Toward Japan-ROK Security Cooperation BeyondNortheast Asia

Sugio Takahashi

Abstract

Security cooperation between Japan and the ROK has unfolded just withinNortheast Asia, rather than extending beyond the region. However, this does notmean that Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia is meaningless or impossible.In fact, such cooperation can play significant roles. First, the differences in attitudetoward regional security cooperation do not come from conflicts of interest, but fromdifferences in priorities. Since both countries depend on overseas trade in the Asia-Pacific region and energy supplies from the Middle East, the stability of sea lanes isa shared concern and cooperation in this regard will serve both countries’ nationalinterests.

Second, with the “normalization” of Japan’s security policy and modernizationof the ROK navy and air force, both countries may have concerns about each other’sstrategic intentions. Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia, based onstrategic consensus on the importance of sea lanes, can reduce such suspicion onboth sides. Third, faced with the rising China, the coordination of both countries’policies toward China to increase the “partner” aspect will serve the interests oflong-term stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Six-Party Talks play such a rolenow, but regional security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia will have broadereffects on the Asia-Pacific region.

This paper argues that there is a way forward for Japan-ROK security cooperationbeyond Northeast Asia.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 2007, pp. 119–143.

Introduction

Despite the end of the Cold War, the “dividend of peace” was notnecessarily enjoyed in Northeast Asia. North Korea’s nuclear develop-ment program brought this region to a crisis. Moreover, the TaiwanStrait problem has not been resolved yet, and the rise of China causesconcerns over changes in the balance of power in the future. Given thisunclear situation, Japan has sought to strengthen the Japan-U.S.alliance by the revision of the Defense Guidelines in 1997 and theDefense Policy Review Initiative in 2006. Through this process, Japanand the United States have established a closer and more effectiveframework for bilateral defense cooperation.

In addition to the United States, for Japan, the Republic of Korea(ROK) is an indispensable partner in Northeast Asia. The broad andsolid bilateral defense exchanges, the Trilateral Coordination andOversight Group (TCOG), and cooperation through the Six-Party Talksdemonstrate how important Japan-ROK cooperation is for regionalsecurity.

Such security cooperation between Japan and the ROK has unfold-ed just within Northeast Asia, rather than extending beyond the region.However, Japan pays more attention to regions beyond Northeast Asia,such as the Asia-Pacific region, in its policy on regional security coop-eration, while Japan has seldom taken active initiatives for region-widesecurity cooperation. There are two strategic backdrops to this differingapproach to security cooperation in Northeast Asia and other regions.

Firstly, it comes from the differences in the dynamics of regionalsecurity issues. In Northeast Asia, the biggest security issue in the shortterm is North Korea’s nuclear development program and the mostchallenging issue in the long term will be the rise of China. In particular,to deal with the former issue, deterrence based on alliance cooperation,rather than region-wide security cooperation, is much more effective.On the other hand, in regions beyond Northeast Asia, such as the Asia-Pacific region or the Indian Ocean, specifiable security threats are notprevalent. In these regions, international terror, piracy, natural disasters,and the stability of sea lanes are more serious concerns—rather thanCold War-style inter-state conflicts, such as on the Korean peninsula orin the Taiwan Strait. To deal with these concerns, regional security

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cooperation—more comprehensive and flexible than formal alliancesbetween or among countries sharing mutual concerns—would be moreeffective.

Secondly, although the stability of Northeast Asia is indispensablefor Japan’s national security, the stability of only Northeast Asia is notenough for protection of Japan’s national interests. Since Japan’s econo-my is highly dependent on oil from the Middle East and Japanese man-ufacturers have developed a production network in East Asia, any lackof stability of these regions and sea lanes from there to Japan will seri-ously harm Japan’s economic prosperity. Thus, in the sense that the sta-bility of these regions is indispensable to Japan’s prosperity, theseregions are included in the strategic horizon of Japan, and it is naturalfor Japan to share their national security resources for the stability ofthese regions.

So far, both Japan and the ROK have paid slight attention to Japan-ROK security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia. But for the futurebilateral cooperation, such cooperation not just within Northeast Asiashould be discussed now for three reasons. Firstly, not just Japan’s, butalso the ROK’s economy, depend on overseas trade in the Asia-Pacificand energy supplies from the Middle East. This means both countriesshare many interests, even outside of Northeast Asia, and developingcooperation between these two countries in these areas will serve bothcountries’ national interests. Secondly, it will serve as mutual reassur-ance for each other’s concerns. Now, Japan’s “normalization” of securi-ty policy and the ROK’s modernization of its naval and air forces isgoing to develop. If Japan “normalizes” its policy without any coopera-tive framework with the ROK, it will cause concern over a possiblerevival of “Imperial Japan” from the ROK side, on one hand, if theROK modernizes its naval and air forces without attention to the stabil-ity of sea lanes beyond Northeast Asia, it would cause concerns overwhether such a modernized force is actually “against” Japan or onJapan’s side. Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia wouldreassure both sides and reduce such concerns. Thirdly, Japan-ROKregional cooperation beyond Northeast Asia could be a platform tointegrate China into the existing regional order and induce China to bea responsible power. Not just through the Six-Party Talks, but by devel-oping regional security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia that could

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coincide with China’s interests, Japan and the ROK could acquire thetools to embrace China. This is not to contain China, but rather to makeChina act as a responsible regional power through integration intoregional security cooperation.

This paper is intended to argue the way forward for Japan-ROKsecurity cooperation beyond Northeast Asia. First, the overall situationof regional security cooperation after the Cold War is discussed. Withthe end of the Cold War, regionalization of international security poli-tics has developed, and the importance of regional security cooperationhas increased. This paper categorizes regional security cooperation intofour types: quasi-alliances, confidence-building/crisis management,problem-solving, and non-traditional threats. Since different regionsneed different types of regional security cooperation, an appropriateunderstanding of the dynamics of regional security and the function ofregional security cooperation is critically important. Secondly, Japan’spolicy on regional security cooperation and strategic backdrops areanalyzed. Since Japan depends on oil from the Middle East and Japan-ese manufacturers develop production networks in East Asia, the lackof stability of these regions and sea lanes endangers Japan’s nationalinterests. Thus, Japan has paid attention to regional security coopera-tion in these regions beyond Northeast Asia. Thirdly, the possibleobjectives of Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia are dis-cussed. Since both Japan and the ROK share a common concern aboutthe stability of sea lanes, cooperation to ensure the stability of sea lanesbeyond Northeast Asia merits consideration. In addition, Japan-ROKregional security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia can be used as aplatform to integrate China into the existing international order as aresponsible power, rather than as a containment of China.

Regionalization of Security after the Cold War

and Regional Security Cooperation

Types of Regional Security Cooperation

One big keyword of international politics and economy since theend of the Cold War is “globalization.” Ironically, however, in the field

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of international security, the two decades after the end of the Cold Warare the era of “regionalization.” While the Cold War era was the “glob-alization” period—when two superpowers penetrated regional securityissues such as Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Korean peninsula—the penetration by the global superpower into regional security issueswas lessening in the post-Cold War era with the demise of the SovietUnion.1 As a result, an understanding of the dynamics of regional secu-rity, rather than that of global superpower competition, has been muchmore important in the post-Cold War era. This change has made theregional-based approach more relevant and many countries have becomeinterested in promoting regional cooperation in their regions.2 In short,“regionalization” of security politics has developed since the end of theCold War.

“Regionalization” of security politics means that a tailored approachfitting into the dynamics of the region is necessary to deal with issuesthat are idiosyncratic in the region. In a regionally-based, tailoredapproach, regional security cooperation plays a critical role, if the secu-rity cooperation is appropriately designed to manage security issues inthe region. The precondition for “appropriate design of regional coop-eration” is a correct understanding of the function of regional securitycooperation, since there is a wide range of functions in security cooper-ation. The most formal variation of security cooperation is alliancesagainst external threats. But even without formal treaties, informal typesof cooperation like “coalitions of the willing” can be developed. Alter-natively, confidence-building measures between adversaries, such asIndia and Pakistan, are one variation of regional security cooperationto manage the situation.

The character of regional security cooperation after the end of the

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1 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of InternationalSecurity (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 17–19.

2 For a theoretical analysis on regional cooperation after the Cold War, see DavidA. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a NewWorld (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996); HelgaHaftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions:Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999);Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (London: Cam-bridge University Press, 1998).

Cold War is cooperation other than formal alliances, which has blos-somed. Of course, this does not mean that the role of formal allianceshas ended. Needless to say, formal military alliances—such as NATO,the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance—still play an indis-pensable role in regional security. But at the same time, non-alliancesecurity cooperation—such as the Organization of Security and Cooper-ation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) orinformal cases of bilateral or mini-lateral security cooperation—plays asignificant role as well. The former type of formal security cooperationis good for deterrence against threat. The latter type of less formal secu-rity cooperation is good for confidence-building, dealing with transna-tional threats and accumulating practices of cooperation in the region.To deepen the understanding of such informal security cooperation,this paper clarifies the functioning of a varied range of security cooper-ation in accordance with the four categories: quasi-alliances, CBM/crisismanagement, problem-solving, and non-traditional threats.

First, quasi-alliance security cooperation is security cooperationamong countries that behave as if they are alliances, even without for-mal treaties. The countries under quasi-alliance security cooperationclosely coordinate their policies to deal with regional security concerns,or they even conduct actual combined military operations. “Coalitionsof the willing,” such as multinational cooperation for America’s Opera-tion Enduring Freedom since 2001, or cooperation between countriesthat do not have formal treaties arranged by their common treaty-alliedcountry, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation are an example.3 As partof Japan’s security policy, recent Japan-Australia security cooperationcan be understood as an example of Japan’s efforts to expand quasi-alliance security cooperation.4

In contrast to quasi-alliance security cooperation that will developamong friendly countries, CBM/crisis management security coopera-tion is to stabilize relations among adversaries or non-friendly coun-

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3 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

4 “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html, accessed on March13, 2007.

tries. The objective of CBM/crisis management is to avoid escalation ofinadvertent military clashes or an accident between frontline unitsescalating into a full-scale interstate conflict. Improvements in mutualtransparency of defense policies and military postures, pre-notifica-tions of military exercises, or connection of “hotlines” between head-quarters or political leaders are the tools for CBM/crisis management.In the Asia-Pacific region, ARF functions as a mechanism to promotetransparency of regional countries’ defense policy.

Problem-solving security cooperation is to solve specific problemsin the region. A good example of this type of cooperation is the Six-Party Talks to tackle the North Korean nuclear development problem.Once the specific problem is shared by countries in the region, they cancooperate to solve the problem, regardless of their political relations.For example, in 2004-2005, even though Japan-China relations werestrained because of the Chinese anti-Japan public demonstration in2005 or China’s reaction to then Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to theYasukuni Shrine, and Japan-China political and security cooperationstagnated, Japan and China could cooperate regarding the North Koreanuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks.5 In that sense, problem-solv-ing security cooperation can have positive external effects on relationsamong regional countries by providing incentives and opportunitiesfor cooperation within a broader framework than bilateral relations.

And ultimately, security cooperation regarding non-traditionalthreats involves building frameworks to deal with non-traditionalthreats such as terrorism, piracy, natural disasters, or disease pandemics.The characteristic of this type of cooperation is that it develops func-tionally. Against international terrorism, functional cooperation amongcustoms, financial sections, or immigration controls serve to constrainterrorists’ activities. Or dealing with piracy, functional cooperationamong coastguards is critically important.6

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5 Regarding Japan-China relations at that time, see Yomiuri Shimbun Seijibu,Gaiko wo Kenka ni Shita Otoko: Koizumi Gaiko Nisennichi no Shinjitsu [The ManWho Made Diplomacy a Fight: The Reality of 2000 days of Koizumi Diplomacy](Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2006), pp. 222–92; about the Six-Party Talks, see FunabashiYoichi, Za Peninshura Kueschon: Chousen Hanto Dainiji Kakukiki [The PeninsulaQuestion: The Second Nuclear Crisis on the Korean peninsula] (Tokyo: AsahiShimbunsha, 2006), pp. 526–673.

Increased attention to this type of security cooperation has beenevident since the September 11 terrorist attacks that showed how atransnational terrorist network can inflict serious damage on the world’slargest superpower. As a part of the “Global War on Terrorism,” theUnited States developed security cooperation to defeat the Al Qaeda-related local terrorism network.7 In addition to security cooperation tocombat terrorism, the Sumatra tsunami disaster relief operation in 20038

and coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits by Malaysia,Singapore, and Indonesia9 are good examples of regional security cooper-ation regarding non-traditional threats.

Patterns of Regional Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia, among these four types of regional securitycooperation, the focus is on CBM/crisis management and problem-solving. The reason is simple. Firstly, in this region, traditional securityissues between or among states are still the most important issues forregional countries, unlike Europe, where the traditional interstatethreats have almost disappeared. Secondly, the main Northeast Asiancountries—China, North Korea, Japan and the ROK—are strong statesenjoying well-built governance in terms of relations with society. ForNortheast Asian countries, non-traditional threats from domestic non-state actors are not serious threats.10 Thirdly, the societies of these coun-tries are ethnically homogeneous and infiltration by Islamic radicals ishighly limited, unlike European countries. The threats from radical

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6 For regional cooperation against piracy and other maritime threats against sealanes, see Kaijo Hoan Cho [Japan Coast Guard], Kaijo Hoan Report [Japan CoastGuard Annual Report] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsu Kyoku, 2006), pp. 17–42,available at http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2006/top.html.

7 See National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006), pp. 8–13.8 For further detail on the international relief operation for the Sumatra tsunami

disaster relief, see the National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian StrategicReview 2006 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2006), pp. 38–61.

9 Regarding these three countries’ coordinated patrols, see Joshua Ho, “The Secu-rity of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August2006), pp. 567–68.

10 One exception is Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. But after the sarin gas attack on theTokyo subway, the Japanese government has managed to contain them.

Islamic fundamentalists are secondary threats to interstate conflict inthis region. As a result, the primary objective of Northeast Asian coun-tries’ security policies is to manage interstate conflict—and more specifi-cally, North Korea’s nuclear development program and the rising China.

As discussed, in the context of the regionalization of security poli-tics since the end of the Cold War, regionally based approaches arerequired to manage idiosyncratic issues in the region. To tailor theseapproaches, a correct understanding of issues in the region and func-tions of regional security cooperation that were outlined in the previ-ous section is indispensable. If countries in one region promote CBM/crisis management in a region where non-security threats are prevail-ing, the regional security cooperation for CBM/crisis management willnot bring fruitful outcomes for regional countries because CBM/crisismanagement to avoid inadvertent interstate conflict does not workagainst non-traditional threats. Or if two countries are in conflictualrelations and one side seeks to promote quasi-alliance cooperation, thecooperation will not be achieved because these countries share verylittle interest in cooperation by definition. In this case, CBM/crisismanagement is necessary to stabilize their relations initially. Coopera-tion between them can be pursued after they do not see the other asthreats to each other. In short, issues in one region determine what typeof security cooperation is appropriate. If interstate conflict is a seriousconcern in one region, quasi-alliance cooperation and CBM/crisis man-agement are appropriate recipes for regional security cooperation. Ifregional countries share some specific problem and there is consensusto resolve it based on regional cooperation, problem-solving regionalsecurity cooperation is the best approach.

Moreover, the character of issue determines not just the type ofcooperation, but the membership of the cooperation. Indeed, underregionalization of security politics, simple geography does not deter-mine which countries are appropriate members of the cooperation.11 Ifone region has the instability of sea lanes problem, countries that dependon overseas trade require security cooperation for non-traditionalthreats and they should be members of the framework for stability ofsea lanes, while a country that seeks an autarkic economy has no incen-

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11 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, pp. 40–51.

tive to do it. In the case of Northeast Asia, Japan and ROK depend onoverseas trade on the one hand and North Korea does not on the otherhand. This suggests that Japan and the ROK share incentives to stabi-lize sea lanes and North Korea does not—even if North Korea is geo-graphically approximate to Japan and ROK.12

In a nutshell, every region has a unique pattern of security politicsand to tackle these problems, countries need to choose appropriatetypes of security cooperation. And the character of issues in the region’ssecurity politics determine what type of security cooperation is properand which countries are relevant members of the cooperation. In thecase of Northeast Asia, where interstate conflict is the first priority con-cern, the combination of CBM/crisis management and problem-solvingbased on formal military alliances is the optimal solution and the mem-bership is limited to regional countries. On the other hand, in the case ofSoutheast Asia where transnational threats are a more serious concernand they endanger the stability of sea lanes, security cooperation onnon-traditional threats and quasi-alliance cooperation are important.The instability of sea lanes has negative effects on extra-region countriesthat depend on overseas trade or energy supply, the membership of thecooperation is not limited to Southeast Asian countries. Japan, the Unit-ed States and the ROK—and even China—have a stake in the stabilityof sea lanes. Thus, a more comprehensive framework of security cooper-ation regarding non-traditional threats is necessary in this region.

In this way, different regions have different patterns of regionalsecurity politics and require different tailored approaches. Japan’s poli-cy toward regional security cooperation is no exception. In NortheastAsia and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan applies different policies. InNortheast Asia, Japan depends on its formal military alliance with theUnited States to strengthen deterrence, while CBM/crisis managementthrough ARF and quasi-alliance cooperation with Australia have beendeveloped (or are going to develop) in the Asia-Pacific region.

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12 A more systemic study on regionalization of security politics is provided byBarry Buzan. He uses the phrase “security complex” to analyze regionalizationand defines it as “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.” Ibid.,p. 45.

Japan’s Policy Toward Regional Security Cooperation

Japan’s Double-Track Policy on Regional Security Cooperation

As is widely known, the foundation of Japan’s security policy isthe Japan-U.S. alliance. So Japan is often regarded as reluctant to partic-ipate in regional security cooperation.13 However, this perception is notnecessarily true. In the kick-off phase of ARF in the mid-1990s, theJapanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) played a key role. At thattime, MOFA acknowledged that the lack of a framework for politicaldialogue in this region could be an Achilles’ heel of the stability of theregion and promoted a region-wide framework for political dialogue.Though Japan’s initiative was not accepted immediately, coordinatingwith Australia and ASEAN countries, this political dialogue initiativefinally received region-wide support and was realized as ARF.14

But at the same time, Japan’s efforts toward regional security cooper-ation were deliberately designed not to weaken the Japan-U.S. alliance.15

The consensus in the Japanese policy community is that multilateralregional security cooperation cannot substitute for the Japan-U.S.alliance because regional security cooperation without an enforcementmechanism cannot deter challengers who want to challenge the statusquo, but regional security cooperation can complement the alliancethrough confidence-building and by practicing cooperation amongregional countries.16 Based on this consensus, since the end of the Cold

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13 For Japan’s attitudes toward bilateral alliances and multilateral security cooper-ation, see Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, “U.S. Japan SecurityRelations: Toward Bilateralism Plus?” in Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds.,Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 55–86.

14 Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model ofRegional Security,” Adelphi Paper, No. 302 (1996); Nishihara Masashi, “Ajia-Tai-heiyou Chiiki to Takokukan Anzenhoshou Kyouryoku no Wakugumi: ASEANChiiki Forum wo Chushin ni [Framework of Multilateral Security Cooperationin the Asia-Pacific Region: Focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum],” KokusaiMondai, No. 415, October 1994.

15 Hughes and Fukushima, “U.S.-Japan Security Relations,” pp. 78–84.16 About this “complement” argument in Japan, see Matake Kamiya, “The U.S.-

Japan Alliance and Regional Security Cooperation: Toward a Double-Layered

War, Japanese international security policy has developed in the doubletracks: strengthening the alliance on one hand and promoting regionalsecurity cooperation on the other hand. Combining them, Japan hassought both to fortify deterrence and build confidence among countriesin the region. Thus, in parallel with ARF, Japan pursued strengtheningof the alliance. The revised Defense Guidelines with the United Statesin 1997 to extend Japan’s support for U.S. forces dealing with regionalcontingencies is one big step for the alliance track. And following theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks, Japan dispatched MSDF vessels to theIndian Ocean and GSDF ground troops and ASDF transportation air-craft to Iraq.

On the other hand, after several years passed after the establish-ment of the ARF, Japan’s movement is less active along the regionalcooperation track. The stagnation of the ARF process brought aboutthis attitude on Japan’s part. Originally, ARF articulates three stagestoward regional stability: promotion of confidence-building measures,development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and developmentof conflict-resolution mechanisms.17 In this process, confidence-build-ing achieved mainly through improvement of transparency by publish-ing a defense white paper and promoting defense exchange/securitydialogue. But difficulties emerged when the ARF process was expectedto transition from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy phase.18

The fear that preventive diplomacy may invite intervention in nationalsovereignty made the ARF process toward conflict resolution sluggish.Since the “ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” adopt-

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Security System,” in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance:Toward a More Equal Partnership (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 1997), pp. 19–28.

17 The ASEAN Regional Forum, “Concept Paper,” (August, 1995), available athttp://www.aseansec.org/politics/arf_ch2c.htm.

18 For the transition from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, seeDesmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, eds., The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacyand Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Canberra: Australian NationalUniversity, 1999); Ken Jimbo, “ASEAN Chiiki Forum to Yobou Gaikou: Ta-youkasuru Yobougaikougainen to Chiikiteki Tekiyou no Mosaku [ARF andPreventive Diplomacy: Diversification of Preventive Diplomacy Concept andSort of Regional Application],” Shin Bouei Ronshu, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December1999), pp. 23–44.

ed at the 8th ARF meeting in the 2001,19 little practical progress hasbeen made. This stagnation of the ARF led to Japan’s paying decreas-ing attention to the ARF and consequently Japan’s diplomatic effortshave seemed to concentrate on the alliance track.

Expansion of Japan’s Strategic Horizons Beyond Northeast Asia

One character of these double-track policies of Japan’s, combiningthe alliance with a regional security policy, is that these efforts havedeveloped in regions beyond Northeast Asia. While the strengtheningof Japan-U.S. cooperation in contingencies in Northeast Asia was themain goal of the revision of the Defense Guidelines in 1997, the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration between both countries’ national leadersin 1995 indicated the focus of the alliance would shift from the “FarEast” (the word that was used in Article Six of the Japan-U.S. SecurityTreaty) to the “Asia-Pacific.”20 That does not mean the obligations ofthe treaty have been expanded, but the Joint Declaration shows Japanis now paying attention not just to the “Far East” (Northeast Asia), butalso to the Asia-Pacific region. And, Japan’s efforts to promote ARF-based regional cooperation, which include ASEAN countries and theUnited States, were made in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than inNortheast Asia.

The extension of Japan’s strategic horizons in the mid-1980s andthe early 1990s required this shift of attention in Japan’s security policy.Since the 1985 Plaza Accord to strengthen the value of the yen, Japan’smanufacturers increased foreign direct investment in other Asian coun-tries (Newly Industrializing Economies, or NIEs, and ASEAN) andbegan manufacturing across borders to maintain competitiveness.21

With the transplanting of some parts of the manufacturing process of

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19 ARF, “ARF Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” July 25, 2001,available at http://www.aseansec.org/3571.htm.

20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, press release, “Japan-U.S. Joint Declarationof Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,” April 17, 1996, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html.

21 T. J. Pempel, “Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism,”in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 47–82, 58–69.

Japanese companies to NIEs and ASEAN countries, interdependence inthis region has deepened and a transnational production network hasdeveloped in Asia. Consequently, the concept of “East Asia” that inte-grates Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia emerged in Japan22 and thestability of “East Asia” gained critical importance for Japan. Since boththe U.S. market for the East Asian economies and the presence of theU.S. military in security terms are indispensable for the stability of EastAsia, the “Asia-Pacific region,” the geographical concept of East Asiaplus the United States, became the key geographical arena for Japan’sinternational economy and security policy. In this way, Japan’s strategichorizons have expanded to the Asia-Pacific region, beyond NortheastAsia.

This expansion of the strategic horizon is the backdrop to Japan’sefforts regarding the ARF. But as stated, the development of an ARF-based conflict resolution was stagnated in the beginning of the 2000s,while the ARF still works as the framework for political dialogue as orig-inally intended. It does not mean, however, the stagnation of overallregional security cooperation. Non-ARF regional security cooperation ona functional military-to-military basis has developed. Defense exchangesto discuss strategic issues, multinational search and rescue training, orregion-wide multilateral military exercises, such as Cobra-Gold or TeamChallenge, have strengthened military-to-military relationships in thisregion.23 Admiral Dennis Blair argued this trend in the Asia-Pacificregion as “from wheel to web.”24 The September 11 terrorist attacks in2001 gave an impetus to such functional cooperation, rather than politi-cal dialogue. As a part of the “Global War on Terrorism” led by the Unit-ed States, military-to-military cooperation among Indonesia, the Philip-pines and the United States has developed. And not just military-to-mili-

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22 Takashi Shiraishi, “Japan and Southeast Asia,” in Katzenstein and Shiraishi,eds., Network Power, p. 186.

23 Nagao Yuichiro, Tachikawa Kyoichi, and Tsukamoto Tatsuya, “Reisen Shuketsu-go no Gunji Koryu ni Kansuru Kenkyu [A Study on Military Exchanges afterthe End of the Cold War],” NIDS Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (February 2002),pp. 1–52.

24 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: ReconstructingAsia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter2001), pp. 7–17.

tary, but also multinational cooperation among coastguards or customshas evolved to constrain international terrorists’ activities.25

Japan is not the outsider in this wave of functional cooperationagainst international terrorism. To support American operations inAfghanistan and maritime inspections to contain movements of ter-rorists to and from Afghanistan, Japan dispatched the refueling ship ofthe Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2001; and to cooperate in the recon-struction efforts in Iraq, Japan sent ground troops and transportationaircraft to Iraq in 2003. The threats from international terrorism organi-zations and these SDF operations in regions beyond the Asia-Pacificagain have expanded Japan’s strategic horizons.

Since the Japanese economy is heavily dependent on oil from theMiddle East, the stability of the Middle East and sea lanes from thatregion to Japan is critically important for Japan. The terrorist threatsfrom Central Asia and the Middle East and the operations of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the Indian Ocean and Iraq prompted Japan tocommit to the stability of these regions more actively. The “Arc of Free-dom and Prosperity,” the diplomatic vision addressed by Foreign Min-ister Taro Aso,26 which pursues bringing about a more stable socialenvironment in the southern part of the Eurasian Continent, is one suchexample. The area that is embraced by the “Arc of Freedom and Pros-perity” overlaps “the arc of instability” which the United States desig-nated as a source of trouble.27 In a sense, this “Arc of Freedom and Pros-perity” is the diplomatic vision for Japan to commit to the stability ofthese areas by cooperating with the United States. For the “Arc of Free-dom and Prosperity,” Japan promotes cooperation with Australia, aswell as trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Aus-tralia, or India and other South Asia countries.28 These diplomatic

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25 Kaijo Hoan Cho [Japan Coast Guard], Kaijo Hoan Report [Japan Coast GuardAnnual Report], pp. 17–42.

26 Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Hori-zons,” speech delivered at the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar(Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.

27 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Sept. 30, 2001),p. 4, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf.

28 Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s statement at the SAARC summit in 2007 refers to

efforts beyond Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region reflect furtherexpansion of Japan’s strategic horizons in the 21st century.

Why beyond Northeast Asia?

As discussed so far, Japan’s commitment to regional security policydeveloped not just in Northeast Asia, where Japan is located. In themiddle of the 1980s, with the development of a region-wide productionnetwork, spurred by the heightened value of the yen as agreed in thePlaza Accord in 1985, Japan’s strategic horizons expanded to the Asia-Pacific region. And Japanese commitment to the War on Terrorism afterthe September 11 terrorist attacks again expanded Japan’s strategichorizons to the southern part of the Eurasian Continent to solve thesocial problems that cause the growth of radical terrorist groups and tostabilize sea lanes from the Middle East to Japan.

At a glance, this attention shown by Japan to regional security coop-eration in Asia-Pacific or Eurasia, rather than Northeast Asia, looksunreasonable. Since the stability of Northeast Asia should be the mostimportant for Japan’s national security, the first priority of Japan’s secu-rity and foreign policy should focus on Northeast Asia. Of course, suchattention shown to other regions does not mean that Japan underesti-mates the importance of Northeast Asia to its security. Rather, this atti-tude of Japan toward regional security cooperation merely reflects thedifference in the impact of the regional situation on Japan’s securityand the character of security in these regions.

In Northeast Asia, the main threat against Japan’s national security isfrom North Korea’s nuclear development program, and deterring NorthKorea is thus the top priority of Japan’s security policy in NortheastAsia. To deter North Korea, the most effective solution is to strengthenthe alliance with the United States and to improve trilateral coopera-tion among Japan, the United States and the ROK. Thus, Japan basicallyapproached the threat in Northeast Asia through the alliance and quasi-alliance cooperation with the ROK. In addition, as a diplomatic efforttoward a denuclearized North Korea, Japan has committed itself to the

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“the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” April 3, 2007, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/saarc/state0704.html.

Six-Party Talks as a form of problem-solving regional cooperation.Apart from North Korea’s nuclear development program, in the

long-term, the rising China can be a concern for Japan’s security inNortheast Asia. Since China is too big to contain, even for the Japan-U.S. alliance, “shaping” its choice to become a “responsible stakeholder”is the only achievable and effective strategy.29 To avoid inadvertent mili-tary conflict with China, CBM/crisis management cooperation is neces-sary and Japan and China must discuss how to promote CBM and cri-sis management in bilateral relations.30

This short-term threat from North Korea and long-term concernfrom China are both issues of national security to Japan. The founda-tion of Japan’s strategy to deal with them is the alliance with the Unit-ed States. However, these measures to deter North Korea, or “shape”the choice of China, are not all the necessary means to serve Japan’snational interests. For Japan, to remain an economic great power, regionalsecurity cooperation in regions other than Northeast Asia is indispens-able, for the following two reasons:

First, the lifeline of Japan as an economic great power is the stableenergy supply route from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Oceanand the Malacca Straits to Japan, since Japan is dependent on the Mid-dle East for about 90 percent of its supply. A closure of this long sea lanewould inevitably inflict heavy damage on Japan. Such a closure wouldbe one of the worst-case scenarios for Japan, and thus one that shouldbe avoided. But Japan’s own efforts alone can play just a limited role.31

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29 Japan showed that it shares this “stakeholder strategy” through the Japan-U.S.Security Consultative Committee (the so-called “2+2”). The meeting of Japan’sDefense Minister, the Foreign Minister, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Secre-tary of State issued a statement on May 1, 2007. The Joint Statement of theSecurity Consultative Committee, “Alliance Transformation: Advancing UnitedStates-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation,” May 1, 2007, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html.

30 Wen Jiabao, the Premier of the State Council of China, visited Japan in April2007, and Japan and China agreed to “strengthen dialogue and exchanges inthe area of defense and make utmost efforts for the stability of the regiontogether.” See “Japan-China Joint Press Statement,” April 11, 2007, available athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pv0704/joint.html.

31 Japan established the “Malacca Kaikyo Kyogikai [The Council on the MalaccaStraits]” to improve safety of navigation through the Malacca Straits in 1968.

Needless to say, the main player maintaining the stability of this vitalsea lane is the dominant presence of the U.S Navy. Unlike threats orconcerns in Northeast Asia, threats against sea lanes are difficult tospecify. Piracy, a serious maritime accident in the Malacca Straits, terri-torial disputes among coastal countries adjoining this sea lane, or mar-itime terrorism are on the list of possible threats against Japan’s sealanes. To deal with these various types of threat, region-wide coopera-tion that includes ASEAN countries, Australia, or India—in addition tothe presence of the U.S. Navy—will play a significant role.

Secondly, just the stability of the “line” from Middle East to Japanis not enough for Japan to remain an economic great power. As dis-cussed in the previous section, since the mid-1980s, a region-wideJapanese production network has been developed in East Asia. Thisproduction network would not work if regional stability is endangered.In case of armed conflict somewhere in East Asia, sea lanes connectingthe production network might be blocked and the production of multi-national enterprises would be paralyzed. On the other hand, fortunate-ly—except for the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, which areregarded as two most probable conflict zones in Northeast Asia—thelikely scenario of regional inter-state conflict in East Asia is difficult toarticulate. To maintain this region-wide relative stability, the promotionof multi-layered regional security cooperation, reinforced by the U.S.military presence, to build confidence in the region is an effective poli-cy choice. Thus, Japan has supported regional security cooperation inEast Asia, rather than just in Northeast Asia.

In addition to these two economy-driven incentives, the politicalfactor concerning the competition with China should be considered.For Japan, the rising China has three implications: The first is one of amilitary “threat” or “concern.” Its growing military power representsthis aspect. Secondly, the rising China raises the prospect of the rise ofChina as a political and diplomatic rival. In this context, political anddiplomatic competition to expand influence in the Asia-Pacific andother regions is unfolding. Finally, the rising China implies the rise of apartner in economic and global issues. Japan-China economic relationsare growing more interdependent through inclusion in the region-wideproduction network. Stability of the Malacca Strait is also a commonconcern of Japan and China. Needless to say, environmental issues

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matter as well. In these areas, Japan and China actually have manyproblems that require cooperation between them.

Among these three implications of the rising China, the reality of itas a political/diplomatic rival is recently growing. The diplomatic com-petition over the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform andJapan’s membership of it in 2005 was one such example. Japan activelysought to join the UNSC in cooperation with the “G4” (Japan, Germany,Brazil and India). China was opposed to it and launched a diplomaticcampaign against the proposal by the G4.32 The other example isChina’s active regional diplomacy (“neighboring diplomacy”) includingtheir efforts to strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO).33 Through the SCO, China may attempt to provide an alternativeto the existing regional order. The Six-Party Talks to resolve the NorthKorean nuclear problem is of course another example that shows China’sgrowing presence, both diplomatically and politically. This diplomaticcompetition is going to be an incentive for Japan to commit to regionalsecurity cooperation in a different sense from economic-driven incen-tives discussed above. The example is to expand the membership of theEast Asia Summit to include Australia, New Zealand, and India. More-over, the recent diplomatic vision such as “the Arc of Freedom and Pros-perity” can be understood as a part of the diplomatic competition withChina. This diplomatic competition will develop not just in NortheastAsia, but also in the Asia-Pacific region and even Eurasia are the stageof such competition.

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32 About Japan’s diplomatic campaign for UNSC reform, see Kitaoka Shin’ichi,“Anpori Kaikaku ha Naze Teitai Surunoka [Why Does Reform of the UNSCStagnate?]” Chuo Koron, Vol. 121, No. 5 (May 2006), pp. 130–41.

33 The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2006, pp.101–32.

Toward Japan-ROK Security Cooperation Beyond Northeast Asia

Cooperation on Stability of Sea Lanes

Since both Japan and the ROK are democratic countries and bothare allied with the United States, the two countries have close relationsbetween their respective militaries. The Defense summit meeting hasbeen held almost annually since 1994 (except in 2001, 2004, and 2006)and consultations of high-ranking officials and staff talks by militaryofficers are frequently conducted.34 However, these defense exchangesfocus on confidence-building for each other and cooperation in North-east Asia (especially regarding policy toward North Korea) and cooper-ation beyond Northeast Asia is underdeveloped.

In a sense, for Japan-ROK defense cooperation, focusing on North-east Asia is a natural thing, because security in Northeast Asia is in thecommon interest for both countries. As discussed above, while Japanpays great attention to stability beyond Northeast Asia, such as EastAsia or sea lanes from the Middle East, the ROK focuses on NortheastAsia, because North Korea is the most serious and immediate concernto the ROK’s national security. This difference in strategic interest cre-ates a gap between these two countries’ policies toward regional securi-ty cooperation. While the ROK focuses on the Six-Party Talks, with thehope to evolve it into a permanent body to guarantee security in North-east Asia—while paying little attention to regional security cooperationbeyond Northeast Asia—Japan regards the Six-Party Talks merely as ameans to resolve the North Korean nuclear development problem andpay more attention to regional security cooperation beyond NortheastAsia. The outlook for promoting Japan-ROK cooperation beyond North-east Asia therefore seems to be rather hopeless.

Japan and the the ROK, however, share many interests, not just inNortheast Asia, but beyond it too. Besides Japan, the ROK’s economyhas developed based on oil from the Middle East and overseas trade.Therefore, the safety of sea lanes from the Middle East and stability inthe Asia-Pacific region, not just in Northeast Asia, should be a shared

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34 Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2006 (2006), pp. 314–15, available athttp://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2006/5-2-1.pdf.

concern for Japan and the ROK. Especially, cooperation regarding thestability of sea lanes and coordination of policy toward China are theimportant agenda for Japan and the ROK.

As a first step, some preconditions for cooperation regarding thesafety of sea lanes need to be settled by both sides. On the side of Japan,traditionally, the SDF did not participate in international security affairsat all until the dispatch to the Cambodia peacekeeping operation in1994. But since then, Japan has gradually expanded SDF internationalpeace cooperation activities. The new National Defense Program Guide-lines of 2004 declare that Japan would more actively engage in interna-tional security and legal frameworks for overseas operation of the SDF.The Guidelines have been improved, such as setting international peacecooperation activities as primary missions of the SDF by amending theSDF law and discussion on permanent law on international peace coop-eration by the SDF is under way.35 Based on these improvements of thelegal framework, Japan is expected to expand the SDF’s overseas opera-tions further.

On the side of the ROK, with economic development through ener-gy supply from the Middle East and overseas trade, the necessity toexpand strategic horizons from Northeast Asia to regions that relate tostability of sea lanes from the Middle East and in the Asia-Pacificregion has been increasing. In addition, the capacity to contribute to thestability of sea lanes is now going to expand greatly. If the moderniza-tion program of Defense Reform 2020 is completed, the ROK’s navaland air capability will be improved drastically, while the ROK militarytraditionally focused on ground forces. These modernized air andnaval assets can play an invaluable role in maintaining the stability ofsea lanes. Thus, for both Japan (mainly software, such as legal frame-works) and the ROK (mainly hardware, such as air and naval assets),the precondition of Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia forthe stability of sea lanes is going to be fulfilled.

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35 In the current legal framework, both SDF operations in Iraq and in the IndianOcean are based on the “special measures law” which means the provisions ofthese laws cannot be applied to other operations. As a result, some operationsthat are permitted in Iraq are not permitted in Afghanistan. Permanent law oninternational peace cooperation will provide a single format for SDF overseasoperation in all cases.

Moreover, Japan-ROK cooperation beyond Northeast Asia basedon the awareness of shared strategic interests merits consideration,because it serves to reduce mutual concerns over the future direction ofthe other. From the Japanese side, if the ROK develops its navy and airforce without expansion of the strategic horizons from Northeast Asiato the Asia-Pacific, the operation area of the modernized navy and airforce will be assumed to be in Northeast Asia. This will cause concernin Japan that these modernized forces are actually deployed “against”Japan. But if both countries clearly confirm their commitment to thestability of sea lanes from the Middle East and in the Asia-Pacificregion and establish some formats for cooperation in protecting thesesea lanes, Japan will understand that the reason for the modernizationof the ROK’s naval and air force is to tackle a shared agenda with Japanand that there is no need to have unnecessary concerns over the ROK’sintentions.

On the other hand, from the ROK’s side, Japan’s proactive commit-ment to stability of the sea lanes without consultation and cooperationwith the ROK may be perceived as a revival of the expansionism ofImperial Japan. But if Japan’s commitment to the stability of the sealanes is developed within the framework of Japan-ROK cooperation onsea lanes beyond Northeast Asia, the ROK side’s concerns over Japan’sintentions can be reduced.

Japan-ROK cooperation on the stability of the sea lanes will serveto settle these mutual concerns on the future direction of the other side.The bottom line is both countries’ understanding that their mutualprosperity depends on the stability of the sea lanes. If the two countriesshare this strategic interest, the cooperation beyond Northeast Asia willnot be difficult; rather, it should be understood as a natural sharedstrategic interest. And one should not forget about the role of the U.S.naval presence regarding the stability of the sea lanes and that bothJapan and the ROK are allied with the United States. Therefore, Japan-ROK cooperation for the stability of sea lanes is actually inseparablefrom the United States. Indeed, the role of Japan-ROK cooperation willcomplement the U.S. naval presence.

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Coordination of Policy Toward China

In addition to cooperation on sea lanes, Japan-ROK security coop-eration beyond Northeast Asia can function as a platform to integratethe rising China into the existing international order. As discussedabove, the rising China has three implications for Japan: military“concern,” diplomatic “rival,” and “partner” in transnational issues.Japan’s policy toward regional security cooperation in the future shouldbe developed along with these three implications of the rising China.Firstly, to deal with China as a military “concern,” Japan has strength-ened the alliance through the Defense Policy Review Initiative with theUnited States from 2002 to 2006 to “hedge” China on one hand, andpromote the CBM/crisis management framework with China on theother hand. Secondly, to deal with China as diplomatic rival, Japanwill develop a more effective framework of problem-solving and secu-rity cooperation for transnational threat to attract regional countries.Thirdly, for China as a partner in economy and global issues, Japanshould establish a comprehensive cooperation framework for transna-tional threats to embrace China. And the long-term strategy of Japanshould increase “partner” implications with hedging against “threat”implications.

Of course, the ROK does not necessarily share these three implica-tions from the rising China. Especially, the “threat” implication and“rival” implication would be hardly shared with Japan. But in the thirdimplication, as a “partner,” there seems to be great room for policycoordination. Needless to say, in Northeast Asia, the ROK and Chinaare closely cooperating to tackle the North Korea nuclear developmentproblem in the Six-Party Talks. Through this process, the ROK plays asignificant role to make China a responsible stakeholder in this region.Not just in the Six-Party Talks, but in regional security cooperationbeyond Northeast Asia, the development of policy coordination byJapan and the ROK to embrace China into the existing regional orderwill contribute to a sustainable and stable strategic environment in theAsia-Pacific.

For example, regional security cooperation on stability of the sealanes will consist of the countries sharing the same concerns; in otherwords, the countries that depend on overseas trade and energy supply.

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Not just Japan and the ROK, but China too now depends on them. Thismeans that Japan-ROK regional security cooperation on stability of thesea lanes can be a platform to induce China to be a protector of theexisting order, rather than a challenger.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, regionalization of international secu-rity affairs has been developed. It means that a tailored approach thatfits into the dynamics of the region is necessary to deal with issues thatare idiosyncratic in the region. The Six-Party Talks is such a regionallybased tailored approach to deal with security problems in NortheastAsia. As discussed, the ROK is focused on Northeast Asia and the coreof its regional security cooperation policy is the Six-Party Talks. On theother hand, while Japan regards the Six-Party Talks as an effective toolto denuclearize North Korea, Japan pays more attention to securitycooperation beyond Northeast Asia. This difference in attitudes reflectsthe differences in strategic horizons. Since for the ROK, policy towardNorth Korea is the number one priority in foreign policy, the ROKmainly focuses on Northeast Asia. On the other hand, for Japan, thethreat from North Korea is serious, but dealing with concerns in EastAsia or other regions is indispensable to being a great economic power.

However, this does not mean that Japan-ROK cooperation beyondNortheast Asia is impossible. Rather, such cooperation must be mean-ingful. Firstly, the differences in attitude toward regional security coop-eration not only come from conflicts of interest of both countries, butfrom differences in priorities. Since both countries depend on overseastrade in the Asia-Pacific region and energy supply from the Middle East,stability of the sea lanes is a shared concern and cooperation regardingthis issue will serve both countries’ national interests. Secondly, withthe “normalization” of Japan’s security policy and modernization ofthe ROK navy and air force, both countries may have concerns overeach other’s strategic intentions. Japan-ROK cooperation beyondNortheast Asia based on strategic consensus on the importance of thesea lanes will reduce such suspicions on both sides. Third, faced withthe rising China, coordination of both countries’ policies toward China

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to increase the “partner” aspect will serve the long-term stability of theAsia-Pacific region. The Six-Party Talks fulfill such a role now, butregional security cooperation beyond Northeast Asia will have broadereffects on regional security in the Asia-Pacific region.

If the Six-Party Talks succeed, it will mean not only the removal ofthe nuclear threat from North Korea, but also the member countrieswill share the successful experience of cooperation to tackle specificproblems. It may serve to bring about a more stable security environ-ment in Northeast Asia. However, while security concerns in NortheastAsia are critical to regional countries, there are other issues to be tack-led beyond Northeast Asia. For example, as long as both Japan and theROK depend on overseas trade in the Asia-Pacific region and energysupply from the Middle East, the stability of the sea lanes is a criticallyimportant issue, too. Japan and ROK need to discuss how to expandtheir cooperation beyond Northeast Asia.

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