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Traditions of moral education in IraqHuda Al‐Khaizaran a

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Traditions of moral education in Iraq

Huda Al-Khaizaran*

Institute of Education, University of London, UK

This article suggests three ideas. First, under the pressures of the Ottoman and Iraqi state

modernity projects, two types of cultural traditions in Iraq, namely Islam and Arab tribal values,

were negotiated and re-negotiated. Second, the concepts of merit based on these values changed

over time and were institutionalised in education. Third, these changes created contrasting forms

of moral education in the state education, the Arab tribal diwan and in Shı’a religious hawza

education. Overall, the article discusses how cultural traditions were adapted in these societies in

times of rapid change, how they affected moral education and how these themes may be

understood historically.

Introduction

Iraq has deeply rooted religious and ethnic traditions, whose influence on moral

education has had various political and social consequences. This article examines

changes in the concept of merit and in what was counted as sound knowledge during

the Ottoman Empire, especially in the late nineteenth century, in monarchical and

republican Iraq in the period from 1921 to 1979, and during and after Saddam

Hussain’s regime as the new modern state institutionalised these concepts in the

education system.

This article offers an interpretation of the implications of the political, social and

intellectual struggles over the nature of merit and modernity projects in Iraq. The

changes in the concepts of merit and the struggles over state modernity projects

created new modes of moral education at both state and social levels. As a

consequence, a fragmented society emerged, but within it small and protective

communities developed by preserving many of their traditions in order to safeguard

their ways of life from the pressure of the state modernity projects.

Concepts of merit

Concepts of merit in Iraq had strong political implications and were shaped by

renegotiating the previous traditional cultural values, namely Islam and Arab tribal

*House no 7, Road no 53, Babel District 925, Baghdad, Iraq. Email: chieyoshida75@hotmail.com

Journal of Moral Education

Vol. 36, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 321–332

ISSN 0305-7240 (print)/ISSN 1465-3877 (online)/07/030321-12

# 2007 Journal of Moral Education Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/03057240701552836

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values and knowledge. Merit in Iraq can be seen as having three components,

namely, philosophical knowledge, practical or useful knowledge and moral knowl-

edge. Moral education is defined as an education in an ethical code that synthesises

knowledge and values negotiated within the concepts of merit. It can be described as

a study of the way of understanding the self, others (i.e. the nature of social being as

a person or group, community or institution) and social obligations. These ideas

change over time and are institutionalised in the education system.

The state modernity projects in Iraq included the establishment of the state’s

central value systems, the political visions embedded in the education systems and

the slow changes in the social stratification systems. Alternative voices were raised by

cultural leaders from among the religious, tribal and urban leaders. They defended

traditional values and concepts of merit based on their life experiences and created

different styles of education to protect their lifestyles from the pressures of the state

modernity projects.

The narratives are set out in four sections. These sections investigate the

modernisation projects of the late Ottoman period, the Iraqi state in the monarchical

period, the republican period and during and after Saddam Hussain’s regime. The

article concludes with a discussion of three central themes.

Moral education in the modernisation of the late Ottoman period (1808–

1922)

The Sunni Ottoman national idea, which first appeared in the mid-nineteenth

century, was marked by the defensive modernisation of the state against foreign

intervention and foreign political and economic pressures. For this purpose, the

Tanzimat (the Reform) was introduced in the period 1839–1876. The Tanzimat led

to the emergence of a new style of education in the provinces of Mesopotamia.

Merit, as valued by the Ottoman government, was defined within its political

ideology as a matter of state policy. The new emphasis, through the Education Law

of 1868 and the Regulations for Public Education in 1869, was on state education.

The excessive adoption of western attitudes, and in particular French institutions,

was criticised by Sultan Abdulhamid II, who reigned from 1876 to 1909. The

curriculum used in the Tanzimat period was modified. In lower and higher

secondary schooling, a new curriculum of akhlaq (morals or manners) was

introduced in the examination system. Each student acquired western knowledge

and, at the same time, studied two textbooks, The guide to morals (Rehber-i akhlaq)

and The science of morals (‘Ilm-i akhlaq), which were taught inside and outside the

classroom, as was the traditional pedagogical practice of the Islamic world. The

increased attention paid to Arabic and the language of the Qur’an was critical to the

moral educational agenda. The emphasis was on theological subjects, texts devoted

to the life of the Prophet Muhammad and religious observance. Islamic terms,

sources and concepts were explained in terms of the moral duties incumbent upon

the young subjects of the Ottoman Empire (Fortna, 2002, pp. 208, 224–35). The

Islamic legacy of the practical study of the didactic method, which emphasised

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theological disputation, was revived and prevailed in the form of the question–

response technique of teaching and learning, (Fortna, 2002, pp. 226–227) but, at

the same time, there was a loss of the traditional Islamic philosophical knowledge,

literature and morality. For the training of civil and military leaders the students

dressed in uniform, recited slogans such as ‘Long live the Sultan!’ and participated in

a regimented daily routine within the state education system (Fortna, 2002, p. 193).

As the Empire modernised, the bureaucracy and the unification of the Empire

were consolidated. However, Arab tribal and Shı’a communities, which were

excluded from the main imperial modernity projects, resisted them and preserved

different concepts of merit from the new state leaders.

Moral education in Iraq (1921–1979)

In the period of the formation of the new Iraqi state, the modernisation of tribal

communities and the secularisation of Islam became parts of the state modernity

projects and social modernisation. Immediately after the occupation in 1917, the

British Mandate officials were pragmatic in integrating the tribal communities into

the state apparatus. The tribal reconciliation system (fasl) was redefined and

legitimised as the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation in 1924 (Report by

His Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the

Administration of Iraq for the Year 1925; Ireland, 1937, pp. 85–87, 151–165). The

government depended for regional peace on tribal and urban communities.

Therefore fasl, though an independent traditional practice, was important for the

state as well as the community. However, the knowledge required by the bureaucrats

provided only a partial understanding of the indigenous world. Islamic knowledge

was politicised by state modernity projects. The Shı’a traditions were continuously

excluded from contribution at all levels. The different political positions of the

Sunni, the Shı’a and the Arab tribes brought about the emergence of different styles

of leaders and ways of moral education.

The moral aspect of the state education system continued the Ottoman legacy,

except for the change of language and the replacement of the emphasis on Islam by

Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism was advocated by Sati’ al-Husrı, Director-

General of Education. The Ottoman Hamidian legacy of Islamic manners, The guide

to morals, was redefined as secular Civic ethics (Akhlaq al-mudnıya). Civic ethics

included a study of the political system and was obligatory from the elementary

schools to the university level (Iraq Ministry of Information, 1926; al-Husrı, 1967,

pp. 183–245; Mushtaq, 1968, pp. 181–207; Marr, 1985, pp. 85–101). The emphasis

was on honouring Arab nationalism and the acquisition of English language, western

knowledge as well as indigenous knowledge, the Arabic language, history and

geography and civic ethics all became a part of the state modernity projects. In

European history, the emphasis was on the study of Garibaldi and Bismarck (al-

Husri, 1967, p. 216; Cleveland, 1971, pp. 123–126; Baram, 1991, p. 134, n.15).

This selected foreign knowledge was a means to communicate and consolidate

individual loyalty to the nation-state as prior to obligation to individuals and to

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strengthen national identity. Arab nationalism and Sunni belief became sources of

merit and promotion.

In opposition to al-Husrı’s Sunni Arab centralism, Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali,

an urban Arab nationalist who became Director-General of Education and later

Prime Minister, emphasised educational provision in the rural areas. Through the

United League of Nations, the Iraqi government invited Professor Paul Monroe of

Columbia Teachers’ College to prepare a report on the modernisation of education

in the country. Al-Jamali’s emphasis in the Monroe Commission Report of 1931 was

on tribal education but his support for a democratic civic society contradicted the

preservation of education for the tribes and the socialisation of tribal leaders

(Monroe, 1932). His solution to the need for tribal education was the provision of

peripatetic schools and knowledge about health and farming (al-Jamali, 1934, pp. vi,

119). In 1935, a training school for rural teachers was established but very few

secondary schools were opened in the provinces. Al-Husrı criticised the Monroe

Commission Report as a foreign, hastily prepared evaluation without an under-

standing of the cultural traditions and the politics of Iraq. He wanted to open a

dialogue, but his request was rejected by the Committee and al-Jamali (al-Husrı,

1967, pp. 183–247). Al-Jamali’s education policy confirmed the fragmentation of

ethnic and regional groups.

The curricula of the state College of Law in Baghdad, which trained civil servants,

diplomats, lawyers and judicial administrators, did not include the indigenous

customary law then practised by Arab tribal society, which was not taught as an

academic subject. Law college graduates who were not from tribal families had no

knowledge of such socially constructed law; their lack of awareness made it difficult

for them to understand Arab tribal values and identity.

Like al-Husrı and al-Jamali, Samı Shawkat, a medical doctor, later the Director

General of Education in 1939 and a Minister of Education in the 1940s, supported

Arab nationalism. His concept of merit was based on the Islamic morality of loyalty,

but was transmitted in a militaristic and pragmatic way in the education system and

in the bureaucracy. The effect of his educational modernity projects was the

emergence of a militaristic style of leadership. As early as 1932, Shawkat and other

Arab nationalists had envisaged the militarisation of Iraqi society by training the

youth and institutionalising their ideologies in education. This educational

programme was called futuwa (literally, the Islamic youth). The vision of state

education set goals and structures tied directly to the interest of the state: Sunni

Islamisation, Arabisation and the militarisation of education (Hemphill, 1979,

p. 93).

In 1934, a futuwa programme was developed jointly by the Ministries of

Education and Defence (Flacker, 1998, pp. 141–142). The programme was popular

with the administrative bureaucrats and was supported by the Arab nationalist

Muthanna Club and teachers at the Teachers’ Training College. In 1935, under the

Yashin al-Hashimi regime, the futuwa programme was legitimised and was enacted

as nidham al-Futuwa (the Youth Chivalry Regulation) (Iraqi File, 1935). The law

extended the compulsory futuwa curriculum from all secondary schools to high

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schools and teachers’ colleges and, later, to all other educational institutions and

administrative offices. By 1936, the government had introduced compulsory moral

knowledge—the Arab-Islamic ethic of unity and loyalty, which was defined by the

examination system. The merit, which was institutionalised in the Youth Chivalry

Regulation, was used to guide Iraqi youngsters into a sense of involvement in a

historical mission aimed at a total renovation of Arab society.

Teaching was focused on the cultivation of the individual Islamic spirit, the

English language and militaristic chivalry. Secondary school students completed the

curriculum of military training for the infantry and cavalry and the use of small arms

(Hussain, 1982). Educational ceremonies included students’ parades and meetings,

modelled on similar gatherings taking place in Germany and Italy. These events

became frequent. Students were classified by military rank and wore chevrons and

badges. Service in the military profession was regarded as the fulfilment of a religious

duty (Hemphill, 1979, p. 99). The ideal soldier was the perfect citizen, retaining

traditional values. Students formed the audience for Shawkat’s speeches in which he

emphasised Arab nationalism and selfless loyalty to the nation:

I hereafter shall permit no one to make any propaganda for peace and shall oppose

anyone who advocates peace. We want war. We should shed our blood for the sake of

Arabism. We should die for our national cause…It is our duty to perfect the profession

of Death, the profession of the army, the sacred military profession. (Shawkat, 1939,

pp. 97–99)

Although this speech was criticised and ridiculed by the more moderate sectors of

the population, promoting the principle of individual sacrifice for the sake of

national salvation remained a part of the state modernity project. Resisting the view

of education as a militaristic institution in the service of the state, al-Husrı opposed

the idea of military bureaucrats teaching in the schools. There was no dialogue

between al-Husrı and Shawkat. The futuwa educational project was abolished in

1941. But until 1941, the military was used as a political means for gaining power

over opposition movements (Tripp, 2000, pp. 88–94).

Social and moral education and the changing concepts of merit

During the 1930s and 1940s, new young and educated social groups, namely the

Ba’thists (Pan-Arab nationalists), the communists and the new military officers (who

called themselves the Free Officers), were emerging from the new state colleges. In

1958, Abd al-Karım Qasim, a new military officer within these groups, overthrew

the monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq under his dictatorship (Batatu,

1989, pp. 742–748; Tripp, 2000, pp. 143–161).

In the republican period, state moral education lost its effectiveness. Firstly, the

frequent conflicts among the state leaders, al-Husrı, al-Jamali and Shawkat, over

their different political, social and educational visions weakened the effect of state

education. Secondly, foreign knowledge was not combined with traditional Islamic

and Arab tribal knowledge. Thirdly, Arab and Iraqi national identity was

continuously a source of merit valued by the state for leadership positions. A study

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of Islam, Arabic language and history was used to reinforce the national ideology.

For nationalists, however, there was no room for other indigenous knowledge.

The differently educated groups pursued their own agendas with differing results.

The idea of the renovation of hawza began in the 1960s. A hawza is a Shı’a learning

community independent of the state and a theological madrasa (Litvak, 1998, p. 2).

Concerned about the young Shı‘a groups’ involvement in the communist

movements, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir as-

Sadr and Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakım devoted themselves to the modernisation of

merit as valued by the hawza theological learning community. In their view, hawza

education needed to change. The whole relationship between academia and the

social world also needed to change. Ideas and arguments flew in two directions—

non-political and political.

Al-Khoei had a traditional view of Islam as independent from the state. His groups

had no aspirations to set up an Islamic theocracy, but were active in religious, social

and cultural affairs. The practice of jurisprudence and ijtihad was for al-Khoei an

important aspect of learning Islamic law. Ijtihad is literally ‘exerting oneself’ for new

knowledge, and includes the independent interpretation of Islamic law (sharı‘a) and

jurisprudence (Lewis et al., 1971, p. 1026). Ijtihad was one way to follow the Way of

the Truth (sirata mustaqım: the Islamic Way). Al-Khoei reformed hawza education

according to the new way of learning about Islam. The first grade required a firm

knowledge of Arabic as well as basic concepts of logic, grammar and rhetoric. The

science of hadıth (the study of the authenticity of oral tradition and of the record of

sayings of the Prophet and the first Muslims) was new. In the second stage, a study

of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the principle of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) were

prerequisite. Each subject had its own specific universally-accepted texts, which

were read successively. The highest course was at the postgraduate level for the

acquisition of access to ijtihad. The teacher did not use specific books, but discussed

various questions and issues, citing opinions of different ‘ulama’ (Islamic scholars

who are learned in Islamic law) and adding his own comments and criticism (Asifı,

1964, p. 11). Teaching and guidance on the way to ijtihad emphasised the

importance of understanding oneself in relation to one’s surroundings.

However, the classical hawza of Najaf, as a community which encompasses

scholarship and inter-personal and social bonds, as well as the organisational and

financial spheres in the 1960s, was retained because of the importance of the colleges

in the constitutional system of the Shı‘a world (Khoei Foundation, 2003). By

promoting private relations between a mujtahid (a Shı’a cleric recognised as

competent to deliver ijtihad) and the students, hawza developed as an effective

method of socialisation in moral values and knowledge (Asifı, 1964, pp. 22–23, 29,

200, n. 31).

As-Sadr renovated hawza by institutionalising academic promotion and by

changing the method of learning. He believed in a new Islamic education as an

important part of his answer to the problems of the politically vulnerable hawza

system. Rather than maintaining merit valued by traditional hawza scholarly

communities, he aimed at the establishment of western-style universities that would

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hold the student responsible for completing certain courses and passing regular

examinations (Azız, 1993, p. 211). He allowed the intervention of the clerics in

politics. As-Sadr transformed the learning community itself by institutionalising his

redefined Islamic political thought and movements, and enlarged Islamic political

activities by including laymen. As-Sadr’s thoughts were institutionalised in hawza

and the enlarged Najaf University.

In opposing communism, as-Sadr recognised the existence of contradictions in

society and in political ideology. In his Falsafatuna (Our philosophy) he gave an idea

of Islamic philosophy at work, claiming that the idea of contradiction in the

dialectics of Communism is redundant:

Motion in its dialectical understanding rests on the basis of contradiction, and the

opposition of contradictions. These conflicts and contradictions are the inner force,

which pushes movement and creates development. In contrast to this, our philosophical

understanding rests on a notion of movement, which is considered a course [of passing]

from degree to a corresponding degree, without these corresponding degrees ever

meeting in one specific stage of the course of the movement. (As-Sadr, 1987, p. 236)

As-Sadr debated in public Islamic knowledge that led to spiritual and material

harmony. More practically, his work also led to the idea of the renovation of hawza.

He set up a new curriculum by revising traditional curricula, which had not changed

since the Ottoman period. He translated old textbooks into modern language for

students. Among textbooks, most conspicuous was his book on usul al-fiqh

(principles of jurisprudence). This book, published in 1964, became widely used

for introductory teaching at Najaf (Azız, 1993, p. 211). The important subjects were

jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, the interpretation of the Qur’an (tafsır),

Islamic philology and hadıth (oral tradition and the records of sayings of the Prophet

and the first Muslims). The study of the science of jurisprudence was new (Mallat,

1993, pp. 9–10).

However, within the different educational styles of hawza, there was conflict over

principles. As-Sadr and Shams-ad-Din redefined Islam in terms of political thought,

and as-Sadr more widely in terms of economics, sociology and other worldviews. Al-

Hakım aimed to preserve the institutional independence of the community from the

government and from the transformation of the system at the political centre (Azız,

1993, p. 211). Affected by as-Sadr’s ijtihad, ideas and views on the structure of an

Islamic state and his influence over the Da‘wa (the Islamic call) in the 1970s, the

‘ulama’s encouragement of individual philosophical access to ijtihad continued.

Conflicts over the cultural redefinition of Islam and the political actions of each

group affected the state. These conflicts, and the state leaders’ absence of social

trust, created difficulties for both the state and society in developing the

modernisation of the country.

Education in the diwan (literally the guest room of a sheikh and tribal members,

and referred to in this article as ‘diwan education’) developed during the monarchy

(1921–1958) and was an important way of transmitting the principles of the tribal

reconciliation system (fasl). The British mandate legacy of fasl system, legitimised in

1924, was the Arab tribal method of settling disputes between two parties by using

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mediators. It was a tradition from the pre-Islamic period, recognised in Islamic law

and practised by the Prophet Mohammed as a judge in the mosque. Fasl developed

as a tribal judicial meeting and a consultation procedure was set up to reach a final

decision (compensation). Its traditional purpose was to pardon the offender, prevent

revenge and maintain peace in Islam (al-Rawi, 1949, pp. 297–301; Hasanayn, 1967,

pp. 169–89; Haleem et al., 2003, pp. 97–108).

The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was abolished in 1958.

However, diwan education continued because fasl was a prerequisite to maintaining

peace within and between the tribes. The fasl tradition underpinned the functions of

the alliance or negotiation for the tribal rights of peace, security and protection of the

tribe, family and individuals. The Islamic concept of ijtihad was also institutionalised

in the criminal justice system (Haleem et al., 2003, pp. 172–174). In order to reach

ijtihad and a new decision of compensation, each case of fasl should be studied and

checked with the customary law by the sheikhs and their members who were

involved. The tribal concepts of merit developed through this Arab-Islamic

tradition. A tribal member who possessed merit was called muru‘a. Muru‘a can be

translated into English as an ‘ideal youth of the tribe’. The socialisation of the muru‘a

was framed by Arabhood and combined Islamic with tribal virtues and obligations. A

muru’a was required to possess morals, martial arts and refinement and, in

particular, skills in fasl and peace alliances, which demonstrate merit and lead

to tribal honour and dignity. This concept of merit served individual and com-

munity life.

Knowledge institutionalised in diwan education included a study of jurispru-

dence, Qur’an reading, tribal history, poetry and oral traditions from the pre-

Islamic period, literary history and events. This study did not mean selfless loyalty

to their community, but loyalty based on the person’s autonomous decisions

according to the dignity promoted by Arab cultural values. After 1958, frequent

assemblies based on this knowledge and debate in public over their tribal

obligations brought about the cohesiveness of the tribal groups. In this context,

strong diwan education continued and developed, with its Islamic, judicial and

literary language components and traditions; hence, strong tribal identities were

maintained. These were transmitted by tribal families over generations (al-Jamıl,

1956, pp. 91–110; Hasanayn, 1967, pp. 109, 207, 288; Owedi, 1982, pp. 95–98,

319–22).

To summarise, throughout the 1960s, the Arab-Islamic ethic of unity and loyalty

was used to reinforce the national ideology at the state level. Moral education in

diwan and hawza developed through an encouragement of members’ civic

engagement within their communities. The institutionalisation of cultural traditional

values in their education system were their expressions of the ideal social being, and

this ideal underpinned moral education in terms of religious, ethical and ethnic

group values. Such voices were based on tribal and Islamic worldviews and their

social obligations, with which renegotiation could work. The traditional concepts of

merit that functioned in Islamic and Arab tribal communities could be combined

with foreign knowledge and create new forms of civic society.

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Moral education during and after Saddam Hussain’s regime (1978–2007)

Three types of modern education, namely the Arabisation, the militarisation and the

Islamisation of education, developed their conflicting ideologies during and after the

1920s and these were revived during Saddam Hussain’s regime.

As already noted, the Ottoman legacy of The guide to morals was transformed into

the textbooks called Civic ethics during the monarchy and National and social

education during the republic after 1958. During the Ba’thist regime of Saddam

Hussain there were two aspects of the study of national morality. ‘National

Education’ required knowledge of Iraqi nationalism (watanıya) and applied to the

secondary school. ‘Pan-Arab Culture’ required knowledge of Pan-Arab nationalism

(qaumıya) and support for Arab and Palestinian freedom. This study, which applied

to students in the first to third year at the university, was compulsory. Schools and

universities were used as Ba’thist centres for the propagation of Iraqi pan-Arabism.

History and geography texts were written and re-written for Party purposes.

During the Iraq-Iran war, young men between the ages of 15 and 20 joined the

reconstituted futuwa youth organization. By 1994, drawing on Shawkat’s ‘Profession

of Death’, Saddam Hussain sought to inculcate a fighting spirit in young people, and

began ‘implanting the spirit of sacrifice for the sake of the homeland’ (Bengio, 1998,

p. 152). High school boys were encouraged to join the Republican Guard.

In 1993, examinations in Islamic Education, followed by ‘the Great National

Religious Campaign’ for teaching the Qur’an (recitation and interpretation) at all

educational levels, were introduced at the intermediate and preparatory levels.

Nationalised Islam was reinforced by a campaign for teaching Islamic values

organized through the Ministry of Education. The movement permeated Iraq

through teaching conducted by trained school teachers and specialised supervisors in

Islamic Education and specified activities for the recitation and memorisation of the

entire Qur’an. The state set out principles for educational professionals, including

patriotism and the encouragement of loyalty and obedience to the leader of the state

(Iraq Ministry of Education, 1996, pp. 18–20). Thus the content was national ethics

rather than theological doctrine and the emphasis was on the reinforcement of the

new Islamic value of loyalty to the state. The Great National Religious Campaign

was politically successful.

Any criticism of the government and any movements for democratic rights were

prohibited. Alternative voices to the state’s modernity projects were weak in Iraq in

the late twentieth century. There were gaps between urban and rural groups

concerning their understanding of values, merit and knowledge. Disruption arose

from foreign intervention in political, economic and cultural spheres, and education

in Iraq became a human rights issue. Education was never set free from power—the

state’s power and its control of knowledge. The indigenous cultural aspect of moral

education was thus separated from modern state education. New problems in the

aftermath of the 2003 war were the increase of the brain drain; cross-border terrorist

networks and activity; and political, social and educational insecurity. The impact of

the conflicts on the education system has been devastating in its effect on both

children and adults.

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During this period, the private learning communities (the diwan among the Arab

tribal communities and hawza in the Shı‘a Islamic religious communities) developed

personal learning and networking in private educational communities. Their

institutions might further develop by interacting with the different social groups

and by changing their form and content. However, it is difficult at the time of writing

to predict the future of education in Iraq.

Conclusion

It has been suggested that concepts of merit were negotiated and renegotiated

throughout history of Iraq. In the state and the traditional diwan and hawza moral

education, concepts of merit developed to:

(1) renegotiate cultural traditions and values and what has been counted as sound

knowledge

(2) institutionalise (and often legitimise) these values and knowledge in the state

and private education systems, at the social level

(3) create a new mode of education

Throughout the twentieth century, Islamic values were translated into national

morality, expressed in The guide to morals, The science of morals, Civic ethics, chivalry

and the Great National Religious Campaign, and permeated the entire state

educational project. In the Hamidian period, the motivation for launching this

campaign derived from the desire to defend the Ottoman Empire against foreign

encroachment, while later, in Iraq, the motivation derived from the hope to achieve a

united Arab nation and the formation of Iraq as a part of it. Morality underpinned

the state educational project as a whole. In the face of a variety of changes, the

system of moral education was meant to inculcate in its students an Islamic sense of

morality within an imperial and militaristic orientation. However, self-cultivation in

philosophical knowledge about the Truth (the ‘Islamic Way’) and literature were

neglected.

As the Iraqi state modernised, concepts of merit institutionalised in the state

education system strengthened Sunni Arab political ideologies and shaped

intellectuals who were loyal servants to the state. The redefined akhlaq (morality)

was adapted to recruitment, promotion and competitive examinations. The new

school system was designed to train such candidates. However, the pursuit of the

philosophical, practical and useful knowledge that led to ijtihad was neglected.

Ijtihad was institutionalised in Sunni judicial training, Shı’a theological learning and

the fasl system in the Arab tribal community. The failure to include the philosophical

learning of Islam, history and literature, meant that they had no impact on the state

education system. As a consequence, the establishment of modern curricula for the

state education eroded the social values contained in the moral code of Islamic and

Arab tribal knowledge.

During the monarchical and the republic after 1958 and the Ba’thist regime of

Saddam Hussain, moral educational contradictions between state and social

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modernity projects led to tensions, not only between state educationalists but also

between leading tribal and religious members, over the traditional knowledge and

obligation and loyalty to the state and its Pan-Arab and Iraqi ideologies. State

educationalists perceived the promotion of merit based on Islamic and Arab values

as a convenient instrument to reinforce the new political ideology. In contrast,

cultural leaders saw merit as valuable in itself and in relation to social obligations. As

a consequence, new modes of moral education, namely state, diwan and hawza

education emerged. Fragmented communities were promoted. However, through

the diwan and hawza educational space developed within the community in terms of

protection from the pressures of state modernity. The preservation of the traditional

society was thus an indirect consequence of the state modernity project.

In this article, I have tried to show how the concepts of merit and moral education

were neither fixed nor discontinued but renegotiated in time and rapidly and

dramatically changed at certain times. Traditional values, institutionalised in moral

education based on the life experiences of individuals or groups, were neither

abandoned nor firmly defined, but negotiated and renegotiated. They continued

either transformed in the broader society or preserved in many of the traditions of

the communities.

A fragmenting society will continue to exist, maintained by structures that have

developed in the past, unless the concepts of merit which were negotiated and

institutionalised in the state diwan and hawza education system are questioned,

renegotiated and debated in public.

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