Towards a Reformulation of CorePeriphery Relationship a Critical Reapprai...

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PGD 8 (2009) 263-294 brill.nl/pgdt

P E R S P E C T I V E SO N G L O B A L

D E V E L O P M E N TA N D

T E C H N O L O G Y

owards a Reformulation of Core/PeripheryRelationship: A Critical Reappraisal of the

rimodality of the Capitalist World-Economyin the Early 21st Century*

Kwangkun LeeDepartment of Sociology, Binghamton University, State University of New York

[email protected]

AbstractTe trimodal framework of core-semiperiphery-periphery has been challenged by globalizationtheorists. Tis article is not only an anti-criticism of critics but also a criticism of the trimodalityitself. Against critics, I argue that the national state is still a meaningful unit of world inequali-ties. But I also argue that semiperiphery has been decomposed since the late-1970s. It implies

that the semiperiphery may not be a constant feature of the capitalist world-economy for alongue-durebut an historical product specific to two decades of development in 1960-70s.

Keywordsglobal inequality, trimodality, core-periphery hierarchy, semiperiphery, Immanuel Wallerstein

Introduction

Te trimodal conceptualization of core-semiperiphery-periphery has been rec-ognized as one of trademarks of the world-systems analysis since Wallersteinsfirst volume ofTe Modern World-System (1974) came out. It has made theworld-systems perspective distinguished from other development discoursesincluding modernization theory, dependency theory, and orthodox Marxismin the 1970s. Although it tends to be often forgotten, the concept of semipe-riphery, playing the pivotal role of the trimodality, was initially advanced as an

* Previous versions of this article were presented in Graduate Student Conference inHistorical Social Science (Binghamton University, April 29, 2007) and Global Studies

Association Conference 2008 (Pace University, New York, June 6-8, 2008). Te author isgrateful to Ravi Palat and William G. Martin for their valuable suggestions on the earlierdraft of this article, and to an anonymous referee of GSA proceeding book.


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answer to the question that arose from a paradoxical phenomenonthe rela-tive stability of the whole hierarchical structure of global capitalism in spite of

the possible upward or downward mobility of constituent units (i.e. nationalstates). Te concept of semiperiphery was an attempt to get out of the theo-retical quagmire by explaining the paradoxical compatibility of the limitedpossibility of national economic development with the tendency towardspolarization on a global scale. Most of the previous theories had tended toregard the existence of developing middle-income states as exceptional, resid-ual, or transitory, rather than an integral, necessary, and constant feature of thecapitalist world-economy. By contrast, the world-systems analysis has tried toconceptualize those states under the rubric of semiperiphery, as a stable fea-

ture of the capitalist world-economy. Tis conceptual maneuver liberated thefuture of developing countries from the rosy prospect propagated by the mod-ernization theory as well as from the gloomy pessimism of the dependencytheory. Te future trajectory of individual developing countries came to beunderstood as something predicated on a more or less contingent combina-tion of developmental capacity of national states, conjunctural opportunities,and structural constraints on a global scale.

Te concept of semiperiphery was born in the 1970sthe second decadeof development proclaimed by the United Nations in 1970and subse-

quently got wide attention. It was actively exploited both for explainingnational paths of development and for describing the global structure of capi-talism in the 1980s. Te trimodal characterization, especially the concept ofsemiperiphery, had been popular during the initial two decades as it explainedsimultaneously both possibilities of, and constraints on, national develop-ment. In addition, regardless of their Cold War camp membership and geo-graphical regions across the world, developing countries seemed to share somedomestic contents such as neocolonial situations, subimperialist roles, state-led late industrialization, military or one-party dictatorship and subsequent

democratization, or active antisystemic movements within their territories.Tese conspicuous similarities of developing countries had made the conceptof semiperiphery more attractive. Furthermore, most influential works of theworld-systems analysis regarded the existing state socialist bloc as a part of thecapitalist world-economy rather than constituting a separate world-economy.As the conventional image of three worlds delineated by the geography of theCold War had been erased by the 1990s, the trimodality of core, semiperiph-ery, and periphery could have emerged as a meaningful framework to analyti-cally partition global capitalism. However, current abuse, neglect, disinterest,

and superficial criticisms on this conceptualization stand in stark contrast tothe broad attentions, critical discussions, and even active suspicion of thismodeling about 20 years ago


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Tis paper consists of three sections. First, I briefly survey recent criticismsof Wallersteins trimodal formulation. Second, I revisit the trimodality models

of the world-systems perspective. I argue that there is no single trimodalitymodel as assumed by critics and some proponents, and present three differentmodels of the trimodality. Tird, I examine how these models are adoptedby quantitative analyses on global inequality. In conclusion, I refute both thedeterritorialization approach and the basic tenet of the trimodality of existingworld-systems perspective. Against the deterritorialization approach I arguethat between-country inequality is more important than within-countryinequality in explaining global inequalities. Against the traditional world-sys-tems perspective, I argue that semiperiphery may not be a constant figure of

the capitalist world-economy.

Deterritorialization Criticisms on Wallersteins rimodality

In spite of, and partially because of, the initial success of the world-systemsperspective, there have been a variety of criticisms on the trimodal formula-tion of the capitalist world-economy, especially as it was originally formulatedby Wallerstein. Te criticisms may be classified into four categories: (1) criti-cisms of functionalism, teleological explanation, and the instrumentalist viewof the state (Skocpol 1977; Block 1978; Sewell Jr. 1996), (2) criticisms of theunderrating of class relations (Brenner 1977; Gerstein 1977), (3) criticisms ofthe violence of abstraction, in other words, on homogenization effect of theuneven space into a zone or a structural location of the world-economy (Mintz1977; Wolf 1982; McMichael 1990; Paige 1999; omich 2004), and (4) crit-icisms of the status of national states as constituent units or building blocks ofthe capitalist world-economy (Castells 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000; aylor1987, 1994a, 1994b). What is of special interest here is the fourth categoryof criticisms that strongly question the current heuristic value of the trimodalformulation through which global hierarchy-cum-network is represented asbeing built with national state building blocks. Teir analyses on global restruc-turing processes were the main components of the globalization discourse. Fol-lowing Neil Brenner (2004), I would call these deterritorialization approaches.

Te basic tenet of various deterritorialization criticisms of the trimodality isthat the heuristic power of core-semiperiphery-periphery partition of the cap-italist world-economy, which was once useful, has been increasingly underminedwith globalization.1 Manuel Castells (1996) explicitly rejects the tri-partite

1 Tis tenet is shared by Walter Mignolo: Until the middle of the twentieth century thecolonial difference honored the classical distinction between centers and peripheries. In the sec-

d h lf f th t ti th t th f l b l l i li d b t ti l


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model of global capitalism. He is not only well aware of the deeply asymmet-ric nature of the global economy, but also agrees with Braudel and Waller-

stein in that the capitalist world-economy has existed in the West at least sincethe sixteenth century (Pp. 92-93, 108). But for Castells, not until the latetwentieth century did the world economy became truly global. Describing hisobservation of the newest international division of labor which consists offour different positions in the informational / global economy,2 Castells(1996) poses a critical challenge on some basic assumptions on which Waller-steins preconceived model of the trimodality is built. Castells argues that thefour different positions do not coincide with countries: All countries arepenetrated by the four positions . . . because all networks are global in their

reality or in their target. (p. 174) Tus, for Castells, the world-systems modelof the three-tiered pyramid built with state blocksin which three tiers of core,semiperipheral, and peripheral countries are layered from top to bottom hascome to lose its original heuristic value as the new global informational econ-omy, what he called the network society, has emerged.

Hardt and Negri (2000) take a similar stance with Castells. While theyacknowledge both capitalisms continuous foundational relationship to . . .the world market and capitalisms expanding cycles of development, theyseek the reason for the shift in contemporary capitalist production and global

relations of power in the capitalist project to bring together economic powerand political power to realize the Empire, which is capitalist (Pp. 8-9). Underthis novel situation, they argue that the initial heuristic value of the trimodal-ity or bipolarity has disappeared, as Castells does: If the First World and theTird World, center and periphery, North and South were ever really sepa-rated along national lines,today they clearly infuse one another, distributinginequalities and barriers along multiple and fractured lines (p. 335).

Even before Castells, Hardt and Negri, the same voice has been heard fromthe inside of the world-systems perspective. Indeed, Peter J. aylor (1987) has

criticized the tendency to use national states as building blocks of the capitalistworld-economy. Te tendency has prevailed through the world-systems analy-sis, especially in the quantitative research on the global hierarchy. He argues

corporations, erased the distinction that was valid for early forms of colonialism and the coloni-ality of power. Yesterday the colonial difference was out there, away from the center. oday, it isall over, in the peripheries of the center and in the centers of the periphery (Mignolo, 2000: ix).

2 Te four different positions refer to (1) the producers of high value, based on informa-tional labor, (2) the producers of high volume, based on lower-cost labor, (3) the producersof raw materials, based on natural endowments, and (4) the redundant producers, reduced todevalued labor (Castells 1996: 147). Tey can be understood as a contemporary version of what

Wallerstein called the modes of labor control when he deals with different structural positionsof the incipient capitalist world-economy in the long sixteenth century in the first volume ofModern World System (Wallerstein 1974)


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that the core, semiperiphery, and periphery need not coincide with the polit-ical boundaries of states (p. 35). But most of the world-systems studies have

taken it for granted that the stratification of the world-economy is conceivedin terms of states (aylor 1988: 571). By pointing out this presupposition,aylor aptly challenges Wallerstein: [W]hen Wallerstein (1979: CWE) appliesthe semiperiphery concept to the current situation he only refers to states, buthe has no discussion of when and how states emerged as a necessary basis forthis exercise (aylor 1988: 571). Recently, aylor (1996, 2000a, 2003) sys-tematically elaborates his criticism on the embedded statism which consti-tutes the essence of the mosaic metageography. According to his glossary, themetageography refers to the geographical structures through which people

order their knowledge of the world, and a metageographical moment isa critical time of transition between metageographies (aylor 2003a: 47).Emerged from decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, a mosaic meta-geography universalized the image of the world map in which each state isdistinguished along borderlines from one another with different colors. Pre-senting a geohistorical interpretation of the capitalist world-economy, he con-tends that globalization is a metageographical moment shifting from a mosaicmetageography to a network metageography and that this is no less than anerosion process of the embedded statism with the rise of trans-state global city

networks. Based on this interpretation, he suggests integrating the traditionalpolitical mosaic of state territories with the network of world cities in a singleanalysis (aylor 2000b: 6).

Under the rubric of different names of globalization, Castells, Hardt andNegri, and aylor share a critical stance on the trimodality traditionallyassumed by the world-systems perspective. Tey argue that the trimodality ofcore, semiperiphery, and periphery has lost its heuristic vitality as the worldhas changed. Are they right? If we want to answer this question, we should putthe trimodality of the capitalist world-economy under scrutiny.

Tree Different Models of Core-Semiperiphery-Periphery Hierarchy/Network

Against the conventional understanding of the trimodality represented by thedeterritorialization critics, there is no single coherent model of the trimodalframework. Te world-systems analysis as a collective intellectual enterprisehas been ever changing while maintaining some essential points.3 We can

3 We may understand what Wallerstein (2001: 267-268) presents three defining characteris-tics of the world systems perspective as the persistent claims of this perspective Te three specific


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observe both continuity and discontinuity simultaneously from Wallersteinsand others works done for more than a generation. Here I try to trace how his

model of tripartite global hierarchy has changed so far and to clarify how thechange produces further changes in his conception of the semiperiphery. Fur-thermore, I examine how subsequent studies, especially Arrighi and Drangel(1986), try to revise Wallersteins earlier modeling. I argue that a critical shiftin Wallersteins modeling from the initial structural-functionalist to the rela-tion-mix model of the semiperiphery took place as a result of Wallersteinsattempt at avoiding unnecessary misunderstanding by his earlier critics, forwhich he was partly responsible. But I also argue that the revised relation-mixmodel is far from perfect, especially as it comes to encounter some old prob-

lems that the earlier structural-functionalist model could handle much better.In this situation, Arrighi and Drangels global-wealth-hierarchy modeling canbe viewed as an alternative to Wallersteins. But this model has evolved witha critical rupture. In more recent studies by Arrighi and his co-authors, theproblem of the existence of trimodality has disappeared.

Structural-Functionalist Modeling (1974)

Wallerstein (1979) asserts that a three-layered structure is an obvious mech-anism necessary for sustaining existence of any social system based on unequalreward: the system cannot function without being tri-modal because thepolitical stability of the system can be guaranteed through the division of themajority into a larger lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum. For him,this preconceived model is assumed operative in all kinds of social structure.In other words, it is supposed to be observed in any kind of world-systems, atleast in those known through history.4 Tis political rationale of the interme-

points are put forth in terms of (1) unit of analysis, (2) longue dure, and (3) a certain view of thecapitalist world-economy, one of which is the structural existence of a semiperipheral zone.4 In this way, Wallerstein (2001) tends to assume that the tripartite structure has existed

through the very long-term, paraphrasing Braudel, through the time period of the sages(p. 137). In the same vein, William Sewell Jr. (1996) also points out the abstract transhistoricaltime of Wallerstein (p. 245-80). Tus, Wallerstein, although it might be unintentional, seemsto share this quasi-eternity with nomothetic scientists whom he has criticized. But we shouldnote that the assumption of the tripartite structure is an analytical starting point rather than asynthetic outcome of his intellectual enterprise. In other words, the trimodal structure is a pos-tulate, which is notnecessarily a self-evident truth, but rather a presupposition initially adoptedfor further production of meaningful knowledge within the specific theoretical totality. In ascientific enterprise, an explanation on the dynamic processes of the real world does not only rest

on, but also is built up from, postulates. If we bear in mind this heuristic nature of the postulate,it would be understandable that Wallersteins tripartite configuration of the world hierarchyt k th ti f th th ti b d d d idi hi B


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diate zone is deduced from the assumed general nature of the world-system.Tus, the tripartite structure is common to world-economies and world-empires as both kinds of the world-system need an in-between buffer zoneblocking or absorbing any serious threat from the below (Pp. 22, 68-69).

However, there is an important difference between the two world-systems:While world-empires have a central political authority coordinating a cul-

tural stratification by providing the middle-strata with a limited access to thesurplus, the capitalist world-economy has instead three kinds of states. Inother words, besides the upper stratum of core states and the lower stratumof peripheral states, there is a middle stratum of semiperipheral ones (Waller-stein 1979: 23, italics in original).

According to this scheme visualized in Figure 1, every state in the capitalistworld-economy occupies one of three structural positions within a hierarchi-cal system. Te coupling of the world-economy with the interstate system asthe alternative to an absence of the singular political authority is the basis on

which the assumption that membership of each zone is confined to the sover-eign state is built, so that we can say in such ways as core states, semiperipheralstates, and peripheral states. It reflects not only a formal equivalency amongsovereign states, but also a substantial difference between strong states andweak states.

Te assumption, in turn, prevents Wallersteins model from being facedwith the intangible problem of internal core-periphery relations within acountry. Combined and uneven development may exist regardless of the spa-

imposing the imaginary mental map of the core-semiperiphery-periphery hierarchy on the real

world, Wallerstein seeks to delineate an international hierarchy entailed with global division oflabor. In sum, the mental map may contribute to producing further knowledge on the aimedbj t i th l ld b t t b ifi d b it lf

Figure 1 Structural-Functionalist Model of the ripartite Hierarchy

Social system in general

Core

Semiperiphery

Periphery

Capitalist world-economy


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tial scale of its range. o be sure, there can be core-periphery relationshipswithin a country. Wallerstein also readily acknowledges the historical existence

of non-state peripheral areas and the coexistence of different zones within theborders of a national state in such cases as France in the long sixteenth centuryor the United States in the eighteenth century (aylor 1987). But Wallerstein(1978) pays more attention to a historical specificity of the capitalist world-economy, i.e., the singular division of labor on a world-systemic scale, parti-tioned with a multiplicity of states rather than core-periphery relationships onmultiple scales: If one starts with the framework of a single division of laborwithin which there are multiple states and multiple economic processes, thenone has to worry about the lack of total coincidence (p. 220).

ogether with the lack of total coincidence between core-periphery rela-tional structures and national states, there is another serious problem in hisframeworks of the three kinds of states in the capitalist world-economy. Tecriterion by which each state is categorized into three positions of the world-economy is not rigorously advanced. Tus, plural features such as the mode oflabor control, complexity of economic activities, strength of the state machin-ery, cultural integrity, etc. are put forth for sorting out countries into the threecategories of core, semiperiphery, and periphery (Wallerstein 1974: 349).

It is this very point where deterritorialization critics reject the core-semipe-

riphery-periphery framework. Tey try to vindicate their criticism with theevidence that there is no coincidence of the core-periphery relationships withcountries, as is a consequence of their different names of globalization. Is theproblem of the lack of total coincidence between the economic processesand the state boundaries new? Not at all. However, their criticism is partiallyvalid, even if it is not a novel phenomenon brought about by globalization.Indeed, it was the problem already admitted by Wallerstein when he concededhis own responsibility for the prevailing misunderstanding of core-peripheryrelationship. Although it has been largely neglected, Wallerstein (1974)

was aware of the existence of a multilayered format of layers within layerswhen he described the uneven development of the fledgling capitalist world-economy:

In the sixteenth century, there was the differential of the core of the European world-economy versus its peripheral areas, within the European core between states, withinstates between regions and strata, within regions between city and country, and ulti-mately within more local units (Pp. 86, 119).

But his recognition of the multiple scales of core-periphery relationship is not

reflected in the earlier structural-functionalist modeling, but kept out of hisabstraction of the modeling.


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It is not diffi cult to discern a vestige of the structural functionalism from thisearlier framework. What is to be explained, that is, the existence of the tripar-

tite structure of the capitalist world-economy, is just presumed as a generaltrait of the social system. Unlike a world-empire characterized by the existenceof the central authority governing the whole sphere of its division of labor, thecapitalist world-economy is coupled with the interstate-system, which consistsof many formally sovereign states. Despite this difference, both a world-econ-omy and a world-empire commonly have the tripartite structure as all socialsystems have. Te difference is only expressed into the formulation that thecapitalist world-economy consists of the three structural locations, namely thethree kinds of states. Te image of organism, in which the whole system is

sustained by the function performing of various parts, fits well to this struc-tural-functionalist picture. In the case of the capitalist world-economy, eachzone, which is a cluster of states, is viewed as a part performing a typical func-tion, which is conditioned by the needs of the whole system.

Relation-Mix Modeling (1978)

Many earlier critics of Wallerstein, such as Teda Skocpol (1977) and Robert

Brenner (1977), have preyed on the structural-functionalist modeling. Whilethey (mis)charge Wallersteins reliance on conjunctural explanation on his-torically contingent combination of events, of teleological, a posteriori, orad hoc justifications, they keep their blind obsession with the necessary cau-sality against contingency and reluctance to accept Wallersteins innovative criti-cism of the national state unit of analysis. But their criticism of Wallersteinsfunctionalist inclination of his systemic-level explanation has some valid points.I believe that it led Wallerstein to departing from the earlier structural-func-tionalist modeling. Te following passage shows his recognition of the fault

inherent in his earlier structural-functionalist modeling well.

Tere is a certain sloppiness of which I myself have been guilty in using core andperipheral as adjectives for states. Tese words refer to processes that are relational, andI add that there is a lack of total coincidence between the economic processes and thestate boundaries (Wallerstein 1978: 219-220; 1982: 581).

Now, the focus of core-periphery framework is shifted from the hierarchyto the interconnection, from the classificatory categories to the relational pro-cess. Trough the shift, Wallerstein removes the functionalist understanding

of the trimodality, which is presumed as inherent in any social system. Keep-ing himself distant from this ill-founded deduction, Wallerstein comes to lay


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his emphasis, more explicitly than before, on the relational character of core-periphery production processes.5

In the earlier structural-functionalist model, the three-tiered pyramid struc-ture is envisaged as if each layer, performing its typical function, is composedof the state building blocks. By contrast, according to the relation-mix modeldepicted in Figure 2, the core-periphery relationship per seentails neither apriorifunction of its parts nor any notion of the structural location. Te iden-tification of states as being located in one of three positions is rather just ageographical consequence of the core-peripheral relationship:

Core-like processes tend to group themselves in a few states and to constitute the bulkof the production activity in such states. Peripheral processes tend to be scatteredamong a large number of states and to constitute the bulk of the production activity

in these states. . . . Some states have a near even mix of core-like and peripheral prod-ucts. We may call them semiperipheral states. Tey have . . . special political properties.It is however not meaningful to speak of semiperipheral production processes (Waller-stein 2004b: 28-29, italics added).

In the earlier structural-functionalist model, the collective function of semipe-riphery is an inference drawn from the logic of the social system in general;that is, the role managing the polarizing forces by keeping the lower tier of

5

Te changed position has been kept since then: For shorthand purposes we can talk of corestates and peripheral states, so long as we remember that we are really talking of a relationshipbetween production processes (Wallerstein 2004: 28).

Figure 2 Relation-Mix Model of Core-Periphery Processes

Core

Phenomenallevel

Productionprocesses

States

PeripherySemiperiphery


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the system from uniting against the upper tier of the system. In the revisedrelation-mix model, each state has the different proportion of core-like pro-

cesses to peripheral processes. While the state containing relatively more core-like processes than peripheral processes is classified as core, the state in whichthe peripheral processes are predominant is classified as periphery. In thisframework, the semiperipheral state is defined as a state which has a near evenmix of core-like and peripheral production processes. Te distinction betweencore-like activities and peripheral activities can be said to exist analyticallyprior to the classification of states into three zones. Also, the core-peripherydynamic as a relational process exists analytically prior to the two productionprocesses.

While the structural-functionalist model views the state as a constituentunit of the three-tiered hierarchy, the relation-mix model views the state asa container of different mix of core-like activities and peripheral activities.For the former, the state constitutes the core-periphery relationship on a globalscale; for the latter, the core-periphery relationships are inbred within the state.Te relation-mix model of semiperiphery based on the distinction betweencore-like activity and peripheral activity came to appear and manifested insome works in the late-1970s (Wallerstein, et al. 1982[1977]: 46-7; Waller-stein 1978: 220-222), and later it was more elaborated by analytically locat-

ing the production processes within the framework of commodity chains(Wallerstein 1985: 34).

Te model shift accompanies the change of the implication of semiperiph-ery. Most of all, the previous assignment of the buffer-zone function disap-pears. As a result, the collective characterization of semiperiphery as themiddle-tier of the three-layered pyramid dwindles. Tere is no presumed func-tion of semiperiphery as a collective cluster of plural countries. Rather, thesemiperipheral contents, which semiperipheral states contain, are revealed andaccumulated only through performances of comparative and case studies, which are

time-space-bounded in nature. Terefore, the social meaning of semiperipheryvaries over time and space:

Under certain circumstances it is the expression of anti-systemic thrusts. But inothers it serves primarily to recuperate such thrusts and further to stabilize the system(p. 39).6

6 Te prosystemic function of semiperiphery as a collective zone is relegated to the status ofone among many by Arrighi, too. Arrighi (1990) classifies organic members of semiperiphery

into three kinds of regimes, one of which is antisystemic: (1) stable prosystemic parliamentaryregimes, (2) prosystemic authoritarian regimes, and (3) antisystemic authoritarian regimes(Pp. 26-34).


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According to Wallersteins revision, the use of core state and peripheralstate is only for shorthand purpose, because the core and periphery are two

aspects of the same coin. But;

semiperiphery now would not refer to a relational economic process, to which theterms core and periphery refer. Semiperiphery would now refer to a quantification ofsuch relations as they fall within the bounds of a given state. Such a concept would beof interest only if it would turn out to be a clue to or indicator of certain politicalprocesses (Wallestein 1985: 34, italics in original).

As he implies by the above passage, the semiperiphery, unlike core and periph-ery, is still reserved only for a certain kind of states. At least in Wallersteins use,

there are neither semiperipheral production processes nor semiperipheral cit-ies, but only semiperipheral states having special political properties.7 Whatare the special political properties? Wallerstein (1985) suggests a generalproposition that the closer the overall mix of core-peripheral activities is to aneven one in a given statethat is, the more semiperipheral the statethemore will the complex calculus tilt towards rewarding efforts to secure eco-nomic advantage via affecting (transforming) the state structure . . . becausethe nearer to some median is the economic mix, the more immediately anddirectly can state policies affect the accumulation of capital (p. 35).8 How-

ever, the properties are not so presumed a priorito concrete historical analysisas Wallerstein did through the earlier modeling.

Te relation-mix model seems to be successful not only in avoiding theunnecessary accusation of functionalism as Wallerstein intended, but alsoin responding to the deterritorialization critics who raise the question of thestate-constituted core-periphery model by dissociating the core-peripheryrelationships from the relationship between dominant states and subordinatestates. But it leaves us some other problems. First of all, it still remains veryhard to define the ever-shifting core-periphery relationship. How can we anchor

the meaning of core-like activities and peripheral activities in the real world?Te distinction may be very useful for the emphasis on the ever-changingform of core-periphery relationship (Wallerstein 1985: 33), but confrontedwith a critical problem in operationalization with regard to the measurementof core-periphery hierarchy on a global level. As the obverse side of the same

7 It is what Peter J. aylor has criticized as we saw above.8 Sharing this view with Wallerstein, Etienne Balibar (1991) seeks the reason why the semi-

periphery is the privileged place for what we traditionally call politics in the situation in

which social blocs that are at different stages of development exist together within the samestate-organized space, so that they may come into conflict in explosive ways (p. 177, italicsin original).


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coin, there are different arrays of semiperipheral states by different researchers,as the classification of states into a cluster of semiperiphery is totally predi-

cated on researchers definition of core-like activities and peripheral activities(Martin 1990: 5).

Te second problem is more diffi cult. It becomes very hard, if not totallyimpossible, to define semiperiphery theoretically as a consistent category. Inother words, semiperiphery becomes the residual category again. By abandon-ing the notion of function, the category of semiperiphery is identified eitherwith the descriptive termmiddle-income countries discerned by more orless arbitrary cutting points on a core-periphery continuumor with a vacantcontainer always waiting for being filled by concrete analyses of historically

specific conjunctures. Te former way is usually taken by most statistical anal-yses on global inequality using the category of semiperiphery and the latter isadopted by a few case studies or comparative studies.

Te third problem is that the revised model lacks the image of the hierar-chic whole, which was better represented by the first model. Related to thesecond problem above, it is hard to gauge global inequality in terms of thecore-periphery hierarchy based on the relation-mix model. One may envisagean image of the network entangled with numerous core-periphery relationships,but the network image cannot be easily translated to the hierarchy. How does

the core-periphery model carry both image of the network and hierarchy?

Arrighi and Drangels Global-Wealth-Hierarchy Modeling (1986)

An attempt at giving a partial solution to the above problems is made byArrighi and Drangel (1986). Tey try to depict a new theoretical map ofcore-periphery relationships by redressing drawbacks inherent in Wallersteinstheoretical mapping. Te contrast between core-like activities and peripheralactivities is understood as the outcome of persistent endeavors of various eco-nomic actors to shift . . . the pressure of competition from themselves ontoother actors. In this framework, the economic activities are polarized intopositions from which the pressure of competition has been transferred else-where (core-like activities) and positions to which such pressure has beentransferred (peripheral activities) (p. 17). Within this situation, it is necessaryfor a state trying to upgrade its own mix to attract and develop organic linkswith core capital (p.24). Peripheral states can benefit from providing corecapitals with cost advantage in contrast to the revenue advantage enjoyed incore states. But it is very diffi cult for peripheral states to upgrade the mix

because the number of competing peripheral states is much larger than corestates, so that the scarcity of cost advantage provided by peripheral states


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becomes much lower than cores revenue advantage. It produces a further situ-ation to concentrate innovations within the core zone.9

[O]ver time, core states and core capital tend to develop a symbiotic relationship thatincreases each others capability to consolidate and reproduce their association withpredominantly core-like activities. Te obverse of this tendency is the endemic inabil-ity of peripheral states to escape their association with predominantly peripheral activ-ities. aken together, the two tendencies imply a stable, if not growing, polarization ofthe space of the world-economy into a peripheral and a core zone (Arrighi and Drangel1986: 26).

Here the notion of polarity extended from the contrast entails a notion of

degree. So, there are some states containing a more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities within their territories, as the relation-mix model sug-gests. Tese semiperipheral states resist peripheralization by exploiting theirrevenue advantage vis--vis peripheral states and their cost advantage vis--viscore states(ibid. 26-27). If they succeed in enhancing the cost advantages oflocations within their jurisdictions, producers in the semiperipheral zone caneffectively compete with producers in the core zone. Tis competition, how-ever, far from upgrading the mix of core-peripheral activities of the semipe-ripheral zone, is one of the mechanisms that turns core-like activities into

peripheral activities and keeps the mix of the zone more or less even (ibid. 27).But it does not exclude the possibility that individual semiperipheral orperipheral states can upgrade their mix of core-peripheral activities. Teupward and downward movements of individual states within the core-periph-ery hierarchy are key mechanisms of reproduction of the three separate zonesof the world-economy (ibid. 28).

Later, Arrighi (1990) makes a further attempt at providing each zonewith distinctive quality in terms of different character of wealth of the threezones. He elaborates the quantitative difference among three zones into quali-

tative one:

If the claims of world-systems analysis have any validity at all, observation of the dis-tribution of incomes among the various political jurisdictions of the capitalist world-economy over relatively long periods of time should reveal the existence of threeseparate standards of wealth corresponding to the oligarchic wealth of core states, thedemocratic wealth of semiperipheral states, and the nonwealth, that is, thepoverty, ofperipheral states10 (p. 18, italics added).

9 Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer (2003: 17) point out that the fact that the innovation process

tends to begin in the wealthier countries is emphasized by both Akamatsus flying geese modeland Raymond Vernons product-cycle model.10 Democratic wealth is the kind of command over resources that, in principle, all can attain


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Te disparity of wealth among three zones is championed by the observationthat the distribution of wealth (that is, of long-term income) is more stable

than the distribution of short-term income (p. 22).ogether with connoting the contents of each zone in this way, Arrighi and

Drangel (1986) also denote boundaries of the three zones. According to them,as the Figure 3 shows, the semiperiphery is bounded both by perimeter of thecore (henceforth) and by perimeter of the periphery (henceforth), so that itcould be discerned, if we see a frequency distribution of world population bythe mix of core-peripheral activities of the state of residence (p. 28).11 Troughthis new theoretical mapping, Arrighi and Drangel extend the core-peripheryrelationship formulated by the relation-mix model. Tey translate the net-

work of commodity chains as an aggregate of the global core-periphery rela-tionships into the hierarchy of world income inequality.

Based on this global-wealth-hierarchy model, Arrighi and Drangel try torepresent a picture of the core-periphery hierarchy on a world scale through aworld distribution of GNP per capita during the period from 1938 to 1983.But, since the early-1990s, Arrighi has not employed anymore the concept ofsemiperiphery although some ideas developed in Arrighi and Drangel (1986)are still retained in his recent works. Despite Arrighis abandonment of trimo-dality, it still remains as the latest theoretical mapping of the tripartite struc-

ture of the capitalist world-economy.In sum, unlike the conventional understanding, the core-periphery model

adopted in various works is not a coherent one, rather plural. I discerned threedistinct models: (1) structural-functionalist, (2) relation-mix, and (3) global-wealth-hierarchy models. able 1 summarizes them.

Quantitative Research on the Global Core-Periphery Structure

Although I confine the scope of the previous section to the abstract modeling ofthe tripartite hierarchy, here I examine how the model has been employed, andhow the semiperiphery is explicated with the model. Given space restrictions,

in direct relation to the intensity and effi ciency of their efforts. Oligarchic wealth, in contrast,bears no relation to the intensity and effi ciency of its recipients efforts, and is never available toall because generalized attempts to attain it raise costs and reduce benefits for all actors involved(Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer 2003: 19).

11 Tis hypothetical distribution of world population in the global core-periphery structurereflects Arrighis earlier criticism on Wallersteins list of semiperipheral countries, including two-thirds of world population, as a result of the vagueness and formality of Wallersteins criteria for

identifying semiperipheral states, in other words, a confusion between the position of a state inrelation to the world division of labor and its position in the interstate system (Arrighi 1985:243-244; Arrighi and Drangel 1986: 13-16; cf. Wallerstein 1979: 100).


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this section concentrates on how the tripartite hierarchy is depicted in thestatistical analysis of global inequality.

While Wallersteins (1974, 1980, 1989) three volumes of theModern World-System are based on the extrapolation of the trimodality into the past historyof the capitalist world-economy, a series of quantitative analyses have beenobliged to deal with more contemporary period as the systemic collection ofdata on GNP or GDP only began in the 1950s, and most peripheral andsemiperipheral countries lack the historical estimates that observers have

calculated for the majority of todays core countries (Korzeniewicz, Moran,and Stach 2003: 14). Tus, the possibility and likelihood of empirical researchis totally up to the availability of data Some statistical analyses attempt statis

Figure 3 Global Wealth Hierarchy Model of Core-Periphery Structure

(Percentage of World Population by Mix of Core-Peripheral Activities of the State ofResidence)[excerpted from Arrighi and Drangel (1986: 29)]

PP

PC

0

PercentofWorld

Population

100

Periphery

Share of Core Activities in the Mix (%)

Semi-periphery Core


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tical extrapolation, too. For example, Korzeniewicz, Moran, and Stach (2003:14-15) approximate a between-country inequality, utilize Maddisons data onpopulation and GDP for 24 countries between 1820 and 1990.12

Tese statistical analyses have commonly treated the three-layered structureof the capitalist world-economy as a hypothesis to be tested in their initialstage, and, if demonstrated, have attributed the status of a truth to it. So far,

many attempts have been made for measuring the international core-periph-ery structure in various ways; some have been noteworthy and hotly debated;a few have had significant effects on the direction of following quantitativestudies; few have raised critical questions on Wallersteins preconceived model

12 Milanovic (2005) points out the limit of the Maddisons data: []he problemeven ifthis information were fully correctis that for large parts of the world we do not have GDP percapital for the early nineteenth century. Tere are no data for Africa, most of (what used to becalled) Indo-China, the Philippines, Korea, urkey and the Middle East, the Balkans, and all of

Latin America and the Caribbean with the exception of Brazil. . . . Fortunately, Maddisons datado include China and India, which keeps the population coverage around 80 percent even in thenineteenth century (p 139)

able 1

Tree Different Models of the Global Core-Periphery Structure

Structural-Functionalist

Relation-Mix

Global-Wealth-Hierarchy

Main Figures Wallerstein in theearly 1970s

Wallerstein (andHopkins) since thelate 1970s

Phase I: Arrighi (andDrangel) (1986)Phase II: Arrighi(,Silver, and Brewer)(2003)

Core-Periphery

Structure

Hierarchy built with

state building-blocks:three kinds ofstates

Relational processes

of surplus transfer:Every state hasdifferent mixes ofcore-like activities andperipheral activities.

Tree types of the

wealth:1. oligarchic wealth2. democratic wealth3. nonwealth (poverty)

DistinguishingCriteria

Plural (economic,political, cultural)

Singular (economic) Singular (GNP or GNIper capita)

Image of theSemiperiphery

Te middle tier of athree-story pyramid:buffer zone

Relatively even mix ofthe core-like andperipheral activities

Te population size ofsemiperiphery is largerthan core but smaller

than periphery.


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of the tripartite hierarchy;13 but no agreement on the world as it really is hasbeen attained against their own empiricist expectation.14

It is possible to draw some family trees of the quantitative analyses on theglobal hierarchy of the capitalist world-economy if we pay attention to thepersisting research interest of distinctive authors in this field. What is of inter-est is not the cutting-edge technique of statistics to measure the global inequal-ity, but interpretative implications, which can be obtained from the executionof the statistical analyses. o be sure, the former is important. But I intention-ally rule out some authors who had treated the tri-partite model of the globalhierarchy just once or twice, and then abandoned it, even if their works werepublished in some major journals. Instead, I include some theoretical consid-

erations on the matter from the same authors qualitative analyses, if theysubstantiate the interpretative issues raised by their statistical analysis.

Te family trees presented in the able 2 show us not only the continuityand discontinuity of five pedigrees, but also the divergence and convergenceamong them. Let me briefly explain each of five threads.Alpha() is the tradi-tion beginning from Snyder and Kicks (1979) path-breaking multiple net-work analysis through a block-modeling. Te most distinct feature characterizingthis tree is its inclusion of non-economic relations such as military and diplo-matic ties between countries. With regard to taking multiple criteria to distin-

guish the three world-systemic positions, it can be understood as adoptingthe earlier structural-functionalist model. Te same research design has beenmaintained through the recent works by Kick and others. Ronan Van Rossem(1996) also adopts this type of approach with some modifications.

Beta() is the tradition of the trade network analysis led by David Smith,who also had some works on semiperipheral contents in the case of South

13 Arrighi and Drangel (1986) is one of the few cases to effectively challenge Wallersteinsloose framework in several points, such as the introduction of the population limits in each zone,

rigorous conceptualization of organic members of core, periphery and semiperiphery enabled bythe adoption of the pair of the perimeter of core and perimeter of periphery together withthe upward / downward mobility across the perimeters, and the verification of the essential claimof the world-systems analysis, namely, the stability of the tri-partite hierarchy in spite of themobility of individual countries, etc. But, unlike Wallersteins earlier structural-functionalistmodel, their global-wealth-hierarchy model denies the stability function of semiperiphery:[]he function of the semiperipheral zone . . . is neither necessary nor suffi cient to account forits existence (p. 13, fn. 3).

14 Te controversial situation is not confined to world-systems analyses. Revolving around theissue of whether the world inequality for past and present decades has been increasing or decreas-ing, two opposing views have been pitted against each other: While Firebaugh (2003), Lucas

(2002), Quah (1993), and Jones (1997) have attempted to demonstrate that the world inequal-ity has been decreasing on the one side, Milanovic (2002, 2005), Wade (2004), and Galbraith(2002) have tried to demonstrate the opposite.


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Korea. His focus of study has been changed through some work on world citynetworks that he co-authored with Michael imberlake. Te characteristic

feature of the tree is its single focus on the trade networks because they thinkthat the trade network data is the best tool to show the flow of economic sur-plus, which is fundamental to the core-periphery relationships. As the tradenetworks are understood as a multiplication of the surplus flows between core-like activities and peripheral activities, can be interpreted as having affi nitywith the relation-mix model. Peacock, Hoover, and Killian (1988) follow thistradition, even with using a decomposition analysis.

Te rest, Gamma(), Delta(), and Epsilon (), can be understood as threedifferent branches diverging from Arrighi and Drangels (1986) global-wealth-

hierarchy model. Arrighi and Drangel try to empirically demonstrate the exis-tence of the stable three-tiered structure of the world-economy as well as todraw a new theoretical mapping of the global-wealth-hierarchy model. Teauthors empirical analysis shows us the mid-term stability of the three-tieredstructure of the world-economy over the 45 years (1938-1983). Despite someexceptional examples of upward or downward mobility, such as Japan, Italy,South Korea, and Ghana, the ascending or descending movements of parts havenot changed the stable three-tiered structure of the world-economy. Despitesome disputes on measurement problems,15 the analysis by Arrighi and Drangel

got some significant and theoretically favorable reverberations.What I label Gamma () is Peter J. aylors (1988) work. He supported

Arrighi and Drangels finding of the relatively stable existence of three discretezones by showing that the tripartite distribution is observed even if the com-ponential blocks are changed from national states, all of which have differentpopulation sizes, to the population blocks, which have the same size of popula-tion. As its title, a supportive note on Arrighi and Drangel, indicates, aylordemonstrates that the trimodal hierarchy analogy of the world-systems analy-sis empirically survives the spatial reorganization of the data, making use of

John Coles world data that is not state-based. While other statistical analysestested Wallersteins model of three-tiered pyramid built with the nation-stateblocks, the size of which is different, the Coles data utilized by aylor canbe understood as the three-tiered pyramid built with population blocks, thesize of which is all the same. As we have seen, here we can observe a conver-gence ofBeta() thread of David Smith and Gamma() thread of Peter J.aylor, eventually making a confluence with the deterritorialization approachto globalization.

15

On the problem in the use of GNP per capita as an indicator, see Korzeniewicz and Awbrey(1992: 615-616), and Chase-Dunn (1998: 215-216). On Arrighis position to the criticisms, seeArrighi (1990: 19-21, 36-37).


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able 2

Family rees of Quantitative Analyses of the World-Systems Perspective

Year

1979/ Snyder &Kick

1985 Nemeth &Smith

Arrighi(1985)

1986 Arrighi & Drangel (1986)

1986 Arrighi,

Korzeniewicz& Martin(1986)

1987 Kick Peter J.aylor

1988 Smith &Nemeth

aylor

1990 Arrighi

1991 Arrighi

1992 Smith &White Korzeniewicz& Awbrey(1992)

1994 aylor Korzeniewicz& Martin(1994)

Arrighi

1995 Smith &imberlake

aylor

1996 Arrighi,Korzeniewicz,

Consiglio, &Moran (1996)

1997 aylor Korzeniewicz& Moran(1997)

2000 Kick,Davis,Lehtinen,& Burns(2000)

aylor Korzeniewicz& Moran(2000)

Arrighi& Silver

2001 Kick &Davis

Smith &imberlake

aylor


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Year

2001/2002

Arrighi

2002 Korzeniewicz,Stach,Consiglio, &Moran (2002)

Arrighi

Arrighi

2003 Smith aylor Korzeniewicz,Moran, &

Stach

Arrighi, Silver,& Brewer

2004 Smith aylor

2005 Korzeniewicz& Moran

Arrighi, Silver,& Brewer

* Te shaded area includes studies in which the tripartite structure of core-semi-periphery-periphery is focused as one of their main objective of analyses.

able 2 (cont.)

Delta () is identified with the works by Roberto P. Korzeniewicz and hisco-authors. Initially, they were interested in the extension of Arrighi and

Drangels position on the stability of the tripartite hierarchy. Korzeniewiczand Awbrey (1992) use Arrighi and Drangels classification of the structuralposition of 102 nations in the mid-1980s for the study intended to observethe correlation between global transition to democracy and semiperipheralposition. Korzeniewicz and Martin (1994) also attempt to overcome someshortcomings of Arrighi and Drangels analysis by extending their research tofar more time-points (34) and countries (up to 134), so that the authorscan make some original contributions to understanding zonal distributions ofspecific commodity productions and to observing shift of commodities char-

acterizing each zone (p. 71). Yet, Arrighi and Drangels essential points arereaffi rmed and remained unchallenged in these studies. But now, Delta() isfocusing on the multi-dimensionality of the global inequalities (inequalitiesamong nations, inequalities among households within nations, and inequali-ties between men and women), as Korzeniewicz and his co-authors get moreinterested in the co-relation of the between-country inequalities with thewithin-country inequalities. Concurring with most of empirical studies onglobal income inequality (Milanovic 2002, 2005; Firebaugh 1999, 2001,2003), they argue that the total world income inequality in the 1990s is con-

ditioned more by between-country inequalities than by within-countryinequalities. If, as they argue, the between-country inequalities have more


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weight in constituting the global inequality than within-country inequalities,not only the state-based measurement of global inequality, but also the core-

periphery model built with the constituent units of national states is stillmeaningful in contrast to the deterritorialization criticisms.

Finally, Epsilon () refers to Arrighi and his coauthors recent works. Arrighiand Drangel (1986) show us that most of states have remained by 1983 withinthe zone to which they belonged in 1938, notwithstanding rare exceptions.Te existence of the unbridgeable gulfs between core and semiperiphery(i.e. PC) and between semiperiphery and periphery (i.e. PP) observed inArrighi and Drangels study is reiterated in Arrighi (1990). Later, Arrighi andSilver (2000) argue that the relative demographic size of the three groups

remained roughly constant during the period from 1961 to 1981 in spite ofsome upward movement by Japan, Italy, aiwan, and South Korea. Tey attri-bute the persistence of the relatively stable tripartite structure to the fasteraverage demographic growth of the states in the lower income groups.

A remarkable change of this thread is a shift of Arrighis focus from therelative stability of the tri-partite hierarchy despite the upward and downwardmobility of individual countries in the mid-term period in the twentieth cen-tury, to the divergence within the South since 1980, which is outstanding inthe contrast between East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Arrighi, Silver, and

Brewer (2003) present a novel framework distinguished from the earlier phaseof the global-wealth-hierarchy modeling.

Most of all, the earlier tripartite structure of world hierarchy that consistsof core, semiperiphery, and periphery was abandoned and superseded by theNorth-South divide. While Arrighi and Drangel (1986) argued that there wasstable and distinctive tripartite hierarchy divided by two unbridgeable gulfs,PC and PP, the authors present a seemingly traditional claim of the North vs.South or the First World vs. the Tird World. Tere is little consideration ofthe semiperiphery occupying an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the

wealth of nations. But the reproductive mechanism for the North-Southdivide is attributed instead to the bifurcation within the Tird World coun-tries explicitly revealed from about 1980 (coinciding with the redirection ofcapital flows to US and the Washington Consensus as a hegemonic reactionto the crisis of capital accumulation) by the authors. Now, the claim on thestable existence of the intermediate sector (the semiperipheral zone) cannot befound. For the same reason, the previous triple categories of the wealth ofnations (oligarchic wealth of the core, democratic wealth of the semiperiphery,and the nonwealth of periphery), which appeared in Arrighi (1990) are sim-

plified to Harrods original pair of wealth (oligarchic wealth of the First Worldand democratic wealth of the Tird World).


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Te five threads of able 2 have their own findings, but here I confine myselfto the matter of the tripartite structure. We can get a general morphology of

the tripartite structure from the findings of the quantitative analyses on theglobal hierarchy in their earlier stage. Both Snyder and Kick (1979) [] andNemeth and Smith (1985) [] give us a similar image of the tri-partite net-works: core countries dominate all over the networks; semiperipheral coun-tries have strong ties with core countries, but also with each other; and theperiphery is connected to the international trade system almost exclusivelythrough trade with core states. Arrighi and Drangel (1986) and the subse-quent studies of, and in their early stages affi rm the mid-term stability ofthe tripartite structure, too. Arrighi and Drangel put forth nine distributions

of world population corresponding to nine time points from 1938 to 1983.Five out of nine appear to confirm the existence of relatively clear tri-modalstructure of the capitalist world-economy, and the remaining four distribu-tions also have one or two peaks sandwiched by two low-frequency intervals(i.e. PP and PC). Tus, we can observe the evidence of stable existence of thethree-tiered structure from 1938 to 1983, as hypothesized in the Figure 3.

Tere are two noteworthy trends in the family trees. First, earlier attemptsof each tree to prove the existence of three discrete clusters have faded out: and are now concentrating on the global city network; is focusing on the

co-relationships between different types of inequalities; and is dedicated tothe bifurcation of the Tird World. Second, there are increasing disagreementson the relatively stable existence of the tripartite structure. In contrast to theirearlier studies, some findings of recent studies are against the claim of the sta-bility of the trimodality. Nemeth and Smith distinguish the fourth strata of theweak semiperiphery from strong semiperiphery in the trade data for the year1970 (Nemeth and Smith 1985: 543; Smith and Nemeth 1988). Kick (1987)also argues that there are four tiers in the world-economy: core, semicore, semi-periphery, and periphery in the period, 1970-1975 (p. 135). Smith and White

(1992) even argue the existence of five tiers. Te outcome to suspect the actualexistence of three discrete clusters is also observed in other research not includedin the above family trees (Bornschier and rezzini 1997: 430; Van Rossem1996: 513). Although some of recent studies still confirm the existence of threeclusters, their clustering of each zone is done by arbitrary cutting point on acontinuum of GNP or GNI, not by the existence of low frequency distributionsuch as Arrighi and Drangels PC and PP (Ikeda, 2004; Babones, 2005). In thiscase, the trimodality is just assumed, not proved. At this point, we should aska valid question. Te question is whether or not the three discrete clusters of

states are observed even by other quantitative analyses performed by research-ers outside of the world-systems analysis.


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An innovative research on the world income distribution was made byBranko Milanovic (2002; 2005), a lead economist in the World Banks research

department. Unlike most previous studies on international inequality mea-sured by GDP or GNP per capital of each country, his study is based on thehousehold survey on a global scale. For the first time in human history, it waspossible to measure Gini coeffi cients at multiple levelscountry level, regionallevel, and global level. It makes possible the measure of the different weight ofbetween-country inequality and within-country inequality. According to hisfinding, while 88 percent of world inequality in 1993 is due to between-coun-try inequality, the within-country inequality accounts for only 2 percent oftotal world inequality with the remaining 10 percent due to the overlap com-

ponent (Pp. 59-92).Another empirical outcome of Milanovics (2005) research poses a critical

challenge on one of the most important premises of the world-systems per-spective: the overall systemic stability of the tripartite core-semiperiphery-periphery structure despite the upward and downward mobility of parts.Measuring world inequalities at three time points (1960, 1978, and 2000),Milanovic presents a striking picture of global inequality. He classifies almostevery country in the world into four categories: (1) the rich, (2) the contend-ers, (3) the Tird World, and (4) the Fourth World.16 racing the dynamic

of upward and downward movements of individual countries, he derives twoconcluding observations from the measurement of the upward and downwardmovements of countries for two periods, 1960-78 and 1978-2000 (Pp. 68-70). First, the rich and the Fourth World located at the extremes show a rela-tive stability. At the top, 73 percent of the rich in 1960 had remained rich in1978, and 82 percent of the rich in 1978 remained still rich in 2000. And, atthe bottom, all of the poorest countries in 1960 remained poor in 1978, and95 percent of them still remained poor in 2000. Second, in contrast to thestability at the two poles, he shows the churning among the contenders and

16 Milanivic defines GDP per capita of the poorest WENAO (Western Europe, NorthAmerica and Oceania, i.e. the old OECD region short of Japan) countries, excluding urkey, asthe cut-off point between the rich and the contenders (2005: 61, 2002: 59). Te countrieswhose GDP per capita is no more than one-third below that of the poorest WENAO countryare called contenders. . . . Basically, a contender country has a fairly reasonable chance of catch-ing up within a generation or two. Te Tird World countries are those with GDP per capita

levels between one- and two-thirds of the poorest WENAO country. Finally, the Fourth Worldis composed of countries whose GDPs are less than a third of the GDP per capita of the poorestWestern country (Milanovic 2005: 61 62)


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the Tird World and its downward pressure.17 Milanovic enumerates thirty-three downwardly mobile countries and seven upwardly mobile countries.18

Further, he points out two features common to twenty countries out ofthirty three downwardly mobile countries (thirteen that in 1960 belongedto the rich world, and twenty that were contenders): political instabilitypunctuated by wars, insurgencies, and revolutions; and transition from aplanned to a market economy which resulted in massive real income declines(ibid. 72). Drawing upon Arrighi, Galbraith, Easterly, and Bairoch, he attri-butes the developing countries stagnation and the bifurcation of the develop-ing world to a series of changes occurred around 1978-80: the increase inworld interest rates, the increased debt burden of developing countries, the

growth slowdown in the industrial world, and skill-based technologicalchange (ibid. 79). In sum, his study on the global inequality during theperiod from 1960 to 2000 shows the relative stability in the two poles of core-periphery spectrum, combined with a predominant downward pressure for mid-dle-income countries, with a handful ofexceptional cases of the upward mobility.

Te immense imbalance between upwardly mobile cases and downwardlymobile cases, shown in Milanovics study, flies in the face of the traditionalclaim of the world-systems perspective. Has the tripartite structure, as hypoth-esized in Figure 3, really been maintained, despite the dominant pressure

for downward movements? Milanovic (2005) reports twin peaks of coreand periphery instead of three discrete clusters in 2000. In his study, wecan observe a clear existence of three clusters in 1960, but the intermediating

17 Among the contenders, the number of downwardly vs. upwardly mobile countries was12 to 3 in the first period, and 13 to 2 in the second. Regarding the Tird World countries,almost two-thirds of the them slipped into the Fourth World during the 1978-2000 period.Overall upward mobility was 4 and 3 percent in the two periods respectively; overall downwardmobility was, in contrast, 24 and 29 percent. . . . Stability on the bottom, combined with down-ward mobility of the contenders and the Tird World countries, resulted in the remarkable factthat once a country became part of the poorest group, it found it almost impossible to escapefrom (relative) poverty. During the past forty years, only two countriesBotswana and Egyptescaped from the trap of the Fourth World (ibid. 69-70).

18 Te thirty-three downwardly mobile countries include (1) countries who experienced civilor international wars or both (Nicaragua, Iran, Angola, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro), (2) coun-tries who faced massive domestic insurgencies or conflicts during the period 1960-2000 (Algeria,Colombia, Haiti, Fiji, Panama, South Africa), (3) countries who were affected by the stagnationin the 1980s and then experienced transition from planned to market economy (Russia, Ukraine,Hungary, Poland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania), (4) countries who hit by the lower oil prices (SaudiArabia, Gabon), and (5) others (Argentina, Barbados, rinidad and obago, Seychelles, CostaRica, Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, urkey, Jamaica, Guyana, Senegal, and Ghana). Te sevenupwardly mobile countries are Singapore, Hong Kong, aiwan, South Korea, Malaysia,

Botswana, and Egypt. Milanovic acknowledges that Tailand and China, although their upwardmovements are not observed in this study, may be added to the success cases because they wereamong the ten most successful economies during the 1960 2000 period


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cluster, what the world-systems perspective calls the semiperiphery, has even-tually decomposed (Pp. 94, 129).

Conclusion: Decomposition of Semiperiphery?

In order to understand the problems of the trimodality of the world-systemsperspective and deterritorialization criticisms to the perspective, we have exam-ined three different preconceived models of the trimodality and six differenttrends of quantitative research on global inequalities (five family trees in theworld-systems perspective plus Milanovic). Te empirical analyses examinedhere show us a part of the picture of changes on a global scale. Especially,Milanovics research provides us with two important points on the morphol-ogy of global inequality.

On the one hand, as we briefly mentioned above, the between-countryinequality has more weight than the within-country inequality in explainingglobal inequalities, so the deterritorialization critics arguments on generalequalization or smoothing of social space (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 55) on aglobal scale is somewhat exaggerated. Terefore, the state-based global inequal-ity is not meaningless. Robert Wades (2006) recent attention on the emer-gence of a hierarchy of national currencies and its constraints on economicpolicies of developing countries effectively back up the meaningfulness of theinterstate hierarchy (Pp. 115-127).

But, on the other hand, the existence of interstate hierarchy does not guaran-tee the validity of the existing model of trimodality of the world-systems per-spective. Te semiperiphery, in other words, the tripartite structure of globalhierarchy, has not survived the neoliberal restructuring of global capitalism since1978-80. If Milanovic is right, the tripartite structure existed in the year 1960.He also implies that it may reappear as a discrete intermediate zone in the futureif China and/or India continue their recent pace of fast economic growth. Butit does not exist now. Te increasing disagreement on the existence of the tri-partite structure among the statistical analyses of the world-systems perspectivemight have reflected this reality. How can we interpret this empirical challengeto the traditional claim of the world-systems analysis? In spite of some conflicts,some recent statistical research coming from the world-systems perspectiveconfirms the emptying-out of the semiperiphery, too (Babones 2005).19 Te

19 Baboness (2005) distribution of the world population at six time points (1975, 80, 85, 90,95, and 2000) still shows the existence of three clusters, but, semiperiphery, in all of six distribu-

tions, has the lowest proportion among the three zones (Pp. 46-48). It is different from Arrighiand Drangels hypothesized image of the global-wealth-hierarchy model (Figure 3) in which thesemiperipher has the middle le el of population distribution


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world Milanovic represents shows a clear bi-polar shape of the global inequal-ity. Te trimodality of the world premised by Wallerstein and Arrighi should

be judged in the mid-term and long-term perspective, so it may be too earlyto say that they are simply wrong. But it would be safe to say that the currentperiod is not anymore the period when the world-systems perspective wasborn. After a generation, the polarized shape of global inequality once pre-mised by dependentistas who thought the developing countries were ratherresidual exceptions seems to more fit to the reality from the viewpoint of thefirst decade of the twenty-first century.

Te concept of semiperiphery was born in the second decade of develop-ment. Ever since, many studies have tried to show its discrete existence in

various ways. But now, the semiperiphery is disappearing and it is disappear-ing in two senses. On the one hand, as Arrighis abandonment of the termshows, the semiperiphery as a concept useful for representation of the worldinequality is disappearing. And, on the other hand, as Milanovics study shows,the semiperiphery as a distinct group of countries within the global hierarchy,which is the existential condition of the concept, is disappearing.

Te disappearance is not an absence, but a process of decomposition of thehistorical existence, the semiperiphery. It requires situating the tripartite struc-ture in a shorter time-span than Wallerstein did in his theoretical mappings.

Wallersteins model implies that the tripartite structure is situated throughoutthe longue-dureof capitalism or, worse still, in his earlier structuralist-func-tionalist modeling, throughout the very long-term time period of sages. It isnot to deny the heuristic value of the concept, but to put it in its relevantplace. Te current twin peaks in the polarized world of global inequalitydisproves the existence of semiperiphery at this juncture. But, as Milanovicshows, the current twin peaks has been shaped by evolving from the tripartitestructure in the 1960s, passing through the watershed years around 1978-80.Terefore, what we need to do is not to abandon the concept, but to study

what kind of relational process has been undergoing beneath the changingform of core-periphery hierarchy.Although the stable existence of semiperiphery as a discrete zone through-

out the longue-dureof capitalism is denied, we cannot deny the existence ofglobal hierarchy or the interstate inequality in global income distribution.Terefore, every national state is still supposed to occupy its structural loca-tion within the hierarchy. It is a general condition of existence for all states inthe capitalist world-economy. What differentiates them is the unequal distri-bution of the wealth and power of nations. In this vein, even with the decreas-

ing heuristic power of the concept of semiperiphery, the qualitative studies onsemiperiphery, which are not directly dealt with in this paper, still retain somesignificance for understanding the reality of states within global capitalism


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Te world-systems analysis has tried to answer, with the concept of semi-periphery, to the question on the stability of the hierarchic whole of the cap-

italist world-economy despite the mobility of its parts. If the answer thatsemiperiphery is conducive to the stable reproduction of the global hierarchyis regarded as still valid, the focus of future studies would lay on the instabilityheightened by the decomposition of the semiperiphery. We may interpret thetransformation of the global inequality from the triple peaks to the twin peaksas a symptom of a hegemonic transition period if we can observe the sametendency in the history of past hegemonic transition phases. Or, it may bebigger than a hegemonic transition. As Hardt and Negri argue, it may be thetransmutation of the capitalist world-economy into the capitalist Empire. If

so, it would shatter the definition of the capitalist world-economy, once dis-tinguished from world-empires.

But now, we need to think about not just the pertinence of the answer, butthe validity of the question itself. Does the whole hierarchical structure remaineven with the upward and downward mobility of individual countries? Mila-novics study provides us with a strong negative answer denying the originalquestion. Te whole global wealth hierarchy has changed from the triple-peaksto the twin-peaks as a result of few cases of catching-up and many cases offalling-behind of national economies. Te movements of the parts shape and

reshape the whole. If we cannot prove the stable existence of the tripartite hier-archy during the longue-dureof capitalism, and therefore, if we admit that thetripartite structure is a postulate as a part of the theoretical mapping ratherthan an outcome of research, there would be no reason to believe that thesemiperiphery is a constant of the capitalist world-economy. It would be toosoon to drop the concept of semiperiphery as the tripartite structure of thecapitalist world-economy is assumed as the long-term phenomenon. It may beresumed in the future if BRICs countries can continue their economic growthas fast as they did for the last decade. Especially, the current global turmoil

triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in US may contribute to the accel-eration of their catch-up development (Aglietta, 2008: 72-73). But keeping asuspicion on the postulate of the tripartite structure of the capitalist world-economy would be valid at least before we can have the information on theglobal inequality for the period longer than Milanovics study. It would bemore reasonable than the abuse of the problematic termsemiperiphery.

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