Transnational Organized Crime In Latin America and the ... Organized Crime as a LAC Security Issue...

Transnational Organized CrimeIn Latin America and the Caribbean

R. Evan Ellis, PhDStrategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War CollegePresentation for theHudson Institute

Washington DCMarch 21, 2018

Transnational Organized Crimein Latin America and the Caribbean

• Understanding transnational organized crime in the region through patterns of flows / networks

• An examination and typology of groups (“cartels,” intermediary groups, gangs, “political” groups”)

• Comparative solutions by governments in the region

• Recommendations for partner nationsin the region, and the US

• Additional content in this presentation from recent research in Mexico)

For more information, contact Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel: 717-245-4085 Email: [email protected]

Transnational Organized Crimeas a LAC Security Issue

• Not all “multinational” TOCs are the same

• Major groupings (“Cartels”) vs Intermediaries vs. Gangs

• Not just narcotrafficking…Criminal groups have a portfolio of activities including contraband, extortion, kidnapping, TIP, human smuggling, etc.

• Legitimate businesses + informal economy important

• For logistics, laundering, legitimation of wealth (UIFs)

• CGs: Resources + Corruption / Impunity + Political Will

Key is not only whole of government, but a coordinated, adaptive approach


Latin America is not just a“Transit Zone” For U.S.-Bound Drugs

• Flows of people, arms, money, contraband, Mining, etc

• New consumption markets (eg.BRA, CHI, AR)

• Changes in patterns, groups• New drugs (↑synthetics, heroine,

∆ marijuana) change in criminal dynamics, sites of violence

• Fragmentation of groups• Changes in routes, tactics(↑

Pacific, HispanolaEastCaribbean, ↑Panamá/CR/NI)

• Difficult terrain, with a lack of government presence

• Innovation w technologies• Narcosubs, UAVs


http://mondediplo.com/IMG/arton2024.jpg

• Mexico: Fragmentation (7245+ groups?), ↑ violence + political uncertainty, NAFTA + tensions with the US

• Northern Triangle: Evolution of maras (↑sophistication, role in narcotrafficking eg Fulton & Normandie locos), Return of immigrants (eg. End of TPS), Future of Alliance for Progress($655M$460MCY19?)

• Caribbean: End to MINUSTAH + Transition in Cuba + Collapse of Venezuela, ↑ cocaine from Colombia

• Colombia/Venezuela: Cocaine + post-agreement + Elections

• South America Drug Belt: Diversification of production outside VRAEM (eg. Puno, northern jungle), ↑ ofPCC, expanding markets in Brazil, BsAs, Montevideo + political change in Brazil, Paraguay)

• Transpacific Organized Crime(human trafficking, precursors, illegal mining, other contraband, money laundering)

Some Areas of ConcernAcross the Region


Interdependence of US and MexicoTOC Challenges and Solutions

*Source: The Economist


• Impact of fragmentation (740245+ groups?): violence, leadership, connections outside Mexico

• CJNG: Contacts and criminal franchising of Sinaloa + Violence/Military prowess of Zetas + disciplined evangelism / strategic messaging of LFM/KT??

• “End of sanctuaries” in Yucatán, Puebla, etc?• Guerrero, Michoacán, Tamaulipas• CJNG vs Zetas in south of Veracruz• CJNG vs Sinaloa in Baja California Sur• Tijuana, Juárez: Arellano Felix, Carillo Fuentes

• ↑ demand for opioids, synthetic drugs from US ( Violence in towns vs countryside?)

• Gasoline robberies (↑2x 20162017): factor behind the violence in Puebla, Guanajuato, Veracruz

• Chinese & Korean mafia (eg. Tepito)?• Security Law & 18 challenges in supreme court:

Implications for the future of the Military Police

Mexico: Trendsof Concern


• Whole of Government Strategies / Policy

• Interdiction (Air, Maritime, Land)

• High-Value Targeting (eg. TOC leadership)

• Armed Force-Police Cooperation

• All Government Intelligence Coordination

• Police Reform

• Targeting of TOC Group Financial Flows/Assets

• Penitentiary Control / Reform

• International Coordination (inter-regional, US)

Partner Nation Approaches:Useful Areas of Comparison / Insights


The rhetoric, documents and structures have become almost ubiquitous• Colombia:: DSS, Security Policy for a New Century, Plan Victoria• Guatemala: NSP system (w. DIRI), NSC• ES: “Plan Secure Salvador”• Panama National Security Plan (Varela)• Peru National Security Plan, integrated zones: UHV, VRAEM• Ecuador: Plan de Seguridad Nacional Integral (from “Plan de Bien

Vivir”)• New processes and generating planning documents can be helpful, but

don’t inherently produce results • Mexico: National Development Plan for sexenioNational Security

Plan (done after sectoral plans of Army, Navy)• Guatemala 2016-2020 strategic plan, “National Risk Agenda”, the

National Security Policy, the Strategic Agenda for the Security of the Nation (docs)

• Salvador: Imperfect coordination between social and security parts?• Argentine “Political Directive for National Defense” prev. admin?

Whole of Government Strategies / Policy


• Cooperation w US (intel/Ops): JIATF-S, JTF-B, Comalapa, Aruba FOLs, etc.• Air: Shootdown laws across region (AR, BOL, HN, PY, PE, VE):

Implementation, support challenges, but effective w/o shootdowns?• Lack of Interceptors: GT (confiscated King Airs), AR & UY (little

remaining cap.), BOL from PRC, NI (Russia?) DR Tucanos x invasions• Lack of Radars (HN from Israelis, Panama insufficient, BE & CR just at

airport, BRA: CINDACTA, AR problems w. INVAP for Op. Northern Shield

• Discomfort with legal framework (eg. AR: Decree 228, PE and GT)• Going after runways (Peru, GT, etc.) but can be rebuilt

• Naval (river + open sea)• Landings on Pacific coast: GT, MX (Oaxaca, Guerro), ES, PAN, CR• Includes rivers (HN interior, Peten, VRAEM/Amazon)• New (Metal Shark) vs. repurposed (legal challenges, refit support)• Technology challenge: ↑ sophisticated subs, towed buoys• Endurance of assets: Long coasts of AR, CHI, PE(new ships Sima-

Callao), GT Mothership• Sustainment of remote ship stations (eg. La Mosquitia)

Interdiction (Air, Maritime)


• Military border role• Goes to issue of control of national territory• Task Forces, eg. Sumpul (ES), Tecun-Uman & Chorti (GT)• SENAFRONT (PA)

• CHI military base near northern border (formally Gendarmerie border role)

• Brazil: SISFRON/SIVAM, bi-annualcontinuous) Agata exercises• ↑ importance on relation with neighbors (eg. Brazil, CFAC (Combifrons)

• Border coordination with neighbors ↑ important, eg. Combifrons, CFAC, Morazon-Sandino, Maya-Chorti, Lenca-Sumpul (HN-ES)

• ↑Colombia coca production: Challenges for PE, EC, BRA, PA• Question of police-Military coordination: Cdo. Zeus (ES), Guatemala

TFs, PMOP

Interdiction (Land)


• Necessary and ubiquitous, but increases violence…Have to plan for secondary effects

• Mexico, Colombia lists (like US)• Significant progress x Leaders in recent years

• Mexico cartels, eg. Sinaloa (Chapo)• GT leaders of Lopez Ortiz, Lorenzanas• HN x leaders of Cachiros & Valle Valles• PA: Top Leaders of Bagdad, Calor Calor mostly in jail

• Resources, incl. elite units:• FERES(ES)• PMOP (HN)• GEIR and FIAT (GT)• CIOEC (Ivan Vega) in Peru (prev)

High-Value Targeting


• Virtually everywhere (incl. large states MX, COL, Peru), except where strong tradition against it, legacy of abuse (Chile, Argentina), or no armed forces (CR, NI)

• COL: Decrees 15, 16 x GAOs + BRANCA (x mining), Gaula (anti-kidnapping)• PE: Dec. 1095 to operate in VRAEM, elsewhere / Dec 2015 forces to Callao• DR 2013 troops to Santo Domingo / CIUTRAN• BRA: Favelas for World Cup, Olympics, to Roraima state for prison riots, Rio

and Espiritu Santu (Jan 2017) during police strikes.• But GT Phasing out Citizen Security Squadrons

• Sometimes product of reduction in force after civil wars (GT, ES)COL?• Integrated teams including investigators/prosecutors (GT, HN, COL, etc) • Concerns about legal framework limits initiatives (MEX, PE, AR, GT, BR),

• Desire for lawsroles, protections (Mexico: test case, but challenges?)• COL: Future role x GAO? (little COLMIL action x BACRIM since Nov 2015 )• AR: 1988 Defense law vs Decree 228• PE: Separate employment of MIL vs. national police in CEVRAEM• Brazil: authorization in 1988 constitution, but discomfort w. favela mission

• Institutional differences (eg. ES, GT) • Eg. Differences in pay system, Police-Mil work ethic (ES, GT) • Less where British tradition, or small forces, eg. GUY, JAM

• Concern over corruption from engagement in police missions

Armed Force-Police Cooperation


• Challenge of integration (including separate service intelligence, staff (eg. COL, AR)

• Question of need for organic capabilities for new police/elite bodies (eg. FUSINA own intel organization)

• Concern with politicization of national-level intelligence organizations (CISEN, DINI, DAS, Panama)

Government Intelligence Coordination


• Everyone making an effort, incl. polygraphs (CAP, etc), databases, eg.PMOP, Salvador x mara infiltration

• Colombia: 4,000 polys/year in DIRAN (CN directorate)• Honduras: Special commission (top down) fired 4,000+• Guatemala: Professionalization + pressures of CICIG?• Mexico: Especially federal police (polys, but still limited resources,

“holes in system?”)• Obstacles:

• Acceptance of technical evidence (eg. Polygraphs)• Resources to “fire”• Enabling laws designed to protect against arbitrary action with due

process• Secondary effects of putting police on the streets (why GT didn’t do a

larger purge?)• Resources for following those “put on the street” (eg. database)

Police Reform


• ↑ in FIUs and their equivalent, new laws• Many different arrangements for location of FIUs

(independent, in Finance Ministry, Banking supervisory organization – IVE in GT)

• Need for corresponding strengthening and enforcement of banking laws, extension to other institutions

• Cooperatives, insurance, brokerages, notaries, etc.)• Mexico 2014 law limiting deposits in dollars…but still

enforcement isssues?• Importance of cooperation with foreign institutions (eg. FINCEN

/ DoT FATF)• Edgemont Group (a global society of FIUs), GAFILAT (makes

inspections, recommendations)

Targeting of TOC GroupFinancial Flows/Assets


• Fundamental, especially w. gangs (eg. Central America)• Goal: Breaking cycle of communication and

corruption/intimidation• Honduras: 2014 report, Comayagua fire killing 300• Brazil (Roraima 2016; Natal and Amazonas Jan, April 2017)

• Military perimeter control (military hates it, prisoners hate it)• Salvador: Military return to jails (San Carlos

command…coordination w Police inside)• Overcapacity: eg. 300% in Guatemala (especially pre-trial

holding)Building new jails…but resource question (ES)• ES: 3 new min security prisons, 3 new country prisons…but

funding?• Go slow reforming institutions (GT, DR “model penitentiary”

approach)

Penitentiary Control / Reform


• Bilateral (Combifrons) and multilateral (CFAC)

• Big state-little state, versus peer-peer

• Focus on intelligence sharing, border coordination

• Joint ops where permitted, but national sovereignty, tradition an issue (eg. Mexico)

International Coordination:Intra-region & with US


Some Recommendations for Partners in the Region (w US help)


• Expand the Focus on Systemic Concepts and Internationally Coordinated, Whole-of-Government Solutions

• Strengthen Efforts and Share Best Practices for Interdiction and Territorial Control

• Improve Anticipation and Management of Collateral Effects in Targeting Criminal Group Leadership

• Study and Incorporate Regional Best Practices and Lessons Learned in the Use of the Armed Forces to Support the Police

• Leverage Regional Best Practices in Including Technical Means and Statutory Adjustment for Reforming the Police and Judicial System

• Expand Effort, Coordination, and Legal Tools for Attacking Criminal Group Finances

• Improve Control and Further Reform of Penitentiary Systems

• Expand Bilateral and Multilateral International Coordination Mechanisms

Some Recommendations for the US in its Policy Toward the Region


• Dedicate More Resources and Leadership Attention, Invested More Intelligently

• Pursue Solutions Consistent with the Preferred Strategies and Approaches of Partners in the Region

• Pursue Coordinated, System-Oriented Solutions From the Perspective of the US as a Part of the Region

• Leverage the Experience of Latin American Governments with Interagency Coordination in US Partnerships and Activities Globally

¿Preguntas?¿Comentarios?

Para mas información, comunicarse con Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel: 717-245-4085 Email: [email protected]

• Reform of Penitentiary system(progress in federal system, persistence of many problems at State level—eg. Topo Chico)

• SEMAR takeover/implementation of Maritime Authority(UNICOPAM)• Impact on contraband, illegal mining, precursor chemicals, eg. Ports like

Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo• Progress in the fight against money laundering (FIU & the GAFI report)• Role of CISEN, CESEP x TOC

• Future of Intelligence Fusion Centers• Combatting drugs, immigrants, other illicit flows in the southern border (esp.

by SEMAR)• Challenges in implementation of the Adversarial justice system, political

ramifications of released criminals, sense of imposition by US• Future of Unified Command (Interior) after elections• Future of new multilateral role of Mexican Armed Forces (PKO training

center & PKO Bn, SICOFAA, CFAC (14), presidency of CDMA, IADB etc)Para mas información, comunicarse con Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel: 717-245-4085 Email: [email protected]

Mexico: Trendsof Concern (2)

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