III. NEGLIGENCE A. Concept Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Plicart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

1. JARCO MARKETING V CA (1999) G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999 JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents. FACTS: Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH). In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES: Jarco Marketing Corporation 1. CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances 2. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. 3. counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. 4. observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees Conrado and Criselda 1. asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence. 2. testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "[N]othing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me." Accordingly, Gonzales' testimony on ZHIENETH's spontaneous declaration should not only be considered as part of res gestae but also accorded credit. 3. negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip. 4. maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH's death, was petitioners' negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. RTC: dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners, that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. trial court reasoned that the counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance. 2. CA: set aside the 15 January 1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorney's fees to private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar. petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" 11 with a top

wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern. ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. ISSUES: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.

RULING: (1) The death is attributable to negligence.

Accident Negligence • unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence

attaches to the defendant. • omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by

those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

• "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."

• "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. 2. The corporation and their employees are liable for negligence.

test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and should be admitted as) part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:

Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.

Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter.

Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory

negligence as a matter of law.

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 1172-1174 Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) 2. SARMIENTO V SUN-CABRIDO (2003) [G.R. No. 141258. April 9, 2003] TOMASA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. SPS. LUIS & ROSE SUN-CABRIDO and MARIA LOURDES SUN, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, Tomasa Sarmiento, states that sometime in April 1994, a friend, Dra. Virginia Lao, requested her to find somebody to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. Accordingly, petitioner sent a certain Tita Payag with the pair of earrings to Dingding’s Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by respondent spouses Luis and Rose Cabrido, which accepted the job order for P400.

Petitioner provided 12 grams of gold to be used in crafting the pair of ring settings. After 3 days, Tita Payag delivered to the jewelry shop one of Dra. Lao’s diamond earrings which was earlier appraised as worth .33 carat and almost perfect in cut and clarity. Respondent Ma. Lourdes (Marilou) Sun went on to dismount the diamond from its original setting. Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do it. Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers, breaking the gem in the process.

Petitioner required the respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and quality. When they refused, the petitioner was forced to buy a replacement in the amount of P30,000.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages on June 28, 1994. private respondents vigorously denied any transaction between Dingdings’ Jewelry Shop and the petitioner, through Tita Payag.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. MTC: declared respondents liable. 2. RTC: absolving the respondents of any responsibility arising from breach of contract. while ostensibly admitting the existence of the said agreement, private respondents, nonetheless denied assuming any obligation to dismount the diamonds from their original settings. 3. CA: declared the private respondents not liable for damages.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES: Respondents - dismounting of the diamond from its original setting was part of the obligation assumed by the private respondents under the contract of service. Petitioners - agreement was for crafting two gold rings mounted with diamonds only and did not include the dismounting of the said diamonds from their original setting.

ISSUE: Whether respondents are liable RULING: Yes. it is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the practice of

the trade to use a miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems, such as diamonds, from their original settings. However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the original setting, thus resulting in breakage of the diamond. The jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the circumstances. It should be pointed out that Marilou examined the diamond before dismounting it from the original setting and found the same to be in order. Its subsequent breakage in the hands of Santos could only have been caused by his negligence in using the wrong equipment. Res ipsa loquitur. (the thing speaks for itself)

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.23[23] The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.

Marilou and Zenon Santos were employed at Dingding’s Jewelry Shop in order to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in its business.

Private respondents Luis Cabrido and Rose Sun-Cabrido are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P30,000 as actual damages and P10,000 as moral damages in favor of the petitioner

B. AS PROXIMATE CAUSE (ARTICLE 2179)

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) Test of negligence Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Proximate cause has been defined as:

. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

3. TAYLOR v MANILA RAILROAD (1910)

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant. FACTS: The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.

Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are

intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.

After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.

After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.

Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

Defendant company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof.

ISSUE: Whether defendant company is liable RULING: No, the company is not liable. under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control.

plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.

the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and

their consequences; he was sui juris (legally competent; capacity to manage one’s own affairs) in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act.

Counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based there the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.

Principle of proportional damages is not applicable. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

4. BATACLAN V MEDINA (1957) G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned.

At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch

Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it

one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.

By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Court of First Instance – Cavite: awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.

ISSUE: Whether Medina transportation is liable RULING:

Yes. here is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. 5. FERNANDO V CA (1992) G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardian ad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners,

vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.

FACTS: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re- emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: dismissed the case. (2) Court of Appeals: Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs damages. (3) CA (motion for reconsideration): reversed itself.

ISSUES: 1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar? 2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof?

RULING: No. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred

The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.

While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it

awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon.

The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank (TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.

it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.

We held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

the herein circumstances lead Us to no other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.

6. URBANO V IAC (1988) G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Circuit Criminal Court: finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. (2) IAC: affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether Urban is guilty or whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death. RULING: No. The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.

7. BERNAL V JV HOUSE (1930) G.R. No. L-30741 January 30, 1930

TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee.

FACTS: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and Elias, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her clothes were immediately removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40 o'clock.

Defense: The hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Court of First Instance – Leyte: denied them P15,000 damages from J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., for the death of the child as a consequence of burns alleged to have been caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether the company is liable RULING: Yes. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.

The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of Purificacion Bernal and the former was the natural

father, who had never legally recognized his child. The daughter lived with the mother, and presumably was supported by her. Under these facts, recovery should be permitted the mother but not the father.

As to the defendants, they are J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House was granted a franchise by Act No. 2700 of the Philippine Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only transferred this franchise formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is, nearly a year after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J.V. House is solely responsible.

8. GABETO V ARANETA (1921) G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921

CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three children, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant. FACTS: It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918. Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment. At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few years further the side of the

carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.

Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. CFI- Iloilo: awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P3,000, from which judgment the defendant appealed.

ISSUE: Is Araneta liable? RULING: No. The evidence is convincing to the effect that, after Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say several minutes — before the horse started on his career up the street.

It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.

According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano.

9. MCKEE V IAC (1992) G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992 GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992 CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. FACTS:

Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.

In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.

As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively.

On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. RTC: Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. 2. RTC: Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. (conflicting decisions) 3. CA: concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.

ISSUE: Whether Galang is liable RULING: Yes. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.

Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.

Under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision.

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE 10. ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (1958) G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. The main pool it between two small pools of oval shape known as the "Wading pool" and the "Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the water at different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The care and supervision of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a recreational section composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila.

In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.

Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abaño was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in compliance with the instructions of his chief.

Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.

The death was due to asphyxia by submersion in water.

ISSUE: whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

RULING: NO. Ruben Ong particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts for help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person under water who turned out to be his brother.

there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility.

appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Aba_¤_o responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

1. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (ARTICLES 1755-1756)

Meaning: Let the master answer (also known as vicarious liability) Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the

utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

11. PAL V. CA (1981) [G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.] PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS V. SAMSON, Respondents. FACTS: The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, private respondent herein, averred that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and Pili, Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante as commanding pilot of a C-47 plane belonging to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the herein petitioner; that on attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Captain Delfin Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the airplane crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick front windshield of the airplane causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and abrasions on the forehead with intense pain and suffering cranad(par. 6, complaint).:onad

The complaint further alleged that instead of giving plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment called for by the nature and severity of his injuries, defendant simply referred him to a company physician, a general medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior injuries without examining the severe brain concussion of plaintiff

defendant airline company instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert medical treatment, discharged the latter from its employ on December 21, 1953 on grounds of physical disability, thereby causing plaintiff not only to lose his job but to become physically unfit to continue as aviator due to defendant’s negligence in not giving him the proper medical attention cranad(pars. 10-11, complaint). Plaintiff prayed for damages

defendant PAL denied the substantial averments in the complaint, alleging among others, that the accident was due solely and exclusively to inevitable unforeseen circumstances whereby plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and minor injuries which were promptly treated by defendant’s medical personnel cranad(par. 5, answer); that plaintiff did not sustain brain injury or cerebral concussion from the accident since he passed the annual physical and medical examination given thereafter on April 24, 1951; that the headaches and dizziness experienced by plaintiff were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required up-grading or promotional course given by defendant company

The pilot, Captain Delfin Bustamante, was a competent and proficient pilot, and although he was already afflicted with a tumor of the nasopharynx even before the accident of January 8, 1951, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in passing upon the fitness of pilots, gave Capt. Bustamante a waiver of physical standards to enable him to retain his first class airman certificate

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. RTC: ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff, 2. CA: Plaintiff-Appellee, who has been deprived of his job since 1954, is entitled to the legal rate of interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint

ISSUE: Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident on 8 January 1951 and the subsequent “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” of which private respondent complained every now and then, on the one hand, and such “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” allegedly caused by the accident and private respondent’s eventual discharge from employment, on the other? RULING: Yes. The dizzy spells, headache and general debility of private respondent Samson was an after-effect of the crash-landing

We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent court to PAL for having allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on January 8, 1951

The pilot was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx cranad(nose). He is now in the Great Beyond. The spot is very near the brain and the eyes. Tumor on the spot will affect the sinus, the breathing, the eyes which are very near it. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease.

the evidence shows that the overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the

defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for this negligence of defendant’s employee, it is liable

The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the head when the plane crash- landed due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. The negligence of the latter is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Article 2219, cranad(2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages.

The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code on Human Relations which requires that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith

12. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT V CA (1988) G.R. No. L-49407 August 19, 1988 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents-appellees.

No. L-49469 August 19, 1988 MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents- appellees.

FACTS: in accordance with a memorandum agreement entered into between defendants NDC and MCP on September 13, 1962, defendant NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean going vessels including one with the name 'Dona Nati' appointed defendant MCP as its agent to manage and operate said vessel for and in its behalf and account

on February 28, 1964 the E. Philipp Corporation of New York loaded on board the vessel "Dona Nati" at San Francisco, California, a total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the People's Bank and Trust Company acting for and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., who represents Riverside Mills Corporation

Also loaded on the same vessel at Tokyo, Japan, were the cargo of Kyokuto Boekui, Kaisa, Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10 cases of aluminum foil (Exhs. M & M-1). En route to Manila the vessel Dofia Nati figured in a collision at 6:04 a.m. on April 15, 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel 'SS Yasushima Maru' as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost and/or destroyed, of which 535 bales as damaged were landed and sold on the authority of the General Average Surveyor for Yen 6,045,-500 and 15 bales were not landed and deemed lost. Thus, the plaintiff had paid as insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to the consignees or their successors-in-interest, for the said lost or damaged cargoes.

On April 22, 1965, the Development Insurance and Surety Corporation filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the recovery of the sum of P364,915.86 plus attorney's fees of P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: ordering the defendants National Development Company and Maritime Company of the Philippines, to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff Development Insurance and Surety Corp 364,915.86. (2) CA: affirmed RTC in toto.

ISSUE: which laws govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters, and the extent of liability as well as the rules of prescription provided thereunder.

RULING: collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision of vessels.

More specifically, Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert appraisal. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code, which provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.

Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage

the Memorandum Agreement of September 13, 1962 (Exhibit 6, Maritime) shows that NDC appointed MCP as Agent, a term broad enough to include the concept of Ship-agent in Maritime Law. In fact, MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the

vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the NDC (Decision, CA G.R. No. 46513, p. 12; Rollo, p. 40). Consequently, under the circumstances, MCP cannot escape liability.

It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both are impleaded.

Both the owner and agent (Naviero) should be declared jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a tortious act and did not arise from contract. Common carriers, in the language of the court in Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Barrette et al., (51 Phil. 90 [1927]) "cannot limit its liability for injury to a loss of goods where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence." Negligence of the captains of the colliding vessel being the cause of the collision, and the cargoes not being jettisoned to save some of the cargoes and

The vessel, the trial court and the Court of Appeals acted correctly in not applying the law on averages. Both pilots were at fault for not changing their excessive speed despite the thick fog obstructing their visibility.

13. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS V ARGOS (2001) G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.

In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.

Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a "Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.

On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations against Costa. On March 31, 1995, respondents fi1ed'a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: initially granted the motion to dismiss filed by Costa and IFFI but reconsidered its position. (2) CA: dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's employee?

RULING: No. The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action.

A perusal of the respondents' civil complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.

A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to amend that those matters do not exist.

This is a basic rule in pleadings.

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.

Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

14. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V VASQUEZ (1999) G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999 CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA

SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., respondents. FACTS: On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. Trial Court: ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily Spouses Vasquez. 2. CA: affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80

ISSUE: whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

RULING: No. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.

At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. 2. Violation of rules and statutes a. Traffic rules Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)

15. MANUEL v. CA (1993) [G.R. No. 96781. October 1, 1993.]

EMILIANO MANUEL and SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ERNESTO A. RAMOS substituted by Goyena Z. Ramos, Grace, David, Jobet, Portia and Banjo, all surnamed RAMOS; and GOYENA ZANAROSA-RAMOS, for herself and as Guardian Ad Litem for the minors JOBET, BANJO, DAVID and GRACE, all surnamed RAMOS; FERNANDO ABCEDE, SR., for himself and as Guardian Ad Litem for minor FERNANDO G. ABCEDE, JR.; MIGUEL JERNZ MAGO, as Guardian Ad Litem for minor ARLEEN R. MAGO, and ANACLETA J. ZANAROSA, Respondents.

FACTS: Private respondents were passengers of an International Harvester Scout Car (Scout car) owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila for Camarines Norte in the morning of December 27, 1977 with respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver of the vehicle.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car, which was negotiating the zigzag road in Bo. Paraiso, Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Superlines Transportation, Co., Inc. and was driven by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing. Were it not for the railing, the Scout car would have fallen into a deep ravine. All its ten occupants, which included four children, were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physical injuries

Emiliano Manuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. As he could not be found after he ceased reporting for work a few days following the incident, the private respondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict.

DEFENSE: Fernando Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout car, who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim that Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19- years old at the time of the incident, did not have a driver’s license DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Court of First Instance: finding the defendant Emiliano Manuel negligent, reckless and imprudent in the operation of Superlines Bus No. 406, which was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and damage of the Scout Car in which they were riding; (2) ordering the said defendant, jointly and solidarily, with the defendant Superlines Bus Co., Inc. to pay plaintiffs the amounts of P49,954.86, as itemized elsewhere in this decision and the costs. (2) CA: affirmed CFI. ISSUE: Whether Manuel and Superlines Transportation is liable RULING: Yes. The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could not simply exempt petitioners’ liability because they were the parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car’s lane. Nevertheless, the witnesses presented by petitioners who allegedly saw "the younger Abcede pined behind the driver’s wheels," testified on matters that transpired after the accident. Discrediting this allegation, the Court of Appeals noted that none of the aforesaid witnesses actually saw the younger Abcede driving the car and that the younger Abcede could have simply been thrown off his seat toward the steering wheel.

While it may be accepted that some of the skid marks may have been erased by the "heavy downpour" on or about the time of the accident, it remains a possibility that not all skid marks were washed away. The strong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), 1989 Rules on Evidence) erases, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, any suspicions that the police investigator just invented the skid marks indicated in his report.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Granting, however, that the skid marks in the questioned sketch were inaccurate, nonetheless, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the collision took place within the lane of the Scout car was supported by other conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of broken glass which was scattered along the car’s side of the road, whereas the bus lane was entirely clear of debris. Since the act complained of falls under the aegis of quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana), moral damages is likewise available to plaintiffs pursuant to Article 2219 also of the New Civil Code"

16. MALLARI v CA (2000) [G.R. No. 128607. January 31, 2000] ALFREDO MALLARI SR. and ALFREDO MALLARI JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: The points of collision were the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN. The two (2) right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

On 16 December 1987 Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to pay jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes, widow of the deceased victim (2) CA: ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. ISSUE: Who is liable for the accident?

RULING: Alfredo Mallari is liable for the accident. Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

By his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

B. Statutes and ordinances / administrative rules

17. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC v WCC (1956) [G.R. No. L-8110. June 30, 1956.] MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents. FACTS:

On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.”

Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to the latter.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner: confirmed the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the deceased’s having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks

RULING: No. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because

transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition.

However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. Section 6 provides as follows:

“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.”

It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court.

Indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation. As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution.” Upon making such promise — Petitioner argues — she elected one of the remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against the employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. Note further that a question may be raised whether she could bind the other heirs of the deceased.

18. CIPRIANO v CA (1996)

[G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996] ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC., respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride People’s car to petitioner’s shop for rustproofing. The car had been purchased the year before from the Integrated Auto Sales, Inc. for P252,155.00.

The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581,iii[3] which showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time.

According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 o’clock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.

In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent’s Kia Pride.

On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against petitioner.

Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioner’s failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: sustained the private respondent’s contention that the “failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire. (2) CA: affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: whether petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether

his failure to do so constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against

RULING: Yes. We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.

It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

19. CRUZ v CA (1988) G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA, ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME, ANTONIO, and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE, respondents. FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents' residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances.

Subsequently, private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the contents thereof.

On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner, praying for a judgment in their favor awarding P150,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) CFI - renders judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the defendant. (2) CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of damages

ISSUE: Whether the of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable

RULING: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing itself speaks”) Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop.

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.

In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.

Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied.]

The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from petitioner.

20. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC V CA (1998)

[G.R. No. 119092. December 10, 1998] SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NICANOR BERNABE III, JOSEFINA BERNABE, in their individual capacities and as HEIRS OF JASON BERNABE, JOHN JOSEPH BERNABE, VICTOR IGNACIO, JULIETA ENRIQUEZ and RAMON ENRIQUEZ, RENE TABLANTE, LEOMAR MACASPAC, JR., CHARITO ESTOLANO, NENITA SALUNOY, in their individual capacities and as HEIRS OF DALMACIO SALUNOY, respondents. FACTS: This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver.

The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family members and friends whom they invited to an excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back to Manila. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner’s panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite direction. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC – Makati: found petitioner’s driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney’s fees. (2) CA - affirmed in toto.

Defenses: 1. The Cimarron was overloaded because there were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when the passenger capacity of the vehicle was only 17. 2. The front seat of the Cimarron was occupied by four adults, including the driver. 3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on (its right headlight) as its left headlight was not functioning.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable RULING: Yes. it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped just the same because the driver of the panel truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes. Petitioner’s contention that because of “decreased visibility,” caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. The police investigator did not state in his report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one headlight on.

There is nothing in the testimonies of the passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano, who was seated in front, which suggest that the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle. We are convinced that no “maneuvering” which the Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.

3. Dangerous weapons and substances Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)

21. ARANETA v ARREGLADO (1958) G.R. No. L-11394 September 9, 1958 MANUEL S. ARANETA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JUAN ARREGLADO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Lugar pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, and causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he rallied and after some time finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital.

Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide (Criminal Case No. 15143, of Manila) and pleaded guilty; but in view of his youth, Dario being only 14 years of age, the court suspended the hearings as prescribed by Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, and ordered him committed to the care of Mr. Deogracias Lerma, under the supervision of the Commissioner of Social Welfare, conformably to Republic Act No. 47. Because Arreglado observed proper conduct and discipline while on probation, the court, upon recommendation of the Social Welfare Administrator, finally discharged him on May 22, 1953, and quashed the criminal case.

Thereafter, on October 13, 1954, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son, Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) CFI- Manila: sentencing defendants Juan Arreglado, his wife, and his son, Jose Dario Arreglado, to pay the former only P3,943 damages in lieu of the P112,000 claimed in the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner are entitled to greater award for damages RULING: Yes. We do not believe that plaintiffs-appellants should recover the cost of a plastic operation and surgical treatment in the United States, since their own experts asserted that the operation could be competently performed here by local practitioners. Still, taking into account the necessity and

cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair, however skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state, we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18,000.

4. Res ipsa loquitur Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

22. AFRICA v CALTEX (1966) G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.

the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the

gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) CFI – Manila : dismissed petitioners’ second amended complaint against respondents. petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. (2) CA: affirmed CFI. ISSUE: (1) whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees. (2) Whether Caltex is liable

RULING: (Evidence) There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information

The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.

(Torts) (1) Yes, the doctrine applies.

Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man.

The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."

Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat.

"The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury."

(2) Yes, Caltex is liable with Boquiren being considered as agent of the company: (1) Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees.

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time.

Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.

23. CEBU SHIPYARD v WILLIAM LINES (1999) [G.R. No. 132607. May 5, 1999] CEBU SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS, INC., petitioner, vs. WILLIAM LINES, INC. and PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE and ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.

FACTS: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels while the private respondent, Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential), also a domestic corporation is in the non-life insurance business.

William Lines, Inc. (plaintiff below) is in the shipping business. It was the owner of M/V Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and sank on February 16, 1991. At the time of the unfortunate occurrence sued upon, subject vessel was insured with Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and machinery. The Hull Policy included an “Additional Perils (INCHMAREE)” Clause covering loss of or damage to the vessel through the negligence of, among others, ship repairmen. On February 5, 1991, William Lines, Inc. brought its vessel, M/V Manila City, to the Cebu Shipyard in Lapulapu City for annual dry-docking and repair.

On February 6, 1991, an arrival conference was held between representatives of William Lines, Inc. and CSEW to discuss the work to be undertaken on the M/V Manila City.

The contracts, denominated as Work Orders, were signed thereafter

While the M/V Manila City was undergoing dry-docking and repairs within the premises of CSEW, the master, officers and crew of M/V Manila City stayed in the vessel, using their cabins as living quarters. Other employees hired by William Lines to do repairs and maintenance work on the vessel were also present during the dry-docking.

On February 16, 1991, after subject vessel was transferred to the docking quay, it caught fire and sank, resulting to its eventual total loss.

On February 21, 1991, William Lines, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against CSEW, alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by CSEW’s negligence and lack of care.

On July 15, 1991 was filed an Amended Complaint impleading Prudential as co-plaintiff, after the latter had paid William Lines, Inc. the value of the hull and machinery insurance on the M/V Manila City. As a result of such payment Prudential was subrogated to the claim of P45 million, representing the value of the said insurance it paid.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: finding the petitioner herein, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. (CSEW) negligent and liable for damages to the private respondent, William Lines, Inc., and to the insurer, Prudential Guarantee Assurance Company, Inc. (2) CA: affirmed trial court. DEFENSE: On February 13, 1991, the CSEW completed the drydocking of M/V Manila City at its grave dock. It was then transferred to the docking quay of CSEW where the remaining repair to be done was the replating of the top of Water Ballast Tank No. 12 (Tank Top No. 12) which was subcontracted by CSEW to JNB General Services.

While in the process of rigging the second steel plate, the JNB workers noticed smoke coming from the passageway along the crew cabins. When one of the workers, Mr. Casas, proceeded to the passageway to ascertain the origin of the smoke, he noticed that smoke was gathering on the ceiling of the passageway but did not see any fire as the crew cabins on either side of the passageway were locked. He immediately sought out the proprietor of JNB, Mr. Buenavista, and the Safety Officer of CSEW, Mr. Aves, who sounded the fire alarm.

ISSUE: Whether CSEW is liable RULING: Yes. Under the circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

What is more, in the present case the trial court found direct evidence to prove that the workers and/or employees of CSEW were remiss in their duty of exercising due diligence in the care of subject vessel. The direct evidence substantiates the conclusion that

CSEW was really negligent. Thus, even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in light of the direct evidence on record, the ineluctable conclusion is that the petitioner, Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc., was negligent and consequently liable for damages to the respondent, William Lines, Inc.

the fact that CSEW benefits from the said stipulation does not automatically make it as a co-assured of William Lines. The intention of the parties to make each other a co-assured under an insurance policy is to be gleaned principally from the insurance contract or policy itself and not from any other contract or agreement because the insurance policy denominates the assured and the beneficiaries of the insurance

24. CONSUNJI v CA (2001) G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001 D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo

[were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th

floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower. It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

Defense: he widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC: judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff (2) CA: affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the company is liable RULING: Yes. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.

under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.

it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.

As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of

res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain

an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously

Example: although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.

As to the contention that the action should be barred due to prior claim with the State Insurance Fund - private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

25. NPC v CA (2005) [G.R. No. 124378. March 8, 2005]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division), HADJI ABDUL CARIM ABDULLAH, CARIS ABDULLAH, HADJI ALI LANGCO and DIAMAEL PANGCATAN, respondents.

FACTS: Office of the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 398 - “Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters Elevation, and for Other Purposes.” Said decree instructed the NPC to build the Agus Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation. Pursuant thereto, petitioner built and operated the said dam in 1978.

Private respondents Hadji Abdul Carim Abdullah and Caris Abdullah were owners of fishponds in Barangay Bacong, Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, while private respondents Hadji Ali Langco and Diamael Pangcatan had their fishponds built in Poona-Marantao, also in the same province. All of these fishponds were sited along the Lake Lanao shore.

In October and November of 1986, all the improvements were washed away when the water level of the lake escalated and the subject lakeshore area was flooded. Private respondents blamed the inundation on the Agus Regulation Dam built and operated by the NPC in 1978. They theorized that NPC failed to increase the outflow of water even as the water level of the lake rose due to the heavy rains.

Respondents wrote separate letters to the NPC’s Vice-President, a certain “R.B. Santos,” who was based in Ditucalan, Iligan City. They sought assistance and compensation for the damage suffered by each of them. NPC retorted that visible monuments and benchmarks indicating the 702-meter elevation had been established around the lake from 1974 to 1983, which should have served as a warning to the private respondents not to introduce any improvements below the 702-meter level as this was outlawed.

Left with no other recourse, the private respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Marawi City

DECISION OF LOWER COURT: (1) RTC – Marawi City: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of respondents. (2) CA: affirmed RTC. ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s verdict that petitioner was legally answerable for the damages endured by the private respondents.

RULING:

No, NPC is liable. With respect to its job to maintain the normal maximum level of the lake at 702 meters, the Court of Appeals, echoing the trial court, observed with alacrity that when the water level rises due to the rainy season, the NPC ought to release more water to the Agus River to avoid flooding and prevent the water from going over the maximum level.

In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, comes to fore.[24] Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

although the dam was built in 1978, the benchmarks were installed only in July and August of 1984 and that apparently, many had already worn-out, to be replaced only in October of 1986. At that time, many farms and houses were already swamped and many fishponds, including those of the private respondents, damaged.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict.”

both the appellate court and the trial court uniformly found that it was such negligence on the part of NPC which directly caused the damage to the fishponds of private respondents.

26. PERLA COMPANIA v SPS. SARANGAYA (2005)

G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005 PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL, - versus - SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA, Respondents.

FACTS: In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner- corporation), through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building,” abutting the office of Matsushita. Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to “warm up” the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed

the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.

Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances.

Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic) Property” was filed against petitioner Pascual. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.

Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi- delict against petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Trial Court: ruled in favor of respondents. (2) CA: affirmed RTC ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies RULING: Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.

To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.

Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year- model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year- old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.

Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual.

Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident.

While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. The relationship between the two petitioners was based on the principle of pater familias according to which the employer becomes liable to the party aggrieved by its employee if he fails to prove due diligence of a good

father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either.