U N C L A S S I F I E D

Tools and Techniques for State Evaluation

Rick Wallace Los Alamos National Laboratory

George Anzelon Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course

MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Monterey, California, June 2013

Work supported by DOE/NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation & International Security

Based on LA-UR 10-04295

Non-traditional information used in safeguards State Evaluation

• Environmental sampling

• Satellite imagery

• Open Source Analysis

• IAEA/TC projects

• Nuclear trade information

• AP declarations

Ph

oto

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Today, we’ll talk mostly

about these

These tools were first applied to IAEA verification in 1991-93 and later became part of strengthened safeguards

Iraq

, D

PR

K, S

ou

th A

fric

a

New challenges

for safeguards:

DPRK, Iran,

Libya, . . .

Development

& consolidation

of strengthened

safeguards

Traditional

safeguards

1

2

3

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

0

1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1988 1986 1990 1996 2008

Environmental sampling

Extremely powerful technique for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities

Ad hoc use in early 1990s cases illustrated potential

93+2 field trials established feasibility as an IAEA tool

IAEA has an “in-house” lab and a network of analytical laboratories in Member States

More than 5,000 samples collected and analyzed

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The technical basis for environmental sampling

• Nuclear processes emit trace amounts of material to the environment

• This material can settle on equipment and surfaces within buildings, and can be transported outside to deposit on vegetation or soil or reach water systems

• Techniques exist that can detect and characterize these extremely low levels of nuclear material

A one-micron-diameter uranium particle (Photo: V. Stebelkov, Laboratory for Microparticle

Analysis, Moscow, Russian Federation)

Source: IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005

Early ad hoc IAEA use of environmental

sampling

Iraq

DPRK Ph

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CN

N

Program 93+2 field trials

• Swipe sampling was determined to be a viable, cost-effective technique – Use at declared sites

authorized in 1995

– Use at other locations authorized in 1997 for AP States

• Wide-area monitoring seen as useful but too expensive – AP provides for wide-area

environmental sampling only after Board of Governors approves its use

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P

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to:

IAE

A

IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)

(Number of laboratories in the State)

(As of Fall 2006)

Major steps in the process

Inspection

planning

Sampling kit

preparation

Shipment

to IAEA

Archive

Receipt and

encoding

Shipment

to NWAL Laboratory

analysis

ES Database

Input to State Evaluation

and Safeguards Conclusions

Evaluation of

ES results

Results sent

to IAEA

Sampling

Laboratory

analysis

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Photo: IAEA

Sampling

• The most common method

involves wiping surfaces with

a specially prepared cloth

• Specific procedures are

followed to avoid cross-

contamination and ensure

audit trail

• Other methods: – Vegetation

– Soil

– Water sampling Ph

oto

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Laboratory analysis

• Two main types of analysis

– Bulk analysis looks at a whole sample

– Particle analysis looks at individual microscopic particles (more sensitive, more expensive)

• Analytical instruments include

– Radiation detectors

– Mass spectrometers

– Scanning electron microscope, electron microprobe

• Isotopic ratios, age, chemical form, morphology, etc. all can provide clues

Sources:

--IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005;

--Safeguards Techniques and Equipment, 2003 Edition (IAEA Nuclear Verification Series)

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Fission track method for

locating U and Pu particles

Example Equipment:

Mass Spectrometer

Source: http://science.howstuffworks.com/mass-spectrometry.htm/printable

What can be measured and inferred?

A few examples:

• Uranium isotope ratios that differ from natural composition indicate enrichment activity

• Minor isotope ratios can indicate additional detail about enrichment processes and feed materials

• Presence of fission products can indicate processing of spent fuel

• Plutonium isotope ratios (240Pu/239Pu) indicate fuel burnup

• Radioactive parent-daughter ratios (e.g., 241Am/241Pu) serve as “chronometers” to indicate time since last chemical separation

Source: IAEA STR-348, Environmental Sampling for Safeguards, September 2005

Most work of enrichment is done at lower levels

From DOE GNEP Nonproliferation Impact Assessment

http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/documents/GNEP_NPIA.pdf

U-Thorium

Reactor

Illustrative particle data from sampling at a

gas centrifuge plant

Source: W. Bush, G. af Ekenstam, J. Janov, E. Kuhn, and M. Ryjinski, “IAEA Experience with Environmental

Sampling at Gas Centrifuge Plants in the European Union, IAEA-SM-367/1-/04

Pu Isotopic Composition as a function of Burn-

Up for LWRs

Data points are from: B. Pellaud, “Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling,” J. Nuc. Mat. Management XXXI, 30 (2002)

Graph courtesy Bathke, Charles, LANL D-5, 2007, Private Communication

Environmental sampling is used in synthesis

with other information streams

An example: South Korean uranium AVLIS research:

• From its open-source review of ROK scientific literature, the IAEA was aware of KAERI research on atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) of stable isotopes

• In order to rule out the possibility of undeclared uranium AVLIS work, the IAEA on 2002 and 2003 requested (and was refused) access to KAERI’s laser technology R&D center

• In March 2004, after ROK’s AP entered into force but before submission of ROK’s initial declaration, IAEA was allowed to visit the laser center but:

– ROK did not permit IAEA take environmental samples

– ROK said its AVLIS work did not involve nuclear material

• Once it receives a State’s initial AP declaration, the IAEA gains the right to conduct environmental sampling anywhere on a site

• In August 2004, the ROK proactively disclosed its past uranium AVLIS and U-metal conversion activities

Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004

Environmental sampling: Issues

• Implications for intelligence sources and methods

• States’ concerns about potential disclosure of sensitive or proprietary process details

• Ruling out cross-contamination or deliberate falsification – Confirmatory analysis (2 labs); blind samples

• States don’t want AP Article 5.a(iii) to be used as an excuse to access sensitive military sites with no nuclear connection

• Sample turnaround time

Questions on environmental sampling?

Satellite Imagery

Background

Cold

War Satellites for intelligence and national verification means

Early

1990s

IAEA receives and uses Member-State satellite

information on Iraq and DPRK

1995 Satellite imagery becomes a commercially available “open” source”

1998 IAEA Office of Legal Affairs study assessed legal issues

regarding safeguards use of commercial satellite imagery

2000

Commercial satellite imagery offers sufficient spatial

resolution (~1 meter) to enable analysis of detailed

structures; deemed viable for use in Safeguards

Today Multiple commercial satellites offer a range of providers,

resolutions, and capabilities, down to 0.5m resolution.

Beginnings: UNSCR 687 (1991) gave the IAEA exceptional

authorities and tasks with respect to Iraq’s nuclear

program

• IAEA needed, and had latitude to use, new tools and methods

• Member-State satellite imagery information was provided to the IAEA

– At first, as general background on suspect sites and for inspection planning

– Then, more tactically, to pursue actionable leads

– Later received U-2 (“Olive Branch”) aerial imagery

The first IAEA Iraq inspection team received Member-

State information, including line drawings of two sites

Baghdad Nuclear Research Centre,

Al-Tuwaitha Al-Tarmiya, site of suspected

uranium enrichment activities

Familiarized inspectors with suspect locations;

served as an aid to systematic verification

Sourc

e: U

N S

ecurity

Council,

S/2

2788, 15 J

uly

1991

Sourc

e: U

N S

ecurity

Council,

S/2

2788, 15 J

uly

1991

The second IAEA mission team received actionable

imagery-derived information support on a short-

turnaround basis

For example, the IAEA was informed of

specific locations where EMIS equipment was

being hidden at Qasr Tal, west of Baghdad

Image: DigitalGlobe via GoogleEarth

(See Jere Nichols, “Uncovering the Secret Program (I) -- the Initial Inspections,” http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/nichols.html)

One of these leads provided confirmation of an alleged

undeclared uranium enrichment program

Dust clouds from trucks

carrying EMIS gear

EMIS magnet

photographed

by IAEA team

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(See J. Nichols, “Uncovering the Secret Program (I) -- the Initial Inspections,” http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/nichols.html)

Director General Blix highlighted three conditions

needed for the IAEA to uncover clandestine nuclear

activities

- Statement by the Director General, Dr. Hans Blix before the Board of Governors, 18 July 1991

2. Unequivocal right of access, even at short notice, to

such sites

3. Necessary backing and support from the Security

Council

1. Access to information obtained, inter alia, through

national technical means, regarding sites that may

require inspection

DPRK 1992-93: Member-State satellite imagery was used

to support verification under an INFCIRC/153 agreement

Sources: Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) Center for Nonproliferation Studies; and David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, Vienna, 1997)

(Image: GeoEye IKONOS 0.8m, February 2006)

(Graphic: MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies)

1992-1993: Member-State satellite imagery used

in support of verification under DPRK’s NPT

safeguards agreement

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

(Image: GeoEye IKONOS 0.8m, February 2006)

(Image source: GeoEye IKONOS February 2006)

Building 500 Undeclared

waste storage

Ridge

High-resolution satellite imagery became commercially available at just the right time for strengthened

safeguards

1

2

3

10

9

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5

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1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1988 1986 1990 1996 2008

Sp

ati

al re

so

luti

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(G

SD

) -

metr

es

SPOT-1

IRS-1C/D Ir

aq

, D

PR

K, S

ou

th A

fric

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KVR-1000

(archival)

Worldview Orbview-3

SPOT-5

EROS-A

IKONOS

ALOS/PRISM

Traditional

safeguards

New challenges

for safeguards:

DPRK, Iran,

Libya, others

Development

& consolidation

of strengthened

safeguards

IAEA SIAU

established

IAEA/OLA

legal review

PDD-23

Quickbird

GeoEye-1

Cincinnati CVG Airport – old Satellite image

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Dubai International Airport GeoEye-1, 0.5m, 16 Nov 2009, from 423 mi at 4 mi/sec

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Moscow, Russia – Red Square GeoEye-1, 0.5m on 9 May 2010, 40 min after Victory Day Parade

32

33 From Frank Pabian, 2009, LANL

IAEA policy places certain limitations on the use of commercial satellite imagery

• Imagery analysis only for safeguards verification process

• All state-declared locations are subject to imaging

• No systematic, countrywide searches for undeclared activities permitted, but:

• Imagery may be used in conjunction with complementary information that localizes any suspected activity

• Other requirements • Security and confidentiality

• Source diversification

The IAEA uses commercial satellite imagery in a range of safeguards applications

• Supporting evaluation of newly revealed and alleged clandestine programs and activities

• Monitoring on-going development at critical nuclear fuel cycle facilities

• Support to Complementary Access inspections

• Supporting the verification of States’ declarations – Facility design information verification (DIV)

– Additional Protocol Article 2.a(iii), others

Highest

priority

As feasible

within

resources

Example: In August 2002, NCRI alleged that Iran was building a secret nuclear fuel plant 40 km SE of Kashan on the road to Natanz

A candidate location is

seen even on 30-meter

Landsat-7 imagery

A September 2002 high-resolution IKONOS image

shows construction of two large, hardened,

underground production halls

20 JUN 04

Natanz

uranium

enrichment

complex

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

4 OCT 05

Monitoring

changes at a site

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

(Image annotations by

Frank Pabian, LANL)

High-resolution optical imagery also is useful for monitoring changes near critical sites

ISIS published its analysis of possible tunneling activity (above) near Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment site and also (right) near the Esfahan uranium conversion facility

Source: Institute for Science and International Security, April 2006 and July 2007, www.isis-online.org

Imagery analysis can support design information verification

Imagery of UCF, Esfahan,

Iran, via GlobalSecurity.org,

(c) Space Imaging

IR-40 Radioisotope Production Reactor seen

under construction at Arak, Iran

42

Iran s refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency’s ability to

carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further

on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. The completion of the

containment structure over the reactor building, and the roofing for the other buildings on the site,

makes it impossible to assess further progress on construction inside the buildings without access

to the facility. However, satellite imagery suggests that construction is continuing at the reactor site.

IR-40 Radioisotope Production Reactor seen

under construction at Arak, Iran

43

The research community is developing tools to

assist image analysts in extracting key content

Other sensor types can selectively

complement optical imagery

• Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)

• Thermal infrared

• Hyperspectral

An optical image of the Arak heavy water plant

Optical imagery is only available in daytime and in clear weather

Gra

ph

ic:

IAE

A

A synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) image of the Arak heavy water plant

0.3m TerraSAR X Graphic:

IAEA

Coherent change detection with radar imagery

SAR image Optical image (Source: http://www.sandia.gov/radar/images/ccd.jpg)

Vehicle tracks that are not

apparent in optical image

Hyperspectral analysis relies on spectral

information to identify materials

HYPERION © NASA

Most promising near-term safeguards application

appears to be monitoring mining/milling sites,

where there are large, open stockpiles of materials

Source: G. Borstad, Borstad Associates, Ltd., Sydney, BC, Canada

Multispectral Satellite Photos identify materials

from space, using spectral absorption

50

The images produced by M3 can be thought of as a

cube of information. The width is 600 pixels (each of

which has a spatial resolution of 70 m at the

instrument's altitude of 100 km), the length is an infinite

strip along the spacecraft's orbital path (or wherever

one chooses to "crop" the picture for an individual

study), and the depth is 261 spectral channels.

From NASA: Moon Mineralogy Mapper website

51

Satellite imagery: issues

• Image acquisition is expensive

• SIAU has small staff relative to workload

• It takes considerable time for nuclear imagery analysts to gain proficiency, which is at odds with the IAEA’s rotation policy

• Shutter-control and resolution control by States that operate satellites; competition for coverage

• Some states (notably Iran) still question IAEA’s authority to use satellite imagery

• Facilitating integration with other information sources needed for analysis

Questions on satellite imagery?

Open Source Analysis

R. Wallace, G. Anzelon, J. Essner, F. Pabian

Usefulness of Open Source Information

• May provide the first clues to clandestine nuclear activities

• May provide clues to specific locations for application of

more detailed technologies (imagery, ES, inspections, etc.)

• May provide relationships between entities that suggest

further investigation needed

No

. of re

po

rts (av/y

r)

Year

Publications from nulear institute

Examples of OS Questions

• Can the country make x (magnetic top bearings for centrifuges for example)?

Where? Who's involved?

• Country technology assessment - does the country have the capability to

conduct a nuclear weapons program, what key organizations and people

would likely be involved, what technologies are lacking?

• Is there a relationship between organization x and organization y and

individual z?

• Where might a secret enrichment plant be located?

• Are the high-voltage switches recently reported as being illegally sold by x to

y, suitable for use in a nuclear weapon detonator firing set?

• Is Iranian Speaker of the Majlis (parliament) and former Chief Nuclear

Negotiator Ali Larijani related to M J A Larijani, Director of the Iranian

Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (leading center

for computational modeling)? (yes, they're brothers)

Slide 56

Open Sources include:

• Publicly available information (found on internet, provided by NGOs,

companies, the news media, and governments).

• "Fee-based" information such as published scientific and technical

literature or subscription data bases, maps, guidebooks, statistical

compilations of data, textbooks.

• Information normally only made available on request or to specific

individuals including:

– Company financial reports

– Conference information (participant lists or paper titles, abstracts, or full

text)

– Internal publications of various organizations

– Internal travel reports

– Technical cooperation summaries

– Unpublished scientific papers and pre-prints

– Patent applications

Slide 57

Scientific papers

• Bhatti, J.A., Aijazi, M.K., Khan, A.Q., “Design characteristics of molecular drag pumps,” (2000) Vacuum, 60 (1-2), pp. 213-219.

• Ahmed M., Ali A., Hasnain S.K., Hashmi F.H., Khan A.Q., “Magnetic properties of maraging steel in relation to deformation and structural phase transformations,” (1994) Acta metallurgica et materialia, 42 (3), pp. 631-638.

• F. Habiby, T. N. Siddiqui, H. Hussain, M. A. Khan, A. ul Haq, A. Q. Khan, “Machine-induced phase transformation in a maraging steel,” Materials Science and Engineering A, Volume 159, Issue 2, 30 December 1992, Pages 261-265.

• F. Habiby, A. ul Haq, A. Q. Khan, “Influence of austenite on the coercive force, electrical resistivity and hardness of 18% Ni maraging steels,” Materials & Design, Volume 13, Issue 5, 1992, Pages 259-264.

• M. Alam, M.A. Atta, J.A. Mirza and A.Q. Khan, “Flow induced vibrations in gas tube assembly of centrifuge,” Journal of Nuclear Science Technology. 23 (1986) (9), pp. 819–827.

Slide 58

Proliferation Pathway Analysis

• Consider the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

• Consider activities required to successfully produce &

deliver nuclear weapon

• Analyze State to determine which components are

present or missing.

Slide 59

60

A fuel cycle with reprocessing recovers unburned 235U

and plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

From Fred Wehling, MIIS

Storage

Enrich

ment

U ore

Yellow-

cake

UF6

LEU-

UO2

LEU

-

UF6

Value of Open Sources to Safeguards

• “Part 1” measures under strengthened safeguards allows IAEA, inter

alia, to evaluate open-source information as part of safeguards

process

• Value of open sources evident in 2004 in two cases

1. South Korean publications suggested AVLIS activities took place in

ROK, leading to clarified declaration from ROK authorities. a

2. Publications suggested nuclear material, facilities and activities related

to U conversion and reprocessing taking place in Egypt, leading to

Egyptian cooperation in resolving anomalies. b

61

a “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004

b Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, GOV/2005/9, Date: 14 February 2005

ROK Uranium enrichment experiments of 2000

• KAERI has published over a dozen papers on the spectroscopy of

uranium and uranium compounds between 1991-2004, most of which

involved the same research team. Many were published in Optics

Communications in 1993, 1994, 1998, and 1999.

• On August 17, 2004, South Korea's Ministry of Science and

Technology (MOST) reported to the IAEA that South Korea had

conducted experiments to enrich U. The Laboratory for Quantum

Optics at KAERI conducted experiments to enrich uranium three

times during January and February 2000. The experiments were

conducted using atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and

yielded about 0.2 grams of uranium enriched to an average of 10

percent in the three experiments. The peak level of enrichment in the

experiments was 77 percent. Korean scientists separated the U235.

Slide 62

Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea, GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004

ROK Uranium Spectroscopy – Ex. paper

• Author(s): Jung, EC; Kim, TS; Song, K; Kim, CJ

• Title: Diode laser-excited optogalvanic and absorption measurements of uranium in a hollow

cathode discharge

• Source: SPECTROSCOPY LETTERS, 36 (1-2): 167-180 JAN-MAR 2003

• Abstract: Optogalvanic spectra for fifty two transition lines of uranium in the wavelength ranges

of 662-683, 774-792, and 834-862 nm were measured by using external-cavity diode lasers.

Among these transitions, 860.795 nm and 682.691 nm were chosen for a detailed investigation of

the detection limit for uranium by wavelength modulation spectroscopy due to its stronger signal

magnitudes. A detection limit of about 2 x 10(-5) absorbance achieved at 860.795 nm is more

sensitive than that obtained at 682.691 nm, but the absorption spectrum at 682.691 nm is

preferable to determine the isotope ratio due to the narrower hyperfine structure as well as

the larger isotope shift. A preliminary result for an isotope ratio determination in a depleted

sample is presented.

• Addresses: Korea Atom Energy Res Inst, Lab Quantum Opt, Taejon 305600, South Korea

63

Egypt Irradiation & Reprocessing (2004-2005)

• IAEA analysis of open-source publications suggested the possibility of nuclear material, activities, and facilities in Egypt related to uranium extraction and conversion,

irradiation of uranium targets and reprocessing that had not been reported as required

• During a series of meetings and inspections from October 2004 – February 2005, Egypt cooperated with the IAEA in resolving these relatively small-scale issues and making proper declarations

• The Board did not ask for Egypt’s reporting failures to be reported to the Security Council

Source: “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, GOV/2005/9, 14 February 2005

Example Publication on reprocessing

“Kinetic separation of uranium from selected fission products”,

Daoud, J.A.; Rahman, N.A.; Aly, H.F. (Atomic Energy Authority, Cairo

(Egypt). Hot Laboratories Centre), International conference on

evaluation of emerging nuclear fuel cycle systems, Versailles

(France) 11-14 Sep 1995, Anon. Global 1995 Paris (France) Edition

ANS 1995 2032 p. p. 1227-1233.

Slide 65

NCRI 8/14/2002 Revelation led to Confirmation of Natanz

66

Five Greatest Challenges for Open Source

Analysis

Challenges to using open sources in attempt to answer specific

nonproliferation questions

1. Scarcity of information

– (e.g., DPRK uranium enrichment in 2005)

2. Information overload

– (e.g., nuclear fuel cycle in Japan: 21,400,000 Google results)

3. Validation

– (e.g., inaccurate & deliberately false or misleading info)

Slide 67

Slide 68

Iran Missile Test – Sepah News (IRG), 7/9/08

Slide 69

Iran Missile Test –News & TV Broadcast, 7/10/08

Slide 70

Internet Blog - July, 2008

Five Greatest Challenges for Open Source

Analysis

Challenges to using open sources in attempt to answer specific

nonproliferation questions

1. Scarcity of information

– (e.g., DPRK uranium enrichment in 2005)

2. Information overload

– (e.g., nuclear fuel cycle in Japan: 21,400,000 Google results)

3. Validation

– (e.g., inaccurate & deliberately false or misleading info)

4. Language barriers

5. Information analysis

– Collecting, organizing, determining associations, tracking, and

drawing conclusions

Slide 71

Search Terms – Language Issues

Abd Al-Qadir Khan, Abdel Kader Khan, Abdel Qadeer Khan, Abdel Qader Khan,

Ab-del-Qadeer Khan, Abdoul Qadeer Khan , Abdoul Quadeer Khan, Abdul Kadeer Khan, Abdul Kader Khan, Abdul Kadir

Khan , Abdul Qadeer, Abdul Qadeer Kahn, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Abdul Qadir Khan,

Abdul Quadeer Khan, Abdul Quadir Khan, Abdul Quader Khan, AQ Khan, A.Q. Khan, A Q Khan, عبد القدير خان (ar), عبدالغدير خان (fa),

,(fa) عبدالقديرخان

Recent Advances

• Advances in collection • Expanded range of online sources

• “Federated” search

• Anonymous searching

• Name-alias reconciling, phonetic searching

• Advanced machine translation

• Advances in processing • Duplication removal

• Automatic entity extraction

• Machine translation

• Improved relevance ranking

73

Recent Advances

• Advances in analysis • Integrated analysis of different types of information (unstructured

text, graphics, geographic, etc.)

• Automatic extraction of relationships, links, associations

• Geospatial Information System to organize data spatially

• Simplified user interfaces

• Minimal training and maintenance requirements

• Visual and graphical link/association analysis • Improved collaboration analysis tools

• Improved security of electronic distribution systems

• Overall analysis and resource efficiencies and improvements

result in lower overall costs

74

Open Source Analysis Future Needs

• Many desired needs are for the continued improvement of

recent advances • Improvement on overall ease-of-use

• Better computerized language translation and searching

• Better entity extraction

• More efficient duplicate elimination

• Development of a nuclear-proliferation-specific database

containing information that contribute to State Evaluation

Process and a Integrated Collaborative Environment for

nonproliferation analysis

75

76

Open Source Analysis Summary

• Advancements in information collection and analysis will

continue to improve the use of open source information

for nuclear nonproliferation detection

• Key technologies – Anonymously ferreting out obscure information from numerous

sources that are in different formats & a variety of languages,

using simple interfaces (with a single query!)

– Combining that information & extracting relevant data

– Rapidly analyzing the relevance of vast amounts of information

and presenting an integrated, intuitive summary to the analyst

Other non-traditional information used in safeguards State Evaluation

• Environmental sampling

• Satellite imagery

• Open Sources

• IAEA/TC projects

• Nuclear trade information

• AP declarations

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oto

: IA

EA

There’s more to it than just “detection”

• Assessing likely risk that a clandestine nuclear program exists

• Detecting (or receiving from 3rd parties) specific actionable indications

• Follow-up investigations, possibly at suspect locations

• Confirmation of undeclared activities

• Assessment and characterization

• Verification of elimination

Detection: Where did actionable leads come from that

allowed probing of undeclared nuclear activities?

Case At sites with

declared facilities? IAEA Third Parties

2002-2004 Iran No X

2003-2004 Libya No X

2004 South Korea Yes X

2004 Egypt Yes X

2007-2008 Syria No X

The IAEA needn’t be the main defense for detecting

activities away from declared locations

• Actionable leads more often come from member-state intelligence or other 3rd-party sources than as a product of the IAEA’s independent detection means

– The IAEA doesn’t necessarily have to be the first line of defense with respect to detecting indications of undeclared activities, especially at undeclared sites

– But the IAEA often is best positioned to act on and investigate indications

• Equipping, empowering, and encouraging the IAEA to fully investigate and report indications of undeclared activities is essential

The State Evaluation process puts it all

together

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Safeguards Conclusions

Resolution of Inconsistencies & Questions

State Evaluation Report • Assessment • Follow-up Action

Analysis and Evaluation

Safeguards verification information

• Inspector observations

• Inspection data &analysis

• Environmental sampling

results

• Material balance evaluations

State-declared information

• Design information

• Operating records

• Accountancy reports

• Voluntary export reporting

• Additional Protocol reporting

Other information • Internal databases

• Scientific & technical literature

• News media articles

• Research institutions

• Trade publications

• Internet

• Satellite Imagery

The End

Slide 82