TOWARdS A NEW MANAGERiAl idENTiTY FOR THE …the Union for Foreign Affairsand Security Policy....

THE BEliTTlEd TRiO

Kaisa Korhonen BRiEFiNG PAPER 71, 16 december 2010

71TOWARdS A NEW MANAGERiAl idENTiTY

FOR THE ROTATiNG EU COUNCil PRESidENCY

• ThepresidencyoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionrotateseverysixmonthsamongthe27memberstates.Presidenciesaredividedintogroupsofthreecalled‘trios’,withacommonprogrammefor18months.ThisformoftripartiteleadershipisformalizedbytheTreatyofLisbon,andmemberstatesareexplicitlyencouragedtosharetheirresponsibilitiestoagreaterdegreethanbefore.

• The Council presidency no longer represents the EU externally due to the prerogatives of theEuropeanCommissionandtheHighRepresentative.Nordoesithaveanyspecialroletoplaywhengeneralpoliticalguidelinesaredeterminedatthehighestpoliticallevel,sincetheEuropeanCouncilhasbecomeaformalinstitutionwithitsownpermanentpresidency.

• Underthenewregime,theCouncilpresidencyistaskedwithensuringthatthedecision-makingprocessintheCouncilrunssmoothly.IthasalimitedbutclearmandatetomanagetheCouncilandlinkthislegislativebodywithotherEUinstitutions.AstheCouncilmovesclosertowardsresemblingthe second chamber of theUnion’s emerging bicameral parliament, the presidency in office isrequiredtooffermoreproceduralexpertiseandlesspoliticalleadershipskills.

• TheCouncilpresidencystillpresidesovernineoutoftenCouncilconfigurations,whichcovermostpoliciesfrominstitutionalandbudgetaryaffairsviaenlargementpolicytoeconomicandfinancialregulation.AlthoughtheCouncilpresidency’smandateexcludestheForeignAffairsConfiguration’schairmanship,administrativetasksremainsignificantinnumber.

• While theCouncilpresidencyhas lostpolitical leadership functions toother institutionalactors,chairmanshipoftheCouncilcomprisesmanagerialaspectssuchasagenda-shapingorbrokerage.Astrongidentityinthemanagementofdecision-makingwould,however,haveagreaterchanceofemergingifsix-monthpresidenciessucceededincreatingasenseofshareddestinyamongtriomembersandembeddedthisinamorefar-reachingdivisionoflabour.

THE BEliTTlEd TRiO

Kaisa Korhonen

Researcher

The Finnish institute of international Affairs

Briefing Paper 71

16 december 2010

TOWARdS A NEW MANAGERiAl idENTiTY FOR THE ROTATiNG EU COUNCil PRESidENCY

The European Union research programme


THE FiNNiSH iNSTiTUTE OF iNTERNATiONAl AFFAiRS 3

The presidency of the Council of the EuropeanUnion1 is still alive and rotating, albeit in a some-whatmodified form, after the entering into forceoftheTreatyofLisbonon1December2009.AtthesametimeastheprerogativesoftheCouncilpresi-dencyweredecreasedinnumberbythenewtreaty,itwas overshadowedby twonewpolitical figureswith presidential mandates—the President of theEuropean Council and theHigh Representative ofthe Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.Thepost-LisbonroleoftheCouncilpresidencywastentativelydeemedpoliticallyunimportantandlim-ited toadministrativeassistanceonly.AfterayearwiththeTreatyofLisboninplace,amorenuancedanalysisofthisnewroleis,however,justified.

The groups of three member states—known as‘trios’—continue to hold the Council presidency.Even if their responsibilities have changed a greatdeal, working procedures are much the same asthose put in place when the first team of threesix-monthpresidencieswithacommon18-monthprogrammetookofficeinJanuary2007.TheTreatyofLisbonreformedtheseproceduresslightlyinordertoincreasecooperationwithinthetrios,withtheresultthatgroupdynamicshavebecomemoreimportantthanbefore.Six-monthpresidencies areexplicitlyurgedtoaskothertriomemberstotakeoversomeof their responsibilities in situationswhere this isbelievedtoincreaseefficiencyintheCouncil’swork.The effort to establish closer cooperation betweenpresidenciesisembodiedinthecommonworkpro-gramme.InthecaseofthecurrentSpanish-Belgian-

1 AlsoknownastheCouncilofMinisters;henceforth‘theCouncil’.

Hungariantrio,theirfellowshipisevensymbolizedbyacommonlogoandwebsite,eutrio.eu.

Therestofthisbriefingpaperisdevotedtodiscuss-ingthemandatewhichthisupdatedteampresidencynowhas inthereformedinstitutionalarchitectureoftheEU.Thepolicy-makingarrangementsinbothgeneralaffairsandforeignaffairsareespeciallynote-worthy from thepointofviewof thepost-LisbonCouncil presidency. With this analytical focus inmind,itissuggestedthattheCouncilpresidency’sadministrative and managerial functions in EUdecision-makingarestillcentral,whilemanyformalpoliticalpowerswerelostduringthelatestroundoftreatyreform.Inthiscontext,itissafetosaythatacommonidentityamongtriomemberswouldservethepurposeofthereform.Itwouldenhanceeffectivedecision-making,increasecontinuityintheCounciland,assuch,pointtoanewmanagerialidentityfortheCouncilpresidency.

State of play under the Treaty of Lisbon

TheEuropean Council decision of December 2009states thatwhile “eachmember of the [triopresi-dency]shallinturnchairforasix-monthperiodallconfigurationsoftheCouncil,[…]theothermembersofthegroupshallassist theChair inall itsrespon-sibilities on the basis of a common programme”.2According to thisdecision,“membersof the teammaydecidealternativearrangementsamongthem-

2 EuropeanCouncildecisionof1December2009ontheexercise

ofthePresidencyoftheCouncil(2009/881/EU).

The Treaty of lisbon entered into force on 1 december 2009. Photo: The Council of the European Union.


theEUtosuchadegreethattheParliamentandtheCouncilcanrightfullybedescribedasthetwolegis-lativebodiesoftheUnion—thefirstandthesecondchamberofabicameralparliament.3TheirfunctionsaremuchmorecomparablesincetheLisbonTreaty,althoughthedecision-makingpowersoftheCouncilstillextendfurtherthantheParliament’s,dueinparttothedecision-makingthattakesplaceoutsidetheframeworkoflegislativeprocedures.

As a consequence, the contemporary institutionalrole of the rotating presidency is best understoodagainst the role of the Council as a legislator anddecision-maker which has the responsibility toensure that thepositionsof theEUmemberstatesaretakenintoaccountinpolicy-making.WhattheCouncilasadecision-makingbodydemands fromits presidency is legislative and procedural exper-tise, aswell as intra-institutional negotiation andinter-institutional conciliation skills.The CouncilpresidencyisexpectedtomanagebargainingintheCouncilasabrokeramongthe27memberstates.Itisalso theCouncil’s representativebefore theParlia-ment.

Whenplayingoutthisrole,ithasseveralassets.TheCouncilpresidencymay,togetherwiththeothertwomembersof the trio, tryand influence theagendaandtimingofdecision-making,whileithassuperioraccess to information concerning the negotiationpositionsofothermemberstatesandinstitutions.InthecontextoftheCouncil’sinternalnegotiations,itevenhas theadvantageof assumedneutrality andprovenwillingnesstodeliverduringitslimitedterminoffice.

Fromanadministrativeoramanagerialperspective,thesituationprettymuchresemblesthewaythingswerebeforetheTreatyofLisbon.ChangesundertheLisbon regime are largely related to the narrowerscopeofresponsibilitiesgiventotherotatingpresi-dencyasapoliticalactor.Indeed,manyofitsmostvisiblepoliticalpowersweretransferredtotheEuro-peanCouncilPresidentandtheHighRepresentative.ThatiswhythemandateoftriosincomparisonwithotherchairpersonsintheEU‘Councils’makesforaninterestingstudy.

3 ForarecentanalysisoftheEU’spoliticalsystem,seee.g.FIIA

BriefingPaperNo.65/October2010.

selves”.Inshort,threememberstatesatatimeforma trio presidencywith a common programme for18months.EachmemberstateisresponsibleforallthedutiesoftheCouncilpresidencyduringtheirsixmonthsinofficeprovidingthetriodoesnotdecideotherwise—orinviteafourthplayertojointhefold:thememberstatethatisfirstinlinewhenthenexttriopresidencytakesoverwillalso,whereappropri-ate,assisttheactingpresidency.

The aim is to increase continuity in the Council’sproceedingsand,hence,efficiencyintheCouncil’sdecision-makingprocesses.Forexample,itispref-erableforthesamepresidencytoholdthechairman-shipthroughoutthelifespanofadossierevenifthisprocessexceedsthesix-monthperiod.Thereisalsoanaspirationtocreateasenseofsharedinstitutionalmemory among trio presidencies and to foster aprocessofsocializationamongnationalgovernmentsandcivilservantsbyusinganeach-one-teach-onemethod.Theorderinwhichtheofficeofpresidencyisheldbythe27memberstates isplannedaccord-ingly:eachtriohasbeendesignedtoincludeatleastone‘old’andone‘new’memberstate.

The efficiency of decision-making in the Councilwas also the reasonwhy theCouncil presidency’staskswerenarroweddowntoexcludetheexternalrepresentationandstrategicleadershipoftheUnion.Thetasksoftherotatingpresidencyarenowlimitedtoadministrativeandmanagerialtasks‘only’.Theyinclude,forexample,meetingpreparations,agenda-setting,chairmanship,conclusionsdraftingandbro-kerage.AlthoughsuchresponsibilitiesarefamiliartothepreviousCouncilpresidencies,scholarscontinuetodebatewhetherornotsuchresponsibilitiescomewithpolitical influence.With theTreatyofLisbonin place, the Council presidency’s administrativeandmanagerial powers have nonetheless becomeequated with its overall power to impact policy-making.

Incomparisonwiththepoliticalinfluenceexercisedbystrategicleadership,thistypeofpoweris infor-maland inconspicuous.Still, total ignoranceof itspossible impactwouldbeamistake. In thecaseoftheCouncilpresidency,itisgoodtorememberthatnearlyallpolicy-makingintheEUgoesthroughtheCouncil.The European Council does not legislate,while the European Parliament and the Councilusually adopt legal acts together. In general, theLisbonTreatyhasreformedlegislativeproceduresin


Trios and decision-making in general affairs

Foroverayearnow,theEuropeanCouncilhasbeena formalEU institutionwithaseparatepresidencyfromthatoftheCouncil’s.IncomparisonwiththeCouncil’srotatingpresidency,thePresidentoftheEuropeanCouncilis(semi-)permanentandelectedforaoncerenewable termof twoandahalfyears.Importantly,thePresidentoftheEuropeanCouncilonlyoperatesattheEuropeanCouncillevelandhasnoformalfunctionsorpowersintheCouncil,since(s)hedoesnothaveaseatinanyoftheCouncil’stenconfigurations.

With the notable exception of the Foreign AffairsCouncil (FAC) discussed in the next section, nineout of ten Council configurations and their sub-structuresareprepared,executedandfollowed-upbytherotatingCouncilpresidency.Theseconfigura-tionscovermostpoliciesfromEUinstitutionalandbudgetaryaffairsviaenlargementpolicytointernalmarket,economicregulation,financialsupervisionandmonetaryunion.

Of these configurations, the potential embeddedin theGeneralAffairsCouncil (GAC)deservespar-ticularattention.Thisisnotonlybecausehorizontalpolicies like institutional development in the EUorenlargementof theUnionbelongto itsagenda.It is alsobecause it formally performsoneof themost important coordination tasks in the EU. Itis supposed to ensure consistency in theworkofCouncilconfigurationsaswellascollecttheirinputaheadoftheEuropeanCouncilmeetings.Atleastonpaper, italsopreparesandfollowsupthesemeet-ings.

Even if it is still questionable to what degree theGAC is actually allowed to prepare the EuropeanCouncilagendaandhowsuchinputisembracedbytheOfficeof theEuropeanCouncilPresident, thisconfiguration officially persists as a link betweentheCouncilPresidency and theEuropeanCouncil.ThePresidentorPrimeMinisterofthememberstateholding the rotating presidency has, in turn, losthis/her chairmanship of the European Council tothenewpermanentpresidentandnowmerelyhastheresponsibilitytoreporttotheEuropeanCouncilabouttheworkdoneintheCouncilconfigurations—inthesamewayas(s)hepresentstheprioritiesandresults of theCouncil presidency to theEuropeanParliament.

When itcomes to theCouncilpresidency’sadmin-istrative workload in general, this remains heavydue to the large number of preparatory bodies.Accordingtoarecentaccount,thereareatotalof162preparatorybodiesintheCouncil,15ofwhichhaveafixedchairandabout21ofwhichare—orwillbeafteratransitionalperiod—chairedbyarepresenta-tiveoftheHighRepresentative.4ThismeansthattheCouncilpresidencycurrentlyhassome126prepara-torybodies to chair,which includeCoreper I andII.Inotherwords,closeto78percentofallCouncilpreparatorybodiesarestillchairedbytherotatingCouncilpresidencyevenaftertheimplementationoftheLisbonTreaty.

Trios and decision-making in foreign affairs

Generallyspeaking,theCouncilpresidency’sman-date excludes theFAC chairmanship. In principle,theHighRepresentative or his/her representativepresidesoverthisconfiguration,whichisresponsi-blefortheEU’sexternalactionincludingtheCFSPand theCSDP, external trade, development policyandtheENP.Inthesphereofexternalrepresentation,thePresidentoftheEuropeanCounciltogetherwiththePresidentoftheCommissionrepresenttheUnionexternallyatthehighestpolitical(presidential)level,andtheHighRepresentativeattheministeriallevel.

International treaty negotiations are furthermoredriven—without theCouncil presidency’s involve-ment—by the European Commission or the High

4 This calculation is based on the list of Council preparatory

bodiespublishedbytheGeneralSecretariaton11February2010

(5869/1/10REV1).Thebodiesmarkedasnolongerexistingare

notincludedinthecalculation.Accordingtothislist,38prepa-

ratorybodiesareentitledtobelongtotheforeignaffairscategory.

Ofthesebodies,twonolongerexistandonehasafixedchair.Of

theremaining35bodies,19arechairedbyarepresentativeofthe

HighRepresentative,while16remaintobechairedbytherotating

Councilpresidency.ThePoliticalandSecurityCommitteeandthe

CommitteeforCivilianAspectsofCrisisManagementchairedby

theHighRepresentative’sappointeeaswellastheMilitaryCom-

mittee,whichhasanelectedchair,areplacedunderaseparateca-

tegoryforcommitteesestablishedbytheTreatiesandCouncilActs.

Altogether,thereareconsequently39bodiesthatlogicallybelong

tothesphereofforeignaffairs:twoofthesehaveafixedchair,16

arechairedbytheCouncilpresidencyand21presidedoverbythe

HighRepresentative’sappointee.


Representative, while the latter is also in chargeof the Union’s diplomatic corps and coordinatescooperation among national embassies in thirdcountries.5

IfthereisasinglevoicethatcanspeakonbehalfoftheUnionininternationalarenas,itisthereforecertainlynotthatoftheCouncilpresidency.Asageneralrule,foreign relations are no longer the rotating presi-dency’s business. Administratively speaking, thisdoesnot fully apply,however.Although theHighRepresentative or his/her appointee in principlepresidesovertheFACasawhole,onlyaround57percentofforeignaffairspreparatorybodiesarealsoin practicechairedbytheHighRepresentative’steam.

Forsure,thiscalculationisonlyadirectionalindica-torbasedontheabove-mentionedregularlychang-ing account of the Council’s preparatory bodies,but it still implies that a largenumber of theFACpreparatorybodiesremainforthetimebeingbeyondthe scope of the High Representative’s mandate.Tradeanddevelopmentaswellassomehorizontal,mostly CFSP-related preparatory bodies remainchairedbysix-monthpresidencies.

The rotating presidency’s role in foreign affairs isthuslimitedtoadministrationandmanagement,butitshouldalsoberememberedthatnotwithstandingthe special arrangements of its chairmanship, theFAC remains the 10th configuration of the Coun-cil.Thisisreflectedinthewaythedeputiesforthe

5 ForananalysisofinternationalnegotiationsundertheLisbon

rules,seee.g.CEPSPolicyBriefNo.207/March2010.

chairpersonsarechosen.TheHighRepresentative’sdeputy inhis/her capacity as theFAC chair is theforeignminister of the acting Council presidency,whereas the other 26 foreign ministers may also,uponrequest,actashis/herrepresentatives‘inthefield’onthebasisofexpertise.

FromtheCouncilpresidency’sperspective,itwillbeintriguingtofollowhowworkingrelationsbetweentheFACandtheGeneralSecretariatoftheCouncil(GSC) develop once the European External ActionService (EEAS) is runningat full speed.TheGSC isresponsible for assisting theCouncil’sworkundertheguidanceoftherotatingpresidency,whilethissecretariat also assists the European Council. InmostUnionpolicy-making,closecooperationwiththe GSC thus enables the Council presidency tofocusonuntanglingtheinternaldissonancesoftheCouncilinsteadofonlycarryingoutadministrativeduties.TheFACisturningintoadifferentcase.OncethedepartmentsoftheGSCspecializedin‘externalaction’ have been transferred to theEEAS,whichworksundertheHighRepresentative’sresponsibil-ity,foreignpolicyexpertisewillnotbeascharacter-isticoftheGSCasbefore.

Fostering a managerial identity by burden-sharing

TheCouncil presidency’s role as an administratorand amanager of decision-making in theCouncilis actually not thatnew in the literal sense of theword.Thisisratheratypicalroleforapresidencyingeneralandtheoriginalreasonbehindthecreationofthepresidencyinquestion.Nevertheless,thelossofpoliticalleadershipfunctionstootherinstitutional

Political and managerial leadership of the Union at the European Council meeting in Brussels in October 2010 from left to right: High Representative

Catherine Ashton, Prime Minister of the acting Council presidency Yves leterme, President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy, President

of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek and Secretary General of the GSC Pierre de Boissieu. Photo: The Council of the European Union.


players has not pleased everyone. Small memberstatesinparticularhavebeenconcernedbecausetherotatingCouncilpresidencyusedtomakethemfeelmore involved since, everynowand again, itwastheirpresidentorprime/foreignministerwhospokeonbehalfoftheEU.TheSpanishpresidency,whichwasthefirsttotakeofficeundertheLisbonTreatyprovisions,wasevenaccusedofnotlettinggoofthisleadershipfunction.

Still,theCouncilpresidency’sinstitutionalidentitycannolongerbesoughtfromwithintheEU’sexter-nal representation or strategic leadership. Since 1December2009,itsidentityhasbeenattachedtotheCouncil as adecision-makerat thehubofday-to-daypolitics.Thefactofthematteristhatthepost-Lisbonmandate of the Council presidency is nar-rowerthanbefore,butitalsoallowsthepresidencytostayfocusedonthedecision-makingintheCoun-cil. Inordertoexploitthiswindowofopportunityformanagerialinfluenceinpolicy-making,thetriopresidenciesoftheCouncilwillquicklyneedtocometotermswiththesechangesintheinstitutionaldivi-sionoflabour.Afterexecutingtheiradministrativeresponsibilities,theywouldbebetteroffre-focusingtheirremainingenergiesonmanagerialtasks.

The number of configurations, committees andworkinggroupschairedbytheCouncilpresidencyis still extensive, especially for a presidencywithlimitedexperienceorminimalresources.Actingasabrokerageamong27memberstatesandbargain-ing with the increasingly powerful co-legislatorEuropeanParliamentdemandbothproceduralandpolicy-related expertise. The latter will becomeparticularly important asmore andmore policiesaredecidedattheEuropeanlevel.TheCouncilpresi-dency’s workload should not be underestimated,eventhoughitnolongerhas‘ceremonial’dutiesortherighttospeakonbehalfoftheEU.

This iswhere theother triomemberscancome totherescue.Fromthepointofviewofcontinuityandefficiency,amorefar-reachingdivisionoflabourispreferable.Thisisespeciallytruewhenthesmallestmemberstatesactasleadingpresidencies,orwhenamemberstatetakesofficeduringturbulenttimes

indomesticpolitics—asBelgiumdidveryrecently.Actsofburden-sharingcouldreasonablyeventakeintoaccountthespecialexpertiseofmemberstatesindifferentfieldsofpolicy-making.

Expertise-based chairmanship has been proventoworkasadriving force forpolicydevelopment.Macro-regionalstrategiesaregoodexamplesofthisdevelopment, since the impetus given to certaingeographical areas is often due to convenientlytimedchairmanships.Asatopicalexample,the2011Hungarian Presidency is—as aDanube state—wellpreparedandcertainlyself-motivatedtokickofftheimplementationprocessofabrand-newEUstrategyfortheDanuberegion.

Thedelegationoftaskstoothertriomembersforthesake of a more smoothly functioning Council—orchangingturns inoffice in theeventof temporarydomesticdisarray—wouldsimultaneouslyrepresentthe first steps towards a common identity amongmember states forming trio presidencies. Thiskindofcommon identity isdifficult toachieve. Inpractice, the actingpresidencywouldhave to askfor help, which might happen with single dossi-ersbutremainsunlikelyonalargerscale.Afterall,member states share the tendency todefend theirprerogatives.Forwhatit’sworth,seriouseffortstosharethepresidentialburdentransgovernmentallywouldsurelybewarmlywelcomedintheCouncilof27memberstates.Thiswouldalsoenabletherotat-ingpresidencytocreateanewmanagerialidentityin policy-making, instead of simply becoming anadministrativemachine.

Kaisa Korhonen

Researcher


iSBN 978-951-769-288-5

iSSN 1795-8059

Cover photo: leo Reynolds

layout: Juha Mäkinen

language editing: lynn Nikkanen

The Finnish institute of international Affairs 2010

www.upi-fiia.fi

TOWARdS A NEW MANAGERiAl idENTiTY FOR THE …the Union for Foreign Affairsand Security Policy....

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