Transparency and accounTabiliTy -...

Transparency and

accounTabiliTy

NPT RepoRting 2002-2007

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

NPT Reporting 2002-2007

Project Ploughshares

About this Publication As agreed in 2000, States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are called to submit regular reports on their efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT – nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This paper tabulates and summarizes reporting at the five NPT review process meetings since then – the three Preparatory Committee sessions leading up to the 2005 Review Conference (2002-4), the 2005 Review Conference itself, and the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference. The paper briefly reviews the background to the reporting obligation and offers recommendations for enhanced reporting that would more effectively reflect the “permanence with accountability” framework that is at its core. The paper, prepared by Project Ploughshares staff Adam Parsons, Jessica West, and Ernie Regehr, has benefited from a review provided at a roundtable attended by Canadian government officials and civil society representatives. Prepared for International Security Research and Outreach Program (ISROP) International Security Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original language. Préparé pour le programme de recherche et d’information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI), Direction générale de la sécurité internationale, Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport appartiennent exclusivement aux auteurs, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celles du gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction. Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is the ecumenical peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches established to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and nongovernmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada 519-888-6541 Fax 519-888-0018 [email protected] www.ploughshares.ca © Project Ploughshares 2008 First printed April 2008 Printed by Pandora Press, Kitchener, Ontario. Pandora Press prints on 100% recycled Eco-Logo certified paper. ISBN 978-1-895722-62-8

Table of Contents Preface 5 Introduction 7 Background to the Reporting Provision 9 Reporting to Date 14 NNWS Reporting 16

Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime 16 Strategic reductions 17 Tactical or non-strategic reductions 18 Irreversibility 18 The CTBT and a testing moratorium 19 Fissile material controls 19 Security assurances 20 Verification 20 The Conference on Disarmament 21 Nuclear energy 21 Export controls 22 Safeguards 22 Nuclear-weapon-free zones 23 International cooperation 24 Transparency 24 Reporting 25 NWS Reporting 25 Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings 26 Operational status 28 Strategic reductions 29 Tactical reductions 30 Affirmation of Article VI 30 Doctrine 30 Security assurances 32 Fissile material control 32 Policy Considerations 34 Objective and Participation Rate 34 Frequency 35 Structure 36 Scope 37 Notes 39 Acronyms and Abbreviations 40 Table 1: Tabulation 2002–2007 41 Table 2: Article VI Reporting by NWS 47

Preface The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was agreed in the context of a collective commitment by States Parties to strengthening the Treaty’s review process and, in particular, with a heightened sense of the need for mutual accountability in the implementation and furtherance of the aims of the Treaty. In 2000 states agreed (in step 12 of the 13 practical steps) that such accountability would be advanced by a more formalized approach to reporting by each State Party to its Treaty partners, providing regular information on the actions taken and policies followed to meet the requirements of the Treaty and to implement additional measures agreed to in the review process. The framers of the reporting obligation understood reporting―as they understood the review process itself―to be a potential prod to the more effective pursuit of nuclear disarmament. This paper reviews the frequency, format, and content of reporting to date and considers whether this experience offers guidance for the future elaboration and clarification of the Article VI reporting requirement. In the review of early drafts of this paper there was support for an annual update of the tabulations and summaries in the paper and for the development of a comprehensive online database of all reports submitted—including the reports made available by NWS that they do not formally designated as reports under the 2000 Review Conference step 12 agreement. We welcome further suggestions along those lines, as well as corrections of the current paper, to help make future editions and a companion database as useful and informative as possible.

Transparency and Accountability 5

Introduction States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have now had five specific occasions to submit the “regular reports” that were agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (RevCon). Some 48 states have used at least one of those opportunities and have together submitted 112 reports (see Table 1). This paper summarizes the reporting to date, provides background to the reporting commitment, reviews the continuing discussion of the appropriate scope and format of reports, broadly surveys the content of reports submitted, and recommends ways in which reporting can be strengthened and thus better meet the principle of accountability that was emphasized as part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty. As shown in Figure 1, just over one-quarter of the 189 States Parties to the NPT have reported at least once since 2000, and one in six submitted reports to the 2005 RevCon. At the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) one in 20 reported. Figure 1 48 States have submitted at least one report

11 States reported in 2002

28 States reported in 2003 (20 for the first time)



9 States reported in 2007 (none for the first time)

5 States have submitted reports all five years

16 States have submitted only once

It is noteworthy that a relatively high proportion, almost two-thirds, of the 44 states in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) reported at some point in the past seven years (see Figure 2, which identifies reporting by states within various groupings). Annex 2 lists states with some nuclear technology capability, all of which must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force, of which three (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are not parties to the NPT. Only two nuclear weapon states (NWS) are included among the 48 states reporting. Russia and China each submitted formal reports in 2005. The three non-NPT states in possession of nuclear weapons—India, Israel, and Pakistan—are not under any reporting requirement because they are not NPT signatories. All of the NWS that are party to the NPT have reported informally through a variety of statements and background materials (the selected contents of which are surveyed in Table 2). For the most part, however, NWS have chosen not to provide formal reports, in defiance of the promise made when they agreed to the 2000 reporting provision.


Figure 2 6 New Agenda Coalition States reported: Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden (Egypt, also a member, has not reported). 12 Non-Aligned Movement States reported: Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand (NAM membership is now at 118,1 106 of which have not reported). 19 NATO States reported: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey (of NATO’s 26 members, the following seven did not report: Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Slovenia, UK, US). 19 EU States reported: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden (the following EU states did not report: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Malta, Slovenia, UK). 30 CTBT Annex 2 States reported: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (of the 44 Annex 2 states, three—India, Israel, and Pakistan—are not signatories to the NPT, and 11 others that are parties to the NPT have not reported—Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, DPRK, DRC, Egypt, France, UK, US, Vietnam). 2 Nuclear Weapon States formally reported: Russia, China (France, UK, US have not submitted formal reports).

8 Transparency and Accountability

Background to the Reporting Provision “Permanence with accountability” was the central equation of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The indefinite extension of the treaty was accompanied by a commitment to strengthen the review process, focused on the Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences. The 2000 RevCon then elaborated on the accountability commitment through the provision of a specific reporting requirement. The Final Document included a list of 13 Practical Steps toward the implementation of the Treaty, among which was the Step 12 agreement to submit:

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.2

The term “regular reports” was not defined, but it was accepted as a compromise and an alternative to “annual reports.” The call for reports “within the framework of the strengthened review process for the NPT” suggests that states are expected to report to each PrepCom and RevCon, the central features of the strengthened review process. The reporting requirement applies to all States Parties, as all signatories share in the responsibility to implement the Treaty. The reporting requirement is framed by the objectives of three internationally agreed nuclear disarmament decisions:

“cessation of the nuclear arms race” (Article VI of the NPT)3; “reduction of nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those

weapons” (Paragraph 4[c] of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”);4 and

the “obligation to achieve a precise result—nuclear disarmament in all its aspects”

(the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996).5 Beyond these references, there is no further definition or elaboration of the reporting requirement. Some States Parties and NGOs have called for a standard reporting format to allow comparability of information among states and over time, while others, including the NWS, are opposed to any enforced or even agreed structure. Since the NPT has no permanent secretariat, there is in effect also no central entity to receive the reports and perhaps to compile and analyze them. The recipients of the reports are other States Parties (currently the reports are at least posted and maintained, and thus remain accessible, on the website of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs). The reluctance of some states to accept the 2000 RevCon decision as adding a special obligation to report was reflected in disputes over the annotated agenda during the


preparatory lead-up to the 2005 RevCon. In addition to dividing the PrepCom’s program of work into three clusters (Cluster One, nuclear disarmament; Two, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and Three, the peaceful use of nuclear energy), the Chair’s annotated agenda for the 2002 PrepCom included two specific items with reference to the reporting obligation:

Implementation of Article VI, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting;

Regional issues, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting on a

Middle East Zone of Peace. The US and France in particular rejected the references to required reporting, while Egypt, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), submitted a short working paper to argue the importance of retaining a separate reporting item: “the reporting requirements of paragraph 12 of the nuclear disarmament part of the Final Document [2000] are an integral part of the language in the indicative timetable that we have just taken note of.” Ultimately the following compromise language was agreed for the agenda item:

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled “Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs” contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference [emphasis added].

Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of

the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled “Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference [emphasis added].

Canada presented a working paper on “Reporting by States Party to the NPT” to the 2002 PrepCom which called for “a common understanding of the reporting requirements agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference” and for a standardized reporting format. In its formal report in fulfillment of the reporting obligation, Canada offered a model for comprehensive reporting on an article-by-article basis, a format also used by New Zealand. Canada summarized its approach as supporting “a loosely-defined and relatively simple common approach that balances the need for adequate and meaningful content with the desirability of keeping the procedure simple enough to facilitate compliance.” Canada submitted its second Working Paper on Reporting at the 2003 PrepCom, in which it reviewed the 2002 experience of reporting and presented the results of informal consultations with states. The paper concluded that the value to be gained from reports


would only be realized through greater participation in reporting and wider use of the reports. Canada urged States Parties to draw on the body of information from reports to the first and second PrepComs to inform dialogues and discussion at the next PrepCom and the RevCon in 2005. The New Agenda Coalition 2002 working paper also offered reporting format and content suggestions:

The reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, de-alerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability.)

The reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments

in these areas.6 The NPT review process has not produced a consensus document since the 2000 review conference, but the results of the 2002 and 2003 PrepComs were reviewed in “factual summaries” compiled by the chair in each case. The issues of transparency in general and reporting in particular featured in both. The Chair’s summary of 2002 reflects the PrepCom’s broad support for reporting as an instrument of accountability and confidence-building. It also accurately notes the absence of consensus on the question of whether a specific new requirement exists and the extent to which reporting should be standardized:

The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty’s operation.

States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on

the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensible information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.


The chair’s summary of the 2003 PrepCom repeated the points made in 2002, but added two important observations:

The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to increase transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures. (para 10)

It was also expressed that such transparency provides valuable means to address and

respond to compliance concerns. States parties recognized the value of reports and used them in substantive deliberation, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction. (para 21)

The reference to making use of the reports to support discussion (“interactivity”) echoes the Canadian Working Paper’s plea to States Parties to allow the reports to stimulate greater debate. During the PrepComs for the 2005 Review Conference there were frequent references to reports and some significant requests for clarification or elaboration. If the pursuit of a culture of transparency, in which information is freely given and through which States Parties acknowledge that they are accountable to their Treaty partners, is advancing, it must be said that it is doing so only cautiously. Nevertheless, some states continue to call for States Parties to recognize and meet their obligations. In its 2007 report, the Republic of Korea said “that national reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures enhances transparency and builds confidence, and therefore should be encouraged.” It “encourage[d] both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference” and noted, “While there is no consensus on the content and format of national reports, more detailed information contained in them will instill greater confidence in the States’ nuclear policies and disarmament efforts.” In its 2007 report Ireland described “regular reporting” as “a key element of the 13 steps” and saw reporting “not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency.” The Islamic Republic of Iran in 2007 called for the “adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the review strengthening process.” In its 2007 report Canada recalled its 2005 working paper on the concept of “permanence with accountability” and its call for reports to be submitted prior to each set of meetings in the review process. Canada “commend[ed] the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date” and encouraged them to “submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report.” As part of their participation in the 2002 PrepCom, NGOs prepared “Shadow Reports” on 44 States Party to the NPT,7 in a sense offering another variation on reporting models. The NGO reports assessed national positions on a variety of issues, including stated nuclear doctrine, transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials, fissile material holdings and nuclear


facilities, nuclear weapons holdings, and assessments of NWS efforts to fulfill Article VI. In 2003 the shadow report was updated to include a discussion of NWS compliance with the 13 Practical Steps.


Reporting to Date A decline in attention to reporting is reflected in the fact that 2007 was the first year since the 2000 agreement on reporting in which no new states were added to the list of reporting states—in other words, the first year in which no state submitted a report for the first time. Indeed, 2007 saw the lowest level of reporting since the obligation to report was undertaken. A decline from the level of reporting to the 2005 RevCon was perhaps to be expected, but a 75 per cent drop should be taken as a worrying sign about the level of commitment to transparency and accountability. To date the greatest increase in levels of reporting occurred in 2003, when 20 states submitted reports for the first time. The highest level of reporting occurred at the 2005 RevCon when 34 states reported, 11 for the first time. Of the 48 States that have submitted a report to date, 34 have reported more than once, and of these, only Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, and New Zealand have reported at all meetings of the review process since 2000. There is not yet wide agreement on the format of reporting. There are many variations, but they can be divided into three basic categories, as shown in Figure 3. The “General” format refers to reports that tend to focus on Article VI issues and describe broadly the reporting state’s activities in support of disarmament. The “Articles” format refers to submissions that report on activities related to each article of the Treaty, generally on the grounds that the Treaty is an integrated whole and that all its articles are relevant to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. The “13 steps” approach reports on each element of the widely agreed disarmament agenda outline in the 2000 RevCon 13 practical steps. Some states, notably Canada and New Zealand, have reported in two formats: article-by-article and the 13 steps. Most states still prefer the general format of reporting on their disarmament activities, responding to the particular language of the 2000 Final Document to entitle their reports “Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” Some states refer simply to reporting on the implementation of Article VI, without mentioning the 1995 Decision. Others use the title, “Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” broadening the reporting mandate to the entire Treaty.


Figure 3

Report Formats 2002 - Total 10

6

3

1

GeneralArticles13 Steps


15

5

9



14

6

10GeneralArticles13 Steps


17

9

10



6

2

3

GeneralArticles 13 Steps

These charts examine the breakdown of the various reporting formats since 2002: the article-by-article (Articles) and 13 Steps formats, and the overview of activities relevant to Article VI reports. In 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 New Zealand is counted twice, while Canada is counted twice in 2007, both due to the fact that theses States used two formats in the years listed. The general narrative format consistent with the 1995 Principles and Objectives and Article VI continues to be the most widely used, although increasingly states are exploring other formats.


NNWS Reporting Table 1 provides a list, by country and year, of all reports submitted to date and tabulates the major and recurring disarmament themes referred to in each. All except two of the 112 reports tabulated are from non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). While the reports cover a wide range of themes, activities, and concerns, Table 1 identifies 16 issues that most often receive explicit and repeated attention. These 16 issues can be taken as reflecting key concerns of states and the priorities of the international nuclear disarmament agenda. The following elaboration on each of the issue areas includes excerpts from reports that are illustrative of overall reporting, but far from exhaustive.

Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime

It is no surprise that states that have reported are strong supporters of the NPT and disarmament, and they use their reports to reaffirm that commitment and to express concerns or assessments of the overall health of the regime. Of the 112 reports submitted 91—or well over three-quarters—made explicit reference to the well-being of the NPT and the broader regime that it anchors. Turkey (2005): “Turkey favours global overall disarmament and supports all efforts in the field of sustaining international security through arms control and disarmament…. Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programmes for acquiring weapons of this kind. In this spirit, Turkey became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2000…. Non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both fronts. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of the 1995 decisions and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the 13 Practical Steps.” Australia (2007): “The current intense international concern about weapons of mass destruction proliferation, including potentially non-State groups, has added to the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty. Universality remains a key objective. Australia calls upon the countries yet to join to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.” Cuba (2005): “Over the years, Cuba maintained reservations regarding the Treaty, which it considered to be a discriminatory international regime conductive to the existence of a club of nuclear-weapons-States… On becoming a State party to the Treaty Cuba’s position of principle did not change. Our country has decided to work from within the Treaty in order to further what we regard to be our priority in the area of disarmament, namely, achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons…. The only way of overcoming the built in flaws of the NPT, and its selective and discriminatory nature, is by attaining the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby guaranteeing the security of all countries on an equal footing.”


Strategic reductions One-half of all reports by non-nuclear weapon states referred to strategic reductions. This relatively low level of attention to the central Article VI obligation may in part reflect a NNWS assumption that this is obviously a NWS responsibility, even though the obligation to report applies to all states and provides an opportunity for NNWS to report on their activities and policies in support of nuclear disarmament. It could also reflect a sense that the arsenals of the two leading NWS are declining, although a number of the references to reductions deplore what they see as ongoing NWS commitments to the modernization of their arsenals as well as the failure to make reductions irreversible. In 2005, for example, Brazil noted: “Particularly disturbing are new approaches concerning the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, especially studies on the possible development of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to their tactical uses, including countering conventional forces. The ‘unequivocal undertaking’ agreed upon in 2000 should be demonstrated by further, stronger nuclear disarmament measures. Little has been done since 2000 by the 5 NWS to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons at their defence and strategic doctrines. The continuous importance attached by the 5 NWS to nuclear weapons suggests to the rest of the world that such weapons are indeed relevant to security needs. This perception may generate genuine interest in such an option in other Parties, which would in turn stoke the flames of nuclear proliferation.” In 2007 Ukraine drew attention to its own successful program of disarmament: “From 1992 to 1996 all tactical nuclear warheads and more then 1,600 strategic warheads were transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. By October 2001 all those warheads were eliminated at the relevant facilities of the Russian Federation under the monitoring of Ukrainian representatives.” The Republic of Korea said in its 2007 report that it “hopes for deeper cuts and further engagement by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty.” Also in 2007, Ireland emphasized that “developments since 2000 have not removed the need for a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Ireland notes the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation but questions its contribution to effective nuclear disarmament. As we have emphasized, through the New Agenda Coalition, reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, while welcoming, are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.”


Tactical or non-strategic reductions Only slightly more than a third of the reports referred to reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons. This may in part reflect the regional character of this issue, with NATO and European states being more inclined to address it. The Netherlands report of 2004 is indicative of the approach: “As party to the NPT and as a member of NATO, we feel a special responsibility in relation to the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has significantly reduced the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. What remains deployed in Europe is only a very small amount of the original numbers that were there 10 or more years ago. More than 80 percent of these weapons were actually eliminated. Their readiness is presently measured in weeks and months rather than in hours and days. The purpose of NATO’s remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons is fundamentally political. Within NATO, a process has started between the Alliance and the Russian Federation to give appropriate attention to the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dialogue, which is now starting will hopefully lead to measures that will promote mutual confidence, transparency and stability.” Sweden’s 2005 Report continued “to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” “Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Against this background, Sweden together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, have presented resolutions on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which were adopted by the fifty-seventh and fifty-eighth United Nations General Assembly. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sweden together with Austria and Mexico, submitted a working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and at the third session a second working paper on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons together with Austria and Ukraine. Sweden will continue to work on this issue at the NPT Review Conference.” The 2007 report of the Republic of Korea called for “progress toward reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as part of overall nuclear disarmament,” and also proposed that “nuclear-weapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrines.”

Irreversibility Step 5 of the 2000 RevCon’s 13 practical steps called for “the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures” and roughly half of all reports stressed its importance. For example, “Argentina hopes that such principle will be explicitly included in all the bilateral and multilateral instruments that are negotiated pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; clearly, this is vital for the credibility of such arrangements” (2005). In 2005, Spain said, “Spain believes that the principle of irreversibility should be considered as an essential principle of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms control depends very strongly on their


irreversibility. Spain calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to reflect the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.” Netherlands described “irreversibility [as] important for multilateral and bilateral arms control alike. Although agreeing on bilateral nuclear arms reductions is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, international stability and security are best served by irreversible reductions. It has been a consistent element in the approach of the Netherlands towards nuclear reduction talks to emphasize the importance of irreversibility.”

The CTBT and a testing moratorium The most referenced item within national reports has been support for ratification of the CTBT and reiterations of the need to uphold the testing moratorium. The 2005 report from Morocco reflects the approach and concern that states regularly convey: “The Kingdom of Morocco, which supports a total ban on nuclear tests, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It deplores the fact that this Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, has still not entered into force. In this respect, it reiterates its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. It stresses the importance of respect for the moratoriums on nuclear tests and of the convening of conferences in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty.” Norway reminded NPT states parties that “the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The verification system is thus at the core of the Treaty. The full implementation of the International Monitoring System as soon as possible, without waiting for the entry into force of the Treaty, would represent a significant confidence and security-building measure. Six monitoring stations comprising altogether 119 field instruments are located on Norwegian territory as part of the International Monitoring System. With the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1999, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) was established as the Norwegian National Data Centre for verification of compliance with the Treaty” (2005). Brazil’s 2005 report pointed out that it “has consistently called for the universalization of the CTBT. Furthermore, [Brazil] continues to call for signatories that have not done so, particularly those 11 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify it with a view to its early entry into force” (2005).

Fissile material controls The prominence given to the need to end production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also reflected in more than three-quarters of the reports. In 2005 Lithuania declared, “A fissile material cut-off Treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lithuania calls upon the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.” Japan’s 2005 report also linked the issue of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD): “Japan regards it as a primary task to


reach an agreement on a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby bring about the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Japan has been making utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament and has redoubled its endeavours to that end during its Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament from 29 August to December 31 2003.”

Security assurances Given the importance of negative security assurances in the stalemate at the CD it is perhaps surprising that less than a quarter of the reports made reference to the issue. “Indonesia emphasizes the paramount importance of providing security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument. This will constitute a critical element to maintain the norms of the non-proliferation regime” (2005). Turkey’s 2005 report described such assurances as supporting the overall effectiveness of the NPT: “As pointed out in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), Turkey recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive security assurances. As also pointed out in the same resolution, Turkey believes that the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States are legitimate, and that, in conjunction with adherence to the Treaty, further appropriate measures [should] be undertaken to safeguard their security. While recognizing the continuing value of confidence-building-measures such as unilateral declarations of nuclear-power States, Turkey believes that the further measures mentioned above should be largely binding security assurances and that these measures will complement and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.”

Verification Verification concerns are also reflected prominently in the reports, with two-thirds of the reports including a reference; in most case the issue is raised in several contexts, including reductions, fissile material controls, and safeguards. In its 2007 report Canada referred to its working paper on “An FMCT Scope-Verification Arrangement” (CD/1819, 21 March 2007) “discussing the interrelationship between the scope and verifiability of an FMCT and suggesting an approach for cost effective verification of an eventual treaty.” The principles of verification and irreversibility were of major concern for states in 2003, particularly in response to the Moscow Treaty, which does not require that reductions are made irreversible or are verified. In 2005 Norway reported that it “supports the further development of and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including the above-mentioned International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway co-sponsored the resolution entitled ‘Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of Verification’, which was adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.”


The Conference on Disarmament The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was also addressed in two-thirds of the reports. In its 2007 report Japan recounted its efforts to end the CD stalemate: “Japan has been making its utmost effort to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Japan has redoubled its endeavours for this purpose through the dispatch of high-level representatives to the Conference on Disarmament on various occasions. During the 2006 session, both the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Akiko Yamanaka, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yohei Kono, delivered speeches stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. On 13 March 2007, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Hamada also made a statement at the Conference on Disarmament, urging the members to commence negotiations on an FMCT in the second part of the current session, building upon the positive results in the first part.” Nigeria reported in 2005 that it “has supported all General Assembly resolutions calling on the Conference on Disarmament to agree to commence work on substantive issues before it as soon as possible. Nigeria has continued to reiterate its full support for the Five Ambassadors Proposal as a mechanism for breaking the existing impasse in reaching a work programme for the Conference on Disarmament.” Argentina pointed out in 2005 that it “favours establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, which would help to advance the issues that Argentina would like the Conference on Disarmament to address pursuant to Article VI.”

Nuclear energy Fewer than half the states referred directly to nuclear energy. States reporting in the article-by-article format are most likely to address the issue under Article IV. In its 2005 report Brazil emphasized the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as existing outside the NPT: “The NPT clearly recognizes the inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends, which predated the Treaty. This recognition of this inalienable right was a central part of the bargain that was struck at the creation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. This bargain was at the core of the creation of the IAEA, and it was later to prove instrumental in establishing the NPT and in making it a permanent, quasi-universal regime…. The development and uses of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of our national policy, which is enshrined in our Constitution. We remain convinced of the potential benefits of the responsible use of nuclear technologies and of the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field, for which the work of the IAEA is of great importance.” Canada’s 2005 report also recognized the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, emphasizing the responsibilities that attend such use: “In view of the inherent relationship between States’ inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant


international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In this regard, a Canadian expert participated in the recent IAEA ad hoc experts group studying new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives.” In 2007 Malaysia reported that it “is deeply concerned with the practice of selectivity and discrimination, as well as the trend towards unilateralism in dictating the limits of research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia calls upon NPT States parties, particularly the advanced States parties in terms of nuclear technology development, to live up to their obligations in upholding the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, to ensure that all NPT States parties can benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear technology.”

Export controls Export controls are referred to in fewer than half of the reports, but are especially addressed by states reporting in the article-by-article format. Hungary’s 2005 report focused its attention on controls and declared support for, and the importance of, control of fuel cycle technologies: “Hungary regards the introduction and application of appropriate export control measures as an important tool for stemming the risk of clandestine nuclear programmes. As a participating State of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Hungary maintains and operates an effective national system of export controls and contributes to international efforts in this field. Hungary welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), requiring States to adopt domestic controls to prevent and preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the Proliferation Security Initiative framework (e.g., in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary’s participation in cooperation activities within the Proliferation Security Initiative framework…. Hungary follows with great interest the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and non-discriminatory framework. The dual-use technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing, are a source of concern.” In 2005 New Zealand reported that “in implementing its national export controls, New Zealand seeks to restrict trade related only to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or nuclear weapon programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand advocates cooperation only with States in compliance with obligations under safeguards agreement.”

Safeguards Wide support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime is a prominent feature of the reports, with more than 80 per cent of reports addressing the issue. In 2003, Mongolia and Morocco announced entry into force of Additional Protocols, and in 2004 several EU states reported on the entry into force of the Additional Protocol between Euratom and the IAEA. A number of States Parties including Australia (2004), Canada


(2007), Croatia (2005), the Czech Republic (2004), Finland (2005), Hungary (2004, 2005), Indonesia (2005), Italy (2005), Lithuania (2005), Luxembourg (2004), Netherlands (2005), Norway (2003), Republic of Korea (2005, 2007), and Sweden (2003, 2004, 2005) called for the Additional Protocol to be the verification standard and a condition of supply for transfer of nuclear and dual-use items. In 2007 Australia noted that “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not static and have undergone considerable evolution since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 19 70. The Additional Protocol and the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards are the most recent manifestation of that evolution. Australia played a prominent role in negotiation of the Additional Protocol and was the first country to ratify such a protocol…. It is of concern that seven non-nuclear-weapon State NPT parties with significant nuclear activities have yet to conclude an Additional Protocol.” Finland’s 2005 report said: “The international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear-non-proliferation regime. Finland considers that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol, represent the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1 of the Treaty. Finland calls upon all states that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol without delay.” Latvia‘s 2007 report says that “Latvia considers the IAEA safeguards system as an essential mechanism of verifying compliance with the obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Latvia favours the universalization of the Additional Protocol and urges all countries who have not yet signed this document to do so.”

Nuclear-weapon-free zones Just over one-half of all reports included references to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). Malaysia reported in 2007 that it “signed the Treaty on the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) on 15 December 1995, and ratified it on 11 October 1996. Malaysia is also continuing to work actively with other member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to this treaty, particularly in encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to accede as parties to the Protocol to the Treaty at an early date. Malaysia is also of the view that the accession to the Protocol to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States would effectively constitute a negative security assurance to the regional States parties of such nuclear-weapons-free zones.” Croatia welcomed “the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones recognizing them as important complementary instruments to the NPT and appreciating the role they play in promoting regional and global peace and security. Croatia believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones must be based on arrangements freely made among the States of the region in question, and should not interfere with the existing or evolving security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security” (2005).


International cooperation Several states reported on disarmament measures they took in cooperation with other states. Canada (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Japan (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Germany (2002), Kazakhstan (2004), Norway (2003, 2004), Sweden (2002), and Ukraine (2004) all reported on specific programs to assist in securing former Soviet nuclear facilities, weapons, and materials. In 2007 Japan reviewed the Global Partnership program: “At their Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, the leaders of the Group of Eight announced the ‘G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Materials of Mass Destruction’ to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership to make a contribution amounting to a little more than $200 million United States dollars, of which $100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 disposition programme for Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, for the first time, 20 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists. Under the same partnership, in December of 2003, Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first cooperation project to dismantle a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine, a project which was successfully completed in December of 2004. At present, Japan and the Russian Federation are making great efforts to conclude an implementing arrangement for dismantling five additional decommissioned nuclear submarines.”

Transparency Transparency was referred to by just over half of all reports. The 2005 report of the Netherlands noted: “The Netherlands has been strongly advocating increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the last NPT Review Conference, in 2000, the Netherlands introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway. Regarding transparency, according to the original proposals, such measures could include a commitment by the nuclear-weapons States to make known periodically the aggregate numbers of warheads, delivery systems, and stocks of fissile material for military purposes in their possession and their nuclear policies.” Sweden’s 2005 report linked transparency and confidence building: “Steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI serve as a confidence building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms controls efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. It is also of particular importance that nuclear-weapon States diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed, and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use.” Spain (2005) offered specific suggestions for NWS to use their reporting obligation to enhance transparency: “It would be desirable that nuclear-weapon States submit regular


reports on their arsenals, delivery systems, fissile-material stocks, and exports of technology for military use. Although it must be emphasized that some nuclear-weapon States have shown considerable proof of transparency, it should be borne in mind that any confidence-building measure and any progress made in this area is of particular importance and urgency. More specifically, one cannot ignore the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist organizations. This leads to the realization that non-nuclear weapon States also have important responsibilities with respect to verification and transparency: in this regard, it is essential inter alia to strengthen the role played by the IAEA.”

Reporting The reporting obligation was itself a feature of more than half of the reports. Reporting was identified as both a transparency and accountability mechanism. Mexico in its 2005 report emphasized “the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear- weapon States” and went on to make the point “that the five nuclear-weapon States have a greater responsibility for submitting information about steps taken to comply with the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty.” In 2007 Canada referred to its working paper submitted to the 2005 Review Conference on the concept of “permanence with accountability” for the NPT, which, it said, among other proposals, supported the practice of submitting annual reports on treaty implementation prior to such meetings. This followed up on a number of previous papers submitted by Canada at earlier Preparatory Committee meetings on this topic. “Canada commends the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date, and would encourage them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report.” Indonesia noted in 2007 that “the 1995 decisions included a Strengthened Review Process and an indefinite extension of the Treaty that was intended to ensure accountability, inter alia, by submitting annual reports on the implementing of its provisions. Such reporting, called for in the 2000 document, would contribute substantively to the regime’s credibility and acceptance.” Ireland’s 2007 report noted that “Ireland considers regular reporting to be a key element of the 13 practical steps and presented reports during the last NPT review cycle. Ireland views reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency.” NWS Reporting China and Russia both submitted formal reports in 2005. Beyond that, NWS have not submitted reports that they specifically identify as being in response to the 2000 agreement on reporting. At the same time, all five NWS regularly report to NPT review process meetings and it must be said that such reporting, while it varies considerably, has increased in detail and scope since 2000. It comes in the form of national statements, working papers, fact sheets, and other background material, some of which is distributed informally at review process meetings.

Table 2 attempts to summarize information provided on eight selected issues drawn from this broad range of formal and informal documents:


Warhead and launch vehicles holdings, both tactical and strategic; Operational status of weapons held; Progress on strategic reductions; Progress on non-strategic reductions; Affirmation of Article VI; Strategic doctrine; Security assurances; and Fissile material control.

The sources are listed and, as in the case of reporting by NNWS, the excerpts and summaries provided are illustrative rather than exhaustive. The basic guideline has been to include materials that the NWS made a point of distributing at NPT review meetings. It is clear that there is a great deal more information relevant to NWS arsenals, disarmament efforts, strategic doctrine, and security assurances available, both from the NWS governments themselves and from independent sources. The focus here is to review the information that the NWS have made a point of sharing with other States Parties to the NPT in the context of NPT review process meetings. There is, in fact, a sense in which other sources represent a means to verify the accuracy and completeness of reporting to the NPT (but the present report does not include references to such external sources). The reporting to the NPT review process provides a reading of the extent to which NWS regard themselves as accountable to other States Parties to the Treaty and the extent to which they regard the reporting provision as a firm obligation. By refusing, for the most part, to submit formal reports, the NWS seem to be asserting a basic unwillingness to accept Step 12 of the 13 practical steps set out in the 2000 RevCon as a clear obligation linked to their accountability to other States Parties of the NPT. On the other hand, their informal reporting suggests a measure of openness to meeting the reporting requirement and giving account of themselves to the international community represented by the NPT. Generally, the documents provided range from the reasonably detailed—particularly in the case of the UK, which has provided numbers of nuclear weapons in its stockpile, their operational status, and details about disarmament and verification programs, fissile material stocks, and other policy commitments—to the generally opaque, as in the case of some of China’s statements and documents, which provided virtually no quantitative detail at all. Without a standardized format or more detailed reporting guidelines, NWS reporting will likely continue to be mixed. The following reviews the reporting under each of the eight categories referred to above.

Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings Most of the reporting on warheads and delivery vehicles has focused on past reductions rather than on current holdings. Russia, the UK, and the US have provided some information on both warheads and launch vehicles; France has reported only on delivery vehicles; and China, in 2004, reported that it “possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal” of all NWS, while in the same year the UK reported that “we hold less than 200 operationally available warheads.”


The UK has consistently provided information on current holdings, reporting a “reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of our deterrent” to “fewer than 200 warheads” in 2002. The information was repeated in 2003–2005. In 2003, the UK noted that it has “dismantled our last Chevaline warhead—part of our commitment to irreversibility in reductions in the UK’s nuclear weapons.” The UK updated the statistic on its warhead holdings in 2007, stating that “the UK has…decided to reduce its stockpile of operationally available warheads by a further 20% to fewer than 160.” The UK has also provided details on current delivery vehicle holdings, stating in 2002 that “only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads” and maintaining this report in 2003–2005. In 2007 the UK referenced its Trident renewal program, indicating that “the UK has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic missile submarine fleet; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy.” It also stated that “the UK is retaining not modernizing its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine.” China, France, and the UK all report their holdings as the minimum needed for national security. France uses the term “strict sufficiency”; China describes its arsenal as the “minimum level for self defense”; and the UK refers to “the minimum level necessary for the UK’s national security.” The US and Russia supply data on deployment (not total holdings) that is frequently in reference to requirements under current treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), START, and the Moscow Treaty. In a 2002 Information Paper the US reported “dismantling over 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1998,” including a reduction to “a level of less than 6,000 deployed warheads” by December 2001, also indicating that its arsenal would be further reduced to “a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade.” In 2007 the US reported that, “as of December 31, 2006, the United States had 3,696 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.” In response to claims that the US 2001 Nuclear Posture Review called for new nuclear weapons, a paper titled “The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons” clarified that “there are two activities that have been debated extensively: a modest research effort on advanced nuclear-weapon concepts that Congress recently redirected to study technologies to enhance confidence in warhead reliability without testing; and a study on whether—without testing—an existing weapon could be adapted to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried targets…. There has been no decision to move beyond the study stage, which will require Presidential and congressional action.” This stance was clarified in 2007 when the US reported that it has “decided to go forward with developing the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)…. The Reliable Replacement Warhead will not provide any new or improved military capabilities compared to the older warheads it replaces in the United States arsenal.” Russia has also reported holdings statistics that correspond to targets in the INF, START I, and Moscow Treaty, stating in 2002 that “on the deadline date December 5, 2001 [Russia] has actually lowered the number of her deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM


and strategic bombers) down to 1136 units, and the number of the reentry vehicles accounted with them down to 5518 units.” In 2007 Russia provided specific updates on START reductions, indicating that “as of January 1, 2007, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4200 warheads accountable under the START 1 Treaty.” France and China report the fewest details. France focuses its information on holdings on delivery systems, and a chart provided in 2005 appears to show holdings of about 105 nuclear delivery vehicles, but the precise figure is not provided. Finally, in 2007 France added that the number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles has been reduced from six to four. China, on the other hand, has only recently referenced its nuclear warhead holdings, indicating for the first time in 2004 that it “possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal” of all the NWS states. This detail was not published in its official report submitted in 2005 and no references to holdings were made in 2007. The most consistent indication of China’s nuclear holdings has been the statements that China “has exercised utmost restraint in developing nuclear weapons” and that its weapons are for “self-defence purposes only.” It has no reporting on holdings of delivery vehicles. Both the UK and the US have reported on new programs, noting that these are not designed to produce new capabilities. Upgrades in missile, submarine, and bomber delivery systems have not been reported to other NPT states parties. Russia and China have not reported to the NPT on any of their delivery vehicle upgrade programs.

Operational status All of the NWS have reported that their nuclear arsenals have been detargeted. China has provided the fewest details on the operational status of its nuclear arsenals, first mentioning in 2004 that “China and Russia, China and the United States declared that they would not aim nuclear weapons at each other” and adding in 2005 that “in April 2000, the five nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement announcing that they would not target their nuclear weapons at any countries.” The readiness of China’s weapons for launch has not been indicated. France has similarly focused on detargeting measures, reporting in 2002 that “as far back as 1997 France announced that none of its nuclear weapons was henceforth targeted” and repeating that information in 2004 and 2005. In 2007, however, France added the statement that “the alert status of French nuclear forces has been downgraded on two occasions, in 1992 and 1996. Those reductions applied to both the response times and the number of weapons on alert.” Russia reported in 2002 that “detargeting of strategic nuclear weapons has become one of Russia’s steps in the area of reducing the nuclear threat. At present as a result of implementation of that initiative all Russia’s ballistic missiles are equipped with a so-called ‘zero’ launch mission.” In 2004 Russia added that, “as a result of this initiative, the launch of


missiles becomes technically impossible in the absence of a real flight mission plan”; these statements were repeated in 2005. The only mention of operational status in 2007 was that Russia “continues steadily reducing strategic delivery means and the related warheads.” The UK has consistently provided information on the targeting and readiness status of its Trident nuclear weapons system from 2002–2007, indicating that “only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol at any one time, normally at several days ‘notice to fire’ and with its missile detargeted.” The US reported in 2002 that “U.S. nuclear forces are not targeted on any state on a day-to-day basis” and that “NATO has ceased to maintain standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and its nuclear forces no longer target any country. NATO has taken a number of steps to reduce the number and readiness of its dual-capable aircraft; readiness of these aircraft is now measured in weeks and months compared to minutes and hours as in the past. U.S. reliance on the forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been dramatically curtailed.” The statement on the increase of NATO’s launch time from “minutes to months” was repeated in 2003. In 2004 and 2005 the US reported that it “no longer targets any country with nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis. Strategic bombers are no longer on alert. Dual-capable aircraft no longer operate on a high-alert basis, and their readiness requirements now are measured in weeks and months, rather than minutes.” There was no clear indication of the operational status of US nuclear weapons in 2007, however, aside from reports on nuclear warhead and delivery vehicle reductions.

Strategic reductions

China reports no reductions, insisting that “the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility and should take the lead in nuclear disarmament.” In 2007 the UK committed to reduce “operationally available warheads by 20% to fewer than 160.” France, Russia, and the United States tend to focus on reductions from the 1990s. France says the number of “warheads held by France has never exceeded a few hundred” and that “the number of delivery vehicles has been reduced by over half.” The United States reports that “we have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War.” The general approach of Russia and the United States is to report on the implementation of START I and draw on major reductions undertaken in the 1990s. At the RevCon of 2005 Russia submitted its first formal report and gave specific strategic reduction numbers: “over the five year period that elapsed between the previous and today’s NPT Review Conference the Russian Federation reduced its strategic nuclear force by 357 delivery vehicles and 1740 nuclear warheads.”

The Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States commits both states to reduce strategic nuclear weapons holdings to between 1,700–2,000; both states have emphasized and repeated the reduction targets without regularly reporting the details of progress made to date—that is, the specific deployment reductions toward those goals in each reporting period.


Tactical reductions NWS reporting on tactical reductions tends to focus on total tactical reductions undertaken since the Cold War. Russia reported in 2002 that, “in accordance with statements made by the President of the U.S.S.R. on Oct. 5, 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation on January 29, 1992 Russia consistently fulfills the initiatives, which she declared unilaterally. We would like to remind at this juncture that all nuclear weapons deployed outside of Russia, have been brought back to her territory and are in the process of liquidation.” The US reported that non-strategic weapons deployed in support of NATO have been reduced by more than 90 per cent and that all have been removed from ground forces and naval surface ships and its carrier-dual capable aircraft. “In sum, the Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of the Navy have been denuclearized.”

The United Kingdom reported that it had dismantled the last of its freefall Chevaline warheads in 2002. In 2004 France drew attention to the withdrawal of its short-range Pluton surface-to-surface missiles and AN-52 bombs.

Affirmation of Article VI All NWS have declared themselves to be in complete support of Article VI and committed to its implementation.

China declares support for the “elimination of nuclear weapons.” France affirmed in 2002 the “ultimate goal of eliminating [nuclear weapons] altogether” and in 2003 emphasized that “nuclear disarmament presupposes a context of undiminished international stability and security for all.” Russia declared in 2003 that it is committed “to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” and in 2007 reaffirmed the NPT as being “at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.” The UK declared in 2003 its “commitment to verifiable nuclear disarmament.” In 2007 the UK stated that, “in the absence of further measures being agreed in 2005, the UK continues to implement the decisions taken in previous review cycles.”

The United States regularly affirms its support for Article VI, but in 2003 pointed out that: “[w]e think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 Steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations.” In 2005 the United States reaffirmed that it is “fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI,” but “there can be no artificial timetable for progress in realizing our common Article VI objectives.” In 2007 the US stated in a working paper on disarmament that it “seeks to build a new global environment in which disarmament can become a realistic possibility.”8

Doctrine China’s doctrinal statements tend to focus on its non-first-use commitment, its “utmost constraint towards developing nuclear weapons,” and its commitment to keeping its arsenal “at the minimum level for self-defense.” In 2005 China added that “no efforts should be made to develop and deploy missile defence systems detrimental to the global strategic balance and stability, and no weapons systems should be deployed to outer space.”


France describes its policy of nuclear deterrence as based on the “principle of strict sufficiency,” stating in 2005 that “France considers that the purpose of its deterrent forces is to guarantee that its vital interests will never be threatened by any other power” and that “French nuclear weapons form no part of any strategy based on the military use of such weapons and have never been considered by France to be war-fighting assets.” In 2007 its document on nuclear disarmament measures quotes the President as saying: “Our doctrine has been adapted taking account of the new threats and our international commitments: faced with a major power, to be able to inflict damage of any kind, and, faced with a regional power, to exercise our response on its centres of power and capacity to act so that the risk of unacceptable damage deters any potential aggressor.” Russia makes several references to maintaining a nuclear arsenal at “minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability,” or “in accordance with the idea of ‘minimum sufficiency.’” In 2004 it explained that “nuclear disarmament…may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world and Europe.” In 2002 the UK stated that, “having reduced our nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary for the UK’s national security, further unilateral steps we can take now without compromising that security are limited.” This reference to a “minimum level” was repeated in 2003. In 2005 the UK referenced its 1998 Strategic Defence review and the 2003 Defence White Paper, which “noted that due to the continuing risk of nuclear proliferation and the retention by other countries of substantial nuclear arsenals, Trident was likely to remain a necessary element of our security…we are continuing the policy we have had since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review of taking appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability are kept open.” The US reported the outcome of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that “the new U.S. defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. This approach is designed to provide the President with a broad array of options to address a wide range of contingencies. It will increase the nuclear threshold by giving U.S. Presidents additional non-nuclear options and defenses to deter an enemy attack.” In 2003, it added that “there has been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and…the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Indeed, by strengthening non-nuclear forces…we will be able to hold targets at risk with an advanced conventional system that heretofore required a nuclear weapon. The result is an increase in the threshold for nuclear use.” This line of reporting is consistent between 2002 and 2007. (The US also calls for “general and complete disarmament.”) In 2002 the US also reported on NATO’s nuclear doctrine, indicating that “the United States and its NATO allies over the past decade have adapted NATO’s defense posture to the new security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Its strategy is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation, and the circumstances in which NATO might have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are considered to be extremely remote.”


Security assurances China’s declared determination “not to be the first to use nuclear weapons” represents a general security assurance to NNWS when joined by its commitment “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear-weapon-free-zones.” France reaffirmed its commitment to negative security assurances provided in UN Resolution 984 in 2002–2005, stating in 2002 that its commitments made in Resolution 984 “remain valid” and in 2003 that “France has made absolutely no change to its policy in this area.” This policy was qualified in 2003, however, by the statement that “states in breach of their commitments on non-proliferation cannot invoke the benefit of those safeguards,” and again in 2004 by reference to “the natural right of legitimate self-defense.” France also reports the security assurances it provides to members of NWFZs by signing onto supporting Protocols, indicating in 2003 and 2004 that it has extended these “to over 100 countries” and in 2005 that “among NWS, France is party to the greatest number of protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.” The UK reports that it is “fully committed to negative security assurances” and also supports the establishment of NWFZ and security assurances to their members. Russia’s statements in 2002 and 2003 indicate that the “unconditional fulfillment of negative security assurances” provided in the 1995 resolution are “fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.” In 2004, while maintaining the right of NNWS to security assurances and continuing to support NWFZ, Russia began to call for a global, binding negative security assurance (NSA) agreement, “provided it contains reservations concerning cases in which nuclear weapons may be used.” This statement was continued in 2005 and 2007, with the added clarification that the instances when nuclear weapons may be used would be based on the military doctrines of NWS. The US stated in 2002–2004 that “there remains no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.” In 2004 this statement was qualified insofar as the US does not see “any justification for expanding NSAs to encompass global-legally binding assurances”; that “these assurances are applicable only to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states in compliance with the Treaty”; and that “in this security environment [of nuclear proliferation], it is apparent that NSAs by the NPT nuclear weapon states are of diminishing importance as a possible remedy to the security concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states,” calling instead for “strict compliance with the NPT by all states.” Similar statements were repeated in 2005, but security assurances were not mentioned in 2007.

Fissile material control In their 2007 statements, working papers, and reports submitted to the NPT, each of the NWS has indicated support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. China says that it “attaches great importance to the recent proposals submitted by parties concerned regarding the program of work of the CD,” but refers to the need for “substantive work on the FMCT,” rather than negotiations.


France declares itself “ready to initiate, without preconditions, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear-weapons at the Disarmament Conference.” It reports that it announced in 1996 “a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed down the relevant facilities,” making it the “first State to take and implement a decision to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” Russia also declares that “it is high time for the CD in Geneva to start negotiations on elaboration of the FMCT. We reaffirm our support for this idea. The sooner the deadlock situation at the CD is broken and the programme of work is agreed, the earlier it could undertake negotiating the FMCT.” The United Kingdom “reiterates its commitment to abide by its …moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes…. We hope…that the recent positive indicators that the 10 year long blockage at the Conference on Disarmament may be broken herald a new phase of consensus building in that forum. In the first instance we would like to see the early negotiation, of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty—an issue that would represent an important and concrete step towards disarmament and one that is ripe and ready to be taken forward.” The United States declares itself a “staunch advocate of a treaty to ban any further production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive purposes,” and reported on its May 2006 draft FMCT submitted to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The draft treaty reflects US opposition to FMCT verification measures.


Policy Considerations Though reporting is in its infancy in the sense that only a minority of NPT states report and the amount of detail varies considerably, it can still be said that formal reports submitted in response to the 2000 reporting agreement have already begun to demonstrate their value. In them each State Party offers its own account of its disarmament commitments and activities. These accounts are not offered in a vacuum but are subject to at least an informal level of verification inasmuch as it is possible in most cases to check a State Party’s reporting against independent sources. That is particularly true for NWS reporting. Formal reports by NNWS, it is probably fair to say, tend to be more descriptions than national statements, and they generally contain more detail about specific initiatives undertaken to pursue the goals of Article VI than do other statements. In addition to stating policy and making general assessments about the state of disarmament, States Parties use the reports to note resolutions they supported in the First Committee, the signing and ratification of relevant treaties, initiatives such as national and regional technical meetings, and to confirm their compliance with IAEA safeguards, export controls, and nonproliferation mechanisms. NWS reporting remains largely informal and some of it has the character of promotional material designed to build the political case for NWS commitment to disarmament.

Some states have suggested that the practice of reporting could become repetitive over time. Reporting in 2003 for the first time, South Africa noted that “the Preparatory Committee should make every endeavor to ensure that this does not take place as a matter of rote. The Preparatory Committee should endeavor to ensure that a seemingly endless procession of largely repetitive prepared statements and reports does not lull us into a sense of complacency in which we would come to believe that all is well.” As South Africa notes, its comment is relevant to all statements to the review process. Germany, in its opening statement of 2003, explained: “We have at this time decided not to submit a national report, which would have repeated in essence our last year’s contribution.”

The following addresses recommendations regarding the objective, frequency, structure, and scope of NPT reporting in light of the experience to date. Objective and Participation Rate To be a tool for accountability, reporting must become detailed, systematic, universal. It is clear that in the case of NWS in particular, reporting will have to become a formal expression of their accountability to other States Parties to the NPT and will also need to become much more detailed and systematic for it to mature into an effective tool for States Parties to assess the compliance of other states with Treaty obligations. Accountability is the fundamental purpose or objective of reporting, and reporting even at current minimal levels has begun to help states to better understand the approaches and activities of other States Parties and has helped to generate a general attitude that each owes the others an accounting


of what it is doing to implement and strengthen the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. There may well be a temptation for states to drift toward either minimalist, pro forma statements or toward overly self-serving assessments that do not yield any significant information. The intent of the reporting mandate is just the opposite—that is, it anticipates reports that are regular, systematic, and detailed accounts that make a significant contribution to transparency and confidence-building. While the overall rate of explicit responses to the reporting requirement remains low, many States Parties that have formally responded have pursued a significant level of detail that suggests that reporting states accept the obligation as a serious one. That in turn suggests that overall transparency and accountability could be significantly enhanced through a determined effort to increase the response rate to the reporting requirement. The general quality of formal reports suggests that if enhanced transparency is the primary objective of reporting, it might now be useful to focus attention on increasing the response or participation rate rather than negotiating a common format. Simply achieving higher levels of participation would substantially contribute to the purpose of the reporting mandate, enhanced transparency and accountability, since it seems the very act of entering into a formal reporting mode encourages higher levels of quality and thoroughness. Of course, as the reporting experience develops, states are likely to find it useful to follow common reporting formats. But the primary objective of enhanced transparency depends more on increasing the participation rate than on the pursuit of standardized formats for reporting. In that regard, it is critically important that NWS begin to submit formal reports and thus to acknowledge and act on the fundamental principle of accountability that they agreed to in 1995. Frequency Reporting should occur at all substantive meetings of the NPT. The 2000 RevCon reporting requirement, as already noted, is for “regular reports” to be provided “within the framework of the strengthened review process” agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. And that review process, it was noted in turn, was to include the PrepComs as substantive meetings designed “to promote the full implementation of the Treaty” and “to make recommendations” to the RevCon. Since the PrepComs and RevCons are not annual events, it is logical to conclude that the decision to mandate “regular” reporting, rather than “annual” reporting, is based on the assumption that States Parties should be reporting to all PrepComs and RevCons. This would mean that states would be reporting four out of five years. Only a very small handful of states currently meet that standard. If NPT States Parties were to move to annual decision-making meetings, as has been proposed in the context of discussions of the NPT’s “institutional deficit,” it would follow that reporting would then become an annual requirement.


Structure Common categories that have emerged should form the basis of more uniform reporting formats. In the absence of any agreed structure, the reports that have been submitted broadly followed the themes that dominate international disarmament discourse. The reports did not uniformly follow any discernable standard or model, although most reflected one of three basic formats (article-by-article, the 13 steps, and general information on activities related to implementing Article VI). Notwithstanding the suggestion above that the current priority should be to increase the reporting participation rate rather than to negotiate a common reporting format and structure, certain common or generic categories of reporting have emerged over two years, and could in the long run form the basis of more uniform reporting formats.

General Assessments of Developments and Trends relevant to the implementation of the Treaty – Most of the reports include statements or comments on certain developments and trends within the broad nonproliferation regime. Such comments are frequently accompanied by explicit statements of “welcome” or “regret” and amount to broad assessments of the arms control and disarmament landscape.

Information on National Nuclear Holdings and Doctrines – Most of the NWS

statements include some information on holdings and more extensive information on reductions of nuclear arsenals. They also include direct or implicit statements of doctrine, including information on operational status. While the UK statements have offered the most explicit detail, in all cases there is room for substantial elaboration. At the same time, with the exception of China, all NWS have included hard information on at least some elements of their holdings, reductions, doctrine, and operational status of their arsenals. In other words, the principle of reporting on these elements is accepted; now the priority must be further progress toward comprehensive and formal reporting on each of those categories. NWS should thus be encouraged to provide much more detailed reporting on their basic nuclear weapons facilities and on holdings in materials, warheads, and delivery systems, for example: • The transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials; • Holdings of fissile materials; • Nuclear facilities of all kinds; • Holdings and production of nuclear weapons (including the numbers, types, and

yields of warheads, as well as numbers and types of delivery vehicles); • The operational status of all weapons held; and • Nuclear weapons doctrines (including security assurances) and policies to govern

the use of those weapons.

Descriptions of Disarmament Policies, Initiatives and Programs (national as well as cooperative bilateral and multinational efforts) – Reports also include information on national measures undertaken in support of the objectives of the


Treaty, including references to studies commissioned and research undertaken in support of efforts, for example, related to verification. States also use the reports to provide information on their efforts in cooperation with other states to achieve specific implementation objectives, for example, plutonium disposition efforts, NWFZ discussions, multinational seminars, and so on.

Identification of Advocacy and Diplomatic Priorities – States also report on

states’ efforts to engage other states and forums on Treaty implementation issues, and on efforts to encourage other states to take specific actions in support of implementation and compliance. Thus, the reports could be used to identify priority items for international attention and action. In some instances states used the reports themselves as advocacy tools, calling on other States Parties to take particular actions, although, in the context of the Review Process, it might be useful to regard Reports as vehicles for reporting actions taken, including the policies on which those actions are based, and to use national statements as vehicles for advocacy.

Information on Agreements Reached and Commitments Undertaken – States

also report on a broad range of international agreements and Treaties to which they adhere in support of NPT implementation objectives (ranging from the CTBT to IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocols, to other weapons of mass destruction [WMD] agreements and conventional arms control and disarmament efforts).

Regular Declarations of Compliance – Some states make specific statements of

compliance with the Treaty, or specific elements of it. It would be useful for States Parties to the NPT to regularly provide public assurances to other signatories, on an Article-by-Article basis, of their full compliance with the Treaty, and provide information on national mechanisms and policies relied on to assure such compliance.

Scope States should report on all elements of the Treaty, as all are relevant to the implementation of Article VI. The scope or content of reporting, as distinct from the format, has been understandably guided by the international action agenda identified in the 2000 RevCon 13 steps. This focus has influenced the format of some reports as some states choose to use the 13 steps as the outline for their submission. Whether states report specifically on Article VI, on the 13 steps, or on an Article-by-Article basis, they implicitly acknowledge that all elements of the Treaty are relevant to the goal of implementing Article VI. Any reporting mechanism should serve as an enabling tool―one that first of all encourages transparency in principle and practice, and then serves to shape information into helpful and useable forms. Thus States Parties should be encouraged to report on any and all issues important to their national and cooperative efforts toward Treaty implementation.


Given the range of priorities and preoccupations of individual states, it might not be practical or useful to attempt to pre-define, through the establishment of a highly structured or standardized reporting form, the range of issues on which reporting is sought; nevertheless, the practice to date suggests a compelling format. Since all elements of the Treaty are relevant in achieving the objectives of Article VI paragraph 4(c) of Decision 2 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the most appropriate current format for reporting would be to report on each Article of the Treaty and then use the 13 steps as a means of organizing the reporting on Article VI. As noted above, NWS have an additional requirement to report on all relevant holdings. The principle of mutual accountability has been a long time in developing within the NPT, but it became explicit in the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT. In the 2000 decision reporting became a particular mechanism for operationalizing that accountability. The degree to which the mechanism of reporting is accepted by States Parties will reflect the degree to which the principle of mutual accountability is accepted.



Notes

1 See NAM News Network, http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/mempro.php. 2 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document (Volume I, Part I), “Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty,” New York, 2000, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement. 3 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 4 1995 NPT Decisions and Resolution, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: 4(c): “The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 5 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 [relevant excerpts]: Paragraph 99: “The legal import of the (Article VI) obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct [of negotiations in good faith]; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations in good faith. Paragraph 100: This two-fold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the [then] 18 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community.” 6 Statement by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Special Time on Nuclear Disarmament, 2002. 7 The Reaching Critical Will Shadow Report examined holdings, policies, and activities of the 44 States identified by the IAEA as possessing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear power. 8 Working Paper Submitted on May 3, 2007 by the United States of America, “Disarmament, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 7.

http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/mempro.php

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CD Conference on Disarmament CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty EU European Union FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty NAC New Agenda Coalition NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Nongovernmental organization NNWS Non-nuclear weapon state NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA Negative security assurance NWFZ Nuclear-weapon-free zone NWS Nuclear weapon state PrepCom Preparatory Committee RevCon Review Conference START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty


Country Year Format NPT

Regi

me

Stra

tegi

c Red

uctio

ns

Tact

ical R

educ

tions

Irrev

ersib

ility

CTBT

/Mor

ator

ium

FMCT

Secu

rity A

ssur

ance

s

Verif

icatio

n

CD Nucle

ar E

nerg

y

Expo

rt Co

ntro

ls

Safe

guar

ds/A

dditi

onal

Prot

ocol

NWFZ

Inte

rnat

iona

l Coo

pera

tion

Tran

spar

ency

Repo

rting

Argentina 05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x

02 General x x x x x x x03 General x x x x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x x x x07 General x x x x x x x x x x x

04 Articles x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x

03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x

03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x

Bulgaria 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x

02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

China 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x

Cuba 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Czech Rep 04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x

TABLE 1: Tabulation of NPT Reports since the 2000 RevCon agreement on reporting

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Croatia

Brazil

Canada



Regi

me

Stra

tegi

c Red

uctio

ns

Tact

ical R

educ

tions

Irrev

ersib

ility

CTBT

/Mor

ator

ium

FMCT

Secu

rity A

ssur

ance

s

Verif

icatio

n

CD Nucle

ar E

nerg

y

Expo

rt Co

ntro

ls

Safe

guar

ds/A

dditi

onal

Prot

ocol

NWFZ

Inte

rnat

iona

l Coo

pera

tion

Tran

spar

ency

Repo

rting

03 General x x x x x x04 General x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x

Germany 02 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x

Greece 04 General x x x x x x x

Guatemala 05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x

02 General x x x x x x03 General x x x x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x07 General x x x x x x x x x x

02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x07 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x

Italy 05 General x x x x x x x x x

02 General x x x x x x03 General x x x x04 General x x x x x05 General x x x x07 General x x x x x x

Japan

Hungary

Ireland

Finland

Indonesia

Iran



Regi

me

Stra

tegi

c Red

uctio

ns

Tact

ical R

educ

tions

Irrev

ersib

ility

CTBT

/Mor

ator

ium

FMCT

Secu

rity A

ssur

ance

s

Verif

icatio

n

CD Nucle

ar E

nerg

y

Expo

rt Co

ntro

ls

Safe

guar

ds/A

dditi

onal

Prot

ocol

NWFZ

Inte

rnat

iona

l Coo

pera

tion

Tran

spar

ency

Repo

rting

Kazakhstan 04 General x x x x

Latvia 05 General x x x x x x x x

03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x

04 Articles x x x x x x x x05 Articles x x x

03 General x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x07 General x x x x x x x x x

03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x x

02 Activity x x x x03 Articles x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x x x

03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x

02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x03 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x04 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x05 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Morocco

Lithuania

New Zealand

Mongolia

Mexico

Netherlands



Regi

me

Stra

tegi

c Red

uctio

ns

Tact

ical R

educ

tions

Irrev

ersib

ility

CTBT

/Mor

ator

ium

FMCT

Secu

rity A

ssur

ance

s

Verif

icatio

n

CD Nucle

ar E

nerg

y

Expo

rt Co

ntro

ls

Safe

guar

ds/A

dditi

onal

Prot

ocol

NWFZ

Inte

rnat

iona

l Coo

pera

tion

Tran

spar

ency

Repo

rting

Nigeria 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x

03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x07 General x x x x x x x x x x x

03 Articles x x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x

04 General x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x x x x

02 General x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x x x04 General x x x x x x x x x05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x07 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x04 General x x x x x x

Russia 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x x x x x04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x

04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x

Sri Lanka 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x

13 Steps x x x

Spain

xx x xxxSouth Africa

Peru

Portugal

Slovakia

03

Rep of Korea

Poland

Norway

x

Romania

x



Regi

me

Stra

tegi

c Red

uctio

ns

Tact

ical R

educ

tions

Irrev

ersib

ility

CTBT

/Mor

ator

ium

FMCT

Secu

rity A

ssur

ance

s

Verif

icatio

n

CD Nucle

ar E

nerg

y

Expo

rt Co

ntro

ls

Safe

guar

ds/A

dditi

onal

Prot

ocol

NWFZ

Inte

rnat

iona

l Coo

pera

tion

Tran

spar

ency

Repo

rting

02 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x03 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x04 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x

03 General x x x x x x04 General x x x x05 General x x x x x

Thailand 02 General x x x x x x

Turkey 05 13 Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x

04 General x x05 General x x

Total Reports 112 81 72 44 57 104 88 27 84 81 49 50 93 64 44 58 63Total Countries 48

Sweden

Ukraine

Switzerland


TABLE 2

Article VI Reporting by NWSNPT PrepComs 2002–2007

Although only China and Russia to date have submitted formal reports, all five NWS provide information, through various national statements, fact sheets, and working papers, on their efforts to implement Article VI. The following summary of selected reporting is based on these documents. The references included in the Table are illustrative of such reporting and are certainly not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Sources for the years 2004 and following are indicated below. Evidence for 2002 and 2003 are based on similar documents.

China: Information for 2004: the opening statement of April 26, a Fact Sheet on “Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” a statement on “Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,” a Working Paper on Security Assurances, a Working Paper on NWFZs, and a Working Paper on “prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” Information for 2005: China’s Contribution to Nuclear Disarmament; “Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” a Working Paper submitted April 26; “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” a Working Paper submitted May 4; “Security Assurances,” a Working Paper submitted May 4; “NWFZ”, a Working Paper Submitted April 26; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: “Security Assurances,” a Working Paper submitted May 7; “NWFZ,” a Working Paper submitted May 7; “Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” a Working Paper submitted May 7; “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” a Working Paper submitted May 7; General Debate Statement of May 1; Cluster 1 Statement of May 1; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10.

France: Information for 2004: General Debate statement of April 26, Cluster 1 statement of April 29. Information for 2005: Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution, General Debate statement of May 5. Information for 2007: Nuclear Disarmament Measures Implemented by France, General Debate Statement of May 1, Cluster 1 Statement of May 8, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10.

Russia: Information for 2004: Opening Statement of April 27, Statement on Article VI of the Treaty, Statement on negative security assurances. Information for 2005: Practical Steps Taken by the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, May; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30, Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances of May 9, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10.

United Kingdom: Information for 2004: General Debate Statement, April 26; Cluster 1 Statement, April 30; Cluster 1: Specific time: Disarmament/NSAs, May 3. Information for 2005: Strengthening Non-Proliferation: The 2005 Review Conference, April; “Verification of Nuclear


Disarmament: Final Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components,” a Working Paper submitted April 18; General Debate Statement of May 5. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; Working Paper on Cluster II Issues, submitted May 9.

United States: Information for 2004: Opening statement by Under Secretary of State on “The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance,” April 27; “Article VI: The US Record of Compliance,” statement by Assistant Secretary of State, May 3. Information for 2005: Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Rademaker, May 2; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, United States Department of State, April 20; The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; “Challenges of Non-Proliferation Compliance,” a Working Paper submitted May 3; “Disarmament, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” a Working Paper submitted May 3; “Achieving and Sustaining Nuclear Weapons Elimination,” a Working Paper submitted May 3; “Safeguards and Nuclear Security,” a Woking Paper submitted May 3; “Facilitating Disarmament,” a Working Paper submitted May 3.

The following table summarizes information supplied by NWS through these various statements and documents on a set of issues particularly relevant to Article VI implementation:

1. Holdings2. Operational status of weapons held 3. Progress on strategic reductions4. Progress on non-strategic reductions 5. Affirmation of Article VI 6. Strategic doctrine 7. Security assurances 8. Fissile material control.


1.Ho

ldin

gs

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Hold

ings

20

02No

numb

er, “m

inimu

m lev

el for

self d

efens

e”No

numb

erNo

med

ium- o

r sho

rt-ra

nge m

issile

s, 1,1

36 st

rateg

ic de

liver

y unit

s, 5,5

18 re

-entr

y veh

icles

Avail

able

stock

pile f

ewer

than

20

0 war

head

s, sin

gle Tr

ident

subm

arine

on pa

trol w

ith 48

wa

rhea

ds

Fewe

r tha

n 6,00

0 dep

loyed

stra

tegic

warh

eads

Hold

ings

20

03No

numb

er, “C

hina h

as

exer

cised

utmo

st re

strain

t tow

ards

deve

loping

nucle

ar

weap

ons.”

No nu

mber

(see

redu

ction

s),

“prin

ciple

of str

ict su

fficien

cy

…de

termi

nes t

he fo

rmat

of the

Fr

ench

nucle

ar ar

sena

l”

Fulfil

led S

TART

I req

uirem

ents

– 1,13

6 dep

loyed

str

ategic

deliv

ery s

ystem

s, 5,5

18 w

arhe

ads,

no

infor

matio

n on s

tockp

iled w

eapo

ns

Avail

able

stock

pile f

ewer

than

20

0 war

head

s, sin

gle Tr

ident

subm

arine

on pa

trol w

ith 48

wa

rhea

ds

As a

resu

lt of S

TART

I it n

ow ha

s few

er th

an 6,

000 d

eploy

ed st

rateg

ic wa

rhea

ds; n

o info

rmati

on on

deliv

ery

syste

ms or

stoc

kpile

.

Hold

ings

20

04Ch

ina “p

osse

sses

the

small

est n

uclea

r arse

nal” o

f all

the N

WS.

No nu

mber

s

“Sinc

e 199

0, Fr

ance

has h

alved

the

numb

er of

nucle

ar de

liver

y ve

hicles

in its

force

, and

the

numb

er of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns

syste

ms is

down

from

6 to

2. Th

e sha

re of

nucle

ar fo

rces i

n tot

al Fr

ench

defen

ce sp

endin

g ha

s dro

pped

from

17%

in 19

90

to be

low 9

.5% in

2004

.”

“As o

f Jan

uary

1, 20

04, R

ussia

poss

esse

d 103

1 de

ploye

d stra

tegic

offen

sive d

elive

ry ve

hicles

and

4978

wea

pons

acco

untab

le un

der t

he S

TART

1 Tr

eaty.

”

“We h

old le

ss th

an 20

0 op

erati

onall

y ava

ilable

wa

rhea

ds.”

The U

nited

Stat

es pr

ovide

s inf

orma

tion o

n exe

cuted

and

plann

ed re

ducti

ons b

ut pr

ovide

s no

infor

matio

n on c

urre

nt ho

lding

s.

Hold

ings

2005

“Chin

a kee

ps a

very

limite

d nu

clear

arse

nal o

nly fo

r self

-de

fense

purp

oses

.”

Total

holdi

ngs o

f just

over

10

0, sp

lit be

twee

n sea

-to-la

nd

miss

iles a

nd nu

clear

-capa

ble

aircra

ft.

“As o

f Jan

uary

1, 20

05 R

ussia

poss

esse

d 981

de

ploye

d stra

tegic

offen

sive d

elive

ry ve

hicles

and

4732

war

head

s acc

ounta

ble un

der t

he S

TART

.”

“Hav

e a st

ock p

ile of

less

than

20

0 ope

ratio

nal w

arhe

ads a

nd

only

one T

riden

t Sub

marin

e is

on de

terre

nt pa

trol a

t one

time,

carry

ing a

redu

ced l

oad o

f 48

war h

eads

.”

The U

nited

Stat

es pr

ovide

s inf

orma

tion o

n exe

cuted

and

plann

ed re

ducti

ons b

ut pr

ovide

s no

infor

matio

n on c

urre

nt ho

lding

s.

Hold

ings

20

07No

refer

ence

“In

total

, takin

g all c

ompo

nents

tog

ether,

the n

umbe

r of d

elive

ry ve

hicles

has b

een e

limina

ted by

mo

re th

an ha

lf sinc

e 198

5.”

Nucle

ar su

bmar

ines c

arryi

ng

ballis

tic m

issile

s hav

e bee

n re

duce

d fro

m 6 t

o 4.

“The

numb

er of

Fre

nch n

uclea

r we

apon

s sys

tems h

as be

en

redu

ced f

rom

6 to 2

.”

“As o

f Jan

uary

1, 20

07, R

ussia

poss

esse

d no m

ore

than 9

00 de

ploye

d stra

tegic

offen

sive d

elive

ry ve

hicles

and 4

200 w

arhe

ads a

ccou

ntable

unde

r the

ST

ART

1 Tre

aty.”

Redu

cing s

tockp

iles b

y 20%

to

fewer

than

160

“UK

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns no

w ac

coun

t for le

ss th

an 1%

of th

e glo

bal in

vento

ry.”

“As o

f Dec

embe

r 31,

2006

, the

Unite

d Stat

es ha

d 3,69

6 ope

ratio

nally

de

ploye

d nuc

lear w

arhe

ads,

which

is

signifi

cantl

y low

er by

40 pe

r cen

t than

the

total

numb

er of

attrib

uted n

uclea

r wa

rhea

ds pe

rmitte

d und

er S

TART

.”


2. Op

erat

iona

l Sta

tus

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Oper

atio

nal

Stat

us 20

02No

refer

ence

No

wea

pons

targ

eted s

ince

1997

Comm

itted t

o deta

rgeti

ng st

rateg

ic nu

clear

we

apon

s, ba

llistic

miss

iles h

ave ‘

zero

’ laun

ch

miss

ion

Only

patro

lling s

ubma

rine o

n se

vera

l day

s’ ‘no

tice t

o fire

’, mi

ssile

s are

de-ta

rgete

d

Force

s not

targe

ted on

day-t

o-da

y ba

sis, d

oes n

ot be

lieve

gene

ral ‘d

e-ale

rting’

contr

ibutes

to st

abilit

y, wi

th Ru

ssia

worki

ng on

early

war

ning d

ata

shar

ing

Oper

atio

nal

Stat

us 20

03No

refer

ence

No re

feren

ceNo

refer

ence

Sing

le Tr

ident

subm

arine

on

deter

rent

patro

l; it is

norm

ally

on se

vera

l day

s’ ‘no

tice t

o fire

’; its

miss

iles a

re de

-targ

eted

Laun

ch tim

e of N

ATO’

s nuc

lear-

capa

ble de

liver

y airc

raft i

ncre

ased

fro

m mi

nutes

to m

onths

Oper

atio

nal

Stat

us 20

04In

1994

Chin

a and

Ru

ssia

anno

unce

d the

“n

on-ta

rgeti

ng” o

f nuc

lear

weap

ons a

gains

t eac

h oth

er. In

1998

Chin

a and

US

anno

unce

d mutu

al no

n-tar

getin

g, an

d in 2

000

all fiv

e NW

S iss

ued a

joint

de

clara

tion “

anno

uncin

g the

no

n-tar

getin

g of th

eir nu

clear

we

apon

s at a

ny co

untrie

s.”

1997

– An

noun

ceme

nt tha

t no

part

of the

Fre

nch n

uclea

r de

terre

nt for

ces w

as an

y lon

ger

targe

ted

“One

of th

e step

s tak

en by

the R

ussia

n Fed

erati

on

to re

duce

the n

uclea

r thr

eat w

as th

e stat

emen

t by

the R

ussia

n Pre

siden

t of M

ay 27

, 199

7, on

de

targe

ting s

trateg

ic nu

clear

wea

pons

. As a

resu

lt of

this i

nitiat

ive, th

e lau

nch o

f miss

iles b

ecom

es

techn

ically

impo

ssibl

e in t

he ab

senc

e of a

real

flight

miss

ion pl

an.”

“[O]ur

nucle

ar fo

rces p

atrol

on re

duce

d rea

dines

s; on

ly a s

ingle

Tride

nt su

bmar

ine is

no

w on

deter

rent

patro

l at a

ny

one t

ime,

norm

ally a

t sev

eral

days

‘noti

ce to

fire’

and w

ith its

mi

ssile

de-ta

rgete

d.”

Does

not ta

rget

any c

ountr

y with

nu

clear

wea

pons

Stra

tegic

bomb

ers a

re no

long

er on

ale

rt

Dual-

capa

ble ai

rcraft

no lo

nger

op

erate

on a

high-

alert

basis

(re

adine

ss m

easu

red i

n mon

ths)

NATO

no lo

nger

main

tains

nucle

ar

conti

ngen

cy pl

ans a

nd as

socia

ted

targe

ts for

its N

SNW

“It is

true

that

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns ca

n be

re-ta

rgete

d with

relat

ive ea

se,…

but U

S co

nscio

usly

has c

hose

n not

to tar

get a

ny na

tion.

This

is an

impo

rtant

symb

olic a

nd co

nfide

nce-

build

ing

meas

ure.”

Oper

atio

nal

Stat

us 20

05“In

Sep

tembe

r 199

4, the

Pr

eside

nts of

Chin

a and

Ru

ssia

made

a ple

dge i

n the

ir join

t stat

emen

t on n

o-firs

t-use

and d

e-tar

getin

g of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns ag

ainst

each

othe

r. In J

une 1

998,

China

and t

he U

nited

Stat

es

decla

red d

e-tar

getin

g of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns ag

ainst

each

othe

r.”

“Fre

nch d

eterre

nt is

not d

irecte

d ag

ainst

any p

artic

ular c

ountr

y.”

“All n

uclea

r wea

pons

of th

e for

mer U

SSR

that

were

outsi

de R

ussia

at th

e end

of 19

91 ha

ve be

en

withd

rawn

to its

terri

tory f

or el

imina

tion.”

“Trid

ent S

ubma

rine i

s nor

mally

at

a red

uced

aler

t stat

us an

d its

miss

iles a

re no

t targ

eted a

t an

y Stat

e.”

“US

strate

gic bo

mber

s are

no lo

nger

on

aler

t. The

US

no lo

nger

targ

ets

any c

ountr

y with

Nuc

lear w

eapo

ns.

NATO

no lo

nger

main

tains

nucle

ar

conti

ngen

cy pl

ans a

nd as

socia

ted

targe

ts for

its no

n-str

ategic

nucle

ar

weap

ons.

US du

al-ca

pable

aircr

aft no

lon

ger o

pera

te on

a hig

h-ale

rt ba

sis,

and t

heir r

eadin

ess r

equir

emen

ts no

w me

asur

e in w

eeks

and m

onths

, ra

ther t

han m

inutes

.”


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Oper

atio

nal

Stat

us 20

07No

refer

ence

“The

aler

t stat

us of

Fre

nch

nucle

ar fo

rces h

as be

en

down

grad

ed on

two o

ccas

ions,

in 19

92 an

d 199

6. Th

ose

redu

ction

s app

lied t

o both

the

resp

onse

times

and t

he nu

mber

of

weap

ons o

n aler

t.”

No nu

clear

comp

onen

t of

the F

renc

h dete

rrent

force

co

ntinu

es to

have

desig

nated

tar

gets.

No re

feren

ce.

“Our

Tride

nt su

bmar

ines

are n

orma

lly at

seve

ral d

ays

‘notic

e to fi

re.’ T

heir m

issile

s ar

e not

targe

ted at

any o

ne

coun

try.”

No re

feren

ce

3. St

rate

gic R

educ

tions

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Re

duct

ions

20

02

No re

feren

ce, th

ose w

ith

large

st ar

sena

ls ha

ve

grea

test r

espo

nsibi

lity to

re

duce

Halve

d its

deliv

ery v

ehicl

es, n

o gr

ound

-to-g

roun

d com

pone

nt,

scale

d bac

k othe

r pro

gram

s, dis

mantl

ed te

sting

and fi

ssile

ma

terial

prod

uctio

n site

s

Elim

inated

mor

e tha

n 1,20

0 ICB

M/SL

BM la

unch

ers,

2,350

ICBM

/SLB

Ms, 4

0 sub

marin

es, 6

0 bom

bers;

pr

oduc

tion p

otenti

al ha

lved;

prep

ared

to fu

rther

re

duce

arse

nal to

mini

mum

levels

for s

ecur

ity

Unila

terall

y red

uced

force

to

fewer

than

200 w

arhe

ads,

withd

rew

freefa

ll nuc

lear

bomb

, last

Chev

aline

war

head

dis

mantl

ed (2

002)

Stra

tegic

redu

ction

s to 1

,700-

2,200

ov

er th

e nex

t dec

ade w

ith re

tireme

nt of

ICBM

Pea

ceke

eper

s, fou

r Trid

ent

subm

arine

s, eli

mina

tion o

f B-1

’s nu

clear

capa

bility

; has

dism

antle

d 13

,000 w

eapo

ns si

nce 1

988

Stra

tegi

c Re

duct

ions

20

03

No re

feren

ce to

its ar

sena

l; “e

xistin

g arse

nals

must

be

redu

ced i

n an i

rreve

rsible

, eff

ectiv

ely ve

rifiab

le an

d leg

ally b

inding

man

ner.

Coun

tries p

osse

ssing

the

large

st nu

clear

arse

nals

bear

spec

ial an

d prim

ary

resp

onsib

ility i

n this

rega

rd.”

Elim

inated

surfa

ce-to

-surfa

ce

weap

ons,

redu

ced n

umbe

r of

nucle

ar su

bmar

ines,

halve

d tota

l nu

mber

of de

liver

y veh

icles

, dis

mantl

ed te

sting

site

in Pa

cific,

fissil

e mate

rials

prod

uctio

n site

s at

Pier

relat

te an

d Mar

coule

clo

sed a

nd be

ing di

sman

tled

Unde

r STA

RT I a

rsena

l redu

ced t

o lev

els lis

ted

abov

e, Oc

tober

2001

last

nucle

ar w

arhe

ad re

turne

d to

Russ

ia fro

m Uk

raine

elim

inated

, exp

ress

ed

supp

ort fo

r Mos

cow

Trea

ty an

d agr

eed r

educ

tions

to

betw

een 1

,700-

2,200

units

by 20

12, u

ntil 2

009

STAR

T I w

ill re

main

in for

ce, “

doub

le mu

tually

re

infor

cing l

imita

tions

by tw

o tre

aties

”

redu

ction

s to f

ewer

than

200

warh

eads

repr

esen

t red

uctio

ns

to les

s tha

n 70 p

er ce

nt of

the

poten

tial e

xplos

ive po

wer o

f UK

’s nu

clear

deter

rent

since

the

end o

f the C

old W

ar

Mosc

ow Tr

eaty

repr

esen

ts a 2

/3 re

ducti

on fr

om S

TART

I lev

els of

6,0

00 w

arhe

ads –

50 P

eace

keep

er

ICBM

s are

being

retire

d and

dis

asse

mbled

, 2 of

plan

ned 4

Tride

nt su

bmar

ines r

emov

ed fr

om st

rateg

ic se

rvice

, enti

re B

-1 bo

mber

force

is

now

dedic

ated t

o con

venti

onal

miss

ions;

furthe

r red

uctio

ns w

ill re

sult

in few

er w

arhe

ads o

n ball

istic

miss

iles

and f

ewer

oper

ation

ally d

eploy

ed

weap

ons a

t bom

ber b

ases


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Re

duct

ions

20

04

No re

feren

ce to

redu

ction

s, on

ly tha

t it ha

s the

small

est

arse

nal o

f the N

WS

“Fro

m 19

64 to

1996

, Chin

a co

nduc

ted 45

nucle

ar te

sts.

Amon

g the

nucle

ar w

eapo

n sta

tes, C

hina h

as pe

rform

ed

fewes

t nuc

lear t

ests

and

poss

esse

s the

small

est

nucle

ar ar

sena

l. It h

as ne

ver

taken

part

in an

y nuc

lear

arms

race

or de

ploye

d any

nu

clear

wea

pons

outsi

de its

ter

ritory.

”

Sinc

e the

1990

s, Ch

ina

has g

radu

ally c

ut ba

ck

on its

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns

deve

lopme

nt pr

ogra

m. T

he

rese

arch

and d

evelo

pmen

t sit

e in Q

ingha

i was

clos

ed…

[and]

was r

eturn

ed to

civil

ian

use i

n May

1995

….”

“[T]he

end o

f the c

old w

ar

set th

e sce

ne fo

r effe

ctive

im

pleme

ntatio

n of A

rticle

VI…

.”

“Fra

nce h

as …

cut it

s nuc

lear

arse

nal, e

limina

ting a

ll of it

s su

rface

-to-su

rface

nucle

ar

weap

ons;

redu

cing t

he nu

mber

of

its ba

llistic

miss

ile nu

clear

su

bmar

ines;

and h

alving

its to

tal

numb

er of

deliv

ery v

ehicl

es…

,[and

] has

dism

antle

d its

nucle

ar

testin

g cen

tre in

the P

acific

.”

1991

– an

noun

ceme

nt of

the

early

with

draw

al, ah

ead o

f sc

hedu

le, of

Plut

on su

rface

-to-

surfa

ce m

issile

s and

AN-

52

bomb

s

1996

– Fr

ance

’s las

t and

final

nucle

ar te

st

1996

– An

noun

ceme

nt of

redu

ction

in th

e num

ber

of ba

llistic

miss

ile nu

clear

su

bmar

ines f

rom

5 to 4

, the

end o

f the M

irage

IV’s

nucle

ar

miss

ions,

the ab

ando

nmen

t of

the su

rface

-to-su

rface

co

mpon

ent o

f the n

uclea

r for

ces

throu

gh th

e stan

ding d

own a

nd

destr

uctio

n of th

e Had

es an

d S3

D su

rface

-to-su

rface

miss

iles

“[R]at

ificati

on of

the R

ussia

n-US

Trea

ty on

Stra

tegic

Offen

sive R

educ

tions

callin

g for

recip

roca

l cuts

in

the ag

greg

ate nu

mber

of st

rateg

ic nu

clear

wea

pons

by

each

side

down

to 17

00-2

200 b

efore

Dec

embe

r 31

, 201

2. In

other

wor

ds, th

ese w

eapo

ns w

ill be

re

duce

d app

roxim

ately

three

fold a

gains

t the l

evel

envis

aged

unde

r the

STA

RT I T

reaty

.”

“To da

te, R

ussia

has e

limina

ted 12

50 IC

BM an

d SL

BM la

unch

ers,

2580

ICBM

and S

LBM

deliv

ery

vehic

les, 4

3 Stra

tegic

nucle

ar-p

ower

ed su

bmar

ines

and 6

5 hea

vy bo

mber

s.”

“[F]or

the p

urpo

ses o

f imple

menta

tion o

f the

Mosc

ow Tr

eaty

the B

ilater

al Co

mplia

nce

Comm

ission

was

estab

lishe

d und

er th

e Tre

aty’s

prov

ision

s, an

d its

first s

essio

n was

held

in Ge

neva

on

Apr

il 8-9

, 200

4.”

Willi

ng to

redu

ce st

rateg

ic ar

sena

l well

below

SOR

T pr

ovisi

ons –

cons

isten

t with

the “

notio

n of m

inimu

m su

fficien

cy”

70%

redu

ction

in th

e ex

plosiv

e pow

er of

UK

nucle

ar

weap

ons s

ince e

nd of

the

Cold

War

Polar

is, su

perse

ded b

y Tr

ident,

the o

nly nu

clear

sy

stem;

sinc

e 200

0 hav

e co

mplet

ed th

e dism

antlin

g of

the C

heva

line (

Polar

is)

warh

eads

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

has b

een r

educ

ing

its nu

clear

force

s and

nucle

ar

weap

ons s

tockp

iles i

n a co

nsist

ent

fashio

n thr

ough

both

unila

teral

and

bilate

ral in

itiativ

es, m

ost r

ecen

tly

unde

r the

Mos

cow

Trea

ty.”

Dism

antle

d mor

e tha

n 13,0

00 nu

clear

we

apon

s sinc

e 198

8

Draw

ing do

wn op

erati

onall

y dep

loyed

str

ategic

nucle

ar w

arhe

ads t

o the

lev

el of

1,700

-2,00

0, ab

out o

ne-th

ird

of the

2002

leve

l

By 20

12, w

ill ha

ve re

duce

d stra

tegic

warh

eads

deplo

yed b

y 80%

sinc

e 19

91

From

1994

-199

7 elim

inated

near

ly 1,0

00 st

rateg

ic nu

clear

miss

iles a

nd

bomb

ers

Sinc

e 199

9 elim

inated

64 he

avy

bomb

ers,

150 m

issile

silos

, take

n ou

t of s

trateg

ic se

rvice

4 mi

ssile

su

bmar

ines (

and m

issile

remo

ved)

, an

d dea

ctiva

ted 28

“pea

ceke

eper

” IC

BMs (

the re

maini

ng 22

sche

duled

for

deac

tivati

on by

Octo

ber 2

005)

Nucle

ar fo

rces d

eclin

ed fr

om 7%

of

DOD

budg

et to

less t

han 3

% to

day


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

cRe

duct

ions

2005

No re

feren

ce

“Chin

a is t

he on

ly nu

clear

-we

apon

state

to ad

voca

te a c

omple

te pr

ohibi

tion a

nd

thoro

ugh d

estru

ction

of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“Fra

nce h

as th

erefo

re

aban

done

d and

dism

antle

d the

su

rface

-to-su

rface

wea

pons

sy

stems

on th

e Plat

eau d

’Albi

on

and t

he sh

ort-r

ange

surfa

ce-

to-su

rface

wea

pons

syste

ms

Pluto

n and

Had

es. T

he nu

mber

of

nucle

ar su

bmar

ines c

arryi

ng

ballis

tic m

issile

s (SS

BNs)

has

been

redu

ced f

rom

six to

four.

To

day,

one S

SBN,

at le

ast, i

s at

sea a

t all t

imes

, com

pare

d wi

th thr

ee un

til 19

90. L

astly

, the

airb

orne

comp

onen

t has

als

o bee

n red

uced

. In to

tal th

e nu

mber

of de

liver

y veh

icles

has

been

redu

ced b

y ove

r half

.”

“Fra

nce a

nnou

nced

on 20

Ja

nuar

y 199

6 the

cess

ation

of

all nu

clear

testi

ng fo

llowi

ng

comp

letion

of a

final

serie

s of

tests.

This

decis

ion to

ok

prac

tical

shap

e in t

he co

mplet

e dis

mantl

ing of

testi

ng fa

cilitie

s in

the P

acific

, whic

h was

an

noun

ced a

s ear

ly as

22

Febr

uary

1996

and c

omple

ted

by th

e end

of Ju

ly 19

98. T

his

mean

s sinc

e the

end o

f the C

old

War

and o

penin

g of th

e (CT

BT)

for si

gnatu

re in

1996

, Fra

nce i

s the

only

NWS

to ha

ve cl

osed

do

wn an

d dism

antle

d its

nucle

ar

testin

g fac

ilities

.”

“The

INF

Trea

ty of

unlim

ited d

urati

on re

mains

an

esse

ntial

contr

ibutio

n to t

he nu

clear

disa

rmam

ent.

Unde

r this

Trea

ty tw

o clas

ses o

f land

-bas

ed

miss

iles w

ith a

rang

e of 5

00 to

1000

and 1

000 t

o 55

00 km

– a t

otal o

f 184

6 inte

rmed

iate-

rang

e and

sh

orter

-rang

e miss

iles a

nd 82

5 of th

eir la

unch

ers

were

comp

letely

destr

oyed

, whil

e fur

ther p

rodu

ction

an

d tes

ting o

f suc

h miss

iles w

as ba

nned

.”

“Ove

r the

five y

ear p

eriod

that

elaps

ed be

twee

n the

pr

eviou

s and

toda

y’s N

PT R

eview

Con

feren

ces t

he

Russ

ian F

eder

ation

redu

ced i

ts str

ategic

nucle

ar

force

by 35

7 deli

very

vehic

les an

d 174

0 nuc

lear

warh

eads

.”

“In ac

cord

ance

with

the T

reaty

(STA

RT),

as of

De

cemb

er 5,

2001

, the s

trateg

ic off

ensiv

e arm

s lev

el sh

ould

not h

ave e

xcee

ded 1

600 c

arrie

rs an

d 60

00 nu

clear

war

head

s. As

of th

at tar

get d

ate

the ac

tual le

vels

reac

hed 1

136 a

nd 55

18 pi

eces

co

rresp

ondin

gly.”

“The

Trea

ty on

Stra

tegic

Offen

sive R

educ

tions

(M

osco

w Tr

eaty)

calls

for t

he ob

ligati

on by

Rus

sia

and t

he U

S to

redu

ce an

d lim

it by D

ecem

ber 3

1, 20

12, th

eir re

spec

tive s

trateg

ic nu

clear

war

head

s to

the ag

greg

ate nu

mber

not e

xcee

ding 1

700-

2200

.”

“The

Pre

siden

t of th

e Rus

sian F

eder

ation

Vlad

imir

V. P

utin h

as tim

e and

again

reite

rated

our c

ountr

y’s

comm

itmen

t to re

duce

, on a

mutu

al ba

sis, it

s nu

clear

arse

nals

envis

aged

by th

e Mos

cow

Trea

ty – n

amely

to 15

00 w

eapo

ns an

d les

s.”

“Elim

inatio

n of 1

328 I

CBM

and S

LBM

launc

hers,

26

70 IC

BMs a

nd S

LBMs

, 45 s

trateg

ic nu

clear

su

bmar

ines a

nd 66

heav

y bom

bers

“We h

ave r

educ

ed th

e ex

plosiv

e pow

er of

our n

uclea

r for

ces b

y ove

r 70 p

er ce

nt sin

ce th

e end

of th

e Cold

War.

”

“Sinc

e 200

0 we h

ave

comp

leted

the d

isman

tling o

f all

our r

emain

ing C

heva

line

(Pola

ris) w

arhe

ads.

The U

K ma

intain

s a m

inimu

m de

terre

nt at

the lo

west

level

cons

isten

t wi

th ou

r nati

onal

secu

rity, a

s ou

tlined

in th

e 199

8 Stra

tegic

Defen

ce R

eview

and 2

003

Defen

ce W

hite P

aper.

Tride

nt is

our s

ole nu

clear

wea

pons

sy

stem,

mak

ing th

e UK

the

only

NWS

to ha

ve re

duce

d to

a sing

le sy

stem.

On t

his po

int

we ar

e pro

ud to

be th

e mos

t for

ward

-lean

ing of

the N

WS.

”

Tride

nt su

bmar

ine ca

rries

“4

8 war

head

s com

pare

d to a

pr

eviou

sly pl

anne

d tota

l of 9

6”

“Sinc

e the

last

revie

w co

nfere

nce

the U

nited

Stat

es an

d the

Ru

ssian

Fed

erati

on co

nclud

ed

our im

pleme

ntatio

n of S

TART

I re

ducti

ons,

and s

igned

and b

roug

ht int

o for

ce th

e Mos

cow

Trea

ty 20

02.

Unde

r the

Mos

cow

Trea

ty, w

e hav

e ag

reed

to re

duce

our o

pera

tiona

lly

deplo

yed s

trateg

ic nu

clear

war

head

s to

1700

-220

0, ab

out a

third

of 20

02

levels

and l

ess t

han a

quar

ter of

the

level

at the

end o

f the C

old W

ar.

Whe

n this

Trea

ty is

fully

imple

mente

d by

the e

nd of

2012

, the U

nited

Stat

es

will h

ave r

educ

ed th

e num

ber o

f str

ategic

war

head

s it h

ad de

ploye

d in

1990

by ab

out 8

0%.”

“[W]e

have

elim

inated

thou

sand

s of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns, e

limina

ted

an en

tire cl

ass o

f inter

media

te-ra

nge b

allist

ic mi

ssile

s, tak

en B

-1

bomb

ers o

ut of

nucle

ar se

rvice

, re

duce

d the

numb

er of

ballis

tic

miss

ile su

bmar

ines,

dras

ticall

y re

duce

d our

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns-re

lated

do

mesti

c infr

astru

cture

, and

are n

ow

elimi

natin

g our

mos

t mod

ern a

nd

soph

istica

ted la

nd-b

ased

ballis

tic

miss

ile. W

e hav

e also

spen

t billi

ons

of do

llars,

thro

ugh p

rogr

ams s

uch a

s Nu

nn-L

ugar,

to he

lp oth

er co

untrie

s co

ntrol

and e

limina

te the

ir nuc

lear

mater

ials.

We a

re pr

oud t

o hav

e pla

yed a

lead

ing ro

le in

redu

cing

nucle

ar m

ateria

ls.”

“We h

ave a

lso re

duce

d the

role

of nu

clear

wea

pons

in ou

r dete

rrenc

e str

ategy

and a

re cu

tting o

ur nu

clear

sto

ck pi

le alm

ost in

half,

to the

lowe

st lev

el in

deca

des.”


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

cRe

duct

ions

2007

No re

feren

ce

“Chin

a main

tains

that

the

two c

ountr

ies po

sses

sing

the la

rges

t nuc

lear a

rsena

ls be

ar sp

ecial

resp

onsib

ility

and s

hould

take

the l

ead i

n nu

clear

disa

rmam

ent.”

“Aba

ndon

ment

of the

stra

tegic

surfa

ce-to

-surfa

ce S

45 m

issile

pr

ogra

mme d

estin

ed to

repla

ce

the S

3D m

issile

s on t

he P

latea

u d’A

lbion

”

“Clos

ure o

f the P

latea

u d’A

lbion

fac

ility”

“Dec

ision

to di

sman

tle th

e Had

es

shor

t-ran

ge su

rface

-to-su

rface

mi

ssile

s sys

tem”

“Ear

ly wi

thdra

wal o

f the P

luton

sh

ort-r

ange

surfa

ce-to

-surfa

ce

miss

iles”

“Ear

ly wi

thdra

wal fr

om se

rvice

an

d dism

antlin

g of th

e AN

52

nucle

ar bo

mbs c

arrie

d by J

agua

r an

d Mira

ge III

aircr

aft”

“With

draw

al of

the M

irage

IV

strate

gic ai

rcraft

from

nucle

ar

miss

ions”

Russ

ia ful

filled

its ob

ligati

ons c

omple

tely a

nd ah

ead

of the

STA

RT, a

nd co

ntinu

es st

eadil

y red

ucing

str

ategic

deliv

ery m

eans

and t

he re

lated

war

head

s.”

“We a

re fu

lfillin

g obli

gatio

ns un

der t

he R

ussia

n-US

Tr

eaty

on S

trateg

ic Of

fensiv

e Red

uctio

ns w

hich

prov

ides f

or re

ducti

on of

the n

umbe

r of s

trateg

ic nu

clear

wea

pons

down

to 17

00-2

200 b

y eac

h side

be

fore D

ecem

ber 3

1, 20

12.“

“The

Joint

decla

ratio

n of th

e Pre

siden

ts of

Russ

ia an

d the

Unit

ed S

tates

whic

h was

sign

ed up

on

conc

lusion

of th

e Mos

cow

Trea

ty an

d whic

h stat

es

the in

tentio

n of th

e two

natio

ns to

redu

ce th

eir

strate

gic of

fensiv

e pote

ntial

to the

mini

mal p

ossib

le lev

els co

rresp

ondin

g to t

heir n

ation

al se

curity

and

ally o

bliga

tions

as w

ell as

refle

cting

the n

ew na

ture

of re

lation

s betw

een R

ussia

and t

he U

nited

Stat

es

in the

stra

tegic

sphe

re.”

“We w

ill no

w cu

t our

stoc

kpile

of

oper

ation

ally a

vaila

ble

warh

eads

by 20

per c

ent

to few

er th

an 16

0. Th

is am

ounts

to a

total

redu

ction

of

explo

sive p

ower

of th

e Unit

ed

King

dom

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns by

75

per c

ent s

ince t

he en

d of

the co

ld wa

r.”

“The

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m is

the

only

nucle

ar w

eapo

n Stat

e tha

t has

redu

ced i

ts de

terre

nt ca

pabil

ity to

a sin

gle nu

clear

we

apon

syste

m.”

“Buil

ding n

ew su

bmar

ines

for ou

r exis

ting T

riden

t D5

miss

ile sy

stem

does

not

reve

rse or

unde

rmine

any o

f the

se po

sitive

disa

rmam

ent

steps

. Any

sugg

estio

n tha

t the

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m is

furthe

r de

velop

ing nu

clear

wea

pons

is

a misu

nder

stand

ing.”

“Dra

matic

redu

ction

s are

in fa

ct un

derw

ay in

stra

tegic

warh

ead

numb

ers.

The U

nited

Stat

es is

now

in the

proc

ess o

f dra

wing

down

its

oper

ation

ally d

eploy

ed st

rateg

ic nu

clear

war

head

s to b

etwee

n 170

0-22

00 by

the y

ear 2

012.

The d

ecisi

on

made

by P

resid

ent G

eorg

e W. B

ush

in 20

01 to

do th

is wa

s refl

ected

in

the M

osco

w Tr

eaty

he si

gned

with

Ru

ssian

Pre

siden

t Puti

n in 2

002.”

“Sinc

e the

end o

f the C

old W

ar th

e Un

ited S

tates

has c

ance

lled t

he

mode

rn, h

ighly

soph

istica

ted M

GM-

134 ‘

Midg

etman

’ miss

ile, a

nd ha

lted

prod

uctio

n of o

ther m

ajor w

eapo

n sy

stems

such

as th

e B-2

‘Stea

lth’

bomb

er. U

nder

Pre

siden

t Geo

rge

H.W

. Bus

h, the

Unit

ed S

tates

took

out

of nu

clear

wea

pon s

ervic

e fou

r Ohio

-cla

ss nu

clear

powe

red b

allist

ic mi

ssile

su

bmar

ines c

arryi

ng th

e Trid

ent C

-4

subm

arine

-laun

ched

ballis

tic m

issile

s, an

d mod

ified t

hese

vess

els fo

r othe

r us

es.”

“Whe

n this

ongo

ing pr

oces

s of

warh

ead r

educ

tions

has b

een

comp

leted

, the U

nited

Stat

es w

ill ha

ve re

move

d abo

ut 80

per c

ent

of the

numb

er of

stra

tegic

nucle

ar

warh

eads

deplo

yed i

n 199

1, lea

ving

the to

tal at

abou

t one

-third

of th

e Un

ited S

tates

2002

leve

l. Whe

n this

po

int is

reac

hed i

n 201

2, in

fact,

the nu

mber

of su

ch w

eapo

ns w

ill ha

ve re

ache

d its

lowes

t leve

l sinc

e the

admi

nistra

tion o

f Unit

ed S

tates

Pr

eside

nt Dw

ight E

isenh

ower.

”


4. No

n-St

rate

gic R

educ

tions

Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Tact

ical

Redu

ctio

ns

2002

No re

feren

ceNo

refer

ence

All n

uclea

r wea

pons

deplo

yed o

utside

Rus

sia ha

ve

been

retur

ned,

more

than

30 pe

r cen

t of ta

ctica

l se

a-lau

nche

d miss

iles e

limina

ted, p

rodu

ction

of

tactic

al nu

clear

mun

itions

ceas

ed, d

estru

ction

co

ntinu

es

No re

feren

ceNo

n-str

ategic

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns

redu

ced b

y mor

e tha

n 85 p

er ce

nt,

remo

ved f

rom

grou

nd fo

rces a

nd

nava

l sur

face s

hips;

grav

ity bo

mbs

redu

ced b

y 50 p

er ce

nt; A

rmy,

Marin

e Cor

ps, a

nd su

rface

and a

ir co

mpon

ents

of Na

vy de

nucle

arize

d

Tact

ical

Redu

ctio

ns

2003

“[N]o

rese

arch

and

deve

lopme

nt wo

rk sh

ould

be co

nduc

ted in

to low

-yield

nu

clear

wea

pons

or ‘m

ini-

nuke

s’ aim

ed at

prob

able

battle

field

use”

No re

feren

ceW

hole

class

of no

n-str

ategic

offen

sive w

eapo

ns

was e

limina

ted ac

cord

ing to

INF

Trea

ty; re

mova

l of

tactic

al nu

clear

wea

pons

from

Eur

ope a

n “im

porta

nt pr

actic

al ste

p to u

ltimate

ly ov

erco

me th

e rem

nants

of

the co

ld-wa

r per

iod”

With

draw

n fre

efall n

uclea

r bo

mb (W

E177

); in

2002

las

t of C

heva

line w

arhe

ads

disma

ntled

In Ja

nuar

y the

US

finish

ed

disma

ntling

the n

uclea

r wea

pons

it p

ledge

d to u

nder

the 1

991 P

NI;

all bu

t one

nucle

ar de

liver

y sys

tem

in Eu

rope

elim

inated

(90 p

er ce

nt re

ducti

ons);

Arm

y, Ma

rine C

orps

, su

rface

and a

ir com

pone

nts of

Nav

y all

denu

clear

ized;

NATO

and R

ussia

en

gage

d in f

urthe

r disc

ussio

ns;

legal

agre

emen

t on t

actic

al we

apon

s ca

lled ‘

not p

ossib

le’ be

caus

e sy

stems

mor

e diffi

cult t

o ver

ify

Tact

ical

Redu

ctio

ns

2004

No re

feren

ce

1991

– an

noun

ceme

nt of

the

early

with

draw

al, ah

ead o

f sc

hedu

le, of

Plut

on su

rface

-to-

surfa

ce m

issile

s and

AN-

52

bomb

s

No nu

mber

s

“We h

ave p

racti

cally

comp

leted

our in

itiativ

es

conc

ernin

g non

-stra

tegic

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns

redu

ction

s, ex

cept

for el

imina

ting t

he A

rmy’s

nu

clear

wea

pons

. Elim

inatio

n of n

uclea

r war

head

s of

land-

base

d tac

tical

miss

iles,

nucle

ar ar

tiller

y sh

ells a

nd nu

clear

mine

s is p

ursu

ed on

the b

asis

of tec

hnolo

gical

capa

bilitie

s of th

e nuc

lear w

eapo

n co

mplex

and a

ctual

finan

cing.”

Revie

w of

INF

Trea

ty

All n

uclea

r wea

pons

of fo

rmer

Sov

iet U

nion

retur

ned t

o Rus

sian t

errito

ry. “T

he la

st nu

clear

wa

rhea

d pull

ed ba

ck fr

om th

e ter

ritory

of Uk

raine

to

Russ

ia wa

s elim

inated

in O

ctobe

r 200

1.”

“[M]or

e tha

n 50%

of th

e tota

l num

ber o

f nuc

lear

weap

ons f

or se

a-lau

nche

d, air

-laun

ched

tacti

cal

miss

iles,

air de

fense

miss

iles a

nd nu

clear

air

bomb

s hav

e bee

n elim

inated

.”

Over

the p

ast d

ecad

e the

UK

ha

s ach

ieved

:“▪

the w

ithdr

awal

and

disma

ntling

of ou

r mar

itime

tactic

al nu

clear

capa

bility

;▪ t

he w

ithdr

awal

and

disma

ntling

of th

e RAF

’s W

E177

nucle

ar bo

mb;

▪ the

term

inatio

n of th

e nuc

lear

Lanc

e miss

ile an

d artil

lery

roles

that

we un

derto

ok w

ith

US nu

clear

wea

pons

held

unde

r dua

l-key

arra

ngem

ents.

”

90%

of U

S NS

NW el

imina

ted si

nce

fall o

f Ber

lin W

all

Remo

ved n

uclea

r wea

pons

from

all

surfa

ce sh

ips an

d atta

ck su

bmar

ines

Redu

ced t

he nu

mber

of ty

pes o

f nu

clear

syste

ms in

Eur

ope f

rom

9 in

1991

to ju

st 1 t

oday

With

draw

n mor

e tha

n 3,00

0 tac

tical

nucle

ar w

arhe

ads (

artill

ery s

hells

, sh

ort-r

ange

miss

iles,

Navy

depth

bo

mbs),

the l

ast o

f thes

e dism

antle

d in

2003

.

“The

numb

er of

stor

age s

ites i

n NA

TO fo

r non

-stra

tegic

nucle

ar

weap

ons h

as be

en re

duce

d by

80%

.”


Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Tact

ical

Redu

ctio

ns

2005

No re

feren

ceNo

refer

ence

“By n

ow th

e Rus

sian T

NWs a

re de

ploye

d only

wi

thin n

ation

al ter

ritory

and c

once

ntrate

d at c

entra

l sto

rage

facil

ities o

f the M

inistr

y of D

efenc

e.”

“It is

impo

rtant

to no

te tha

t Rus

sia’s

non-

strate

gic

nucle

ar ar

sena

l has

been

redu

ced b

y fou

r tim

es

as co

mpar

ed to

wha

t the S

oviet

Unio

n pos

sess

ed

in 19

91. W

e will

furthe

r red

uce t

he le

vel o

f thes

e we

apon

s. Th

is pr

oces

s will

certa

inly b

e pur

sued

wi

th du

e acc

ount

for th

e milit

ary a

nd st

rateg

ic sit

uatio

n and

our n

ation

al se

curity

inter

ests.

”

“With

draw

n and

dism

antle

d the

RAF

’s W

E 17

7 nuc

lear

bomb

so th

at Tr

ident

is ou

r on

ly nu

clear

syste

m”

“[W]e

have

redu

ced o

ur no

n-str

ategic

nu

clear

wea

pons

by 90

% si

nce t

he

end o

f the C

old W

ar, di

sman

tling

over

3000

such

wea

pons

pursu

ant to

the

Pre

siden

tial N

uclea

r Init

iative

s of

1991

and 1

992.”

“The

US

has r

emov

ed nu

clear

we

apon

s fro

m all

surfa

ce sh

ips

and a

ttack

subm

arine

s, an

d NAT

O ha

s red

uced

the n

umbe

r of ty

pes

of nu

clear

syste

ms in

Eur

ope f

rom

five i

n 199

1 to j

ust o

ne to

day.

The

numb

er of

NAT

O sto

rage

sites

for

NSNW

has b

een r

educ

ed by

80

perce

nt. T

he U

S ha

s with

draw

n wo

rldwi

de an

d elim

inated

mor

e tha

n 30

00 ta

ctica

l nuc

lear w

arhe

ads,

cons

isting

of ar

tiller

y she

lls,

warh

eads

for s

hort-

rang

e miss

ile

syste

ms, a

nd N

avy d

epth

bomb

s.”

Tact

ical

Redu

ctio

ns

2007

No re

feren

ce

“Red

uctio

n of th

e num

ber o

f we

apon

s car

ried b

y the

airb

orne

co

mpon

ent”

“Red

uctio

n of th

e num

ber o

f nu

clear

subm

arine

s car

rying

ba

llistic

miss

iles (

SSBN

s) fro

m 6 t

o 4”

“To da

te, R

ussia

has e

limina

ted its

non-

strate

gic

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns by

thre

e qua

rters

again

st the

ar

sena

ls ha

nded

down

to us

by th

e USS

R.”

“In to

tal, in

comp

ariso

n with

1991

, the t

otal a

moun

t of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns st

ockp

iles h

as be

en re

duce

d mo

re th

an fiv

efold.

”

Sinc

e the

Cold

War

– “

withd

rawa

l and

dism

antlin

g of

our m

aritim

e tac

tical

nucle

ar

capa

bility

; the w

ithdr

awal

and d

isman

tling o

f the R

AF’s

WE1

77 nu

clear

bomb

; and

the

term

inatio

n of th

e nuc

lear

Lanc

e miss

ile an

d artil

lery

roles

that

we un

derto

ok w

ith

the U

nited

Stat

es of

Ame

rica

unde

r dua

l-key

arra

ngem

ents”

“Dism

antle

d mor

e tha

n 3,00

0 non

-str

ategic

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns nu

mber

s, an

d red

uced

non-

strate

gic w

eapo

ns

deplo

yed i

n sup

port

of NA

TO in

Eu

rope

by 90

per c

ent. I

n add

ition,

the U

nited

Stat

es ha

s rem

oved

all

non-

strate

gic nu

clear

wea

pons

from

su

rface

ships

and n

aval

aircra

ft.”

5. Af

firm

atio

n of

Arti

cle V

I Com

mitm

ents

Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Affir

mat

ion

of A

rticle

VI

Com

mitm

ents

2002

“[F]irm

and s

acre

d as

pirati

on to

elim

inate

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns”;

NPT

princ

iples

a glo

bal n

orm

appli

cable

to al

l stat

es

“Fra

nce h

as m

ade c

lear it

s de

termi

natio

n to c

ontrib

ute to

sy

stema

ticall

y and

prog

ress

ively

movin

g to r

educ

e the

glob

al lev

el of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns w

ith th

e ult

imate

goal

of eli

mina

ting t

hem

altog

ether.

”

Stro

ng su

ppor

t for N

PT, n

o refe

renc

e to e

limina

tion

of nu

clear

wea

pons

“[R]em

ains f

ully c

ommi

tted t

o the

ultim

ate go

al of

verifi

able

globa

l disa

rmam

ent …

activ

e in

worki

ng to

ward

s cre

ating

the

cond

itions

nece

ssar

y for

the

globa

l elim

inatio

n of n

uclea

r we

apon

s”

No re

feren

ce to

elim

inatio

n of n

uclea

r we

apon

s

“The

US

gene

rally

agre

es w

ith th

e co

nclus

ions o

f the 2

000 N

PT R

eview

Co

nfere

nce a

nd w

ill co

ntribu

te to

their i

mplem

entat

ion.”


Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Affir

mat

ion

of A

rticle

VI

Com

mitm

ents

2003

“Chin

a rem

ains c

ommi

tted

to nu

clear

disa

rmam

ent

and t

horo

ugh e

limina

tion o

f nu

clear

wea

pons

.”

State

d its

conti

nued

comp

lianc

e wi

th Ar

ticle

VI, b

ut it “

will

also c

ontin

ue to

emph

asise

tha

t nuc

lear d

isarm

amen

t pr

esup

pose

s a co

ntext

of un

dimini

shed

inter

natio

nal

stabil

ity an

d sec

urity

for a

ll. In

other

wor

ds, th

e pro

lifera

tion o

f we

apon

s of m

ass d

estru

ction

an

d the

ir deli

very

vehic

les is

a f

actor

whic

h may

hold

back

dis

arma

ment.

”

“Our

coun

try no

t only

decla

res i

ts co

mmitm

ent –

as

the ul

timate

goal

– to t

he co

mplet

e elim

inatio

n of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns an

d to t

he co

nclus

ion of

a tre

aty

on co

mpre

hens

ive an

d com

plete

disar

mame

nt un

der s

trict a

nd ef

fectiv

e inte

rnati

onal

contr

ol,

but a

lso ta

kes s

teps i

n the

sphe

re of

nucle

ar

disar

mame

nt.”

“[T]he

UK

rema

ins co

mmitte

d to

verifi

able

globa

l nuc

lear

disar

mame

nt …

[and

] has

alr

eady

take

n sign

ifican

t ste

ps to

ward

s this

goal

and

conti

nues

to w

ork a

ctive

ly to

that e

nd.…

”

US st

ated t

hat it

no lo

nger

supp

orts

all of

the 1

3 Pra

ctica

l Step

s: “W

e thi

nk it

is a m

istak

e to u

se st

rict

adhe

renc

e to t

he 13

Step

s as

the on

ly me

ans b

y whic

h NPT

pa

rties c

an fu

lfill th

eir A

rticle

VI

oblig

ation

s.” U

S sta

ted th

at it

conti

nues

to “u

namb

iguou

sly su

ppor

t Ar

ticle

VI an

d the

goal

of nu

clear

dis

arma

ment.

”

Affir

mat

ion

of A

rticle

VI

Com

mitm

ents

20

04

“Chin

a stan

ds fo

r the

co

mplet

e pro

hibitio

n and

tho

roug

h des

tructi

on

of nu

clear

wea

pons

an

d the

conc

lusion

of

an in

terna

tiona

l lega

l ins

trume

nt for

this

purp

ose.”

“In or

der t

o adv

ance

the

nucle

ar di

sarm

amen

t pr

oces

s, Ch

ina su

bmitte

d to

the G

ener

al As

semb

ly at

its 49

th sess

ion a

prop

osal

for a

comp

rehe

nsive

an

d inte

rlinke

d nuc

lear

disar

mame

nt pr

oces

s, wh

ich ca

lled o

n the

nucle

ar-

weap

on st

ates,

inter

alia,

to

nego

tiate

imme

diatel

y an

d sign

a tre

aty on

mutu

al no

-first-

use o

f nuc

lear

weap

ons;

to un

derta

ke no

t to

use o

r thr

eaten

to us

e nu

clear

wea

pons

again

st no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon s

tates

an

d nuc

lear-w

eapo

n-fre

e zo

nes;

to co

nclud

e and

ra

tify C

TBT;

to ne

gotia

te an

d con

clude

FMC

T; to

nego

tiate,

conc

lude a

nd

sign a

conv

entio

n on t

he

comp

rehe

nsive

proh

ibitio

n of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“The

NPT

conti

nues

to be

a v

ital in

strum

ent in

the

pres

erva

tion o

f pea

ce an

d int

erna

tiona

l sec

urity

.… F

ranc

e wi

shes

to re

affirm

here

its

comm

itmen

t to th

e Tre

aty on

the

Non

-Pro

lifera

tion o

f Nuc

lear

Wea

pons

, and

its co

nvict

ion th

at the

re is

no su

bstitu

te ca

pable

of

guar

antee

ing a

comp

arab

le lev

el of

secu

rity fo

r the

inter

natio

nal

comm

unity

.”

“Des

pite a

ll the

chan

ges h

appe

ning i

n the

wor

ld,

the N

PT re

mains

a ma

jor pi

llar o

f the i

ntern

ation

al se

curity

syste

m.”

“The

prac

tical

steps

that

Russ

ia is

taking

de

mons

trate

its co

ntinu

ed co

mmitm

ent to

str

ict co

mplia

nce w

ith its

nucle

ar di

sarm

amen

t ob

ligati

ons,

partic

ularly

thos

e con

taine

d in A

rticle

VI

of the

Trea

ty.”

“The

NPT

is th

e cor

nerst

one

of the

nucle

ar no

n-pr

olifer

ation

re

gime.

It reta

ins th

e wh

olehe

arted

supp

ort o

f the

Unite

d King

dom

and t

he va

st ma

jority

of th

e inte

rnati

onal

comm

unity

.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

supp

orts

the N

on-

Proli

ferati

on Tr

eaty

and i

s com

mitte

d to

its go

als.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

is m

eetin

g its

Artic

le VI

oblig

ation

s und

er th

e NPT

.”


Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Affir

mat

ion

of A

rticle

VI

Com

mitm

ents

20

05

“Chin

a stric

tly ab

ides b

y the

prov

ision

s of th

e NPT

an

d has

been

mak

ing

unre

mittin

g effo

rts in

pr

omoti

ng th

e thr

ee N

PT

goals

of: n

on-p

rolife

ratio

n of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns, p

rogr

ess

in nu

clear

disa

rmam

ent, a

nd

prom

otion

of pe

acefu

l use

s of

nucle

ar en

ergy

.”

“Fra

nce p

layed

a ma

jor ro

le in

the 19

95 N

PT R

eview

and

Exten

sion C

onfer

ence

at

which

it ex

pres

sed i

ts re

solut

e co

mmitm

ent in

favo

ur of

ind

efinit

e and

unco

nditio

nal

exten

sion o

f the T

reaty

.”

“Fra

nce p

romo

tes th

e pr

eser

vatio

n and

unive

rsality

of

the N

PT. It

belie

ves t

hat th

e NPT

is

indisp

ensa

ble to

main

tenan

ce

of int

erna

tiona

l pea

ce an

d se

curity

.”

“Fra

nce a

ttach

es pa

rticula

r im

porta

nce t

o the

centr

al ro

le of

the IA

EA’s

syste

m of

safeg

uard

s, on

e of th

e pilla

rs of

the nu

clear

no

n-pr

olifer

ation

regim

e. Un

der

the sy

stem

of sa

fegua

rds,

the

imple

menta

tion o

f an A

dditio

nal

Proto

col, c

ombin

ed w

ith th

at of

a Com

preh

ensiv

e Safe

guar

ds

Agre

emen

t, is e

ssen

tial to

ob

tain c

omple

te as

sura

nce o

f ad

here

nce t

o non

-pro

lifera

tion

comm

itmen

ts.”

“The

Rus

sian F

eder

ation

is st

rictly

comm

itted

to ful

filling

its ob

ligati

ons u

nder

Artic

le VI

of th

e Tr

eaty.

”

“The

Rus

sian F

eder

ation

is co

nvinc

ed th

at the

inde

finite

ly ex

tende

d NPT

is a

time-

tested

ins

trume

nt an

d sou

nd pi

llar o

f inter

natio

nal

secu

rity. D

uring

the 3

5 yea

rs aft

er its

entry

into

force

the T

reaty

has p

rove

d to b

e viab

le an

d stoo

d ma

ny di

fficult

tests

. It co

ntinu

es to

succ

essfu

lly

perfo

rm its

role

as th

e mos

t impo

rtant

instru

ment

prev

entin

g nuc

lear w

eapo

ns pr

olifer

ation

, ser

ve as

a f

ound

ation

for t

he pr

ogre

ss to

ward

s irre

versi

ble

nucle

ar di

sarm

amen

t and

prov

ide fo

r inter

natio

nal

coop

erati

on in

the p

eace

ful us

es of

nucle

ar en

ergy

.”

“To ac

hieve

unive

rsality

Rus

sia is

activ

ely w

orkin

g bo

th in

bilate

ral a

nd m

ultila

teral

forma

ts to

have

Ind

ia, P

akist

an an

d Isra

el joi

n the

NPT

as no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon S

tates

.”

“The

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m firm

ly be

lieve

s tha

t the N

uclea

r Non

-Pr

olifer

ation

Trea

ty re

mains

the

fund

amen

tal un

derp

inning

of

the nu

clear

non-

proli

ferati

on

regim

e. Th

e tre

aty is

as

nece

ssar

y as i

t eve

r has

been

. W

e mus

t ens

ure t

hat S

tates

Pa

rties r

espo

nd ef

fectiv

ely

and w

ith de

termi

natio

n to t

he

diver

se ra

nge o

f con

tempo

rary

chall

enge

s to t

he re

gime.”

“The

UK

supp

orts

effec

tive

mech

anism

s to e

nsur

e full

co

mplia

nce w

ith th

e obli

gatio

ns

unde

r the

NPT

. One

of th

e mo

st im

porta

nt iss

ues f

acing

thi

s Rev

iew C

onfer

ence

is

how

we ca

n ver

ify co

mplia

nce

more

effec

tively

and t

here

fore

incre

ase t

he di

since

ntive

of

those

who

migh

t con

sider

non-

comp

lianc

e.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

rema

ins fu

lly

comm

itted t

o fulfi

lling o

ur ob

ligati

ons

unde

r Artic

le VI

.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

prov

ides w

orld

leade

rship

in re

alisin

g Artic

le VI

ob

jectiv

es th

roug

h dee

p red

uctio

ns

in nu

clear

force

s und

ertak

en in

ST

ART

and t

he M

osco

w Tr

eaty,

as

sistan

ce fo

r Rus

sian d

isarm

amen

t thr

ough

the N

unn-

Luga

r Coo

pera

tive

Thre

at Re

ducti

on P

rogr

am an

d othe

r ac

tions

. The

U.S

. con

tinue

s to b

e a

leade

r in th

ese a

reas

and o

n man

y oth

er fr

onts

in su

ppor

t of th

e NPT

.”

“The

re ca

n be n

o artifi

cial ti

metab

les

for pr

ogre

ss in

reali

sing o

ur co

mmon

Ar

ticle

VI ob

jectiv

es. D

etails

and

dates

cann

ot an

d sho

uld no

t be

pred

icted

or fo

reor

daine

d.”


Ch

ina

Fran

ceRu

ssia

UKUS

Affir

mat

ion

of A

rticle

VI

Com

mitm

ents

20

07

“As a

Stat

e Par

ty to

the N

PT, C

hina h

as al

l alo

ng co

mmitte

d itse

lf to

enha

ncing

the a

uthor

ity,

effec

tiven

ess a

nd

unive

rsality

of th

e Tre

aty.

China

has f

aithfu

lly fu

lfilled

its

oblig

ation

s, an

d has

be

en ac

tively

prom

oting

the

three

goals

of th

e Tre

aty.”

“Chin

a atta

ches

grea

t im

porta

nce t

o and

ac

tively

partic

ipates

in

inter

natio

nal e

fforts

of

non-

proli

ferati

on, a

nd ha

s ac

cede

d to a

ll rele

vant

treati

es an

d reg

imes

. Chin

a ha

s com

mitte

d itse

lf to

multil

atera

l and

bilat

eral

exch

ange

s and

coop

erati

on

on no

n-pr

olifer

ation

and

is str

ictly

imple

menti

ng

Reso

lution

1540

of th

e UN

Secu

rity C

ounc

il as w

ell as

oth

er re

solut

ions r

elated

to

non-

proli

ferati

on.”

“The

inter

natio

nal

comm

unity

shou

ld ad

vanc

e wi

th the

times

and s

eek

a fair

, rea

sona

ble an

d eff

ectiv

e way

to en

hanc

e the

nucle

ar no

n-pr

olifer

ation

pr

ogra

m re

gime t

hrou

gh

exten

sive c

onsu

ltatio

ns.”

“Fra

nce i

s wor

king t

o imp

lemen

t the

1995

prog

ramm

e (Ar

ticle

VI).

In 19

96 it

signe

d, an

d rati

fied i

n 19

98, th

e CTB

T. Fr

ance

was

, alo

ng w

ith th

e Unit

ed K

ingdo

m,

the fir

st NW

S to

ratify

the C

TBT.

Fran

ce di

sman

tled i

ts nu

clear

tes

t facil

ity in

the P

acific

. It

anno

unce

d, as

long

ago a

s 199

6, a d

efinit

ive ha

lt to t

he pr

oduc

tion

of fis

sile w

eapo

ns m

ateria

l an

d clos

ed do

wn th

e rele

vant

facilit

ies fo

r the

prod

uctio

n of

fissil

e mate

rials

in Pi

erre

latte

and

Marco

ule.”

“The

NPT

, whic

h was

agre

ed

forty

year

s ago

next

year,

is

an in

valua

ble in

strum

ent fo

r co

llecti

ve se

curity

and i

t is ou

r du

ty to

pres

erve

its in

tegrity

in

the fa

ce of

the c

halle

nges

to

which

it is

subje

ct, no

table

since

the

prev

ious r

eview

cycle

. We

must

all be

awar

e of th

e lev

el of

se

curity

it off

ers u

s by l

imitin

g the

risk o

f the p

rolife

ratio

n of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns, b

y fos

tering

nu

clear

disa

rmam

ent w

ithin

the fr

amew

ork o

f gen

eral

and

comp

lete d

isarm

amen

t and

by

prov

iding

for m

echa

nisms

int

ende

d to a

llow

acce

ss to

pe

acefu

l use

s of n

uclea

r ene

rgy

while

at th

e sam

e tim

e avo

iding

the

use f

or no

n-pe

acefu

l end

s of

nucle

ar go

ods a

nd te

chno

logies

int

ende

d for

civil

purp

oses

.”

“NPT

rema

ins at

the c

ore o

f nuc

lear n

on-

proli

ferati

on an

d disa

rmam

ent. I

t has

succ

essfu

lly

serve

d the

task

of m

inimi

zing n

uclea

r con

flict.

No m

atter

how

comp

licate

d the

situa

tion i

s, no

on

e dou

bts th

at we

need

and c

an fin

d way

s to

resp

ond t

o the

chall

enge

s and

thre

ats to

the

non-

proli

ferati

on re

gime b

ased

on th

e NPT

. With

18

9 mem

ber S

tates

the T

reaty

has b

ecom

e the

un

iversa

l one

.”

“The

Rus

sian F

eder

ation

stric

tly ab

ides b

y its

oblig

ation

s und

er th

e Tre

aty.”

“Rus

sia st

eadil

y pur

sues

stre

ngthe

ning a

nd

unive

rsaliz

ation

of th

e NPT

.”

“The

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m re

mains

co

mmitte

d to o

ur nu

clear

dis

arma

ment

oblig

ation

s und

er

artic

le VI

of th

e NPT

and

conti

nues

to m

ake p

rogr

ess t

o thi

s end

.”

“We b

eliev

e tha

t the N

PT

rema

ins a

corn

ersto

ne of

the

nucle

ar no

n-pr

olifer

ation

re

gime a

nd th

e fra

mewo

rk for

nucle

ar di

sarm

amen

t. It

retai

ns ou

r who

lehea

rted a

nd

uneq

uivoc

al su

ppor

t. In t

he

abse

nce o

f furth

er m

easu

res

being

agre

ed in

2005

, the U

K co

ntinu

es to

imple

ment

the

decis

ions t

aken

in pr

eviou

s re

view

cycle

s. W

e abid

ed by

the

unde

rtakin

gs w

e hav

e giv

en to

non-

proli

ferati

on, to

the

peac

eful u

ses o

f nuc

lear

ener

gy an

d to t

hose

on

disar

mame

nt.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

has m

ade

clear

its co

mmitm

ent to

nucle

ar

disar

mame

nt an

d to t

he go

al of

gene

ral a

nd co

mplet

e disa

rmam

ent

since

long

befor

e the

adop

tion o

f the

NPT

. Inde

ed, th

e sub

stanti

al pr

ogre

ss of

the U

nited

Stat

es

towar

ds th

e goa

ls of

artic

le VI

and

the pr

eamb

le, pa

rticula

rly in

rece

nt ye

ars,

gives

it an

unsu

rpas

sed r

ecor

d in

this r

egar

d. Th

e Unit

ed S

tates

is

justifi

ably

prou

d of it

s disa

rmam

ent

relat

ed re

cord

, and

look

s for

ward

to

discu

ssing

and e

xplai

ning t

his re

cord

du

ring t

he cu

rrent

NPT

revie

w cy

cle.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

welc

omes

dis

cuss

ion of

the s

ubjec

t of

disar

mame

nt. O

pen a

nd ho

nest

discu

ssion

of th

is su

bject

is pa

rticula

rly im

porta

nt tod

ay, in

lig

ht of

the de

gree

to w

hich t

he

Unite

d Stat

es re

cord

on en

durin

g co

mmitm

ent to

the g

oals

expr

esse

d in

artic

le VI

and t

he pr

eamb

le of

the N

PT se

ems t

o be s

o poo

rly

unde

rstoo

d by m

any,

and p

artic

ularly

be

caus

e som

e hav

e sou

ght to

mak

e the

ill-fo

unde

d arg

umen

t that

an

alleg

ed la

ck of

prog

ress

on nu

clear

dis

arma

ment

excu

ses v

iolati

ons o

f the

non-

proli

ferati

on ob

ligati

ons o

f the

NPT

.”



6. St

rate

gic D

octri

ne

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Do

ctrin

e 200

2No

-first-

use c

ommi

tmen

t, ar

sena

l kep

t at m

inimu

m lev

el for

self-d

efenc

e

Base

s “its

polic

y of n

uclea

r de

terre

nce o

n the

princ

iple o

f str

ict su

fficien

cy”

“The

logic

of st

rict s

ufficie

ncy h

as

cons

isten

tly di

ctated

the f

orma

t of

its de

terre

nt for

ce, a

key p

illar o

f Fr

ance

’s se

curity

.”

“[P]re

pare

d to f

urthe

r red

uce h

er nu

clear

arms

…

down

to m

inimu

m lev

els co

rresp

ondin

g to

requ

ireme

nts of

stra

tegic

stabil

ity”

“The

UK

has l

ed th

e way

in

taking

mea

sure

s to r

educ

e its

relia

nce o

n nuc

lear w

eapo

ns to

the

mini

mum

level

nece

ssar

y co

nsist

ent w

ith na

tiona

l se

curity

.”

New

conc

ept o

f dete

rrenc

e not

base

d on

nucle

ar re

taliat

ion. “

The n

ew U

S de

fense

stra

tegy i

ncre

ases

the r

ole of

ad

vanc

ed co

nven

tiona

l force

s, mi

ssile

de

fence

s, int

ellige

nce c

apab

ilities

an

d the

defen

se in

frastr

uctur

e….

Adop

ting t

his ne

w ap

proa

ch re

quire

s no

chan

ges i

n cur

rent

polic

y, do

ctrine

an

d stra

tegy.”

Stra

tegi

c Do

ctrin

e 200

3Re

itera

tion o

f no-

first-

use

polic

y.“[N

]uclea

r disa

rmam

ent

pres

uppo

ses a

conte

xt of

undim

inish

ed in

terna

tiona

l sta

bility

and s

ecur

ity fo

r all.…

[T

]he pr

olifer

ation

of w

eapo

ns

of ma

ss de

struc

tion a

nd th

eir

deliv

ery v

ehicl

es is

a fac

tor w

hich

may h

old ba

ck di

sarm

amen

t.”

Princ

iple o

f ‘stric

t suffi

cienc

y’ de

termi

nes f

orma

t of F

renc

h nu

clear

arse

nal

“[I]t i

s imp

ossib

le to

reso

lve pr

oblem

s of

disar

mame

nt an

d stre

ngthe

ning n

on-p

rolife

ratio

n re

gimes

by m

ilitar

y mea

ns.”

Nucle

ar w

eapo

ns w

ill be

re

taine

d unti

l it is

safe

to ma

ke re

ducti

ons “

witho

ut en

dang

ering

our s

ecur

ity

inter

ests.

”

Repo

rted o

n the

Nuc

lear P

ostur

e Re

view,

calle

d it le

ss re

liant

on

deter

renc

e: “[T

]his ‘

New

Triad

’ will

redu

ce ou

r dep

ende

nce o

n nuc

lear

weap

ons f

or de

terre

nce t

hrou

gh

mode

rniza

tion o

f con

venti

onal

force

s, the

addit

ion of

miss

ile de

fense

s, an

d oth

er m

easu

res…

.The

resu

lt is a

n inc

reas

e in t

he th

resh

old fo

r nuc

lear

use.”

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Do

ctrin

e 200

4“C

hina h

as pl

edge

d not

to be

the fi

rst to

use n

uclea

r we

apon

s at a

ny tim

e or

unde

r any

circu

mstan

ces.”

Calls

“upo

n all n

uclea

r-we

apon

state

s to r

enou

nce

the po

licy o

f nuc

lear

deter

renc

e”

Prov

ides h

istor

y of C

hina’s

pu

rsuit o

f a no

-first-

use

agre

emen

t amo

ng N

WS

“Chin

a’s de

velop

ment

of a l

imite

d nuc

lear f

orce

is

pure

ly for

the p

urpo

se of

se

lf-defe

nce.”

“Fra

nce h

as co

nsist

ently

defin

ed

the fo

rmat

of its

nucle

ar ar

sena

l at

a lev

el of

strict

suffic

iency

.”

[R]ed

uctio

ns ha

ve be

en po

ssibl

e be

caus

e of th

e cha

nged

post-

Cold

War

stra

tegic

clima

te

“Willi

ng to

redu

ce st

rateg

ic we

apon

s belo

w SO

RT

prov

ision

s in a

ccor

danc

e with

the i

dea o

f ‘mini

mum

suffic

iency

’”

“[T]he

UK

rema

ins co

mmitte

d to

worki

ng to

ward

s a sa

fer w

orld

in wh

ich th

ere i

s no r

equir

emen

t for

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“The

UK’

s nuc

lear p

olicy

re

mains

‘mini

mum

deter

renc

e’ an

d has

not c

hang

ed. T

he

only

role

for nu

clear

wea

pons

in

nucle

ar de

fence

polic

y is

politi

cal. T

heir p

urpo

se is

to

deter

aggr

essio

n, ra

ther t

han

to be

used

on th

e batt

lefield

to

gain

milita

ry ad

vanta

ge.

Nucle

ar w

eapo

ns w

ould

only

be

used

in ex

treme

circu

mstan

ces

of se

ll defe

nce a

nd in

ac

cord

ance

with

inter

natio

nal

law.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

has a

new

strate

gic de

terre

nce c

once

pt, th

e New

Tr

iad…

: nuc

lear a

nd no

n-nu

clear

off

ensiv

e strik

e sys

tems;

activ

e an

d pas

sive d

efens

es; a

revit

alize

d de

fense

infra

struc

ture t

hat w

ill pr

ovide

ne

w ca

pabil

ities t

o mee

t eme

rging

thr

eats.

T

he ad

dition

of de

fense

s and

non-

nucle

ar st

rike f

orce

s mea

ns th

at the

Un

ited S

tates

will

be le

ss de

pend

ent

than b

efore

on nu

clear

wea

pons

to

prov

ide de

terre

nce.…

Whe

n de

velop

ed, th

e adv

ent o

f the N

ew

Triad

will

mean

that

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns

will p

lay a

small

er ro

le in

US se

curity

tha

n at a

ny ot

her t

ime i

n the

nucle

ar

age.”

US ha

s had

low-

yield

nucle

ar

weap

ons i

n stoc

kpile

for d

ecad

es, s

o a n

ew lo

w-yie

ld we

apon

wou

ld no

t low

er nu

clear

thre

shold


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Do

ctrin

e 200

5“C

hina w

ill no

t be t

he fir

st to

use n

uclea

r wea

pons

at

any t

ime a

nd un

der a

ny

circu

mstan

ces.”

“Chin

a has

been

prom

oting

the

NW

S to

conc

lude a

mu

ltilate

ral tr

eaty

on no

-firs

t-use

of nu

clear

wea

pons

ag

ainst

each

othe

r.”

“No e

fforts

shou

ld be

mad

e to

deve

lop an

d dep

loy

miss

ile de

fence

syste

ms

detrim

ental

to th

e glob

al str

ategic

balan

ce an

d sta

bility

, and

no w

eapo

n sy

stems

shou

ld be

de

ploye

d to o

uter s

pace

.”

“As a

NW

S, F

ranc

e con

sider

s tha

t the p

urpo

se of

its de

terre

nt for

ces i

s to g

uara

ntee t

hat it

s vita

l int

eres

ts wi

ll nev

er be

thre

atene

d by

any o

ther p

ower.

As s

uch,

the

Fren

ch de

terre

nt is

not d

irecte

d ag

ainst

any p

artic

ular c

ountr

y. Fr

ench

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns fo

rm no

pa

rt of

any s

trateg

y bas

ed on

the

milita

ry us

e of s

uch w

eapo

ns an

d ha

ve ne

ver b

een c

onsid

ered

by

Fran

ce to

be w

ar-fig

hting

asse

ts.”

“The

form

at of

Fran

ce’s

deter

rent

force

s, the

esse

ntial

found

ation

of

its se

curity

, is an

d alw

ays

has b

een b

ased

on th

e prin

ciple

of ‘st

rict s

ufficie

ncy’.

Fra

nce

has s

ough

t to m

aintai

n its

nucle

ar ar

sena

l at th

e low

est

level

requ

ired t

o ens

ure i

ts ow

n sec

urity

, in th

e ligh

t of th

e str

ategic

conte

xt.”

“Rus

sia ha

s rep

eated

ly sta

ted th

at it w

ould

not b

e the

first

to de

ploy w

eapo

ns of

any k

ind in

outer

sp

ace.”

“The

1998

Stra

tegic

Defen

ce

revie

w an

d the

2003

Whit

e Pa

per a

ffirme

d tha

t the U

K re

mains

comm

itted t

o wor

king

towar

ds a

safer

wor

ld in

which

ther

e are

no nu

clear

we

apon

s. W

e beli

eve t

hat

stren

gthen

ing th

e inte

rnati

onal

non-

proli

ferati

on re

gime i

s an

impo

rtant

eleme

nt of

our w

ork

towar

ds th

is go

al.

How

ever,

the W

hite P

aper

sta

ted th

at the

conti

nuing

ris

k fro

m the

proli

ferati

on

of nu

clear

wea

pons

due t

o nu

clear

proli

ferati

on m

eant

that

Tride

nt wa

s like

ly to

rema

in a n

eces

sary

eleme

nt of

our

secu

rity. D

ecisi

ons o

n whe

ther

to re

place

Tride

nt ar

e not

need

ed in

this

UK P

arlia

ment

but a

re lik

ely to

be re

quire

d in

the ne

xt on

e. W

e will

there

fore

conti

nue t

o tak

e app

ropr

iate

steps

to en

sure

that

the ra

nge

of op

tions

for m

aintai

ning a

mi

nimum

nucle

ar de

terre

nt ca

pabil

ity is

kept

open

until

that

decis

ion po

int.”

“We h

ave a

lso re

duce

d the

role

of nu

clear

wea

pons

in ou

r dete

rrenc

e str

ategy

and a

re cu

tting o

ur nu

clear

sto

ckpil

e alm

ost in

half,

to the

lowe

st lev

el in

deca

des.”

“The

end o

f the C

old W

ar ha

s pr

ovide

d the

oppo

rtunit

y for

the U

nited

St

ates t

o mov

e bey

ond o

ld str

ategic

do

ctrine

s tha

t reli

ed so

heav

ily on

nu

clear

wea

pons

.”

“[N]uc

lear d

eterre

nce r

emain

s a

nece

ssar

y fac

t of li

fe.…

”

The N

PR “f

ores

ees t

he po

tentia

l for

a fur

ther r

educ

ed ro

le for

nucle

ar

weap

ons.”

The U

S “co

ntinu

es to

mak

e pro

gres

s in

creati

ng a

resp

onsiv

e nuc

lear

weap

ons i

nfras

tructu

re as

part

of the

ne

w tria

d call

ed fo

r in th

e NPR

.”

“Res

pons

ive nu

clear

infra

struc

ture

refer

s to t

he ab

ility o

f the U

S to

resp

ond t

o una

nticip

ated e

vents

or

emer

ging t

hrea

ts, an

ticipa

te inn

ovati

ons b

y an a

dver

sary,

and

coun

ter th

em be

fore t

he U

S de

terre

nt is

degr

aded

.”

“By e

nsur

ing th

at a r

espo

nsive

nu

clear

infra

struc

ture i

s in p

lace,

the U

S ca

n red

uce t

he nu

mber

of

deplo

yed n

uclea

r war

head

s, an

d ca

n fur

ther r

educ

e non

-stra

tegic

warh

eads

.…”


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Stra

tegi

c Do

ctrin

e 200

7“C

hina u

ncon

dition

ally

unde

rtake

s not

to be

the

first

to us

e nuc

lear

weap

ons a

t any

time a

nd

in an

y circ

umsta

nces

, not

to us

e or t

hrea

ten to

use

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns ag

ainst

non-

nucle

ar w

eapo

n stat

es

and n

uclea

r-wea

pons

-free

-zo

nes.”

“Chin

a will

alway

s be a

firm

supp

orter

and a

ctive

pr

omote

r to t

he re

aliza

tion

of a w

orld

free o

f nuc

lear

weap

ons.”

“Our

doctr

ine ha

s bee

n ada

pted

taking

acco

unt o

f the n

ew

threa

ts an

d our

inter

natio

nal

comm

itmen

ts: fa

ced w

ith a

major

powe

r, to b

e able

to in

flict

dama

ge of

any k

ind, a

nd, fa

ced

with

a reg

ional

powe

r, to e

xerci

se

our r

espo

nse o

n its

centr

es of

po

wer a

nd ca

pacit

y to a

ct so

that

the ris

k of u

nacc

eptab

le da

mage

de

ters a

ny po

tentia

l agg

ress

or.”

“We s

trong

ly be

lieve

that

no S

tate,

whate

ver

powe

rful a

nd in

fluen

tial it

is, c

an so

lve th

e tas

k of

pres

ervin

g and

stre

ngthe

ning t

he nu

clear

non-

proli

ferati

on re

gime,

more

over,

by re

lying

on fo

rce.

The n

egati

ve de

velop

ments

can o

nly be

prev

ented

by

joint

effor

ts us

ing po

litica

l and

diplo

matic

mea

ns

and p

rove

n mec

hanis

ms of

the U

nited

Nati

ons,

first

and f

orem

ost, i

ts Se

curity

Cou

ncil.”

“We h

ave w

ithdr

awn a

nd

disma

ntled

our t

actic

al ma

ritime

an

d airb

orne

capa

bilitie

s. W

e ha

ve te

rmina

ted th

e nuc

lear

Lanc

e miss

ile an

d artil

lery

roles

that

we un

derto

ok w

ith

US nu

clear

wea

pons

held

unde

r dua

l-key

arra

ngem

ents.

As

a co

nseq

uenc

e we h

ave

redu

ced o

ur re

lianc

e on n

uclea

r we

apon

s to o

ne sy

stem,

su

bmar

ine-b

ased

Tride

nt. W

e ar

e the

only

nucle

ar w

eapo

n St

ate to

have

done

this.

We

have

also

sign

ifican

tly re

duce

d the

oper

ation

al sta

tus of

our

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns sy

stem

– our

Tride

nt su

bmar

ines a

re

norm

ally a

t sev

eral

days

’ noti

ce

to fire

. The

ir miss

iles a

re no

t tar

geted

at an

y cou

ntry.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

is al

so m

oving

to

redu

ce its

relia

nce u

pon n

uclea

r we

apon

s in i

ts mi

litary

doctr

ine. A

s an

noun

ced i

n the

Pos

ture r

eview

of

2001

, the U

nited

Stat

es is

mov

ing

away

from

the c

old w

ar nu

clear

‘Tr

iad’ a

s the

corn

ersto

ne of

its

strate

gic po

sture

. Pur

suan

t to th

is pla

n, str

ategic

deter

renc

e no l

onge

r re

lies e

xclus

ively

upon

nucle

ar

weap

ons.

Instea

d, to

maint

ain an

d en

hanc

e dete

rrenc

e, the

Unit

ed

State

s reli

es up

on a

comb

inatio

n of

nucle

ar an

d non

-nuc

lear o

ffens

ive

striki

ng ca

pabil

ities (

includ

ing ba

llistic

mi

ssile

defen

ses),

and a

robu

st an

d res

pons

ive de

fense

indu

strial

str

uctur

e.”



7. Se

curit

y Ass

uran

ces

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Secu

rity

Assu

ranc

es

2002

“[U]nd

ertak

en

unco

nditio

nally

… no

t to

use o

r thr

eaten

to us

e nu

clear

wea

pons

again

st no

n-nu

clear

wea

pon S

tates

or

NW

FZ”

Comm

itmen

ts ma

de in

de

clara

tion o

f 6 A

pril 1

995 r

emain

va

lid; e

ndor

sed N

WFZ

Trea

ties

of Tla

telolc

o, Ra

roton

ga, a

nd

Pelin

daba

The a

ssur

ance

s give

n in 1

995 a

re “fi

xed i

n the

mi

litary

doctr

ine of

the R

ussia

n Fed

erati

on”

Supp

ort a

lso ex

pres

sed f

or N

WFZ

s

Comm

itmen

ts ma

de in

Apr

il 19

95 re

main

valid

, poli

cy ha

s no

t cha

nged

; agr

eeme

nts

with

NWFZ

prov

ide ad

dition

al se

curity

assu

ranc

es

“The

re ha

s bee

n no c

hang

e in U

S ne

gativ

e sec

urity

assu

ranc

es po

licy

towar

d NPT

non-

nucle

ar-w

eapo

n sta

tes.”

Secu

rity

Assu

ranc

es

2003

“[U]nd

ertak

en …

not to

use

or th

reate

n to u

se nu

clear

we

apon

s aga

inst n

on-

nucle

ar-w

eapo

ns st

ates o

r nu

clear

-wea

pon-

free-

zone

s at

any t

ime a

nd in

any

situa

tion”

Reite

rates

comm

itmen

t to

NWFZ

and w

illing

ness

to

sign r

eleva

nt pr

otoco

ls

“Fra

nce h

as gi

ven n

egati

ve

secu

rity as

sura

nces

in

conv

entio

nal fo

rm to

over

one

hund

red c

ountr

ies …

[and]

to all

St

ates P

arty

to the

NPT

.” “F

ranc

e has

mad

e abs

olutel

y no

chan

ge to

its po

licy i

n this

area

.”

Quali

fied t

hat “

State

s in b

reac

h of

their c

ommi

tmen

ts on

non-

proli

ferati

on ca

nnot

invok

e the

be

nefit

of tho

se sa

fegua

rds”

“Rus

sia st

ill att

ache

s an e

xclus

ive im

porta

nce

to an

unco

nditio

nal im

pleme

ntatio

n of n

egati

ve

secu

rity as

sura

nces

to no

n-nu

clear

wea

pons

sta

tes th

at nu

clear

wea

pon s

tates

prov

ided i

n 19

95. T

his pr

ovisi

on is

fixed

in th

e milit

ary d

octrin

e of

the R

ussia

n Fed

erati

on.”

No re

feren

ce“T

here

has b

een n

o cha

nge i

n US

nega

tive s

ecur

ity as

sura

nce p

olicy

. In

addit

ion, th

e US

does

not ta

rget

any

coun

try on

a da

y-to-

day b

asis.

”

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Secu

rity

Assu

ranc

es20

04

“Chin

a has

…un

derta

ken

unco

nditio

nally

not to

use

or th

reate

n to u

se nu

clear

we

apon

s aga

inst n

on-

nucle

ar-w

eapo

n stat

es

and n

uclea

r-wea

pon-

free

zone

s.”

In 19

95 “C

hina i

ssue

d a

statem

ent r

eaffir

ming

its

unco

nditio

nal n

egati

ve

secu

rity as

sura

nces

to

all no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon

states

and i

ts co

mmitm

ent

to off

ering

posit

ive se

curity

as

sura

nces

.”

“Chin

a has

sign

ed an

d ra

tified

the r

eleva

nt pr

otoco

ls to

nucle

ar-

weap

on-fr

ee zo

ne tr

eatie

s tha

t hav

e bee

n ope

n to

signa

ture a

nd as

sume

d the

re

levan

t obli

gatio

ns.”

A sp

ecial

state

ment

and

worki

ng pa

per o

n sec

urity

as

sura

nces

wer

e sub

mitte

d.

“It is

legit

imate

and

reas

onab

le for

non-

nucle

ar-

weap

on st

ates t

o clai

m as

sura

nces

that

they b

e fre

e fro

m thr

eat o

f nuc

lear

weap

ons w

hile g

iving

up

the nu

clear

wea

pon o

ption

, an

d tha

t suc

h ass

uran

ces

be af

firmed

in a

legall

y-bin

ding f

orm.

”

1996

– ra

tifica

tion o

f the

Proto

cols

of the

Trea

ties o

f Ra

roton

ga an

d Peli

ndab

a

NWFZ

s “ar

e an e

ffecti

ve

instru

ment”

and F

ranc

e is p

arty

to the

proto

cols

of Tla

telolc

o, Ra

roton

ga, a

nd P

elind

aba,

and

is aw

aiting

prog

ress

in S

E As

ia NW

FZ, a

nd su

ppor

ts pla

n for

Ce

ntral

Asia

NWFZ

.

Thro

ugh t

he pr

otoco

ls “F

ranc

e ha

s give

n neg

ative

secu

rity

assu

ranc

es to

mor

e tha

n on

e hun

dred

coun

tries i

n a c

onve

ntion

al for

m. It

has

also g

iven n

egati

ve se

curity

as

sura

nces

to al

l of th

e Stat

es

partie

s to t

he N

PT, th

roug

h a

unila

teral

decla

ratio

n on A

pril 6

, 19

95, a

s note

d by t

he S

ecur

ity

Coun

cil in

its R

esolu

tion 9

84…

.Th

is co

mmitm

ent is

cons

isten

t wi

th the

natur

al rig

ht of

legitim

ate se

lf-defe

nse…

, [and

] sta

tes th

at vio

late t

heir n

on-

proli

ferati

on co

mmitm

ents

cann

ot cla

im pr

otecti

on un

der t

hese

as

sura

nces

.”

Supp

orts

NWFZ

s and

look

ing fo

r pro

gres

s in a

ll of

them

Supp

orts

NSAs

. Rus

sia ha

s alre

ady p

rovid

ed su

ch

assu

ranc

es to

mor

e tha

n 100

state

s tha

t joine

d the

re

levan

t nuc

lear-w

eapo

n-fre

e zon

e agr

eeme

nts.

“We a

re al

so in

favo

ur of

deve

loping

a glo

bal

nega

tive s

ecur

ity as

sura

nces

agre

emen

t pro

vided

it c

ontai

ns re

serva

tions

conc

ernin

g cas

es in

wh

ich nu

clear

wea

pons

may

be us

ed. It

is tim

e to

resto

re th

e Ad H

oc C

ommi

ttee o

n neg

ative

se

curity

assu

ranc

es w

ithin

the C

D fra

mewo

rk wi

th a n

egoti

ating

man

date.

”

“The

UK

conti

nues

to su

ppor

t the

princ

iple o

f Nuc

lear W

eapo

n Fr

ee Z

ones

.”

Refer

ence

to su

ppor

t for C

entra

l an

d SE

Asian

zone

s, as

well

as

ME zo

ne.

“Our

posit

ion on

NSA

s has

not

chan

ged.

We r

emain

comm

itted

to ou

r neg

ative

secu

rity

assu

ranc

es as

we g

ave i

t in

1995

, as n

oted i

n UN

SC R

es.

984.”

Also

gave

NSA

s thr

ough

NW

FZs a

nd si

nce 2

000 h

as

ratifi

ed pr

otoco

ls to

Raro

tonga

an

d Peli

ndab

a zon

es.

“We b

eliev

e tha

t thes

e co

mmitm

ents

alrea

dy gi

ve N

on-

Nucle

ar W

eapo

ns S

tates

the

assu

ranc

es th

ey se

ek.”

“We a

ffirm

that th

ere h

as be

en no

ch

ange

in th

e US

polic

y tow

ard

nega

tive s

ecur

ity as

sura

nces

(NSA

) an

d pos

itive s

ecur

ity as

sura

nces

(P

SA).

The s

ubsta

ntial

initia

tives

of

the P

-5 in

1995

led t

o nati

onal

decla

ratio

ns an

d the

pass

age o

f UN

Sec

urity

Cou

ncil R

esolu

tion

984.

Thes

e acti

ons r

eflec

t a st

rong

re

spon

se to

the c

once

rns o

f NPT

no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon s

tates

. Of

cour

se, th

ese a

ssur

ance

s are

ap

plica

ble on

ly to

NPT

non-

nucle

ar-

weap

on st

ates i

n com

plian

ce w

ith th

e Tr

eaty.

”

Give

n the

chan

ges i

n the

glob

al se

curity

situa

tion,

and t

he th

reats

fro

m N.

Kor

ea an

d NPT

viola

tions

by

Iran,

“In th

is se

curity

envir

onme

nt,

it is a

ppar

ent th

at NS

As by

the

NPT

nucle

ar w

eapo

n stat

es ar

e of

dimini

shing

impo

rtanc

e as a

poss

ible

reme

dy to

the s

ecur

ity co

ncer

ns of

NP

T no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon s

tates

.”


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Secu

rity

Assu

ranc

es

2005

“Chin

a has

pled

ged

unco

nditio

nally

not to

use

or th

reate

n to u

se nu

clear

we

apon

s aga

inst n

on-

nucle

ar-w

eapo

n stat

es or

nu

clear

-wea

pon-

free z

ones

. Ch

ina is

the o

nly st

ate

amon

g the

five n

uclea

r-we

apon

state

s tha

t has

do

ne so

.”

“Chin

a sup

ports

the

re-e

stabli

shme

nt of

an

ad-h

oc co

mmitte

e on

NSA

at the

CD

and t

he

imme

diate

comm

ence

ment

of su

bstan

tive w

ork a

nd

nego

tiatio

n.”

“Amo

ng N

WS,

Fra

nce i

s par

ty to

the gr

eates

t num

ber o

f pro

tocols

to

treati

es es

tablis

hing n

uclea

r we

apon

free

zone

s. Fr

ance

is

party

to th

e pro

tocols

to th

e Tr

eaty

of Tla

telolc

o, the

Trea

ty of

Raro

tonga

and t

he Tr

eaty

of Pe

linda

ba. A

s of 2

005,

the

Trea

ty of

Bang

kok r

emain

s the

subje

ct of

cons

ultati

ons

betw

een N

WS

and m

embe

rs of

ASEA

N, as

is th

e dra

ft tre

aty

to es

tablis

h a N

WFZ

in C

entra

l As

ia. F

ranc

e, lik

e othe

r NW

S,

has c

ommi

tted i

tself t

o refr

ain

from

deplo

ying e

xplos

ive nu

clear

de

vices

in th

ese t

reati

es’ a

reas

of

appli

catio

n, fro

m co

nduc

ting

nucle

ar te

sts th

ere o

r fro

m us

ing

or th

reate

ning t

o use

nucle

ar

weap

ons a

gains

t Stat

es P

artie

s to

such

trea

ties o

r aga

inst th

ose

territo

ries i

n the

zone

belon

ging

to the

Stat

es P

artie

s to t

he

relev

ant p

rotoc

ol.”

“In Ju

ne 19

82, fo

r the

first

time,

Fran

ce ga

ve ne

gativ

e sec

urity

as

sura

nces

to al

l NNW

S in

a sta

temen

t by t

he M

iniste

r of

Fore

ign A

ffairs

to th

e Unit

ed

Natio

ns G

ener

al As

semb

ly. O

n 6 A

pril 1

995,

Fran

ce re

affirm

ed

and c

larifie

d the

se ne

gativ

e as

sura

nces

and,

for th

e first

time,

gave

posit

ive se

curity

assu

ranc

es

to all

NNW

S pa

rties t

o the

NPT

.”

“The

Rus

sian F

eder

ation

will

not u

se nu

clear

we

apon

s aga

inst n

on-n

uclea

r-wea

pon S

tates

pa

rties t

o the

NPT

, exc

ept in

the c

ase o

f an

invas

ion or

any o

ther a

ttack

on th

e Rus

sian

Fede

ratio

n, its

terri

tory,

its ar

med f

orce

s or o

ther

troop

s, its

allie

s or o

n a S

tate t

owar

ds w

hich i

t has

se

curity

comm

itmen

ts, ca

rried

out o

r sus

taine

d by

such

a no

n-nu

clear

-wea

pon S

tate i

n ass

ociat

ion or

all

iance

with

a nu

clear

wea

pon S

tate.”

“Rus

sia ha

s con

sisten

tly su

ppor

ted no

n-nu

clear

we

apon

Stat

es se

eking

to ob

tain l

egall

y bind

ing

guar

antee

s aga

inst th

e use

or th

reat

of us

e of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“We c

onfirm

our c

ommi

tmen

ts ar

ising

from

the U

N Se

curity

Cou

ncil r

esolu

tion 9

84 (1

995)

. Rus

sia ha

s pr

ovide

d the

lega

lly bi

nding

secu

rity as

sura

nces

to

all st

ates,

which

acce

ded t

o the

resp

ectiv

e NW

FZ ag

reem

ent. W

e inte

nd to

follo

w the

same

pa

ttern

as ne

w nu

clear

wea

pon-

free z

ones

are

estab

lishe

d.”

“We d

o not

objec

t to th

e esta

blish

ment

at the

CD

in G

enev

a of a

n Ad H

oc C

ommi

ttee w

ith

the m

anda

te to

nego

tiate

the ag

enda

item

titled

‘E

ffecti

ve in

terna

tiona

l arra

ngem

ents

to as

sure

no

n-nu

clear

wea

pon S

tates

again

st the

use o

r thr

eat o

f use

of nu

clear

wea

pons

’, pro

vided

that

the po

sition

state

d in t

he m

ilitar

y doc

trine o

f Rus

sia

in re

lation

to ca

ses w

hen s

uch w

eapo

ns m

ay be

us

ed w

ill be

take

n into

acco

unt.”

“We r

emain

fully

comm

itted

to the

nega

tive s

ecur

ity

assu

ranc

es w

e hav

e give

n to

non-

nucle

ar w

eapo

n Stat

es

in ou

r lette

r to t

he S

ecre

tary-

Gene

ral in

1995

, sub

sequ

ently

no

ted in

the U

nited

Nati

ons

Secu

rity C

ounc

il Res

olutio

n 98

4.”

“We r

ecog

nise t

he gr

eat

impo

rtanc

e of N

uclea

r Wea

pon

Free

Zon

es as

regio

nal

initia

tives

that

can b

uild s

tabilit

y an

d sup

port

wide

r inter

natio

nal

objec

tives

of pr

even

ting

the pr

olifer

ation

of nu

clear

we

apon

s. As

a NW

S we

have

ra

tified

the r

eleva

nt Pr

otoco

ls to

the Tr

eatie

s of T

latelo

lco,

Raro

tonga

, and

Peli

ndab

a. Ma

ny st

ates a

re cu

rrentl

y be

nefiti

ng fr

om th

e add

itiona

l se

curity

assu

ranc

es of

fered

by

these

Pro

tocols

.”

No re

feren

ce.


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Secu

rity

Assu

ranc

es

2007

“Chin

a unc

ondit

ionall

y un

derta

kes n

ot to

be

the fir

st to

use n

uclea

r we

apon

s at a

ny tim

e and

in

any c

ircum

stanc

es, n

ot to

use o

r thr

eaten

to us

e nu

clear

wea

pons

again

st no

n-nu

clear

wea

pon s

tates

an

d nuc

lear-w

eapo

ns-fr

ee-

zone

s.”

No re

feren

ce.

“We r

aise n

o obje

ction

to w

orkin

g out

a glob

al ag

reem

ent o

n pro

viding

non-

nucle

ar w

eapo

n St

ates w

ith se

curity

assu

ranc

es th

at wo

uld ex

clude

us

e or t

hrea

t of u

se of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns ta

king i

nto

acco

unt c

ases

stipu

lated

in de

fence

doctr

ines o

f the

nucle

ar w

eapo

n Stat

es w

hen s

uch a

wea

pon

could

be us

ed. R

ussia

is re

ady t

o emb

ark o

n suc

h wo

rk.”

“Esta

blish

ing N

WFZ

is an

effec

tive m

easu

re of

str

ength

ening

nucle

ar no

n-pr

olifer

ation

regim

e an

d enh

ancin

g reg

ional

and i

ntern

ation

al se

curity

. Ru

ssian

initia

tive p

ropo

sing t

o con

centr

ate nu

clear

we

apon

s with

in the

natio

nal te

rritor

ies of

the

nucle

ar w

eapo

n Stat

es re

mains

high

ly re

levan

t. Its

imple

menta

tion w

ould

resu

lt in m

axim

al ex

pans

ion

of ge

ogra

phica

l sco

pe of

area

s com

pletel

y fre

e of

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“The

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m re

affirm

s its

supp

ort fo

r Nuc

lear W

eapo

n Fr

ee Z

ones

. The

se zo

nes

prom

ote no

n-pr

olifer

ation

and

reinf

orce

regio

nal s

tabilit

y. Th

e UK

has n

ow si

gned

and

ratifi

ed pr

otoco

ls in

resp

ect o

f 3 N

uclea

r Wea

pon F

ree Z

ones

an

d has

as a

cons

eque

nce,

agre

ed tr

eaty-

base

d neg

ative

se

curity

assu

ranc

es to

over

100

coun

tries.”

“In ad

dition

to se

curity

as

sura

nces

mad

e in c

onne

ction

wi

th Nu

clear

Wea

pon F

ree

Zone

s, we

rema

in co

mmitte

d to

the se

curity

assu

ranc

es w

e ga

ve to

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns st

ates

in 19

95, a

s note

d in U

NSCR

98

4.”

No re

feren

ce

8. Fi

ssile

Mat

erial

Con

trol

Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Fiss

ile M

ater

ial

Cont

rol 2

002

“[A]ct

ively

partic

ipated

in

amen

ding t

he C

onve

ntion

on

Phy

sical

Prote

ction

of

Nucle

ar M

ateria

l.”

State

d sup

port

for

nego

tiatio

n of F

MCT

in CD

ac

cord

ing to

the S

hann

on

Mand

ate

No re

feren

ce to

stoc

kpile

d ma

terial

State

d com

mitm

ent to

im

media

tely r

esum

e neg

otiati

ons

of FM

CT in

CD;

is “c

ontin

uing

the di

sman

tling o

f its f

acilit

ies fo

r pr

oduc

ing fis

sile m

ateria

ls for

use

in nu

clear

wea

pons

”

Supp

orts

‘begin

ning o

f neg

otiati

ons’

on th

e FMC

T; pr

oduc

tion o

f ura

nium

for nu

clear

wea

pons

dis

conti

nued

; coo

pera

tive p

rogr

am w

ith U

S to

stop

indus

trial u

raniu

m-gr

aphit

e rea

ctors

that p

rodu

ce

weap

ons-g

rade

Plut

onium

; 200

0 agr

eeme

nt to

dispo

se of

34 to

ns of

wea

pons

-gra

de pl

utoniu

m;

MOX

rese

arch

and j

oint p

rojec

t to us

e ura

nium-

pluton

ium fu

el in

CAND

U re

actor

s

In 19

95 pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile

mater

ial fo

r nuc

lear w

eapo

ns

ceas

ed: ”

We c

all up

on th

ose

who h

ave n

ot ye

t don

e so t

o fol

low ou

r exa

mple.

”

Endo

rsed C

D ne

gotia

tions

on

FMCT

, acc

ordin

g to S

hann

on

Mand

ate: “

shou

ld no

t be h

eld

hosta

ge to

othe

r issu

es”

Bush

Adm

inistr

ation

reaffi

rmed

US

effor

ts to

dispo

se of

fissil

e mate

rial;

US-R

ussia

agre

emen

ts tot

al mo

re

than 7

00 to

ns (m

ost s

ubjec

t to

trans

pare

ncy m

easu

res);

conv

ertin

g plu

tonium

into

reac

tor fu

el; su

ppor

t for

prog

ram

to co

nver

t 500

tons

of

Russ

ian w

eapo

ns-g

rade

uran

ium

for sa

le to

US ut

ilities

; exp

andin

g pr

ogra

ms to

secu

re R

ussia

n sto

ckpil

e; su

ppor

ts ne

gotia

tion o

f FM

CT


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Fiss

ile M

ater

ial

Cont

rol 2

003

State

d its

comm

itmen

t to

nego

tiatio

ns in

the C

D of

the F

MCT;

desc

ribed

its

nucle

ar m

ateria

ls se

curity

sy

stem

to pr

otect

nucle

ar

mater

ials

State

d sup

port

for ne

gotia

tions

of

FMCT

at th

e CD

on ba

sis

of the

Sha

nnon

Man

date;

has

comp

letely

ceas

ed pr

oduc

tion

of fis

sile m

ateria

ls at

Pier

relat

te an

d Mar

coule

and d

isman

tling o

f fac

ilities

unde

rway

.

Comm

itmen

t to sa

fegua

rds,

expo

rt co

ntrols

, and

the

IAEA

’s eff

orts

to cu

rb ill

icit tr

affick

ing; li

ttle

detai

l abo

ut sp

ecific

initia

tives

to co

ntrol

stock

piled

ma

terial

Comm

itmen

t to

trans

pare

ncy r

egar

ding

stock

piled

mate

rial; I

AEA

safeg

uard

s app

lied;

Addit

ional

Proto

col p

endin

g entr

y into

for

ce w

ith ot

her E

U sta

tes;

begu

n nati

onal

histor

ical

acco

untin

g stud

y for

fissil

e ma

terial

prod

uced

for d

efenc

e pu

rpos

es; c

ommi

tmen

t to F

MCT

nego

tiatio

ns in

CD

Exten

sive d

etail a

bout

coop

erati

on

with

Russ

ia to

redu

ce pr

olifer

ation

ris

k of s

tockp

iled fi

ssile

mate

rial b

y de

stroy

ing 70

0 ton

s, an

d con

vertin

g Ru

ssian

HEU

into

non-

weap

ons-

grad

e rea

ctor f

uel (3

0-33

tons

to be

co

nver

ted by

2007

); 19

96 Tr

ilater

al Ini

tiativ

e in f

orce

; IAEA

verifi

catio

n of

redu

ction

s, inc

luding

safeg

uard

s

Fiss

ile M

ater

ialCo

ntro

l 200

4“C

hina s

uppo

rts th

e co

nclus

ion of

a mu

ltilate

ral,

non-

discri

mina

tory a

nd

verifi

able

treaty

bann

ing

the pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile

mater

ial fo

r nuc

lear

weap

ons o

r othe

r exp

losive

de

vices

(FMC

T).”

Prov

ides h

istor

y of C

hines

e su

ppor

t of S

hann

on

Repo

rt, F

ive A

mbas

sado

rs’

Prop

osal,

and G

A re

solut

ions.

“[A]s

early

as 19

96 [F

ranc

e] an

noun

ced t

he ce

ssati

on of

pr

oduc

tion o

f wea

pons

fissil

e ma

terial

s and

shut

down

the

corre

spon

ding fi

ssile

mate

rials

prod

uctio

n plan

ts at

Pier

relat

te an

d Mar

coule

, whic

h are

now

being

dism

antle

d.

1992

– ce

ssati

on of

prod

uctio

n of

pluton

ium fo

r nuc

lear w

eapo

ns

1996

– ce

ssati

on of

prod

uctio

n of

highly

enric

hed u

raniu

m for

nu

clear

wea

pons

“Fra

nce c

ame o

ut in

favou

r of

the la

unch

of ne

gotia

tions

on

the F

issile

Mate

rial C

utoff

Trea

ty at

the C

onfer

ence

on

Disa

rmam

ent.”

At th

e “ea

rliest

poss

ible b

eginn

ing, w

ithin

the fr

amew

ork o

f the C

D, ne

gotia

tions

on a

non-

discri

mina

tory,

multil

atera

l and

effec

tive

inter

natio

nally

verifi

able

treaty

bann

ing th

e pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile m

ateria

l for n

uclea

r wea

pons

or

othe

r nuc

lear e

xplos

ives.”

“Toge

ther w

ith th

e Unit

ed S

tates

we a

re w

orkin

g tow

ard s

huttin

g dow

n the

Rus

sian i

ndus

trial

uran

ium-g

raph

ite re

actor

s for

the w

eapo

n-gr

ade p

luton

ium pr

oduc

tion.

The m

ateria

l pr

oduc

ed by

thos

e fac

ilities

is no

t use

d for

mi

litary

purp

oses

. The

prod

uctio

n of u

raniu

m in

Russ

ia for

man

ufactu

ring n

uclea

r wea

pons

was

ter

mina

ted lo

ng ag

o. W

e atta

ch gr

eat im

porta

nce

to the

earlie

st sta

rt of

dispo

sition

by R

ussia

and

the U

nited

Stat

es of

34 to

ns of

wea

pon-

grad

e plu

tonium

for e

ach s

ide th

at is

no lo

nger

requ

ired

for de

fensiv

e pur

pose

s. Th

is wo

uld en

sure

the s

tart

of the

proc

ess o

f the i

rreve

rsible

tran

sform

ation

of

exce

ssive

amou

nts of

wea

pon-

grad

e plut

onium

int

o for

ms un

usab

le for

man

ufactu

ring n

uclea

r we

apon

s.”

“In 19

95 [U

K] an

noun

ced t

hat

we ha

d stop

ped t

he pr

oduc

tion

of fis

sile m

ateria

l for n

uclea

r we

apon

s and

othe

r nuc

lear

explo

sive d

evise

s. In

1998

we

were

the fi

rst N

WS

to de

clare

the

total

size

of th

ese s

tocks

. W

e the

n volu

ntarily

plac

ed al

l ou

r fiss

ile m

ateria

l no l

onge

r re

quire

d for

defen

ce pu

rpos

es

unde

r inter

natio

nal s

afegu

ards

wh

ere t

hey a

re lia

ble to

ins

pecti

on by

the I

AEA.

”

“Plut

onium

histo

rical

acco

untin

g re

cord

”

Supp

ort F

MCT

“and

call u

pon

other

s to j

oin us

in a

mora

torium

on

prod

uctio

n”

“We b

eliev

e tha

t glob

al nu

clear

dis

arma

ment

is a p

roce

ss, a

nd

that a

n FMC

T is

the ne

xt ste

p in

that p

roce

ss.”

Verifi

catio

n of n

uclea

r war

head

s wo

rk.

“All U

S plu

tonium

prod

uctio

n rea

ctors

at Ha

nford

and S

avan

nah R

iver h

ave

been

shut

down

. The

Oak

Ridg

e K-2

5 pla

n was

comp

letely

shut

down

in

1987

. The

Unit

ed S

tates

ceas

ed H

EU

prod

uctio

n for

any p

urpo

ses a

t the

Ports

mouth

Gas

eous

Diffu

sion P

lant

in 19

92.”

“The

US

has n

ot pr

oduc

ed hi

ghly

enric

hed u

raniu

m for

nucle

ar

weap

ons s

ince 1

964.

The U

S ha

lted t

he pr

oduc

tion o

f plut

onium

for

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns in

1988

. The

US

has r

emov

ed 17

4 ton

s of h

ighly

enric

hed u

raniu

m fro

m its

milit

ary

stock

pile,

place

d som

e of th

is ma

terial

unde

r IAE

A sa

fegua

rds,

and

conv

erted

sign

ifican

t qua

ntitie

s of

this m

ateria

l to ci

vil re

actor

fuel.

The

Ad

minis

tratio

n has

soug

ht fun

ds in

its

FY20

05 bu

dget

to be

gin co

nstru

ction

of

US fa

cilitie

s for

disp

osing

of

pluton

ium so

that

it is n

o lon

ger

usab

le for

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

In 19

97 U

S an

d Rus

sia re

ache

d a

bilate

ral a

gree

ment

to pe

rman

ently

sh

ut do

wn re

actor

s pro

ducin

g plu

tonium

for m

ilitar

y pur

pose

s.


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Fiss

ile M

ater

ialCo

ntro

l 200

5“T

he ne

gotia

tions

on F

MCT

shou

ld be

comm

ence

d as

early

as po

ssibl

e.”

“Chin

a sup

ports

the e

arly

nego

tiatio

n of a

FMC

T. In

1993

, Chin

a sup

porte

d the

UNG

A re

solut

ion

on co

nclud

ing a

non-

discri

mina

tory,

multil

atera

l, an

d inte

rnati

onall

y and

eff

ectiv

ely ve

rifiab

le tre

aty

bann

ing th

e pro

ducti

on of

fis

sile m

ateria

l for n

uclea

r we

apon

s or o

ther n

uclea

r ex

plosiv

e dev

ices.

Sinc

e the

n, Ch

ina ha

s vote

d in

favou

r of th

e res

olutio

n on

FMCT

at ea

ch se

ssion

of

the U

NGA.

In A

ugus

t of

2003

, in or

der t

o fac

ilitate

the

early

nego

tiatio

n of

the F

MCT

China

took

a fle

xible

posit

ion an

d was

re

ady t

o join

the c

onse

nsus

on

the fi

ve am

bass

ador

s’ pr

opos

al on

the C

D wo

rking

pr

ogra

m.”

“Fra

nce f

avou

rs the

resu

mptio

n of

work

relat

ing to

the n

egoti

ation

of

a FMC

T. W

hile a

waitin

g the

en

try in

to for

ce of

such

a Tr

eaty,

Fr

ance

calls

for s

trict c

ompli

ance

wi

th a m

orato

rium

on pr

oduc

tion.”

“In 19

96, F

ranc

e bec

ame t

he

first s

tate t

o dec

ide on

, and

be

gin, th

e pro

cess

of di

sman

tling

its fa

cilitie

s for

the p

rodu

ction

of

fissil

e mate

rial fo

r nuc

lear

weap

ons a

t Pier

relat

te an

d Ma

rcoule

.”

“Rus

sia re

affirm

s its

comm

itmen

t to di

spos

e 34

tones

of w

eapo

n-gr

ade p

luton

ium in

acco

rdan

ce

with

the bi

later

al Ag

reem

ent w

ith th

e Unit

ed S

tates

of

Septe

mber

1, 20

00. R

ussia

has t

aken

step

s to

begin

imple

menta

tion o

f the p

rogr

amme

of

pluton

ium di

spos

ition.

Suffic

ient m

ultila

teral

fundin

g of

the R

ussia

n pro

gram

me re

mains

an im

porta

nt pr

ereq

uisite

for t

he be

ginnin

g of d

epos

ition.

“Rus

sia ca

rries

out a

n irre

versi

ble an

d lar

ge-sc

ale

conv

ersio

n of h

ighly

enric

hed u

raniu

m, le

ft afte

r the

nucle

ar ar

ms re

ducti

on, in

to re

actor

fuel

– low

en

riche

d ura

nium,

that

is in

non-

weap

on fo

rm.

Sinc

e 199

5 we h

ave c

onve

rted 2

30 to

ns of

high

ly en

riche

d ura

nium

into f

uel fi

t for n

uclea

r pow

er

statio

ns.”

“The

UK

made

clea

r in

1995

that

it had

ceas

ed th

e pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile m

ateria

l for

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns an

d othe

r nu

clear

explo

sive d

evice

s. Al

l ou

r fiss

ile m

ateria

l no l

onge

r re

quire

d for

defen

ce pu

rpos

es

is no

w un

der in

terna

tiona

l sa

fegua

rds.

We h

ave l

ong

supp

orted

a FM

CT to

halt t

he

prod

uctio

n of fi

ssile

mate

rial

for nu

clear

wea

pons

and o

ther

nucle

ar ex

plosiv

e dev

ices a

nd

would

like t

o see

the i

mmed

iate

comm

ence

ment

of ne

gotia

tions

at

the C

D in

Gene

va.”

“[W]e

have

calle

d upo

n the

Co

nfere

nce o

n Disa

rmam

ent to

ini

tiate

nego

tiatio

ns on

a Fis

sile

Mater

ial C

ut-off

Trea

ty (F

MCT)

. We

belie

ve th

at an

FMC

T wo

uld he

lp to

prom

ote nu

clear

non-

proli

ferati

on

by es

tablis

hing t

he un

iversa

l nor

m tha

t no s

tate s

hould

prod

uce fi

ssile

ma

terial

for w

eapo

ns. F

or its

part,

the

Unite

d Stat

es ce

ased

prod

uctio

n of

fissil

e mate

rial fo

r wea

pons

purp

oses

ne

arly

two d

ecad

es ag

o. To

day w

e re

itera

te the

call w

e iss

ued l

ast y

ear

at the

CD

for al

l nati

ons c

ommi

tted

to the

FMC

T to

join u

s in d

eclar

ing

a mor

atoriu

m on

fissil

e mate

rial

prod

uctio

n for

wea

pons

purp

oses

un

til a b

inding

FMC

T ha

s bee

n co

nclud

ed an

d ente

red i

nto fo

rce.”


Chin

aFr

ance

Russ

iaUK

US

Fiss

ile M

ater

ial

Cont

rol 2

007

“Chin

a atta

ches

grea

t im

porta

nce t

o the

rece

nt pr

opos

als su

bmitte

d by

partie

s con

cern

ed

rega

rding

the p

rogr

am

of wo

rk of

the C

D. It

is ou

r hop

e tha

t all p

artie

s ca

n rea

ch co

nsen

sus o

n it o

n the

basis

of bo

ard

cons

ultati

on, s

o as t

o br

eak t

he de

adloc

k, cre

ate co

nditio

ns fo

r the

comm

ence

ment

of ne

gotia

tions

as w

ell as

su

bstan

tive w

ork o

n the

FM

CT.”

“We a

re re

ady t

o init

iate,

witho

ut pr

econ

dition

s, ne

gotia

tions

on a

treaty

bann

ing th

e pro

ducti

on of

fis

sile m

ateria

l for u

se in

nucle

ar-

weap

ons a

t the D

isarm

amen

t Co

nfere

nce.”

“Ann

ounc

ed, a

s lon

g ago

as

1996

, a de

finitiv

e halt

to th

e pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile w

eapo

ns

mater

ial an

d clos

ed do

wn

the re

levan

t facil

ities f

or th

e pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile m

ateria

ls in

Pier

relat

te an

d Mar

coule

.”

“Fra

nce w

as th

e first

Stat

e to

take a

nd im

pleme

nt a d

ecisi

on

to dis

mantl

e its

facilit

ies fo

r the

pr

oduc

tion o

f fiss

ile m

ateria

l for

nucle

ar w

eapo

ns.”

“It is

high

time f

or th

e CD

in Ge

neva

to st

art

nego

tiatio

ns on

elab

orati

on of

the F

MCT.

We

reaffi

rm ou

r sup

port

for th

is ide

a. Th

e soo

ner t

he

dead

lock s

ituati

on at

the C

D is

brok

en an

d the

pr

ogra

mme o

f wor

k is a

gree

d, the

earlie

r it co

uld

unde

rtake

nego

tiatin

g the

FMC

T.”

“The

Unit

ed K

ingdo

m re

mains

co

mmitte

d to a

bide b

y its

mora

torium

on nu

clear

testi

ng,

and i

ts mo

rator

ium on

the

prod

uctio

n of fi

ssile

mate

rial

for w

eapo

ns pu

rpos

es. T

he

Unite

d King

dom

conti

nues

to

work

towar

ds th

e entr

y into

for

ce of

the C

TBT

as so

on as

po

ssibl

e. W

e hop

e too

that

the

rece

nt po

sitive

indic

ators

that

a 10 y

ear lo

ng bl

ocka

ge at

the

Confe

renc

e on D

isarm

amen

t ma

y be b

roke

n her

ald a

new

phas

e of c

onse

nsus

build

ing in

tha

t foru

m. In

the fi

rst in

stanc

e we

wou

ld lik

e to s

ee th

e ear

ly ne

gotia

tion,

of a F

issile

Mate

rial

Cut-O

ff Tre

aty –

an is

sue t

hat

would

repr

esen

t an i

mpor

tant

and c

oncre

te ste

p tow

ards

dis

arma

ment

and o

ne th

at is

ripe a

nd re

ady t

o be t

aken

for

ward

. We u

rge a

spirit

of

comp

romi

se to

be di

splay

ed

by M

embe

r Stat

es in

the C

D to

allow

this

work

to co

mmen

ce.”

“The

Unit

ed S

tates

is a

staun

ch

advo

cate

of a t

reaty

to ba

n any

fur

ther p

rodu

ction

of fis

sile m

ateria

l for

use i

n nuc

lear w

eapo

ns or

othe

r nu

clear

explo

sive p

urpo

ses.

Indee

d, in

May 2

006,

the U

nited

Stat

es

beca

me th

e first

(and

so fa

r, the

only)

na

tion t

o intr

oduc

e a dr

aft fis

sile

mater

ial cu

t-off t

reaty

at th

e Unit

ed

Natio

ns C

onfer

ence

on D

isarm

amen

t in

Gene

va.”


PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541 Fax [email protected]

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