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MEETING OF AD HOC CABINET COMMITTEE UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE HONOURABLE THE STATE PRESIDENT ON TUESDAY 3 SEPTEMBER 1985 AT

15H00

Present: The Honourable the State President (Chairman) The Ministers of : Foreign Affairs : Defence : Finance : Mineral and Energy Affairs Dr L Alberts (Director-General : Mineral and Energy Affairs) Cmdt. P G Marais (Chairman : ARMSCOR) Dr J W L de Villiers (Chairman : AEC)

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS TAKEN:1. Future BIBO Strategy After discussing the report of the Chairman of the Witvlei Council the follow-

ing decisions were taken:(a) Manufacture a maximum number of 7 A-type warheads. (Gun- type,

yield 5-20 KT TNT equivalent);(b) Do engineering development of implosion type;(c) Do limited research and development on the A* warheads (booster-

type with yield in the order of 100 KT TNT equivalent);( d ) The production of plutonium warheads to be discontinued, but exper-

tise developed with the aid of laboratory-scale plant must be retained, with the emphasis on fission element and transuranium element re-search. Only a limited programme is envisaged;

(e) Integration of payload with long-range delivery system to be contin-ued;

(f) The production of lithium-6 to be continued until sufficient material (about 40 kg) has been produced, which must be stored for future use;

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2g) Continue with theoretical work on all types of warheads(A-, A-*, implo-

sion and B-types);(h) The Gouriqua project to be continued for the development of pres-

surised water reactor technology and for the testing of Koeberg fuel, and to retain the option of manufacturing tritium or plutonium in future if necessary;

(i) Expertise must be preserved so that the option of continuing with ad-vanced systems at a later stage, if necessary, can be retained;

(j) With a view to cost-saving, the operating strategy for the pilot en-richment plant must be adapted to meet the needs outlined above, together with a prudent stockpile.

The nuclear weapons strategy, as originally approved in 1978, and as set out in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of 19 March of the Chairman of the Witvlei Council is confirmed, namely:

“At that stage the nuclear strategy was essentially restricted to the following:(a) A number of 5 to 6 A weapons will be “kept on the shelf” (Current

Resolution 7);(b) If the RSA were to find itself in a “back to the wall” situation, (i) the existence of the RSA’s nuclear capability should be made

known to the Western countries (especially the USA) in a covert manner and if this does not alleviate matters,

(ii) an underground test must be carried out to demonstrate the RSA’s capability (overt disclosure), and

(iii) finally, an above-ground test if the threat persists. Any decision in the above regard will be authorised solely by the State President.”

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3The strategy specifically excludes the operational application of nuclear weapons.

2. International nuclear safeguards at the AEC enrichment plant The decision that in the final instance nuclear safeguards at the semi-com-mercial enrichment plant will not be accepted is confirmed. This means that the current negotiations between the AEC and the IAEA on nuclear safeguards will have to be discontinued at a convenient time or indefinitely suspended. A decision on the discontinuation of negotiations will be taken after the General Conference of the IAEA which will take place in the last week of September 1985, by which time there will also be greater clarity on possible sanctions or boycotts against the RSA, especially by the USA.

3. Payment of the RSA’s membership fees to the IAEA Resolved that arrear membership fees should be paid so that the RSA will not be more than 2 years in arrears, and will therefore not be in default in terms of the Statute of the IAEA.

4. Marketing of armaments containing uranium Resolved that the anti-tank weapon may be marketed to South Korea and Australia but not to Iraq. The Minister of Defence, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Af-fairs, will decide on an ad hoc basis which countries it may (or may not) be marketed to.

5. AEC budget The Minister of Finance expressed concern about the size of the AEC bud-get and the way in which it is being funded (through loans).

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4After some discussion it was decided that alternative funding possibilities should be investigated and that, by re-evaluating its priorities, the AEC should try to curtail its expenditure. It was mentioned that the full effect of the current rationalisation of the AEC will only materialise in 2 to 3 years’ time. The guideline laid down was that a real reduction of 10 percent per annum over the following 3 years should be accepted as the target. However, the biggest saving can only be achieved by retrenching staff. It would not, however, be appropriate in the present economic climate to retrench staff who have made extraordinary efforts to deal with the crisis which arose in 1978 in respect of fuel for the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station.

The State President fully agrees with the last point.

Cmdt. P G Marais DATE:CHAIRMAN ARMSCOR

COUNTERSIGNED

Gen. M A Malan DATE:MINISTER OF DEFENCE

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