1

Transnational political spaces:

Political activism of Philippine labor

migrants in Hong Kong

Draft, please contact author before quotation/circulation

Stefan Rother, M.A.

Research Fellow at the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute

for socio-cultural research, Freiburg

Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science,

Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg

Email: stefan.rother@abi.uni-freiburg.de

Paper prepared for Workshop 29 ‘Civil Society, Democracy and Global

Governance’, ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.

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Abstract/Relevance of the paper for the Workshop theme:

The 2nd Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) was an event of striking contrasts: On the one

hand, the meeting of government representatives in Manila in late October 2008 demonstrated just how far the

international system is still away from establishing any kind of institution or process remotely resembling Global

Governance. On the other hand, the many parallel events organized in addition or in opposition to the GFMD

and its “official” civil society days also served as a showcase of the organizational strength of civil society

actors. In the face of international inertia caused by incommensurate interests of sending and receiving

countries of migration, some authors express the hope that the migrants themselves could overcome this gridlock

by a form of “governance from below” (Piper 2003, 29) that goes beyond the “demanding and voicing”

(Grugel/Piper 2007, 72) of rights.

In my paper I aim to discuss the potential of Philippine migrants’ organizations in Hong Kong to contribute to

“governance from below”. On the outset, this looks like a promising case: In recent years, there has been a

proliferation of migrants’ organizations, predominantly founded not by “concerned citizens” but by migrant

activists. These offer numerous services such as legal assistance and the provision of shelters for victims of

abuse and are very actively advocating migrants’ rights, be it through demonstrations or consultations with the

administrations of Hong Kong as well as the Philippines. There is also increasing transnational cooperation

with organizations representing migrants from different nationalities, reaching up to the global level.

But a closer look reveals severe cleavages among the organizations, with self-defined grassroots movements

distancing themselves from the “NGOism” of other actors. I argue that in the transnational political space in

which these interactions take place, these cleavages mirror political divisions from the home country of the

migrants. The consequences reach up to the international level as well; hence, these two clusters of migrant

organizations, representing in simplified terms the moderate and the more militant/”progressive” left, organized

the two main parallel events during the GFMD separately, if not in opposition to each other.

The ideas and observations outlined in the paper lead to further questions I would like to discuss in the

workshop: How democratic is the structure of these organizations, are “grassroots” movements more

democratic/legitimate than NGOs and is there really a clear distinction between the two? On what mandate do

these NGOs participate in consultations with the respective governments? A Philippine government

representative stated tellingly as a criteria for selection: “We know which are the good ones to talk to…”

Further, is the division among the NGOs mainly a hindrance when negotiating with the administrations, which

might choose to play one side against the other? Or is the “unity of migrants”, called for on a regular basis, an

unrealistic and, worse, also an undemocratic concept? It could be argued, that the two clusters of organizations

represent a wider political spectrum, while providing basic governance services to all migrants regardless of

their political – or apolitical – stance.

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1. Introduction

The objective of this paper1

This article is based on a case study on Philippine temporary labor migration to Hong Kong.

Philippine migrants in Hong Kong numbered around 120 000 in 2006

is to emphasize the political dimension of the predominantly

sociological concept of transnational social spaces and situate it within the (good)

governance discourse in political science. Transnational migration, or more precisely the

research thereof, seems to indeed have “come of age” (Mahler 2007). Studying the “bottom

up“-consequences of transnationalization (Faist 2004, 333) has brought migration research

closer to identifying the multiple ties which link migrants to their home countries. But while

there are numerous studies examining family ties, media or economic linkages (like

remittances), the transnational political agency of migrants seems to have been neglected in

some regards: Unlike hometown associations or diaspora organizations, temporary migration

such as state-regulated contract work is rarely the subject matter of research dealing with

migrants as a political factor.

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1 This paper is based on the ongoing research for my Ph.D. thesis, which I write at the Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Germany. During four field trips to Manila and Hong Kong respectively, I have conducted In-Depth-Interviews with OFWs, migrant activists, government officials and academics and observed the GFMD and its parallel events in Manila. Further quantitative and qualitative research has been conducted while being part of the research project „Democratization through migration“, funded by the Foundation for Population, Migration and Environment (Stiftung für Bevölkerung, Migration und Umwelt, BMU). 2 Source: Migration Information System in Asia, http://www.smc.org.ph/misa/index.php, accessed March 09 2009, data cited based on Hong Kong Yearbook 2006.

and are almost

exclusively employed as domestic workers. Over the last 25 years they have formed an

increasingly dense transnational social space linking them to their homeland. Since labor

migration to Hong Kong is contract-based and thus temporary in nature, and since providing

financial support for their families back home is one of the main motivating factors to go

abroad (Kessler/Rother/Rüland 2008, 56), these consistent social connections to the

Philippines do not come as a surprise. What is remarkable, though, is the very visible degree

of political activism among the migrants: NGOs and grassroots organizations have been

established, trade unions have been set up, party chapters have been founded. Some of these

institutions do not only influence the politics of the Philippine government at home and

abroad, but also aim to substitute its shortcomings by a form of governance from below

(Piper 2003, 29) that goes beyond the “demanding and voicing” (Grugel/Piper 2007, 72) of

rights. For Piper, the notion of governance from below “challenges the previously taken-for

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granted assumption that governance is, or should be, left to the state alone”. In terms of

migration, this form of governance therefore involves NGOs and community based

organizations promoting self governance or empowerment of marginalized groups of migrants

or migrant communities. (ibid, 29/30)

I argue that migrant organizations like the ones present in Hong Kong operate in a

transnational political space and have the potential to establish themselves as an integral part

of “good migration governance” (Rother 2009b). An additional transnational dimension is

added by the increasing cooperation between Filipinos and domestic workers from other

nationalities in Hong Kong, with the latter building upon the strategies established by the

Philippine migrants to achieve a similar level of agency.

In this article, I will first briefly discuss the state of the art in governance and

transnationalization research with regards to migration. I will then introduce my concept of

transnational political spaces. In my case study, I will analyze the efforts of the Philippine

state in migration governance and identify how migrants’ organizations in Hong Kong and the

Philippines have created a transnational political space that enables them to make bottom-up

contributions to migration governance.

2. Migration research and Transnational Social Spaces

Although migration is anything but a new phenomenon, scholars define especially the second

half of the last century as the beginning of the age of migration (Castles/Miller 2003).

Approximately 200 million people live outside their home country, and there is hardly any

country that is not affected by this increased mobility, be it as a transit, sending or receiving

country – or all of these at the same time. Migration across borders is seen as one of the

defining futures of globalization (Beck 1999). Thus, it is surprising that political science with

its vast literature on the consequences of globalization has neglected migration research for a

long time (Brettell/Hollifield 2000, 6; Rother 2005).

If political science research has dealt with migration, one of its main goals in the last 20 years

has been “to bring the state back in” (Hollifield 2000). The focus, therefore, is often on states’

attempts to regulate and control migration, while demonstrating an inherent bias towards the

sending countries, where researchers are usually located. Authors from the realist camp of

International Relations such as Myron Weiner consider migration a “security dilemma”

(Weiner 1995). Non-state actors or even the migrant him- or herself are hardly ever the center

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of attention. Nina Glick-Schiller criticizes that migration scholars, not only within political

science, have “adopted the perspective of their respective nation states” and much of

European und US scholarship on migration confines itself to questions of “how well do they

fit in our society” (Glick Schiller 2007, 4). According to her, the often lamented

“methodological nationalism” still seems to be alive and kicking in migration research. This

results in a neglect of “new social realities” (Pries 2001, 29), which not only affect a

significant number of people in their daily lives but also have important political implications.

If we witness “the growing uncoupling of social space and geographical space” (ibid: 23),

what are the consequences for governance? Especially the rise of circular migration leads to

challenges that go beyond the questions: How does the sending state fulfill his obligations to

his citizens, what is the role of the receiving state? To secure the protection and participation

of these transmigrants3

If one searches for more extensive concepts in political science that include such a bottom up-

perspective, the examples are scant. The ever-expanding literature on Good Governance often

ignores migration, although that might change after the findings of - and especially the

research papers commissioned by - the Global Commission on International Migration

(GCIM 2006). In addition, the recently established Global Forum on Migration and

Development (GFMD) with its proposed yearly gatherings might raise the awareness of the

need for good migration governance.

, a new form of governance is required that not only includes the

governments concerned but also the private sector and, most important, the migrants

themselves. When adopting the “bottom up”-perspective, political scientists are also

confronted with the question: How do these transmigrants influence or maybe even transform

the nation state?

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3 Ludger Pries defines transmigration as “a form of living by shifting between places in

different “national society containers”. This commuting does not always have to take the form of frequent and continuous physical shifting but could, to a considerable extent, consist of commuting, multiple identities and pluri-local life concepts and biographies.” See Pries 2005, 12 and below.

While the participating states so far seem not willing

4 The first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development took place 8-11 July in Brussels. The governmental discussions on 10 and 11 July were preceded by a meeting of civil society representatives on July 9. By self-definition, the introduction of the GFMD “marked the start of a new global process designed to enhance the positive impact of migration on development (and vice versa) by adopting a more consistent policy approach, identifying new instruments and best practices, exchanging know-how and experience about innovative tactics and methods and, finally, establishing cooperative links between the various actors involved.” http://www.gfmd-fmmd.org/, accessed October 3 2008. Participants of the GFMD included more than 200 civil society representatives, more than 800 delegates representing 156 UN member states and more than 20 international organizations (GFMD 2008, 17) Migrant activists criticized the decidedly informal and non-binding nature of the Forum and

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to discuss any binding agreements, the second GFMD in Manila turned out to be a showcase

of the high level of agency migrant NGOs and grassroots organizations have achieved by

now.

An approach that might come closer to fill the existing analytical gap is the concept of

transnational policy regimes, as proposed by Grande et al. (Grande et al. 2006). The authors

identify four dimensions by which these new architectures of political governance reach

beyond the nation state: First, the transnational range, including levels above and below the

nation state and transcending the strict division between internal and external politics; second,

the transnational constellation of actors, integrating a multitude of state and non-state actors

alike; third, the constitutioning functional logic (funktionale Konstitutionslogik), meaning

that these regimes are defined not by territorial borders but along the policy field(s) that

require(s) governance; and, fourth, the institutional character of the regime, consisting of an

ensemble of formal and informal institutions, organizations, actors, relations, norms and rules,

that are involved in the creation and implementation of collectively binding decisions (ibid,

122-123).

While still being close to established regime definitions, these transnational policy regimes

may be a suitable approach to analyze, for example, migration into the European Union. For

the study of labor migration between the Philippines and Hong Kong, the approach is of

limited use, because these transnational policy regimes require political construction and

constitution (ibid, 132), thus again primarily dealing with attempts to provide solutions to

global challenges from above5

The particular characteristic of the case study presented here, on the other hand, is that

migrant activists

.

6 aim to reach beyond the borders of the nation state7

the limited participation of civil society representatives. For the Manila Forum, a multitude of parallel events took place. 5 This is clearly demonstrated by the selection of case studies by the authors – the regulation of genetically engineered food or the internet. 6 I use the term migrant activists here, being aware of the pitfalls of speaking of “the migrants”, since these are far from constituting a homogenous group – quite the opposite is the case, as I will discuss below. 7 I am also, of course, fully aware that Hong Kong is not a nation-state but a Special Administrative Region (SAR). From the point of view of this research project, though, it displays characteristics very similar to the container unit of a nation state.

and fight for political

rights in a space being established from below – often in conflict with the concerned

governments. The uneven distribution of resources and demand and supply of labor is also an

obvious obstacle to collectively binding decisions. In order to develop a more suitable

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approach to cases like the one discussed here, political scientists would do well to embrace

research developed in other fields, especially sociology: the concept of transnational social

spaces. Building on the work on transnational social fields introduced by, among others, Nina

Glick Schiller and Linda Basch (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1997), two of the main

proponents of such an approach are Thomas Faist (Faist 1995, 2004) and Ludger Pries (Pries

1997, 2008). All of these scholars challenge the “container approach of the mutual and exact

overlapping and exclusiveness of social and geographical space in the concept of national

societies” (Pries 2002, 14). But the aspect, in which the concept of transnational social spaces

distinguishes itself from the fields of Glick-Schiller/Basch and parts of the globalization

literature is, as the name obviously implies, the importance of space with its inherent

relational qualities.

“Transnationalism” is by no ways a new term and has been used for more than 40 years in

political science to “characterize all types of interactions and institutions above nationally

bounded phenomena and international relations” (Pries 2001, 17; Albrow 1996, 119ff) There

is also an expanding body of work in economics on transnational companies (Bartlett and

Ghoshal 1989).

Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton provided some groundbreaking

work, when applying the transnational perspective on migration. Distinguishing their

approach from a common view on diaspora, for the authors, communities created by

international migrants in their new regions of residence are not merely “extensions” of their

communities of origin. The migrants form qualitatively new social groups in new “social

fields”, that link together their societies of origin and settlement and thus are transnational in

scope: “We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many migrants today

build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders.” (Basch et al. 1997, 7)

For the authors, this connection leads to “de-territorialized social spaces” that emerge above

and beyond concrete territorial spaces (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). The deterritorialized nature

of these spaces has been highly contested, among others by Pries: “The empirical case studies

underline – against the aforementioned presumptions of “deterritorialization” and

“annihilation of space” – the significance of geographic space and of state regulations for

transnationalism.” (Pries 2001, 20).

In this regard, the transnational social spaces are also differentiated from much of the

globalization literature, where globalization is defined as a “social process in which the

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constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede” (Waters 1995, 3). But

space matters – the expansion of social spaces beyond the container units of nation states does

not automatically lead to the diminishing importance of geographical factors. Smith and

Guarnizo reject prevailing postmodernist metaphors of “deterritorialization” and

“unboundedness”, since transnational actions are still bounded “by the policies and practices

of territorially-based sending and receiving local and national states and communities” (Smith

and Guarnizo 2007, 10). Although new communication technologies might have created what

Lisa Low calls “Transnational cyberpublics” (Law 2003), the members of Migrants Forum in

Asia, the NGO-network she studied, are still based in their respective destination countries

and thus face specific restraints and challenges: it does make a difference, if one is a migrant

activist in Hong Kong or, say, Singapore; even more so when one is based in Saudi-Arabia

and therefore without the ability to organize openly. Thus, the “opportunities and constraints

found in particular localities where transnational practices occur” (Smith and Guarnizo 2007,

12) do matter. But there is still a new dimension in the regard that these transnational social

spaces are multi-sited or, as Pries calls it, pluri-local. The term refers to the various

geographical places that are part of the transnational social ones; for transnational political

spaces I would add, that actions undertaken by migrant activists in one of these places have

also relevance or consequences for the other places in these spaces as well.

Pries criticizes the rather diffuse and undifferentiated use of the terms transnational,

transnational relations and transnationalization by political scientists, which tend to use them

as a synonym for any kind of non-state relations that reach across borders (Pries 2008, 181).

While the transnationalism approach is by now an established research program in various

academic disciplines, “sometimes the terms transnational and Transnationalism are used so

vaguely and indistinctly that they are likely to become “catch-all and say nothing” terms, as

was the case with the globalization concept” (Pries 2007, 3).

The more specific concept of transnationalization, as proposed by Pries, forms the starting

point for this research project. Pries defines transnationalization as economic, cultural,

political and social relations and connections that reach beyond the borders of the nation state,

but are not primarily established between states respectively their governments (Pries 2008,

13). Faist defines transnational social spaces as “sustained ties of persons, networks and

organizations across the borders across multiple nation states, ranging from low to highly

institutionalized forms; transnational social spaces are combinations of ties, positions in

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networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that reach across the borders of

multiple states” (Faist 2004, 337). It is this spatial dimension that makes the term “space”

seem more adequate than “field” when studying these transnational relations.

Thus, transnational social spaces may be based on an abstract concept, but are by no means

entirely situated in spaces of flow or cyberspace, as early globalization literature had it: Social

relations are usually still established at very specific places. This assumption is in accordance

with observations made in the case study: here, transnational politics and advocacy from

below are articulated in a space that can include places like Statue Square in central Hong

Kong, where OFWs gather every Sunday and where – besides socializing – they find a stage

for numerous rallies and political activities. This transnational space consists of numerous

other places: Quezon Circle in Quezon City, Manila, where an electoral campaign rally aimed

at OFWs is carried out by Gabriela Women‘s Party (GWP); the founding meeting of a

Gabriela party chapter in Hong Kong; or the place where consultation meetings between

NGOs and government institutions of the sending country or the destination take place.

These findings support the distinction between transnationalization and globalization made by

Pries: Transnationalization refers to phenomena which reach across borders but are not global

in the sense of being omnipresent. Another differentiation should be made between

transnationalization and the intensification of inter-state or intergovernmental relations: While

the latter are based on the relations of states and governments as corporate actors, the former

include everyday practices as well as organizational and institutionalized relations between

individual and collective actors (Pries 2008, 16). In the case study, the distinction is less clear-

cut, because here the state of intergovernmental relations between the Philippines and Hong

Kong is still of significance, since these relations provide the framework that enables OFWs

to come to Hong Kong in the first place. But when it comes to the design and specific

application of the rules regulating these stays, the non-governmental and private sector play

an important role: They try to exert influence through direct consultations, lobbying,

demonstrations and proposals for legislation in a political space that encompasses and reaches

beyond the containers of the Philippine nation state and the Hong Kong SAR.

In one of his most recent writings on the subject, Pries defines transnationalization as the

formation of relatively stable, cross-boundary and pluri-local social spaces, consisting of the

sense of belonging, cultural similarities, communication, work relations and everyday life of

migrants as well as the related organizations, social orders and regulations (Pries 2008, 44).

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He adds that these formations can display a primarily economic, social, cultural or political

dimension – but are usually characterized by a complex interplay between these dimensions.

This is a definition that can be used as a starting point for a broad variety of research on

transnational migration; but even though innovative research in this field has been conducted,

the political dimension of these ties is still under-researched – even more so when it comes to

temporary labor migration.

Thus, speaking of transnational political spaces puts the emphasis on the political nature of

interactions carried out not only by individual migrants and their various forms of

organizations but also by institutions including government bodies. The term transnational

political space has been used by Michael P. Smith with regards to transnational political

organization and mobilization at multiple levels within a transnational space: “Constructing

transnational political spaces should be treated as the resultant of separate, sometimes parallel,

sometimes competing projects at all levels of the global system”; at the most local level this

includes “survival strategies” by which transnational migrant networks are socially

constructed (Smith and Guarnizo 2007, 6). When defining future directions for transnational

studies, Smith and Guarnizo name as one of the central dimensions “the spatial expansion of

social networks “from below” that facilitate the reproduction of migration, business practices,

cultural beliefs, and political agency”. (ibid, 24) While numerous transnational practices by

individual migrants can in sum have an – unintended - political dimension, the focus here is

on the abovementioned migrant organizations and networks. Therefore, questions of

inclusiveness/exclusiveness have to be kept in mind as well as the fact that many migrants

refrain from intentional political practices altogether.

These organizations and their advocacy work should also be researched regarding the

governance implications. Because of its extensive use and application, the concept of

governance is considered, not unlike transnationalism, as “notoriously slippery” (Pierre/Peters

2000, 7; Benz 2004). While the term governance is increasingly used in migration literature

dealing with the Philippines and the Asia-Pacific, the authors rarely situate it in the context of

the political science discourse on governance. Likewise, migration was almost invisible

within the governance research and the international policy agenda until the millennium

(Newland 2005: 1).

One reason for the less than prominent role of governance aspects in migration research might

be the implicit assumption that sending countries are seen as powerless or weak states and

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therefore do not possess the necessary governance capabilities – or simply do not care about

the exodus of their citizens (Bauböck 2003, 709). Labor migrants, thus, find themselves

confronted with the dilemma of being “usually trapped between less developed and more

highly developed countries with different state structures and power relations” (Piper 2003,

34). Large-scale outmigration can be seen as a result of bad governance of the state economy

or as a deliberate, organized governance effort – or as both, as in the case of the Philippines.

The existing literature on migration and governance in the Asia-Pacific region distinguishes

between governance from above, referring to governance by states or supra-national

institutions, and governance from below, being usually exercised by NGOs, promoting self-

governance or empowerment of marginalized migrant groups (Piper 2003, 29). The focus of

research rests increasingly with the latter group, although some consensus has been reached

that both spheres – from above/from below – cannot be neatly distinguished when it comes to

migration: For Jean Grugel, governance “theorizes a shift from hierarchical and territorially

bounded bureaucracies as a mechanism for delivering public goods to networks of global,

state, and non-state actors, leading to the emergence of national and transnational modes of

Governance not solely controlled by states” (Jean Grugel, quoted in Piper 2003, 29).

The theoretical goal of my research is to connect the two approaches I have outlined above: In

my case study, I want to identify the distinctly political aspect of transnational social spaces

between the Philippines and Hong Kong, and position this aspect as a form of governance

from below within the governance literature.

3. Case study: Philippine labor migration to Hong Kong

In the following section, I discuss the suitability of the approach discussed above for labor

migration between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).

The sending country and the destination with its unique political status are both situated in a

region, where systematic analysis of transnational social spaces is seen as ”still lacking”

(Oswald 2007, 164).

3.1. The Philippines – prototype of a labor-exporting country

The Philippines is seen as “today’s (…) labor exporter par excellence” (Castles and Miller

2003, 168) and “perhaps the prototype of a labor-exporting country” (Semyonov/Gorodzeisky

2004, 6). Philippine labor migration is anything but a new phenomenon – there is a long

tradition of permanent or temporary contract labor that can be analyzed as having taken place

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in three consecutive waves (Tolentino 1996; Gonzalez 1998; Law 2002). Labor migration on

a notable scale began shortly after the US took over as colonial power in the beginning of the

20th century, when the first Filipinos found employment as plantation workers in Hawaii and

later on in California. The second wave started after the end of World War II, when highly

skilled Filipinos migrated to the USA, US military bases or to Australia, which resulted in a

significant brain drain (Adams 1968). The government reacted by introducing the balikbayan

(returning citizens) program, which is in place until today. The intention of the program was

to introduce several incentives to motivate those Filipinos who had permanently left the

country to return regularly to their homeland as investors, or at least spend some money as

tourists. Rafael sees this program as a first indicator for the declining attractiveness the

country held for many of its citizens (Rafael 1997, 273; Law 2002, 207).

In the 1970s, these measures were followed directly by the third wave that continuously

gained momentum until the present day and displayed a new quality in comparison to its

predecessors: Until then, the Philippine state had taken only reactive measures to face an

already existing phenomenon; now, the state took on a much more active role. The aim of the

large-scale Overseas Employment Program was to specifically advance temporary labor

migration. President Ferdinand Marcos installed the program as a response to increasing

unemployment, rapid population growth and declining wages in the Philippines, with the

added benefit of raising the foreign currency stock through remittances (Law 2002, 207).

Thus, the push-factors of a declining economy at home and the absence of social reform met

the pull-factors of the booming oil-exporting Gulf States that needed construction workers for

their ambitious infrastructure programs.

The demand for work opportunities abroad grew so rapidly8

8 The number of new contracts increased between 1975 and 1980 from 36 035 to 214 590 OCWs annually, including seafarers (Asis 2006).

that the state became unable to

accomplish the necessary recruitments without assistance. This resulted in a proliferation of

recruitment agencies, which form the migration industry of the country (Tigno 2004, 9). In

order to cope with the governance demands of the ever-increasing number of OFWs, in 1982

the Philippine state merged existing institutions and founded the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration

(OWWA). They are under the supervision of the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE). Basically, The POEA deals with OFWs until their departure from the Philippines,

while the OWWA is responsible for the migrants during their time abroad.

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These two new institutions were installed at a time when the economic boom in East and

Southeast Asia – the “Asian miracle” – took off. The negative side-effect of this boom for the

Philippines was a demand for a form of migration that not only led to brain drain but also to

de-skilling, since the emerging middle-class especially in destinations like Singapore and

Hong Kong was in need of domestic workers. Many well-educated Filipinas were willing to

accept this kind of work, which made little use of their skills but at least offered significantly

higher payment than an employment in their original profession back in the Philippines. This

development was part of two global trends emerging around the same time: the globalization

of domestic work (“care- or nanny-chain”) and the feminization of migration (Castles and

Miller 2003; Yeates 2005).

The willingness of the Philippine government to accept this loss in human capital in exchange

for foreign currency (which was sent home as remittances), becomes evident when examining

the Executive Order 857, proposed in 1982: Its goal was to oblige OCWs to remit at least 50

percent of their earnings made abroad through Philippine banks (Law 2002, 208). But as it

turned out, the government had to withdraw the order and was unable to make use of it.

Instead, the successful opposition to the “forced remittance” proposal became a major

stepping stone for the migrants’ rights’ movement in the Philippines and the destinations of

labor migration. Hong Kong OFWs had been among the most active opponents of the order;

the confidence gained by its withdrawal motivated them to try to influence Philippine

migration politics from an early stage on, or at least to oppose results that were seen as being

against their interests.

The ousting of Marcos had no major effect on the Philippine governments’ policy to promote

labor migration; in 1988, Cory Aquino, his democratically elected successor, spoke for the

first time of migrants as being “national heroes” which make a major contribution to the

development of the country. Thus, the democratically elected administrations basically

continued to act as a “labor broker” (Rodriguez 1999), based on the politics of temporary

labor migration initiated by Marcos. External shocks like the execution of the domestic

worker Flor Contemplacion in Singapore in 1995 only led to minor and temporary revisions

in the active promotion of labor migration. The term “national heroes” is used to soothe the

unease felt by many Filipinos in the face of the massive negative side-effects of the migration

flow: Families are torn apart, the migrants are put under high emotional stress, exploitation

and abuse through agencies and employers are common in several destinations.

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This has not stopped the current President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

(GMA), to successfully aim for more than one million deployed OFWs annually. GMA

praises the approximately eight million Filipinos living temporarily or permanently abroad as

“Overseas Filipino investors” (DOLE 2002), and migrant remittances are estimated to amount

to eight billion dollars annually, contributing to 10 percent of the gross national product

(Martin et al. 2004).

Philippine civil society organizations denounce the apparent discrepancy between the

economic importance of migrants and the level of their support and protection. NGOs argue

that the latter often comes at a sacrifice of the former. As a result, the migration policies of the

Philippine government are seen as being “strongly influenced by business and bureaucratic

groups at home that have much to gain from continuing and expanding [them]” (Tigno 2000,

62).

Defendants of the government policy point to Republic Act 8042, “An Act to institute the

policies of oversea employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion

of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for

other purposes”. This act was adopted in 1995 in reaction to the aforementioned execution of

a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore and is based on a legislation proposal called “An Act

Providing a Magna Carta of Overseas Filipinos”. The provisions of the act constitute a fairly

unique attempt at migration governance by a sending country in the region. One of the

provisions is to limit the deployment of OFWs to those countries that can guarantee ample

protection; in addition, illegal recruitment agencies are threatened with high penalties while

their victims are offered legal assistance. The promise of assistance includes a clear

transnational component, since it also refers to Filipinos during their time abroad: The

“protection of Filipino migrant workers and the promotion of their welfare, in particular, and

the protection of the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of the Filipinos abroad, in

general, shall be the his/her priority concerns of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the

Philippine Foreign Service Posts”. This above-standard protection should be offered by labor

attachés and, in destinations with an especially high number of OFWs, by “Migrant Workers

and Other Oversea Filipinos Resource Centers”.

Researchers assess the Magna Carta provisions as not being a “complete failure“ (Asis 2006),

since they also offer several orientation and information programs. The most important among

them is the Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS), established already before the 1995

15

Act, where migrants could get information about their rights and obligations as well as about

specific characteristics of their deployment destinations. While this may sound good in

theory, these programs are often conducted by private recruitment agencies because of lack of

government capacities; according to NGO representatives, this results in a strong emphasis on

the aspects of remittances and obligations and very little talk about the rights of the migrants.

Some migrant NGOs have reacted and hold PDOS as well with the goal of offering programs

that go beyond the minimum requirements set by the state. But the verdict of rivaling NGOs is

that this is a highly problematic step and a clear sign of “selling out” and becoming part of the

state agenda.

There have been several amendments to the “Magna Charta” in recent years, with major

changes that have been introduced rather hastily in 2006/2007. These included the

requirement of a certification to work as a domestic helper, at a proposed minimum wage of

400 US$ and a minimum age set at 25 years. The higher age limit was seen as a measure of

protection for migrants, assuring they were more mature when leaving the country. Critics

argued that it is rather questionable to link maturity to a certain age and that the higher age

limit could also be seen as a restriction of freedom. Many migrant NGOs like the Asian

Migrant Center (AMC) in Hong Kong complained that they had not been consulted

sufficiently; their subsequent lobby work led to a reduction of the minimum age to 23 years.

This attests to a notable influence of migrant NGOs and grassroots organizations, although

these organizations can by no means be seen as a united bloc. In contrary, some interview

partners complained that the disunity of the migrant organizations which became apparent in

issues such as the minimum age weakens the reputation and influence of civil society when

dealing with the government. There are consultations between government agencies and

migrant NGOs, but the question of the legitimacy of the civil society representatives – which

NGO represents rightfully which group of migrants – remains unsolved. In addition,

grassroots organizations explicitly distance themselves from “NGOism”, claiming to provide

the migrants with a platform to speak for themselves instead of activists speaking on their

behalf (see below).

All criticism aside, it has to be said that the Philippines have formulated a more coherent and

comprehensive migration policy than most other sending countries. When Philippine activists

are confronted with the desire from migrants from other countries, that their home states

should provide similar provisions, they see it as a case of “In the land of the blind, the one-

16

eyed is king” On the other hand, studies who focus on the “management” of migration,

sometimes laud the Philippine approach as a role model of “best practices” with “unrivaled

sophistication” (Agunias 2008: 1). No matter which of these view one subscribes to, it should

have become apparent by the brief summary of Philippine migration policies, that good

migration governance requires the cooperation of – transnational - civil society actors. But

although there is some exchange taking place with NGO representatives, the attitude behind

the politics of the Philippine government seems to be more defensive than inclusive. And

while the outsourcing of the recruitment process to private agencies might have increased the

efficiency of the deployment, this has also opened the doors for severe cases of abuse.

3.2. The Special Administrative Region (SAR) Hong Kong – the “cradle of political

OFW advocacy”

Some of the obstacles to good migration governance I have described in the section above can

be found in other governance areas as well: the influence of private sector lobby groups which

call for deregulation, difficulties implementing regulations etc. But a challenge that is

especially pressing in the case of migration is its transnational character. While the Philippine

Magna Carta claims to take responsibility for OFWs even during their time abroad, the

migrants are still obliged to adhere to the laws, work regulations etc. of their respective

destination countries. Thus, claims such as the call for a minimum wage are difficult to

enforce from the position of a sending country. While multilateral agreements would be ideal

solutions, these are not in sight, although the recently issued ASEAN Charter for the first time

mentions the need for cooperation in the field of migration (Rother 2008a). So far, the

Philippines already face difficulties in reaching Bilateral Labor Agreements (BLAs) with

major receiving destinations. No such agreement exists with Hong Kong which is certainly

attributable to the strikingly unequal bargaining power between sending country and

destination.

But the exploitation and abuse of OFWs often take place – or become apparent – after the

migrant has left the Philippines and are usually carried out by the employers and agencies. An

NGO interview partner in Hong Kong estimated the number of “black sheep” among the local

agencies at “above 90 percent”; there are no reliable numbers to verify or counter this claim.

To strengthen the position of OFWs, the POEA holds agencies and employers jointly

responsible for claims made by migrants, with the intended result that these claims can be

followed up in the Philippines, independent of the destination where they took place. Once

17

more, implication is the problem and many migrants shy away from legal action. This is the

case even in Hong Kong, where the legal process is open for migrants in principal. Thus,

while the approach is laudable, it mostly serves to highlight the difficulties governments face

when trying to transnationally protect their citizens.

In addition, one of the most contested issues in the SAR is the “two week rule”, which

requires OFWs to find new employment in case of an early termination of their contract –

otherwise they have to leave Hong Kong within two weeks. This results in migrants not

making full use of the legal process but accepting even obviously unfavorable settlements

before leaving the SAR – an advice not uncommonly given by the labor attaches. In sum,

even if it is well-intentioned, the support of the Philippine government abroad often lacks

capacities or possibilities.

It is the goal of the numerous migrant organizations in the OFW destinations to fill this lack in

provisions and governance. These organizations have undergone a massive proliferation

within the last 25 years. Hong Kong can be considered the avant-garde of this movement; for

once, it was the cradle of some of the first migrant NGOs and grassroots movements in

reaction to the above mentioned 1982 remittance act. In addition, organizations first

established in Hong Kong such as United Filipinos in Hong Kong (UNIFIL-HK) were

involved in the founding of more wide-reaching organizations like Migrante International

with its headquarter back in the Philippines but an international outreach as well. The

significance of Hong Kong as a place and space for migrant organizing continues until today,

as the recent choice to hold the founding assembly for the new International Migrant Alliance

(IMA) in the SAR in June 2008 illustrates.

In many countries, “concerned citizens” from the destination society play a vital role in the

establishment of migrant support organizations. Unlike them, the Hong Kong organizations

have been to a large extent founded and developed by migrants themselves or by Filipino

activists. This strengthens the ties to the home country and can be seen as one of the main

factors in the development of transnational spaces for political agency: “A process of civic

transnational networking has taken place, allowing Filipino NGOs to track and advance the

well-being of migrant workers from the Philippines to Hong Kong.” (Wee/Sim 2003, 187)

One pillar of the NGO advocacy movement is the lobby work directed at the governments in

the destination and host country, where some Filipino Hong Kong NGOs have close

connections with party lists and members of parliament or congress. Apart from the Hong

18

Kong immigration law and issues such as minimum wage (which was lowered by the SAR

administration in response to the Asian Financial crisis), the fees issued by the Philippine

government are among the main targets of migrant campaigns, giving them a transnational

dimension: “Each campaign demonstrates different strategies of NGO activism which connect

labor migration to the government policies of the Philippines and Hong Kong, as well to

broader issues of migrants’ rights.” (Law 2002, 212)

Besides these more fundamental issues, direct assistance for the migrants is an important part

of the work of the NGOs in Hong Kong: They provide shelter for OFWs who have been

exploited or physically abused, give legal advice and assistance when dealing with public

authorities and accompany them to court. Additionally, some NGOs are in close contact with

local trade unions and trade unions back in the sending country. The Philippine Alliance of

Progressive Labor (APL) even sent two delegates to Hong Kong to move forward a domestic

worker trade union movement. This is a clear indicator of the transnational orientation of

these activists, although the results of this specific endeavor have been mixed so far. The story

of migrant trade union organizing in Hong Kong has been altogether a rather rough ride, as a

representative of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU) described it;

while the Asian Domestic Workers Union (ADWU) went off to a promising start in the early

1990s and included several nationalities present in Hong Kong, after a few years disunity

became apparent. As the HKCTU representative, who actively supported the project, recalled

in an interview, first the Thai members left, claiming the Filipinos were too dominant, then

there followed a split among the Filipinos themselves.

While personal animosities, a factor rarely ever put into the equation in political science

research, might play a significant role, the difficulties can be also ascribed to conflicting

agendas and ideological backgrounds among the more than 30 political Filipino NGOs and

grassroots organizations (in addition to several hundred social and church-based ones).

Migration researchers are often tempted to treat migrants abroad as constituting a

homogenous group. This is certainly not the case among the Filipinos in Hong Kong: Here,

political cleavages from the home society are mirrored in the migrant society abroad and may

be a contributing factor for the divisions among migrant NGOs.

Thus, while I use the broad term migrant organizations to sum up the various organizational

forms present in Hong Kong, one has to keep the diversity of these organizations in mind.

Hsiao-Chuan Hsia argues that, while Hong Kong has been studied as a site of transnational

19

activism, “many studies fail to highlight the unique importance of grassroots migrant

organizations or conflate them with migrant NGOs” (Hsia 2009: 115). She distinguishes

between more conventional NGOs which she sees as prone to the pitfalls of being elitist and

non-representative, and grassroots migrant organizations like the Asian Migrants

Coordinating Body (AMCB). Formed as the result of a cultural festival bringing together

migrants from different nationalities in 1994 and 1995, the AMCB also includes migrant

organizations from other nationalities like the Far East Overseas Nepalese Association

(FEONA) or the Assosiasi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (ATKI) (Association of Indonesian

Migrant Workers). Thus, the founding of the AMCB is a prime example of new forms of

transnational political activism and governance structures, reaching across the containers of

several nation states at once, since these organizations all have ties to their home countries

and their national governments are affected as well.

It is remarkable that Philippine migrant organizations, still the largest and most well-

established group in Hong Kong, do not seem to perceive migrants from others nationalities

primarily as competitors. Instead, the Philippine experiences are beneficial to these migrants

as well, and Filipino NGOs are seen as a role model in terms of organizational structure and

lobby work (Constable 2007, 214). That is not to say that relations between the migrant

groups are totally smooth; a spokesperson for the AMCB revealed in an interview that many

of her fellow Indonesian domestic workers were cautious about the Filipinas. This view is

already part of the pre-migration training, an often exploitative regulation, where Indonesians

often spend months in remote training camps, where they may learn important skills like

language or using household applications, but also amass debts and receive “brainwashing”,

as the AMCB spokesperson described:

„It is brainwashing by imposing certain values and removing your confidence as a

person: You should be a maid, never say no, if you have a problem, call your

[recrutiment] agency, don’t call anyone [else] you will not get help and don’t be

friend with Filipinos because they don’t like Indonesian, we are so many now and they

think you are overtaking their job. So that kind of mentality is put in the mind of the

Indonesian” (Interview October 2008)

But this attitude apparently changes through interaction. In her case, after running away from

an employer, she stayed in the “Bethune House” shelter, where she was exposed to the

advocacy work done by Filipino migrants and soon decided to join in: „That’s how I start to

20

be an activist, they gave me lots of insight about migrants’ live and our prospects and our

future and what to do.“ (Interview conducted October 2008). As a result, she founded the

above mentioned ATKI organization and became subsequently chair of the AMCB and the

newly established IMA – an impressive move from being apolitical to organization along

national lines, then on to the transnational and finally global level. In a protest called

“countdown to the GFMD” observed by the author in October 2008, the AMCB member

organizations jointly presented demands to the consulates of their respective home countries.

This included the demand to stop the ban on Nepalese domestic workers issued by the Hong

Kong government – thus lobbying for potential competitors on the labor market.

The potential for governance from below exercised by Philippine migrant NGOs is evident in

their effort to secure adherence to standards like payment of the minimum wage or the

guaranteed number of vacation days. A study carried out by the AMC found that 93 percent of

the Philippine domestic workers are able to take at least four days leave every month (usually

every Sunday), but only 55 percent of the Indonesian were able to do so (AMC et. al 2001)

But there is another side of the coin: The Indonesian migrants seem more attractive for

scrupulous agencies and employers because of their higher potential for exploitation –

resulting in a rapid increase in the number of Indonesian domestic workers to more than 104

000 at the latest count, coming up close to the 120 000(Filipinas )9

This holds especially true for the inclusion of civil society: While the staff of the Philippine

consulate may feel pressured by the fervent and constant NGO advocacy,

. Compared to the way the

Indonesian government defines migration governance – basically by not only actively

opening the doors for exploitation but also participating in it – the Philippine approach does

indeed seem to shine bright, all weaknesses not-withstanding.

10

9 Source: Migration Information System in Asia, http://www.smc.org.ph/misa/index.php,

accessed March 09 2009, data cited based on Hong Kong Yearbook 2006.

10 According to a Philippine NGO representative, interviewed in March 2007, among diplomatic staff deployment to the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong is seen as especially challenging – not because the relations with the SAR are exceptionally strenuous, but because one is under the permanent scrutiny of the outspoken fellow Filipinos that organize themselves in the migrant NGOs.

they are

nevertheless willing to participate in consultations with migrant representatives. In contrast,

according to NGO interview partners in Hong Kong, Indonesian migrants are allegedly

21

brought straight to the consulate after their arrival, where they are actively discouraged from

getting into contact with NGOs - and Filipinas - considered as “troublesome”11

But while there is little disunity when it comes to shelters or legal advice, the organizations

providing these services are to various degrees also political players engaging and sometimes

physically moving within the transnational political space comprising Hong Kong and the

Philippines. The density of these transnational interactions is maybe best exemplified by

individual cases like the one of Connie Bragas-Regalado, the present chairperson of Migrante

International and secretary-general of the aforementioned IMA, who is presently based in

Manila but had worked for 13 years as a Domestic Worker in Hong Kong; from 1994-2004

she was chairperson of UNIFIL-HK and spokesperson for the AMCB. While in Hong Kong,

Connie Bragas-Regalado was also appointed by the SAR Secretary for Home Affairs as a

member of the Committee for the Promotion of Racial Harmony. She is also chairperson of

the Migrante Sectoral Party in the Philippines and was number one nominee in the 2004

elections. Since the Migrante Sectoral Party did not manage to get any seats, they supported

Gabriela Women’s Party (GWP) in 2007. In preparation for this election, Filipina OFWs also

formed a GWP chapter in Hong Kong – choosing as spokesperson Cynthia Tellez, Director of

.

Cooperation among migrants from sending nations in the region is especially important, since

there is hardly any cooperation among their home countries taking place at present. With no

global migration regime in sight (Ghosh 2000), regional consultative processes are seen as an

important first step towards such cooperation (Green/Thouez 2005), but usually achieve only

limited concrete outcomes. This holds especially true in a region that values informality and

“track-two-processes”, where controversial issues are preferred to be put aside in order to

search for common ground first (Rother 2004). Still, meetings such as the Manila Process and

dialogues within the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) can be seen as a starting point, and there is

some hope that the inclusion of migration in the above-mentioned ASEAN Charter might

initiate more consultations in this regard within the regional organization. In destinations

other than Hong Kong, there is cooperation between ASEAN consulates or embassies, which

might cater to migrants from other ASEAN member states with no representation in the

country. Until this kind of cooperation can be found on a broader scale, the transnational

endeavors of migrant NGOs provide OFWs with a level of support and a feeling of agency

their government can only partially provide.

11 As a reaction to this practice, representatives of the International Social Service (ISS) try to get into contact with the Indonesian migrants straight at the airport to inform them about their rights.

22

The Mission for Migrant Workers in Hong Kong, a long-time advocate for migrants’ rights in

the SAR.

To cite another example, Flora Baniaga-Belinan, a social worker, spent 12 years working as a

domestic worker in Hong Kong. There she became an activist, returned to the Philippines and

ran for congress in the May 2007 elections on the ticket of GWP, for whom she intensely

campaigned and helped build up a party chapter back in Hong Kong – all this supported by

Migrante International, rooted in Hong Kong and Manila. Although Flora Baniaga-Belinan

was not elected for congress, and there was a sharp decline in absentee voters in Hong Kong,

Gabriela party list managed to get 52.9% of the total party list votes among the absentee votes

of Hong Kong.

These examples are just a glimpse of the very dense interactions, personal and political ties

that reinforce to the transnational political space between the Philippines and Hong Kong.

Obviously, these actors have a transnational agenda, no matter what place within this space

they are situated: they try to influence Hong Kong politics from Manila and vice versa, while

aiming for representation, be it through elections or participation on coordinating bodies or

committees.

The individuals and organizations described here are part of a cluster including several other

organizations like the Asia Pacific Missions for Migrants (APMM). The transnational

character of the cluster notwithstanding, locality/place still plays an important role: APMM,

UNIFIL-HK and AMCB reside in the same building if not office. This can also be observed in

another cluster where the abovementioned Philippine trade union representatives of the APL

resided until very recently in the office of the Asian Migrant Centre in Hong Kong. To

analyze the composition of these transnational clusters and their interactions with each other

will be a major goal of my further research agenda.

4. The contribution of transnational political spaces to good migration governance

So far the empirical research has shown that the transnational political space in which labor

migration between the Philippines and Hong Kong is negotiated consists of pluri-local,

decentralized, dense and consistent interactions between those organizations established by

advocates or the migrants themselves, the private sector (agencies from the “migration

industry”) and the governments involved – and increasingly migrant organizations from other

nationalities and global NGOs. The interactions between the Philippines and Hong Kong are

23

pluri-local and decentralized since they take place in various geographical places that are part

of the transnational political ones, like the locations of demonstrations, offices of migrant

organizations, meeting rooms for government consultations etc. They are also pluri-local in

the sense that a demonstration or campaign activity in Hong Kong is directed towards the

Philippine legislative body or government or may aim to influence politics in other countries

like Indonesia as well.

The density and consistency of the interactions is demonstrated by the continuing advocacy

over the course of more than 25 years and what I would term permanent temporary

migration: It is not uncommon for domestic workers to renew their 2-year-contracts several

times, interrupted by stays of various lengths in the Philippines. This form of continuous

circular migration can be seen as a contributing factor to the construction of an increasingly

dense transnational political space – politics in the home country and the destination of

migration are at all times highly intertwined.

While Ludger Pries points to the centrality of actors in transnationalization research, Thomas

Faist emphasizes the need to “not only study the consequences of transnationalization “top

down”, as in the state-centric paradigm of global governance, but also “bottom up”, as

implied by the transnational turn” (Faist 2004 333). My ongoing research aims to follow up

these propositions by identifying the central actors within the transnational political space at

an empirical level and implement these findings into the systemic level of (good) migration

governance.

The three central groups/clusters of actors are the governments concerned (sending country

and destination), the migration industry and the heterogeneous group of migrants themselves,

under which I also subsume their civil society- NGO and grassroots - organizations. While the

former two groups provide the framework of the migration process, it is “the migrants” who

actively contribute to the formation of transnational political spaces. Further research has to

avoid the pitfalls of seeing “the migrants” as a unified bloc: As politics is characterized by

cleavages, divisions and disagreement, so are transnational political spaces. In the case of the

Philippines and Hong Kong it appears that groups connected to the more moderate and more

militant left respectively have both set up their own infrastructure in terms of organizations,

partylist affiliations, trade union activities, cooperation with migrants from other nationalities

and up to the international level (Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA)/International Migrant

Alliance (IMA). In addition to these two clusters, which should by no means be seen as

24

absolutely homogenous, there are numerous other actors, often associated with church groups

or social work (although the two “camps” have affiliations to churches and mission work as

well). Thus, these organizations are as heterogeneous as Philippine society, and it is hard to

get numbers of how many migrants they actually represent – as at home, many domestic

workers might prefer to stay out of politics, spend their Sunday off at religious groups

meetings (some of which discourage political advocacy) or prefer social activities, in

organizations usually based on their home region (for example, there are several Visayan

organizations). (Rother 2009a)

Therefore, one of the main challenges good migration governance may face is the question of

legitimacy – which migrant group represents which part of the migrants, how are they

organized etc. The specific characteristics of the transnational political space emerging

between the Philippines and Hong Kong may be facilitating as well as being a hindrance to

migration governance “from below”: facilitating, because the density and complexity of the

networks and organizations enables migrants to tackle issues in a powerful and pluri-local, i.e.

addressing institutions in home country and destination, way. But the density of interactions

might also weaken this power, since it can transport and reproduce cleavages: Political

cleavages due to party politics, ideological or historical (for example the split of the

Philippine left) reasons might be brought continuously into the advocacy work in Hong Kong;

vice versa, differing views on issues like the abandonment of the levy in Hong Kong could

make it even harder for migrant groups to form a common stance towards the government in

Manila or jointly participating in fora like the Consultative Council on Overseas Filipino

Workers (CCOFW). These differences might even spill over to the global level, as became

obvious in the separate parallel events organized for the Global Forum on Migration and

Development held in Manila in October 2008. To this regard, the next step in the research

agenda should be to provide a more detailed picture of the actors and their interactions taking

place in the transnational political space incorporating the Philippines and Hong Kong, to

judge the possible contributions to good migration governance “from below”.

25

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