Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia

8/8/2019 Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia

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TRANSFORMING NATO:THE VIEW FROM LATVIA

aneta Ozolia

R I G A p A p E R S

Riga, Latvia November 27 29, 2006


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2006 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means withoutpermission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct enquiriesto:The German Marshall Fund of the United States1744 R Street, NWWashington DC 20009T 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected] publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm.Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to [email protected]

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of individual authors and do no necessarilyrepresent the views of the authors affiliation.


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Riga PapersTRANSFORMING NATO:THE VIEW FROM LATVIA

aneta Ozolia

Riga, LatviaNovember 27 29, 2006


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PREFAcEOver the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the worlds leading thinkers on NATO in advanceof a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the LatvianTransatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host thisconference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.

This summit comes at a critical moment in NATOs history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a dif ficultmission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very differentstrategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider MiddleEast and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? Whenand where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?

Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East andSouth at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transformitself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what futureshould we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent t rends in Russia? Last but not least, doesNATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homelanddefense?

These are just some of the diff icult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulatingthinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to addressthese and other issues.

In Re~reinventing NATO, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitiousAmerican view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility andmeet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.

In NATOs Only Future: The West Abroad, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on theAlliances future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. Hewarns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job inaddressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain itsformer centrality.

In NATO in the Age of Populism, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe andthe challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go globalwithout falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.

In Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia, aneta Ozolia provides the perspective of a smaller,Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of thechallenge that NATOs transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority andcommitment to keeping NATOs door open for additional new members.

The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside. Edited byRonald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors f rom Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan.These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeksto develop a new concept of global partnership.

GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference andsummit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership thatit is our mission to support.

Craig KennedyPresident of the German Marshall Fund of the United States


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TRANSFORMING NATO:

THE VIEW FROM LATVIAaneta Ozolia

Transformation that is the keyword, which most precisely describes the essence ofthe forthcoming 2006 NATO Summit, to be held in Riga. The issue of transformationhas been at the center of attention among the member states of the Alliance over thecourse of 2006 and this has created diverse attitudes. Initially there was no definition

of the kind of transformation that would be the subject of the highest level of politicaldebates. Interpretations of this diverse concept, indeed, tend to be different dependingon the international agenda and specifics of strategic culture in various countries andregions. Some people take transformation to mean the ability of all actors who areinvolved in international processes to understand the changes, which are occurringand to react to them appropriately. Others focus more on components in globaltransformation, military transformation, for example. Therefore, at least two differentgroups of views have emerged in advance of the Riga Summit. There are politiciansand experts who have praised the promise that the Alliance will concentrate on issues,which have to do with adapting military capacities to modern challenges. On theother hand, there have also been criticisms about the prevailing lack of clarity that

has been the result of NATOs failure to formulate a political stance on the strategicissues of international security that limit opportunities for military transformation. Theexistence of these diverse and sometimes exclusionary views has much to do with theAlliances current situation. It has promised to undertake new duties, but it has beenunable to formulate those duties with any precision. Neither has NATO determined theresources, which will be needed to do the work.

An important question for Latvia is whether NATOs transformation will make itdifficult for it, being a new member state, to be actively involved in the process ofchange. Latvia has become accustomed to transformation since the late 1980s.Society and the state have changed radically and have adapted to the changes that

have occurred in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Latvia hasworked with its allies to transform the international institutional architecture, witha focus on adapting the worlds most important international institutions to thefundamentally new security situation. In its fifteen years of direct experience, Latviahas learned that transformation is a complex issue and that changes in one area donot automatically mean that other areas will be adapted to the new situation. FromLatvias perspective, therefore, problems are caused by NATOs desire to focus ononly one aspect of transformation, the military aspect, without taking a good look atthe political, economic, social, institutional and other transformations in the globalarena, which are taking place in parallel and which have a major effect on one another.The caution with which experienced member states treat the issue of including the


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2 aneta Ozolia

aforementioned aspects of transformation in international debates about security canbe understood. Indeed, there is a risk that it might hinder the resolution of internationalsecurity issues. For member states, which joined NATO during the last two roundsof enlargement, however, activities under circumstances of complex transformation

are, in a sense, quite routine. The process has taught them that without an overallconsensus on political issues, there can be no movement toward the resolution ofmore practical matters.

The Future of NATO:Latvias Proposals

The development of NATO since the end of the Cold War can be described as a successstory. In 1991, the Alliance released a series of documents, which spoke to its furtherdevelopment. In June, in Copenhagen, it approved the Partnership with the Countriesof Central and Eastern Europe. In November, in Rome, it approved a new strategy, TheAlliances Strategic Concept, as well as a Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.These latter two documents served as the cornerstones for the North AtlanticCooperation Council. The documents defined the nucleus for the transformation ofNATO and were therefore of immense strategic importance. The process was basedon a diverse set of partnerships and it led to the enlargement process. The accessionof the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance changed NATOs internal

structure, geo-strategic position and security situation. A new strategy was needed.It was approved in Washington in 1999. Even the most pessimistic security experts,however, did not predict the change in international security and insecurity whichoccurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, attacks which marked theemergence of a series of new global threats and risks.

While NATOs political documents describe many important threats such as the spreadof weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the expansion of regional conflicts and theirinfluence on other regions, they do not adequately take into account the increasingchallenges faced by NATO today. The Alliances future influence, effectiveness andsurvival depend on political agreement among member states on a joint understanding

of the threats the Alliance faces, the resources at its disposal for preventing them andthe Alliances area of operations. Without a new strategic consensus, these issues canbe addressed only in an ad hoc manner through the exchange of ideas. In the medium-and long-term the absence of a joint platform may create problems. Several expertshave called for the elaboration of a new conceptual document. Hans Binnendijkand Richard L. Kugler, for instance, have argued that NATO needs a new dual-trackstrategy. The two authors argue that the Alliance needs to formulate concrete goals,forecast threats, develop a strategy for overcoming those threats, institute fundamentalreforms in the decision-making process so as to ensure flexibility, particularly with

1 Binnendijk, H. and R.L. Kugler, The Next Phase of Transformation : A New Dual-Track Strateg y for NATO, in Hamilton, D.S.(ed.), Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, Washington DC, Center for TransatlanticRelations, Johns Hopkins University, 2004, pp. 37-74.


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Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia

respect to operations outside the Euroatlantic security space,2 reform the forcesused for operations of stabilization and reconstruction and expand partnership andcooperation with the greater Middle East.

Clearly, it is not productive to pit military and political transformation against each

other, but on the eve of the Riga Summit it also has to be admitted that there hasbeen greater progress in the area of military transformation. Military transformation,in essence, is a reaction to political change and implies the ability to make politicaljudgments about international security and threats and to take political decisions onthe use of transformed military structures. Due to the fact that there has been nopolitical consolidation in NATO since enlargement, however, debates about politicalissues are among the most important elements on the Alliances agenda. Withoutthis discussion, there will be medium and long-term problems in ongoing militarytransformation. There are still different opinions about fundamental issues concerningthe future of NATO further enlargement, expansion in the global area of partnership

and participants therein, use of international security resources, attitudes towardsconflicts between the United States and its European allies on global security issues,to name but a few. This means that it will be harder for NATO to react to the newchallenges it faces. It is absolutely clear that without greater consensus on politicalissues, the energetically launched military transformation may be held up.

Why is the design of a new strategic concept for NATO important from Latviasperspective? First of all, the international security agenda is changing. Threats andrisks in the world have been expanding on a regular and permanent basis. As soon asthe international community entered the war on terrorism, a new and global debateemerged about energy security. While individual countries often initiate reactionto the emerging threats, the resources for dealing with them are in the hands ofinternational organizations. The international nature of these resources means thatthere is a greater need for a commonly accepted strategic document. Such a documentwill eliminate wasting time on debates about the reasons and manifestations of oneor another threat at a time when a rapid response is required. Governments possesssecurity resources that often make it difficult for them to deal with diversified threats.And, it must be remembered that the number and scope of threats will more thanlikely only grow. The problem is not the numerical increase, but rather the ability ofindividual countries to react to threats at various stages of their development.

This poses a dilemma for the NATO security agenda. Terrorism, as a global threat,expands the list of the Alliances obligations and duties, because terrorism was

previously not a trans-national phenomenon. On the other hand, the focus on the waragainst terror narrows the Alliances agenda, because other kinds of threats are ignored.NATO does not have instruments for fighting terrorism, because the destruction ofone terrorist cell does not prevent others from emerging. At the same time, however,the Alliance can make use of institutional networks, particularly the United Nationsand the European Union, for trying to prevent risks from becoming threats. Without astrategy, which dictates the operations of the Alliance under such new circumstances,it will be difficult to deal with global threats.

2 One can only agree with the authors about the decision-making procedure, because the current situation allows onecountry to block a decision taken by all other member states. This is not an optimal practice, because it weakens the

overall effectiveness of the alliance instead of strengthening the ability of individual countries to defend their interestsor satisfy their ambitions. The greater the unanimity of thinking among member states on political issues, the less likelyit will be that individual countries will block certain NATO activities.

3 Op. cit, Binnendijk and Kugler, p. 59.


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aneta Ozolia

During the Cold War, NATO was well able to prevent threats. It also developed adequatepolitical and military resources to deal with them once they had emerged. Today,however, the quality of the debate about strategic goals, the nature of the threatsfaced and the use of appropriate resources to handle them, is not adequate. In the

absence of a conceptual framework, NATO reacts to threats rather than predictingthem. Sometimes it is not in a position to use the preventive resources that it and itsglobal partners (including other institutions) have at their disposal. It will not alwaysbe possible to prepare for the variety of emerging and non-conventional threats facingthe world. Rapid reaction will be needed, but NATO is currently equipped for this.Steps are being taken to put together NATOs Rapid Response Force (NRF), but NATOscurrent difficulties lie more in the fact that the political decision to put forces to useis not forthcoming, than in the Alliances ability to assemble armed units and providethem with modern arms.

Second, there is the issue of cohesion. The Alliance has always been more attractive

than other international organizations, because it has demonstrated a high level ofconsolidation, something that is particularly important in the security and defensesectors. Even as international threats have multiplied, the Alliance has enlargedand has provided states and organizations access to resources for risk reductionand threat prevention. The establishment of a new strategic conceptual frameworkwould increase the level of consolidation among member states and would eliminatemisunderstandings about what NATO does and does not do. Increasing the cohesionamong allies is essential to designing policy, taking decisions and pursuing theAlliances overall activities. Different views among the allies about the war in Iraq are,in fact, the obvious result of the gap that has emerged within the Alliance over thelast decade. The cohesion of the transatlantic alliance has been strained, but a new

strategy would provide a basis for renewed consolidation of transatlantic relations.Even more importantly, such a conceptual framework would offer a unified view of thenew challenges the world faces.

Third, NATO is attractive because of its capability. There is no other internationalorganization with access to such impressive military resources. This is largely thanksto the United States even if all member states must be involved in enhancing theAlliances military capacity. The question is whether the Alliance will continue todevelop its potential. If so, then what kind of development will there be? What areindividual member states planning to do in terms of military modernization? Thereis a big gap between the level of investment in the development of military capacity

of the United States and that of other member states. There is no indication that thisgap will narrow in the foreseeable future. The effective spending of defense budgetsis a particularly important issue. According to NATO, personnel costs are excessive,which helps to explain why European Union member states lag behind in research,technologies and the development of equipment and armaments.

An important future challenge for NATO will be its ability to develop the capacitiesof civilian institutions and to coordinate their work with those of others, particularlythe forces that are at the disposal of the EU. The international security agenda isincreasingly dominated by military activities. The responsibility of parties involved inthe conflicts is also increasing. They also have to consider how to ensure long-termstability and the economic and social renewal of the relevant countries and regions.One of the most complicated issues remains the expansion of the Alliances activitiesin the non-military area. While one can, of course, commend NATOs achievements


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in Afghanistan, the work of the allies in Iraq teaches us many lessons that needto be remembered in the future. Among these is the fact that the dissemination ofdemocratic values is crucial for the successful transformation of regime change intoa sustainable and durable process, which ensures stability with civilian, not military

resources. Otherwise regime change may prove to be unsuccessful.Latvia has promised to spend money on the development of the defense and securityareas. The state defense budget has increased consistently, both in terms of thepercentage of GDP (1.5 percent) and in absolute terms. During the three years sincethe NATO Summit in Prague, the budget has almost doubled and the upward trend iscontinuing. There have been concerns about the cautious attitude of European alliesvisvis increased defense spending and the effective use of the resources. Latvia iscontinuing to improve the professionalism of its armed forces and was the first countryin the Baltic Sea region to create a professional army. Latvia is also developing nichecapacities. Fears that niche specialization will harm Latvias direct defense and security

capacity have proven to be false. Latvia is developing its niche activities specificallyin those areas of the highest security concern for the country. Fields of specializationinclude dealing with mines (there are still a lot of unexploded ordnance in Latvia), airdefense and civilian and military relations. These are becoming the cornerstones forLatvias activities to export democracy. Latvia provides co-financing to the Alliancesmilitary projects, which strengthen NATOs collective defense capacities and help tonarrow strategic military gaps. For instance, Latvia will join other NATO countries inpurchasing C-17 strategic transport airplanes. The defense budgets of Latvia and othercountries are not large enough to be able to buy such aircraft alone. Latvia will buyflight hours for a longer period of time, thus helping NATO to enhance its capacitiesfor operations that take place outside the transatlantic security space. Latvia has

already contributed a company of mine experts and military police officers to NATOsresponse forces in 2006 and 2007. An anti-mine ship is currently under construction,thus making an investment in both the enhancement of military capacities and in theimplementation of the idea of global partnership. Latvia wants to see NATO transformitself in a direction that allows it to prevent global, regional and local threats andrisks while preserving its unity and military capacity. Latvia would rather avoid thatthe Alliance is faced with new tasks that it cannot handle and opposes the idea ofNATO becoming a looser alliance or coalition of the willing, in which there can besignificant diversity between the interests of member states.

What would happen if Latvia decided to join international security operations, even

with its limited resources? There would be at least three different effects. First of all,Latvia might have difficulties to muster the necessary resources for participation ina variety of coalitions, requiring reduced spending in other sectors. This was alreadythe case with regard to the peacekeeping force, which is being assembled in Lebanon.Secondly, public opinion on Latvian participation in various global partnership projectsmight deteriorate. That would call into question the currently dominant view that Latviamust be involved in projects aimed at supporting democratic regimes. Third, takinginto account the fact that the leaders of some European countries accused Latvia ofbetraying European values because it supported the United States on the war in Iraq,it cannot be excluded that would find itself in such a delicate position again. It is inLatvias interest that the Alliance improves its cohesion and capabilities, because only

then will it be able to ensure sustainability in its effectiveness and in the preservationof NATOs prestige in the world.


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Approval of a strategic concept document would remove various obstacles from thepath of NATO transformation. NATOs strength, first of all, lies in its ability to act, asopposed to debating possible coalitions. If each time the Alliance tries to make adecision there has to be a debate on every action, it will cause international doubt about

NATOs operational capacity. Second, movement toward short-term alliances may splitthe member states. There may be countries, which regularly take part in operations,while others refuse to do so. The more often countries take different positions theweaker NATO will appear both internationally and internally. Third, member stateswill have less of an interest in investing resources in international security. Fourth,countries outside the Alliance might want to join shifting coalitions, and that couldweaken NATOs cohesion and increase the influence of non-member countries on itswork.

Extensive debates among experts and politicians about a new strategic conceptdocument that defines NATOs goals and missions under the new circumstances of

todays world, underpinned by a solid threat analysis, will not create tension betweenmember states. Instead, such discussions would help to achieve political unity in theAlliance, thereby improving its ability to act quickly and effectively.

Global Partnership:Who and Where?

Latvias attitude toward expanded partnership within NATO is clear global andregional partnership increases opportunities to ensure security and cooperationnetworks make it possible to prevent risks and threats. Latvias security policy of thelast decade has been based on the principle of partnership. This is demonstrated bythe participation of Latvian soldiers in missions in Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (OIF) andKosovo (KFOR). Latvias participation in international operations has quadrupled innumerical terms since the Prague Summit and in financial terms it has quintupled.In 2005, Latvia was 9th among 26 NATO member states in terms of the relationshipbetween military and civilian personnel in the armed forces and the participation ofmilitary personnel in peacekeeping operations (in other words, armed forces deployed

to operations of all types as a percentage of defense personnel). Among the last 10countries to join the Alliance, only Hungary is slightly ahead. Partnership initiativesare focused on specific regions. The Northern Caucasus is one of Latvias priorities.Since 2006, Latvia has led the South Caucasus Clearinghouse Instrument, which wasestablished on the basis of the BALTSEA example. The aim is to coordinate cooperationamong Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Latvia also participates in a similar projectin South East Europe, the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse involving Albania, Croatia,Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

While Latvias security policies are focused on the principles of partnership andcooperation, concerns have been raised by certain trends in the international

environment. First of all, it is important to ensure that expanded global partnership, interms of both geography and the scope of tasks, does not call into question or weaken


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7Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia

the importance of Article 5 of the Alliances founding treaty. New missions must notbe organized at the expense of Article 5. In a recent interview (August 28, 2006) withAgence France Presse (AFP) French President Jacques Chirac said that NATO mustconsolidate in pursuit of its main job preservation of security in Europe and North

America.This author cannot agree with that opinion, because the security situation in theseparts of the world is the most stable. If the Alliance concentrates on this narrow region,other countries and alliances could step in and deliver security to conflict hotspotselsewhere in the world, thus reducing NATOs influence. There are, however, legitimateconcerns about the ability of the Alliance to balance its new global mission with itstraditional obligations. A new NATO strategy concept, with a clear definition of theresponsibilities and resources for global partnership would reduce concerns about thecredibility of the principle of collective defense. Without strategic principles, Latviaand other countries would face a great deal of uncertainty in forecasting the security

situation and that would weaken NATOs overall performance.Second, expanded global partnership will be impossible without the cooperation ofthe UN and without increased influence of international law on international events.The subject of the relationship between the UN and NATO has not been sufficientlyconsidered in debates about security policy. There has been increasing UN-NATOcooperation in dealing with crises and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,Iraq and Darfur, but the process so far has been cautious. One reason may be thepossibility of conflicts between the NATO founding treaty and the UN Charter whenit comes to the question of using force. Failure to deal with this issue is not fruitful,because the UN is also undergoing transformation and issues of security are becomingmore important for its agenda. In recent years, the UN has become far more ambitiousabout dealing with international crises and that means an inevitable overlap betweenits interests and those of NATO. According to the Dutch researcher Dick A. Leurdijk,such relations are uneasy at this time.

Third, relationships with countries, which have influence in regional and internationalevents, are important from the perspective of global partnerships. One of such power-projecting country is Russia. When beginning the enlargement of NATO, the Allianceestablished a dialogue with Russia, which since then has moved both forward andbackward. The relationship has become stronger in general, and it can be said, perhaps,that NATO has ensured partial Russian involvement in the search for internationalsecurity solutions. Russias relations with the West became stronger after the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001, when it announced that it was standing shoulder-to-shoulder with us. NATOs relationship with Russia has been more intensive in termsof military cooperation exchange trips, personnel exchange, military-to-militarycooperation, military training and exercises, etc. In political terms, however, manyopportunities have not yet been addressed.

There are several trends, which must be at the center of NATOs future development.For one thing, both NATO and its member states are developing relations with Russia.On the one hand, the Alliance is doing so as a unified institution. On the other handand in parallel, the member states are doing the same on a bilateral basis. Some NATOmember states think more highly of bilateral relations with Russia than multilateral

4 Leurdijk, D.A. UN Reform and NATO Transformation: The Missing Link, CDSP Paper, October 2005, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20051001_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_4_leurdijk.pdf, last accessed August 8, 2006.

5 Ibid.


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ones. In recent years, the new member states have had an effect on NATO-Russianrelations, due to their often reticent attitudes. At an international conference in May2004, organized by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and thePrague Institute of International Relations, it was noted that the new NATO member

states are worried about Russias role in international relations, while old memberstates prefer to develop bilateral relations with Russia. Reference was made to theOlof Palme Syndrome. In other words, the farther from Stockholm human rightsviolations occur, the less important they seem. This creates a foundation for two kindsof asymmetry. One has to do with perceptions. In terms of international events, the oldmember states are mostly concerned with the United States and the Middle East. Thenew member states, on the other hand, see Russia as a problem. The second relatesto the fact that there is a lack of researchers who specialize in Russia and the CIS. Theresult is that to date there have been few objective and all-encompassing studies ofthe problems that do exist.6

NATOs policy of including Russia in its processes serves Latvias interests.Nevertheless, Russia should not be integrated into NATO. Cautious statements havebeen made about this by Leonid Gozman, Deputy Chairman of the Union of RightForces (in Russia) and Michael A. McFaul, a political scientist associated with StanfordUniversity and a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Theyargue that [i]ntegration, under the right conditions, still serves the long-term interestsof Russia and the West.7

Unfortunately, the authors do not explain what they mean by under the rightconditions. The right conditions are understood very differently by the memberstates of the Alliance and Russia.

The position of Alison K. Bailes, however, is considered a more appropriate The bestservice we can do for NATO and NATO-Russian dialogue is to place them in a properperspective within a wider strategic reality. The NATO-Russian relationship has a special

and irreplaceable role to play in this picture and must play it to the full. But, we shall

only hurt both NATO and Russia by placing upon their relationship a burden that it was

not designed for and cannot bear.

NATO and the EU: A Guarantee

of Suessful PartnershipThe fact that Latvia belongs to both NATO and the EU has strengthened its security. Theprejudiced assumption that Latvia chose to strengthen good transatlantic relations atthe expense of more involvement in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)is false. Latvias view visvis the relationship between NATO and the EU is based on

6 Missiroli, A, CFSP and ESDP After Enlargement, EU Institute for Securit y Studies note, May 25, 2004, p. 2.

7 Gozman, L and McFaul, M, Why a Democratic Russia Should Join NATO, Web Commentary, July 13, 2006. See http://

www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=18532, last accessed August 3, 2006.8 Bailes, A.J.K , The NATO-Russian Dialogue: An (Unrepentantly) European View, in Hunter, R.E. and S.M. Rogov (eds.),Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant: The Next Stage of NATO-Russian Relations, RAND, Santa Monica, 2004,p. 31.


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the partnership principle and considers that involvement in these institutions is notmutually exclusive. At the same time, however, both institutions must clearly definethe goals, duties, resources and political framework of their partnership. This onceagain underscores the need for a strategic document. Latvia can contribute to reducing

tensions in the transatlantic space specifically because it is able to operate in thesecurity structures of the Alliance and the European Union in a balanced manner.

The extent and quality of cooperation between the EU and NATO depends on thesecurity policies of the member states of the two organizations. Although there isgrowing interest in multilateralism in this area within the EU, any organizationspolicy is necessarily shaped by the states that make up its membership. If there aredisagreements about the future of the organization and about the security situationin the world, it is hard to establish constructive long-term policies. The war in Iraqsplit EU member states into several camps, but over the last few years, practical andsymbolic steps of an important nature have been taken to overcome this situation.

U.S. President George Bush visited Europe several times in 2005 and one of the mainsubjects was the strengthening of transatlantic relations. It could be said that theball is now on the European side of the court. Steps need to be taken toward greaterpolitical consensus on international security. Positions taken by various countriesvisvis the Iranian nuclear program have shown that there is common understandingon both sides of the Atlantic about the need to prevent the emergence of nuclearthreats. Nevertheless, there remain lots of questions and Europeans must, first andforemost, answer them for themselves. Only then will the transatlantic partners hearwhat they have to say.

In Latvias view, there are several problems that are keeping the EU and NATO frommaking full use of their potential for cooperation. One problem has to do with the viewsof the EU member about the future of the ESDP. It has been agreed that the EU needs adefense component, but what that should be has not. Some countries want the ESDPto play an independent role, while others support close coordination and a sharingof duties with NATO. The more precisely and quickly the spectrum of relationshipsbetween the two institutions is determined, the better things will be for countries,organizations and, of course, the regions in which NATO and the EU will operate. Asecond problem has to do with the ability of the EU to coordinate its policies and toharmonize them with the activities of other institutions. Currently, something of anunclear situation is developing in relation to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),given that the ESDP is a component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Russia has a great deal of influence on the countries to which that policy applies.There is no question that the involvement of Russia is in the EUs interests, but theirviews both about the ESDP and the CFSP differ. If NATO takes part, at least at thecoordination level, then policies will be implemented more effectively, and Russiasinfluence on its neighbors would be reduced.

The third problem has to do with the geographic space in which the ESDP operates. Eversince political cooperation was first established and the CFSP was designed, memberstates have fairly clearly formulated the EUs foreign policy and security interests.These notably include working together in international organizations, the Middle Eastand Africa. The first ESDP activities suggest that this geographic scope has largely


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been preserved.9 Latvia, however, is more interested in regions that lie to the East ofthe EU. While to a certain extent Latvian interests coincide with those of other memberstates, there are also fundamental differences with the European NeighborhoodPolicy being the main priority for Latvia, while the EU and its larger member states

are more interested in Northern Africa. The EUs cautious approach to operationsbeyond its Eastern border is, of course, a result of concern that Russia may react to anintensive political and economic involvement of the EU. An example involves debatesabout a border observation mission that is to be taken over from the Organizationfor Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Polandactively supported this idea, but most member states were predictably cautious as aresult of Russias flat rejection of the idea. 0 A similar situation emerged when Latviapromoted the idea that the EU should become involved in border observations andcustoms control activities in Transnistria (Moldova). The EU did nothing more thanto send a few representatives to the region. The bottom line is that the EU and Latviahave different attitudes as to the geographic scope of the ESDP, and to the specifics of

the policy. Latvia has sometimes been considered passive in relation to the ESDP. Thisattitude is not a result of a lack of understanding of political opportunities, but ratheron distrust in the effective implementation of the politics of opportunity.

A fourth issue concerns the military potential that is at the disposal of the ESDP. Thishas everything to do with the battle capacities of each member state. Questions mustbe asked about the national and international security component of each countrysdefense policy, about the scope of forces and arms in taking part in NATO, ESDP andUN operations. Can one country take part in all operations? What are the priorities?Does the OSCE have the resources for carrying out all of the ESDP missions that havebeen declared? At the moment, there are more questions than answers.

Latvia already makes an investment in ESDP operations. It takes part in the EUsALTHEA military operation. This is a continuation of the NATO mission in Bosnia andHerzegovina. True, Latvias participation is limited to a few military personnel, oneheadquarters officer and two military police officers. It is important, however, thatLatvia is helping to pay for the operation. Latvia has sent personnel to Georgia. Arepresentative of the Ministry of Justice is involved in a mission to improve laws inGeorgia. In addition, in October 2005, Latvia contributed one person to the OSCEmission in South Ossetia.

Latvia will shape its EU Rapid Response Battle Group (EURRB) in close cooperationwith NATO. As a member state of both organizations, Latvia feels that it is important

to take part in ongoing cycles of military cooperation, all the more so if the EURRB isset up in a way which is compatible with the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF). In thatcase participation at the political level is very important, as important as the battlecapacity at the military level. Third, this makes it possible to influence EU defensepolicies so as to ensure that there is no duplication or overlap of efforts and that NATO

9 The ESDP has conducted operations in the Congo (Artemis), Palestine (EUPO-COPPS) and is planning operationsin Indonesia, Sudan and Rafa. In Europe, an operation has been conducted in Macedonia (Concordia), and a bordersupport mission (EU-BAM) is being planned for Moldova and Ukraine.

10 This incident, which involves Georgia, is a good demonstration of the logic of operations of the ESDP. Georgia askedthe EU to take over the border observation operation. The EU answered with three proposals to expand the mandate of

the EUs Special Representative, to ensure an observation mission in the context of the ESDP, or to provide training forborder guards in tandem with an observation mission. After debate among member states, however, the EU agreed tosend a small group of observers to Georgia.

11 See http ://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid =03559.


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is not pushed out of the European space. Latvia does not support initiatives that mightreduce the effectiveness of NATO.2

NATO Enlargement:What to Expet

The new NATO member states have traditionally been seen as eager supporters ofthe idea of enlargement. That is certainly accurate. No member of the political elitein these countries has ever suggested that enlargement might hinder NATOs abilityto pursue its goals. Latvias support for enlargement is not just ideological in nature.

The point is that Latvia has evaluated the positive consequences of enlargement. Oneof the major lessons learned is that membership in the Alliance means more than justreforms in the defense system and functioning in accordance with its principles. Itinvolves restructuring the entire country and its society in line with democratic valuesin all areas from the economy to politics, law, civil society, security and defense. Thereare two priority goals for NATO enlargement: expanding the sphere of the Alliancesgeo-strategic influence and increasing security in that space. These goals, however,are pursued on the basis of democratic values and of respect for those values inexisting and future member states. Latvias experience with NATO integration showedthat at one and the same as the defense and security sector was reformed on the basisof democratic principles, improvements were also made in other sectors.

The success of the Alliances policies in Latvia has been based on its ability to maintaina balance between assistance received from various foreign donors, the desire of theinstitution to maintain its open door policy and the consistent transformation ofthe state. Membership in NATO is not a gift received for having pursued the processof democratization. Instead, it is a reward for a job well done and for the readinessto continue to discharge the obligations which membership involves. The currentdebates about further enlargement have pushed distracted countries from the needfor internal transformation. The quality of those transformations is no longer the mainissue. The speed at which enlargement takes place has taken precedence. Bulgariaand Romania have demonstrated that membership in NATO does not necessarily

lead to all-encompassing state and public reforms. The EU still has difficulties withboth countries, because they have not fulfilled several of the so-called Copenhagencriteria.

Latvia officially supports the admission of all candidate countries to the Alliance,but it has chosen to focus on Ukraine and Georgia, in particular. This choice can beunderstood in historical terms. It is also a result of Latvias knowledge about thetwo countries. The most important argument, however, has to do with the fact thatproviding support will ensure more rapid democratization than can be achieved as aresult of the present EU and NATO activities in those countries, as well as concomitantimprovements in stability in Europe. An institutional partnership makes it possible to

promote multilateral, as opposed to sectoral, reforms.

12 For a look at Latvias investment in the EUs rapid reaction battle groups , see http://www.ppd.mk .gov.lv/ui.


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2 aneta Ozolia

The success of previous rounds of enlargement has pointed to lessons that need tobe understood so as to further promote the Alliances integration policy. For one,conditionality must be precisely formulated. The success of the Baltic States inintegrating into the EU and NATO was the result of a set of fairly strict conditions, as

well as of the respect for those conditions by successive governments and the public.In Ukraine and Georgia, NATO has issued only some of its military conditions, whileit is yet to deal with other areas of reform. Both countries face complicated situationsas a result periods of attempted and, sometimes unsuccessful, democratizationin the past. Previous waves of enlargement have demonstrated the effectivenessof EU conditions for reform in the economic, political, legal, institutional and otherareas. This allowed NATO to concentrate on military issues in relations with potentialmember states. The result has been that by the time they are ready to join the Alliance,candidates have achieved quite a bit in terms of reform. Given that these countrieshave not even made the request to join the EU yet, NATO will have to pay attention tothe issue of democratization in all sectors as it continues to develop relations with

Ukraine and Georgia. A more sophisticated and complex approach needs to be takento the transformation that is taking place in these two countries.

Latvia can offer candidates both theoretical and practical advice from its experience ofenlargement. At least three conditions must be in place for enlargement to be successful.First, the political elite and the public at large must want membership. Today this istrue in Georgia, but not in Ukraine. This is a strategic decision, because it applies notjust to specific areas of policy but, rather, to a complete transformation of states andsocieties. Politicians in the two countries sometimes speak of preserving a specialrelationship with Russia and this is understandable given history, public opinion andcertain economic considerations. Experience shows, however, that this is not a recipe

for success. Since the collapse of the USSR, no country, which chose to implementpolicies of compromise in relations with Russia, has flourished. Relations with Russiaare important, but political uncertainty and inconsistency in that relationship cancause problems for democratization and transatlantic integration alike.

Second, the member states of the two organizations must agree on consistentenlargement policies. NATO has done better than the EU in this regard, but even withinthe Alliance there are diverse views and that keeps it from pursuing its enlargementprocess consistently. Inconsistency in the approaches towards enlargement sends thewrong signals to candidate countries that have faced geopolitical uncertainty for along time, but have now decided to join NATO. The organizations in question should

help to move enlargement along instead of standing on the sidelines.Third, the international environment must support inclusiveness and partnership.The current candidate countries are in a more difficult situation than the countriesof the last round of enlargement. Each round brings with it a period of absorptionand evaluation. Nevertheless, the environment contextualizing enlargement has to beconducive.

These three conditions essentially prove that the biggest problem is not the negativeeffect of external factors on the accession of new member states. Instead, the diff icultylies with the readiness of potential member states to engage in complex domestictransformations. If these transformations are successful, then membership in NATO is

a logical and sequential continuation, not a bonus for reforms that have already beenundertaken.


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The Regional component ofLatvias Seurity Poliy:

The Balti Sea Region afterNATO Enlargement

Regional cooperation has always been a cornerstone for Latvias security policy.

Latvias membership in the international security community has been realizedwith the assistance of regional cooperation projects and arrangements. Securitycooperation among the three Baltic States was the first step and eventually relevantprojects were expanded to the entire Baltic Sea region in various formats. In analyzingthe achievements of the Baltic States over the last fifteen years, specialists say thatcooperation in defense and security has been the most productive. They point toprojects such as BALTBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, BALDEFCOL and BALTCCIS. Latviascomparatively fast and successful integration into NATO occurred thanks to thesupport network, which emerged in the Baltic Sea region after the end of the ColdWar. Latvias new security identity as a member of the NATO Alliance has an effect onthe role of regional security at the local and global level. Since the 2004 enlargement

of NATO, issues of further security policy developments have no longer been of keyimportance in Latvia, but that cannot be said about the Baltic Sea region as a whole.That is because the Baltic Sea region, which at one time facilitated security and, ina sense, was a center for security restructuring (EU and NATO enlargement, Russiasinvolvement in the regional security network, the demilitarization of Kaliningrad andsupport for democracy there, etc.), has become a periphery as a result of the diversesecurity choices that are available.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania used to be peripheral countries in the Baltic Sea region.They were consumers of security. Today, however, they are of central importance,because they bring the EU and NATO to the region. The new role of the Baltic States

is not just the result of membership, but also, possibly more importantly, of thediffering security policies among the countries of the region. They also have differentconcepts of national, regional and international security and the relationship thereshould be between the three. Finland and Sweden have made major investments inthe defense systems of the Baltic States and today they actively support the ESDPand various international peacekeeping missions. They remain very cautious visvisNATO, however, and they have been loath to launch internal debates about joiningthe Alliance. Norway is an active NATO member state and participates in internationaloperations. Denmark has been the most active advocate of NATO enlargement to the

13 Poland and Germany have participated in Baltic Sea regional cooperation in the area of defense and security on a

fragmentary basis, because the security policies of the two countries have focused more on Central Europe than on thisregion. The same can be said of Russia, which has avoided involvement in regional arrangements. Russia considersthese to be unimportant. It has also avoided doing anything that might reduce its influence as cooperative efforts in theregion expand.


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Baltic States and is a member state with a significant level of international involvement,although it does not take part in the CFSP and ESDP. This diversity of security policiesand an ongoing lack of clarity about future developments have not created an idealregional environment for Latvia. From the perspective of stability, the Baltic Sea region

can still be seen as one of the most secure regions in Europe, but differing views aboutregional and international security in terms of institutional activities and their agendasmake it difficult to make effective use of this fact. The diversity in the security situationof the Baltic Sea region countries of fered opportunities for maneuver in the accessionprocess, but since NATO enlargement, it has made it more difficult to establish a clearregional component in strengthening international security. A clear example of thisis the way in which the EU is assembling its battle groups. It would only be logical toestablish battle groups on the basis of experience that has been accumulated throughregional cooperation. A Northern European unit should be established, but countriesin the region have chosen a different path. Latvia and Lithuania work together withPoland, Germany and Slovakia instead. There are also visible differences in defense

policies.

Before the latest enlargement of NATO, one of the attractive features of the BalticSea region was that it could relate useful experiences about relationships betweensmall and large countries. The region could defend the security interests of smallcountries, making use of a variety of security policy instruments, as well as including,neutralizing, providing financial aid to and exporting values to countries, which werenot an example of friendship and stability. It was the countries of Northern Europe,which used their security policies to support the autonomy of small countries underconditions of asymmetrical international relations. Membership in NATO has causedLatvia to change its thinking about security. As a member of a powerful collective

defense system with twenty-six member states, Latvia no longer thinks of itself as asmall country. Membership in the Alliance expands the view of the security area notjust in terms of a larger number of partners, but also, and much more, in terms of muchgreater resources for preventing threats. Countries in the Baltic Sea region which arenot members of the Alliance, by contrast, still use smallness as an argument inshaping security and defense policies, because they can only rely on their own forcesand cannot enhance security through the principles of collective responsibility andsharing of work.

conlusionThe future of NATO and transatlantic relations depends on several significant factors.First, there are developments within the Alliance and in the ability of member statesto react to problem situations. These include issues such as the efficiency of theAlliance, its organizational power, its decision making process and its ability totranslate strategies into plans of action. Second, there are external factors, whichexert an influence on world developments and force NATO to adjust to them. RobertKagan has argued that [t]he danger of the present transatlantic predicament, then,

lies neither in American will nor capability, but in the inherent moral tension of thecurrent international situation.


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This tension is caused by the dramatic changes, which have occurred during the lastdecade, as well as by the fact that international organizations have been too slow inbecoming involved in the process and mapping out further developments. Third, thesuccess of NATO transformation will depend on a series of internal and institutional

issues such as effectiveness, organizational matters, the decision making processand the ability to spot and deal with the overlapping challenges of the contemporaryinternational system. These challenges are of an economic, political, social, ecological,military, cultural and religious nature. Fourth, one of the keywords in the modernglobalized world is networking. Another requirement for success, therefore, is theinvolvement of the Alliance in institutional and international networks so that theycan be used in pursuit of international security. And fifth, the golden rule for NATOsustainability and effectiveness is commonality, a common command, commonfunding, common logistics and common policies.

After Latvia joined the EU and NATO it had to answer the question of whether it would

be an active and equal member state, as opposed to a passive follower of the policiesthat are implemented by other countries. The NATO Summit in Riga is quite symbolic ofthe choice that Latvia has made. A country, which has decided to be a passive follower,would never have agreed to organize one of the most important forums for the debateof international security in the world and its allies would never have agreed to allowit to do so. The Riga Summit represents an expansion of the boundaries of Latviassecurity policy and it will also be an event at which the Alliance will expand its securityagenda. Over the next few years, NATO will have to deal with a wide range of issues,beginning with regional conflicts and ending with energy security. As far as Latvia isconcerned about this rainbow of security colors, it is clear that only a unified alliancewith unified forces will be able to deal with all of the different issues. That is why Latvia

is not able to accept the question of whether it belongs to the group of Atlanticists orthe Eurocentrists. The choice has been made. Latvia plumps for Euroatlanticism.


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About the Author

aneta Ozolia is a Political Scientist and Professor, currently headingthe Department of Political Science at the University of Latvia in Riga.

She is also Chair of the Strategic Analysis Commission under the

auspices of the President of Latvia. Her main research interests include

European integration issues, EU and NATO enlargement, international

politics, international and regional security, Baltic security and Baltic Sea

regional cooperation. Her previous professional appointments include

Information Officer at the European Commission Delegation in Latvia,

Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University

of Turku, Finland, Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research

Institute and Executive Director of the Latvian Center for Human Rights

and Ethnic Studies. aneta Ozolia is also a founder and board member of

the Latvian Political Science Association, of the Latvian Center for Human

Rights and Ethnic Studies and of the Latvian Association for European

Studies.


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9

About the Organizers of the

Riga confereneThe German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan

American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting

greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and

Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working

on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing

transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic

cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,

GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded

in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall

Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the

Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has

six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and

Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic OrganisationThe Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental

organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvias full and active

membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy

in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from

different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO

was established with the objective of facilitating Latvias membership in

NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public

support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities

explained and built public awareness about the principles and values

that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign

policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work

providing information on international defense and security issues andquestions related to Latvias full participation in NATO. LATO has also


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become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the

strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus,

Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local

and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summerschools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO

Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates

understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as

encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis

Latvias Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of thePresident of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004,

at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Ve-Freiberga. Its

founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime

Minister. The Commissions main goal is to generate a long-term vision

of Latvias development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented

studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks

to consolidate Latvias scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvias futuredevelopment. It has undertaken research on Latvias opportunities as a

member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvias place in

global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-

quality dialogue with the countrys legislative and executive powers, as

well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvias development

and the consolidation of democracy.


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With the support of

The Riga Conference was organized by

Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia

Documents

Transcript of Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia