Phoenix Construction v. IACFacts:At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.Issue:Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents own negligenceHeld:We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable.But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes.But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence.The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven;and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it.We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.18We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate courtPLDT v. CAPLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban1989 / Regalado / Petition for review on certiorari of CA resolutionDefenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause

FACTSSps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA saidjeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. Thejeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeeps windshield was also shattered.PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable.PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmedin totoRTCs decision.(SC declared this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDINGWON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.NO

RATIOThe accident which befell the spouses was due to thelack of diligenceof Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT.If the accident did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside laneand for some reason or otherit had to swerve suddenly to the rightand had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, butshould have put on his regular lightswhich should have made him see the accident mound in time. The mound wasrelatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also,he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wifes injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages.The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assumingarguendothat there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT. Theomission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury.As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident.Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established bycompetent evidence.In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was justthe self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

GABETO VS. ARANETA

FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.

RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.

RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

Honoria Vda. de Gregorio, et. al. vs, Go Chong BingNo. L-7763. 2 December 1957Appeal from a judgment of the CFI DavaoLabrador, J.:

Facts:Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a"cargador"by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.

Issue:WON defendant may be held liable for damages.

Ruling:Judgment affirmed.Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.

NAKPIL & SONS v. CATo be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the engineer/architect/contractor must not have been negligent in the construction of the building.

FACTS:Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a non-profit organization formed under the corporation law decided to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in 1966.

In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises. United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the building.

PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.

Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the building suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the building.

ISSUE:Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?

HELD:Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are liable for damages should the building collapse within 15 years from completion.

Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:

1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the industry to the creditor.

In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by the earthquake which was an act of God, the defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in the specifications and plans aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive measures that the building would otherwise have had.Facts:The Philippine Bar Association wanted to erect a building in its lot in Intramuros. They were able to obtain a contract with the United Construction Company Inc for the construction of the building and the design was obtained from Juan M. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil. The Building was completed in June 1966. On August 2, 1968 a massive earthquake hit Manila with an intensity of about 7.3. This earthquake caused damage to the building and caused it to lean forward dangerously which led to the vacation of the building. United Construction Company in turn shored up the building and incurred 13,661.28 php as costs. The PBA then instituted a case against UCC for damages due to its negligence regarding the construction of the said building thru its failure to follow the designs coming from the architects. UCC then filed a complint against the archetechts (Nakpil & Sons) alleging that it was the designs that are flawed and that caused the buildings inability to withstand an earthquake. UCC also included the president of PBA for including them in their petition. Nakpil & Sons answer that the petitioners need not to change the defendants in their petition as UCC deviated from the plans which caused the damages to the building. In the course of the trial a commissioner was appointed by both parties to give a report regarding the technical aspects of the case. His report concluded that indeed there were faults arising from the negligence of both defendants. The report stated that the design was flawed and that UCC deviated from the designs which aggravated the problem. The defendants then put up the Act of God defense.

Issue:Whether or not the defendants could escape liability from the building due to a fortuitous event which is unforeseeable and inevitable even if their negligence is established

Held:The defendants cannot validly invoke the Act of God defense. This is because of the report submitted by the appointed Commissioner which established their negligence. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect. To exempt the obligor from its liability these requisites should first concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. The report of the Commissioner established that the defects that occurred to the building could be attributed to the act of man specifically that of the architects and the engineers as well as the builders. This was because of the fact that UCC deviated from the plans submitted by the architects and their failure to observe the required marksmanship in constructing the building as well as the required degree of supervision. Nakpil & Sons are also liable for the inadequacies and defect in their submitted plan and specifications. These circumstances are the proximate causes of the damages that the PBA building incurred. The costs are to be paid by the defendants amounting to 5M which includes all appreciable damages as well as indemnity plus 100,000php for the atty fee.

One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

NAPOCOR vs. CA (WELMING TYPHOON)Facts: On Nov. 4, 1967, a typhoon called Welming hit Central Luzon passing through NAPOCORs Angat Hydro-Electric Project Dam in Bulacan. The water level had reach the danger height of 212 meters above sea level and abruptly opened the spillway gates. This action by NAPOCOR had an extraordinary large volume of water rushed and hit the installations and construction works of ECI (Engineering Construction, Inc.) a contractor of NAWASA for its tunnel in Bulacan. The negligent manner of opening the spillway gates by NAPOCOR had washed away, lost or destroyed ECIs facilities and structures. NAPOCOR alleged that the destruction and loss was due to force majeure.Issue: WON NAPOCOR is liable for the destruction.Ruling: Petition DismissedRatio: NAPOCOR cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God. It was undoubtly negligent when it only opened the spillway gates at the height of typhoon Welming when it knew very well that it was safer to open it gradually. To be exempt from liability, NAPOCOR must be free from any previous negligence.NPC v. CA (KADING TYPHOON)Facts:At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.Issues:(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuriaHeld:(1)The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law onquasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God orforce majeure,by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature ofdamnum absque injuria,which presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

Vda. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA

FACTS:Medina is the owner and operator of a bus.This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.

The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Proximate Cause that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.And more comprehensively,the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chainof events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

FACTS: Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fastand when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.ISSUE:Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.HELD:No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Rakes v. The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific CompanyFacts:Rakes, respondents employee, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbour to the companys yard. At a certain spot near the waters edge, the track sagged, the car canted, the rails slid off and caught Rakes. He was amputated at about the knee. Rakes claims that only one hand car was used in his work. Atlantic has proved that there were two, so that the end of the rails lay upon sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces to prevent them from slipping off.Issue:Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitionerHeld:While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was guilty of contributory negligence in walking at the side instead of being in front or behind. The amount of damages should be reduced.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.Facts:Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant to visit one Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and reached the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30 fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The boys picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to Manuels house and performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of Davids eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.Issue:Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to be exposed to the harmful substancesHeld:Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the evidencetendsto disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.As was said in case ofRailroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, andthis is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about.We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he wassui jurisin the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence.ISSUE:Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.HELD:No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:(1) Damages to the plaintiff.(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another.Anuran V. Buno (1966)Lessons Applicable:Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS: January 12, 1958 noon:passenger jeepney owned byPedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara and driven byPepito Buo overloaded with (14-16 passengers)was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas when a speedingmotor truck owned byAnselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Arodriven by Guillermo Razonnegligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three passengers died and two others suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days Jeepney was parked to let a passanger alight in such a way that 1/2 of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the road suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the truckand alsoagainst the driver and the owners of the jeepney CFI:absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck driver and the owners to make compensation CA: Affirmed exoneration of the jeepneyISSUE: W/N the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so thattruck driver guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision will be solely liable

HELD: NO.The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision. New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756) principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a suitbetween the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNESG.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.Esguerra, J.:

Facts:On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues:(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling:Decision affirmed.(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.

Malcolm, J.:

Facts:In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue:WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.

Ruling:The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.