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Transformations of a Memory ofTyranny in Syria: From Jamal Pasha to‘Id al-Shuhada’, 1914–2000Fruma ZachsVersion of record first published: 30 Jan 2012.

To cite this article: Fruma Zachs (2012): Transformations of a Memory of Tyranny in Syria: FromJamal Pasha to ‘Id al-Shuhada’, 1914–2000, Middle Eastern Studies, 48:1, 73-88

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Transformations of a Memory of Tyrannyin Syria: From Jamal Pashato ‘Id al-Shuhada’, 1914–2000

FRUMA ZACHS

Since the 1980s, both the public sector and academia have become saturated withreferences to individual and collective memory. Primarily, this has been attributed tothe rise of multiculturalism, the politics of victimization and regret, or the realizationthat the past can be (re)shaped in the present.1 Analogously, sociology has movedfrom the study of social structures and normative systems to that of practice,extending the functionalist characterization of culture as norms, values andattitudes, to culture as the constitutive symbolic dimension of all social processes.2

This new line of interpretation now also prevails in Middle East scholarship thatexamines the ways in which modern day regimes view the past. The events of theFirst World War and the appearance of ‘new’ countries in the Middle East createdopportunities for a broad spectrum of reconstructed memories. One such instance isthe oppressive government of Jamal Pasha3 (1914–17) in Syria and Lebanon duringthe First World War. This episode in Syrian history, which took place immediatelyprior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the beginnings of the Arab NationalMovement and the struggle between the Arabs and the Turks, remains a focus ofdiscourse in the Middle East in general and in Syria and Lebanon in particular.Jamal is remembered not only among Arabs but also among Armenians, Kurds andin the Yishuv.

In this article I define the social construction of memory as the varieties oftransformations through which memories are shaped at different periods.4 I showhow the social construction of memory is used by political elites to advance politicalinterests through the creation of national memories.

I consider both individual and collective memory to be structured by politicalarrangements, and see this as a process rather than a product. In line with otherauthors, I define collective memory as ‘the gathering of elements of the past, andjoining them together by and for the ‘‘public’’. What the public creates is not merelya cluster of individual memories because the whole is greater than the sum of itsparts. Collective memory is thus constructed through the actions of enlightenedgroups and individuals.’5

Thus, memory is not fixed or static but fluid. It is ‘not an un-changing vessel forcarrying the past into the present, memory is a process, not a thing, and its worksdifferently at different points in time’.6 It arises out of the activities of elite groups as

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 48, No. 1, 73–88, January 2012

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/12/010073-16 ª 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.644459

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much as individuals. As Maurice Halbwachs stated, memory connects representationand social experience.7 It is intimately linked to events which are constructed,socialized, transmitted, ritualized and performed.8

My main objective in this article is to examine discourse by the political elite inSyria that has reshaped collective memory. I do not deal with how different sectors ofsociety accepted or rejected this construction.9 Rather, I demonstrate how thememory of one particular episode in Syrian history – that of the rule of JamalPasha – has, over the years, gradually lost its original specific reference to the victimsof his rule, and has merged into a state discourse on martyrdom.

I discuss the memory of Jamal from two perspectives. The first is memoirs/accounts of individuals who lived during Jamal’s rule. These individual accountswritten by the political elite/figures are both individual repositories of memories butalso serve as the basis for the construction of collective memory. I then examine howthese memories were transformed in state symbolic practices of commemoration, inparticular ‘Id al-Shuhada’ (the national holiday of the martyrs) in three formativeperiods: Faisal (1918–20), the French Mandate (1920–46) and the regime of Hafiz al-Assad (1970–2000). These two perspectives highlight the transformations of theinitial events into the memory generated by the state.

My argument is that the way in which martyrs are remembered andcommemorated is informed by the pre-eminently political concerns of the politicalelite and the Syrian state authorities. Through an examination of first-hand accountswritten by the local elite and newspapers published during the French Mandate, andin official Ba’th party outlets during Assad’s reign, I show how the transformationsof the memory of Jamal served the political and national needs of the Syrian politicalelite and how his reshaped memory meshed with political, social and nationalchanges. On a more general level, the article raises questions about the transmission,presentation and alteration of memory over time by shifting the historiographicalfocus from ideology to imagery and from meaning to manipulation. Ultimately itillustrates how a memory has been reconstructed to suit specific interests and howthe past has been modified for present purposes.10 In what follows, I first brieflydepict key events in Jamal Pasha’s rule, and then analyse individual accounts by elitefigures who suffered at the hands of Jamal. Finally I focus on the collective memoryof Jamal’s victims as reflected in the modern day ‘Id al-Shuhada’.

Several historians have emphasized the impact of the First World War on nationalmemory in Europe. George Mosse describes a change in the form of memory afterthat war, highlighting in particular that burials and commemorations were handledby specifically created national commissions. He also discusses the fact thatmourning was more public than ever before, and that memories were re-fashionedinto a sacred experience.11 Similarly, John Gillis notes that the First World War gaverise to a massive democratization of the cult of the dead.12 Finally, Jay Winter, whorefers to this period as the ‘memory boom’,13 examines the new types of warmemorials that appropriated the devastation of universal war for nationalpurposes.14

The First World War also had extensive influence on the historical heritage of the‘new’ Middle Eastern countries. For the Arabs in general and Syria and Lebanon in

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particular it was also a decisive turning point. Najwa al-Qattan emphasizes that‘Syrian collective memory of the war has had an enduring effect on the constructionof identity in the region. In Ottoman Syria the war brought social disruption ofimmense magnitude’.15

The Syrian–Lebanese region underwent a confluence of factors during the war,such as forced exile, food shortages and famine, followed by a succession of harshwinters and severe epidemics that collectively resulted in widespread suffering anddeath.16 After the war a large number of Syrian men and women and theirdescendants preserved their memories of the conflict in writing. These texts areevidence in themselves of the enduring memory of the war in official as well aspopular culture, which still needs to be researched.17

In this respect Jamal Pasha’s rule in Syria during the First World War was atraumatic but also heroic time for the Syrians and the Lebanese. In many ways Jamalbecame the prototype of the horrors of the war and the attitude of the Turks towardthe Arabs.18 Ahmad Jamal Pasha (Ahmet Cemal Pasa, 1872–1922) was a leadingmember of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the national branch of theYoung Turks league, and a supporter of pan-Turanism.19 He was born in Mytileneon the island of Lesbos. Between 1908 and 1918, he was one of the most importantadministrators of the Ottoman government. He graduated from the Kuleli militaryhigh school in 1890, and in 1893 from the Military Academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye-yiSahane) in Constantinople. In the years that followed he held several positions,including a post in the Ministry for Military Issues (Seraskerlik Erkan-i Harbiye).

A year before the Young Turk revolution against the Ottoman Sultan AbdulHamid II, he became a member of the military board of the Third Army Corps. In1911 he was appointed Governor of Baghdad, but resigned in order to rejoin thearmy in the Balkan War. In 1912 he was promoted to colonel. At the end of the FirstBalkan War, he played an important part in the propaganda of the CUP againstnegotiations with Europe. In 1913, he was appointed Commander of Constantinopleand Minister of Public Works. At this time, together with Anwar Pasha and Tal‘atPasha, he assumed control of the Ottoman government. In 1914 Jamal became theNaval Minister in the Ottoman cabinet, and an important national figure.

When Turkey entered the war in 1914, Jamal was sent as commander-in-chief ofthe Fourth Army to Syria, where there had already been strident calls to dissociatethe Arabs from the Young Turks and encourage an Arab awakening. However,influenced by the war, the attitude of the CUP towards the Arab movement becametougher. In 1915 Jamal was given full military and civilian jurisdiction in Syria,which meant that all government decrees from Constantinople relating to Syria weresubject to his approval. After the failure of his expedition to attack the Suez Canal inFebruary 1915, he returned to Syria and ruthlessly condemned many Arab leaders todeath as ‘traitors’ claiming that they wanted to decentralize the Ottoman Empire and‘sell’ their countries to foreigners. His policy (also waged against the Armenians andKurds) earned him the epithet of al-Saffah (the butcher). Jamal not only battled withthe Arab nationalists, he also confiscated secret French documents that supposedlyrevealed the activities and names of Arab insurgents, confirming his belief that Syriawas on the verge of rebellion against Turkish rule.20

On 21 August 1915, 11 Arab notables (ten Muslims and one Christian) werehanged in al-Burj, the main square of Beirut, and on 6 May 1916 another group of 21

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of the most prominent Muslim and Christian leaders and journalists (17 Muslimsand four Christians) were executed at dawn – 14 went to the gallows in Beirut andseven in al-Marja Square in Damascus. This was the climax of Jamal’s repressivepolicy in the eyes of the local Arab population.

There were also other executions of individuals both in Syria and Lebanon. Nofewer than 71 notables were condemned to death in absentia. Many families wereexiled to remote regions of Anatolia, and much property was confiscated.21 ZeineZeine writes that ‘It may not be an exaggeration to say that Jamal Pasha’s rule inSyria was one of the determining factors that helped most of the Muslim Arableaders to make up their minds once and for all to break away completely from theOttoman Empire.’22

Jamal’s policies concerning the local Arab inhabitants, together with theexigencies and famine that afflicted the region during the war years, furtheralienated the population from the Ottoman government. The dissent was wide-spread. In June 1916, an Arab revolt was led by Amir Faisal and supported by theBritish.

In 1917, following the Ottoman Army’s defeat by the British, Jamal resigned fromthe 4th Army and returned to Constantinople. Soon after, Syria was ruled by Faisalas king, but only for two years (1918–20), and in 1920 the French established theirmandate in Syria. In 1922 Jamal was assassinated by an Armenian.23 In thefollowing years Jamal Pasha’s rule/era found its way in a variety of fashions and fora variety of purposes into the discourse on Arab, Syrian and Lebanese memory.

An individual account by a member of a political elite can enter into the constructionof collective memory, since individual voices of political figures can generate multipleinterpretations of memory. These accounts create narratives that help animate theevents in later years when the memory fades. The memoirs of Jamal’s executions areno different. Little documentation (and no pictures as far as I know) followed thehangings in Martyrs’ Square in 1915 and 1916, and their memory survives mainlythrough journalistic accounts, since the executions were carried out betweenmidnight and dawn, and public attendance was strictly forbidden. However, thememoirs written years later by people of the same generation depicted this importantepisode, and eventually fired popular imagination. A number of key figures of thenewly established Syrian and Lebanese states (e.g. intellectuals, notables, officers andpoliticians) had first-hand memories of Jamal Pasha’s rule. By placing theirexperiences in the context of the national/political discourse, and later publishingtheir memoirs, their own history was exposed to readers and was perhaps alsoavailable to those who later constructed the Syrian national narrative. This waspossible because several became key national figures.

Many accounts of that time, which were published from the 1970s to 1990s,incorporate deliberate shifts from the personal to the collective. Some authorssuffered personally from Jamal’s policies and others took a stand against him. Formany, Jamal Pasha’s rule in Syria is seen both as one of the heights of the nationalstruggle for freedom, and as a dark period in the history of Syria and Lebanon. Mostof them describe his cruelty, but at the same time refer to the dignity of the Arabs.Patriotism, sacrifice for the homeland, the suffering of the weak, bloodshed andhopelessness are some of the terms in which these narratives are couched.

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Some writers emphasize how these events affected their own childhood, or theiradult life. This can be seen in the memoirs of Khalid al-‘Azm (1903–65) and ‘AnbaraSalam al-Khalidi (1897/99–1986), which were published in the 1970s.24 Both of thembelonged to distinguished Muslim families that held important positions underOttoman rule. Both viewed this era of their childhood as one which was crushed anddestroyed by Jamal Pasha. Both suffered the consequences of Jamal’s activities whenthey attempted to discard their Ottoman identity and redefine themselves as moreArab and Syrian.

Al-‘Azm became a key political figure, a Syrian nationalist leader from the 1940suntil the 1960s. His wife published his memoirs in 1973. During his political career heheld several positions, including being re-elected as Prime Minister six times, as wellas Acting President. He belonged to one of the most prominent political families inSyria and was the son of Muhammad Fawzi al-‘Azm, an Ottoman minister forreligious affairs. From his memoirs it is evident that the period of the war was crucialto the crystallization of his father’s Arab identity.

Al-‘Azm described how his father was torn between his loyalty to the Ottomansand his responsibilities as a Muslim Arab, i.e. between his religious and his nationalidentity. Apparently Jamal Pasha’s behaviour in Syria made ‘Azm comprehend thathis own loyalty to the Ottoman government was problematic, and he drew closer tothe Arab cause. Devastated by the course of events, Khalid al-‘Azm explained howthis was the first time he himself wanted to fight in the name of Syrian/Arabnationalism.25

The events of 6 May 1916 left a deep impression on Khalid al-‘Azm, who was 13years old at the time. He described how he heard his father weeping and telling hiswife that the next day men would be executed.26 Describing Jamal’s rigid policy,‘Azm mentions how his mother participated in philanthropic societies that Jamalfounded.27 Above all, he confirms that at the time people accepted Jamal, and thatonly later were plays and books published describing him as a butcher. Althoughaware of Jamal’s activities, he presents a less diabolical interpretation and a morecomplex personification of Jamal than other writers.28 ‘Azm stresses that in 1918 hisfather convinced members of the Ottoman government to remove Jamal from Syria,and by so doing ascribed Muhammad Fawzi al-‘Azm a place in collective memory.In ‘Azm’s recollections, this phase conformed to his aspirations to create a Syriannational identity, and he views the Jamal and Faisal periods as the formative years ofthat movement for himself, his father and the nation.

‘Anbara al-Khalidi’s memories of Jamal are more traumatic, since her familysuffered directly at his hands. ‘Anbara was a distinguished figure in the women’smovement in Lebanon, known for her battle against the veil (hijab) and for women’sindependence. Born in Beirut, she became a leading writer, translator and feminist inLebanon and in Palestine.29 ‘Anbara published her memoirs in 1978 but had begunto write them much earlier. She explains that ‘all my desire is to give the nextgeneration knowledge of my own generation and awareness of events and incidents.[In this way] I am certain they will learn much about the history of the politics of theArab country (balad), significant historical events, and the noteworthy events in thelives of its great men.’30

Like other writers, she set the tone for a constructive national historiography,marking Jamal’s rule as one of the most influential episodes. When Jamal Pasha

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came to Syria, ‘Anbara was in her late teens. In her memoirs, she describes the Arabawakening very emotionally, mentioning that her father attended the Parisconference of 1913 – the first to bring the Arab issue to the international arena.

This dynamic phase ended with Jamal’s cruelty. In a chapter titled ‘Jamal Bashawa-Mazalimuhu’31 (Jamal Pasha and his Crimes), she describes how he persecutedArab nationalists. She shows how Jamal’s rule influenced her family, thus reinforcingthe legitimacy of her family’s memory within the national memory. Describing herfather’s patriotism, she writes about his first meeting with Jamal, who asked him‘Have you seen what these reformers have done [referring to the Arab nationalists]?’Her father tried to evade the question, saying that ‘in every group there are bothpositive and negative persons’. Jamal did not like the answer and later had her fatherarrested.32 After a while, however, he was released with the help of the vali of Beirut.

‘Anbara viewed Jamal’s stance toward the Arabs as part of his policy to cleansethe country of non-Turani elements and encourage pan-Turanism. As a Muslim shedid not attack his religion but rather his race and ideologies. Describing the events of6 May 1916, she wrote:

How can I describe my amazement, how I was shaken as if I had been struck bylightning. Then, as if in a dream, I heard the announcement, and I could notunderstand its meaning. It was as if a violent drumming had deafened me, or asif thick darkness full of terrifying, threatening figures had deprived me of mysenses. I wanted to beg for help and to flee from them, to scream, to ask forassistance in my plight.33

The national reaction to this memory overwhelmed her personal feelings regardingher father’s imprisonment and the Arab awakening that she described a few pagesearlier, showing the strength of its impact on her.34 Yet her interactions with Jamalcontinued. In another chapter – ‘Ayyam al-Harb al-Ula wal-Ijtima‘ ila Jamal Basha’(The First Days of the War and the Meeting with Jamal)35 – she describes the terriblecondition of the population and the starvation in Syria in 1917, when the Turksdecided to build four shelters for women and children. As part of this effort Jamalinvited notable ladies from Beirut to come and discuss how to help the population.‘Anbara, who was already active in philanthropic societies, did not want to go,deciding that she would ‘fire a bullet into his [Jamal’s] heart and thus relieve themiseries of his evil deeds’.36

Her family and other Muslim notables convinced her to put aside her own feelings.After meeting with Jamal she again described how she trembled and felt that herhead was on fire; how Jamal called on her, and her relief at wearing a veil since shepreferred not to look at him. She talked with him briefly and then went home andwept.37 A final example of a woman who took a stand against Jamal, thus becomingpart of the national discourse, was Ibtihaj Qaddura, a well-known activist in theLebanese nationalist and feminist movement. These examples are illustrative ofthe first generation of men and women who played a part in the formative period ofthe struggle of the Lebanese and Syrian nations, which were also marked by theirconfrontation with Jamal.38

Some of the memoirs of the first generation were edited and published in thelate 1980s and 1990s. They emphasize the connection between the Arab revolts

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and the executions of 1915, but the figure of Jamal is much less central. Writtenmainly by Syrian nationalists, these memoirs also emphasize the connectionbetween Arabism and Syrianism which was the core of the national discourse atthat time.

Faris al-Khuri (1877–1962), for example, wrote his memoirs from 1903 until the1960s. They were published by his granddaughter in 1989. He was a Christian Arab,a Syrian nationalist who studied law at the American college in Beirut. In 1916 hejoined the Arab underground and supported the Arab revolt. He was arrested by theTurks, and when the Ottoman Empire collapsed he helped establish Syria’s firstgovernment, headed by Faisal, and was a member, serving as a Syrian minister,Prime Minister and speaker of Parliament.39 Apart from the events of 6 May 1916,Khuri gives a lengthy description of other incidents in which Shuhada’ were executedby Jamal. He calls them Abtal (heroes).40 He also describes how Shukri al-Quwatli, aleading Syrian figure, tried to commit suicide when he was arrested by Jamal41 andemphasizes the fact that Faisal decided to start the Arab revolt after the firstexecution in the summer of 1915.42 In 1997, the memoirs of Lutfi al-Haffar (1885/189143–1968), another Syrian nationalist leader, were published. Al-Haffar’snarrative echoes Faris al-Khuri’s commentary.44

These memoirs were essentially written before the 1970s, a crucial decade for Syriaas a modern country after 26 years of Mandate rule. After the Mandate period Syriawent through a period of upheavals that involved the first officers’ revolts (1949–54),the creation of the United Arab Republic (1958–61) and the emergence of the Ba‘thregime in 1963, which increased the opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thewriters, leading Syrian politicians and national figures, strove to promote stabilityand unity in multi-ethnic Syrian society by narrating the glories of Arab and Syrianhistory through their own experience, such that memoirs became a popular genre fordescribing the story of the birth of the nation.

For these writers, the impact of the First World War was connected withmonumental family disasters, the writers’ own maturity and changing identity, andthe world they once knew.45 As these writers entered the public sphere, andcommented about their own and their families’ past and the nation’s past, theyincluded recollections based on their broader social experience. They not onlypresented their own memories but also revealed parts of the contemporaneousframing of public memory.

Until the 1970s, the memory of Jamal was still central to their writing. His actswere a key to the story of nation-building. These individual accounts were also partof the emerging national identity. As these figures became the national and socialelite, the crucial years of Jamal that were engraved in their memories also mergedinto collective memory, and as such contributed to shaping a new Syrian nationalmemory.

So far we have seen how Jamal Pasha’s era was remembered, documented andreinterpreted by individuals, mainly among the local elite. Nevertheless, firstgeneration accounts are not sufficient to create a national memory. In this section Ishow how the events of 1915–16 were later used by the state to construct anothercollective and national memory through the national holiday ‘Id al-Shuhada’.46 Alan

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Confino points out that national holidays are an important tool for generating acollective remembrance, what he terms a ‘collective mentality’.47

Commemoration ceremonies for the shuhada’ of 1915 and 1916, the ‘Id Dhikra al-Shuhada’ existed during the Faisal era, i.e. before Syrian independence in 1946. From1918,48 only two years after the events, Amir Faisal’s government created newsecular and patriotic holidays, one of which was a day of mourning for the 21 Arabmartyrs. The families of the martyrs received stipends from the government, andwere the focus of attention during these national commemorations.49 Mostcommemorations dealt with events related to Jamal and the suffering of themartyrs. James Gelvin writes:

According to Arab government propaganda, the Turks had executed themartyrs because of their nationalist activities; the martyrs were thus part of thesame struggle as those who had participated in the Arab revolt, and thecelebration of their memory was a celebration of the ties that bound Hijazis,Iraqis, and Syrians, ‘the martyrs of the scaffolds and trenches,’ in a commonpurpose ‘in the shade of His beloved Highness [Amir Faysal].’50

Thus, for the Arab government and its supporters the martyrs were a key symbolauthenticating their position in Syrian society. Furthermore, since the martyrs camefrom both Christian and Muslim communities, their enshrinement in the nationalistpantheon underscored the virtues of inter-community collaboration, as well assuggesting that the Arabs had finally outgrown religious fanaticism and were readyfor independence.

In this way the commemoration of the martyrs served as a symbol for themartyrdom of the entire Syrian nation during the war. This traumatic memoryunited the population. However, at the same time, as Gelvin notes, particularlyamong the popular committees which were part of the Arab revolt and advocatedarmed resistance, the lesson of the martyrs was not that Syria deserved independencebecause of their martyrdom; rather than victims, the martyrs were exemplars of therevolutionary struggle.

The symbol of the martyrs retained its impact after the dissolution of the Faisalistate in 1920. In the wake of French colonialism, the story of the martyrs wasincorporated into a discourse depicting increasing Arab victimization at the hands ofoutsiders – Turks, Westerners and others.51 During the French Mandate this was nota regular holiday.52 At times it was not celebrated (such as during the Great Revoltof 1925–27), for instance when the political atmosphere was unstable. At this stage,the ceremony was similar to that in Faisal’s time. It included a display of shuhada’pictures, some poetry reading, several minutes of silence, lectures and a procession tothe Muslim and Christian cemeteries in which the martyrs were buried. Sometimesplays reconstructing the hanging of the martyrs were performed, at other times thecelebration was a political activity in which parties like al-Kutla al-Wataniyya, theleading Syrian national party, introduced their political agenda.53

Between 1927 and 1935 there were newspaper editorials suggesting that this dateshould become a national Syrian holiday (‘id watani ‘amm), declaring that theshuhada’ had made the first gesture of freedom, and that the martyrs were the first(ashab al-sabq) to sacrifice themselves for the freedom of their country. The

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newspapers made it clear that, though there would be other national figures in thefuture, these shuhada’ would never be forgotten.54

In many ways the memory of the shuhada’ was connected, at this stage, specificallyto freedom and independence, not only from the Turks but also from the French.The stage was used to encourage a struggle against French colonialism, and againstSyrian leaders accused of collaboration with the French.55 In a certain way theMandate period empowered the Syrian/Arab struggle for freedom in which thememory of the shuhada’ was one of the main national events.56

In the years following the Mandate, during which the political regime was stillestablishing a political base, there were only brief references in the newspapers to ‘Idal-Shuhada’. Most only discussed the shuhada’ of 6 May 1916, and emphasized theircontribution to the struggle for freedom.57 The years 1946–63 were a time of crisisand the events of 1915 and 1916 were not afforded more than a briefacknowledgement. Apparently much the same was true during the early Ba‘th rulein Syria (1963–70), when fluctuating political rule resulted in less state emphasis onefforts to strengthen heritage. The change in the interpretation of memory becamemuch more visible under Hafiz al-Assad, whose rule provided stability andcontinuity. It was a time when the political elite could set the tone for creating theprime discourse of Syrian national identity in which symbols played an importantpart in creating its legitimacy and hegemony.

Under Assad’s leadership Syria became a regional power, with significantinfluence over surrounding Arab countries. This gave considerable weight toattempts to portray modern Syria as the heir to Arabism, and though the emphasiswas mainly on Syrian identity, this was not seen as contradictory to the idea of Arabunity (pan-Arabism). In fact, the Ba‘th Party, headed by Assad, viewed the rise ofSyrian nationalism as a step on the road toward Arab unity, and Syria as the seedbedfor Arab nationalism both as an ideology and as a political movement.58 Thefrustrations and disappointments of the previous period were replaced by pride andthe heroism of the past. The martyrs of 1916 were gradually seen as part of bothArabism and especially Syrian discourse,59 and their memory was used to encouragepride in the constructed, glorious past of the Syrian nation.

As a member of the Alawi minority and representative of the secular Ba’th regimewith its pan-Arabist ideology, Assad chose this secular holiday to legitimize hisauthority in a multi-ethnic society with a Muslim Sunni majority, especially as hisgreatest political opposition had been from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, whichresented the privileges conferred on Assad’s clansmen and did not consider the Alawisect (to which Assad and his elite cohort belonged) to be Islamic at all. In thiscontext, Arab and Syrian national identity and patriotism were stressed whilereligious identity gradually became less emphasized. Further, in order to avoid thedilemma of portraying the Muslims as being on the wrong side of the confrontation –i.e. the problematic fact that the Turks were Muslim, and thus Jamal was Muslim –the Ottomans were described as oppressive occupiers who almost destroyed Arabvalues while disguising their empire as a Muslim caliphate.60

Assad, followed by his son Bashar, reinforced a Syrian identity based not only onthe Muslim/Arab past but also by embodying Syria’s existence as a modern statedetached from what the Syrians defined as Ottoman colonialism (ihtilal ‘uthmani oral-isti‘mar al-‘Uthmani).61 The latter was portrayed as just as horrible as the acts of

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Western colonialism (al-isti‘mar al-gharbi) against the Arabs. It was presented as aperiod of rigid government in which the Arabs lost their freedom.

In this way, the narrative of Syrian-Arab nationalism was employed by the Ba‘thparty and Assad to highlight the bravery of the martyrs as Syrians. The narrative wasreshaped to unite the nation to create a shared non-religious identity, a sense ofbelonging, inwhich thememory of Jamal’s crimes became part of the Syrian struggle tomove away from sectarianism. The patriotism of the shuhada’ in 1915–16, whenChristians and Muslims fought and were killed together, was given more emphasis inthe Assad years. Gradually the holiday became a symbol for all those who died in warsand battles for the sake of Syria, in other words, a national holiday. In 1970 Hafez al-Assad declared that ‘Id al-Shuhada’ would honour the country’s fallen heroes. In fact,under his rule the concept of sacrifice for one’s country was treated almost as analternative to religious sanctity. The importance of the martyrs was further re-cast in aspeechAssad gave in 1985 at the opening of the 9th students’ union. There he describedthe importance of the concept of sacrifice during his youth, howhe andhis friends in thearmy constantly discussed sacrificial suicide and the JapaneseKamikaze and its virtues.Assad stressed how this principle had guided him throughout his life.62

Contemporary newspapers focused on the executions of 1915 and 1916, but as thefirst of many sacrifices for the homeland and as a tipping point (nuqta ‘intilaq ornuqta in‘itaf) in the modern history of Syria and the Arabs.63 The day ofremembrance of ‘Id al-Shuhada’ was celebrated as a commemoration of nationalunity, a source of power, valour, active pride, patriotism and courage and less as asymbol of suffering, torment and agony. It turned suffering into pride anddespondency into spiritual elevation. The Syrian martyrs were presented as nationalparagons or, in Assad’s own words ‘the most revered of mankind, and the noblest ofmen’. This phrase became the holiday’s mantra.

The newspapers were filled with stories of glorious martyrdom, from those hangedin Damascus in 1916 to those who were killed in Maysalun, during the FrenchMandate, or the wars against Israel.64 The government promulgated laws and set upschools for ‘new’ shuhada’ families. Assad became ‘the father’ of the shuhada’ chil-dren; protecting and rewarding them for their families’ sacrifices. Heroic stories andbiographies about the shuhada’ of 1915 and 1916 were published each year togetherwith stories of the new shuhada’ killed in Syria’s battles, especially in the October Warof 1973. In this way the holiday created a chain (qafilat al-shuhada’) of martyrs fromgeneration to generation; one said to continue ‘until all Arab lands shall be free’.65

Now, every year on 6 May each army unit fires 21 rounds of ammunition (thenumber of executions on 6 May 1916). The main ceremony is held at the Tomb ofthe Unknown Soldier (a state symbol, instead of at the graves of the victims),66

and the continuity between old and new shuhada’ is emphasized.67 The Presidenthosts the families of new martyrs and pays his respects to their memory.68 Althoughpictures of the shuhada’ were published in newspapers in the 1970s, new pictures ofmore recent shuhada’ are now published alongside them. In this way the concept ofshuhada’ and their courage is stressed, but Jamal’s cruelties are not forgotten.

The transformation of the shuhada’ from victims to heroes was also evident in aTV drama series during Ramadan – another mode of disseminating Syrian nationalpride. In 1996 a historico-political series, Brothers of the Dust, looked back on thisvery decisive and sensitive period. The first episodes were set at the end of the First

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World War and showed the effects of the brutal Ottoman rule, especially that ofJamal. The episodes focused mainly on the resistance, upheavals and rebellions ofSyrian nationalists against the Ottomans. The hero, a bold, handsome Syrian officertrained in a military camp near Istanbul, returns to Syria and joins the resistancemovement against the Ottoman troops. He and other fighters for the cause are finallykilled by Jamal Pasha. The resistance continues, and leads to Syrian struggle in 1920and to revolts against the French between 1925 and 1927, as well as to the Frenchevacuation.69

The day of the martyrs is also used to present national and political messages.These encourage the younger Syrian generations to fight against the threat of ‘neo-colonialists’ (for example, Turkey and Israel). In this way the regime uses the past notonly as a fact but also as a symbol. One such example is the use of the Arab–Ottomanconflict as linked to later Syrian–Turkish conflicts, which thus reshapes the pastaccording to current interests. The Syrian regime links the earlier Arab–Ottomanstruggle with the later dispute concerning Alexandretta (Iskandarun), a Syrian regiontransferred in 1939 (under the French Mandate) to Turkey. The conflict continuedthrough 1957, when Turkey worked together with the USA to bring down the Syrianregime. There were bilateral disagreements between Syria and Turkey in the early1980s, when Turkey accused Syria of assisting the Kurdish underground movement –the PKK – by backing terrorist attacks in Turkey, while Syria accused Turkey ofdiverting the flow of the Euphrates. As of the 1990s, the alliance between Turkey andIsrael further intensified the conflict between Syria and Turkey.70

The struggle against Israel and Zionism is also linked to the period of JamalPasha. In 1992, the historian Na’im al-Yafi wrote Jamal Basha al-Saffah: Dirasa fil-Shakhsiyya wal-Ta’rikh (Jamal Pasha the Butcher: An Analysis of Character andHistory),71 a commissioned book in which he tries to analyse Jamal’s personalityfrom a psychological point of view. Al-Yafi explains that the Turani movement, ofwhich Jamal was a member, had connections with Zionism, and that Jamal hadsecretly helped the Jews to immigrate to Palestine which was then under his rule,despite the fact that he also evacuated and executed many Jews from the Yishuv.72

By describing Jamal as ‘helping to build the first settlements (mustawtinat)’,73 and‘one of the first to aid the Jews to build their national homeland in Palestine’, al-Yafiinterprets Jamal’s period (or that of the Young Turks) as the time when the Arab–Israeli conflict began.74 Assad also used the executions as symbolic of the fate andheritage shared by Lebanon and Syria.75

This article has attempted to show how the transformations of the memory of JamalPasha’s rule embodied the ongoing political and national demands of Syrian politicalelite before the establishment of the Syrian state and after it. It highlights the way inwhich the needs of politics can reshape events.

Jamal Pasha’s era is one of the most traumatic memories from the First WorldWar. In a way, it covers two memories – that of Jamal and that of the shuhada’. Overthe years, the memory of Jamal has become less of a focus, while that of the shuhada’has continually shifted to the centre of the Syrian national imagination to becomeone of the main symbols of the Syrian national past, even though the interpretationshave been adjusted to national needs.

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Why does the memory of the Jamal period have so much political capital attachedto it? First of all it is a ‘good story’ with weak and strong personalities, including anoppressive dictator, suffering figures executed for the sake of the homeland, messagesof national and patriotic memory, unity, a struggle against tyranny, pride, honour,respect, power, heroism and sacrifice – all of which are crucial to modern Syrianhistoriography.

Timing also played an important role. The events occurred during a pivotal periodfor a new nation, a period of vast transformations that ended a historical era (theend of the Ottoman Empire), and the beginning of a new one. Mircea Eliade claimedthat the most significant moment of any society’s past is its beginning. Formativeperiods are marked by the magic, attraction and prestige of origins. It is the firstmanifestation of something that is significant and valid to a new-born society.76 Inthis sense, the events of 6 May 1916 became the departure point for this narrative ofa nation, whether Arab, Syrian or Lebanese.77

Although the past cannot be literally reconstructed, it can be selectively exploited.The memory of Jamal’s deeds has given rise to new versions of the past aimed atcreating new meanings of the present and the future. Paradoxically, the past is auseful analytical tool for coping with constant change. The symbol remains but itsinterpretations are altered according to the vicissitudes of (Syrian) history.

Four important phases in the transformations of this memory can be identified.During the Faisal period the memory of the martyrs and Jamal was used as a symbolof Syrian and Arab resistance. Second, in the Mandate period, the memory of Jamaland the shuhada’ from 1915 and 1916 was interpreted in terms of the struggle againstFrench colonialism. This period helped to turn it into a national symbol of struggleand freedom. In this phase, the agony and thus the passivity of this memory(especially that of the shuhada’) were emphasized to reflect the misery of the Syrianpopulation under the French Mandate. In the third period (1946–70), after Syrianindependence, the memory evolved to legitimize the need for Syrian-Arab identity ata time when there was constant political upheaval. In some ways, it was used tovalidate Syrian independence, not by the Syrian government but by the political eliteof the first generation. During the fourth period, when Syria became a relativelystable country with Assad at its head, the memory was institutionalized and turnedinto a national symbol for the state and thus for all its martyrs. The memory was bynow a symbol of active heroism.

This historical overview suggests that at a time when the state was not stable,preservation of memory declined. As it became more powerful, so did the memories,even though the state emphasized its own preferred elements and tended to obscureothers. The various interpretations of layers of memory were transformed accordingto different political changes and discourses. Some parts are re-emphasized whileothers have been omitted in line with new discourse that the political elite and thestate strive to construct.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Mediterranean Programme: 11th Mediterranean

Research Meeting in Florence in March 2010. The author wishes to thank Dr E. Ginio for his

encouragement and insights.

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1. J.K. Olick and J. Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From ‘‘Collective Memory’’ to the Historical

Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.24 (1998), p.107.

2. Ibid.

3. Most of the transliteration in the text is from Arabic.

4. See for example, Olick and Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, p.112.

5. J. Winter and E. Sivan (eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.6; See also J. Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between

Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press,

2006), p.5; See also S.A. Crane, ‘Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory’, The American

Historical Review, Vol. 02, No. (1997), pp.1372–85.

6. Olick and Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, p.122; also, J. Winter, ‘Forms of Kinship and

Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War’, in J. Winter and E. Sivan (eds.), War and

Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.59; See also

Winter, Remembering War.

7. M. Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. and ed. L.A. Coser (Chicago: University Chicago Press,

1992).

8. Winter, Remembering War, p.276; Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p.38; U. Makdisi and P.A.

Silverstein (eds.), Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa (Bloomington and

Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp.9–12.

9. Wedeen shows how Syrian society found a way to subvert state symbols without causing itself trouble

from the authorities. For more details see, L. Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric,

and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

10. Halbwachs, On Collective Memory.

11. For further details see, G.L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

12. For further details see, J.R. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1994).

13. Winter, Remembering War, p.1.

14. J. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

15. N. Al-Qattan, ‘Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War’, in T. Phillipp and C. Schumann (eds.),

From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon (Beirut: Orient-Institut der DMG Beirut,

2004), p.163.

16. See L. Schatkowski Schilcher, ‘The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria’, in J.P. Spagnolo (ed.),

Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani

(Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1992), pp.229–58; E. Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal

Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

17. See for example, N.Q. Hasan, Hadith Dimashqi: 1884–1983 (Mudhakkirat), Vol.1 (Damascus:

Tlasdar, 1988), p.261; See also the way Tergeman presents the attitude of her mother’s generation

toward Jamal. S. Tergeman, Daughter of Damascus. English version by Andrea Rugh (Austin:

University of Texas, 1994), pp.96–7.

18. Al-Qattan, ‘Safarbarlik: Ottoman Syria and the Great War’, pp.166–8.

19. Turan is an ancient Iranian name for the country to the north-east of Persia. It is used to describe

the Turkish lands of Central and South East Asia, and the term Turanian is applied to a group of

peoples and languages comprising Turkish and Mongol as well as Finnish, Hungarian, and others.

Pan-Turanism extended the idea of union on the basis of Turkic ethnicity to encompass the

Hungarians, Finns and Estonians in this mythical land called Turan. Ottoman authors employed

the concept of Turan most often as a synonym for pan-Turanism. For more details see B. Lewis,

The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,

1968), pp.347, 351.

20. See G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965), pp.150–52.

21. For more details see, Z.N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of

Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), pp.128–30; N.Z. Ajay Jr., ‘Political

Intrigue and Suppression in Lebanon during World War I’, International Journal of Middle East

Studies, Vol.5 (1974), pp.146–60: W.L. Cleveland, Islam Against the West – Shakib Arslan and the

Campaign for Islamic Nationalism (London: Al-Saki Books, 1985), pp.34–5.

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22. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p.132.

23. For more details see, M.N. Al-Madani, Watha’iq Jamal Basha al-Saffah-Mazalim Jamal Basha wa-

Akhir Ayyam al-Atrak (Damascus: Maktab ‘Anbar, 1996).

24. ‘A.S. Al-Khalidi, Jawla fil-Dhikrayat bayna Lubnan wa-Filastin (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar lil-Nashr, 1978);

K. al-‘Azm, Mudhakkirat Khalid al-‘Azm, 3 vols. (Beirut: al-Dar al-Mutahida lil-Nashr, 1973).

25. Al-‘Azm, Mudhakkirat Khalid al-‘Azm, Vol.1, p.91.

26. Ibid., pp.67–8.

27. Ibid., pp.68–72.

28. Ibid., pp.73–4.

29. ‘Anbara’s father ‘Ali Salam (1869–1938) was one of the most distinguished leaders in Beirut, and held

various positions in the Ottoman government. He was a merchant, head of the Beiruti Municipality, a

member of the Ottoman parliament, and was active in Arab politics. Al-Khalidi, Jawla fil-Dhikrayat,

pp.5–10.

30. Ibid., p.11.

31. Ibid., pp.100–105.

32. Ibid., pp.99–101.

33. Ibid., p.104.

34. Ibid., pp.103–5.

35. Ibid., pp.106–11.

36. Ibid., p.108.

37. Ibid., pp.106–11.

38. J.S. Makdisi, Teta, Mother and Me: An Arab Women’s Memoir (London: Saqi Books, 2005), pp.204–5.

39. For more details see, S. Moubayed, Steel and Silk: Men and Women who Shaped Syria 1900–2000

(Seattle: Cune Press, 2006), pp.277–81.

40. F. Al-Khuri, Awraq Faris al-Khuri, ed. Kulit al-Khuri (Damascus: ‘Utustrad al-Maza, 1989), p.120.

41. See also Y. ‘Abd al-Latif, Shukri al-Quwatli: Ta’rikh Umma fi Khayat al-Rajul 1908–1958 (Cairo: Dar

al-Ma‘arif, 1959).

42. Al-Khuri, Awraq Faris al-Khuri, p.139.

43. Moubayed, Steel and Silk, p.235.

44. See for example, S. Al-Haffar al-Kuzbari, Lutfi al-Haffar: Mudhakkiratuhu, Hayatuhu wa-‘Asruhu

(London and Beirut: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1997), pp.74–5.

45. Winter, ‘Forms of Kinship and Remembrance’, p.42.

46. For more details on national holidays in the Middle East see, E. Podeh, The Politics of National

Celebrations in the Arab Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

47. See, A. Confino, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method’, The American

Historical Review, Vol.102, No.5 (1997), p.1389.

48. Y. Al-‘Isa, ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, Alif Ba’, No.1933, 6 May 1927; J.L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties:

Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of the Empire (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:

University of California Press, 1998), p.177.

49. Ibid., p.144.

50. Ibid., p.178.

51. Ibid., pp.175–84, 256–9.

52. For example see, Alif Ba’, No.211, 8 May 1921; ‘‘Id al-Shuhada’ wal-Hukuma’, Alif Ba’, No.1413, 6

May 1925; Alif Ba’,No.1686, 6 May 1926; ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, Fata al-‘Arab, No.1312, 5 May 1926;

‘Fi Takrim al-Shuhada’’, Fata al-‘Arab, No.1314, 7 May 1926.

53. ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, Alif Ba’, No.1108, 3 May, 1924; ‘Haflat al-Shuhda’’, Alif Ba’, No.4005, 8 May

1934; ‘Haflat Dhikr al-Shuhada’’, Fata al-Arab, No.3882, 8 May 1935.

54. Y. Al-‘Isa, ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, Alif Ba’, No.1933, 6 May 1927.

55. ‘Haflat al-Shuhada’ fi Baris’, Alif Ba’, No.1425, 20 May 1925.

56. ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, Alif Ba’, No.2821, 6 May 1930.

57. It was difficult to access certain Syrian newspapers published between 1946 and 1670. However, the

issues that I did manage to obtain led to a number of conclusions. In the 1950s, for example, in the

newspaper Alif Ba’ there are brief references to ‘Id al-Shuhada’, see for example, A. Al-‘Isa, ‘‘Id al-

Shuhada’’, Alif Ba’, No.8604, 7 May 1951, p.1. The article describes the martyrs as reflecting strivings

for freedom for the homeland and how the Syrians need to preserve this freedom. However in 1952

there is no mention of the holiday; see Alif Ba’,No.8871, 7 May 1952; In the newspaper al-Qabas there

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is no mention of the ‘Id from 1951 to 1954; see for example, al-Qabas, No.459, 6 May 1952. In the

newspaper al-Insha’ there are hardly any references to this ‘Id in the 1940s and 1950s. See also for

example, ‘Dhikra al-Shuhada’’, al-Istiqlal al-‘Arabi, No.837, 8 May 1947, p.2; Ibn al-Balad, ‘Fi Dhikra

Shuhada’ Ayyar’, al-Nasr, No.4276, 7 May 1959, p.3; ‘Shuhada’una aladhi Saqatu wa-hum

Yuraddiduna Sawfa Nahsulu ‘ala Istiqlalina Kamilan’, al-Thawra, No.906, 6 May 1966, p.3.

58. See for more details, H. Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and

Their Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.279–83.

59. E. Zisser, ‘Who’s Afraid of Syrian Nationalism? National and State Identity in Syria’, Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol.42, No.2 (2006), pp.179–98.

60. See for example, M. Tlas, Al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubra (Beirut: Dar al-Shura, 1978).

61. Other terms were Ta‘ssuf al-‘Uthmani, Irhab ‘Uthmani, Hamlat al-Tatrik. See ‘al-Shahada’ ‘Unwan lil-

Karama wal-‘Izza wa-Tariq al-Thawra’, al-Thawra, No.1284, 7 May 1997, pp.2, 8: ‘Kawakib al-Nidal

al-Watani’, al-Thawra, No.13911, 7 May 2009, p.11: M.K. Al-Jamali, ‘Thamn al-Huriyya fi Qissat al-

Sadis min Ayyar’, al-Thawra, No.8274, 6 May 1990, p.9. These terms were used mainly until 2004,

when an understanding was reached concerning Alexandretta. The two parties set the dispute aside

and concentrated on building a better relationship between them. See for example, A. Al-Wa‘i,

‘Zaman al-Shahada wal-Shuhada’’, No.1390, 6 May 2009, p.6.

62. See for more details, al-Thawra, No.6784, 5 May 1985, pp.1, 2, 3. See also al-Thawra, No.6785, 7 May

1985, p.3; A. Majd, ‘Al-Shuhada’ ‘Iduhum ‘Id al-Huriyya, ‘Id al-Watan’, al-Thawra, No.9703, 6 May

1995, p.8.

63. ‘Al-Shahada, ‘Unwan lil-Karama wal-‘Izza wa-Tariq al-Thawra’, al-Thawra, No.1284, 7 May 1997,

p.2; Nadiya Sabagh, ‘Mawqi‘ al-Sadis min Ayyar Fi Masirat Harakat al-Tahrir al-‘Arabi’, al-Thawra,

7 May 1974, p.3; ‘Al-Sadis min Ayyar In‘itaf Hamm fil-Tarikh al-‘Arabi, al-Mu‘asir’, al-Thawra,

No.4358, 6 May 1977, p.3; ‘al-Shahada’ ‘Unwan lil-Karama wal-‘Izza wa-Tariq al-Thawra’, al-

Thawra, No.1284, 7 May 1997, pp.8, 9; W. Najm, ‘al-Ma‘na al-Ta‘rikhi li-Shuhada’ al-Sadis min

Ayyar’, al-Thawra, No.3437, 7 May 1974, p.6; ‘Kawakib al-Nidal al-Watani’, al-Thawra, No.13911, 7

May 2009, p.11; al-Thawra, No.4359, 7 May 1977, pp.1, 4.

64. See, for example, ‘Tlas ra’a Mihrajan Banat wa-Abna’ al-Shuhada’’, Tishrin, No.1845, 6 May 1981,

p.1; W. Mihna, ‘Shuhada’una Masha‘il Nur ‘ala Durub al-Huriyya wal-Karama’, Tishrin, No.571, 5

May 1986, p.5; Tishrin, No.3571, 6 May 1986, pp.2, 5, 8; Tishrin, No.5049, 7 May, 1991, p.1; ‘Fi ‘Id

Anbal Bani al-Bashar’, Tishrin, No.6772, 6 May 1995, p.1.

65. I. Laqa, ‘6 Ayyar, Yawm al-Shahada al-Khalida fil-Dhakira al-‘Arabiyya’, Tishrin, No.473, 6 May

1977, p.3; H. Al-Sham‘a, ‘Yawm al-Shuhada’-Yawm al-Majd wal-Fakhar wal-Kibriya’, Tishrin,

No.473, 6 May 1977, p.4; F. Zarzur, ‘al-Shuhada’ fil-Shi‘r al-‘Arabi’, Tishrin, No.473, 6 May 1977,

p.5.

66. The tomb, which is in on Jabal Qasyun (traditionally considered the birthplace of the ‘first man’),

is a war memorial dedicated to Syrian soldiers killed during battle. The monument, built in 1994,

has a domed exhibit hall featuring large depictions of five epic battles in Arab history: Yarmuk,

Hatin, Maysalun, Jabal Harmun and Sultan Ya‘qub. It is interesting to note that during the

beginning of Assad’s rule in the 1970s, the events of 6 May were marked by lighting a torch,

whereas a decade later a tomb marked the place and years later this became a mausoleum. On the

Martyrs’ Square in Lebanon today see M. Young, The Ghost of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness

Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle (New York, London, Toronto and Sydney: Simon and

Schuster, 2010), pp.31–6.

67. See, for example, ‘al-Shahada Tariq al-Nasr wal-Sharaf’, Tishrin, No.6514, 6 May 1996, p.1. See also

pages 4, 7, 10.

68. ‘Al-Munadil al-Assad Yukarrim al-Shuhada’ fi ‘Idihim’, Tishrin, No.776, 6 May 1978, p.1, see also

pages 4–6; Tishrin, No.1846, 7 May 1981, pp.1, 11; Tishrin, No.886, 6 May 1984, pp.2, 4.

69. A. Christmann, ‘An Invented Piety? Subduing Ramadan in Syrian State Media’, in A. Salvatore (ed.),

Muslim Traditions and Modern Techniques of Power, Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam 3 (Hamburg,

Berlin, London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp.246–7.

70. See for more details, Zisser, ‘Who’s Afraid of Syrian Nationalism’, pp.179–98.

71. N. al-Yafi, Jamal Basha al-Saffah-Dirasa fil-Shakhsiyya wal-Ta’rikh (Ladhakiyya: Dar al-Hiwar lil-

Nashr wal-Tawzi‘, 1993), p.7.

72. Ibid., p.8.

73. Ibid., pp.8, 18–19.

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74. N. Sabagh, ‘Mawqi‘ al-Sadis min Ayyar fi Masirat Harakat al-Tahrir al-‘Arabi’, al-Thawra, 7 May

1974, p.3.

75. ‘A. Al-Da‘uq, ‘Yawm Mushriq fi 6 Ayyar Ta’rikh al-Nidal al-‘Arabi’, Tishrin, 6 May 1977, p.9.

76. M. Eliade, Images and Symbols (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), p.34.

77. B. Schwartz, ‘The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory’, Social Forces,

Vol.61, No.2 (1982), pp.374–6.

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