinglyand somewhat inexplicably, on mathematicalconcepts of infinity. I do not share

Abramson’s conviction that this subject is ofany great importance, and he is correct innoting that I did not address in detail hispoints regarding Murti; the response side-stepped these views as largely irrelevant tocurrent scholarly debate, for reasons alreadyput forward. Scholars of various spiritualtraditions are likely to remain locked indebate about whether or not some particulartradition such as Buddhism conceives of aspiritual ultimate, but this does not make theissue of absolute reality of any greater impor-tance to contemporary religious studies.

Despite the marginal status of specula-tions about absolute reality, Abramson seemsdetermined to project this issue ontoFerrer’s work. What Abramson has demon-strated is that Ferrer has frequently used theterm mystery to refer to the fact that spiritualstriving often seeks, apprehends, or imaginessomething beyond what is known or familiar:an elevation to something higher, a descentto something more original, progress towardsomething more edifying, or communionwith something less obvious. It would bedifficult to speak of human spiritualitywithout some such construct. In reference tothis issue, Ferrer (2008) has noted that…

virtually all the same participatory implica-tions for the study of religion can be practi-cally drawn if we were to conceive, ortranslate the term, spirit in a naturalisticfashion as an emergent creative potential oflife, nature, or reality. Methodologically, thechallenge to be met is to account for aprocess or dynamism underlying the creativeelements of religious visionary imaginationthat cannot be entirely explicated byappealing to biological or cultural-linguisticfactors (at least as narrowly understood byproponents of reductionist approaches).Whether such creative source is a transcen-dent spirit or immanent life will likely bealways a contested issue, but one, webelieve, that does not damage the generalclaims of the participatory turn. (Ferrer &Sherman, 2008, p.72 [n.155])


Glenn Hartelius

Rather than an ultimate beyond all ulti-mates, Ferrer’s mystery refers generally to allthat may lie beyond human knowledge withrespect to the great diversity of spiritualencounters and aspirations. It is convenientto address the unknown(s) relating to thismultiplicity with a single term, just as onemight say that stars, comets, asteroids,planets, moons, black holes, quasars, pulsars,and nebulae may be thought of as residing inthe ‘same’ sky even though they are riotouslyvarious and spread over inconceivabledistances. To do so does not by any stretch ofimagination suggest that these cosmicphenomena are all manifestations of thesame transcendent celestial object. Ferrerhas made it clear that mystery…

does not entail any kind of essentialist reifi-cation of an ontologically given ground ofbeing, as expressions such as ‘the sacred’,‘the divine’, or ‘the eternal’ often conveyed inclassic scholarship in religion… . In contrast,we deliberately use this conceptually vague,open-ended, and ambiguous term to refer tothe nondetermined creative energy or sourceof reality, the cosmos, life, and conscious-ness. Thus understood, the term mysteryobstructs claims or insinuations of dogmaticcertainty and associated religious exclu-sivisms; more positively, it invites an atti-tude of intellectual and existential humilityand receptivity to the Great Unknown that isthe fountain of our being. (Ferrer &Sherman, 2008, p.64)

Here is Ferrer’s comment on what clearlydifferentiates a participatory approach fromperennialist strategies:

From my perspective, what differentiatesperspectival perennialism from my participa-tory approach is (a) the rejection of the mythof the given (note that even when tradition-alist scholars speak about an ineffable ortransconceptual spiritual ultimate, theyimmediately – and arguably contradictorily –qualify it stating that it is nondual or thatAdvaita Vedanta offers, through its notion of

nirguna Brahman, the best articulation ofthe perennial wisdom, and so forth); (b) theadoption of an enactive paradigm of cogni-tion, according to which the various spiritualultimates are not perspectives of a singlespiritual ultimate but enactions; and, mostcrucially, (c) the overcoming of the dualism ofthe mystery and its enactions, through whichthe participatory approach avoids the tradi-tionalist (and neo-Kantian-like) dualitybetween religions’ relative absolutes and theabsolute supposedly existing behind them. Inother words, participatory enaction affirmsthe radical identity of the manifold spiritualultimates and the mystery, even if the formerdo not exhaust the ontological possibilitiesof the latter. (J. Ferrer, personal communica-tion, June 10, 2015)

The following passage articulates both this rejection of the myth of the Given, and the embrace of an enactive paradigm of cognition:

The participatory vision should not then beconfused with the view that mystics of thevarious kinds and traditions simply accessdifferent dimensions or perspectives of aready-made single ultimate reality. This viewis obviously under the spell of the myth ofthe given and merely admits that this pre-given spiritual referent can be approachedfrom different vantage points. In contrast,the view I am advancing here is that no pre-given ultimate reality exists, and thatdifferent spiritual ultimates can be enactedthrough intentional and creative participa-tion in an indeterminate spiritual power ormystery. (Ferrer, 2008, p. 142)

A participatory stance holds that mystery is itsenactions, rather than a hidden force behindthem (Ferrer, 2011a, 2011b; for a deeperdiscussion, see Ferrer, forthcoming). Thus,when Abramson accuses Ferrer withconflating ‘the ‘absolute that is beyond allreligious absolutes’ with the multipleabsolutes of the different traditions’(p.38–48), he is missing that, in Ferrer’s work,


Participatory thought has no emperor and no absolute – A further response to Abramson

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such a move is not a conflation but a delib-erate overcoming of an arguably perniciousspiritual dualism (e.g., see Ferrer, 2011a).This dualism is pernicious because it not onlybinds scholars and practitioners alike toobjectivist and hierarchical frameworks, butalso paves the way for interreligious exclu-sivism and spiritual narcissism (i.e., once asupra-ultimate absolute is posited, practi-tioners can – and do – claim their own reli-gion’s absolute to be the closer or better ormore accurate account of the supra-ultimateabsolute). A further advantage of dismantlingthis dualism is the preservation of the onto-logical ultimacy of enactions of religious ulti-mates (e.g., God, emptiness, the Tao) in theirrespective universes, avoiding the tradition-alist and neo-Kantian demotion of those ulti-mates to penultimate stations (see Ferrer,2010, forthcoming).

There is a great distance between aninterconnected world in which immanentspiritual encounters cannot be entirelydiscrete, and a perennialist Kosmos in whichthe source of all spiritual experience must bean identical transcendent spiritual ultimateor absolute. That Abramson conflates thesevery different positions based on superficiallinguistic similarities, and thereby framesFerrer’s work as perennialist, is not credible.It is also not unexpected, since a perennialistapproach typically projects its own presuppo-sitions – welcome or not – onto the traditionsof others, in much the way that the UnitedStates Central Intelligence Agency oncebelieved it could detect a communist plotbehind every instance of local unrestanywhere on the globe. (Let me make clearthat by using this familiar historical analogyto illustrate the dynamics of a perennialiststrategy, I am not suggesting that Abramson iseither a government agent or a communist.)

To be sure, Ferrer (2002, 2008, 2011a)has consistently held a ‘more relaxedspiritual universalism’ that affirms an under-lying undetermined mystery or creativepower as the generative source of all spiritualenactions while simultaneously (a)eschewing dubious equations among

spiritual ultimates (e.g., the Tao is God orBuddhist emptiness is structurally equivalentto the Hindu Brahman), (b) avoiding thepromotion of any single spiritual ultimate(e.g., nonduality or God) as universally supe-rior, and (c) rejecting universal, paradig-matic, or mandatory sequences – whetherinvolutionarily or evolutionarily laid down –of spiritual stages or states for all humanbeings regardless of culture, tradition, orspiritual orientation. But as noted previously,unity of context (e.g., many different ‘celes-tial phenomena’ can populate ‘the samesky’) does not imply unitive content, and it isthe latter that characterises perennialism.Reference to an undetermined mystery is notthe same as postulating a transcendentspiritual absolute: The former is akin toobserving that not knowing something is acommon human experience; the latter ismore like suggesting that every timesomeone says the equivalent of, ‘I don’tknow’, they are referencing a shareduniversal ignorance. Ultimately, I suggest thata more productive and relevant discussionshould not focus on terminology or seman-tics but on the deeper, practical issues at stakein Wilber’s and Ferrer’s respective works.

I must object, parenthetically but strenu-ously, that Abramson (this issue) hasmisquoted and misrepresented me asfollows: “In any ordinary usage of the term,… [Ferrer’s] system… is accurately andusefully described as perennialist.’ Thisquote is from Hartelius, 2015” (p.38–48)The use of bracketed insertions is only usedcorrectly when it inserts what seems impliedby the author in that context; one may arguefor a novel application of an author’s point,but to use a bracketed insertion to create theappearance that the author himself makes apoint that is foreign to his discourse isimproper. I have never suggested thatFerrer’s work is perennialist in nature, and Ivigorously disagree with such a position.

It should be noted that Abramson hasalso appended a critique of the Wilber-Combs lattice. This seems marginally rele-vant to his initial critique of the chapter by


Glenn Hartelius

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Hartelius and Ferrer (2013), but perhaps it ismeant to establish Abramson’s bona fides assomeone not wedded to Wilber’s views. Inany case, it is better left to Wilber or Combsto address his suggestions on this topic.

The subject of human spirituality is adeeply important one that deserves consider-ation within psychology as well as religiousstudies. Transpersonal psychology has strug-gled with this issue for more than 45 years,and with the introduction of participatorythought may be on the threshold of making

some real contribution to wider fields ofscholarship. Spirituality is a topic thatextends from the center of human experi-ence to its very edges, often in the context ofgreat passion and commitment. Abramson’sengagement in this enlivening discourse isaccepted with respect and appreciation, evenif few of his positions or arguments convince.

Glenn Hartelius [email protected]


Participatory thought has no emperor and no absolute – A further response to Abramson

ReferencesAbramson, J. (2014). The misunderstanding and

misinterpretation of key aspects of Ken Wilber’swork in Hartelius and Ferrer’s (2013) assess-ment. Transpersonal Psychology Review, 16(1), 3–14.

Abramson, J. (this issue). The emperor’s new clothes:Ferrer isn’t wearing any – participatory is peren-nial. Transpersonal Psychology Review, 17(1), 38–48.

Hartelius, G. (this issue). A startling new role forWilber’s integral model: Or, how I learned tostop worrying and love perennialism (A responseto Abramson). Transpersonal Psychology Review,17(1), 38–48.

Hartelius, G. & Ferrer, J.N. (2013). Transpersonalphilosophy: The participatory turn. In H.L.Friedman & G. Hartelius (Eds.) The Wiley-Black-well handbook of transpersonal psychology(pp.187–202). Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell.

Ferrer, J.N. (2002). Revisioning transpersonal theory: Aparticipatory vision of human spirituality. Albany,NY: State University of New York Press.

Ferrer, J.N. (2008). Spiritual knowing as participatoryenaction: An answer to the question of religiouspluralism. In J.N. Ferrer & J.H. Sherman (Eds.)The participatory turn: Spirituality, mysticism, reli-gious studies (pp.135–169). Albany, NY: StateUniversity of New York Press.

Ferrer, J.N. (2010). The plurality of religions and thespirit of pluralism: A participatory vision of thefuture of religion. International Journal of Transper-sonal Studies, 28(1), 139–151.

Ferrer, J.N. (2011a). Participatory spirituality andtranspersonal theory: A 10-year retrospective.The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 43(1),1–34.

Ferrer, J.N. (2011b). Participation, metaphysics, andenlightenment: Reflections on Ken Wilber’srecent work. Transpersonal Psychology Review,14(2), 3–24.

Ferrer, J.N. (in press). Participation and spirit: Transper-sonal essays in psychology, education, and religion.Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Ferrer, J.N. & Sherman, J.H. (2008). The participa-tory turn in spirituality, mysticism, and religiousstudies. In J.N. Ferrer & J.H. Sherman (Eds.) Theparticipatory turn: Spirituality, mysticism, religiousstudies (pp.1–78). Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press.

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© The British Psychological Society 2013Incorporated by Royal Charter Registered Charity No 229642

Contents1 Editorial: It is time again… to eternity

Ho Law

3 The 18th Annual Transpersonal Psychology Section Conference 2014 – A personal experienceH.W. Randall

9 The hold and release practice: A new way into meditation and mindfulnessElliot Cohen

20 Searching for afrocentric spirituality within the transpersonalDwight Turner, Jane Callaghan & Alasdair Gordon-Finlayson

25 A startling new role for Wilber’s integral model; or how I learned to stop worryingand love perennialism – A response to AbramsonGlenn Hartelius

38 The Emperor's New Clothes: Ferrer isn’t wearing any – Participatory is perennial. A reply to HarteliusJohn Abramson

49 Participatory thought has no emperor and no absolute – A further response to AbramsonGlenn Hartelius

Transpersonal Psychology Review - Dwight Turner … · venues, there are pros and cons – in terms...

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Transcript of Transpersonal Psychology Review - Dwight Turner … · venues, there are pros and cons – in terms...