Toward a General Theory of Corruption

ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORYOF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

Gerald E. Caiden

Introduction

Ever since the dawn of civilization, it has been recognized that anyone putinto a position of exercising communal or collective or public power andcommanding public obedience is tempted to use public office for personalgain and advantage. Perhaps it is asking too much of mere mortals to put asidepersonal ambition and prejudice and ignore all group and peer pressures torule in a completely disinterested manner. Deviant conduct has beenexpected and fairly accurately recorded by historians, brave enough to writeabout Chinese rulers, Hebrew kings and Roman emperors. Indeed, the mostwicked who wallowed in perversion and depravity even welcomed the ideathat their evil deeds would be known forever and showed no shame orremorse.

Guilt about public misbehaviour is only a relatively recentphenomenon, at least the guilt that denies and hides it. Such guilt had to awaitthe universal acceptance of the idea of free will and choice governing humanconduct, optimism about the human condition, the possibility of progress,and acknowledgment of limitations on the exercise of official power. Thesein turn required belief in the betterment of human behaviour, thediscernment of right and good and fair and just, and the recognition of normsof official conduct. So much has the pendulum swung that in some puritanicalsocieties, misuse and abuse of public office is considered shameful, spellingthe end of any further public career with disgrace lasting beyond the grave.

Otherwise, offensive behaviour by public officials had long been takenfor granted, so much assumed that little systematic study was given it, noteven when its happenstance was particularly scandalous or its consequenceswere especially disastrous. The world had to wait until Ibn Khaldundiagnosed that all societies, even the greatest and most brilliant, weredoomed to decay, their energies dissipated, their genius suffocated, their

Gerald E. Caiden is Professor of Public Administration at the University ofSouthern California. This article was made possible through a grant from theFaculty Research Fund of the University of Southern California.


power diminished, their rulers isolated and distant, unable to commandrespect and eventually any following.1 Then Machiavelli analyzed howrulers could improve their image, enrich themselves, increase theirpower, postpone the fading of their light by cunning real politik,deception and unsavoury actions, virtually rationalizing if not justifyingobjectionable public conduct.2 What was the purpose of seeking andretaining public office, if it were not for personal gain? Why should anyonetake on the burdens and responsibilities of public leadership if there wereno personal advantages, no compensating rewards? Naturally, public officewas to be used in self-interest, or why bother at all to enter the harsh,competitive arena of public life? But this very self-interestedness, said IbnKhaldun, would inevitably doom the republic.

Indeed it was proved in the fullness of time that this was not theinevitable fate of mankind. People sought public office and the exercise ofpublic power for nobler causes than pure self-interest. They couldsuccessfully put aside their own personal advantage and ruledisinterestedly. They could recognize conduct unbecoming public office,legislate against it, and drive it underground with harsh prosecution ofoffenders. A higher standard of conduct could be expected, inculcated andpractised; one that added stature and esteem to public office, thatstrengthened loyalty between rulers and ruled, that made government workin the interests of all and not just a privileged few. Yet misuse and abuse ofpublic office persisted, perhaps because the wrong people were still gettinginto office or maybe because when they got into office they found the exerciseof power too easy to manipulate. If every exercise of power was tainted withevil, if power degraded and demoralized those who exercised it, if office-holders came to love power for its own sake, if nobody at all could beentrusted with power, then one would have to conclude with Lord Acton that"power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."3 Whatelse needs to be said? Why study this sleazy side of public life? Muckrakinghas its place but hardly within the halls of academe. So scholarly researchshied off until the pervasiveness and persistence of corruption could not beignored. Despite largely fragmentary, biased, anecdotal, misleading,impressionic, inadequate, clandestine, sensitive, soft, unreliable anddistorted evidence,4 possibly more studies of corruption have beenconducted in the past twenty years than at any time in history.

As so often occurs in science, the more attention a subject receives, themore complicated it becomes. Corruption comes in too many forms to permiteasy generalization (see Table 1). There is high level and low levelcorruption and there is predominantly political and predominantlybureaucratic corruption. There are endemic, pervasive forms and isolated,infrequent forms. There are mutually reinforcing networks of complex,indirect and subtle transactions and isolated, simple, direct and bilateral


Table 1Most Commonly Recognized Forms of Official Corruption

Non-performance of duties; desertion; parasitism

Treason; subversion; illegal foreign transactions; smuggling

Kleptocracy; privatization of public funds; larceny and stealing

Misappropriation; forgery and embezzlement; padding of accounts; divertedfunds; misuse of funds; unaudited revenues; skimming

Abuse and misuse of coercive power; intimidation; undeserved pardons andremissions; torture

Deceit and fraud; misrepresentation; cheating and swindling

Perversion of justice; criminal behaviour; false evidence; unlawful detention;frame-ups

Bribery and graft; extortion; illegal levies; kickbacks

Tampering with elections; vote-rigging; gerrymandering

Misuse of inside knowledge and confidential information; falsification of records

Unauthorized sale of public offices, loans, monopolies, contracts, licences andpublic property

Manipulation of regulations, purchases and supplies; bias and favouritism

Tax evasion; profiteering

Influence-peddling; favour-brokering; conflicts of interest

Acceptance of improper gifts and entertainments; "speed" money; blackmail

Protecting maladministration; cover-ups; perjury

Black market operations; links with organized crime

Cronyism; junkets

Misuse of official seals, stationery, residences and perquisites

Illegal surveillance; misuse of mails and telecommunications


transactions that have contradictory effects. There is large, disruptivecorruption and petty, trivial corruption. Corrupt exchanges may be rare orfrequent, open or closed, between equals or unequals; the stakes may betangible or intangible, durable or non-durable, routine or extraordinary;and the channels may be legitimate or illegitimate.5 Nonetheless, thisconfusion does not invalidate certain universal generalizations:1. Corruption has been found in all political systems, at every level of

government, and in the delivery of all scarce public goods and services.2. Corruption varies in origin, incidence and importance among different

geographical regions, sovereign states, political cultures, economiesand administrative arrangements.

3. Corruption is facilitated or impeded by the societal context (includinginternational and transnational influences) in which public power isexercised.

4. Corruption has multitudinous causes, assumes many differentpatterns and guises and cannot be accurately measured because of itsoften indeterminate and conspiratorial nature.

5. Corruption is deeply rooted, cancerous, contaminating, andimpossible to eradicate because controls tend to be formalistic,superficial, temporary and even counter-productive

6. Corruption is directed at real power, key decision points anddiscretionary authority. It commands a price for both access todecision-makers and influence in decision-making.

7. Corruption is facilitiated by unstable polities, uncertain economies,maldistributed wealth, unrepresentative government,entrepreneurial ambitions, privatization of public resources,factionalism, personalism and dependency.

8. Corruption favours those who have (overthose who have-not), illegalenterprises, underground economies, and organized crime.

9. Corruption persists substantially as long as its perpetrators cancoerce participation, public attitudes towards it vary widely, and itgreatly benefits a privileged few at the expense of the disadvantagedmass.

10. Corruption can be contained within acceptable limits through politicalwill, democratic ethos, fragmented countervailing power, legal-rational administrative norms, inculcation of personal honesty andintegrity, and effective enforcement of public ethics, although itscomplete elimination is still beyond human capability.

These findings indicate that corruption can be reduced and contained throughappropriate counter-measures, but as long as the underlying causespersist, corruption is unlikely to be eliminated altogether.


Definition

The word "corruption" means something spoiled; something sound that hasbeen made defective, debased and tainted; something that has been pushed offcourse into a worse or inferior form. Whoever corrupts sets out to makesomething impure, debased and less capable; an adverse departure from anexpected course. When applied to human relations, corruption is a badinfluence, an injection of rottenness or decay, a decline in moral conduct andpersonal integrity attributable to venality or dishonesty. When applied topublic office, rather than referring to departures from ideal or evengenerally expected standards of incumbent behaviour, the practice has beento spell out specific acts of misconduct that disgrace public office and makethe offenders unfit to remain in office.

In virtually every society, historians and anthropologists have foundthat public offices have been designated by exceptional privileges andtrappings and public officials so graced have been expected to exercise theirspecial communal authority in a manner that dignifies the office, credits theoffice-holder and comforts those out of office. Long before the modern state,the Code of Hammurabi, Mosaic law and Confucian principles shared similarnotions of what was and what was not acceptable official conduct togetherwith pointers of trouble and portents of ruin. Only the best people shouldhold office. They should be the most righteous and wisest; persons ofcharacter and distinction, of honour and integrity; and they should bedependable. These worthy people should set an example and insist on thehighest standards of performance. They were to advance the public interest,maintain the peace, promote the general welfare and deal kindly with theirpeople. They were to administer public affairs with wisdom, compassion,justice, sensitivity and vision. They were to protect and safeguard publicproperty as a sacred trust and to account for their actions to the public. Theywere to proclaim just laws and see they were carried out honestly and fairly.They were to be judged by their good deeds and remembered for their goodworks. They were to be condemned for their wickedness, treachery, deceit,cruelty, rapaciousness, immorality, and all conduct that demeaned publicoffice.

Translating these common aspirations into specific codes of officialethics has been a challenge throughout the centuries. Religious orders,secret societies, military commands, scholars and professional bodies haveall tried. So too have civil governments. Even though politics has commonlybeen viewed as the most unprincipled of human pursuits, codes of conducthave evolved to regulate international relations, armed conflicts amongstates, obligations between politicians and officials, the execution of civillaws and the conduct of public professionals. Alongside have grown legaldefinitions of public misconduct and dereliction of duty. The enforcement


machinery has also been strengthened. Most contemporary states haveoutlawed specific acts of official corruption and have in place machinery toprosecute suspected officials. To this extent, corruption has beenuniversally recognized. But beyond this area, uncertainty begins with a lackof consistency, as not all states outlaw certain acts. In other instances, thelaw is not enforced in a uniform manner. Thus, nepotism is forbidden insome states but it is perfectly acceptable practice elsewhere. Likewise, theacceptance of unsolicited gifts is not allowed in some states but it is in others;or at least it is permitted for some officials but not others. Such differencesthwart the acceptance of legal, moral and public interest definitions.Similarly, even if public attitudes could be measured accurately and werenot so "divided, unsuitable ambiguous and inconsistent,"6 definitions basedon public opinion are not universal enough. Public interest definitions varyso greatly that they provide little basis for comparative research and in anycase inhibit theory construction.

In the absence of an all-purpose definition, the public office definitioncoined by Nye has been the most widely accepted, namely, that corruption is" behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because ofprivate-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary orstatus gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types ofprivate-regarding influence."7 Nye specifically included bribery,nepotism and misappropriation. This operational definition, when extendedto include in addition unscrupulous performance, undue pressures toinfluence official decisions and failure to act, should suffice as a workingdefinition in most instances. It stresses the behavioural element -intentional deviation for personal gain. It covers most market-centereddefinitions that concentrate on maximizing pecuniary gains,8 and it can bestretched to include public interest definitions which identify corrupt actsas those which favour private interests over public concerns. It does excludea strictly Marxist-Leninist interpretation of corruption as all officialactivities which protect the interests of the dominant capitalist class athome and abroad "whether they be spending, taxing, regulating orpolicing"9 but not the public office definitions actually employed incommunist regimes. Perhaps the only area that is not covered is that of"noble" or "patriotic" corruption where public officials supposedly turntheir private vices into public benefits,10 but if they do not personally gainthen their misconduct may be illegal and wrong but not necessarily corrupt,as no improper considerations have induced the violation of duty.

The public office definition does not see corruption as beneficial to thepublic, to the credibility of public institutions, to the status of publicofficials, to public trust in officialdom, to the promotion of public ethics, toopen, honest government, or to common decency. Corruption prevents thepublic realm from pursuing the general welfare, "a Just society which


preserves the liberty and security of each citizen," a society in whichcitizens "under a wise system of laws and institutions, good customs andproper mores ... are capable of identifying their own good and the commongood."11 Corruption leads to a breakdown in shared concerns and results infactional pursuit of special interests and a reliance on coercion overconsensus. Indeed, reliance on coercion indicates a corrupt or corruptedstate, perverted and rotten, where every person is on guard againsteveryone else in a society of amoral familism. It also indicates a state inwhich organizational integrity collapses amidst a race for selfishadvantages.12

Contributory Factors

Just as there are many varieties of corrupt behaviour, so there aremultitudinous factors contributing to corruption. Public officials, or asignificant portion of them around the globe, fail to pursue the common goodand to live up to the moral standards expected of them. Perhaps thesestandards are set too high given human frailty. Perhaps the personal gainsfor self-indulgence are too tempting. Perhaps the chances of being caughtare too low and punishment too lenient to be a serious deterrent. Whateverthe explanation, it is also true that their colleagues do behave themselves,that some public organizations are more trustworthy than others, and thatsome administrative cultures exhibit higher standards of integrity thanothers. What, then, accounts for such variations? So many explanations areoffered that it is difficult to classify them in any systematic manner (seeTable 2).

Ideological

There are ideologies that endorse corruption or prevent remedial action.That there are nihilistic ideologies and their tyrannical exponents whobelieve themselves above and beyond morality is notorious in humanhistory. Then there are religious doctrines which preach that all is divinelydetermined, including corruption, and that nothing is to be questioned orchallenged lest divine retribution occur. There are also those who believethat in a righteous cause, the means justify the ends, apparently any meansto justify their particular ends in an amoral pursuit of power. Life is aboutwinning, if need be at the expense of others. And if the "good" is limited,winning at the expense of others is inevitable.13 The environment is seenas a world one can extract from but not shape:

Table 2A Simplified Typology of Corruption

Type

1. Foreign-sponsored

2. Political scandal

3. Institutionalized

Main Actors

Public officialsPoliticiansRepresentatives of

donor and recipientcountries

Bureaucratic elitesPoliticiansBusinessmen and

middlemen

Bureaucratic elitesPoliticiansBusinessmenWhite-collar workers

Mode

a. Bribery and kickbacksb. Collusion to defraud the public

a. Large-scale embezzlementand misappropriation throughpublic tender and disposalof public property

b. Economic privileges accordedto special interests

c. Large political donations andbribes

a. Large-scale disbursement ofpublic property to specialand privileged interestsunder the pre-text of"national interest"

b. Favouritism and discriminationexercised in favour of rulingparties in exchange forpolitical contributions

Background

a.b.c.

d.

a.

b.c.d.

a.

b.c.d.e.

Economic dependencyMulti-dimension value systemsDyardic, plural, loosely structured

societyComprador bureaucrats

State capitalism. Scarcity ofcapital. Competition for domes-tic markets and public funds

Unpatriotic, self-serving officialsCorruption as a way of lifeIneffectual bureaucratism

Industrialization, concentrationof capital, monopolies, statism

Class systemPetty bourgeoise valuesSpoils systemManaged economies

>zc_

oc>r~O-p

c03I—o>o5IIS

TR

AT

ION

4.Administrativemalfeasance

Petty officialsInterested individuals

a.

b.c.d.

Small-scale embezzlementand misappropriation

BribesFavouritism and discriminationParasitism

a.

b.c.d.

Domestic systems of productionand exchange

Social insecurityClanism. Office as perquisiteMaladministration and

incompetencee. Gossip and rumour


"In popular perception wealth and even decent well-being haveno relationship to work, and can onty be the result of accident,luck, good connections or criminal practices. A '^distributiveorientation1 is the most rational attitude in these circumstances- connections, powerful patrons and the skilful exploitation ofone's office ... are more effective than hard work andfrugality."14

Such realpolitik has obvious appeal in highly competitive andindividualistic societies, in atomistic societies where few common bondsexist, and in very poor societies where death and starvation are dailycompanions.

External

Corruption is contagious. As no society is isolated or cut off from any other,corruption crosses boundaries. It is externally induced. Forbidden andinaccessible fruits are smuggled in across porous borders. All manner ofillegal goods are traded or carried by international travellers. Allforeigners bring with them foreign values. But invaders, especiallyimperialists, deliberately reshape and exploit subjugated societies. Theirsubjects must ape them or indulge in systematic cheating. When they leave,their fegacy fingers as the new indigenous rulers continue their practices,exploiting the fruits of office and expecting the same deference, while theirpeoples engage in underground defiance. Among the fruits of office is theability to borrow on international money markets and to syphon off a certainportion and secrete ill-gotten gains abroad.15 Another is the ability tonegotiate the entry of multi-national corporations whose voracious appetitefor new business enables public officials to demand and receive personalfavours in the form of monopoly dealerships, kickbacks and influence-peddling. Yet another is to indulge in spying and other covert activitiesboth at home and abroad. Even prolonged peace may induce corruption bylulling people into egotistical pursuits which loosen social bonds.16

Economic

Scarcity is clearly a key source of corruption. Without unfulfilled demand,suppliers could not command any additional price and potential purchaserswould not seek unfair access. Any temporary shortage brings out the best andworst in people. But with prolonged scarcity, as in permanentlyimpoverished economies, there may be no second chance. Failure to gainaccess means certain deprivation and probable death. Suppliers can squeezewhatever can be squeezed out of the desperatefy needy. Wherever weafth ismaldistributed to produce a permanent underclass of underprivileged and

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depossessed people who, if unaided, cannot improve their lot, their state ofdependency becomes exploitable. Poor societies lack sufficient resourcesall round, but they are especially short of public resources. Governmentsare too poor to provide sufficient public goods and services, to maintainpublic facilities, or to pay their employees a decent wage. There is thereforea mad scramble to obtain whatever is going and to make up forunderpayments. Planning and regulation of economic activities to ensuregreater access and fairer distribution only distort market conditions,setting into action "corrective" underground arrangements wherein a blackmarket economy coexists with the official economy and the regulated cometo capture the regulators. Public monopolization of scarce resources onlyexacerbates the situation; public officials may just run their publicbusinesses as private concerns. Privatization scarcely helps as in privatebusiness different and less demanding norms apply.

Political

Public officials are powerful because they make decisions that determine inlarge part the personal fortunes of everyone affected by their decisions. Ifthey had no such power, there would be no point in influencing them.Conversely, the more important their personal decisions are to anyindividual, then the more worthwhile it is to try to influence them. Hencecorruption seeks out key decision-makers and the most powerful officials.Where public office is confined to a narrow, unrepresentative elite,extraordinary means have to be employed to enlarge vision and obtainconcessions. Similarly, whenever the masses are excluded from public lifeand beholden to autocratic, omnipotent, discretionary rule, as in the case ofmilitary dictatorships, theocracies and single party regimes, extra-legalways have to be found to influence public decisions and to overcome theprivatization of politics that Lord Acton suggested is in itself corruptive. Hisdictum is certainly confirmed when public officials themselves indulge inlawlessness, arbitrariness, kleptocracy, entrepreneurialism at publicexpense, spoils, immoral choices, undesired social controls and over-regulation. What the government does, the governed believe they can also do.If the government lies, cheats, and steals, so will the people.

Socio-cultural

Failure to pursue the general interest may be attributable to a conflict ofloyalties in which the particularistic wins, there being no commitment tothe wider community but a deliberate preference for a lesser ascriptivegroup. Public office is used for partisan advantages. Civic virtue is lackingas is any notion of altruistic public service. Group advancement and self-

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gratification are the major motives for public work. Public officials cannotmake "reasonably disinterested commitments ... which benefit thesubstantive common welfare"17 and they cannot be trusted to exercise theirdiscretion "with an entire absence of interest motive, with honesty ofintention, and with a fair consideration of the subject."18 Internalsocialization and peer group pressure ensure that public officials go alongwith or at least keep quiet about deviance. Whistleblowers who revealinternal wrongdoings are considered treacherous; they must be publiclydiscredited. Thus once corruption exists, it spreads through inaction andready accommodation "abetted by complacency, naivete and lethargy."19 Itcan be further compounded by public maladministration which alsoprevents effective counter-action. Finally, the root source of corruption,it is said, has to be found in defects of human character. Human beings areby nature evil and sinful. Corruption is the way of this world. It is inherentin the human condition. No person is beyond temptation. The surprise, then,is not that so many succumb but so few. Given the imperfections of homosapiens and human arrangements, there should be more official corruptionthan what appears to exist.

Technological

Faulty technology and faulty administrative systems are also to blame forcorruption as they permit those inclined to corruption to remain unseen andunknown, to evade detection, and to escape investigation. Mechanizationlends itself to backstage manipulation by designers and technicians. Insiderscan exploit legal loopholes known only to themselves. The ingenious and theunscrupulous take advantage of any openings and invent their own.

In sum, corruption can be attributed to almost anything, even to"baseless rumours and gossip-mongering about corruption."20 Any formof human interaction in the public arena can be distorted for personal gain.But while the opportunities exist everywhere, the degree of corruptionvaries widely among individuals, public agencies, administrative culturesand geographical regions. Despite a remarkable expansion of internationalagencies since the Second World War, there have been surprisingly fewscandals involving international officials. They are not free of corruption,but they do seem to fare well in the circumstances. They have a high statusamong public employees and they are paid adequately. Competition for officeis fierce and selection processes are painstaking. The calibre of employeesis high and their professionalism is also high. Member states keep awatchful eye on their performance. But some agencies operate with muchsecrecy and report only to themselves. They have been captured by arrogantelites who have privatized them. Other agencies have not adequately policed

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their field offices which operate in high corruption-prone situations. Yetcorruption on a large and persistent scale has not been revealed. Either theycan hide corruption better or they are better able to resist it.

Regional Patterns

The compendium of contributory factors to official corruption indicates thatwhere many of them are found together, a higher propensity for corruptionexists which may or may not be offset by strong countervailing factors suchas open, representative government, an affluent economy, nationalidentification and loyalty, redistributive taxation and public welfare, astrong civic culture, a jealously guarded high public service tradition,legal-rational norms, competent public administration, professionalintegrity, and public intolerance of official misconduct. The strength ofthese countervailing factors makes the difference between corruption as afact of life and corruption as a way of life, between isolated and infrequentoccurrences and regularized, institutionalized, systematic corruption.Despite the unevenness of research data, several attempts at detectinggeneralized patterns of corruption among different geographical regionshave been made, corresponding to their relative wealth, political stability,social cohesion, cultural mores, administrative capability, and degree ofmodernization. They do reveal significant differences around the world, asmight be expected using a culture-bound western approach.

Western Europe and Scandinavia

Western Europeans have long thought themselves culturally superior toother peoples and for centuries took their civilizing mission to other partsof the globe. They still believe themselves superior in official standards ofbehaviour. While not free of scandal, they claim to have masteredcorruption. In them, corruption is much the exception. They set themselvesup as the standard to which other countries ought to aspire and emulate. Theydo exhibit high degrees of social discipline, law abidingness and civic virtue.They have open, democratic governments with prosperous economies wherewealth is reasonably well distributed and the poor are sustained by publicwelfare. They are well administered. Their public employees evidence highintegrity and honesty and the public is intolerant of official misconduct. Inthem, the mass media delight in exposing public wrongdoing and headliningoccurrences of official corruption.

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Australasia

The former British colonies possibly achieved clean, honest, governmentbefore the mother country and have maintained a low tolerance forcorruption, although as in Western Europe, there has been a declinegenerally in recent years in public rectitude with growing socialpermissiveness and the privatization of some areas of the public sector.

North America

Entrepreneurship and the individualistic credo have supported an anti-statism that has prevented the administrative state reaching the levelscommon in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and Australasia. Entrepreneurialpolitics is more prevalent and the profession of government has less statusand prestige. With a public that is generally more tolerant andaccommodating to corruption and the spoils system of politics that oncedominated public life in North America, a long reform campaign to cleansepublic life has only dented systemic corruption entrenched by machinepolitics in the eastern and southern areas of the continent. But even in Canadaand the western states of the United States, scandals occur with somefrequency and a haze of sleaziness still hovers over public life generally.Nonetheless, definite limitations on corruption are imposed byconstitutionalism, growing professionalism, legal-rational norms,effective public management practices, a vigilant mass media, and watchdogpressure groups. Probably there is less corruption than people suspect butmore than they desire.

Southern Europe

Just as Southern Europeans have endured poverty, autocracy, andinstability, they have endured endemic corruption. Public resources havebeen scarce. Public maladministration has been rife and public goods andservices have been of poor quality. People have accommodated to thissituation and have sought to get around it through extra-legal channels.Despite waves of public indignation, public office has often been seen as anavenue for self-enrichment. In recent years, with increased stability,growing prosperity and democratization, reforms are under way to improvepublic administration and cleanse public business.

Latin America and The Caribbean

Many countries in the region still attribute corruption to their coloniallegacy and to the example of a self-interested elite enslaving the masses.

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Beneath a veneer of hypocritical paternalism, elites have exploited and usedautocracy to privatize public resources. In the competition for scarce goodsand services, there has been no cap on the rich and no safety net for the poorexcept in a few states. Generally, while the protected privileged elite liveswell, the masses have few rights, have little access to public office, and mustpay at every step when undertaking public business. Modernization hasbrought an overlay of bureaucratic formalism but underneath publicbusiness is still conducted in a personalized manner. The state operates asa shameless machine of extraction and diversion of public resources withsome dictators running their countries as personally owned fiefdoms orkleptocracies. Much of the extracted wealth is exported or goes intoconspicuous consumption. But not the entire region is so corrupt.Kleptocracy has been contained by religious outrage, middle classprofessionalism, democratization and administrative reform while civicvirtue has been fostered by post-independence immigrants especially inBrazil and Argentina and patronizing colonial administrations in theCaribbean. Thus, there are dramatic contrasts between neighbouringBarbados and Haiti, Costa Rica and Panama, and Uruguay and Paraguay. Butnowhere have the trickle down effects of corruption satisfied enough peopleto avoid coercion and violence. Exploitation, repression and rebellioncharacterize the region's instability, perpetuating a vicious circle ofcorruption rarely broken above local government level outside theCaribbean.

Sub-Sahara Africa

Post-colonial Africa also blames corruption on its colonial past, possiblywith greater justification.21 It also contains several unabashedkleptocracies in which dictators treat their countries as privatepossessions, impoverish their subjects, amass huge fortunes which aresecreted aboard, and enmesh everyone in corrupt transactions. Again, thereseems to be no cap on the rich and no safety net for the poor Generally, thestate is seen as an exploitive instrument. Office is highly prized. Almosteverywhere officials have to be given treats as an extension of gift-givingand other reciprocal exchanges.22 They are underpaid and have obligationsto support an extended family. The plunder of public resources has beenimpoverishing country after country, diminishing the stock of publiccapital, and permitting bloated parasitical public bureaucracies to furtherundermine social discipline. But such generalizations conceal differencesbetween East and West Africa, Anglophile and Francophile Africa, and evenwithin regions of the largest states. Williams warns "that, despite someobvious points of similarity, there is no one pattern of corruption to be foundin Africa, but rather a variety of patterns produced by political choices and

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differing pressures, constraints and opportunities."23 While Nigeria andZaire compete as kleptocracies, Tanzania and Malawi are relatively clean.Politics in Kenya is entrepreneurial whereas in Marxist Mozambique it isideological. A leadership code in Tanzania curbs corruption but it does notproduce the same effect in the single party state of Zambia. Nonetheless,tribal affiliation still counts for something and tribal loyalties often exceedbureaucratic legal-rational norms.

The Arab World

Similar conclusions are drawn for the Arab world where the extent,symptoms and causes of corruption "vary from one Arab country toanother."24 They are linked to the environment, control systems and publicemployee living standards. But the general lack of success in reducingcorruption has been attributed "to the overwhelming corrupt culture whichpermeates all aspect of society."25 Kinship binds. Loyalty to kinshipoverrides bureaucratic legal-rational norms. Patrons protect clients whoreciprocate with their support and services. Patron-client relationsreinforce favouritism, nepotism and patronage, promote illegaltransactions, breed official irresponsibility, and systematize bribery, allin contradiction to Islamic precepts and Koranic law.26 This contradictionbetween what is and what should be has become too embarrassing as well asdetrimental to national interests. To overcome it, several countries haveembarked on religious fundamentalism, administrative modernization,resocialization and stricter adherence to legal-rational norms in publicadministration.

Asia

In the Indian subcontinent, corruption is a way of life and few public officialscan escape it. All the major contributory factors to corruption are presentand mutually reinforcing, with the result that "even the most determinedefforts to fight the evil have failed miserably."27 But endemic corruptionis also found in several other countries in Asia as diverse as Socialist Burmaand Laos, Islamic Indonesia, Catholic Philippines and Buddhist Thailand.Asia was the location of Myrdal's soft states.28 Even so, there are varyingpatterns of corruption from one part of Asia to another, with some countriessuch as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan relatively clean atbureaucratic levels. Crucial variables seem to be relative wealth, natureof the regime, status of public employment, extent of professionalization,and political will to fight corruption.29 In Malaysia, political corruptionhas been more leniently treated than bureaucratic corruption as appears tobe the case also in Japan,30 whereas the opposite may hold for China where

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outspoken criticism of endemic corruption within the bureaucracy has oftenbeen made by Chinese political leaders.

Eastern Europe

Chinese criticism of a corrupt bureaucracy pales in comparison withEastern European criticism of a corrupted state that has corrupted society.31

But corruption is used in a much wider sense to include all forms of socialbehaviour by which people gain socially disapproved personal gains. It alsoincludes pathologies in the social environment that encourage suchbehaviour and induce a general helpless feeling that nothing can be done tochange the situation. Socialist society is supposed to free itself of corruptionby eliminating competitive materialistic capitalism, bourgeois values andentrepreneurial politics and by fostering the spirit of the civic virtuousindividual, altruism in the collective cause, and strict self-discipline. Noneof this has happened in communist regimes, which are characterized bydemoralization, low productivity, a disinclination to work, highabsenteeism, mass apathy, and widespread cheating. So institutionalized iscorruption in the Soviet Union that a special vocabulary exists to describeit, including words like dostat' or obtaining, blat or influence in obtainingundeserved favours, leviy or left-handed meaning illicit enterprise,tolkadu or expediters, and pripiski or false reporting. To general sourcesof corruption (such as autocracy, scarcity, poverty and inequality) is addedthe planned economy, or rather the mismanaged, distorted planned economywhich is accompanied by a huge underground network of unofficial exchangesthat not only rectifies some of the glaring official mistakes but also sanctionsdeviant official conduct (embezzlement, misappropriation, profiteering,bribery and deceit) provided it achieves the desired official outcomes. Thedeliberate under-production of consumer goods and the poor level of publicservices create a large pool of unmet demand. At the same time, there is acontradiction between "the legal fiction of state property and its actualpossession, management, and use by the political bureaucracy" leading "tothe widespread belief that state property belongs to no one in particular andis therefore free for the taking, as well as to public apathy about thepilferage and waste of state property."32 Since 1980, communist leadershave been hoping that the legalization of underground practices and strongerprosecution of gross self-enrichment through public misconduct willreduce the damage of corruption.

Given that the content and weight of both contributory factors andoffsetting forces change continually, variations in regional patterns cannotbe predicted or measured accurately although they can be accounted for withsome precision in any particular case. The major distinction is betweensocieties where official corruption is so entrenched, so widespread, so

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institutionalized, that it is a way of life, as it is in most poor autocraticcountries, and societies where it is socially unacceptable and officiallycondemned, where it is only random, as in most prosperous democraticcountries. The moral choices confronting public officials are quitedifferent. In corrupted societies, they have to make a moral commitment toresist joining in common and expected practices, thereby foregoingpersonal benefits which may make the difference between a comfortable anda hard life, and also to withstand the pressures imposed on non-conformists.In uncorrupted societies, doing the right thing is much easier. Publicofficials have to opt for deviant behaviour, secrete their wrongdoing, andface the penalties should they be caught. Which way they choose willdetermine whether corruption will be enlarged or reduced.

Effects

Clearly, public officials who indulge in corruption gain until they are caughtand penalized. For them, corruption is profitable. They can accumulatepower and exercise it with fewer restrictions. They can live exceptionallyprivileged, sheltered lives and perhaps amass huge private fortunes. Theycan preserve themselves in office and predetermine succession, perhapseven creating a dynasty. They can do all the things they want to do and preventother people from achieving anything at all. The advantages in status, wealthand power are quite clear. But their gains are by definition unnaturaladvantages that otherwise would not have occurred. Their gains are made atsomebody else's expense, although the losers may never realize that theyhave been denied what should have been theirs.

Corrupt officials, knowingly or not, display a contempt for otherpeople no matter how minor or seemingly innocent their corrupt acts. Thiscontempt harbours within it the seeds of megalomania that, if allowed toflourish, will eventually blossom into grosser and grosser acts that may leadto monstrous crimes against humanity where other people are consideredexpendable and other people's lives are considered meaningless and useless.All corruption is a deceit, a lie, that sacrifices the common good orthe publicinterest for something much less. It deviates from the search for the GoodSociety. Instead it gives comfort to social pathologies that divide, destabilizeand desensitize. Not only does it point society in the wrong direction, but italso exhausts governmental legitimacy, supports the wrong kind of publicleadership and sets the wrong kind of example for future generations. Itcontaminates. The following is just a sample of its adverse effects analysedin depth a decade ago.1. Corruption undermines political decisions, leads to inefficient use of

resources, and benefits the unscrupulous at the cost of the law-abiding.33

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2. Corruption involves the loss of moral authority, weakens theefficiency of government operations, increases opportunities fororganized crime, encourages police brutality, adds to taxpayers'burdens, and impacts directly on the poor.34

3. Corruption is something everybody pays for at huge cost, direct andindirect. It is public works developments that people do not want. Itis shoddy construction which becomes rapidly obsolete and thereforeneeds to be redone. It is public money used to fund inflated contractsor to replace skimmed revenues. It is buildings which threaten publichealth and safety.35

4. Corruption allows immunity for criminal acts so that the law is forsale to the highest bidder.36

If unchecked, official corruption will eventually result in a "softness ofstate" comprising all manner of social indiscipline that prevents effectivegovernment and obstructs national development.37 It will bring about asociety in which little works, with increasing resort being made torepression to prevent things falling apart altogether. Furthermore, it willlead to widespread cynicism, engendering a hopelessness that anything canbe turned around. When a society has deteriorated to this extent, it may betoo weak to resist foreign invasion and outside reconstruction.Alternatively, moral rejuvenation may occur as people struggle to restorethe social fabric and realize a fresh start has to be made, beginning with atruly legitimate, creditable, trustworthy and honest government.

Despite the ill-effects on the official participants and on society as awhole, corruption prevails as a way of life in many poor, autocraticsocieties. Does it perform any useful social functions? Can personal gainsalso promote public benefits? If the alternative to a corrupted society is tohave none at all, then presumably a corrupted society is still better. If thegovernment is doing evil, then official corruption may sabotage evil designsor ameliorate bad outcomes. If the economy is sluggish, then officialcorruption may stimulate economic investment. If the bureaucracy is inert,then official corruption may produce some action. In all these cases,corruption is a poor substitute for reform and reconstruction. But someother extravagant claims have been made for the functionality of corruptionby the self-styled revisionists of the 1960s seeking to explain itsprevalence and persistence in newly independent states:1. Corruption aids national unification and stability, enhances nation-

wide participation in public affairs, helps the formation of a viableparty system and increases bureaucratic accountability to politicalinstitutions.38

2. Corruption incorporates otherwise alienated groups, integrates themand provides them with an alternative to violence.39

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3. Corruption strengthens political institutions, consolidates elites andcements conservative coalitions.40

4. Corruption stimulates economic development by providing asupplemental allocative mechanism for investment purposes andmobilizes the bureaucracy for more energetic action on behalf ofprivate entrepreneurs.41

5. Corruption humanizes officialdom, increases bureaucraticresponsiveness, reduces red-tape, speeds up public business andimproves the quality of public service.42

Accepting these claims at face value, a survey of conventional wisdomnonetheless highlighted some of their underlying contradictions.43

Politically, corruption overcomes cleavages among elites, providesopponents access to public resources, promotes national integration andstrengthens viable political institutions. On the other hand, it exacerbatesethnic and inter-regional conflicts and violence and undermines politicallegitimacy. Economically, corruption encourages capital formation,expedites transactions and opens the economy to enterprisingentrepreneurs. On the other hand, it promotes the illegal export ofresources, encourages conspicuous consumption and results inunproductive public works. Administratively, corruption contributes toflexibility and efficiency by greasing the machinery of government andcushions the impact of badly formulated policies and programmes and poordecision-making. On the other hand, it generates considerable distrustthroughout the public bureaucracy, inhibits delegation of authority andreduces productivity.

Detailed case studies of specific corrupt practices have disproved mostof the supposed benefits claimed for them.44 No substantial evidence hasever been offered proving that corrupt officials contribute notably toeconomic development and social progress. If societal needs are unfulfilled,they would be better met by legitimate and honest means rather than bycorruption, whose costs to those it purportedly helps far outweigh thebenefits they receive.46 Corruption is self-defeating in the long run. Itmakes matters worse, not better. It postpones required changes. It widenssocial barriers. It undermines incentives to perform. It casts suspicionson all authority and all legitimate institutions. The overwhelming weight ofevidence indicates that societies would be considerably better off if theycould reduce official corruption.

Combatting Corruption

With all the will in the world, official corruption is difficult to control. Itis a complex problem involving many different factors and forces. It takesmany different forms and no public agency, indeed no public official, is

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immune. Yet control has been achieved in many countries and how it has beendone is no mystery.46 Besides historical studies and contemporary cases47

cited in a growing literature on the subject, there are now annualconferences and workshops at which experts in anti-corruption strategiesexchange ideas and experiences. For example, at the Third InternationalAnti-Corruption Conference held in Hong Kong in November 1987, theagenda included a working model of corruption, legal sanctions, detectionand enforcement, corruption prevention, community relations andinternational cooperation. Anti-corruption campaigns go beyondtechniques of identifying particular forms of corruption, outlawing them,and investigating and prosecuting suspects. They now involve the wholesociety, not just anti-corruption agencies.

Political Will

The first strategic target is political corruption - the end to all dirty tricksin politics and the creation of an ethos whereby politicians, politicalofficials and party functionaries are not only fair and honest but also take adim view of official corruption in any shape or form. Political leaders mustbe committed to the eradication of corruption by setting a good examplethemselves. No favouritism in the prosecution of corruption should bepermitted and no double standards tolerated. Even the most powerful shouldlive modestly and avoid drawing attention to the privileges they may enjoy.The very high standards expected, higher than in private affairs, arenecessary, for dependent upon them are the respect and confidence peopleplace in government and "also perhaps the general standards of conduct andhonesty in the country as a whole. Unless you secure the very higheststandards of integrity and propriety at the very top in public life, you cannotexpect to have good standards at lower levels." If any person falls shorts ofthese high standards, everybody suffers for it.48

Public Pressure

Political will needs constant pushing and prodding by a watchful publicintolerant of official corruption and vigilant in safeguarding publicintegrity and propriety. For this, the public should know what constitutesunacceptable public behaviour and where to go for assistance in combattingit. Public education begins at home, continues at school and other majorsocializing institutions. It is continually reinforced through the mass mediaand public notices. Official corruption is rarely confined to public officialsonly; the public at large participate as well. People are particularlysensitive when corruption is open and has clear detrimental effects, as itdoes in public health and safety, taxation, criminal justice, land

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registration, and public education. In these areas, public opinion is easy torally as it is in the case of foreign or externally induced corruption whichis usually confined to those with international contacts and is thereforeclearly unfair to everyone else. General public apathy can be offset by self-appointed watchdog groups and voluntary bodies devoted to cleangovernment.

Key Targets

Corruption is uneven. Some areas of government are more prone to it thanothers simply because they exercise the greatest influence over publicdecisions, orthey operate with the highest degree of discretion, or excessivedemand for their services is unlikely to be met in the foreseeable future.Key policy-makers are always under heavy pressures to bend. Temptationsare also great for any public officials who handle large sums of publicmoney, or have dealings with private businesses, or tackle illegal goods andservices. Possibly, the prime target is law enforcement. This implies thatthe law must be upheld; that everybody should have equal access to the law;that there must be uniform, fearless, unprejudiced enforcement; and thatthe public will eventually trust and identify with enforcement agencies.These achievements will do much to clean up the rest of government, and keepall other public officials honest.

Public Service Ethics

Official codes of ethics should be drawn up and enforced as a matter ofprofessional pride and personal self-discipline. But integrity can only besafeguarded if able and virtuous people are attracted to public service, andif compensation is sufficient so that they do not feel obliged to resort tocorruption to sustain a standard of living compatible to their status andrank in society. Furthermore, peer pressures to protect public serviceimage and reputation by suppressing revelations of internal wrongdoingshould be offset by special protective measures for whistleblowers whorisk their careers, and sometimes their lives, for daring to exposecorruption. At the same time, however, the wrongfully accused should beshielded from malicious charges and personal vindictiveness.

Strengthening Countervailing Factors

Every society exhibits certain features that encourage and foster officialcorruption. Because they are embedded in the culture, they are not going tobe changed quickly or easily. They usually swamp political will, publicpressure, key targets and public service ethics, nullifying their intentions.

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Unless they are tackled, endemic corruption is likely to persist. It takesgenerations to overcome religious doctrines, excessive demands, grossinequality, social over-regulation, kinship loyalties, the absence of legal-rational norms and all the other deep-seated contributory factors tocorruption. Without ideological transformation or moral revolution oreconomic redistribution or political reform or socio-cultural changes orlegal revisions or administrative modernization, corruption will endure.

A start has to be made somewhere, the initial steps taken andconsolidated, a momentum generated and optimism stimulated. The task isoverwhelming yet feasible. An array of workable strategies and tactics isavailable. A host of suitable institutional mechanisms can be quicklyassembled. A store of reliable knowledge is fast accumulating to assist incombatting corruption. Even with the best will, however, corruption is toovirile, too contagious, too widespread and too costly to treat, for it to beeliminated entirely. At best it can be contained and minimized, reduced frombeing away of life to a fact of life, driven from intolerable to tolerable forms,from major to minor, and from consequential to inconsequential. For manycountries, if that were achieved, it would be a day for rejoicing.

NOTES

1. Pierre S.R. Payne, The Corrupt Society: From Ancient Greece to Present-clayAmerica (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 145.

2. Ibid., p. 149.3. Ibid., p 1794. Robert Williams, Political Corruption in Africa (Aldershot: Gower, 1987).5. Michael Johnston, "The Political Consequences of Corruption A Reassessment,"

Comparative Politics 18 (4, 1986): 459-77.6. Williams, Political Corruption in Africa, p. 19.7. Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,"

American Political Science Review 61 (2, June 1967): 419. Italics mine.8. See, for example, Michael Beenstock, "Corruption and Development," World

Development 7 (1, 1979): 15-24; John MacRae, "Underdevelopment and the Economicsof Corruption: A Game Theory Approach," World Development 10(8, 1982): 677-87; andSusan Rose-Ackerman, Corruptions Study of Political Economy (New York: AcademicPress, 1978).

9. Edward Greenberg, Serving the Few: Corporate Capitalism and the Bias ofGovernment Policy (New York1 John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 25.

10. Simcha Werner, "New Directions in the Study of Administrative Corruption,"Public Administration Review 43 (2, 1983): 147.

11. Mark Philp, "Defining Corruption: An Analysis of the Republican Tradition,"

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(Mennagio: IPSA Research Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption, May1987), p. 7.

12. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Chicago: The FreePress, 1958).

13. G.M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good," in J.M. Potter,N.W. Diaz and G.M. Foster, Peasant Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 305.

14. Jacek Tarkowski, "Centralized Systems and Corruption", Asian Journal of PublicAdministration 10 (1 , 1988), pp. 48-70.

15. Stephen Riley, "Political Corruption, Third World Debt and InternationalTransfers: A New Recycling?" (Bellagio: IPSA Research Committee on Political Finance andPolitical Corruption, May 1987).

16. Sergio Turone, "Corruption and Political Parties in Italy" (Mennagio: IPSAResearch Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption, May 1987).

17. J.P. Dobel, "Corruption of a State," American Political Science Review 72 (3,1978): 958.

18. C.A. Baker, "Ethics in the Public Service," Journal of Administration Overseas10 (1 , 1970): 31.

19. Werner, "New Directions in the Study of Administrative Corruption," p. 149.20. Shaukat Ali, Corruption: A Third World Perspective (Lahore: Aziz Publishers,

1985), p. 190.21. Williams, Political Corruption in Africa, p. 33.22. Stanislaw Andreski, "Kleptocracy or Corruption as a System of Government" in

S. Andreski, ed., The African Predicament (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), p. 94.23. Williams, Political Corruption in Africa, p. 103.24. Nasser M. Al-Saigh, ed., Administrative Reform in the Arab World: Readings

(Amman: Arab Organization of Administrative Sciences, 1986), p. 83.25. J.G. Jabbra, "Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and Remedy,"

Indian Journal of Public Administration 22 (4, 1976): 673.26. Zaki R. Ghosheh, "Ethics and Values of Public Responsibility in Arab Public

Administration" (Amman: Arab Organization of Administrative Sciences, 1981), p. 7.27. R.B. Jain, "Political and Bureaucratic Corruption in India' Some Ethical

Dimensions" (Bellagio: IPSA Research Committee on Political Finance and PoliticalCorruption, May 1987), p. 5.

28. Gunnar Myrdal, "Corruption: Its Causes and Effects" in G. Myrdal, Asian Drama:An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. II (New York: Twentieth Century, 1968),Chapter 20, pp. 937-58.

29. Jon S.T. Quah, "Corruption in Asia: Patterns and Consequences" (Mennagio: IPSAResearch Committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption, May 1987).

30. Minoru O'uchi, "Comparative Study of Executive Processes in DevelopmentAdministration with Special References to Prevention of Corruption," Local AutonomyCollege, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Japan, April 1974 (in English).

31. Konstantin M.Simis, USSR- The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster,1982).

32. C.A. Schwartz, "Corruption and Political Development in the USSR,"Comparative Politics 11 (4, 1979): 428.

33. Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study of Political Economy.34. George C.S. Benson, Steven A. Maaranen and Alan Heslop, Political Corruption in

America (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978).35. John Gardiner and Theodore Lyman, Decisions For Sale (New York: Praeger,

1978).36. Lawrence W. Sherman, Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).37. See Gunnar Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty

Program in Outline (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970) and Benard D. Nossiter, Soft State:A Newspaperman's Chronicle of India (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

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38. Jose V. Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Draft to PoliticalDevelopment," East-West Centre Review 3 ( 1 , 1966): 45-54.

39. Gabriel Ben Dor, "Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development: TheRevisionist Theses Revisited," Comparative Political Studies 7 ( 1 , 1974): 63-83. Alsosee Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1968).

40. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NewJersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972)

41. See David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," WesternPolitical Quarterly 19 (4, 1966): 719-32; Nathaniel H. Leff, "Economic Developmentthrough Bureaucratic Corruption," American Behavioral Scientist 8 (3, 1964): 8-14; andRobert O. Tilman, "Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration,Development, and Corruption in the New States," Public Administration Review 28 (5,1968): 437-44.

42. O.P. Dwivedi, "Bureaucratic Corruption in Developing Countries," Asian Survey7 ( 1 , 1967): 18-36.

43. David Gould and Jose Amaro-Reyes, The Effects of Corruption on AdministrativePerformance: Illustrations from Developing Countries (Washington, D C: World Bank StaffWorking Paper 580, 1983).

44. See, for example, Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden, "AdministrativeCorruption," Public Administration Review 37 (3, 1977): 301-8; Margaret Goodman,"Does Political Corruption Really Help Economic Development?" Polity 7 (2 , 1974): 143-62; Schwartz, "Corruption and Political Development in the USSR'; Tilman, "Emergenceof Black-Market Bureaucracy"; S.P. Varma, "Corruption and Political Development inIndia," Political Science Review 13 (1974): 157-79; and Werner, "New Directions in theStudy of Administrative Corruption."

45. See Ledivina V. Carino, ed., Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes,Consequences and Controls (Quezon City: JMC Press, 1986) and Gould and Amaro-Reyes,The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance.

46. See George Amick, The American Way of Graft (Princeton, N.J.: Centre forAnalysis of Public Issues, 1976); Alan Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in ContemporaryBritish Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); and Sherman, Scandal and Reform.

47. See, for example, Michael Clarke, ed., Corruption: Causes, Consequences andControl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Robert E. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Leslie Palmier, The Control ofBureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1985); andQuah, "Corruption in Asia."

48. Doig, Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics, p. 341.

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Toward a General Theory of Corruption

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