Transformation of Putin’s Perception in Russian Society (2000-2016)

Elena Shestopal

PhD, professor, head of the Chair of Sociology and Psychology of Politics, Department of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow state

University, shestop0505@rambler.ru

Paper for the ECPR General Conference 7-10 September 2016, Prague

1.Introduction

Vladimir Putin has been in power for 16 years already. He has occupied

different political positions. And, amazingly, even the most prominant political

analysts and journalists still cannot explain “Who Mr. Putin is?” Western Media

not infrequently mythologize and demonize his image. He is endowed with

either supernatural qualities or a maniacal striving for aggression.

In Russia, however, Putin’s popularity is extremely high. Moreover, he is

considered almost a superhero who opposes the West all by himself. Naturally,

his policy is approved even stronger at present than it was at the beginning of

his career.

We assume that it is impossible to answer the question ‘Who is Mr

Putin’ only by analyzing the leader’s personality, though it is an important task

by itself [Shestopal E.,2003]. We should also find out why and how the

Russian society supports him. If we understand the nature of this support, we

will, perhaps, be able to grasp the logic of Putin’s actions in a more consistent

way.

This paper focuses on Putin’s image in Russian public. We are trying here

to evaluate the dynamics of this image during various periods of Putin’s

political career from 2000 to 2016.

We’ll start from his most recent electoral rating given by Foundation of

Public Opinion (FOM) in May 27, 2016. According to this agency Putin’s rating

was 66%1. 80% trusted him, as only 16% did not trust the Russian President.

Those who started to trust him more than before exceed 31%.2

.

All these data have been received while the ruble was falling and the

living standards were plummeting. The citizens instead of a protest against

authorities and the President are uniting around him and support his policy.

Certainly, propaganda alone cannot cause such a political effect. Besides, the

state’s pressure on the society did not increase during this period, either.

Hence transformation of his perception took place due to some other

factors. We suggest that among those factors one can find name at least two:

Russian President with his decisions made, his leadership style and the

psychological state of Russian society.

In this paper we will focus on description of Putin’s image transformation

during 16 years of his power in Russian mentality and try to find those factors

that made it possible.

2. Some theoretical foundations of the study of Putin’s perception by

Russian citizens

The study of political perception is aimed to understand how leaders’

public images take shape in public mentality.

Exploring the formation of political images in Russia during more than

two decades [Shestopal E.,2004,2008,2015] led us to conclusion: in order to

penetrate and describe this process, we need to understand how people view and

sense political reality. The necessity of studying political perception was

prompted by the quick transformations of Russian politics in the post-Soviet

period, which exposed political institutions to rapid change. The public,

however, often had a very accurate concept of politics. To prove it, however, we

needed to integrate the variety of data into a theoretical model, both consistent

and non-contradictory. Such a model cannot currently be found in contemporary

political psychology as well as in political science in general. Studies of

politicians’ perception are mostly focused on electoral campaigns and are aimed

to trace the changes in public perception of particular candidates, in particular

moments of their campaigns. [Feldman S., Conover P.J , 1983,1986]. The more

fundamental and general studies are quite rare [Sniderman et all, 1993,Sullivan

et all, 2007,King Pu-tsung, 1997; Presnjakova L.,2000, Melnikova O.,Goroshko

E.,2001].

For this reason, developing a model for interpreting political perception

was our priority task.

We consider two basic questions related to studying political perception.

The first one is connected with the nature of political images and their

psychological structure. The second issue concerns the factors that determine

political images.

The concept of perception has been widely explored in psychology. The

term ‘social perception’ was introduced by J. Bruner within his project ‘New

Look’. Later, in his joint work with Leo Postman, the term was used to denote

the perception of social objects: personalities, groups, wider social

communities, and the society as a whole. [J. Bruner, and L. Postman, 1949;

J. Bruner, and R. Tagiuri, 1959].

But political perception has some peculiarities that distinguish it from

other types of perception [Fiske S, Neuberg S. 1990, p.1-74]. Shestopal

E.,2002].

First of all, political perception is not a mere reflection of objective reality

in a person’s mind. Rather, it aims to interpret and evaluate political power and

political leaders (Aleksandrov Yu,2007, AleksanderovYu. and Kobleneva M.,,

2011] .

Secondly, it is distinguished by a closer connection between cognitive

and emotional components of perception.

Thirdly, it is always mediated mainly by Media.

Political perception is a mental reproduction of political objects – such as

political power, leaders, parties, governments, etc. – in public or individual

mentality. Hence, images are basic elements or “bricks” of this construction. In

psychology, an image denotes a generalized view of the world (objects or

processes) which results from processing information received through sense

organs[Vosprijatije i dejatelnost,1974].

Scholars offer various interpretations of an image. Within our study an

image will imply a mental reproduction of a leader, a party, government,

organization, etc. in public and individual mind.

Meanwhile, a public image or a brand will signify an image that is

designed and promoted deliberately.

2.2.Psychological Structure of a Political Image

A complex stereoscopic nature is what distinguishes an image, including

a political one, from concepts, attitudes, and other psychological phenomena.

Consequently, we need to single out its separate levels and components for

further analysis. An image is connected not only with cognitive but also with

emotional and behavioral aspects of personality. When evaluating the objects

perceived, it employs such parameters as attractiveness, strength, and activity.

The structure of an image also comprises verbal and visual components.

There are several difficulties we should be aware of when describing the

psychological structure of a political image

First of all, all types of images share the following general feature: their

structure includes both rational and unconscious components. [Granberg et

all,1988, Caplan B., 2001,Shestopal E.,2011]. The rational components are the

characteristics of a perceived political object which a person realizes or gives

account of. For instance, a respondent can describe what he likes or dislikes

about a politician, and explain why. The cognitive mechanisms are the ones

mainly activated at the conscious level.

Studying the political mentality of Russian people almost for the entire

post-Soviet period, we observed an interesting peculiarity. Very often

respondents cannot formulate sound arguments in favor of their answer.

Sometimes they do not realize the nature of their political choice. However, this

choice is always connected with certain emotions.

Emotions dominate at the unconscious level of perception. People hardly

ever realize them. They often cannot explain – even to themselves, to say

nothing of others – their attitude to a party, a leader, a country or the

government. A respondent may try to justify his political position, but such an

explanation might be unreliable: in this case, we deal with

rationalization.According to our previous study, when a political system is

unstable, citizens may lack firm rational views on politics; consequently, there

choice is primarily dictated by emotions

Secondly, we can single out attractiveness, strength, and activity in a

political image: or rather scales of attractiveness/unattractiveness,

strength/weakness, and activity/passivity. These three dimensions were

suggested by Ch. Osgood in his study of personality .We applied them to

political images. In our study, attractiveness of a political leader was identified

using the following characteristics:

- appearance (clothes and behavior) and physical characteristics

(health/illness, physique, corpulence/thinness, bad habits,

masculinity/femininity, age, temperament, and physical attractiveness);

- psychological features (character, personal qualities, and turns of

phrase) and moral values;

- political characteristics and professional qualities (experience, political

views, leadership qualities, political skills, and competence).

Regardless of how attractive the qualities of a political leader are, they

should also be assessed from the perspective of strength and activity. Strength

clearly enhances the attractiveness of a political image. Evaluating respondents’

answers according to this parameter, we can screen out many characteristics

(e.g., professional competence) which seem 100% attractive, but, without

strength, are of little significance for a consistent assessment or political

forecast.

Strength plays a special role in the Russian political culture and,

particularly, in the post-Soviet one. The Russian and Soviet traditions rather

ambiguously treat not only strength, but also coercion, violence. However, the

attitude to both is mostly positive, which is linked with Russia’s historical and

cultural background rooted in the collective unconscious. Remarkably, hardly

any respondent will openly approve strength, to say nothing of violence. Yet,

even when giving a conscious evaluation of the qualities they like or dislike, the

respondents reveal a less conscious layer of attitudes. This layer is connected

with the judgment about politicians or parties in the light of their

strength/weakness.

The given characteristics of strength, to a large extent, apply to the

parameter of activity. Activity refers to the exercise of authority. We revealed

that both strength and activity have certain standard values; and any downward

or upward deviations reduce attractiveness of an image in the eyes of

respondents.

As a rule, people clearly realize strength and activity peculiar to political

objects. However, these parameters are also evaluated unconsciously, and such

unconscious perception can be registered.

Thirdly, it makes sense to single out and separately study visual and

verbal elements in political images. The etymology of the Russian word ‘obraz’

(an equivalent of the English ‘image’) points, first of all, to visual perception.

Perception of visual political information has always been important. Modern

politics is dominated by the Internet and television which mainly offer visual

images, packing all political information in sets of pictures. Visual perception is

easier for a human mind, since it rests on more ancient mechanisms of the first-

signal system. And it is well-known that most of the information received by the

brain comes through visual channels (i.e., eyes).

Admittedly, people do not fully realize the vague and partial information

they use to build up a political image. Nevertheless, they possess a precise

psychological tool for assessing political images. This tool enables them to

make choices. Though these might not be fully rational, they are acceptable for

the people, at least emotionally.

Below we provide a generalized scheme of the psychological structure of

an image. We offered this scheme for analyzing all types of political images

(see Fugure 1).

Figure 1. Structure of a political image

2.3.Determinants of Political Perception

It is impossible to adequately evaluate images of political objects

without due regard to the causal relationships underlying perception. By these,

we imply stable and situational factors; the factors connected with the objects

perceived; and the ones associated with the perceiving subject. Territorial,

temporal, and communicative factors also perform an important role in

perception. Below we give a model describing the entire interaction system of

the factors mentioned. They act as independent variables and affect images

which are dependent variables ( see Figure 2.)

Figure 2.Factors that determine a political image

Cognit

ive

Em

oti

onal

Beh

avio

ura

l

Att

ract

iven

ess

Str

ength

Act

ivit

y Rational

components

Unconscious

components

Verbal

components

Visual

components

Communicative factors

3.Methodology of a study.

The study of politician’s image necessitates a search for appropriate

methods helping avoid pitfalls. These are connected with unconscious

perception of political leaders, and sensitivity of the object of perception. We

chiefly imply respondents’ trend to dodge straightforward questions about

acting politicians. Russian citizens are reluctant to comment on politicians,

especially those in power. This particularly refers to the elder generation who

vividly remember the Soviet political practices. According to them, the direct

questions are politically incorrect.

Political context

Stable

factors

Unstable

factors

Objective factors

Image of a political

leader Space (territorial)

factors

Temporal factors

Subjective factors

Psychological factors:

moods, needs, motives,

values of respondents

Socio-demographic

factors: gender, age,

education, job

Object of perception:

Political leaders

Another reason for such behavior is that respondents do not realize their

genuine attitude to politicians.

The third problem refers to reliability of the answers to direct questions,

such as ‘Will you vote for X, if elections take place tomorrow?’ These are

regularly posed to voters during election campaigns. In certain political context,

however, such questions cannot offer a reliable basis for real voting behavior

forecasts. We designed methodology aiming to detect respondents’ unconscious

layer of attitudes most of which are formed long before elections.

3.1.Research instruments. On the one hand, we required tools for

disclosing people’s opinions about Russia’s political leaders and registering

their preferences at the rational level. On the other, - we sought a method for

measuring their unconscious attitudes towards politicians. The analysis tool

included a topic guide for the in-depth interview.

3.2.The study procedure is based on focused interviews. We used in-

depth interviews, because, unlike focus groups, they involve only one

participant and thus yield maximally individual answers unaffected by group

pressure. [O.T. Melnikova, and E.I. Goroshko,2001]. During these, respondents

are shown, one by one, the black-and-white photos of three politicians. Unlike

verbal stimuli (including only a politician’s name), the visual ones are more

relevant for our task. Even if respondents do not recognize politicians, they will

be able to answer what they like or dislike about them and voice their

associations therewith. We interviewed respondents only about three politicians,

because they needed some time to familiarize themselves with the study

method.

The major criteria for choosing photos were a politician’s recognizability

and distinctive features (‘differential characteristics’). The latter distinguish one

politician from another in citizens’ perception [Shestopal E.,NovikovaGrund M,

1996]. The photos were black-and-white, because we needed to elicit

associations with color. We required the stimulus material that would not have

an unintended effect on perception.

3.3. The Sample.The study of Putin’s image has been conducted from

March 2000 till the April of 2016 periodically one-two times a year. The sample

in each stage contained not less than 200 respondents in each of 8 regions of

Russia, that is more than enough for a qualitative research of such a type. The

sample was balanced in terms of gender, age, education level. We had no aim to

obtain data representative for Russia as a whole but at each stage we included

regions of different types.

Processing of the interviews results was done both by scaling

respondents’ assessments of personal qualities of a leader and by political and

psychological analysis of particular answers. The image of politician was

analyzed both on a rational and unconscious levels. Exposure of unconscious

level of the politician’s image was achieved by analyzing fixed associations

with an animal, color and smell. Both, on rational and on unconscious level the

politician’s images were analyzed along such parameters as attractiveness,

strength and activity.

At the same time, the sample was balanced according to gender, age,

education.

3.4. Analysis and Interpretation. In accordance with the methodology

used, the survey comprises two types of questions. The first one is designed to

register the rational assessment of politicians. It includes the questions on

politicians’ recognizability and citizens’ intention to cast their votes for a

particular candidate; as well as questions about people’s likes and dislikes

towards politicians and their opinion about why these politicians need power.

The second type of questions was supposed to register associations with

animals, color, and smell, and thus shed light on respondents’ unconscious

attitudes. These three sorts of associations spotlight different unconscious

layers: associations with animals refer to the shallowest ones and are most of all

subject to stereotypes; while those with smells are related to the deepest ones

and are least of all exposed to rationalization.

The data were processed by (1) scaling respondents’ evaluations of

politicians’ qualities, and (2) a qualitative politico-psychological analysis of

some of these evaluations, with them being further divided into rational and

unconscious levels. The basic scales used in assessing the perception of

politicians’ features were the same for both rational and unconscious levels of

perception: attractiveness/unattractiveness, strength/weakness, and

activity/passivity. The dual scales proved very convenient in revealing integral

evaluations of politicians’ images among a variety of respondents and in

comparing the perception of one politician with that of all others.

At the rational level, we utilized the scale of politicians’

attractiveness/unattractiveness to find out the frequency, the emotional sign,

and the correlation between positive and negative qualities; as well as the share

of negative and positive evaluations in the general number of the qualities

mentioned by the respondents. We rated evaluations according to the object of

evaluation:

appearance (clothes, behavior);

physical characteristics (health/illness, physique,

corpulence/thinness, bad habits, masculinity/femininity, age,

temperament, and physical attractiveness);

moral and psychological peculiarities (character, certain

personal qualities, turns of phrase, and ethical values of a politician);

purely political and professional qualities (political views,

organizational skills, and leadership potential).

On the strength/weakness scale, respondents most often ascribe strength

or/and weakness to politicians’ appearance, physical characteristics,

psychological and moral features, and political and professional qualities.

The activity/passivity scale is designed to evaluate public activities, the

exercise of authorities, and images associated with a politician. It is subject to

the same algorithm as two previous scales are: we code answers and then

calculate their ratio with regard to the overall number of answers related to a

politician.

After coding respondents’ answers and making a database, we processed

the results using SPSS.

Since we study the images of Russian leaders by analyzing how they are

perceived by rank-and-file citizens, there arises a natural question: what is the

relation between real political figures and citizens’ images thereof?

The nature of changes observed in people’s opinion presents an equally

complicated challenge. We have been studying citizens’ political perception for

many years. The quantitative deviations we registered in people’s evaluations

refer practically to all leading politicians. Sociological surveys also testify to the

sharp differences in evaluating the same qualities of a politician over time. It is

absolutely unclear how to evaluate such drastic changes. Only in rare cases they

were caused by politicians themselves. The given unexplainable shifts in social

moods partly arise from the unstable nature of public mind. It has not fully

normalized after explosion-like reforms of early 1990s. The fluctuations of

public opinion about numerous political issues are chaotic and unconscious.

This also refers to evaluating politicians, especially unknown ones. In Russian

context, people’s opinion, as defined in sociology, often proves merely

unformed. It is more reasonable to speak about situational evaluations, moods,

etc. Obviously, it does not make sense to seek any logic in their variations.

Our immediate task was to:

a) analyze respondents’ rational answers to disclose what politicians’

qualities respondents take notice of and classify as important or unimportant,

positive or negative;

b) analyze respondents’ associations and identify their hidden messages

about what politicians’ qualities respondents noted and evaluated

unconsciously;

c) compare the results (a) and (b).

We proceed from the hypothesis that respondents’ answers hold many

layers of information about the attitude to politicians. The upper layer

consists of rational, characteristics. To interpret them, we utilize simple

scales based on Osgood’s three-dimensional structure of personality –

attractiveness, strength, and activity.

We singled out unconscious elements in the images of politicians by

analyzing the answers to open-ended questions containing their rational

evaluations which also contain a deeper, unconscious layer. We employed the

method of fixed associations with animals, colors, and smells. Unlike Sigmund

Freud’s popular free association technique, we sought to elicit fixed

associations which were artificially limited to the three groups mentioned.

Social psychologists3 tried to use associations with other objects (car models,

family members, types of trees, etc.) They, however, are more suitable for

focus-group discussions rather than in-depth interviews (in studying politicians’

images). We tested the three types of associations mentioned above, and they

proved effective. The major difficulty with the given method is to interpret the

results.

The analysis is based on the studies of Putin’s image carried out from

March 2000till the end of 2014. This permits us to trace the changes in Putin’s

image during a long period of his public career.

4.Results of the study and discussion

4.1.Putin’s First presidency (2000-2004)4

Putin was elected the President in 2000, after Boris Yeltsin’s unexpected

resignation. The former leader expected Putin to pursue the same policy.

Moreover, the new President was expected to defend Yeltsin’s interests and

those of his ‘Family’5. This is why Putin had been bound by the promises given

to Yeltsin for the whole of his first term. This was also sensed by the Russians

who gave Putin their votes during the presidential elections.

By the end of the 1990s, the country had been exhausted by political

instability. Everybody needed confidence and security. And Putin successfully

responded to this social demand. His key advantage, however, was that he was

an absolute opposite of Yeltsin. Yeltsin was old, whereas Putin was young;

Yeltsin was sick, whereas Putin was fit and healthy; Yeltsin was suspected of

dishonest deals, whereas Putin had an impeccable, untarnished reputation. This

list might be continued. People required a radical change of authorities; and

Putin’s image offered a perfect solution.

During his first term, Putin was viewed as Yeltsin’s hand-picked

successor. At the same time, people considered him a complete opposite of the

former President. It is no coincidence that Putin’s moral and psychological

virtues and shortcomings offered a marked contrast to Yeltsin’s image, when

assessed at the attractiveness scale (seeFigure 3.).

Figure 3.Attractivity of Putin’s Image at the rational level

Ma

rch

.00

Oct

.00

Ma

rch

.01

Sep

.01

Ma

rch

.02

Feb

.03

July

.03

No

v.0

3

Ma

rch

.04

appearance 28 24 16 10,5 27 15 21 13 10

Physical traits

21 21 30 16 33 10 0 0 5

Psychological traits

71 54 23 26 63 40 50 70 30

Moral traits

24 11 16 32 52 15 17 70 20

Political, professional and business

69 78 36 32 4 40 60 60 63

traits

The respondents have been emphasizing these qualities during Putin’s

entire presidential career. However, Putin’s advantages stood out against

Yeltsin’s image particularly in 2000. It is exactly these advantages that ensured

the electoral popularity of the new President.

For the whole of his first term, Putin’s image had been distinguished by,

at first, psychological qualities and, later, political ones. The political features,

both positive (they prevailed) and negative, were gradually becoming more

noticeable. They were particularly in demand at the beginning of and at the end

of the first term. Putin was expected to design a new political strategy.

Strength and activity are as significant as attractiveness in a politician’s

image. At the end of Putin’s first term, his image was associated with greater

strength in comparison with the beginning of this term. The same refers to the

activity parameter. Thus, the first term reinforced the positive image of the

President in the public mind.(see Figure 4).

Figure 4.Strength and activity in Putin’s image during his first

Presidency

As far as motives for power are concerned, Russian politicians are

normally associated with ambitiousness as well as the desire of money and

fame. Putin, conversely, was most often considered to need power for social

benefit (‘for doing the right things’). This motive dominated Putin’s image

during his first and second terms. Interestingly, sometimes the respondents

pointed out the motive ‘a politician does not need power’ with regard to Putin’s

first term. It shows that they attributed a lack of independence to the President.

At the beginning of Putin’s presidential career, these respondents noted the

possibility that the President’s decisions could be influenced by ‘the Family’,

security agencies (‘siloviki’), oligarchs, state bureaucrats, and Putin’s inner

circle. Later, however, they practically abandoned this thought. Hence, people

concluded that, by the end of the first term, Putin managed to gain

independence from Yeltsin and his ‘Family’. Almost half of respondents (about

42%) believed that the President truly defended national interests – not those of

oligarchs, top authorities, and security agencies.

The respondents usually single out a few aspects of Putin’s image. First

of all, they appreciate that the President returned them ‘stability’ and self-

respect. They entirely lacked these during Yeltsin’s presidency.6Secondly, Putin

was viewed as a reserved, secretive personality. Many respondents pointed out

that he remained as mysterious as he was at the beginning of his political career.

Thus, he was considered ‘a dark horse’ or ‘an éminencegrise’. Thirdly, all the

respondents noted the status of ‘the President’. According to them, it definitely

reinforced the positive image of Putin as a person. The final characteristic also

has a psychological nature: Putin is usually expected to take decisive actions.

During the first years of Putin’s presidency the social trust in the national

leader was extremely high. This is why he was called ‘the Teflon president’

even then. In fact, Putin’s electoral rating had both highs and lows. According

to our data, the percentage of citizens willing to vote for him reached a

maximum (85%) in February 2003. This value was not repeated ever after.

4.2.The second Putin’s presidency (2004-2008)

The data show that during Putin’s second term (2004-2008) his image

was changing. This was also manifested in verbal evaluations of the President.

The majority of respondents became more critical of authorities in general and

of the President in particular. This is what makes the difference between Putin’s

first and second republics. Right before the 2000 presidential elections, Putin

was supported by 43% of voters. Meanwhile, after the elections the figure

increased by 14%. However, during the second election cycle the electorate’s

behavior was governed by a different logic. Immediately after the 2004

presidential elections, the national leader gained approval among the majority of

the Russians. In autumn 2004, however, the public trust in him started to

decline.

It is absolutely clear why the Russians became much more pessimistic

about their future during Putin’s second term. Their hopes connected with

Putin’s first republic faded away. Meanwhile, the social mistrust of authorities

grew very deep. Though it was not as profound as during Yeltsin’s presidency,

it indicated a rapid loss of people’s faith in politicians. The citizens believed

that authorities in general and the executive branch in particular were passive

and had an indifferent attitude to social needs.

Putin created a good image of authorities. Yet the institution of the

presidency inevitably weakened. This occurred due to a new trend which

existed during neither Yeltsin’s presidency, nor Putin’s first term: the

President’s public influence markedly decreased because of security agencies.

They occupied a more influential role in the public mind. Putin involved his

former reliable colleagues from security agencies in politics. And this is what

played a cruel trick on him. During Putin’s second term, the respondents

considered security agencies more influential than the President.

During Putin’s first term, the social attitude to authorities was extremely

negative, while expectations from the President were, paradoxically, very high.

In Putin’s second term, the opinion on authorities was growing even worse, and

the President’s image was not improving, either. On the whole, people still had

a positive image of Putin. The respondents pointed out the strength and

increased activity of their leader. They tended to value his political and

professional qualities. At the same time, the public was forming quite a critical

opinion of the President’s personal and professional characteristics. People grew

tired of Putin not because he was a well-known politician. Rather, they started

making complaints about state decisions which Putin often failed to take. They

were dissatisfied with his lack of response to social moods. Besides, many acute

problems were still unresolved: from poverty to the Chechen War. Nevertheless,

the study into unconscious (especially, visual) components of the President’s

image showed that during Putin’s second term the society unconsciously

continued to believe in his positive potential.

4.3.Putin as Chairman of Government

The Putin-Medvedev Tandem

There were heated social debates at the end of Putin’s second term.

People were concerned about whether the President will quit his post or attempt

to amend the Constitution to begin his third term. This is exactly what certain

representatives of the political elite (beurocracy) wanted. They did not need the

forthcoming changes in the political system, because these are often triggered

by replacement of the current head of the state.

As soon as Dmitry Medvedev was elected the President in 2008, Putin’s

image started, again, to change. First of all, there arises the following question:

what exactly affects Putin’s image – his official role or his own personality? In

2008 Putin occupied a new role: he was appointed the Chairman of

Government. What impact did it have on the public attitude to him?

When Putin took the position of the Prime Minister, the respondents

continued to approve of his political views. Moreover, their support was even

higher than during Putin’s second presidential term( seeFugure 5)

Figure 5. Do you approve his political views(2010-2012)?

.

From April 2010 to April 2011, the strength parameter of Putin’s image

skyrocketed: from 16.3% up to 66%. This was obvious to both Putin’s

supporters and opponents. Unconsciously, however, the respondents associated

Putin with even greater strength. During this period, the activity parameter of

Putin’s image was also augmenting. The respondents pointed out the growth of

Putin’s leadership potential, masculinity, and general attractiveness. However,

the rise of protest moods in the society entailed an increase in the number of

Putin’s opponents. Meanwhile, the unconscious attitude to Putin was much

more positive than the rational one. Hence, unconsciously people still were

expecting Putin’s good prospects. And he took advantage of that in the 2012

pre-election campaign.

It is noteworthy that, as the Chairman of Government, Putin faced with

considerable changes in the political context. We have already mentioned the

2008 economic crisis. Apart from that, the second half of 2011 proved quite

challenging for Putin and seriously affected his image. The rise of protest

moods in autumn-winter 2011 turned into a powerful factor influencing the

image of Putin as a candidate for presidency.

4.4. Putin. The third term

55 59.4

44.8

21.7 20.8

31.4

16.3

8.5

22.1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

April 10 April11 Jan 12

yes

no

partly

The entire year prior to the 2012 presidential elections was distinguished

by general uncertainty and instability of all political circumstances. We

analyzed Putin’s image (1) directly before and (2) directly after the presidential

elections,7 (3) a year after them and (4) twice in 2014. These data clearly

indicated that Putin’s third term stands out against all previous years starting

from 2000. Moreover, the year 2014 is completely different, because it marks

the end of all post-Soviet development and the beginning of a new historical

period which is incomparable to the previous history.

Below we will trace the changes in perception of a presidential race

winner while he started his third term.

On the eve of the presidential elections, the number of Putin’s supporters

considerably increased. (see figure 6).

Figure 6. Do you approve his political views(2012-2013)?

This is the most important change in his image. In our view, the reason

for it is that Putin clarified his political priorities in his seven pre-election

articles. However, the current programme of the President is still not totally

clear. Even after the elections, many people did not fully understand Putin’s

views. This was manifested in the respondents’ answers. One out of five

noted:‘some of Putin’s positions appeal to me and some do not’; ‘I do not

understand his intentions. They used to be clear to me, but now they are not.’

The logic of approval or disapproval of Putin’s plans and actions is very

difficult to reveal in the respondents’ rational evaluations. The number of the

President’s opponents had been growing right until 2014. The radical change

did not occur even after the Crimea’s reunion with Russia. It took place only by

autumn 2014.

At the same time, the share of people who evaluated Putin’s

psychological qualities very positively was augmenting. The approval rating of

the President, as a personality, was equally high only in early 2000s. However,

Putin’s moral features were less approved compared to the first two terms of his

presidency.

Strength during the first year of Putin’s third term, it was rated quite high.

Gradually, this parameter is growing even larger in the mind of both Putin’s

supporters and opponents.

2014. Crisis. Has the “Smutnoje vremja” (Time of Troubles) Gone?

In 2014, Ukraine’s political situation sharply worsened. In response,

Putin took active measures to consolidate the Russia’s independence and defend

national interests. There occurred a symbolic фсешщт: Russia reunited with the

Crimea. All these events became a turning point in Russia’s contemporary

history. The President managed to return the national self-respect which was

lost during the Perestroika and particularly under Yeltsin. The social

expectations with regard to the leader started to change. People wanted Putin to

implement a strong and tough policy. The President became different himself:

he grew more active, more dynamic, and stronger. And the citizens immediately

noticed that.

Under the pressure of all these events, the Russian society united around

one common national idea. Experts had been trying to find it since Yeltsin in

the 1990s. The idea absorbed two groups of notions. On the one hand, it

included the Soviet symbols of the great victory over Nazism and loyalty to the

memory of fathers. On the other, it comprised the notions of imperial

conservatism, Orthodoxy, and ancient Russian traditions which are older and

more profound than the Soviet patriotism. The new national idea evoked a wide

response among the people. At the same time, they rejected liberal

cosmopolitism and the appeals of the Bolotnaya Square oppositionists.

Naturally enough, the ideological diversity of political discourse

significantly narrowed. Putin’s opponents disappeared. They became invisible

even on the Internet forums and blogs which are independent from state

censorship.

Putin’s image evolved under these very circumstances.8 In spring 2014,

immediately after Russia’s reunion with the Crimea, the President’s

views’approval rating soared from 40.5% (December 2013) up to 69%. Only

16% of respondents expressed mistrust of the leader. It is much more amazing,

however, that by the end of 2014 the number of Putin’s supporters had grown

even larger (up to 71.1%), although the ruble sharply fell and the general

situation got even more alarming (see Figure 7).

Figure 7.Do you approve his political views (2014)?

According to our respondents, Putin’s major advantages include a

successful foreign policy, the display of strength and activity, and independence

of his political views.

As far as Putin’s motivational profile is concerned, each year from 2000

respondents noted that the President’s most important motive for power is the

well-being of the Russian society. In November 2014, the rating of this motive

was the highest – 56.1%. This percentage is even larger than the one registered

in the spring of the same year.

Putin has never been criticized for a desire of ostentatious success. This

motive was assessed last time at the end of 2014, and then its rating was the

highest – 36%. In general, the respondents have a positive view of the

President’s ambitions. At the same time, some people think that Putin is in

politics only for the sake of power.

In Russia, people have always considered whether a politician is

unselfish, or, on the contrary, egotistic, mercenary and greedy. During Putin’s

second term and particularly in late 2011-early 2012, the Internet offered

numerous publications about Putin’s striving for personal gain, millions of

dollars in bank accounts, etc. This undoubtedly affected the social image of the

President. The respondents called him mercenary and dishonest. Besides, they

emphasized his striving for personal gain. This unfavorable opinion reached its

maximum value in December 2012 – 30%. In 2014, however, there occurred a

sharp change of public attitude. The number of respondents who associated the

President with the motive power for money rapidly fell down to 8.2%. This

percentage was registered only in 2000 when Putin was known for honesty and

untarnished reputation (by contrast with Yeltsin)( see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Why, do you think, this person seeks power for? (2014)?

April14 Nov 14

For money 10,7 8,2

For business 44 56,1

For ambitions 28 36

Power for the sake of power 18 14

He does not need power 0,7 2,7

Attractiveness of the President’s Image. In 2014, the respondents started

to pay attention to the President’s appearance. This was not registered during

other years of our studies. Specifically, they positively evaluated Putin’s athletic

and presentable look, as well as his ability to behave in public. The interest in

the President’s appearance was equally high in early 2000, during his first term.

Perhaps, this is connected with Putin’s increased public activity.

Moral Features. In 2012 and 2013, part of respondents reproached the

President for too much PR. In 2014, meanwhile, the share of such expressions

grew inconsiderable. Putin’s divorce from his wife also receives different

interpretations. Some respondents show a positive attitude to this fact. They

consider it a display of honesty and integrity: ‘He treated his wife very honestly.

This is great.’ Others regard it as his personal drawback. The reason for it is that

Putin is often identified with the image of an ideal politician. Such should be a

good family man: ‘He seems to be fighting for stability. Why has he divorced

his wife then?’

The President’s political and professional qualities have been of primary

interest to the respondents throughout all years of the studies. They received both

positive and negative evaluations. In 2012 and 2013, the negative ones prevailed.

Again, the year 2014 stands out against the previous periods. First of all, during

this year the respondents’ interest in Putin’s political and professional qualities

sharply increased by comparison with other parameters of his attractiveness.

Secondly, the number of those who positively evaluated these qualities reached a

historical maximum in fall 2014 and exceeded the share of negative evaluations.

(see Figure 9)

Figure 9. Attractiveness of Putin’s image at the rational level (2014)

.

It is noteworthy that positive evaluations more often refer to Putin’s

foreign policy.

At the same time, the social interpretation of the President’s internal

policy is contradictory. Putin’s professional qualities, as expressed in home

policy, are evaluated quite ambivalently. On the one hand, the respondents

believe that ‘Putin is a politician who indeed achieves his goals.’ The XXII

Olympic Winter Games in Sochi are considered one of his accomplishments:

‘The Games were great. The celebration was beautiful, too.’ On the other, Putin

is, as usual, reproached that his policy is insufficiently effective and major

social problems, including corruption, are still unresolved. However, the

percentage of such views is insignificant compared to positive evaluations.

Strength and Activity. As is revealed in verbal evaluations, the respondents

consider Vladimir Putin a very strong and active politician. They link it with his

behavioral and psychological characteristics. Remarkably, in November 2014

the strength parameter of Putin’s image achieved a historical maximum (since

25.5

45.1

59.1 51.2

5.4

17.7

55

78

3 3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

April14 Nov 14

Attractivity of Putin's image at the rational level

Appearance

psychological traits

Moral traits

Political professional and business traits

2000). Moreover, Putin’s strength is recognized even by those who disapprove

of the President and his policy. (see Figure 10)

Figure 10. Strength and activity in Putin’s image at the rational level

(2014)

The unconscious profile of Putin’s image shows that in 2014 there

emerged a few important trends in perception of the national leader. First of all,

there is incongruence between the rational answers (given by the respondents to

direct questions about Putin’s attractiveness, strength, and activity) and the

unconscious feelings about him. The attractiveness of Putin’s image is

undoubtedly the highest among all other politicians. And it grew even higher

compared to his previous terms and his position of Chairman of Government.

(see Figure 11)

Figure 11. Unconscious attractiveness in Putin’s image

67

75.1

70.7

66.9

62

64

66

68

70

72

74

76

Apr 14 Nov14

Streangth

activity

However, the respondents unconsciously find Putin’s image more

attractive than at the rational level. It signifies that the President has not

exhausted his potential yet.

The President is considered quite influential (39.8% in November 2014),

strong (72% in April2014), and active (62.7% in April). His leadership qualities

assessed by means of an association test received the highest rating in 2014, as

compared to all other years of observation.

At the same time, there is another trend. Many parameters of Putin’s

image reached maximum values in spring 2014. Since fall of the same year,

they started to decrease. This mainly refers to strength and activity. Their

decline, however, was impossible to detect in the respondents’ rational answers.

This is an alarming sign. Unconsciously, the respondents feel what escapes their

rational evaluaions. It should be noted that the President’s image has quite a

complex structure. For this reason, it is difficult to give an unambiguous

interpretation thereof. The positive change is that people do not associate

Putin’s image with mercenariness and selfishness anymore. The aspects of the

image connected with the President’s independence increased – this is also a

favorable change. At certain points of Putin’s political career, the respondents

had a feeling that the President could fall a victim to circumstances or enemies.

Today, however, such feelings practically faded away (0.6%). (see Figure 13).

Figure 12. Status in animal associations

Apr14 Nov 14

Owner of the forest 14,7 34

hunter 42,7 17,9

Hole keeper 4,7 8,2

servant 16 13,4

Finance keeper 0 0,6

victim 4,7 0,6

Not from this forest 13,3 6,7

After Crimea

The most recent study was made in April 2016. During a year and a half

since the last measurement there happened a number of events both in a country

and in the world. One could expect serious changes in Putin’s perception by

Russian citizens. It is obvious that the only parameter that could not change was

recognizability as long time ago it had reached 100%.It is interesting that

answer to a question “Do you know who is this man?” always is followed by

emotional remarks and details of Putin’s biography. It is true both to his

supporters and opponents ( the first exceed the last by numbers:62% vs

12%).We should note that approval of his views slightly declined in April 2016

in comparison with November 2014 but the same tendency concerns his

opponents. We can suggest that this trend is the evidence of decline of interest

to politics in general and to Presidential image in particular .In general

attractiveness of Putin’s image at the rational level takes place now.( See

Figure 13).

Figure 13. Attractiveness / unattractiveness in Putin’s image.

November 2014- April 2016

What do you like/dislike in this person?

Like

Traits November 2014 April 2016

Appearance 45,1 27

Physical traits

Psychological traits 51,2 33

Moral traits 17,7 8

Political and professional

traits 78

53

Like nothing 2,7 5

Dislike

November 2014 April 2016

Appearance 13,1 8

Physical traits

Psychological traits 12,2 9

Moral traits 16,1 18

Political and professional

traits 41,3

42

Like everything 26,4 8

We can see a nonlinear logic of rational evaluations of particular traits of

the president by respondents. It is understandable that under the influence of

economic problems since 2014 people started to see his psychological or

professional traits worse than before. But this does not explain the decline of

negative evaluations either. The only exception ( less than two percent)

concerns moral traits: negative evaluations has grown while positive declined.

This is an important trend that give us an idea of scale for evaluation of a leader

that our respondents use. Another important point concerns the decline of his

supporters and growth of his opponents These figures are quite small (8 и 5%

coordinately) but they can be regarded as markers for psychological changes in

Putin’s electorate.

For evaluation of rational level of perception we use not only parameter

of attractiveness but also those of strength / weakness and activity / passivity.

Which also has transformed after Crimea. Positive evaluation of strength have

declined from75,1% tо 69% while the was also a decline of those who disliked

his strength( from 31.6% tо 8%). But simultaneously there was a growth of the

number of those who did not like his weakness (from 1.8% tо 17%). The lust

figures mean that there is a decline of those who were afraid of his strength and

the growth of those who is not ready to deal with his weakness.

Similar trends one can find in perception of activity of the President. It is

positively evaluated by the majority of respondents ( after November 2014 their

number have grown from61.9% tо 70%. At the same time those who believe

that he is not active enough also have grown up to 24%. These data show

expectations of Russian society towards their President: people push him to be

more active and strong.

Unconscious level of perception reveals rather different accents. For

instance attractiveness became a higher priority in comparison with

strength/Similar to a rational level attractiveness slightly declined(from 69.6%

tо 59%), but it stays very high. But what is even more important, the scale of

Putin’s personality is regarded as very high by 56,1% ( it is a historical

maximum during all the period of our study, while small and medium

associations declined.

It is positive for image of the President that at the unconscious level there

is a substantial increase of his strength and leadership capacities as well as

masculinity. Predominance of dark and deem colors witnesses of his power

capacities At the same time we have revealed some negative tendencies, in

smell associations we have fixed the declined of natural scents and appearance

of artificial ones ( smells of the library, petrol, money, perfume etc).

In general evaluation of Putin’s image can be reduced to the answer to a

question weather respondent is ready to vote for him. In comparison with 2014

the number of his voters slightly declined but it is very high ( about 60%). This

is not a result of disillusionment in him but the result of diminishing of the

interest in elections as people are too busy with everyday survival and have no

time and energy for politics.

Conclusions

Our studies indicate that during 16 years of Putin’s political career his

image had been exposed to considerable and non-linear changes. These are

quite controversial, but nevertheless mark clear stages in perception of the

President by Russian society.

The first stage includes Putin’s first term. In a sense, it was ‘a

honeymoon’ of the President-citizen relations. Putin’s image was distinguished

by many positive features, including strength and activity. Moreover, all these

were manifested in both rational and unconscious judgments of the respondents.

After the destructive 1990s, the public mainly expected stability and order, and

the new leader met these expectations. Also, the President’s image combined

the attractiveness of novelty with strength and honesty. At the same time, during

the first years of Putin’s presidency the leader’s image remained mysterious to a

certain degree. This was connected with his former service in the KGB.

Putin’s second term marks the second stage in his perception. Today

many respondents view the President’s first and second terms as one whole. Yet

the second term left its own imprint on Putin’s image. It includes both positive

and negative changes. During this period, the social criticism of the leader’s

personal and professional qualities was increasing. Not infrequently, he failed to

make necessary decisions and was insufficiently responsive to social moods. At

the same time, the analysis of the respondents’ unconscious perception of the

leader revealed that quite many people unconsciously still believed in their

President during his second term.

Numerous publications accused the President of being selfish

(mercenary). Despite that, the national leader was mainly associated with the

rapidly increasing motive of social benefit. The society was convinced that

Putin came to power to improve the nation’s life. However, during the same

period the President’s electoral attractiveness was falling, while the number of

his opponents was on the rise. To make things worse, not only Putin’s

personality, but also the institution of presidency was losing in attractiveness.

The reason for it is that security agencies (‘siloviki’) which Putin himself

involved in politics assumed the strongest public influence.

The perception trends of Putin’s second term partly continued into his

Government chairmanship. This was a less important role, but Putin managed to

preserve his political influence. His style of interaction with the society did not

change. He not only formed the Putin-Medvedev tandem, but also took the

leading role in it. It was very unusual for Russia’s politics. Thanks to his great

leadership potential, Putin coped with the harsh economic crisis of 2008 without

considerable losses. Besides, he preserved the major part of his electorate

despite the increasing protest moods in late 2011 and early 2012. This was his

primary advantage at the presidential elections when the political situation was

quite against him.

The third stage refers to the beginning of Putin’s third term. The

President clarified his political views. Besides, he sought to clearly outline his

policy and strategic objectives. This is what distinguishes Putin’s third term

from his first two ones and his government chairmanship. The beginning of

Putin’s third term was also marked by contradictory trends. On the one hand, in

2012-13 the President’s electoral attractiveness was decreasing. The

respondents criticized the leader for ambitiousness, love of power, and selfish

motives. On the other, - Putin’s leadership potential, strength, and activity

were growing.

The year 2014 marked a new stage in both Russia’s history and public

perception of the President. The aggravation of the international situation and

the acute economic crisis resulted in two important trends. These exerted a

considerable impact on Putin’s image and the public mood in general. First of

all, the major part of the society consolidated around the national leader.

Moreover, people united around one national idea, one common value system.

Authorities have been unable to come up with it during the previous post-Soviet

years. The country experienced such national unity neither in the 1990s-2000s,

nor even in the late Soviet period.

Secondly, the President became the heart of Russia’s consolidation. It

was manifested in his extraordinarily high ratings, the new quality of his

supporters, and acknowledgment of his strength on the part of rivals.

In 2014, the political situation seriously changed, and Putin, as a

politician, became of primary importance for the country. According to our

respondents, his key achievements include a successful foreign policy and

praiseworthy, admirable defense of national interests.

Thus, the analysis testifies that the country enters a new historic stage.

The importance of this stage is comparable to the End of the Time of Troubles

(SmutnojeVremja). This is a period of social consolidation where the

President’s image plays a crucial role.

1 http://fom.ru/Politika/10946

2 Ibid.

5Today very few people remember that in the 1990s ‘family’ did not imply only

President Yeltsin’s wife, daughters, and other close relatives. This notion also

meant his inner circle, including some oligarchs – for example, the odious Boris

Berezovskiy. The ‘family’ took advantage of wide self-enrichment

opportunities which became available due to its close relations with the

Kremlin.

6Our study into the images of Russian authorities shows that the authorities of

Yeltsin’s period receive a rating which is invariably lower than that of all other

historical periods. See Section 3.3.

7The President’s image was evaluated in January 2012, December 2012, and

April and November 2014.

8In 2014, Putin’s image was measured twice: in April and November. The first

measurement was made before Putin’s famous speech in the Kremlin which was

devoted to Russia’s reunion with the Crimea. The second was made after a

package of sanctions was applied to Russia and the rouble started to sharply fall.

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