Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia

8/11/2019 Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii Foreword A. Mahin Karim

1 ransnational Islam in Asia: Background, ypology, and Conceptual

Overview Peter Mandaville

21 Islamist Networks and Mainstream Politics in South and Southeast AsiaFarish A. Noor 35 ransnational Ideologies and Actors at the Level of Society in South andSoutheast Asia

Alexander Horstmann

53 Migrants, Mujahidin, Madrassa Students: Te Diversity of ransnationalIslam in PakistanDietrich Reetz

79 Interactions of ransnational and Local Islam in Bangladesh Ali Riaz 101 ransnational Islam in India: Movements, Networks, and ConictDynamics

Animesh Roul

121 ransnational Islam in IndonesiaNoorhaidi Hasan

141 ransnational Islam in Malaysia Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 167 ransnational Islam in the PhilippinesRommel C. Banlaoi 189 Local Networks and ransnational Islam in Tailand Joseph C. Liow

Transnational Islamin South andSoutheast Asia Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics

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the national bureau of asia n research


ransnational Islam in Asia:Background, ypology andConceptual Overview

Peter Mandaville

PETER MANDAVILLE is Associate Pro essor in the Department o Public andInternational Affairs and Co-Director o the Center or Global Studies at GeorgeMason University. His recent publications include Global Political Islam (2007),ransnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (2001), and several co-edited

volumes and anthologies such as Globalizing Religions( orthcoming).


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Tis paper provides an overview o the history o transnational Islam in South and SoutheastAsia, identi ying key vectors o religious transmission and points o continuity betweenhistorical and contemporary patterns o cross-regional Islamic discourse. Te paper proposesthat contemporary mani estations o transnational Islam problematize conventional

categorizations o movements and political ideologies through requent cross- ertilizationacross political and militant tendencies. Te paper urther suggests that the emerging geographyo globalized Islam calls into question the extent to which political mani estations o Islam canbe analyzed with exclusive re erence to local circumstances or sources o discontent.

MAIN FINDINGS

Mani estations o contemporary transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia occurin our primary orms: Su brotherhoods, renewalist/pietistic movements, Islamist partiesand groups, charitable organizations and dawa organizations; the primary conduitsor the cross-border transmission o Islam today include scholarly exchange and study

abroad, labor migration, new media, and ritual obligations (e.g. pilgrimage). Inuencesrom transnational Islam do not involve the subversion or eradication o local religioussensibilities but rather a ar more complex dynamic whereby external ideas and belie sare adapted to and grafed onto existing worldviews and conditions. ransnational Islamis not exclusively about religion but can sometimes represent a vocabulary through whichbroader global debates about political and socioeconomic disen ranchisement can beengaged. Te uidity o transnational Islam on the ground in specic country contexts issuch that the social reality o such movement rarely corresponds exactly to the categoriesand orientations suggested by conventional analytical typologies (e.g. sharp distinctionsbetween modernist and traditionalist groups).

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Te involvement o transnational Islamic groups in a localized conict is requently associated

with an escalation dynamic that raises the ideological stakes o the dispute through associationwith global Muslim causes and by introducing new resources (ideational and material) into theconict equation.

ransnational Islamic groups leverage the political sentiments that accrue rom both government

responses to Muslim grievances and to broader geopolitical issues (e.g. global war on terror, waron Iraq) to build local constituencies.

At least one orm o transnational Islamic networkingthat between political parties and

movements operating in the justice and development moldholds the potential to serve as aneffective and largely democratic space or the aggregation o Muslim discontent and the pursuit osocial justice in the name o Islam.

Te complex geographies o transnational Islam, which involve organizations and diasporas

located well beyond the connes o South and Southeast Asia, mean that efforts to exert policyinuence on Muslim actors in the region may well involve interventions and actors located in theMiddle East, Europe, and North America.


7/2143TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM IN ASIA:u MANDAVILLE

While the theme o transnational Islam in Asia most readily brings to mind recentevents in countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia, or networks and movements suchas Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and the aliban, transnational Islamic inuences inSouth and Southeast Asia have a long and complex history dating back hundreds o

years. And, while it is these contemporary groups and conict situations that will constitute theprimary ocus o the present study, it is important both to contextualize them in historical terms,

and to gain a better understanding o how they relate to the diverse range o transnational Islamiccurrents to be ound in the region today.How were the conduits through which contemporary Muslim social and political activists

operate between Asia and the Middle Eastor, indeed, within Asia itsel rst established? Howhave mainstream mass Islamist movements rom the Arab world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,inuenced politics and conict dynamics in South and Southeast Asia, and how do they intersectwith radical and militant groups? Where do centuries-old Su networks and more recent pietistmovements, such as the ablighi Jamaat, t into the picture o contemporary transnational Islamin the region?

Tis paper provides the historical background necessary or understanding the role otransnational Islam in Asia today. Beginning with a brie survey o Islams transmission to Asiarom the Middle East, this section o the paper will ocus on the interplay between nation-states andtransnational Muslim movements during the twentieth century. Next we will survey and organizethe diverse orms (and unctions) o transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia throughthe development o a typology o actors, groups, and drivers o Muslim transnationalism. Finally,and by way o building a oundation or the thematic and country case studies to ollow, we willidenti y and briey discuss some o the major issuesboth conceptual and empiricalrelating tocontemporary transnational Islam. Tis will involve looking at different ways o thinking aboutthe meaning and signicance o transnational Islam in the region, the role o transnational Islamwithin the wider religious eld and particularly its interaction with other orms o religioustransnationalism (e.g. Christian missionary activity), the role o state-sponsored religioustransnationalism, and the impact o issues such as social class on the organizational dynamicso transnational Islam. Te impact o Muslim transnationalism on local conicts, domestic andregional politics, and broader issues o social cohesion will also be considered in this nal section.

It is important to emphasize that the case studies contained in this study do not constitute acomprehensive or exhaustive inventory o contemporary transnational Islam in Asia. Rather, theyrepresent a mixture o key movements rom a policy perspective, and other groups illustrativeo distinctive trends and types that collectively dene the regional ecosystem o Muslimtransnationalism. While an analytical typology is offered below, the complexity and diversity oIslamic networking in Asia cannotas we will seebe reduced exclusively to such a ramework.

Historically Transnational: Islam, the Middle East, and Asia 1

Commercial ties between South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East predate the li etimeo the Prophet Muhammad, whose home city o Mecca in western Arabia was a waypoint

1 Unless otherwise specied, the accounts o historical Muslim transnationalism in South and Southeast Asia offered below rely on thestandard works by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, Te Venture o Islam (Chicago: University o Chicago Press, 1977) and Ira Marvin Lapidus, AHistory o Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


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on the trading networks that brought merchandise and commodities up to the Levant romsouth Arabian ports. Te transmission o Islam rom the Middle East to Asiainitially to theIndian subcontinentbegins as early as the second decade o the eighth century, reaching itssoutheastern extremes in the Malay archipelagos by the thirteen century. Janet Abu-Lughodsbook Be ore European Hegemony: Te World System A.D. 1250-1350 provides us with an accounto something akin to proto-globalization in the southeastern quadrant o the globe during this

period, with rich commercial, scholarly and political ties springing up to connect East A rica toSouthern Arabia, and on across to South and Southeast Asia. Indeed, as a weakened centralizedMuslim polity in the Middle East ound itsel plundered by oreign invaders, the Indian Oceanemerges as a vibrant space o Muslim commercial and intellectual exchange. Although some o thesocieties encompassed within this mini-world system, such as parts o present-day Malaysia andIndonesia, took several hundred years to embrace the religion, the centrality o Muslim tradersand scholars within these networks ensured that Islam served rom early on as an importantorm o transnational symbolic currency. Te vectors o mercantile activity and human mobilityproduced by this system have endured in certain important respects, orming the oundation ocommunal and intellectual ties that link Muslims in South and Southeast Asia to the Middle East,as well as to each other, right up into the contemporary period.

Transnationalism and the History of Islam in South AsiaSind and the northwestern coast o India ell to Arab Muslims during the Umayyad Empire

early in the eighth century, but Islams presence in the subcontinent is really only consolidated twocenturies later with the rise o the Ghaznavidsan Iranian-A ghan dynasty that paid nominal lipservice to the authority o the Abbasids in Baghdad, but which ruled, or all intents and purposes,as a regional sovereign. Penetrating into northern India afer capturing Lahore in the rst halo the eleventh century, the Ghaznavids placed particular emphasis on capturing the Ismaili(that is, Shii) coastal towns that had been established by the Fatimids in Cairo and which stillmaintained protable trade with North A rica. 2 In the wake o these Fatimid ootholds, relativelylarge numbers o Ismailis migrated to India rom Yemen in the thirteenth centuries. When theGhaznavids turned to urkic mamluks (slave-soldiers) in avor o local elites to serve as theirproxies in the late twelfh centuries, a relationship with the Abbasid Caliph helped to buttress theirreligio-political legitimacy.

Over the next our hundred years, the systematic Muslim conquest o South Asia wouldproceed at the hands o various dynasties, several o them dominated by mamluks. Under theGhurids, Khalijis, and ughluqs, Muslim rule extended to Gujarat, Rajasthan, the Deccanregion, and much o southern India. urkic orces continued to be imported rom central Asiato rival the inuence o local notables, and there was ongoing recognition o the Abbasid caliphin Caironow also under mamluk rule, but with the Caliph by this time acting as little more

than a symbolic gurehead.Te central Middle East was not, however, the only external re erence point or South Asias

Muslim rulers, with Iranian conceptions o political authority also having some importantinuenceespecially through the literary orm o the kinship manual, modeled afer the Seljuqadvisor Nizam al-Mulks celebrated eleventh century work the Siyasatnama (Book o Government).Literary work also served as an important inter-regional conduit in Bengal, with local notables

2 Patricia Risso, Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian Ocean (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).



and mystics establishing literary Bengali via the translation o Arabic and Persian works. And,while the feenth and early sixteenth centuries saw political authorities such as the Sultanate oGujarat patronizing local languages and generating a distinctly Indian idiom o Islam (througharchitectural orms, storytelling, local saintly gures, etc.), notables, soldiers and religious scholarsrom Central Asia and A ghanistan continued to rule Muslim India.

Te persistence o many elements o local Hindu culture is an important element in the growth

and phenomenal spread o Su (popular mystical) Islam in India.3

In addition to translating textsrom other key Muslim languages, Su saintswhose social unction readily mapped onto pre-existing Hindu categoriesadopted local languages and permitted the continued practice oHindu rituals rather than imposing a dogmatic Islamic orthodoxy. Tis cross- ertilization workedboth ways, with Hindus, or example, even participating in the Shii commemoration o Ashura,along with other estivals associated with popular Su saints. 4 While Sus played a prominentrole in bringing strong numbers o Indians to Islam, the enduring presence o Hindu culture andits concomitant social structures (e.g. the caste system) proved, however, to be something o ahindrance to mass conversion. Te subcontinents urkic rulers also had not sought to recongurethe demographics o the region through the wholesale import o large numbers o Muslims.

As we enter the modern period, our ocus in South Asia shifs to the Moghul Empire (1526-1858),which brought much o present day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and A ghanistan under a centralizedMuslim authority. urkic, A ghan, and Iranian inuences continued to have a strong role, withPersian serving as the language o court and re erence point in terms o art and literature. Tis

regional cosmopolitanism came to dene Mughal Islam and to distinguish it rom the narrowerconcerns o jurisprudential high orthodoxy. In the second hal o the Mughal period, however,increased contact with the Middle East by modernist re ormers and activists challenged the legacyo religious syncretism in the subcontinent.

Figures such as Shah Walliallah (1702-1763), Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1786-1831), and HajjiShariatallah (1781-1840)all o whom either studied in or were heavily inuenced by revivalisttrends emanating rom the Middle East (such as the ideas o Arabian puritanist Muhammadibn Abdul Wahhab)argued or the expunging rom Indian Islam o Hindu-inuenced rituals,tolerance o Shiism, and various practices relating to the veneration o Su saints, which theyregarded as idolatry. Tis was replaced by an emphasis on basic tenants o aith and a relianceon the core scriptural sources o the Quran and Prophetic tradition (Sunna), a developmentwhich ormed the basis o what eventually developed into a South Asian variant o puritanicalmodernism in the Ahl-e-Hadith movement.

But Susm continued to play an important role, as expressed in the Barelwi movement, with theQadiriyya and Chistiyya orders being particularly prominent. One o the most seminal events inmodern South Asian Islam occurred with the ounding o the Dar ul-Ulum seminary at Deobandin 1867. Tis current, which merged the principles o Islamic revivalism and neo-orthodoxy withelements o Susm, soon consolidated itsel as the leading center o Islamic scholarly productionin South Asia, attracting students not only rom all over the region but also rom the Arab world.

While the Pan-Islam ideology o Jamal al-Din al-A ghani (1838-1897) never had much purchaseas an anti-colonial movement in South Asia, Ottoman solidarity and support or the Caliph inIstanbul did enter the political ormulations o the subcontinents Muslims through the All-India

3 Richard M. Eaton (ed.), Indias Islamic raditions, 711-1750 (New York: Ox ord University Press, 2006). 4 Syed Akbar Hyder, Reviving Karbala: Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (New York: Ox ord University Press, 2006).



Muslim League ounded in 1906. Certain Deobandi leaders, such as Mahmoud al-Hasan, were alsoactive in the anti-British movement, seeking to make common cause with the Qajars in Iran, theOttomans, and A ghanistan, and traveling as ar as Mecca to drum up support or an expandedCaliphate that would reach beyond the boundaries o the Ottoman Empire to encompass Southand Southeast Asia.

It was, however, in opposition to the secular-nationalist ormulations o the All-India Muslim

League (which came to avor the establishment o an independent homeland or the Muslimso India) that the most prominent o South Asias Islamist movements was born. Syed Abul AlaMaududi (1903-1979) ounded the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in 1941. Maududi was strongly inuencedby the ideas o Hassan al-Banna, the ounder in 1928 o the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movementin Egypt. Indeed, the ideological affinities between the MB and JI allowed or considerablecollaboration between activists and intellectuals in the two movements throughout much o thetwentieth century. Although the movement split into two branches with the partition o India andestablishment o Pakistan in 1947the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind(JIH) in Indiaeach developed its own tendrils o outreach to the Middle East over the years. WithIndian Muslims in the minority and Islamist mobilization to establish a sharia-based state off thetable, JIH turned to the Middle East primarily or intellectual and nancial support. Troughincreased labor migration by Indian Muslims to Arab Gul countries such as Saudi Arabia, and

via the efforts o JIH-affiliated scholars such as Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi who enjoyed strong ties toleading Islamic universities and also to the Kingdoms religious establishment, the Indian groupsuccess ully courted Saudi largesse. 5

For its own part, the Pakistani JIwhose only meaning ul taste o political success came underthe tenure o Zia ul-Haqs Islamization program in the late 1970s and early 1980s (and even thenwith only limited impact)actively cultivated ties to Islamist groups in the Arab world and soughtto build a strong base o support within organizations with strong ties to Saudi Arabia, such as theMuslim World League and the World Assembly o Muslim Youth. Both groups drew inspirationrom external political events in the Muslim world, such as Mujahideen resistance to the Sovietoccupation o A ghanistan and Irans Islamic Revolutionwith the latter also serving to mobilizethe Shia o Pakistan.6 Te growth o a signicant community o South Asian immigrants in theUnited Kingdom rom the 1960s was also signicant, with the ecology o South Asian Islamismreplicating itsel to some extent in the United Kingdom via organizations such as the UK IslamicMission, the Islamic Foundation, and the Islamic Forum Europe. A branch o the Jamaat alsoexists in Bangladesh and its leaders have also similarly cultivated ties to the Middle East and theUnited Kingdom.

While Deoband is best thought o as a scholarly and theological current, it does also providethe basis or one o the largest transnational Muslim movements to be established in the lastcentury, the ablighi Jamaat ( J), rst established in India in 1927. 7 Generally regarded asconservative traditionalists, ablighis take it as their mission to encourage Muslims across theumma s many sub-communities to observe the tenets o aith and practice appropriate orms o

5 Ir an Ahmad, Between Moderation and Radicalization: ransnational Interactions o Jamaat-e-Islami o India, Global Networks: A Journalo ransnational Affairs 5, no. 3 ( July 2005): 279-299.

6 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: Te Radicalization o Shia and Sunni Identities, Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3(1998): 687-716.

7 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ravellers in Faith: Studies o the ablighi Jamaat as a ransnational Islamic Movement or Faith Renewal(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000).



worship. Wandering bands o J ollowers are ofen dispatched on dawa missions by regionaloffices throughout the worldnot seeking primarily to make conversions to Islam, but rather torenew the piety and assure the correct devotional practice o existing Muslims. While the socialsignicance o both pietistic groups and transnational Su networkswhich also continue to beimmensely important in contemporary South Asiais clear in terms o their breadth, global reachand popularity, scholars differ as to the political signicance o such movements.

While the inuence o Susm as a socio-religious orce has certainly been integrated into theabric o South Asian Muslim societies (as alluded to above) the brotherhoods ( tariqat ) rarelytake overtly political stances. Rather, they would be more likely to seek to widen their inuenceby gaining the interest and eventual membership o local leaders and opinion-makers. Te J,likewise, describes itsel as an apolitical organization whose orientation eschews the machinationso power and wealth. Te vast majorityo its ollowers hold to this ethos. Terehave nonetheless been instances inwhich ollowers on the margins o Jhave become involved with politicalactivists organized through the religiousseminaries (mainly in South Asia) inwhich Js religious conservatism wasinitially articulated. Others have arguedthat while most ablighi ollowers maynot themselves become involved inpolitics, the work they per orm in termso heightening religious consciousness can ofen serve to prime the way or Islamists to emerge. 8 Te ounder o J, Muhammad Ilyas, was himsel a great admirer o Abul-Ala Mawdudi andunderstood his ablighi work to complement that o the Islamists.

Te inux into South Asia o more overtly militarized Islamist currents rom the Middle Eastcan be traced to the war in A ghanistan (1980-88). During this period, tens o thousands o ghtersrom the Middle Eastofen re erred to as the Arab A ghansjourneyed to the region to wage

war against the Soviets. With the complicity and eventually the active support o the Pakistanisecurity services (not to mention Saudi Arabia and the United States), these groups came toconstitute a major presence in the northern tribal areas o Pakistan, particularly around citiessuch as the jihad boom town o Peshawar and its cognate in the Kashmiri capital, Muza arabad.Afer the Soviet withdrawal, the remnants o this orce went in search o other causes, sometimesnding them relatively close by, such as in the case o the Kashmir conict, or, as with UsamaBin Ladens Al-Qaida, developing visions o a wider global war against Muslim oppression. TeMiddle East, particularly Yemen, Sudan, and the UAE, served as an important resource base orAl-Qaida, with Bin Laden joining orces with the alibana post- mujahideen militant movementin A ghanistanin the late 1990s.

The History of Transnational Islam in Southeast AsiaWhile there was likely some contact with Southeast Asia on the part o Arab traders in the very

early years o Islam, the origins o the religion in this region trace back to the time o the oceanic

8 Yoginder Sikand, Te ablighi Jamaat and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal, Te Muslim World 96 , no. 1 (January 2006): 175-195.

The inux into South Asiaof more overtly militarizedIslamist currents from theMiddle East can be tracedto the war in Afghanistan(1980-88).



trading system described above. Although details are scarce, it appears that rom the thirteenthcentury, Muslim merchants rom various parts o South Asia and the Middle Eastwith Gujaratand Yemen being particularly importantbegan to travel and trade regularly in the Malayarchipelagos. China was another important source, with at least one o the nine amous Walis whobrought Islam to Java hailing rom China. While some explorers reported the presence o Muslimcommunities in areas such as Sumatra (more specically Samudra-Pasai and Aceh) as early as the

late thirteenth-century, the rst Muslim polity was established in the region at Malacca in about1400 when Iskandar Shah embraced Islam. Several other Muslim kingdoms arose in the area inrelatively quick succession, bringing Islam to Java, Madura, Surabaya, Pattani (southern Tailand)and eventually to the Moluccas, Borneo and the Philippines. With Portugal taking control oMalacca in the early sixteenth century, many Muslim notables relocated to Sumatra, particularlythe northern province o Aceh.

However, it was the island o Java that soon emerged as the cultural heartland o SoutheastAsian Islam. Here we saw a process o religious syncretism that intermingled Islam with elementso Hinduism, Buddhism, and local olk talesmuch like the South Asian experience describedabove. Indeed, it is possible to see in the Islamization o Southeast Asia (both historically and inthe contemporary era) many o the same patterns that dened vectors o Hinduization and thetransmission o Buddhism rom India across much o Asia. In this regard, the spread o Islamrom the subcontinent is neither new nor unique.

ies with the Middle East during this period were mainly through two sources, scholarlytravel and Su networks. Aceh, in particular, maintained relations with both the Ottomans andMughals, a connection that mostly entailed the provision o religious scholars and some modicumo military assistance in Acehs struggle against the Portuguese and the Dutch. With regards toSusm, the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, and Shattariyya orders became strongly entrenched inMalay Muslim society by the seventeenth century. Te development o scholarly ties with theMiddle East by the early nineteenth century, however, ensured that the revivalist backlash againstSusm did not take long to rear its head in Southeast Asia. 9 Tis contact with the wider Muslimworld also instilled a sense o anti-colonialism as a distinctly Muslim cause in the minds o someMalay Indonesians. Singapore emerged in the nineteenth century as a hub or Islamic modernistsand re ormers, playing host to a number o inuential Muslim periodicals.

Tis cleavage was to solidi y by the later nineteenth and early twentieth century in the ormation otwo distinct currents in Malay Islam. Te Kaum ua (Older Generation) represented the traditiono religious syncretism and courtly Islam, strongly inuenced by Susm, whereas the Kaum Muda (Younger Generation) were inspired by the revivalist trends coming out o Arabia and India (seeabove), with young religious scholars who had studied in the Middle East returning to Indonesiaand pursuing a project to puri y local Islam o all pre-Islamic inuences. o some extent these samecategories were implicated in the oundation o the two main mass religious movements in Indonesia,the rural-based and traditionalist (e.g. Su-oriented) Nahdatul Ulama (est. 1926) and the modernist(e.g. orthodox revivalist) and more urban Muhammadiyah (est. 1912). Tese two movements todayboast a combined membership o some 60 million Indonesian Muslims. 10

9 Azyumardi Azra, Te Origins o Islamic Re ormism in Southeast Asia: Networks o Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in theSeventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: University o Hawaii Press, 2004).

10 Barry Desker, Islam and Society in South-East Asia afer 11 September, Australian Journal o International Affairs 56, no. 3 (November2002): 383-394.



Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami style Islamism rst appeared in Southeast Asia with theounding in 1951 o the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). While religious scholars ( ulama) have a moreprominent role in PAS than in modern Islamist movements elsewhere, the modern pro essionalswho constitute the core o the partys leadership draw strongly on the MB and JI traditions and arewell-connected with ellow Islamists in the Arab world, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

While Islamic parties have been part o the Indonesian political landscape since the 1950s, these

have not generally been Islam ist parties in the sense o advocating religious law, or sharia. Withthe ounding o the Parti Keadilan (now the Parti Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice & Prosperity Party,PKS) in 1998, a ranchise o the Muslim Brotherhood ideology entered Indonesian politics. 11 Whilemany PKS leaders, such as HidayatNurwahid, have spent considerabletime in the Arab world, it would not beaccurate to regard PKS as representingthe wholesale transplantation o theMB model into Indonesia. Te partysagenda, or the most part, reects localconcerns and demonstrates the samesense o pragmatism that has led to thephenomenal political success o theirurkish namesake, the AKP (Justiceand Development Party). Indeed,PKS leaders are quite open about theirdesire to emulate the AKP and havesent party workers on study toursto urkey to learn rom the latter. PKS and PAS have both also been active within the recentlyestablished International Forum o Islamist Parliamentarians, a transnational orum that gatherstogether elected members o national legislative bodies representing Islamist parties rom all majorregions o the Muslim world.

Te political struggles o Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippinesand Tailand, have also eatured some measure o transnational linkage to the Middle East andSouth Asia. In the case o Tailand, or example, young Pattani returning rom study in Pakistan,India and Egypt in the 1960s played a leading role in the establishment o both the Islamist-leaning Barisan Revolusi Nasional and the more secular Patani United Liberation Organization. 12 In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has actively courted support inthe wider Muslim world or the autonomy o the Muslim community o Mindanao. In additionto taking its case be ore the Organization o the Islamic Con erence, the MNLF in the mid-1970smobilized government officials rom Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya andSenegal to intervene on its behal with then president Ferdinand Marcos. MNLF leaders have alsotaken sanctuary in the Middle East. 13

11 Te Ikhwan current o thought had, however, been present since at least the 1970s on Indonesian university campuses. Te Salman Mosqueat Bandung Institute o echnology, or example, was an important site or student Islamist agitation in this period. Te Dural Islammovement also represented a source o pro- sharia political struggle in Indonesia rom the 1940s to 1960s.

12 Syed Serajul Islam, Te Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o Tailand and Mindanao o the Philippines, Asian Survey 38, no. 5(May 1998): 441-456.

13 Ibid.

The political strugglesof Muslim minorities inSoutheast Asia, mostnotably in the Philippines

and Thailand, have alsofeatured some measure oftransnational linkage to theMiddle East and South Asia.



Recent years have seen increased interest in the ties between Islamic militants in Southeast Asianand oreign groups such as al-Qaida. Some o these relationships go back to the war in A ghanistanin the 1980s when, or example, Philippine jihadists ought alongside the Arab-A ghans. From theearly 1990s, Al-Qaida appears to have built o linkages with regional affiliates in Southeast Asia,including groups such as the Abu Sayya group (Philippines) and Jemaah Islamiyya (JI). Te latteris most strongly associated with Indonesia and its alleged leader Abu Bakr Basyir, the head o

an Islamic school in central Java. JI, which carried out the Bali bombings o 2002, is said to alsooperate cells in other regional settings such as Malaysia and Singapore. 14 Indonesia has also seena recent increase in support or another radical Islamist group, Hizb ut- ahrir (H ), a movementthat originated in the Middle East in the early 1950s. While it publicly eschews the use o violencein avor o political methods, H s core goal involves the re-establishment o centralized Muslimpolitical authority in the orm o a renewed caliphate. 15

Cross-regional Vectors of Transnational IslamizationLooking back over and trying to distill some analytical categories rom the historical account

provided above, it would appear that we can identi y three or perhaps our major conduits otransnational Muslim connectivity between South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, aswell as several other signicant issues that merit keeping in mindsuch as the consistent presenceand deep social roots o Su brotherhoods ( tariqat ) and, more recently, largely apolitical pietisticmovements such as the ablighi Jamaat. Tese are particularly important groups to considerinso ar as they help us to understand some o the ways in which transnational Islam is embedded ineveryday li e; the signicance o scholarly exchange between South/Southeast Asia and the MiddleEast as a vehicle or the transplantation to Asian contexts o theological currents emanating outo the Arab world (e.g. sala revivalism); in the twentieth century, the establishment in South/Southeast Asia o a number o modern Islamist movements modeled on the ideology o the MuslimBrotherhood (e.g. Jamaat-e-Islami, PAS, PKS); more recently, the appearance o militant Islamistgroups with transnational organizational and ideological affinities with Al-Qaida.

In addition, we should also consider here the role o new media such as the Internet andsatellite television in ostering a greater sense o awareness on the part o South/Southeast AsianMuslims o the issues and challenges that ace their co-religionists in other global settings and thepotential capacity o the same to generate a renewed sense o umma consciousness.16 Sectariandivisions within Islam are obviously also relevant here, with the regions Shii minority osteringtransnational ties over centuries. It is worth noting that Husayn Bashir al-Naja, one o the ourGrand Ayatullahs in Naja (currently the leading world center o Shii scholarship), is rom theIndian subcontinent. Finally, in addition to the more organized movements and parties mentionedabove, we should also consider how some o the more everyday and ritualistic dimensions o Islammay also constitute sites o transnational engagement and inuence. One thinks here, or example,

o the role o pilgrimage networks and the Hajj in ostering contact and exchange between Muslimsrom disparate corners o the umma .

14 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible o error (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).15 Greg Fealy, Hizb ut- ahrir in Indonesia in Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West , Shahram Akbarzadeh

and Fethi Mansouri (eds.) (London: I.B. auris, 2007).16 Peter G. Mandaville, ransnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London: Routledge, 2001).



Typologies of Muslim Transnationalism in Asia: Movements and DriversHaving surveyed the broad historical contours o transnational Islam in Asia, we can now go

on to take stock o the various orms it assumes in the contemporary region. We conceptualizetransnationalism here in two ways: rst, by looking at those groups and movements or whommovement and mobilization across nation-state borders is intrinsic to their nature, and secondby looking at other orces that enable the transnationalization o Muslims and Islam (e.g. labormigration, global media). Tis section will hence outline both a broad typology o movementsand also identi y some o the major driving orces o Muslim transnationalism in Asia. As withall typologies, the categories represented below should be viewed as ideal types rather than asprecise descriptions o social reality. Indeed, as the various country case studies that comprise thebulk o this study make abundantly clear, it would be analytically dangerous to assume any sorto hermetic seal between the different types o groups. Rather, we ofen see considerable overlapand cross- ertilization between them, and in some cases individuals will move between differentgroups, or even participate in several simultaneously.

Groups and MovementsIn terms o groups and movements demonstrating a relatively high degree o ormal

organization, the most important actors within contemporary Muslim transnationalism in Asiaall into the ollowing categories:

Su Brotherhoods (tariqat) . Islams mystical orders have operated transnationally or manycenturies. While less directly involved in conict and politics than other movements, Susm hashad an important impact on the general character o Islam and on everyday religious sensibilitiesacross the region. One o the two mass Islamic movements in Indonesia, Nahdatul Ulama (withsome 30 million members) is largely Su-based. 17 Some authors have also argued that Su socialstructures have played an important role in mediating popular perceptions o the nation-stateand its legitimacy in countries such as Pakistan. 18 In South and Southeast Asia some o the more

important Su orders include the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, Chistiyya (almost exclusively inIndia), and the Shattariyyamost o which also have a presence in other world regions. Te grandshaykh o the Naqshbandiyya, or example, is based in northern Cyprus, but has traveled to Asiato visit ollowers in the region (many o whom are ound in amilies o the political elite) on severaloccasions.

Renewalist/pietistic movements.19 Tis trend is most clearly represented by the ablighi Jamaat,a grassroots pietistic social movement derived rom the Deoband School o renewalist thought(est. 1867 in India). Te Deobandi School is largely conned to South Asia and those areas othe world with large South Asian diasporas (e.g. United Kingdom, South and East A rica). Teablighi movement, while ounded in South Asia, is today ound almost everywhere in the world

where Muslims are to be ound. Primarily concerned with matters o proper religious observance,sel -improvement, and the Islamization o society through an emphasis on personal piety, some

17 Martin van Bruinessen, Najmuddin al-Kubra, Jumadil Kubra and Jamaluddin al-Akbar: races o Kubrawiyya Inuence in EarlyIndonesian Islam, Bijdragen tot de aal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 150 (1994): 305-329.

18 Robert Rozehnal, Origins and Development o the Su orders (tarekat) in Southeast Asia, Studia Islamika 1, no. 1(1994):1-23.19 Te term renewalist here re ers to those movements whose intellectual and ideological heritage traces back to late eighteenth century

gures such as Shah Wali Ullah (India) and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (Arabia). Tey sought to reinvigorate Islam through anemphasis on personal piety, purity, and correct adherence to ritual obligation.



dimensions o ablighi activity overlap with politics. 20 As the subsequent case studies will show,the ablighi Jamaat is an important actor in nearly every country within the scope o this study.

Islamist parties/groups. Tis broad category re ers to a wide selection o movements who varyconsiderably in terms o their political goals and methods. What they share in common is aocus on political change and, more specically, the establishment o some orm o shariah -basedpolity. We can identi y three major subgroups here: 1) those groups, such as the Jamaati Islami

in Pakistan or PAS in Malaysia, which accept the ramework o the nation-state and pursue theiragenda via participation in the political system; 2) groups such as Hizb ut- ahrir which reject thelegitimacy o the nation-state system and democracy in avor o a global Islamic polity in the ormo a renewed caliphate, but who nonetheless reject the use o violence towards this end; and nally3) militant radical groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya that both reject the politicalstatus quo and are prepared to use violence to establish a global shariah state.

While the latter two are transnational in terms o their political vision and organization, groupsin the rst category tend to operate within the connes o a single-nation state. Teir transnationaldimensions are to be ound in the act that almost all political parties o this sort were ounded inthe ideological current o Hassan al-Bannas Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) or Abul Ala MawdudisJamaati Islami (Pakistan). Te party leaderships are generally well-networked transnationally andwhile it would be a stretch to claim operational coordination, rom e.g. Cairo to Lahore to Jakarta,these mostly nationally-based parties nevertheless share a common worldview with cognate groupsin other countries and regions. Under the auspices o the recently-established International Forumo Islamic Parliamentarians, or example, sitting legislators rom several o the new generationIslamist parties across several world regions meet regularly to share their experiences.

Charity organizations and modernist dawa groups. 21 Tis category again covers the activityo a diverse range o groups, ranging rom the Saudi-sponsored propagation work o theMuslim World League 22 to the humanitarian-oriented efforts o organizations such as IslamicRelie , Muslim Aid, and the International Islamic Council or Dawah and Relie . 23 Te latterorganizationssome o which are based in Europe, others in the Middle Easthave playedimportant roles in the afermath o disasters such as the Indonesian sunami and earthquakesin Pakistan. Some have accused the Saudi- unded charities o engaging in proselytizationalongside their humanitarian work.

Forces and DriversIn addition to inventorying the various groups and movements that embody Muslim

transnationalism, it is also use ul to think about other social and structural orces that provideconduits or Islam and Muslims to cross borders. While some o these drivers o transnationalIslam are directly implicated in the activities o the groups outlined above, they also remind usthat Muslim transnationalism is not always about groups and movements but rather part and

parcel o more mundane and ofen highly personalized trajectories o education, employment, andritual observance. Some o the most important o these are:

20 Sikand, Te ablighi Jamaat and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal. 21 Te term dawawhich occurs in some analyses in conjunction with pietistic renewalist movements such as the ablighi Jamaathere

re ers to a wide range o modernist, bureaucratic organizations that ofen serve as proxies or state-led Islamization agendas.22 Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der islamischen Weltliga (Leiden: Brill,

1990). 23 Jonathon Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, Te Charitable Crescent: Politics o Aid in the Muslim World (London: I.B. auris, 2003).


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Key Empirical and Conceptual ThemesHaving outlined a rough typology and movements and drivers, we move on now to identi y

the key empirical and conceptual points that dene the scope o our analysis. While the thematicand country case studies that comprise the present study vary in terms o their areas o emphasisand overall analytical import, there are a number o common baseline empirical questions thatall chapters will address. A number o important cross cutting conceptual themes also presentthemselves albeit with varying levels o direct relevance to each o the cases ound in the ull study.We will provide an overview and brie discussion o each o these, pointing to the cases where theyhold the greatest salience.

Given the diverse range o meanings and signicance that can be attached to the concepto transnational Islam, there is rst some denitional work to be done in each o our variousgeographic and thematic settings. We need to be cautious about how we posit transnational Islamas an object o study. Tere is considerable danger o reication i we simply appear to take or

granted the existence o somethingcalled transnational Islam separaterom the social relations that dene it.

Tis would run the risk o grantingundue weight and explanatorypower to a social orce that cannotbe properly understood outsidean analysis o the circumstancesthat give rise to it in the rst place.Such an approach would there oreresist any line o analysis thatdeclares transnational Islam to be adiscrete social agent unto itsel . We

begin, there ore, in each case withan effort to contextualize Muslim

transnationalism and to outline the nature and diversity o the phenomenon in each setting.Tis will also entail identi ying the key actors (groups/movements/individuals) and drivers otransnational Islam rom amongbut by no means conned tothe typologies outlined aboveand to explain the division o labor in terms o social unction between them. Te question o theextent to which various orms o Muslim transnationalism overlap, interact, or exist in dialecticalrelation to each other also needs some attention.

Tis point about identi ying and dening the meaning o transnational Islam in particularcontexts also involves challenging the assumption that the arrival or entry into a particular

locality o what we are calling Muslim transnationalism necessarily involves the eradicationo local Islam and its wholesale replacement by something external. As we have seen rom thehistorical discussion above, the arrival o Islam in, or example, Southeast Asia set in motioncomplex processes o adaptation and metamorphosis. ransnational Islam is inevitably alteredthrough its encounter with local cultural sensibilities and pre-existing conceptions and practiceso religiosity, whether the society in question is Muslim or non-Muslim. What we see there ore is

Transnational Islam is

inevitably altered through itsencounter with local culturalsensibilities and pre-existingconceptions and practicesof religiosity, whether thesociety in question is Muslim

or non-Muslim.



something much more akin to the glocalization 29 o Islam, implying complex interplay betweentransnational inuences and the society and settings into which they enter. Tis is an importantpoint to bear in mind when we consider, or example, the role o religious trends emanating romthe Arab world in the Asian region. Mosque-building efforts sponsored by Saudi dawa or charityorganizations do not automatically turn into channels or the unexamined import o strict andpuritanical Wahhabi sensibilities. Rather, such external inuences inevitably engage and negotiate

withand are in turn to some extent reshaped bythe social and religious environment intowhich they enter.Te temporality o transnational Islam is important to consider when trying to make some

assessment as to whether we are dealing with a wholly new phenomenon, or whether contemporaryMuslim transnationalism can be said to relate to pre-existing orms o the sameor to historicalorms o social relations that predate the ormation o distinct groups and movements. Te twomass Muslim movements in Indonesia, or example, Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah,do not themselves engage in signicant transnational activity but their ormation can to someextent be seen in terms o varying orientations towards re ormist and revivalist trends emanatingrom the Middle East rom the late nineteenth century. Similarly, even where contemporary tiesbetween subregions o South Asia and Malaysia occur under the auspices o particular groupsor ideological trends, they can also be seen as the continuation o commercial ties that date backmany centuries ( see above). Further, in addition to considering lines o temporal continuity intransnational Islam, what about instances o rupture? Can we identi y instances where a particulartrend or group whose activity was previously contained exclusively within national borders shifedto a transnational orientation? Or, conversely, examples o transnational movements that at somepoints ceased to operate across borders?

Te spatiality o transnational Islam in particular settings also merits our attention. In each case,there ore, we will need to elaborate the relevant geography o Muslim transnationalism. Looking atthis issue with greater resolution and granularity, it quickly becomes clear that in some cases whatwe are terming transnationalism is actually something ar more precise involving ties (o commerce,devotional activity, labor migration, etc.) between, and ofen limited to, very specic points intwo or more countriesa phenomenon perhaps better captured under the rubric o translocality .30 Elsewhere, the phenomena o migration and diaspora mean that the geographies o social, political,and religious inuence around a particular country can entail the involvement o unexpected andcounterintuitive locales. Te dynamics around the 1988-89 Satanic Verses affair and the more recentDanish Cartoon crisis, or example, illustrate the importance o transnational religious ties betweenPakistan, Bangladesh and South Asian populations living in the United Kingdom.

Indeed, while the geographic scope o the present study is dened in terms o transnationalIslam in South and Southeast Asia, a ull understanding o the extent and signicance o theselinkages can only be achieved by looking at vectors o connectivity that extend well beyond thoseimmediate regions. Asian diasporas in the West and the Middle East are o vital importance, asare political movements and theological trends emanating rom the latter. When thinking aboutthe practical implications o dealing withand, looking ahead to our nal section, making policyina world o such interdependent geographies, one might think in terms o global acupuncture.

29 Roland Robertson, Glocalization: ime-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, in Global Modernities, Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, andRoland Robertson (eds.) (London: Sage, 1995).

30 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions o Globalization (Minneapolis: University o Minnesota Press, 1996).



With this image we seek to capture the idea that having an impact on certain Islamist dynamicsin Pakistan may well involve interventions with Jamaat-i Islami legacy groups in London andLeicester in the United Kingdom.

Beyond these core empirical touchpoints relating toin shortthe who, what, where, how,and why o transnational Islam, there are a number o important conceptual issues entailed inthe analysis o Muslim transnationalism. While they do not all have equal bearing in each o the

country cases and thematic spaces visited by the study, it would be worthwhile or us to brieymap these out by way o orienting the reader to the ull range o conceptual issues and challengesposed by the study o transnational Islam.

Non-religious Dimensions of Transnational IslamFirst o all, we need to appreciate the act that transnational Islam is not always about religion.

Sometimes we are dealing with situations in which religious vocabularies and modes o expressionoverlap with and articulate phenomena that are actually better understood through the studyo culture, social structures, and political economy. For example, when and to what extent canwe understand an individuals pre erence or participation in a transnational Muslim movementas indicator o the weakness or incompleteness o nation-state projects? Likewise, the pursuit osocial justice ramed in Islamic terms can sometimes be understood as a response to prevailingsocioeconomic conditions and the effects o globalization. Islamist groups in Pakistan, Malaysia,and Indonesia, or example, have ofen been most success ul at the ballot box when they associatethemselves with efforts to undermine corruption and improve the delivery o basic social services.o better understand these phenomena we would want to ask why and under what circumstancesIslam comes to constitute the relevant lexicon o affiliation, aspiration, or resistance.

A related point, and one that has already been touched on above, pertains to the need todistinguish between transnational Islam that takes the orm o movements and groups thatare inherently transnational in terms o their modes o organization or normative vision(e.g. the ablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut- ahrir), and transnational Islam represented by thetransnationalization o Muslims and Muslim ideas through e.g. labor migration and the circulationo particular texts or aspirational discourses (the umma ).

Likewise, we would also want to consider to what extent transnational Muslim circuits aresometimes used by actors and agendas whose primary motives lie outside the realm o religion.For example, inso ar as the ablighi Jamaat operates an alternative in rastructure or travel andtransportation in some o the countries in which it operates, and given that barriers to temporaryparticipation in the movement are relatively low, the Jamaat potentially becomes a vehicle thatmight be appropriated by a diverse range o social and political actors. Te practical implicationso this possibility are also ound in the realm o policy analysis inso ar as it requires that we re rainrom drawing a direct equivalence between the political agendas and behaviors associated with the

in ormal in rastructures and organizational tendrils o certain kinds o groups with the ideologicalorientation o the group as a whole. Rather, certain kinds o movements need to be seen as justthat: groups whose resources and network ormations are eminently subject to appropriation bydiverse agendas whose root source lies elsewhere.

While this study is ramed in terms o transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia, wewould do well to note that it could equally have ocused on transnational Christianity in the sameregion. In other words, we have to be care ul not to assume that Islam is uniquely transnational in



the realm o religion. Other aith traditions in the regionsuch as Christianity 31 and Hinduism 32are today exhibiting similar transnational characteristics. Indeed, their activity has an importantimpact on the dynamics o Muslim transnationalism. Te activities o Laskar Jihad in Indonesia,or example, cannot be ully understood without considering the role o the Christian militiaLaskar Christus. Tis point also speaks to the act that the transnational dimensions o Islam inany given country are inevitably part o a wider religious eld. Bearing in mind the point raised

above about the glocalization o Islam, we would want to ask whether Muslim transnationalismcan be said to play any particular unctional or symbolic roles within this wider religious eld.Another set o conceptual concerns can be related to the typology o movement and groups types

outlined above and the question we have already raised about the extent to which it correspondsto social reality. o what extent and under what conditions do we see overlap, cross- ertilization,and movement between these movement/group types, and when does transnational Islam resistsuch typologization altogether? Also, while some groups and movements correspond more orless consistently to a particular theological space or political agenda, we requently see groupsand individuals that move back and orth between disparate methods and orms o activismorwhich pursue their agendas via multiple means simultaneously. Under what conditions does thisoccur and how can we account or this variation?

Te answer lies in part in the analysis o the ambient social and political environment inhabitedby such actors, and issues (some o which we explore below) such as the various state responsesto Islamic movements and their transnational relationships. Te Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,or example, can be described accurately as a religious group, a militant ormation, a politicalparty, and a charitable organization, but no single one o these labels captures the entirety o themovement (likewise the problem with describing HAMAS or Hizbullah exclusively in terms oterrorism, a tactic). Ratherand this point undoubtedly becomes relevant when analyzing some othe groups in South and Southeast Asia that inhabit the ringes o jihadist activitiesit is possibleto identi y certain pivotal moments (changing political opportunity structures, leadership changes,periods o state repression) that widen the repertoire o potential pathways and modes o activism.Such moments are almost always, as in the case o the various neo-jihadist ormations in Indonesiain the early 2000s, accompanied by internal deliberation, contestation, and dissentensuring thatat the very moment a particular course o action is decided upon, the seeds o alternatives havealready been sown.

It is also common in such analytical typologies to map groups and movements onto particularqualitative categories (e.g. modernist vs. traditionalist or quietist vs. activist). Again, when welook at reality on the ground, these easy distinctions break down quite quickly as we inevitableidenti y elements o the modern within the traditional, and vice versa. Finally, we need toconsider correlations between membership in particular groups and wider social structures. Canwe see, or example, any correspondence between social class and the groups and movements withwhich people associate? Likewise, within those movements that cut across (or recongure?) classboundariessuch as the ablighi Jamaathow should we think about class dynamics and socialdifferentiation within the movements themselves?

31 Philip Jenkins, Te New Faces o Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South (New York: Ox ord University Press, 2006).32 Arvind Rajagopal, ransnational Networks and Hindu Nationalism, Bulletin o Concerned Asian Scholars 29, no. 3 (1997): 45-58.



Conclusion: Policy Implications of Transnational IslamIn this nal section we will give some consideration to the practical policy implications o

transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia. Tese bear on a range o issuesincludingsecurity and conict, social cohesion, and political stability. In many cases, as we will see, thepolicy aspects ow quite directly rom the conceptual concerns rehearsed above. Specic policyconsiderations will obviously vary between country settings, but there are several cross-cuttingissues and areas o concern they all share in common, and these will orm the basis o ourdiscussion in this concluding section.

First o all, we would want to consider the impact o transnational Islam on conict andsecurity dynamics in particular countries. A number o countries in the region have seen increasedepisodes o violent conict (ofen with a sectarian or intercommunal dimension), terrorism, orongoing irredentist dispute. In a number o these cases, such as the Philippines and Indonesia,transnational Muslim movements appear to be playing a signicant role. How can we bestcharacterize the impact on conict dynamics when these groups become implicated? Are thereclear patterns relating to, or example, conict escalation or de-escalation that can be discerned?

Beyond the connes o particular countries cases, we would also want to ask what regionaland extra-regional (extending to global-systemic) effects can be attributed to transnational Islam.In the case o the Philippines, or example, the appearance on the scene o groups and conictentrepreneurs with links to Al-Qaeda have served to escalate the dispute in the southern islandsin at least two important respects: rst, by linking the cause o Muslims in the Philippines withglobal Islamic struggles, such actors unction as ideological orce multipliers that dis-embedthe conict rom its local context and make it increasingly difficult to achieve a resolution denedexclusively along the horizon o the nation; second, the network tendrils that accompany such actorscan raise the material stakes o the conict by providing a conduit to resources and material thatwould otherwise have been unavailable to irredentist orces. But the impact o such transnationallinkages is not limited only to escalation. In the case o unrest in the Federally Administered ribal

Areas (FA A) o Pakistan and along the A ghanistan border, interventions rom leading religiousscholars in the Middle Eastsuch as Sheikh Yusu al-Qaradawihave sought to exceptionalizethe circumstances under which violence in the name o Islam is permitted.

With regard to the conduct o politics more generally, there is the question o the extent towhich transnational Islam has played a role in domestic and local politics, either by emergingas a contentious issue or, more directly, as a source o resources and ideas drawn upon bylocal politicians. In some cases the impact on social cohesion more broadly will be signicant,particularly with regard to dynamics between religious minorities and the majority, or aroundsectarian cleavages. We also need to consider how the central state, regional/local governmentsand wider civil society groups (including non-Muslims) in various countries have responded to

transnational Islam and what impact these responses have had on the social and political dynamicsaround Muslim transnationalism. Has transnational Islam generally been ramed as an externalthreat or unwelcome intervention in domestic affairs? Have law en orcement and security orcestargeted transnational groups directly? Do the orces o transnational Islam directly challenge orcon ront the general policy trajectory o national development agendas o particular countries?

In other words, we want to try and get a handle on the policy implications o policy responsesto transnational Islam. For example, it is clear that in the handling o Abu Bakar Basyir in theafermath o the Bali bombings, the Indonesian government had to tread a care ul line between


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space o political participation that allows Muslims and Islamically-inclined political actors tolevel the playing eld. Te ortunes o the Muslim democracy trend will constitute an importantbellwether o the extent to which political ormations based on a new synthesis o Islam, anti-corruption/authoritarianism and socioeconomic en ranchisement can serve as effective spaces toaggregate and deploy (in a mostly democratic ashion) the discontent o Muslim communities inthe region.

Above all, what comes out o this study is a portrait o the diversity o transnational Islam. It isa phenomenon that thoroughly resists easy typication or the pronouncement o a denitive set oconclusions regarding its social, political, and security impact. Tat said, and as will become clearrom the country case studies to ollow, there are clear regional and subregional differences thatcan be identied, as well as certain patterns o similarity across disparate and ar ung nationalsettings that nevertheless share similar social and political environments.

As globalization processes progress in the coming years, and as the intensity o cross-bordersocial networking in the region increases, so will the salience o transnational Islam. As these

very same processes work to embed Muslim transnationalism within the societies o South andSoutheast Asia, however, it is also the case that, analytically speaking, it will become increasinglydifficult to identi y transnational Islam as a discrete phenomenon unto itsel , separate rom

national or local Islam.Instead, we should expect ever greater intermingling o global and local dynamics across the

domains o religion, politics, and security. In the realms o policymaking and analysis, this willnecessarily entail a reconguration o conventional assumptions about the borders and limits oparticular policy spaces (province, nation, region) and the extent to which events here can haveimportant determinative effects thereeven on a global scale. And, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, in a context in which many policy actors eel compelled to seek greater understandingo Islam and Muslims in order to comprehend worldviews and behaviors in strategically signicantcountries, there is a need to resist deploying religion as a primary (or uniquely ascriptive) categoryo analysissince Islam, requently, unctions as a political vocabulary or the expression ogrievances and aspirations whose sources are commonly ound in the mundane circumstances oeveryday li e.


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the national bureau of asia n research


Islamist Networks andMainstream Politics in Southand Southeast Asia

Dr. Farish A. Noor

FARISH A. NOOR is presently Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School o InternationalStudies, Singapore. His recent publications include Te Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and ransnational Linkages (2008), Writings on the War on error (2006),and Islam Embedded: Te Historical Development o the Pan-Malaysian Islamic PartyPAS: 1951-2003 (2004).


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27/21423ISLAMIST NETWORKS AND MAINSTREAM P OLITICS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIAu NOOR

Historical Continuities and New Modalities

T hat there exist numerous networks o religious-based political and pseudo-politicalmovements and organizations across South and Southeast Asia today should not strikeanyone by surprise. Much o the concern that has been raised o late over the appearanceo religiously-inspired politics in Asia is due to the mistaken assumption that religion

has played a largely passive or secondary role in the development o Asian society since the endo colonial rule and that much o what has guided and determined the nation-building processin South and Southeast Asia has been the prerogatives o good governance, developmentalismand nationalism.

Yet a quick historical survey o the development o South and Southeast Asia would show very clearly that the spread o religion and the development o the respective polit ical cu ltureso all these societies (which, by the 20th century adapted and developed the rameworks omodern nation-states) went hand-in-hand. Early South Asian notions and values o governancewere shaped by the dominant religious belie and value systems o the Indian people, withmuch o Indian political culture determined by religio-ethnic tenets o the Vedantic aith.Likewise the spread o Indianized culture to Southeast Asia (both mainland and maritime)brought with it not only Indian aesthetics and value-systems but also the vocabulary andideology o kingship and governance, shaping the political culture o many Southeast Asiancountries until today. 33

By the 13th century the spread o Islam across South and Southeast Asia merely added anotherlayer o religio-political semantics and semiotics on what was already a number o polities wherethe relationship between religion, politics and governance was an intimate one. By the late 19thcentury Islam was certainly a potent and visible orce in many predominantly Muslim countriesacross the Arab world and Asia. As noted by Kramer, it was Islam that served as the basis or whatlater became the nascent anti-colonial movement across the Muslim world as well as the subjector long-extended and widely-disseminated debates on modernization and re orm all over the

Muslim world. 34 Yet, the mobilization o Muslims worldwide on the basis o a global sense o Muslim

identity and shared values was neither new nor unique, or similar developments were takingplace among the Christians, Hindus and Buddhists o Asia. he work o Lubeck and Brittshas shown that religious-based mobilization was not con ined to Asia either, or similardevelopments were also taking place in other parts o the world, such as east A rica. Piousactivists shared the same political objectives: the mobilization o the masses, the gatheringo in-group members o the same aith community, the development o political movementsand the creation o a political economy o aith-based politics. hese objectives were o tencombined with transnational ambitions. 35

Understanding the development and spread o religio-political networks across South andSoutheast Asia today, there ore, has to take into consideration the long historical precedent that

33 As testied by the act that the very word or government in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Tailand is derivative o the Indian-Hindunotion o divine k ingship, kerajaan .

34 Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: Te Advent o the Muslim Congress (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1986). 35 Paul Lubeck, Islam and Urban Labour in Northern Nigeria: Te Making o a Muslim Working Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1986); and Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, Muslim Civil Society and Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifs and Socia lMovements, in Urban Studies: Contemporary and Future Perspectives, eds. J. Eade and C. Mele (London: Blackwell, 2001).



laid the ground or the ertile development o religious-based politics as we are witnessing in theregion at the present. Te rise o Christian politics in the Philippines, Hindu politics in India,Buddhist politics in Tailand and Sri Lanka, Islamism in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia andIndonesia can only be understood against such a broad historical background which paved theway or the inculcation o religious values and ideas into the socio-cultural milieu o the region,where religion has never been seen as a stranger to politics and the conduct o governance in the

public domain.36

Te rst premise that has to be set there ore is this: Tat despite the adoption o modernnotions and values associated with the modern nation-state, most postcolonial Asian states have

really been engaged in a processo grafing and bricolage wheremodern concepts and values suchas constitutionalism, the rule olaw, citizenship, etc., have merelybeen grafed upon a socio-politicalenvironment that was never secular(understood in the French meaningo the word Laicite) in the rst place.Te rise o religious politics in Asiais there ore neither an anomaly nora novel phenomenon that needsexplanation or Asians themselves.

Religious Mobilization and Networks: Return to a Pre-ModernGlobalized Space

Te history o 21st

century Asian politics demonstrates the effectiveness o religious-basedpolitical mobilization to an entire generation o Asian political actors and agents. Te history oSoutheast Asia would demonstrate that religious-based mobilization was the most effective toolor the gathering o public support and ensuring public consensus or a range o political projects,the chie o which was the mobilization o Asians against colonial rule.

36 Tere exist numerous works written by scholars who have ocused on the development o political Islam or Islamism to date. Undoubtedlythe best study o the historical development o the Jamaat-e Islami party o Pakistan (with its links and chapters to the Jamaat-e Islamio India and Bangladesh) is Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Te Vanguard o the Islamic Revolution: Te Jamaat-i Islami o Pakistan (London: I. B.auris, 1994). On the development o the aliban that began along the borders o Pakistan-A ghanistan, see Ahmad Rashid, aliban: Islam,Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. auris Publishers, 2001). On the development o the Deobandi school o thoughtin India and its development into a movement with political ambitions, see Barbara D. Metcal , Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband18601900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); and Barbara D. Metcal , raditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, ablighis andalibs , ISIM Papers IV (Leiden: International Institute or the Study o Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), 2002).For the development o the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), see Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: Te Historical Development o the Pan- Malaysian Islamic Party PAS, 1951-2003 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute (MSRI), 2004). Te best study on thedevelopment o the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM) remains the one by Muhammad Nor Monutty, Perceptions o Social Changein Contemporary Malaysia: A Critical Analysis o ABIMs Role and Impact on Muslim Youth (Ph.D. dissertation, emple University, 1988.unpublished). See also Revival o Islam in Malaysia: Te Role o ABIM (Kuala Lumpur: Angkata Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1974). Forurther studies on the development o political Islam in Malaysia during the 1970s to the 1980s, see Chandra Muzaffar Islamic Resurgence:

A Global View, in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, eds. auk Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute or Southeast AsianStudies (ISEAS), 1986); Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Press, 1987); and Judith Nagata, TeReowering o Malaysian Islam (Vancouver: University o British Columbia Press, 1984). A detailed comparison o the impact o theIranian revolution on the development o Islamist movements o Southeast Asia can be ound at: Fred R. von der Mehden, Malaysianand Indonesian Islamic Movements and the Iranian Connection in Te Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact , ed. John Esposito, (Miami:Florida International University Press, 1990).

The history of Southeast Asiawould demonstrate thatreligious-based mobilizationwas the most effective toolfor the gathering of publicsupport and ensuring publicconsensus for a range ofpolitical projects



In the cases o Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tailand and the Philippines, the emergence oearly proto-nationalist thought came hand-in-hand with the development o new religio-politicalidentities and movements. Te rise o modern Buddhist activism in Burma was one o the catalyststhat mobilized the Burmese intellectual classes against British rule since the late 19 th century; andsimilar developments are to be ound in the case o rising Malay-Muslim consciousness in BritishMalaya and the Dutch East Indies. Te act that many o the early pioneers o the anti-colonial

movement were Muslim re ormers who were captivated and inspired by the re ormist zeal oellow Muslim modernizers in India, Egypt and the Arab lands suggests that religion has indeedbeen a mobilizing actor in the development o political awareness. Tis is urther bolstered bythe act that among the rst anti-colonial movements in the region, many o them were clearlyidentied by their sectarian, Muslim membership and Islamist leanings such as the Sarekat Islamo Indonesia.

Te work o Benda is instructive in this respect. He has noted how the rise o nationalismand Islamism in Indonesia during the mid-colonial era leading to the Second World War wenthand-in-hand. Benda has also observed how the Islamists o Indonesia played a crucial role inrst mobilizing the Indonesian Muslim commercial groups on the basis o class solidarity andlater went on to create the rst anti-colonial movements on the basis o a shared ethnic-religioussolidarity. 37 From the outset these Islamist groups combined both the goals o anti-colonialismwith the broader vision o a globaland politically mobilized and activeMuslim Ummah ,prompting organizations like the Sarekat Islam to spread its wings across the South China Sea andopen up branches in neighboring states like British Malaya. 38

Developments in Southeast Asia were matched by similar developments in South Asia, withgroups like the Muslim League o India opening up chapters and branches all across the Indiansubcontinent and eliciting support rom the Indian-Muslim diaspora in other places such asPenang, Malacca and Singapore (which were then under British rule and grouped together as theBritish Straits Settlements). 39 Nasr notes that in the case o the Jamaat-e Islamiarguably themost important and well-known o the Islamist political movements o South Asiathe samehistorical trajectory can be seen: What began as a movement or Muslim solidarity later joinedorces with Indian nationalists (including the Congress Party o India and the Muslim League), tolater emerge on its own as the subcontinents rst and oremost Islamist political movement with aclearly dened Islamist agenda. 40

Even afer the partition between India and Pakistan, and the migration o many o the Jamaatsleaders to Pakistan, the Jamaat-e Islami continued in its efforts to de end and promote Muslimpolitical, economic, educational and cultural interests in both India and Pakistan, albeit accordingto the modalities that were available as dened by the very different political circumstances theyaced in the two countries. Tis continued well afer the conict between East and West Pakistanin 1971 and the creation o the state o Bangladesh, where the Jamaat still operates. Furthermore,

37 Harry J. Benda, Te Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under Japanese Occupation 19421945 (Leiden: Fouris, 1983, orig. publ.1958).

38 See: Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali, Sarekat Islam di rengganu, Malaysia in History XX, no. 11 (1972).39 Te Muslim League o India ac tually inuenced and inspired the creation o the Muslim League o Malaya, which later developed into a

political orce by the 1960s and eventually culminated in the creation o the Kesatuan India Muslim Malaysia (KIMMA, also known asKongres India Muslim Malaysia) which was ormed in 1979 in Penang.

40 Nasr, Te Vanguard o the Islamic Revolution.



as was demonstrated afer the victories o the Jamaat-e Islami at the elections in Pakistan andBangladesh in recent years, this transnational mode o cooperation persists to the present.

Te emergence and development o these religio-political movementsthat later turned anddeveloped into ully-edged social movements, nationalist organizations and political partiesserves as the starting point or any enquiry into the networks o religio-political movements inAsia today. It is imperative that some historical depth is established to provide the background or

our analysis o the global network o Islamist movements today, as well as to underscore the actthat these movements are neither new nor revolutionary.I , or instance, the Jamaat-e Islami party o Pakistan is presently well-connected to the Pan-

Malaysian Islamic party o Malaysia (PAS), this is explained by the simple act that since the mid-19th century Malay-Muslim scholars and activists had already been traveling across the IndianOcean to pursue their studies in what was then British India, and that or generations these bondso itinerant scholar-activists have been maintained on both sides o the geographical divide. Ourown research into the long-established and intimate connections between the network o itinerantmissionaries o the ablighi Jamaat, the scholars o the Deobandi school, and the movement andcirculation o Indian and Malay-Muslim diaspora communities across the Indian ocean has ledus to the conclusion that the overlap and cooperation between Islamist political parties like theJamaat-e Islami and PAS is just one acet o a myriad o networks that have been in existence atleast rom the late 19th century. 41

Tere ore, there is a need to map out the world o these itinerant religious scholar-activists and tochart out the vast assembly o competing and overlapping networks that bring together the diverseglobal worlds o groups such as the ablighi Jamaat (itinerant scholar-missionaries), Su networks,political networks as well as traders networks. Much o the research that has been done thus ar hastended to ocus on specic groups and networks (such as the abligh) or instance, while overlookingthe act that specic networks may actually overlap and interpenetrate as well, thereby creating three-dimensional network systems that need to be mapped out three-dimensionally.

It is crucial at this stage o our enquiry to look at how the members o the abligh movementalso overlap with and join other itinerant networks such as those o Islamist political parties, andhow one network may lend both logistical support as well as manpower to other networks. Ourown research on the ablighi Jamaat movement in Malaysia and Indonesia has shown that manymembers o the abligh movement double as active party supporters and members o the respectiveIslamist parties o both countries. 42 Similar, anecdotal 43 observations have been made aboutthe membership o the new Islamist organizations and parties o Indonesia, such as the PartaiKeadilan Sejahtera (PKS) whose membership seems to be drawn mainly rom the urban-baseduniversity and college educated lower middle classes who also happen to be members o urban-based pietist movements like the ablighi Jamaat and urban Su study circles and networks.

41 See Farish A. Noor, Salayya Purists in the land o Shadow Puppets and Hindu emples: Te ablighi Jamaat in Indonesia (paper or theWissenschafliche Kon erenz zur gegenwartsbezogenen Forchung im Vorderen Orient (DAVO Congress), Hamburg, November 20-22,2003); and, Pathans to the East! Te Historical Development o the ablighi Jamaat movement in Kelantan, rengganu and Patani and itstransnational links with the South Asia and the Global Islamist Revivalist Movement, Comparative Studies o South Asia, A rica and the

Middle East 27, no. 1 (2007). 42 Ibid. 43 It has to be stressed here that this view is entirely based on the interviews and meetings done by the author during his numerous eld

research trips to Indonesia rom 2003 to 2008. At present there has been no systematic study on the membership prole o the PKS, thoughin many o our meetings and interviews with PKS party members we were struck by the number o them who were also members, or hadbeen members o , the ablighi Jamaat movement.



Deconstructing GlobalizationTe act is that all o us ace a new historical situation every day. States,organizations, cultures, movements, even civilizations that are most success ulare those that can manage, direct, guide, inuence, anticipate, manipulate andcontrol the orces o change. 44

At a moment when the post-colonial nation-state has lost innumerable sovereignpowers to neo-liberal global restructuring, Islamism has seized the popularimagination by capturing the mantle o anti-imperialist, populist nationalism inmost Muslim majority states. 45

Religio-political networks present an ambiguous challenge or theorists o capital-drivenglobalization today as we still do not ully understand how and why this global network systemis sustained by what appears to be aith primarily. Understanding the motivating drivers behindreligiously-inspired political mobilization and networking there ore throws up counter- actualexamples o a parallel globalization at work that may orce us to reconsider some o the more staidpremises o globalization theory thus ar. For we still have not answered the basic question: Whydo these networks exist and why do peoplemembers o the respective global aith communities

join them?46

Tere are, presently, a plethora o Islamist organizations and mass movements who have takenthe notion o the global caliphate as their goal. Groups like the Hizb ut- ahrir openly proclaimtheir vision o a pan-Islamic world; while mainstream Islamist parties ranging rom the MuslimBrotherhood ( Ikhwanul Muslimin) o Egypt and the Arab world to the Jamaat-e Islami o SouthAsia to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party o Malaysia have also spread their networks and contactsbeyond the host countries where they rst emerged. International con erences bring togetherIslamists rom all corners o the globe with the requency we associate more with internationalgovernmental or business con erences; and the Internet has already created a virtual Islamoscapewhere Islamists rom every country on the planet may interact simultaneously in real time. In

many respects, such a global pan-Islamic universe already exists, and it can be said that the pan-Islamic world is a virtual empire where the sun never sets.

Yet looking beyond the narrow concerns o securocrats obsessed with the threat o Islamicterrorism, we need to peer beneath the discursive carapace o this grand project and understandits true import and what it hopes to achieve.

Te current author, in his discussions with Islamists rom Pakistan to Indonesia, has been struckby the common appeal o them all: Tey long to create a global pan-Islamic space where belongingto the same aith community is the only passport one needs to

Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia

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