Robes-Francisco Realty and Development Corporation vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal

G.R. No. L-41093October 30, 1978

Facts:

In May 1962 private respondent Millan bought a lot from petitioner corporation and paid in full her installments on December 22, 1971, but it was only on March 2,1973, that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in her favor. Notwithstanding the lapse of almost three (3) years since she made her last payment, petitioner corporation still failed to convey the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT) to Millan who accordingly was compelled to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner on August 14, 1974. One of the prayers in the complaint include the payment of damages, corrective and actual in the sum of P15,000.00.

The trial court ruled in favor of Millan and ordered petitioner to pay her nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5k and costs. Petitioner corporation now questions the award for nominal damages of 20k and attorney’s fees of 5k which are allegedly excessive and unjustified.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court was correct in awarding nominal damages?

Ruling:

The trial court did not err in awarding nominal damages; however, the circumstance of the case warrant a reduction of the amount of 20k granted to privaterespondent Millan. There can be no dispute that petitioner corporation was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance of its obligation, in issuing the TCT to vendee Millan who had fully paid up her installments on the lot bought by her. Article 1170 of the Civil Code expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. However, vendee Millan submitted her case without presenting evidence on the actual damages suffered by her as a result of the non-performance of petitioner’s obligation under the deed of sale.

NONETHELESS, the facts show that the right of the vendee to acquire title to the lot bought by her was violated by petitioner and this entitles her at the very least to nominal damages. Nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication o recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstance of the case.

In the situation now before Us, We are of the view that the amount of 20k is excessive. The admitted fact that petitioner failed to furnish Millan the TCT because said lot was mortgaged to GSIS does not in itself show that there was bad faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed. Millan’s contention that the 20k award may be considered in the nature of exemplary damages cannot be upheld because in case of breach of contract, exemplary damages may be awarded if the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Enervida vs. Dela TorreG.R. No. L-38037January 28, 1974

Facts:

Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against the defendant-spouses de la Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed on December 3, 1957 by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years, in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Law) and that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father. The defendants filed their answer, stating that the plaintiff has no cause of action against them as his father, Ciriaco Enervida, is still living, the petitioner is not only son of Ciriaco Enervida as he has also four other living children and that the sale of the property in question did not take place within the prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.

During the pre-trial conference, petitioner admitted that his father is still living and that he has four other living brothers and sisters who were not joined as party-plaintiffs. He also admitted that the sale of the land in question actually took place on November 20, 1957, but was formalized only on December 3, 1957. He likewise admitted that the homestead patent was issued on November 17, 1952 to his father, which was beyond the prohibited period of 5 years. The CFI ruled that petitioner has no cause of action and was prompted with malice and bad faith in taking his action to court by alleging false statement in his complaint. The court dismissed the case and ordered the petitioner to pay the defendants P2000 as actual moral and exemplary damages and pay also the attorney’s fees. On appeal to Court of Appeals, it certified the case to the Supreme Court for it involved purely question of law.

Issue:

Whether or not it is proper to award the defendant an actual moral and exemplary damages when plaintiff  filed unfounded civil case. 

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that with regard to the award of TWO THOUSAND PESOS "in concept of actual, moral and exemplary damages ...", the same is not proper for it would ran counter to the decision of this Court in Deogracias Malonzo vs Gregoria Galang (109 Phil. 16, 18, 19) where it was ruled:

Finally, with respect to moral damages, we are inclined to agree with petitioner that these damages are not recoverable herein, notwithstanding the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that his complaint against respondents were clearly unfounded or unreasonable. It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages, may be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages. It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries", as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309, par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category

of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 294). The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages.

  

 

Editha M. Mijares and Glicerio T. Mijares vs. Court of Appeals and Metro Drug, Inc.

G.R. No. 113558April 18, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Editha Mijares and Glicerio T. Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical products from private respondent Metro Drug since 1976. Editha Mijares, aside frombeing the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, a concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital compound where it operated a drugstore. The Ospital ng Maynila Cooperative also had some transactions with Metro Drug as supplier of pharmaceutical products. Subsequently, the Cooperative was dissolved and stopped its operations in October 1986.

On November 1, 1986, a Contract of Lease was entered into between the City of Manila as Lessor and Solomon Silverio, Jr. as Lessee. Solomon Silverio as the new lessee, put up a drugstore on the same area occupied by the Cooperative. On November 26, 1986, Metro Drug delivered pharmaceutical products to the said store thru Dioscoro Lamenta, its salesman/collector. More deliveries of pharmaceutical products were made in the same place by Metro Drug, the total value of which amounted to P32,034.42. In partial payment of these receivables, a check was drawn by Solomon Silverio, Jr. under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios amounting to P14,180.46. The check however was subsequently dishonored due to insufficient fund.

Metro Drug filed a telegram addressed to Aklan Drug demanding full payment of outstanding account for P27,938.06. Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for the disputed claim, but Editha referred him to Mr. Silverio as the new operator and concessionaire of the drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as the cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations. Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram addressed to Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram, Editha again directed Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio, the new owner of the drugstore.

Thereafter, Metro Drug filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Editha Mijares and Glicerio T. Mijares. Petitioners in their "Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim," denied Metro Drug's allegations and interposed a counterclaim for malicious prosecution and prayed for moral damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of suit.

The RTC concluded that petitioners were not the owners of said drugstore when the deliveries were made and the absence of any privity of relations between the parties at the time of the deliveries precludes any cause of action in favor of Metro Drug against petitioners. Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Metro Drug to pay the petitioners P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the award of moral damages in favor of petitioners was proper

Ruling:

No. Petitioners have failed to show that private respondent was motivated by bad faith when itinstituted the action for collection below. In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we heldthat:

x x x Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Hence, mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good

faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]). If damage results from the filing of the complaint, itis damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

For the same reasons, the award for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must likewise be deleted.

 

Valenzuela v. CAG.R. No. 115024February 7, 1996

Facts:  

Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela is driving along Aurora Blvd. when she noticed something wrong with her tires. She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.  Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when a car suddenly bumped her which was driven Richard Li and registered under Alexander Commercial Inc. Because of the impact, she was thrown against the windshield of the defendant. Her left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).”

Issue:

Whether or not the damages should be mitigated by contributory negligence of the Valenzuela for parking alongside Aurora Blvd. which entire area is a no parking zone.

Ruling:

Valenzuela is not guilty of contributory negligence. There is no question that Li was the one negligent in the accident. It was proven through the investigation of the scene of the accident and the testimonies of the witnesses that Valenzuela was properly parked and that Li should have seen her parked by the sidewalk.

As a result of the accident, Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art

prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.The damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.

As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

Aurelio Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 123404February 26, 1997

Facts:

The petitioner was charged with the crime of attempted homicide allegedly armed with a .38 caliber revolver and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot (sic) one Arsolo Ramos, thus the said accused having commenced the commission of Homicide directly by overt acts and did not perform all acts of execution which should have produced the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

On the other hand, the defense would have us believe that it was the complainant who had a gun which he intended to use against the petitioner after the latter's heated altercation with Leonarda.

According full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of attempted homicide.

The petitioner contends that a material discrepancy exists between the complainant's sworn statement that the petitioner fired at him first before shooting Leonarda, and his oral testimony that the petitioner shot his wife, Leonarda, before firing at him twice.

Time and again this Court has held that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken their credibility and suggest that they are telling the truth.

Issue:

W/N the petitioner is guilty and liable for damages.

Ruling:

In view of the foregoing, this Court cannot but concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Anent the award of damages, however, this Court upholds the Court of Appeals' ruling on the matter. Eliminating the award of actual or compensatory damages in the form of hospitalization expenses and loss of income, the Court of Appeals cited the failure of the complainant to offer any proof of the same. To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss. 17

The petitioner belabors the increase in the amount of moral damages to P10,000.00 and the award of nominal damages in an equivalent amount when the complainant did not appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

The Court finds the award of nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,000.00 justified under the circumstances.

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 116181

April 17, 1996

Facts:

Flores purchased from PNB two (2) manager's checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge. A receipt for said amount was issued by the PNB. 

On 12 July 1989, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of PNB. But PNB refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks but the payment was deferred until after Flores agrees that it be broken down into five manager’s checks. PNB also refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. 

Upon his return to Manila, he tried to encash the checks through its Malate Branch but to no avail.  A Formal Demand was made by Flores’ counsel but PNB persisted in its refusal to honor the check. 

Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the RCT of Quezon City against PNB. In its answer PNB insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges were actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two checks. That it was dues to Flores’ demanding attitude and temper that Montes, a money counter, made an error in good faith in issuing a receipt for P1,000,040.00. 

After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of Flores, ordering PNB to pay the sum of P100,000.00 representing the amount of the check dishonored with interest thereon at the legal rate per annum from November 16, 1989 until fully paid; as well as ordering PNB to pay Flores P1,000,000.00 moral damages, P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. 

PNB appealed to the CA, to which the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

 Issue:

Is the award of P1,000,000.00 moral and exemplary damages in addition to actual claim of inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable? Ruling:

YES. We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, we give consideration to PNB’s allegation that the award of P1,000,000.00 moral damages and P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in addition to Flores' actual claim of P100,000.00 is "inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable."

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, we rule that the award of moral and exemplary damages is patently excessive and should be reduced to a reasonable amount. We take into consideration the following factors: First, Flores' contention that he lost the opportunity to purchase a house and lot in Baguio City due to petitioner's gross negligence is based solely on his own testimony and a mere general statement at that. The broker he named during his cross-examination, Mr. Nick Buendia was not even presented to confirm the aforementioned allegation.

 Second, the award of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00

is obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00 sustained by Flores. In RCPI v. Rodriguez, SC ruled that: “it is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages and that the Court of Appeals can only modify of change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the Trial Court. But in more recent cases where the amount of moral and exemplary damages are far too excessice compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduces to more reasonable amounts.” 

In other words, the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered. Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the

claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted. 

PNB’s act of issuing the manager's checks and corresponding receipt before payment thereof was completely counted reckless and grossly negligent. It is an appalling breach of bank procedures and must never be repeated However, the award of P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is also far too excessive and should likewise be reduced to an equitable level. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. The award of moral damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00; and2. The award of exemplary damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs.National Labor Relations Commision, Hon. Labor Arbiter

Potenciano S. Canizares Jr. and Erlinda OsdanaG.R. No. 129584

December 3, 1998

Facts:

In August 1992, private respondent Erlinda Osdana was recruited by petitioner together with petitioner’s principal Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a company based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Osdana’s contract stated that she is to work there for a period of thirty-six (36) months with a salary of fine hundred fifty Saudi Rials (SR550) as a food server or a waitress. Before contract was finalized, she needed to complete some requirements including a payment of P11,950 and a “Fit to work” certification from Philippine Medical Test System which is duly accredited for overseas workers. Osdana was then asked to sign another “Contractor Employee Agreement” which stated that she will be employed for 12 months as a “waitress” with a salary of $280 which was the agreement that was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Osdana left for Riyadh, Sauidi Arabia on September 16, 1992 and started working for GCC. In Riyadh, she did not work as a food server as stated in her contract but was made to wash dishes and pots at the Oleysha University. She was also made to do janitorial works and tasks none of which are included in the job description. Osdana was also made to work in 12 hour shifts from 6:00am to 6:00pm without overtime pay. Due to the workload, Osdana suffered from numbness and much pain in her arms that she needed to be confined from June 18 – August 22, 1993 at the Ladies Villa and during such time, she was not paid her salaries. After the confinement, she was allowed to work as a food server and cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital seven days a week without compensation from August 22 to October 5, 1993. She was then again confined at the Ladies Villa without salary from October 6 to October 23, 1993 for no apparent reason. She was sent back to work at the Oleysha University to do the same tasks as she did. This then led to Osdana being diagnosed with Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Respondent then needed to undergo two surgerical operations, one in January 1994 and the other on April 23, 1994. Osdana was not given any work assignments in between the two operations without any compensation despite the fact that she was willing and her doctors advised

that she can do light work. Osdana was released from the hospital on April 25, 1995 with a medical certificate stating that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms” but was dismissed from work four days after and was sent back to the Philippines for grounds of illness. She was not given separation pay. Osdana filed a complaint before the POEA and ordered petitioner to pay $2,499 as salry for unexpired contract and $1,076 for her unpaid salaries. Osdana was also awarded P50,000 and P20,000 for moral and exemplary damages and 10% for attorney’s fees. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision on March 11, 1997.

Issue:

Whether or Not award for moral and exemplary damages was justified

Ruling:

Yes, the award for moral and exemplary damages was justified as petitioner was clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides, Sec 8. Disease as grounds for dismissal – Where the eployee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public authority that the disease of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within such period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.

A Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is not contagious therefore will not harm her co workers and the fact that she was given a medical certificate that stated that she had shown very good improvements made sure that she was able to work again without having to harm herself. Osdana’s dismissal also was not backed up by a certification from a competent public authority that would state that she is not eligible to work anymore. Petitioner claimed that Osdana was in a foreign land that is why they were unable to get such certification here in the Philippines but what the petitioner failed to notice is that the section only needed a certification from a competent public authority and did not require such certification to come from the Philippines.

Del Rosario vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 118325January 21, 1997

Facts:

The Del Rosarios filed on November 21, 1990 charged MFC (Metal Forming Corporation) with a violation of Section 3 of Act no. 3740 “An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc”. It alleged that MFC made representations on the durability of the product and the sturdiness of its installation through massive advertisements in print media and television. The representations, particularly those characterizing the shingles as “STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG” and that the “BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps” prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the ‘Banawe’ shingles and had them installed in their residence, but barely two months after the completion of the installation, portions of the roof were blown away by strong wind brought about by typhoon “Ruping”.

The DTI rendered judgment declaring that MFC had indeed misrepresented its product because strong winds actually blew off part of the structure/roof of the Del Rosario Spouses. MFC was accordingly sentenced to pay an administrative fine of P10,000. The decision of the DTI was affirmed in toto by the Office of the President, and the latter’s judgment was in turn affirmed by the Supreme Court with modification of the fine to P5,000, finding that MFC acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence.

It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge because it was still covered by the one-year warranty. The repair work was observed and analyzed by the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which wasengaged by the Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction and the Adjusters submitted a report concluding that the “Banawe’ metal tiles which were detached from the roof trusses were not fastened according to instructions, design and specifications.

MFC however declined to concede liability. This prompted the latter to commence a civil action against MFC in the RTC of Manila to recover from MFC damages, contending that aside from the destruction of the roof, injury

was also caused to its electric al wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture and reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003.00 estimating the repair, restoration, and/or replacement of the damaged areas and items and also the cost of the inspection conducted by the independent adjuster. They also prayed for an award of moral damages in the sum of P3,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000,000.

MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that it had no contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the purchase and installation of the roofing was actually entered into between it and another person, Engr. Puno (identified as the Del Rosario’s contractor). The Trial Court denied the motion and the MFC went to the CA but was rebuffed. The recourse to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Del Rosarios, holding that there was a privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC, and Eng. Puno acted as MFC’s agent in the signing of contracts for the supply and installation of the “Banawe” shingles, and the latter is liable for breach of its contract for the supply and installation of the roofing materials and ordered MFC to pay: P1,000,000-Actual damages; P500,000- Moral Damages; 300,000-Exemplary Damages.

MFC appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the Trial Court’s judgment and ruled that there was no privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC. The Del Rosarios went to the SC.

Issues:

Whether or not MFC is answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damage caused; whether or not there was privity of contract.

Are the Del Rosarios entitled to payment of Actual damages, Moral Damages, and Exemplary damages?

Ruling:

Yes. The quibbling whether Engr. Puno acted as agent of MFC or the Spouses is pointless. Not only that MFC’s tiles were delivered to the Del Rosrios and were used in fabricating the roof of their home, it was the

employees and workers of MFC who delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del Rosarios’ home and they undertook and completed the installation thereof. These they did in bad faith, using inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFC’s express representations in its brochures and advertisements which had induced the Del Rosarios to choose the metal tiles in question for their roofing. In fine, since MFC in bad faith and gross negligence infringed the express warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the “Banawe” tiles brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity of the individual who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installation is of little moment.

The Del Rosarios contend that the pecuniary detriment to their home amounted to P1,008,003. They rely on the Report of the Esteban Adjusters. But the report contains no statement whatever of the amount of the damage. Indeed, the representative of the Esteban Adjusters is that his firm had been retained only to determine the cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. There is therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of actual damages. The Trial Court’s grand thereof must be struck down. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty.

The grant of moral and exemplary damages was justified by the Trial Court. It held that the plaintiffs’ sufferingshave duly and substantially proven by the defendant’s fraudulent actuation and breach of warranty and thereby entitled for the claim of damages and litigation costs as it has caused sufferings, feelings of shock, helplessness, fears and embarrassment and anger. The moral damages were awarded for indemnity or reparation not punishment or correction, an award to entitle the injured party to obtain means of diversions and amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he has undergone by reason of defendant’s culpable action. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages “in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.” There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. In Makabili vs CA, it was held that moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer, and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the

complaint.

The Court also agrees that exemplary damages are properly exigible of MFC. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. They are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleteriousactions.

The award for attorney’s fees must be deleted because the judgment of the Trial Court’s decision does not say why they are awarded, and since there is no basis for such award, it should be removed.

Armovit vs CA, Northewest AirlinesG.R. No. 88561April 20, 1990

Facts:

In October 1989, the petitioners decided to spend Christmas in the Philippines. They purchased 3 round trip tickets from the US to Manila and back from private respondent Northwest Airlines. On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled on January 17, 1982, they were unable to board their plane despite the fact that they arrived a good 1 hour and 15 minutes ahead of their 10:30 a.m. flight They were informed at the check-in counter that the flight had been moved to 9: 15 a.m. Petitioners were not informed of these changes despite having complied with the Airline’s policy of 72 hours booking confirmation in their Manila office, nor did their tickets bear the 9:15a.m flight schedule. Having failed to board said flight, aside from the petitioners being inconvenienced, they were unable to meet their personal and professional commitments in the US. Hence they filed this action for Damages.

The RTC held for petitioners herein citing that there was negligence on the part of NorthwestAirlines justifying the awarding of moral, actual, and nominal damages. Private respondent appealed said ruling before the CA which deleted the awarding of nominal and moral damages. CA held that nominal damages cannot co-exist with an award for a duly proven actual and compensatory damage. Moral damages on the other hand cannot be proven if petitioners were not able to testify to the extent that said negligence of private respondent affected them as to cause emotional stress, anxiety, wounded feelings among others. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON CA erred in eliminating the awards for nominal and moral damages awarded by the RTC.

Ruling:

The deletion of the award for nominal damages is correct, since said award cannot co-exist witha duly proven actual or compensatory award for damages.

As to the award for moral damages, said award should be given as even though petitioners were not able to testify Dr. Herman’s brother Atty. Armovit was able to testify as to his personal knowledge or how his brother’s family were treated at the check-in counter of Northwest Airlines, furthermore this court took into consideration the circumstances in the Philippines at the time where there is a political unrest due the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Hence, nominal damages were rightfully deleted as it cannot co-0exist with actual damages. Moral damages awarded by the RTC should be reinstated and an award of exemplary damages may also be awarded on account of private respondent’s negligence.

Strebel vs. Figueras, et al.G. R, No. L-4722

December 29, 1954

Facts:

As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. The latter constructed thereon a Mobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio & Co., a partnership organized by said plaintiff and one Primo Eustaquio. "Out of spite and with a view to the eventual acquisition of the said property for himself and his men," defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage through" the aforementioned property. In order to accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and political influence, defendant Figueras, then Under- Secretary of Labor, caused his co-defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, to prepare an opinion which was signed by the City Fiscal, holding that the City of Manila has a right to construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebel and the lot belonging to Figueras.

Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras "by making use of his official and political connections," was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer temporarily, from the Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of Strebel's step daughter.

Strebel asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate between them and Under-Secretary Figueras to forget about pastfamily problems. Strebel later on claims that Figueras still didn’t forget about the past and making use of his official and political influence, and with the cooperation of his former secretary, defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, as well as in connivance with the Director of Labor, which office was then held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, and other employees in the Department and Bureau of Labor, defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution, against Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of Criminal Case No. 11005 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees to work more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303, although before the filing of the information the defendants collectively and singly knew that the allegations therein are false said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by the Court

of First Instance of Manila for failure of the prosecution to establish even a prima facie case against the accused.

Through the foregoing series of acts, Figueras and his co-defendants have caused moral and mental suffering toStrebel, his wife, and his entire family, and damage to his business in the amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in theamount of P1,500.00 paid to his attorney in defending himself from the malicious charge.

Issue:

Whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for moral and mental suffering?

Ruling: As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration.

The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to another. — In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.

Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their cause of action to recover damages, they said that "with a view to further injuring him and besmirching his good name in the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants

Felipe E. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to the effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and that said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy ground; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to the herein plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this newsitem mentions, neither the number of the case referred to, nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The reference, therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hour labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the prosecution had adopted by filing the information in said case. Being a matter of court record, which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision already promulgated, said theory was open for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not actionable.

As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results or causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at bar. Although the same article permits recovery of said damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature of said provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein, inasmuch as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in 1949, or before said Code became effective (laws shouldn’t have retroactive effect).

People of the Philippines vs. Edison PlazoG.R. No. 120547January 29, 2001

Facts:

Leonor Fabula, a resident of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, went out of her house at around 4:00pm of August 8, 1989 to buy sugar at a nearby store when she saw appellant Plazo boxing with her son Romeo Fabula whose headwas even banged on the post by appellant. When Leonor sought to intervene, appellant got angry. Leonor asked for help but nobody came to her aid. Romeo was able to free himself but was chased by appellant with a “gatab”, a small bolo. Despite Leonor’s pleas for appellant to stop, he stabbed Romeo in the upper and lower chest area that led to his death. Leonor told the people not to touch him because she would be calling a policeman. When they arrived, they saw Romeo’s body with the small bolo in his chest and a detached handle near his body. The body was brought to the Municipal building where an autopsy was conducted by Dr. Constancio Tam, the Municipal Health Officer.

Plazo was charged with murder to which he pleaded not guilty. The defense presented Plazo’s cousin, Alfredo Siso, as witness, who testified that Plazo and Romeo grappled with the small bolo after the victim was drunk and wanted to put a bet against Siso in a billiard match. Siso testified that his cousin, herein appellant, tried to pacify the victim who threatened Plazo with a bolo and ran after him. As a result, they grappled with the bolo and suddenly itwas imbedded on Romeo’s chest.

Leonor, on the other hand, claims that the police were looking for appellant’s cousin who had a pending case for robbery. The police asked her son, who knew nothing of the case, where the house of appellant’s cousin waslocated, so he pointed the house to them. When Plazo discovered that it was Romeo who pointed the house to the police, he got angry and sought to kill her son.

The trial court of Camarines Sur found appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P15,712.00 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court was correct in awarding actual damages to the heirs of Romeo Fabula

Ruling:

NO. It was settled by the Court that actual damages may awarded when the same is supported by receipts. In the present case, the amount of actual damages was based solely on the bare assertions of Romeo Fabula’s mother. In the absence of receipts, no actual damages may be awarded. However, the Court ruled that temperate damages may be awarded to the family who suffered some pecuniary loss in lieu of actual damages, but the award for the same cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, the award of temperate damages is proper. Likewise, moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its award.

The decision of RTC Camarines Sur is MODIFIED, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P15,000.00 as temperate damages, and costs.

Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals and Leovigildo A. Pantejo

G.R. No. 120262July 17, 1997

Facts:

On October 23, 1988, Leovegildo Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100 and, the next day, P200 for their expected stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be accommodated in a hotel at the expense of PAL as he did not have cash with him at that time but PAL refused. Fortunately, Pantejo was accommodated by Andoni Dumlao and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao. When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo was informed that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed the Manager for Departure Services of PAL at Mactan Airport that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. The manager offered to pay Pantejo P300 which the latter declined. Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL in the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City. Said court rendered judgment in favor of Pantejo, ordering PAL to pay Pantejo P300 for actual damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages, P15,000 as attorney's fees, and 6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs of suit. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not PAL was liable for damages.

Ruling:

Yes. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public.

It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.

In this case, there was bad faith on the part of PAL. Contrary to the claim of PAL that cash assistance was given instead because of non-availability of rooms in hotels, the evidence showed that Sky View Hotel, where respondent Pantejo was billeted, had plenty of rooms available. Pantejo only came to know about the reimbursements when other passengers informed him that they were able to obtain the refund for their own hotel expenses. PAL offered to pay P300.00 to Pantejo only after the latter had confronted the manager of PAL about the discrimination committed against Pantejo, which the manager realized was an actionable wrong. The hotel accommodation was not a mere amenity or privilege. It was a company policy whenever a flight is cancelled as testified by several witnesses. And even if it was a mere privilege, PAL was still liable for damages for its blatant refusal to accord the so-called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers. No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct. It was not also true that Pantejo was not listening to the announcements. In fact, Pantejo immediately proceeded to the office of PAL and requested for hotel accommodations. He was not only refused accommodations, but he was not even informed that he may later on be reimbursed for his hotel expenses. The refund of hotel expenses was surreptitiously and discriminatorily made by PAL as only handful of passengers knew about it. Pantejo was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his government position and social prominence. The discriminatory act of PAL against Pantejo made PAL liable for moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the interest of its passengers who were entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amounted to bad faith which entitled the passenger to the award of moral damages. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages granted in the judgment of CA were just and equitable. But the interest of 6% imposed should be computed from the date of rendition of judgment and not from the filing of the complaint. The judgment of Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION regarding the computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary awards granted therein to private respondent.

Oscar Ventanilla vs. Gregorio CentenoG.R. No. 14333

January 28, 1961

Facts:

Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages against his lawyer, Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila. Trial court’s facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ventanilla ordered Centeno to pay Ventanilla the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs. Ventanilla appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. The defendant did not appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not ordering Centeno to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering that only the sum of P200 be paid to him, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not ordering that the sum of P500 as attorney's fee be paid as well.

Ruling:

AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES:

Ventanilla is not entitled to such damages as his basis is highly speculative. Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss (Malonzo vs. Galang). Ventanilla’s allegation that by Centeno’s negligence in not paying the appeal bond of P60,

Ventanilla lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which Ventanilla could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative.

AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:

Since the Ventanilla’s cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated (under Art. 2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219) trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him. Ventanilla claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to the Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in Civil Case No. 18833; and wounded feelings for the Centeno’s failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence. (See Art.2217, 2219 and 2220 NCC)

Malonzo vs. Galang: “. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec.29, 1954), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:

Considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages, and so trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the Ventanilla.

AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:

It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Trial court did not err in not giving any.

NOMINAL DAMAGES:

Considering the circumstances and the degree of negligence committed by Atty. Centeno in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to Ventanilla as nominal damages may seem exiguous.

Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in Civil Case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.

Art. 2221 of New Civil Code provides: Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES:- since the Ventanilla’s claim does not fall under any of those enumerated in Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code, the Ventanilla may not be compelled to satisfy it.

Disposition: Trial court’s judgment affirmed.

Cometa vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 141855February 6, 2001

Facts:

            Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI) extended loans in various amounts to Guevent Industrial Development Corp., (GIDC).  However, GIDC failed to pay on the dates the loans became due.  For this reason, GIDC agreed to mortgage several parcels of land to SITI.  When GIDC again defaulted, SITI foreclosed the mortgages and it acquired the properties as the highest bidder.

            Thereafter, GIDC filed a case alleging that there were irregularities in the foreclosure of the mortgages.  The case was eventually settled through a compromise agreement. A dispute later arose concerning the interpretation of the said agreement, as Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI) offered to purchase from GIDC the lot covered by the agreement and the latter agreed but SITI as mortgagee refused to give its consent to the sale.  The trial court directed SITI to accept the offer of HBI.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same

Meanwhile, respondent HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for a permit to develop the property in question. Its application was granted, on account of which respondent HBI built a condominium on the property.  When respondent HBI applied for a license to sell the condominium units it was required by the HLURB to submit an Affidavit of Undertaking which in effect stated that the mortgagee (SITI) of the said property to be developed agrees to release the mortgage on the said property as soon as the full purchase price of the same is paid by the buyer. Respondent HBI submitted the required affidavit purportedly executed by Cometa as president of SITI (mortgagee).

Petitioner Cometa denied that he ever executed the affidavit. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) found Cometa's signature to be forgery on the basis of which a complaint for

falsification of public document was filed against HBI president Guevara.  However, the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor's Office found no probable cause against Guevara and accordingly dismissed the complaint.

            On appeal, Secretary Drilon reversed the decision of the prosecutor and ordered it to file information against Guevara.  The trial court dismissed the criminal case.  Thereafter, Guevara and HBI file a complaint for malicious prosecution against Cometa and SITI.  

Issue:

Whether or not the case for malicious prosecution states a cause of action.

Ruling:

A complaint for malicious prosecution sates a cause of action if it alleges —

1. that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at leas he instigated the prosecution;

2. that the prosecution finally terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal;

3. that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and

4. that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i e ., by improper and sinister motives. 

The mere allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution that an information was filed after preliminary investigation and that a warrant of arrest was there after issued does not by itself negate allegations in the same complaint that the prosecution was malicious. All criminal prosecutions are by direction and control of the public prosecutor.  To sustain petitioners' stand that an allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution that the information in the criminal case was filed after appropriate preliminary investigation negates a contrary allegation that the filing

of the case was malicious would result in the dismissal of every action for malicious prosecution.

People of the Philippines vs. Agustin GopioG.R. No. 133925

November 29, 2000

Facts:

Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan was celebrating its fiesta.When the accsed -appellant rape Ma. Princess Millano y San Diego an 11 year old inside the bedroom of his house after victim went from store and bought cooking oil around 10:00 am between months of May and June 1995. The victim related that on two other occasions after the incident, also in 1995, she was again molested by accused-appellant. The victim did not confide to her family about these incidents because she was very afraid of accused-appellant and of what her parents would do to her.  Likewise, the victim was ashamed and worried that her friends would spread the news regarding her unfortunate experience. In November 1996, Luzviminda brought the victim to the Municipal Health Center of Obando, Bulacan because the latter had been experiencing pain in her navel.  The health officer of Obando, Dr. Rufino Bautista, conducted the physical examination of the victim. Dr. Bautista’s findings showed that the victim’s hymen had been ruptured caused possibly by the insertion of a male organ. The victim revealed that she was raped by the accused-appellant. A criminal action was filed by Luzviminda. The trial court convicted the accused-appellant for the crime of rape. 

Issue:

Does the plaintiff shall be entitle for nominal damages? Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.   As has been held, whenever there has been a violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal damages is proper. In this case, the victim’s family clearly incurred medical expenses due to the rape committed by accused-appellant.  The victim suffered from pains in her navel which required her physical examination.   An award of P2, 000.00 as nominal damages is thus appropriate under the circumstances.

Pleno v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-56505

May 9, 1998

Facts:

The Philippine Paper Products, Inc. is the owner of a Ford Stake delivery truck. The said truck, driven by Florante de Luna, was traversing the right side of the South Super Highway when it bumped and sideswiped a Volkswagen Delivery Van, driven by plaintiff Maximo Pleno. James Arthur Langley was sitting beside Pleno on the front seat. Due to the impact, the Volkswagen moved faster veering to the right and smashing unto the right rear portion of another truck parked along the shoulder of the road in front of the National Manpower Building. The driver of the truck, Ruben Rivera, who was at that that time standing in front of his parked truck was by his own truck.

Maximo Pleno was crushed in the driver’s seat and his leg was trapped in the wreckage. Langley was thrown outside of the truck but only suffered minor injuries. Rivera was also brought to the hospital. According to the witness, Diego Orca, the red cargo truck stopped for a while and then sped away. Pleno suffered injuries affecting his brain causing him to act beyond normalcy at times.

The trial court rendered a decision sentencing Philippine Paper Products, Inc. and de Luna jointly and severally liable and pay plaintiff 1) P 48,24408 for actual damages, 2) P200,000 for temperate or moderate damages, 3) P200,000 for moral damages, 4) P50,000 for exemplary damages,5) P30, 000 attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but it reduced the temperate and moral damages as well as the am0unt of the attorney’s fees on the ground that the amount of P200,000 is rather “too high” especially considering the fact that the driver de Luna is a mere driver and defendant-appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable. It was reduced to P100,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the reduction of the temperate damage is proper.

Ruling:

No. The employer’s liability is primary and solidary. The award of temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees lies upon the discretion of the court based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

The court’s decision is, of course, subject to the condition that the award for damages is not excessive under the attendant facts and circumstances.

The trial court based the amount of temperate damages awarded to the p etitioner based on the following circumstance:

As to the loss of impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an entrepreneur and the founder of his corporation, the Mayon Ceramics Coporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Copr. His actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained permanent deformity due to a

shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life.

The petition is granted.

ABS-CBN vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 128690January 29, 1999

Facts:

ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. In lieu of the contract, ABS-CBN had a right of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN three packages which consist of 36 titles to choose from. VP for ABS-CBN Charo Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that they are not accepting the list because there were only 10 titles there that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked for another list, saying they had quite an attractive offer to make.

VIVA gave ABS-CBN a new list: 52 original movie titles (never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVA’s proposal was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52 originals and 52 reruns.

Del Rosario, private respondent and one of VIVA representative had a meeting with Eugenio Lopez III in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. According to ABS-CBN, the meeting culminated in Del Rosario accepting ABS-CBN’s offer of P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus Maging Sino Ka Man.

VIVA said this wasn’t their agreement and that they refuse to sell anything less the 104-movie package for P60M. In the meantime, Republic Broadcasting System (RBS) bought the 104-film package which included Maging Sino Ka Man for P60M. There were ads in the newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7.

ABS-CBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA films, including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted the preliminary injunction but lifted the same after RBS put up a counter bond. ABS-CBN appealed in the CA to challenge the RTC decision. CA granted TRO but eventually dismissed ABS-CBN’s petition and made them pay for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to RBS, and attorney’s fees to VIVA.

Issue:

Whether or not RBS may recover damages from ABS-CBN.

Ruling:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with good faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delict, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

In the case at bar, RBS claims actual damages based on Articles 19-21 for the injunction for having to put up a counter bond. The SC said that since ABS-CBN had not posted a bond and was in fact still challenging it, RBS didn’t have to put up the counter bond. RBS also claims actual damages for the advertisements for the airing of Maging Sino Ka Man. The SC said that ABS-CBN is not liable for lack of sufficient basis. The preliminary injunction was lifted by RTC upon RBS paying the counter bond, and not on any legal and factual basis.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

The law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

MORAL DAMAGES

Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favour of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish which can be

experienced only by one having a nervous system. The award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delict, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Articles 19-21 have at their very core the common element of malice or bad faith. Such intentional design to do a wrongful act must be proved by evidence. Here, ABS-CBN was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract.

Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.

People of the Philippines vs. PirameG.R. No. 121998

March 9, 2000

Facts:

Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame were both convicted by the trial court for murder, the eye-witness Cipriano Supero saw them killing one Pedro Torrenueva by hitting him with iron pipe while being held by the accused Florencio Pirame. The trial court ordered to indemnify the surviving spouse of the deceased victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of P50,000.00 each and the amount of P23,214.00 representing burial and incidental expenses and P50,000 representing moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Pirame appealed the trial court’s decision denying his participation in the crime and alleging that the evidence against him was weak to begin with as the eye-witness’ testimony was unbelievable, improbable and unreliable, as he claims that Supero’s testimony were inconsistent and that he only volunteered to testify two months after the crime. And so the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred regarding the conviction and awarding of damages

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. They are safeguards against memorized perjury. As to the delay, it was a result of the fear that was instilled upon him upon seeing the killing with his own eyes.

Regarding the amount of the damages awarded, the order to pay the widow of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P23,214.00 as actual damages, as well as the costs was AFFIRMED, but the award of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages was DELETED, there being no legal and factual basis.The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exemplary damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her husband's death. The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending the crime likewise disqualified the award of exemplary damages. The attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the information, is not supported by the evidence, as there is no showing as to when appellant and his co-accused determined to kill the victim. Likewise, abuse of superior strength, being absorbed by treachery, cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.

Arcona vs. Court of Appeals and People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 134784

December 9, 2002

Facts:

Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The element of unlawful aggression by the victim was not proven. He was convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. In this petition, the Court affirmed CA decision but modified the damages.

Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both pleaded “not guilty”.

At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking on their way home after coming from a birthday party. When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.

Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he was standing in front of Jerry Boston’ house, about 7 meters away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon. - Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained at the stomach area just above the waistline.

Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police. - In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted, "Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. Petitioner then drew out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and hit the former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos also left the premises and went home. On the way, he met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house.- TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of attempted homicide. He was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k for Napoleon’s death, 10K for actual damages, and 10K as moral damages. On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of homicide and convicted of attempted homicide. He was made to indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual damages.- Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He maintains that it was self-defense.

Issue:

WON all elements of self-defense were present

What are the proper damages to be rendered?

Ruling:

Unlawful aggression was not proven.- When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if the prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed because of the open admission of the killing. - To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that:(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.- Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression of the

part of the victim. Although the bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed, it does not conclude that there was unlawful aggression. When Jerry Boston testified to hearing someone say, “ Caloy, I will kill you”, he did not categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that he said it while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible that Carlos escaped

CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of 50K is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.- On the other hand, the award of moral damages (10K) must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering . - The award of actual damages in the amount of 10K was not substantiated. Only those expenses which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim, will be recognized in court. It was deleted. Disposition petition for review is DENIED. The decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the increased amount of 50KThe award of actual damages is.