Transcript - CVE Event 2015

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PS21 and Just Security: Countering Violent Extremism Friday 29 May 2015, New York Unedited Transcript Ryan Goodman (Moderator): NYU professor of law and co-editor, Just Security Richard Barrett: Former British diplomat and intelligence officer who headed the United Nations monitoring team covering Al Qaeda and the Taliban for nearly a decade. Now Vice President at the Soufan Group and an International Advisor at PS21. Faiza Patel: Founding editor of Just Security, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU. Goodman: So, welcome everybody, to our event on counteracting violent extremism. My name is Ryan Goodman, I’m a professor here at NYU Law School and co-editor and chief of the Just Security blog. It’s a terrific opportunity for us to have a discussion. It’s not one of my main areas of deep expertise so I plan to learn a lot and ask the questions that have been burning in my mind on this particular topic. And it’s an extraordinary opportunity given the expertise that we have here. So just to introduce our speakers. Richard Barrett, to the left of me, is Senior Vice President of the Soufan Group, from 2004 to 2013 he headed the UN monitoring team on al-Qaida and the Taliban. He’s served in the UK government, the security service MI5, the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service MI6 and he also served as the UK’s Director of Global Counter Terrorism operations, both before and after 9/11. And to the right of me is Faiza Patel, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Programme at the Brennan Centre, and prior to joining the Brennan centre, Faiza was senior policy officer at the organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons in The Hague and is author of a major report on the topic of CVE, counteracting violent extremism, titled “Rethinking Radicalisation”. In terms of regional experience I thought just to identify that as an element that also unifies our speakers. Richard served abroad in the UK government in Jordan and Turkey, and Faiza was born and raised in Pakistan. So we also have that element that is added to the equation of our discussion. So I thought just to start the discussion in one area and then move over to two areas. The first area that I thought we’d talk about is the conditions that might give rise to individuals on a pathway to extremism, if that can even be identified as a pathway. Then after we discuss that, to then start to discuss what is the real threat, in this instance, both inside the West or in other regions of the world and then talk about policy interventions, whether or not they’re effective and what the trade-offs may be. So to start off the discussion I guess the first

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Transcript from PS21 and Just Security discussion on Countering Violent Extremism

Transcript of Transcript - CVE Event 2015

  • PS21 and Just Security: Countering Violent Extremism

    Friday 29 May 2015, New York

    Unedited Transcript

    Ryan Goodman (Moderator): NYU professor of law and co-editor, Just Security

    Richard Barrett: Former British diplomat and intelligence officer who headed the United Nations monitoring team covering Al Qaeda and the Taliban for nearly a decade. Now Vice President at the Soufan Group and an International Advisor at PS21.

    Faiza Patel: Founding editor of Just Security, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU.

    Goodman: So, welcome everybody, to our event on counteracting violent extremism. My

    name is Ryan Goodman, Im a professor here at NYU Law School and co-editor and chief of

    the Just Security blog. Its a terrific opportunity for us to have a discussion. Its not one of my

    main areas of deep expertise so I plan to learn a lot and ask the questions that have been

    burning in my mind on this particular topic. And its an extraordinary opportunity given the

    expertise that we have here. So just to introduce our speakers. Richard Barrett, to the left of

    me, is Senior Vice President of the Soufan Group, from 2004 to 2013 he headed the UN

    monitoring team on al-Qaida and the Taliban. Hes served in the UK government, the security

    service MI5, the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service MI6 and he also served as

    the UKs Director of Global Counter Terrorism operations, both before and after 9/11. And to

    the right of me is Faiza Patel, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Programme at

    the Brennan Centre, and prior to joining the Brennan centre, Faiza was senior policy officer at

    the organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons in The Hague and is author of a

    major report on the topic of CVE, counteracting violent extremism, titled Rethinking

    Radicalisation. In terms of regional experience I thought just to identify that as an element

    that also unifies our speakers. Richard served abroad in the UK government in Jordan and

    Turkey, and Faiza was born and raised in Pakistan. So we also have that element that is added

    to the equation of our discussion.

    So I thought just to start the discussion in one area and then move over to two areas. The

    first area that I thought wed talk about is the conditions that might give rise to individuals on

    a pathway to extremism, if that can even be identified as a pathway. Then after we discuss

    that, to then start to discuss what is the real threat, in this instance, both inside the West or

    in other regions of the world and then talk about policy interventions, whether or not theyre

    effective and what the trade-offs may be. So to start off the discussion I guess the first

  • question would be, I just want to open it up with are, are there predictors or risk factors that

    we can think about with respect to individuals in the West who might want to join in or join

    up with groups like the Islamic State? Is there empirical evidence thats reliable in identifying

    these kinds of causations and how should we think about that? I know Faiza, for example, in

    your major report you identify a conveyer belt theory that the US government has in part

    relied upon and dismissed??? it, but the question is, are there other predictors or other

    theories that you would suggest are plausible. So why dont we just open up with you and

    then turn to Richard.

    Patel: Sure. So let me start by saying that I am a CVE sceptic. Thats how I define myself in this

    debate. And Ive been studying CVE, which is what we use in studying Countering Violent

    Extremism, what use to be called anti-radicalisation or any number of terms, but CVE or I

    guess in the UK PVE, Preventing Violent Extremism, is sort of the term that most people use.

    Ive been studying this issue since right around 2007, which is when I started looking at it. I

    started looking at it then because the NYPD had issued this report called Countering Home

    Grown Terrorism, in which it put forward this model, which said weve looked at 17 cases of

    terrorism in the United States and overseas and we can trace a path by which someone

    becomes a terrorist. And the implications of that theory were, one, that if you can identify a

    path, then you have points of intervention that are identifiable. Two, that the behaviours that

    were put forward as being, how shall we say, indicators of somebody about to become a

    terrorist, were things that were very common amongst Muslim populations. So, for example,

    growing a beard. It was really as simplistic as that. Joining political and religious organisations,

    giving up smoking and drinking, which I thought was a good thing, but apparently not

    according to the NYPD. So, they sort of came up with this model that really looked at religious

    behaviour and said, if you see a young Muslim guy whos engaged in these behaviours, he

    might be on the path to radicalisation, and the implication being so we should watch that

    guy. The FBI had its own version of this, which came out basically simultaneously, which also

    put forward the same theory.

    Now the problem with that theory is that I havent seen a single empirical study that backs it

    up. Pretty much every study that comes out on these issues says its a very individual process.

    In fact I dont even know if I can call it a process. And there are lots of different factors that

    go into whether somebody decides to commit a terrorist act. Not dissimilar to when one tries

    to predict violence. Can you predict violence amidst a small, amidst any population? Its been

    something that we as society have been struggling with for many, many years and simply

    havent been able to come up with the problem.

    So that was CVE, the original. Now, what weve seen in the current administration is a slight

    shift on CVE, which is to say theyve moved away from these religious factors although they

    still focus their efforts on the same communities, and theyve moved into more of a kind of

    psychological thing. So if you kids are alienated or if they are concerned about foreign policy

    or if they change their behaviour, you should be careful, because maybe theyre going to go

    and join ISIS. Now I would pause it there there are a lot of teenagers who are alienated,

    who are unhappy with the status quo, who have problems with US foreign policy, who are

    not going to go and join ISIS. Now I dont see the kinds of things that have been put forward

  • as predictors of radicalisation or violent extremism as being particularly useful. I look at my

    own kids who are fifteen and seventeen and I can assure you that if I went through the

    indicators of radicalisation that were put forward by Lisa Monaco from the White House

    about a year ago, my kids would probably meet five of them. Theres such an urge to do

    something about the problem, that were using these models that are simply not based on

    empirical science and still using them to build programs that have very real impacts on

    communities. I want to make one point over here, which is that since people have started

    pushing back on the theory of radicalisation, the response has been yeah, theyre not

    predictors, but theyre factors. Now, sure, you can say that, but if youre using exactly the

    same kinds of things to target programmes, youre treating these things as predictors, as

    reasons why you should be looking at particular individuals in order to provide some kind of

    programming, whether that programming be a programme like the NYPDs Muslim

    Surveillance Programme or whats now being put forward as a softer, kinder guise of

    countering violent extremism, driven by communities.

    Barrett: Well thanks very much for asking me to join you here today. The more that you look

    at countering violent extremism and the phenomenon of so many people going off to join the

    Islamic state, the harder it is to think of any good policy response to that. Clearly the main

    policy response, and well come to talking about that a little bit later, has to lie with the

    countries in the region, primarily, rather than the Western countries from which some of

    these people go. And I say some because in total theres probably five or maybe six thousand

    people form EU and North America combined and in terms of the total population, that is a

    minute number. And even with empirical studies, and we are trying to do that more by

    interviewing people whove gone away to fight in Iraq and Syria, and who have now come

    back home and indeed people who have gone away to fight in Iraq and Syria and who have

    now come back home and indeed people who have gone to fight and havent come back

    home, to try and find out a little bit more about what reasons they gave. What reasons they

    thought they had at the point of departure and how their thinking developed when they

    were there. And, for those that came back, why they decided to come back, because I think

    that will help us both in terms of understanding how people get radicalised to the point of

    thinking that their future lies with the Islamic State. And the sort of effect of the counter-

    narratives that might persuade people to come back early or perhaps not go there at all.

    Its difficult to disaggregate the three questions you asked. What do we know about why

    people go and whose gone and what is the threat that they pose, and what effective policy

    response could there be, because all those things are sort of very intertwined and they all

    rely on each other. And the great majority of the people who go I dont think are much of a

    threat, and well come on to talk about that, but there is a real concern, and this is the nature

    of terrorism of course, to make the public concerned, not to kill you, but to scare you, thats

    the whole point of terrorism. There is a real public concern about the Islamic State. If you

    look at the newspapers, if you follow the media of any sort, these days, it is, as it were above

    the fold, its always in the headlines, its always something that people are talking about, and

    therefore politicians inevitably feel they have to respond to that. And I imagine with the 2016

    election cycle coming up here, therell be a great deal of discussion about whether the

    Obama administration has been effective in countering the Islamic State, or not. Well, its a

  • bit rich to expect the Obama administration to have been able to do something about the

    Islamic State, because it is such a complex problem and its a complex problem in

    International politics.

    I think people are worried about it, not because they worry about Iraq and Syria, or the

    future of the Middle East, or the future of North Africa, which are the areas most affected by

    this, but they are worried about what may happen at some convention they go to in garden

    Texas. They worry about what may happen when they go to the local Walmart store, or

    whatever. That is an unreal worry, but that is a worry created by terrorism, and of course it

    shows the effectiveness of terrorism, as I said. So if you look at violent extremism, and you

    look at the cases that we know of and can plot, as to why people went, what theyre saying

    while theyre there on twitter and so on, you get just a collection of individuals stories, but

    from all those individual stories, of course, you can make generalisations. The danger with

    that is, they are generalisations, so therefore they cover a huge population far greater than

    the people who have gone off to join the Islamic State, as Faiza said, but, nonetheless, what

    can be done about those factors which may be indicators that somebody is becoming

    radicalised to the point of committing a terrorist crime, either here or going abroad to join a

    violent group? And if you go abroad to join a violent group, you may not go with any

    intention yourself of being violent or terroristic, but you are in an environment where that is

    very much the norm and if you do come back you may be very much affected by your

    experience there. We can talk about that a little bit later.

    So looking at the main drivers of violent extremism. They are common for many people who

    are going through that period, sort of late teenage, early twenties where you, for many

    reasons, go through a period of questioning your identity and wondering where you belong

    and what the future holds for you and whether youre valued as an individual. All these sorts

    of things very, very normal and everybody works their way through that. But I think for some

    people theres not only those push factors, but also very powerful pull factors exercised by

    the Islamic State, which prey on those feelings and say, Ok, you can come here, you can

    help build something, you can be part of something you can do your duty, you can be an

    individual. Dont worry about your past and what you have done, its all about your future

    and what you can do. Everybody can fit, everybody is welcome. Now for the vast, vast

    majority of people, 99.99 %, that isnt enough of a pull factor, but for some it is, and

    unfortunately the people who get up and go are the people who get up and go, people who

    actually could do something rather more worthwhile. So I think that policy makers are not

    just looking at how to prevent people becoming radicalised to the point of going to join the

    Islamic State, but they should also be looking, if they are not looking, at offering alternative

    channels for people who have that energy and determination that takes them out of their

    family and into the unknown of the Islamic State. Finding ways that they could expend those

    energies in a much more positive way to help society. And I think that those two objectives

    are important objectives for any politician and they have to be considered in all sorts of

    policies, which can fall very broadly into a framework of a general social policy, rather than a

    specific countering violent extremism policy. But people like to think that they are engaged in

    countering terrorism. Its a bit attractive than saying Im engaged in social work. I would say

    that social work is probably more valuable.

  • Patel: So I can I just jump in a little bit. I think that its important when youre talking about

    countering violent extremism to look at the different kinds of initiatives that have taken place

    in that space because I think its only then that you can get a clear idea of the policy response

    and the concerns with the policy response. One set of initiatives that you refer to are things

    that would be good for any community, whether it is building a community centre in

    Beiridge, which has a large Arab population. Whether, as I believe the French are doing,

    building a highway that connects their suburbs into Paris more effectively or whether youre

    increasing digital literacy amongst populations. All of these things are in the social services

    category and I think that if you took them out of the securitised space of counter terrorism,

    they could be helpful. I think they are helpful on their own. Whether they help counter

    violent extremism or not, I couldnt tell you. I dont think anybody can demonstrate giving

    more economic opportunity, giving more political participation opportunity, increasing civic

    engagement is necessarily going to staunch violent extremism. But theyre good things on

    their own, so very little down side to them.

    But theres a second set of programmes and I think those are the ones that are most

    problematic, and those are the ones that weve seen emerging in the United States, imported

    from Great Britain, and I think these are a really bad idea. And these are programmes that say

    we are going to identify vulnerable Muslim youth and then we are going to conduct

    interventions. Now I have two fundamental problems with that. One is, how are you going to

    identify vulnerable youth? This is a very, very risky and open-ended proposition, particularly

    when you are looking at minority populations, who are not well understood by law

    enforcement, much less by public school teachers in Minnesota. So, you have that one set of

    issues. And my second problem with that is, how is that intervention, whatever it might be,

    and whatever it might be based on, going to dovetail with law enforcement efforts. Because,

    if Im a school teacher and Im worried that some kid, some Somali kid in my class, is

    alienated or seems troubled, what am I going to do? Am I going to give that child counselling?

    Am I going to report him or her to the principal? Am I going to go to the police officer whose

    been designated as my CVE liaison and put this kid on a list, possibly for no good reason? And

    one of the problems with these programmes is that that relationship, between social workers

    and law enforcement, is a black box for us. And we dont know what the criteria are, which is

    going to take a kid who is troubled in high school and someone wants to give him or her

    counselling to getting put on some kind of a watch list. Its a very risky proposition.

    Barrett: The development of counter terrorism over the years, as I have been involved in it,

    has been remarkable in that, immediately after 9/11, the idea was that you could essentially

    eradicate terrorism by killing everybody. And of course that became ridiculous pretty quickly.

    But I was at the White House summit on CVE earlier this year, and there were a lot of people

    there. The President was there of course, and many senior people of the US administration.

    But also many people from other countries as well and many civil society people. Now it was

    striking to me that, what are we now, almost fourteen years after 9/11, that still were fishing

    around in the dark, really, to find an understanding of terrorism, let alone find a counter

  • measure against that. But, having said that, there has been this remarkable change of

    attitude. It is not about, well not just about a military response. It is also about understanding

    why people from our societies would want to be terrorists. And I think law enforcement

    definitely has a role.

    We have to acknowledge that law enforcement is not just there to catch people who have

    committed crimes and punish them, but also to try to prevent crimes. And with terrorism,

    particularly, the prevention is much more important than the retribution, than the capture

    and punishment, because you want to protect people from violence. But dealing with that,

    dealing with people who are going to join a clandestine group, or possibly go abroad to

    commit terrorist acts, is a very new problem for police officers who, maybe, are very use to

    dealing with gangs, for example. Maybe many of the motives for people joining gangs are

    very similar to the motives of people who join terrorist groups, in the sense that they want an

    identity, they want a sense of belonging, they want to be part of something which is bigger

    than themselves, but gangs for police officers is a known quantity. Theyve been dealing with

    gangs forever and a day and they will carry on doing so. And dealing with terrorism for law

    enforcement is a completely new issue, which I think touches very much on the whole

    problem of community policing, of how you engage and help the community look after itself.

    And maybe well come onto that when we come to talk about policy responses.

    Goodman: Great. I just want to disaggregate the two elements of, is it empirically possible to

    identify at risk factors or predictors separate from what should be the role of law

    enforcement and the police or the state. So the question of prediction. One question is, so I

    understand why we would be concerned about a list that is so generic and over inclusive that

    it could just sweep in so many false positives, but are there ways in which you could

    reconstruct the list, imagining that you are advising a graduate on a dissertation. Just to

    identify, can we empirically get some handle on what creates a motivation or a social

    network that leads individuals down this path, so that the very list you identified, if you only

    looked to that once, there are other characteristics like, if the individual is consuming ISIL

    social media. And then lets go to the list. Theyre changing their practices quite radically

    from what theyve done before. Theyre disassociating from friends theyve had before, or

    they may even wear some insignia. Would that start to count, if we had a list like that, and if

    we were more honest about the potential slippage? I think Faiza, as you have said in your

    writing, the government should be but we should all be honest about where the slippage may

    occur. If we are honest about it, is there a way that you think we can actually get at

    something here?

    Patel: So I think that one way to further disaggregate the problem is if you want to talk about

    how to prevent young people from going to join ISIS, to becoming foreign fighters, as is

  • fashionable, we can talk about that. That is a set of issues that one can talk about, but I think

    that if one frames it very broadly, as countering violent extremism, that will inevitably take

    you into very generic kinds of factors that people will look at. As I said, the first set of factors

    that were put out by law enforcement were really focused on religious behaviour and social

    behaviour and political behaviour. Now the second set of factors, the new fashion, theres

    more of a kind of mental health model were looking at and neither of those are empirically

    sound, and very very general, and have the risk of slippage.

    One way that I think about it is, I can imagine a programme that says, we have this risk and it

    is a very small risk, particularly in the United States. You are looking at roughly around,

    according to law enforcement estimates, 100 or 130 people who have left. You dont

    necessarily know who theyve gone to join in that fight either. You cant assume that all these

    people have gone to join ISIL. So I can imagine something that says, let us educate parents

    about the kind of propaganda put forward and then they can think about the best ways to

    engage with their kids on that.

    I want to point out a couple of things that make it really difficult to do this. One is that when

    we talk about countering violent extremism, the thing we never talk about is politics and

    whats going on in the world and we assume that this is come kind of poisonous ideology that

    we need to inoculate kids against. And when we were discussing this at the White House,

    with the National Security Council, ahead of the CVE summit, we asked them, when you have

    these discussions, will you also talk about these issues. So if you go back to say Minnesota

    again, which I think is an interesting example, you remember about five years ago there was

    a spate of kids who went to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, and this was portrayed as being all

    about the attraction of this Islamic ideology. Now, when you actually talk to these Somali

    communities from whence these kids came, they will tell you that it is as much about wanting

    to participate in a civil war that was going on in their country, that was brought on by

    Ethiopias invasion of Somalia, backed by the United States, and that this is a kind of

    geopolitical issue. Now you may not agree with their geopolitical view, and you may want to

    push back against that, but if you dont even acknowledge that there are factors other than

    ideology, other than mental health, that are going into this recruitment process and this flow

    of young people, youre actually not getting at the problem at all.

    Barrett: Yes, well terrorism is of course a political expression, so inevitably its wrapped up in

    politics. Somalia is a bit different because Somalis are so well connected back to their country

    and I dont think there are very many people who went back to Somalia who were Americans,

    who were non-Somalis. Omar Hammami is of course a famous example of that. The American

    rapper who eventually got killed by al-Shabaab because he objected to their policies and

    practices. But, all right, lets accept Somalia as part of this phenomenon. But if the

    phenomenon is more broadly examined, its not so much that the individual policies of

    Ethiopia or the United States support of Ethiopia, are the problem. What is happening to

    Muslims as a community, that seems to be a much greater appeal for people to go to join the

    Islamic State, anyway, even if not al-Shabaab. And you could say well, its how the

    community, the world community, treats any sort of group of people, any group of people,

  • unfortunately a minority group in some countries, maybe a majority in others, who can say

    they are being persecuted or treated badly. And of course the response is to try and change

    the policies through normal means rather than go off and attack the people who you believe

    responsible for those policies through terrorist acts.

    I think that many of the people who go to join the Islamic State, are objecting to those

    policies, against Muslims, generally against the Uma, rather than specific things that are

    being done by Western countries. In fact I think the objection is more for things that are not

    being done. For example, now with the Islamic State, theres a lot of discussion about

    America actually supporting Assad because it doesnt bomb the Islamic State so much. Its left

    Palmyra and all this sort of thing and really the whole thing is a sort of set up. Now theres

    not very much push back, unfortunately, by the United States on that because, although it is

    not true that explaining the policy is extraordinarily complicated, inevitably there are gaps

    that can be easily exploited by the Islamic State and others, who oppose the United States on

    a point of principle. Maybe I didnt express that point very clearly, but I think you have got to

    see it more as the defence of our community rather than an objection to a specific policy.

    I think that, for example, there may be many people who are joining the Islamic State who

    are converts to Islam. I think thats quite interesting because it shows these people who are

    converts are probably looking for the truth. Theyre seeking for something to believe in and

    identify with and so they go further, probably, than someone whos been brought up in a

    particular religion. And they will go and they will join the Islamic State and they will say, yeah,

    Im all in. Im absolutely 100% behind this. Its once you really believe this is it, this is where

    Ive got to be, you want to believe that. You keep on trying to reinforce your belief in that and

    therefore you look at non-Muslims or non- Islamic State people even as sort of the other.

    And whatever they do is wrong. And if youre looking for indicators, its I think, extremely

    difficult. There are individuals who go to join the Islamic State, theres individuals who mount

    terrorist attacks here, but generally speaking its a group, its a small group of people who

    wind themselves up to make a decision to either commit a terrorist attack or to go together

    to join the Islamic State. That in itself is quite an interesting phenomenon as well.

    Patel: Can I just say a couple of things? I think a lot of what you say is really accurate. I think

    Somalia is an interesting case because its such a microcosm, but if you read the papers, al-

    Shabaab, ISIS, al-Qaida, they just think its all the same thing if you look at the media frankly.

    And theres a direct line being drawn in both the media and amongst policy makers between

    whats happening with the al-Shabaab recruitment and whats happening with ISIL. But I do

    think this idea, for lack of a better word, the war between Islam and the West, is something

    that does seem to be very much part of the motivation of a lot of people. I also think that if

    you look at particular terrorists and what they say about what motivates them, they do point

    to very specific things. In particular the use of drones in ??? (30:56 sec) has been a recurring

    theme we see terrorists coming up with. So it is the general sense of this tension between

    the West and Islam, but there are specific things which really capture peoples imaginations

    and the point Im trying to make is that when we talk about this, we cant ignore those things.

  • Im not saying that I think the US drone policy is driving people, but I also dont think its a

    religious conceptuousness necessarily driving people. I think what drives an individual is

    different from case to case, but I feel that when people talk about this issue and the choose

    the factors they want to focus on, they focus on the factors that most appeal to them, so

    Obama is like, oh well, you need to have better democratic participation. Thats going to help

    you with your extremism problem. Democratic participation is great, you know I would be

    much happier if more of the Middle East was democratic, but whether or not thats actually

    the solution is really dictated by what you think, what your normative value structure is. If

    youre somebody like Pamela Gellar youll say, well, its Islam. Islam is an inherently violent

    religion and thats whats driving this. So I feel that if you want to talk about the factors, lets

    talk about all the factors that go into this and not pretend that what is an elephant in the

    room just doesnt exist. And to come back to your point about converts, which is a really

    good one, and I agree, is the idea that a lot of times though youll see, not a lot of times but

    in a few cases, you see a conversion and then literally weeks after an attempt to go and join

    ISIS. What that brings up for me is that there is more of an attraction to the violence.

    Somebody with a video game mentality. This cool, exciting thing going on over there and its

    somebody who is looking for that. And so it may be the zeal of a convert but it may also be

    something else going on over there that we cant really put our figure on precisely.

    Goodman: So Richard I actually want to drill down a little deeper on what youre both kind of

    touching on. The US role potentially in geopolitics and the US role in the region, in the Middle

    East and the like, and how that might be a contributing factor. And in some sense I think

    when Obama is making the reference to democratisation, its a second message that hes

    trying to send to take the heat off the United States for having supported autocratic regimes.

    Its not actually about heres the solution and Im coming from my framework. Its actually

    very strategic, instrumental. Were not supporting autocracy in the region, we are trying to

    open up political institutions. Richard, one of your reports, one of the major reports from the

    Soufan Group late 2014, you identify this upfront as one of the issues. I have a quote from

    the report where you say, the Islamic State itself is incandescent with the rage. Not only that

    the West will not leave it alone to establish the utopia that it believes is within reach, it is

    hard at work persuading potential supporters that the non-Muslim world will do whatever it

    can to protect local rulers, which I read being autocratic regimes and the like, and so ensure

    their discriminatory and irreligious policies remain in force. Then the last sentences is what I

    want to ask you most about. Not enough is being done on the ground to counter this

    narrative. So what do you think should be done on the ground to counter the narrative? Is it

    the Assad, this is a kind of misconception, and all we need to do to counter the narrative is

    fight information with more information or is it actually change of policy, and thats what

    really has to happen on the ground?

    Barrett: Well, if we knew the answers we shouldnt be sitting here, we should be affecting

    them, and the answers are incredibly difficult, but lets step back a little bit. One of the key

    differences, probably the only difference between al-Qaida and Islamic State, in their

  • approach, is that al-Qaida believes that the local regimes are a secondary target, and the first

    target is their supporters, the West, who really prop them up, and without those props they

    would fall over, so take away the props rather than the regimes. Whereas the Islamic State

    say no, we want to attack the local regimes and that is our primary target.

    Well both, in a way, are right in that the regimes are both self-reliant and reliant on Western

    support. And the regimes have grown up in a culture which has allowed them to reinforce

    that power in ways that we in the Western world would think were inimical to the interest of

    society as a whole. And that is of course one of the reasons why you see the problems of

    today. If you look at what Hafiz Hassan and now Bashar Assad is doing, to replace him, it is

    highly discriminatory, but then you could argue, well, Syria is a false construct anyway. It

    results from an agreement between the French and the British, and years of Ottoman rule

    before that. So really what experience the people have of organising themselves in any form

    of government we might enjoy in the West. And I think thats very reasonable. A very

    reasonable complaint to make. And our system as we see it- as we grow up in school with

    atlases on the wall with nicely coloured countries all brightly distinguished by hard lines

    between them. We believe in whats called the Westphalian arrangements, where nation

    states enjoy sovereignty and full jurisdiction within their own borders and then have relations

    with other states and international agreements. But that is being challenged now really more

    broadly than just the Middle East and North Africa. I think its being challenged through other

    parts of Africa and I think it will be challenged in other parts of Asia as well because its not

    really tenable in the long run. Because it does depend very much on individuals holding sway.

    Now in countries like Saudi Arabia you have a very strong culture where the head of the

    family is the head of the family, and everyone should defer to him and so the head of the

    family answer to the head of the tribe, who may answer to a more superior head of a clan or

    something, and then ultimately to the head of state who is the king. And that is the way that

    it goes. And if the King says such and such should happen, then not only should it happen,

    but it does happen, and thats the way its organised. We may or may not like that, but its

    how society, how culture, is organised in that area. And I think that to change that from the

    outside is an enormous challenge and very unlikely to be successful, and that can only really

    change from inside. And how should it change? Well, should it change to be more like an

    American democracy? I think theres many complaints that many of us in this room would

    have about American democracy living in America even. Should it change in a much more

    culturally specific, evolutionary way? And these debates are endless. Who knows? I guess

    history will tell us eventually.

    Goodman: So one issue we havent highlighted yet is the gender dynamic of motivations for

    individuals to join the Islamic State or these organisations. Recent attention has been placed

    on this. At the White House Summit theres a particular panel on it and I just want to get a

    sense of what you think the best evidence is for why females or women join ISIL, the Islamic

    State, either from the West or from other countries. In the West I believe the statistic is

    something like 18% of individuals who leave to join up with the Islamic State are female.

    There is one theory, or explanation thats given, which is its about misinformation. That

  • theyre being lured into repressive situations in which they arent fully aware. The other is no,

    this is volitional, informed. Its actually similar in character to the generic descriptions that

    youve been getting for the motivation to join something thats a larger group and fulfils a

    certain sense of identity, or response to alienation in the West, if were talking about people

    coming from the West, or building a new state and getting a second life in a certain sense. Do

    you have a sense on the gender issue, whether or not we should be thinking about CVE, both

    as a response to this phenomenon, differently than if you have a gender analysis of it, or just

    the causes or predictors?

    Barrett: Well, funnily enough theres been a very interesting study by the Institute for

    Strategic Dialogue in London, just produced a couple of days ago about, I think they call it Till

    Martyrdom Do Us Part, about women, Western women, joining the Islamic State, and it looks

    at the few examples that are available in detail, and comes to some sort of conclusions,

    which broadly tracked why men joined the Islamic State. Though of course a women joining

    the Islamic State is much more likely to see her role as a wife and a mother, rather than as a

    fighter in the front line. There are many of the women who slightly fret that they are not

    allowed to fight in the front line, particularly after they have been there some time. But this

    idea of going, particularly if you are relatively young, if you are in your late teens, the idea of

    thinking Im going to marry this heroic guy, because theres a lot of heroism mixed in with the

    betrayal of terrorism by the Islamic State. So Im going to marry this young, good looking guy

    and Im going to have children and Im going to belong to this really strong sisterhood, which

    is also very important. Im not going to be discriminated against. Im not going to be teased

    for wearing a hijab as I walk down the street. Im really going to be somebody who is really

    going to contribute and Im going to build the future of the state through my children and so

    on. That seems to be a strong motivation for many young women that are going. Its a

    mixture of idealism and romanticism and the belief that there is the possibility of a world that

    can, almost, not be utopia of course, most people that go are pretty intelligent, but can be

    sufficiently better than the world theyre leaving, to offer a much stronger sense of identity.

    And so the difference between men and women I dont think is that great, probably. But

    nonetheless, this idea of sisterhood is very strong and certainly, in the twitter and whats app

    and the messages that go back from these women in the Islamic State, its something they

    talk about a great deal. And in deed they talk about how wonderful it is to have your husband

    martyred, so that you can have an even stronger sense of sisterhood, but that rings a bit

    hollow sometimes.

    Patel: I think I would basically agree with that assessment.

    Goodman: Then I just want to turn it a little bit more to the policy interventions, to respond

    to what these drivers might be or just the phenomenon itself. And one idea I guess thats

    discussed an enormous amount on CVE is counter narratives and what you think about what

    makes a potential counter narrative effective? Is it the notion of using formers, which I guess

  • is a part of the lingo or a term that is used in CVE? People who have defected from the

    organisation, have left the organisation and returned to life. So is it about testimonies from

    formers who talk about why they were turned a second time, in a certain sense, or

    disillusioned with their membership? Is it about using victims of terrorist acts or atrocities

    being committed by the organisations so that thats part of the counter narrative thats

    effective, because it puts more front and centre those aspects of the Islamic State or terrorist

    organisations? What are the parts of counter narratives that you think are the most

    promising? What might be the least promising ones in which they arent really working and

    dont make sense?

    Patel: Well, I can get to that last bit. So every time Im in a meeting with John Miller, whos

    the head of Counter Terrorism and Intelligence at the NYPD, he says to me and to my

    colleagues, many of whom are activists. Muslim, Arab, South Asian activists who are

    concerned about the NYPD's surveillance program. He is like, but why aren't you guys out

    there countering ISIS's narrative? I just look at this guy because I'm like, do you think that the

    people who are interested in what I have to say, or what Linda Sarsour or Farah Ahmed

    (45:20) or any of the people who are sitting in that room, most of whom are activists and

    lawyers working for Muslim civil rights, are going to be at all influential with the kind of

    people who want to go and join ISIS? Because if thats the case, then you are really, I don't

    know. Whats going on with those marijuana arrests? But anyway, there is this false idea that

    there is this moderate Muslim group out there who is going to be able to put forward

    messages that are going to be appealing to the people who are going to join ISIS. And I think

    we really have to get away from that because its not my responsibility to put those messages

    out. I'm not an effective messenger. Its just when we start talking about that, we put this

    kind of blame and responsibility on people which really doesn't belong there. So let me start

    with that.

    I think that the other thing that I've noticed is that the most effective counter narratives are

    those that aren't even meant to be counter narratives. Those are the things that are organic

    that sort of come from the community and that are really people's individual responses to

    what they see as the distortion of their religion. And something that has really ill effects, not

    just on the individuals who are going overseas to fight with these people but also to the

    broader Muslim communities in the United States who feel the aftershocks of this. In terms

    of effectiveness, and I know you have done some work on the former thing so I think I will let

    you speak to that.

    Barrett Sure. Well I see the audience for counter narrative really divided into five groups and

    at the very end you have the people who have already committed to be violent extremists.

    They are incredibly hard to reach because the more they go into the radicalisation, the more

    they go into a bubble of mutual reinforcement with people who think like themselves. Really,

    really difficult to reach them. You may reach them with a former, but they will quickly label

    the former as a traitor, as someone who has betrayed the cause and someone who has all

  • sorts of reasons to dismiss what he is saying. So it is a really, really hard target. Not one to

    ignore completely but certainly not the main one because it is so difficult and its also very

    small.

    The second one target and much more important one are the people who are sympathetic.

    They are interested in things being put out by extremist groups and thinking maybe that

    makes a bit of sense to me. I'll find out a bit more about that. Those guys need access to

    other people who can give them the other side of the story. Not necessarily in a religious

    sense, though that is important if their motivation is religious, but I don't think the religious

    motivation has really been demonstrated in very many people who become extremely

    radical. After all, there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world and there are extremely few of

    them who are violent extremists. So, although there is a lot of emphasis on Imams talking

    about the true meaning of religion, there isn't a true meaning of Islam. Islam you have the

    Koran, you have the Hadith, and there is an interpretation of what they mean. You can be a

    literalist like the Islamic state people or you can take a broader view and try to put it into a

    context. So that in a way the religion thing isn't so good. But in the sense that these are

    people who are tempted to the Islamic state or to a radical violent extremist group because

    they want to belong to something, they want to have a stronger sense of identity, they want

    to do something, they feel slightly alienated or uncomfortable in their own society, then I

    think a former could say oh okay I was exactly the same. I was exactly like you, I came from a

    very similar demographic from you and I tried this. I was attracted by it. It didn't work out.

    Now what I am doing is this. So in other words, not to deny that people would want to find

    these avenues in life but to provide them alternatives. So I think that is really important. So

    that is the second group.

    The third group of people you would say are neutral. They dont think about it very much.

    Well some people become extremists. So what? Not people I know. Well, those people are

    also really important because those are the members of the community. If we are to manage

    and spot people who are going to fight violent extremists groups, it is only their friends,

    relatives, their family who are going to do that. It is not going to be the local policemen. It is

    extremely unlikely. Probably not even their teacher. So it is people who are moving with

    them every day. So those people have to be aware a little bit about the dangers of getting

    attracted into a violent extremist group or even taking or paying too much uncritical

    attention of them without hearing the other side of the story.

    Then there are the people who are inclined to sort of think terrorism is a bad thing and they

    should be doing something about it. They are a useful audience to go, okay, this is what you

    could do. To be sort of enthused and encouraged.

    Then there are also the people who are doing something about it, who need to be given

    more ammunition and more support and more help.

    So you have these five audiences but for each of them you need a different message of

    course, you need to tell them a different thing. You need a different messenger, whether it is

    a former or not, and you need a different medium. Because where I get my information from

    will be completely different from where somebody who is younger or a different ethnic

  • background will get their information from. So you really need to be very aware of that and

    that is why I think a lot of the counter narrative is probably quite well conceptualized but very

    poorly delivered. Because it doesn't find the right messenger or the right medium. Or, it finds

    the right messenger but its the wrong message. And so, this sort of stuff is not easy, but

    there are increasingly a lot of formers who have a much more instinctive understanding of

    what needs to be done. And I think that to provide them with opportunities is a very good

    policy initiative.

    Patel: One of the things that I think is worth thinking about, is what impact it has when

    government intervenes in this space, in the counter narrative space. Particularly when you

    have, you know as you said, people who are interested in doing something about terrorism. I

    think that what I have seen in my work is that there a lot of, and I'm talking really about the

    United States because that is what I know and I know these communities here, what I've seen

    is there are a lot of organic initiatives which are aimed at strengthening Muslim communities.

    It could be everything like a leadership initiative, there is a very famous one called Amachli

    (52.20), it could be voter registration drives, it could be different forms of activism linking up

    with the black lives matter, for example. So there are all of these different things which grow

    up organically from within the community which are very helpful in generally building the

    community to be part of the American fabric right? These are things we want every

    community to be doing to be engaged, to be active to be thinking, but there is a real danger

    when any of these things become associated with being a counter terrorism initiative. So,

    Ammachli, I will give you this example, so in Los Angeles and I know we will get into this later,

    there is a huge debate going on about whether to participate in the government's CVE

    initiative. About a year ago or so, the DOJ identified three cities in the United States where it

    would roll out a CVE initiative. Minneapolis, Boston and Los Angeles. Los Angeles has a long

    history of police community relations right. They have had lots of institutions, theyve had

    their problems, but they have also had a lot of community outreach going on for a long time.

    So what happens when the federal government comes along with its CVE initiative right?

    Basically L.A. says okay well we are doing x, y, and z in terms of community outreach and that

    is CVE and all of the things they are talking about are actually pretty useful things. They are

    useful things for law enforcement, they are useful for the community. But you put that CVE

    tag on them and you are already turning off a large portion of your audience. One specific

    example really struck and it is a thing called Amachli. It is a leadership training retreat, great

    program, a lot of young Muslim activists that I know have gone through it. Some of the folks

    who are very engaged with CVE in Los Angeles put out a tweet #CVE Amachli leadership

    program (54.27). It led to a huge outburst from the community and the folks who were

    involved in that leadership program were like we are doing this for ourselves, we are doing

    this to build ourselves as leaders in our community and as people who can participate in civic

    life of the United States. We are not doing this as part of a counter terrorism initiative. So

    whatever you do in this space, your first principle I think has to be, do no harm. And what I

    see is when the government intervenes in counter narrative, particularly on the domestic

    side there is a lot of harm.

  • Barrett: Well I just have one little thing to add to that, which is that everything the

    government does is counter narrative. Whether they cast it as counter narrative or not,

    everything that the authorities do is counter narrative. It can push somebody away from the

    community or pull somebody back in. So whether you label or not, you shouldn't label it I

    agree, but everything is counter narrative.

    Goodman So a question I was going to ask in some sense any case, but I want to kind of tie it

    in a little bit, is how we measure effectiveness. Effectiveness of counter narrative,

    effectiveness of social programs. And then who or what institution is right to make those

    measurements? Faiza, based in your remarks, I think in the Brennan report you guys actually

    say the ODNI would evaluate the effectiveness. Isn't that...

    Patel That was a while ago..

    Goodman: Okay yes, so now then what institutions or governmental institutions then

    because isn't that in a certain sense intention with the idea that we don't want to invade the

    space with intelligence or counter terrorism but leave it more organic or have other kinds of

    frames that can be applied here rather than that?

    Patel: So when I wrote that report I was looking at intelligence programs that were based on

    the theory of radicalisation. I wasn't looking at the kinds of social intervention programs that

    are being put forward now and are sort of the fashion these days. I guess what I would say in

    terms of effectiveness is that is one of the big gaps in the space which is that nobody

    measures effectiveness, partly because it is really, really, hard to do. I mean how do you

    measure how many people your counter narrative prevented from going to join ISIS? I mean

    it is a very, very difficult thing to do. But, in addition to that, I think there is a kind of

    resistance that we see generally in the counter terrorism field and we have seen it with NSA

    programs as well to actually try and measure effectiveness in a way and developing metrics.

    So I think that is definitely a big issue. One thing that has happened since 9/11 is that the bulk

    of the CVE funding in the United States has gone to research institutions. It has not gone out

    to community groups, which I actually think is probably a good idea. These research

    institutions have sort of been trying to identify indicators for at least the last twelve years

    from what I can tell. But right now there are two studies going on, which I think are going to

    be very helpful in this space. The one is being conducted by David Shanzer at UNC, at the

    University of Carolina. It is an NIJ grant and he is actually going out and talking to various

    communities in which CVE has been deployed to get a sense of its effectiveness in that so

    that I think will be interesting to see. I believe his report is going to come out sometime in

    early September and it will be interesting to see that. He is also doing another study which is

  • looking at local law enforcements interactions on these issues and sort of what are the best

    practices in that space as well. So I think we certainly don't have much measure of

    effectiveness in this area.

    Barrett: Yeah, measuring effectiveness is a real, real problem. Because the instance of

    terrorism is so small, so to measure well what happened last year, what happens this year is

    not a really good way of doing it because you can't really relate that back to any of the

    actions that you have taken. It is interesting, I was reading today a story in the UK papers

    about a program which has caused a real rumpus where primary school children, which in the

    UK is children between nine and eleven, are being asked to fill out a questionnaire about

    their religion, ethnicity and so on and also their attitudes to people who are not from that

    religion or ethnicity. So okay, what would you do if somebody was rude about your religion?

    How would you feel about that? To sort of see what degree of potential radicalization there

    was in children at this age. Well it sounds absolutely absurd, doesn't it? It sounds completely

    and utterly ridiculous and indeed completely counterproductive. But I can see that behind

    this somebody is thinking okay well maybe we can measure the attitudes of these children at

    this age and then we can go back and look at their attitudes at a later age and see whether

    some of the discussions we have been having about tolerance and the other are effective.

    Maybe, but the problem with that is that even with a measure like that the backfire is so

    great that it makes you wonder who the hell thought of this.

    Patel: I mean that is truly, when I read that article I was just gobsmacked, I think is the word.

    And you know the questions that were being asked where do you think Christmas is haram

    (not allowed in religion), you know like imagine going to a Jewish population and saying do

    you celebrate Christmas or do you prefer Hanukkah? It would simply be unacceptable with

    any group except Muslims. Then some of the questions like do you think it is acceptable to

    marry outside of your religion? I actually went and Googled the statistics on the United States

    and the percentages of people, particularly the older generation by the way, who believe you

    shouldnt marry outside your faith, are actually really high, well into 30s and 40 percent. By

    the way good money was spent on this. I believe they got 500 thousand Euros from the EU as

    part of one of its work streams of countering violent extremism. You know, spend that 500

    thousand Euros on building a football stadium I tell you, or whatever, community centre.

    Don't do this stuff.

    Goodman: So let me ask one last question and then open it up to see if anybody has

    questions. So lets imagine, so the question is about what is the proper role for the state, law

    enforcement or policing. So lets imagine we have scenarios in which it is highly reliable that

    we are able to identify potential youths at risk even to the point that they are engaging in

    forming organizations or associations that are affiliated at some level with ISIS or engaging in

    political demonstrations in favour of the Islamic State. I can imagine this as part of, its not

    happening in the United States, but it is happening in some respects in other countries with

  • the black flag being deployed or unfurled in various situations of political protests or the like.

    So if you could actually identify certain youths and it is in fact kind of clear that they are one

    that would be on this kind of risk continuum, what then? What then is the role for police, the

    social workers from the government, with respect to these communities?

    Barrett: It is such a difficult question isn't it, because if you are only looking to intervene with

    people who are showing signs of radicalization in this very specific area of Islamist terrorism,

    as many people refer to it. Then it would seem to me that the community would say that that

    is fundamentally discriminatory. What about a guy who is going to go out and beat up old

    ladies because he is showing signs of violence, he comes from a broken home, he is

    uncomfortable in his skin and so on. I mean that guy obviously merits as much attention but

    he will, I hope, get attention of society, but I hope not with this label of, oh you know this guy

    may be moving towards radicalization. If you start discriminating in that way, that term

    discrimination becomes pejorative very, very quickly. I think the community, the at risk

    community, the vulnerable community we are talking about, communities as being at risk or

    vulnerable, then they are going to feel that you only come and build a football field or

    community centre when you think we are going to blow you up. So probably it is a good idea

    if you think we are going to blow you up.

    Patel: Perverse incentives.

    Barrett: So I think that when a family identifies somebody within the family, or a teacher

    identifies somebody or other community leader identifies somebody who they feel is veering

    off the path, it doesn't really matter whether they are veering towards violent extremism or

    whether they are veering towards joining a gang or whether they are just veering towards

    some other anti-social behaviour. There has to be some sort of intervention there. I think

    building that communitys capacity to provide that intervention, at the community level, is

    clearly what most governments would like to do. But it is how you do that on an even playing

    field, to carry on with the stadium idea. How you can do that without seeming to favour

    communities just because you think they are vulnerable to violence rather than because you

    identify their need. I think thats really hard.

    Patel: Yeah, I mean I think I very much agree with you that the discrimination and

    stigmatization piece of this is a very big part of it. I mean if you sort of transpose your

    question and say I'm concerned about KKK recruitment in a geographical area, and Im going

    to figure out what are the signs of white supremacist particular variety of Christian and Im

    going to identify the twelve guys who I think are going to go join the clan and go out and

    commit violent acts. Because you know in the clan presumably last I check is still legal. The

    absurdity of that, really Ryan, is that like nobody would accept that. Nobody would accept in

    this country that you could go to white churches, and look at what people are saying, you

  • wouldn't go to white families and say we are afraid your son is about to become a racist

    right? You should look out for these twelve signs to tell me if your son is going to become a

    racist and go do violent things. It is simply not acceptable and I think thatis the problem with

    this conversation from the very beginning. We start with the assumption that this particular

    community is a sort of pool of potential terrorists, like this fifth column within our society and

    that is really where fundamental discrimination starts. It is not that different frankly from

    thinking oh young black men are more likely to become criminals so we say its okay if we

    stop and frisk them at a higher rate so we kind of start from these assumptions which I think

    are really, really problematic.

    I think that in terms of intervention one of the things I would say ids that when you look at

    the sentencing that is in place for material support of terrorism. The US support laws require

    very, very little actus reus, very little action required in order to be charged and convicted

    with material support. Each count of material support carry a sentence of fifteen years you

    know. The government is never shy of charging people and so you normally see an

    indictment for where you might have three to five counts where people might be looking out

    60-65 years in jail for what even objectively looks like a very small amount of criminal activity,

    and a lot of blather and a lot of anti-Semitism, and that kind of rhetoric that we don't like.

    That risk factor alone I think makes it very difficult for concerned parents to come forward

    and say, I am a little bit worried about my kid, you know, he has been watching ISIS videos, or

    you know, whatever other site might even be considered reliable. So I think you have to kind

    of look at that back end as well in addition to looking at the front end of this. For the most

    part I really firmly would resist the import of the kinds of policies that have been

    implemented in the United Kingdom. Particularly, the most recent round is even more

    fundamentally objectionable to me. But one of the things that you do see in the European

    systems is far lower sentences for activity. So if you were thinking of you know looking at this

    kind material support stuff, it covers such a wide range of activity but when at the low end of

    what might considered to be approaching terrorist activity, you might be looking at far lower

    sentences because that is going to make it much more likely that you will have some sort of

    cooperation from the community.

    Another thing, another practical thing is you know, stop doing sting operations, right? The FBI

    and the NYPD love doing sting operations and I can of understand it a little bit from their

    perspective because they are like how can we tell when somebody is just a blow hard and

    never going to do anything or somebody is actually going to carry out a serious attack. And so

    they want to be pre-emptive and we put a lot of pressure on our law enforcement agencies

    to be preventive but the consequences at the end of that are so high for the individuals

    concerned that the communities from where they come are seeing this and they are like

    really? Did this kid really, you know, deserve to go to jail for thirty years or face sixty? The last

    thing I'd say in that space, and it comes back to some of the things we talked about earlier,

    which is when you take politics and what is going on in the world off the table, when you

    make that a no go zone, and some of the models in this do that, they say if somebody is

    expressing concerns about US foreign policy that might be a sign, that theyre going to

    become a terrorist. When you take that issue off the table you actually leave young people

    much more vulnerable to whatever nonsense they find on the internet. And this is something

  • that weve heard from communities and religious leaders again and again. Which is, you

    know, in my mosque I don't want to talk about foreign policy because if I talk about foreign

    policy the FBI is going to be at my door, the Boston police department is going to be at my

    door and want to know what I am all about. Parents don't want to talk to their children about

    these issues because theyre afraid to do so. This is actually a real dynamic that you see in the

    community which is really detrimental to allowing the organic community institutions to push

    back against the ISIS narrative.

    Q&A Session (unable to hear audience questions in video):

    Barrett: Thank you for the questions about Northern Ireland. Many people in Britain I think

    say oh we can look at the experience in Northern Ireland to deal with the problems of

    terrorism today. Personally, I don't really believe that, I think that the issue of Northern

    Ireland is really very, very different. As for what measures were taken to reduce radicalisation

    during the troubles I think that there was some effort definitely to talk to each community

    about the value and rights of "the other," but the communities themselves were so divided in

    Northern Ireland that that was really rather difficult. You had Catholics living in one area, the

    Protestants in another area and so at there was this long tradition of passivity between one

    community to the other. So whatever was taught at schools was probably lost at home

    because he messages didn't resonate. and what, how the troubles ended of course, was

    when a) a degree of exhaustion and sort of revulsion at the amount of violence and b) a

    degree of acceptance amongst both sides that their political solution, a dialogue, was

    possible and that was the best way forward. And of course, that happened. The British

    government accepted that they couldnt go on just trying to suppress Catholic rights in the

    North. They had to acknowledge the IRA had some grounding in populous support, it was not

    just a terrorist group and that was an important breakthrough I think. And then there was the

    whole thing of politicians wanting to be on the right side of history which is also a very

    important thing when it comes to dealing with terrorism.

    Now when you see gestures like Prince Charles saying hello to Jerry Adams I think thats quite

    confused probably. I think the Queen saying hello to the other key Northern Ireland ex IRA

    guy was more instrumental. But the thing about Jerry Adams was that personally for Prince

    Charles, he was very close to his uncle who was killed by the IRA, so I think there is a

    personal thing there but for young people there I think they are saying who the hell is Prince

    Charles you know he is just some old fogy, and by the way who the hell is Jerry Adams, and

    the people who remember Jerry Adams I think both on the Catholic and Protestant side

    maybe look at him in quite different ways because hes never accepted, never admitted he

    was part of the IRA. He was implicated by some as being involved in the murder of, in a very

    famous case, of a woman of several children who was accused of informing on the IRA,

    although she wasnt an informer, leaving all her children orphaned and so on. And hes been

    a politician since then. So I dont want to go on to long about it because it is a very

    complicated issue but I dont think gestures like that are very relevant today because I cant

  • see Abu Bakr Baghdadi standing up shaking hands with Bashar Al Assad or Bader al Hajri

    (1:15:01) or President Obama for that matter. So I think the terrorism we are facing today,

    although it may reflect populous support in the way that the IRA reflected some sort of

    populous sympathy, is a long, long way still from that sort of possibility of understanding,

    reconciliation etc. Stuff like that, but its an interesting point.

    Barrett: What can the UN do about terrorism? It can do and promote all of these sorts of

    social things and good governance, which is very important, and rule of law very, very

    important. But what can it do in a practical sense? The Security Council can declare war on

    one hand or it can issue a presidential statement on the other hand. I think we have seen

    that neither of those work. Certainly wars havent done too much to defeat terrorism,

    perhaps they have increased them in many ways. And presidential statements if anybody

    reads them on the West Side of 1st Av above 42nd St and below 48th Street, Id be a little bit

    surprised. So the Security Council reaches with its tool of sanctions which is something its

    familiar with and has used for very any other problems and it is just one tool. Although I dont

    think it has very much effect on people like Abu Bakr Baghdadi because he is not going to be

    in the world, you cant stop him travelling in the areas that he travels, you cant stop him

    from having assets because he is not using the banking system in the West and so on. People

    sell him arms anyway so the arms embargo wont work against him. But nonetheless,

    sanctions do warn people. They raise awareness of the problems that this is of international

    concern, there is international consensus about it. They warn people that if you get involved

    with these guys youre likely to suffer, your reputation and your business will suffer. And also

    they do act as, I think, of punishment for people who do get involved. So although the inner

    ring or terrorists arent much affected, the system of supporters who might send them

    money or whatever might be effected. So they have a limited purpose.

    Question

    Barrett: Well most of them are in fact coming from the West, because I think in Arab societies

    in particular, the likelihood of, and in many other Muslim societies, the likelihood of a

    woman getting up and leaving and going to a foreign country on her own or with her sister or

    something is really, really difficult. It is extremely unlikely to happen. Its just the opportunity

    is not there, even if they thought it was a good idea, and culturally they are probably not

    thinking it is a particularly great idea. So many of the woman we hear about have come from

    Western countries. From traditional societies maybe, but in Western countries. And of course

    a lot of other women have come from Syria and Iraq because thats where they are. I would

    say that as a sort of general answer.

    Goodman: We have time for one last question.

  • Question

    Patel: Well I mean I think that is the question that most Western governments are trying to

    struggle with on this. Because when you say we have this community in our country and this

    community is where the terrorists come from and so we are going to spend time and money

    focusing on this community in some sense you are sort of reinforcing this idea that this is a

    suspect group and so I think some of the things you have mentioned earlier are very

    important, which is that you need to take. So governments feel like theyve got to do

    something. I was at a conference in Brussels a couple of weeks ago, maybe three weeks ago,

    and this was the general sense you got, you get it from the White House having a summit,

    you get it from the EU, you get it from programs in the UK like you know eight year olds fill

    out a questionnaire. So they feel like they have got to do something and they feel like they

    have got to do it in this counter terrorism framework. What I would say is, if youve got to do

    something, take it out of the counter terrorism framework. If you see community needs, try

    and fill them. Try and do it in a way that doesnt harm the community by stigmatizing them.

    Do things that are good in and of themselves and I think that is the most likely to have the

    desired effect.

    Question

    Patel: So weve certainly seen a number of cases where there has been allegations of

    entrapment. Now, I am sure he knows very well that entrapment is a very, very high bar to

    clear as a defence in any criminal case but there has been a number of cases. The Newberg

    ford case comes to mind as one, where there were these four young African American men

    who were, you know, down on their luck in and out of prison. One or two of them had mental

    health issues, an informant goes in, and goes into their community starts trying to involve

    them in a plot to bomb a Synagogue, agrees to pay them something like 100,000 dollars if

    memory serves and this all happens over the course of several years. And a lot of these

    recordings go into evidence so you can hear the conversation between these guys and you

    can see and you can kind of just tell these guys are in it for the money. The next thing you

    know there is a huge media circus because they have taken these guys all the way to the

    synagogue with their fake bombs and have FBI and NYPD helicopters flying overhead, all the

    roads are blocked, and it was what you would call in my world a tamasha, it is like a real

    spectacle. This is a huge counter terrorism success on the part of the FBI and NYPD, you know

    no one mentions it was a sting operation by the way at the time when they make the arrest

    that only comes out later. I think a lot of people question after that whether a case like that is

    a wise use of the FBIs resources, because it takes you know many years of investigation, a lot

    people involved in that case. And b) what kind of security it actually gives us to be going after

    people who seem not to have the resources to actually carry out a terrorist attack and dont

    seem particularly committed to it either and finally what impact this has on a community

    when you see these kinds of plots over and over again and you really, as a community,

  • perceive them to be illegitimate. Ill give you a couple of other quick examples, there is this

    guy called Cragi Monteal. He is this big body builder guy who went to a number of mosques

    in Orange county in California pretending to be a recent convert to Islam and really spent a

    lot of time basically trying to draw people out into talking about politics, talking about al-

    Qaida, how oppressed Muslims were, all the tropes that are used to draw people in and

    eventually one of the mosques where he was going called the FBI and said there is this guy

    here and hes really trying to provoke people but guess what he was an FBI informant. I think

    that kind of encapsulates whats been going on in this space. As I said there have been

    instances, and I understand law enforcements difficulty in sort of trying to winnow out the

    weed from the chaff, and when is somebody just a blowhard or when they are actually going

    to do something, but the whole system kind of exacerbates the effects of these sting

    operations and they are hugely unpopular amongst all Muslim communities that Ive spoken

    with.

    Goodman: So we are out of time but I just wanted to make two notes of appreciation. One is

    to PS21 for being our cosponsors for this event, it has been tremendous to work with them

    on it, and to Faiza and Richard for such a rich discussion. Thanks.