Torts Bar Notes 2008

7/30/2019 Torts Bar Notes 2008

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SUMMARY OF RECENT DOCTRINES

By SJSSeptember 2008

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for

such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as

actual or compensatory damages. Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an

injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured.They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of

measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the

actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by

receipts. [Job estimates as to cost of repair to property not sufficient to establish amount

actually spent for repair]BF Metal v. Lomotan, April 16, 2008 [J. Tinga]

In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. An award of

moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or

psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factuallyestablished; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate

cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on anyof the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. BFMetal v. Lomotan, April 16, 2008 [J. Tinga]

Owners of damaged property are not entitled to moral damages if there is no proof that the

accident was willful. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury

to property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are

justly due.BF Metal v. Lomotan, April 16, 2008 [J. Tinga]

When an employee of a drugstore misreads the prescription, and gave the customer a potent

sleeping tablet (instead of something to keep his blood sugar down), and the customer is

involved in a vehicular accident because he fell asleep while driving, the proximate cause of theaccident is the gross negligence of the employee. The employer is likewise liable. Considering

the business of the drugstore, the employee should have been very cautious in dispensing

medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skillemployed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Moral & exemplary damages awarded.Mercury Drug v. Baking, May 25, 2007.

Pedestrian, instead of using overpass, crosses Commonwealth avenue and was hit by speeding

Tamaraw FX. The driver brought the pedestrian to the hospital, returns to his FX and then flees.

In a suit for damages against the driver and owner, both were held liable. But the pedestrian was

held contributorily negligent, and damages reduced by 20%. Mendoza v. Soriano, June 8, 2007

The driver of pickup had slowed down as he was about to make a u-turn while at the outer lane

(instead of occupying the inner lane) when he got hit by a speeding vehicle. The driver of thespeeding vehicle admitted that he saw the pickup at about 20 meters away but did not step on the

brakes until after the collision. Both vehicles were the only ones on the road. SC found both

parties were negligent/at fault, and applied the doctrine of last clear chance. The other driverfound liable as well as his employer. Owner of pick-up who was on board the vehicle when the

accident happened was awarded moral damages, after having established that he suffered shock,

serious anxiety and fright. Lapanday Agricultural v. Angala, June 2007

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A Toyota corolla driven by a 17 year old was on the left most inner land and a 6-wheeler truck of

Mercury right beside it when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the car. At

the time of the accident, the driver of the truck only had a traffic violation receipt as his drivers

license was confiscated for reckless driving. SC found truck driver and employer liable.Awarded actual damages (hospital expenses, medicines, medical services). And, because tort-

feasors are liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of thenegligence, also awarded approx. P23.5M as life care cost/continuous rehabilitation and therapy

(the victim was paralyzed, chances of walking and performing basic bodily functions nil). The

award was computed based on average monthly expense and actuarial computation of remainingyears. Plus P10M for the loss or impairment of earning capacity (only 17, nearly 6feet tall,

member of school varsity basketball team, class president and editor-in-chief of school annual,

good leadership qualities, exceptional student in academics and extra-curricular activities, and

had passed UP, DLSU, UAP and offer of athletic scholarship from Sto. Tomas). Also awardedmoral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Mercury Drug v. Huang, June 22, 2007

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplarydamages and for attorneys fees for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is

a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. The plaintiff must prove that these

officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But evenif their acts has not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages

if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. Under

this article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable,

it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on thepretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. Cojuangco v. CA,

July 2, 1999.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose

right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing

that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also awardnominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such

damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken

into account. Cojuangco v. CA, July 2, 1999.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner (a public officer) in her private

capacity for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for the issuance of a tax revenue

memorandum circular which purportedly violated respondents constitutional right againstdeprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner claims that since the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her

functions as a public officer, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should beapplied. [Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad

faith, malice, or gross negligence.] She also claims that Article 32 is a general law on the

liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special lawon the superior public officers liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does

not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a

cause of action.

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May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection

with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? Which as between Article 32 of the Civil

Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining

whether the complaint states a cause of action?

Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA (1998) has ruled that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates theconstitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil

Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. The rule in this jurisdiction is

that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course ofthe performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice,

bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the

plaintiff.

Article 32 was meant to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for

violation of the rights enumerated. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article

should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which isthe effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the

constitutional right of the plaintiff. Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and

unequivocal terms a particular specie of an act that may give rise to an action for damagesagainst a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article

32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public

officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the

Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is ageneral law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public

officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be

committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article

32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the case precisely filed to

seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Since the complaint in the case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code and considering

that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, thefailure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The

courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a

cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of

the plaintiff. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco, G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007.

The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased's earning capacity should be

deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate theclaim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning

capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is

self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial noticemay be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is

available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum

wage under current labor laws.

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Bare testimony as to the earning capacity of the deceased is not enough, and the deceased did notfall within the exceptions. However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate

damages should be awarded. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate

damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered

when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from thenature of the case, be proved with certainty. The SC noted two earlier cases where Art. 2224 was

applied to justify the award of temperate damages in lieu of damages for loss of earning capacitywhich was not substantiated by the required documentary proof. Victory Liner v. Gammad,

November 25, 2004

A bank refused to release a mortgage cancellation document of ABC and lead to the failure of

ABC to generate the required capital to meet its distribution targets, and the cancellation of a

distribution agreement with another company. The SC ruled that the wrongful acts of the bank

adversely affected, in one way or another, the commercial credit of ABC, greatly contributed to,if not, decisively caused the premature stoppage of its business operations and the consequent

loss of business opportunity. Since these losses are not susceptible to pecuniary estimation,

temperate damages were awarded.Premiere Development Bank v. CA, April 14, 2004.

Defendant lost in an ejectment suit and aside from being ejected and declared liable for arrears,

was also assessed P3K per day as damages, pursuant to the lease contract. Defendant claims thatthe P3K award as damages was improper in the light of the doctrine enunciated in 3 cases that

"the only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the

reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be

claimed in an ordinary action." The SC ruled that reliance on the three cases was misplaced asthey dealt with additional damages and charges other than liquidated damages, defined as ".those

agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof". The trial court, was

merely enforcing what was stipulated upon in black and white in the lease contract. Azcuna v.CA, March 20, 1996.

The court sustained the award of moral and exemplary damages, having found them justifiedunder the circumstances. But since plaintiffs had limited their claim for moral and exemplary

damages to a total of P35K, the SC said that the award should not exceed that amount.

Makabali v. CA, January 22, 1988

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified

otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has atwo-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the

private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the

prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to thevictim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of

the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its

commission. Unlike the criminal which is basically a State concern, the award of damages,however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It

would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party

when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal,

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the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should onlybe of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,

relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or

qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the

unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. People v. Catubig, August 23, 2001[en banc]

In a vehicular collision, the court ruled for the plaintiff, the owner of a passenger jeepney.

However, the court noted that plaintiff left his passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of

the elements, which was contrary to Article 2203 of the Civil Code (parties suffering from lossor injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages

resulting from the act or omission in question). But since petitioners failed to offer in evidence

the estimated amount of the damage caused by plaintiffs unconcern towards the damaged

vehicle, they could not reduce the award. It is the burden of defendant to show satisfactorily

not only that the injured party could have mitigated his damages but also the amount

thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be proportionately

reduced.Lim v. CA, January 16, 2002.

Awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of execution pending

appeal. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on theoutcome of the main case. Unlike the actual damages for which the defendants may clearly be

held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,

liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain

uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Court. The existence of the factual bases ofthese types of damages and their causal relation to the defendant's act will have to be determined

in the light of errors on appeal. It is possible that the defendant, after all, while liable for actual

damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated tothe Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.IS v. CA, June 29, 1999.

The case of So Ping Bun v. CA laid down the elements of tortious interference with

contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third

person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal

justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which thecorporation of his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the knowledge and

permission of the corporation.

A person may held liable for malicious interference only when there was no legal

justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive.

To sustain a case for tortious interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must

have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act ofinterference cannot be justified. Thus, if the purchase of the subject property was merely an

advancement of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by

improper motives, he is not a malicious interferer. This would make it a case of damnum absqueinjuria or damage without injury.Lagon v. CA, March 18, 2005.

Medical malpractice case, where the doctor was grossly negligent and the hospital was sought

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to be declared vicariously liable. The Court found no single evidence pointing to hospitalsexercise of control over the doctor, who was found to be an independent contractor-physician.

But the hospital was found liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, because the hospital

(1) granted staff privileges to the doctor; (2) made the husband sign forms relating to the

operation using the hospitals letterhead (strengthening the belief that the doctor was a memberof the staff); (3) when the complications arose the doctor referred the case to the head of the

OBGYN of the Hospitals .Nogales c. Capitol Medical Center, December 19, 2006

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician.

There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is

the "ostensible" agent of the hospital (aka "doctrine of apparent authority). Nogales c.Capitol Medical Center, December 19, 2006

The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the

liability of an independent-contractor physician. The first factor focuses on the hospital's

manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner

which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to benegligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make

express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital;

rather a representation may be general and implied. The second factor focuses on the patient'sreliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance

upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

Nogales c. Capitol Medical Center, December 19, 2006

The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of

the Civil Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the personrelying thereon." Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act,

or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to

act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,be permitted to falsify it."Nogales c. Capitol Medical Center, December 19, 2006

In another medical malpractice suit where the gross negligence of the doctor was established,and the hospital likewise sought to be held liable. The Court said that traditionally, the hospital is

not considered an employer within the context of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, and , "a hospital

cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the treatment oroperation of patients." However, by virtue of the pronouncement in the Ramos case (which had

been reversed on this issue!) that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical

negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and theirattending and visiting physicians.Professional Services v. Agana, January 31, 2007.

The Court also said that the Ramos pronouncement is not the only basis in sustaining hospitalsliability, as it is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by

estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the

determination of a hospital's liability for negligent acts of health professionals. ProfessionalServices v. Agana, January 31, 2007.

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Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine ofostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes

liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the

actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the

relationship or the authority exists. in cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions,has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted

treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of thehospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician's negligence. Professional Services v.

Agana, January 31, 2007.

In this case, there were public displays in the lobby of the Hospital the names and specializations

of the physicians associated or accredited by it so it is now estopped from passing all the blame

to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public tobelieve that it vouched for their skill and competence. Indeed, the hospitals act is tantamount to

holding out to the public that the Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health

care services. By accrediting the doctors and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospitalcreated the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical

services for its patients. As expected, these patients accepted the services on the reasonable belief

that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. Professional

Services v. Agana, January 31, 2007.

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recoveryof a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant's alleged tortious acts, and

are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation. Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals

claims is not capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or

negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third person. The reliefavailable to the offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of such

damage, without which any alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or

negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages,and there can be no action based on quasi-delict without a claim for damages.Iniego v.

Purganan, March 24, 2006

A child was hit by a van and died. While the criminal case was ongoing, the driver committed

suicide. The criminal case was thus dismissed. The parents of the child filed a case against the

employer of the driver. The employers sought for dismissal on the ground that, since the casewas one to impose subsidiary liability, there must first be conviction of the driver, as the parents

had not reserved the right to file a separate action. The Court ruled that the Maniago case reliedon by the employers was inapplicable. There, the civil case was filed while the criminal caseagainst the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was

prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, the parents filed their case because no remedy

can be obtained by them against the employers with the dismissal of the criminal case againsttheir driver during the pendency thereof. That there was no reservation to institute a separate

civil action for damages is of no moment because the criminal case was dismissed without any

pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal

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case to speak of in the first place. And for the employers to insist for the conviction of theirdriver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.

L.G. Foods v. Gabor, Sept. 26, 2006

Train hits Mercedes Benz. Passenger of car dies. The doctrine of last clear chance does not

apply when the proximate cause of the accident has been established to be the negligence of

defendant. Also, as to award of damages due to death of passenger of the car, the contributorynegligence of the driver of the car will not lead to mitigation of liability because there was no

allegation or proof between the relationship the passenger and the driver. Phil. National

Railways v. Brunty, Nov. 2, 2006

Petitioner bought a car, the engine of which he sought to be replaced after more than a year

because the engine he had developed a crack. When Toyota refused, he filed a case for damages.

The case was dismissed on prescription (6 months for implied warranty). Contrary topetitioners claim that moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is based on quasi-delictor breach of contract, such are merely ancillary to the main cause of action which is based on

warranty against hidden defects. Without the latter, the former cannot stand alone.De Guzman v.

Toyota Cubao, Nov. 29, 2006

Evangeline went to Ecology Bank to renew her time deposit. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm

holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security

guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to

deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun

hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. The guard was convicted in a criminalcase. In the separate civil case for damages, the CA ruled that, since the source of damages in

the case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of andserving sentence thereof, the employers could only be subsidiarily liable, pursuant to Articles

100 & 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The SC reversed, as the plaintiffs were invoking their

right to recover damages for the employers vicarious responsibility for the injury caused byguards act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176. Safeguard Security v.

Tangco, December 14, 2006

Rules on Interest :Eastern Shipping caseI. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delictsor quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions

under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of

recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest, in the concept of actual and

compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

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1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been

stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the

time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be

12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demandunder and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, aninterest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court

at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated

claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonablecertainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the

interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially

(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at

the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date thejudgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be

deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of

legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and

executory, the rate of legal interest whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph

2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interimperiod being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit..

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Torts Bar Notes 2008

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