Transnational Politics
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Transcript of Transnational Politics
Transnational Politics
Drug trafficking: The power of network analysis
Today Columbian drug cartels: a myth?
The ‘kingpins’ and ‘drug lords’: How to frame and mobilize for a ‘war on drugs’
What can the study of NGOs and TANs (Keck/Sikkink) contribute to our understanding of drug trafficking?
Readings: From the bottom-up: Michael Kenney, ‘The Architecture of Drug
Trafficking: network Forms of Organization in the Colombian Cocaine Trade’
From the top-down: World Drug Report, 2007
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
The Cartel: a myth?
Key argument: Not vertically organized ‘cartels,’ but small, independent and networked suppliers dominate the drug trade.
Myth of powerful, coordinated price-fixing and strategic planning.
Method: Interviews with law enforcement/traffickers.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
Four sections
Kenney, p. 236 First section: Literature on criminal networks
Organizational/social network analysis Second section: Empirical example of the Columbian
case Wheel and chain networks
Third section: Rules of drug trafficking Routines and experience
Fourth section: Individual participation in the networks
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
1. Theory: Network analysis
Shared norms and customs. Fluid networks based on kinship, not hierarchy or formal
organization (see Keck/Sikkink). Social network analysis.
Focus on individuals’ relational ties. Leads to more transnational ties across societies. Increased connectivity: decreased costs of communication.
Organizational network analysis. Focus on groups and cooperation across organizations.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
Individuals and groups
Compare Kenney to Keck/Sikkink: Social network analysis: explains why
individuals participate in networks (shared norms; K/S: who is part of a TAN?).
Organizational network analysis: explains how groups cooperate (K/S: how does a TAN produce a campaign?)
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
2. Empirical case: Columbian networks
The dilemma (241): Information-sharing is necessary, but increases the risk of exposure (to competitors and law enforcement).
Why networks do better (than hierarchies and markets) in addressing this dilemma:
Better than hierarchies: looser structure, decentralized decision-making, better chances of survival.
Better than markets: more enforcement power and control based on family and other ties.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
What integrates networks?
Shared experiences, communication, and trust (242):
TANs: principles such as human rights. Illicit networks: Economic gain, social ties.
Inter-group networks: producers > processors > exporters > distributors > money launders > etc. Inter-personal networks: create trust and reciprocity, lower chances of ‘free-riding,’ sharing of knowledge.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
Wheel and chain networks
Organizational analysisWheel (hub, star) networks, 243: A core group has
superior capabilities and control. Mode: contract out services.
Advantage: better coordination and more power to corrupt officials.
Disadvantage: vulnerable to ‘head hunting’ Chain networks, 244: No core group and coordination
from a center. Advantage: greater insulation of individual groups. Disadvantage: less powerful and less capable to deal with
internal dissent.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
3. The Rules of Drug Trafficking p. 249: How do ‘flat’ networks actually work?
Illicit networks, just like TANs, frequently operate in hostile environments. Rules are significant tools to regulate behavior, but rarely written
down. Inter-subjective understandings (compare to def. of norms) Information politics (K/S): Expertise matters. Symbolic politics (K/S): Without written rules, symbols, stories, and
social interaction dominate networks.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
4. Individual participation
Secrecy requires steady supply of new participants. How individuals get involved:
Based on family or other social ties. Gradual inclusion based on reciprocity and trust. Based on experience in trafficking in a non-drug related
field. How to get out (p. 255)
Retirement. Involuntary expulsion. Arrest and death.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz
Conclusions: An answer?
If the ‘kingpin’ strategy has failed, what is Kenney’s recommendations in dealing with illicit drugs as a transnational problem?
If Kenney’s analysis is correct, what does this mean for U.S. foreign and domestic drug policies?
Looking ahead to the presentations: Supply vs. demand-driven approaches to illicit drugs. Pros and cons of legalization.
Wednesday, 2/13/2008Hans Peter Schmitz