Tolan Committee and the Internment of Japanese Americans

THE TOLAN COMMITTEE AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

by

Matthew Saccento

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

The Wilkes Honors College

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences

with a Concentration in History

Wilkes Honors College of

Florida Atlantic University

Jupiter, Florida

May 2008

ii

THE TOLAN COMMITTEE AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

by

Matthew Saccento

This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s thesis advisor, Dr. Christopher D. Ely, and has been approved by the members of his supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of The Honors College and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

____________________________ Dr. Christopher D. Ely

____________________________ Dr. Christopher B. Strain

____________________________ Dr. Jeffrey Buller - Dean, Wilkes Honors College

____________ Date

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Professor Christopher Ely for keeping me on track with what I

assumed would be the most difficult task of my life. Of course, it was, but I can

thankfully note that my sanity remains intact.

And to Professor Christopher Strain, for agreeing to read this thing less than a week

before the due date, and for all the additional sources.

iv

ABSTRACT

Author: Matthew Saccento

Title: The Tolan Committee and the Internment of Japanese Americans

Institution: Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Christopher D. Ely

Degree: Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences

Concentration: History

Year: 2008

Within three months of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin

Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which allowed military commanders to establish

zones of military importance within which they could remove any person considered

dangerous, specifically those of Japanese descent. The Tolan Committee, a House

committee examining the logistics of the new wartime economy, was immediately sent to

the West Coast in order to evaluate the merit of the President's policy. They were

presented with the most complete set of arguments both supporting and opposing

internment, and were therefore in a unique position to make a well-informed decision

regarding the internment of over 100,000 persons. Despite the strength of the arguments

of the opposition, the Committee abdicated their power and submitted to the will of the

President and the military. In succumbing to fear, the Committee legitimized the policy

of internment without making a truly objective decision.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface……………………………………………………………………………vi

Chapter 1: Panic…………………………………………………………………...1

Chapter 2: The Committee…………………….......................................................6

Chapter 3: Much Needed Education……………...................................................27

Chapter 4: Necessity...............................................................................................39

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….......50

vi

PREFACE

The slow-changing and non-reactive nature of the American political system is

one of the great strengths of the Constitution. The many checks and balances enumerated

in the Constitution resist radical political changes and reforms based on the often-

reactionary whims of the people. In times of crisis, logic and reason are quickly replaced

with passion and irrationality. Following the recent terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001, many Muslims and persons of Middle-Eastern descent were the targets of violence

and even calls of deportation. Panic quickly undermined any notion of equal protection

under the law. The constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment were almost

lost in the panic of the attacks. Despite continuing discrimination, the government

restored order and an oppressive backlash was averted.

The Japanese American citizens residing in the United States following the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were not so lucky. The Constitution and many of its

guarantees were forgotten in the ensuing panic. Today, the internment of the Japanese

during the Second World War is considered one of the greatest failures of American

democracy and one of the most shameful events in American history. Diametrically

opposed to the core principles that the United States was founded on, the internment

policy represents the actions of an overly responsive government with a bloated and

unbalanced executive branch. Retrospectively, the internment of the Japanese is a

cautionary tale regarding political conduct during a time of panic.

1

Chapter 1: Panic

The internment of Japanese American citizens and aliens following the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor represents a fundamental breakdown of American democracy.

Filled with fear and anger, and driven by panic, Americans called upon their government

for actions that would demonstrate strength and stability. This 'panic' was characterized

by a severe sense of insecurity regarding the overall safety of the United States, the

strength of the American military, and the ability of the government to protect the nation.

The attack destabilized the nation, and while government agencies and officials worked

quickly to restore order and faith in their leadership, many Americans sought the most

immediate source of consolation. As rumors of sabotage and disloyalty within the

Japanese American community spread, Americans became increasingly suspicious and

racial tensions grew strained. Once prominent government officials suggested relocating

all of the Japanese residing on the West Coast; the federal government implemented the

policy within a few months. Most Americans were either in favor of, ignorant of, or

indifferent to the proposed relocation, and thus over 100,000 Japanese American citizens

and aliens were quietly interned in early 1942.

The frightened members of Congress and the Supreme Court surrendered their

authority to the executive branch and the military. Unwilling to protect the rights of

minorities or uphold the Constitution, they abdicated their responsibilities to the

American people and betrayed the very basic principles of the American Constitution: the

balance and separation of powers. The wartime panic prevented the formation of

organized opposition to relocation from within or outside the government. Civil rights

groups supported the President and the military; even within the Japanese American

2

community dissent was minimal. The doctrine of “military necessity” allowed the

executive to claim an increasing amount of power for itself.

Despite the general apathy that met the call for internment, Congress made a

token effort to examine the justifications for relocation. The House of Representatives

established a special committee, the Select Committee Investigating National Defense

Migration, a committee chaired by Congressman John Tolan of California. The Tolan

committee scrutinized the evidence presented by those proposing internment, inevitably

determining that relocation was indeed a military necessity; however, they based their

conclusions on weak, biased, and in many cases unsubstantiated evidence.

“A date which will live in infamy”

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese military attacked an American naval base at

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, killing roughly 2,300 Americans and damaging or destroying

nineteen naval ships.1 Shocked and horrified by the actions of the Japanese Empire, many

Americans began to panic. Before long, rumors of Japanese espionage, also known as

“fifth-column activity,” spread, instilling within many Americans a profound sense of

insecurity regarding their neighbors of Japanese descent. The media and public figures

fueled these rumors. For example, after a brief visit to Pearl Harbor, Secretary of the

Navy Frank Knox hastily declared, without evidence, that the resident Japanese had

sabotaged the American defense effort. The rumors of Japanese sabotage, such as stories

about Japanese Americans signaling offshore Japanese Navy ships, continued, despite

assurances by the federal government that all dangerous persons had been apprehended

1 Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II (New York: Hill and

Wang, 1993), 22.

3

immediately following the attack, and that sabotage did not constitute a threat.2 Indeed,

law enforcement agencies detained over 2,000 aliens after the attack.3

The assurances of the federal government could not overcome the racial hostility

that had been growing on the West Coast for decades. The Japanese inherited a negative

racial stereotype from the long-despised Chinese that many Americans often described as

dishonest, untrustworthy, disloyal, and menacing.4 The incongruity of this stereotype was

not only blatant, but wholly without logic. Americans condemned the Japanese for their

inability to be faithful to anything, and for their undying loyalty to the Emperor of Japan.

Most Americans accepted the Japanese racial stereotype and truly believed that

the Japanese were inherently less able, less intelligent, and culturally backwards. Thus the

staggeringly impressive military campaign of the Japanese navy startled and terrified

Americans. On the same day that they attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese navy

devastated Hong Kong, Manila, Thailand, Singapore, Midway, Wake, and Guam. By

December 8, Thailand had surrendered, and the Japanese military continued towards

Singapore. On December 10, the Japanese destroyed the British warships Repulse and

Prince of Wales. That same day, Japanese forces entered the Philippines and neared

Manila. Guam fell on the 11th, and Midway and Wake were all but lost.5 In the past, many

Americans viewed the Japanese as weak and backwards, but their perceptions changed

drastically in light of these Japanese naval successes. Afterwards, a sense of insecurity

and hopelessness prevailed in the United States, especially on the West Coast, where a

2 Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Mason, Prejudice, War and the Constitution

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 70. 3 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942 (Washington, D. C.: United States

Government Printing Office, 1943), 3. 4 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 23-24. 5 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 69.

4

Japanese invasion not only seemed plausible, but likely.6

Military Necessity

Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt led the Western Defense Command, which

supervised the war effort on the West Coast. His leadership was weak, nervous, biased,

and dangerous. He once revealed his opinion of the Japanese before Congress, stating, “A

Jap's a Jap, it makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not. I have no

confidence in their loyalty whatsoever.”7 Prone to overreaction and insecure to a fault,

DeWitt constantly feared that the West Coast was in imminent danger from invasion. For

instance, he and his staff believed that an impending armed uprising of twenty thousand

Japanese residing in the San Francisco Bay Area would coincide with an invasion on

December 10. DeWitt’s incompetence here is readily apparent. Even if he assumed that

every Japanese American man, woman, and child in the region took part in the imagined

uprising, twenty thousand Japanese did not reside in the area.8

Convinced that all the Japanese residing on the West Coast were cooperating with

the Japanese Empire, DeWitt wanted expanded powers to deal with subversive aliens and

secure the West Coast. He requested greater search and seizure powers in order to

conduct more effective raids on homes and businesses to confiscate contraband.9 On a

number of occasions DeWitt suggested the relocation all aliens of enemy states from the

coast. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, citing military

6 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 241. 7 Peter Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 350. 8 Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger

Publishing Company, 1990), 14-15. 9 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 3.

5

necessity, signed Executive Order 9066, which gave General DeWitt the authority to

relocate any person who posed a danger within a military area.10 As applied, the policy

would specifically target persons of Japanese lineage.

The President and the military cited a number of reasons to support the claim of

military necessity. They noted the surprising success of the Japanese military in the

Pacific, and the threat of invasion. The military believed that the Japanese who resided on

the coast were naturally sympathetic and loyal to Japan, and would likely assist in the

invasion. Furthermore, concentrated on the West Coast were precious war facilities and

installations that they argued could not be jeopardized. Finally, they claimed that the

long-standing racial hostilities towards persons of Japanese descent could produce

violence and civil disorder.11

President Roosevelt claimed that victory required an expansion of executive

power; however, both Congress and the Supreme Court needed to approve the measure in

order to legitimize it. Roosevelt asked Congress to give him the power to enforce

interment. On March 12, 1942, the 77th U.S. Congress did so by enacting Public Law No.

503, which provided a penalty for the “violation of restrictions or orders with respect to

persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or

zones.”12 The Supreme Court supported the military and the power to wage war. The

Court determined that General DeWitt had enough evidence to honestly and reasonably

conclude that Executive Order 9066 represented a military necessity.13

10 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 25. 11 War Relocation Authority, Legal and Constitutional Phases of the War Program. Vol. 4 (New

York: AMS Press, 1975), 6-7. 12 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 30. 13 War Relocation Authority, Legal and Constitutional Phases of the War Program. Vol. 4, 5-6.

6

Chapter 2: The Committee

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Tolan Committee performed the most

extensive analysis of President Roosevelt's proposed relocation policy. Not only was the

Committee in a position to make a well informed and reasonable decision regarding the

policy, the reactions and the conduct of the committee members exposed the sentiments

held by elected lawmakers towards the appropriate wartime conduct of the government.

By examining the hearings of the Tolan Committee it is possible to gain an understanding

of the greater American discourse regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the

Tolan Committee had the opportunity to influence the decisions of Congress with respect

to internment, an extremely important role considering that, without Congressional

approval and cooperation, the President's policy could not have been implemented.

Unfortunately, this is a fact that seems to have been lost of the members of the

Committee. Overall, it appears that they considered the judgment of the President to be

final, and once the President suggested that the military handle the Japanese residing in

the United States, they felt that they were not in a position to argue. The actions of the

Tolan Committee suggest that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was enough to disrupt

the Constitutionally guaranteed balance of power and to remove Congress from its place

as the President and the executive's equal.

Before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, Congress created a

committee to investigate the “Japanese question.” The committee chairman, John Tolan

(Democrat), was a lawyer before he was elected in California to the House of

Representatives in 1935, and was a fourth term member at the time that the President

7

issued Order 9066.14 John J. Sparkman (Democrat), was also a lawyer before he was

elected to represent Alabama in the House, and was serving his third term in 1942.15

Laurence F. Arnold (Democrat), of Illinois, was a banker and a businessman before being

elected to the House in 1937, and was serving in his third and final term at the time that

the Tolan Committee met.16 Like Tolan and Sparkman, Carl T. Curtis (Republican) came

from a legal background before being elected to represent Nebraska in 1939 and was

serving in only his second term in the House of Representatives at the outbreak of World

War II.17 George H. Bender (Republican), of Ohio, was a businessman before he decided

to run for Congress and failed in his first four attempts, finally being elected to the

seventy-sixth Congress in 1939.18 The Tolan Committee met in several cities on the West

Coast to examine the threat posed by resident Japanese and the necessity of relocation.

After the President signed Order 9066, the committee had the opportunity to evaluate the

decisions of the both the President and the military. The Presidential Order, among a

number of other factors, biased their decisions.

“A Jap is a Jap”

After the United States declared war on the Japanese empire, both Germany and

Italy declared war on America, so during the Second World War three groups of enemy

aliens resided within the United States—Japanese, Germans, and Italians.19 Germans and

Italians, for the most part, coexisted peacefully in American society; and while a large

14 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “Tolan, John Harvey, (1877-1947)”

http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000295 (accessed February 27, 2008). 15 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “Sparkman, John Jackson, (1899-1985).” 16 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “Arnold, Laurence Fletcher, (1891-1966).” 17 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “Curtis, Carl Thomas, (1905-2000).” 18 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “Bender, George Harrison, (1896-1961).” 19 The term “enemy alien” simply refers to persons from an enemy nation who were living in the

United States during the war, not necessarily enemy combatants.

8

number of these groups resisted, to a certain extent, assimilation into the greater

American culture, Americans accepted them. The Japanese on the other hand faced great

discrimination. Many of the groups and persons who advanced internment as witnesses

before the Tolan Committee did so blatantly and for purely racist reasons. They

succeeded in convincing a similarly minded group of congressmen that failed to observe

the situation objectively and logically.

The Japanese, they argued, were an “obscure” and “secretive” race. The private

nature of Japanese communities led many to believe that the Japanese actively avoided

assimilation. The term “enemy alien” concisely describes the perceived status of the

Japanese at the time. Whether they were born on American soil or not, they were

foreigners. The perceived racial differences were so glaring that many Americans

believed that it was impossible to understand the Japanese who might as well have been a

different species. Instead of approaching the cultural particularities of the Japanese with

curiosity, they simply deemed the Japanese a race of people that could not be understood.

Robert H. Fouke, Representing the California Joint Immigration Committee, argued that

it was inherently difficult to establish the loyalty of the Japanese.20 Many readily

admitted that they did not understand the Japanese. J. W. Spangler, the vice president of

the Seattle First National Bank, stated quite simply that he found the Japanese hard to

understand; their foreign customs and traditions created a cultural divide that prevented

many Americans from having any contact with them.21 State Senator Ronald E. Jones of

20

House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, National Defense Migration. Part

29: San Francisco Hearings: Problems of Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military

Zones, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., February 21, 23, 1942, 11074-86. 21

House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, National Defense Migration. Part

30: Portland and Seattle Hearings: Problems of Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited

Military Zones, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., February 26, 28, and March 2, 1942, 11421.

9

Oregon could not accurately describe the culture of Japanese Americans. He provided a

vague and uncertain description of the Japanese, and many Americans shared his views.22

Because of the perceived differences in culture that divided the Japanese from the greater

American culture, many considered the Japanese to be dangerous, secretive, disloyal, and

un-American.

Many believed that the Japanese had not assimilated into American culture,

causing many Americans to distrust the Japanese and question their capacity to actually

act as Americans. The common belief expressed during the Tolan hearings was that

unlike the Japanese, Germans and Italians had assimilated and were “good, trustworthy”

Americans.23 Many Americans sincerely believed that Germans and Italians should be

treated differently from the Japanese. Numerous witnesses note the ease with which one

could judge the loyalty of Germans and Italians, and the nigh impossibility of verifying

the loyalty of the Japanese. Verne Smith, the chief of police of Alameda, California,

addressing the racial tolerance of the Tolan Committee, stated:

I think from your remarks that you are considering the Italian, German, and Japanese question as a whole. I think that is a mistake. I think that there are two divisions—the question of the Italian and German aliens, and the question of the Japanese citizen.

I say that even though we are showing our racial tolerance by having some of the Japanese citizens in the audience listening today.

I think they are two entirely different questions, because for years we have known Italian and German aliens and there is a common meeting ground between their minds and our own.

There is, so far as I can ascertain, no particular common meeting ground for the oriental and occidental mind, In other words, as an experienced police officer, I find it practically impossible to obtain information, to obtain true impressions of the Japanese, It is much more difficult, in fact more nearly impossible than it is with the other two classes of aliens.24

22 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11314. 23 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11102. 24 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11108.

10

The fierce manner in which the committee members defended the rights of Italians

exposes their bias against the Japanese. First of all, Congress gave Italians the

opportunity to prove their loyalty by pledging their allegiance to the United States (a

mere pledge was not enough for the Japanese), a measure that the committee supported

wholeheartedly. Second, in order to preserve the morale of Italians serving in the

American military, the committee noted that it would be unreasonable to subject their

families to loyalty checks, and that it was reasonable to assume that most subversive

elements would not serve, or send their children to serve in the military of the enemy

nation. Third, the committee expressed great sympathy for the Italian families subjected

to hardships because of loyalty checks.25 This claim most clearly elucidates the bias of

the committee, as they ignored the focus of the hearings: the abridgment of the rights of

over 100,000 people by removing them from their homes and detaining them in interment

centers. The final assurance of the loyalty of Italians supported by the committee was the

claim that the Italians were cooperating with law enforcement officials and turning in

known subversive Italian agents.26

The Tolan Committee should be commended for protecting the liberties of Italian

Americans; however, when confronted with the facts regarding the nature of Japanese

patriotic activities, the Committee ignored reason and logic. First, the Japanese, certainly

American-born citizens, wanted to help the United States win the war. As James Y.

Sakamoto, the general chairman of the emergency defense council of the Japanese

American Citizens League said, the “Japanese do not want to be sent to a safe place.”27


11

When the war began, thousands of Japanese already served in the armed forces, and after

Pearl Harbor, many more wished to join. The mayor of Seattle, Washington, Earl Millikin

argued that the Japanese did in fact want to prevent subversion, but they were unwilling

to go to the authorities.28 As Louis Goldblatt, secretary of the California State Industrial

Union Council, explained, because of fear and historic discrimination, the Japanese felt

less comfortable dealing with the authorities than with other groups. Furthermore, he

argued that the authorities knew of pro-fascist persons and groups, yet did nothing

because they were not Japanese. Goldblatt called the racial antagonism that had gripped

the nation a great victory for those who wished to assail the Japanese rather than defeat

the Axis nations. In response to Goldblatt, Tolan questioned him regarding the manner in

which the military and the Justice Department should investigate the loyalty of the

Japanese. Goldblatt argued that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] had been

investigating Japanese subversive activities for years. By cooperating with the FBI, he

explained, the loyalty of the Japanese could be determined much like any other group.

Tolan claimed that the FBI had previously attempted to apprehend subversive Japanese,

and their failure resulted in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated:

We had our F. B. I. in Honolulu, yet they had probably the greatest, the most perfect system of espionage and sabotage ever in the history of war, native-born Japanese. On the only roadway to the shipping harbor there were hundreds and hundreds of automobiles clogging the street, don’t you see? There they sought to distinguish the Japanese in Pearl Harbor from our American Japanese.

For the remainder of the exchange, Tolan dismissed most of Goldblatt’s

testimony. Unhappy with an answer given by Goldblatt, he neither questioned nor

affirmed, and merely replied with “Uh-huh.” Goldblatt later argued that the

28 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11409.

12

government was unfairly targeting the Japanese, letting known subversive agents

of Italy and Germany retain their freedom. For example, Goldblatt claimed that

Andriano Sylvester, a known government agent of Italy who spoke highly of

Mussolini, was allowed to serve on the draft board in San Francisco. Instead of

directly responding to his claim, Tolan simply avoided Goldblatt’s point and tried

to undermine his credibility as a serious and reasonable witness, stating, “So you

are not worried about Japan. They seem to be winning a good many battles over

there.”29 In their defense of Italians, the committee also failed to note the

lackluster attempt on the part of many Italians to assimilate into the greater

American culture. Many Italians could neither read nor write English, which

certainly represents a refusal to assimilate. Regarding Italians, the committee

simply paid this claim no attention; however, when regarding the Japanese, they

argued this as a source of disloyalty.30

At this point, Tolan was no longer arguing from a controlled and

reasonable perspective. He made no attempt to defend any of the inconsistencies

in his arguments, and he quickly, and seemingly randomly, leaped from point to

point with little connection between his ideas. Tolan was merely clinging to his

preconceived notions regarding the Japanese and he seemed unable to concede

any point made contrary to those notions. Not only were his arguments made at

random, but also they were without truth, and in some cases wholly without logic.

He claimed that the “native-born Japanese” constituted the greatest form of

espionage and sabotage “ever in the history of war,” as if they had been “planted”

29 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11182. 30 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11125.

13

there by the Japanese government—spies from birth.31 Clearly, in Tolan's mind,

there is simply no difference between a person of Japanese descent born and

raised in Japan or America. The failure of the F.B.I. in Honolulu was that they

attempted to make this distinction—that they tried to distinguish between

Japanese fighter pilots and the Japanese standing in the streets of Hawaii staring

in horror. From this exchange alone, Tolan became unbelievable as a fair judge of

the Japanese.

Citizenship posed yet another hurdle for Japanese trying to prove their loyalty. At

the time, technically, all persons of Japanese descent were citizens of the empire of Japan,

and a person who held citizenship in another state could not become a citizen of the

United States. Therefore, according to Joseph K. Carson, Jr., Department Commander of

the American Legion, the Japanese were naturally different from Americans. He, and

many others, claimed that since the Japanese could not technically become citizens of the

United States they did not deserve the rights accorded to citizens by the Constitution.32

While the Japanese government did claim that all persons of Japanese descent held

Japanese citizenship, expatriation was possible, and therefore any Japanese person

willing to renounce his or her Japanese citizenship could become a citizen of the United

States; however, after Pearl Harbor, the American government dissolved all Japanese

consulates within the United States, and consequently no course for formal expatriation

existed, unless the government established an official method within the American court

system.33

The differences of the Japanese, both culturally and physically, created


14

insurmountable barriers to their treatment as equals and Americans. All Japanese residing

in the United States, citizens or not, were consistently referred to as “enemy aliens.”

While Americans often used this term simply to refer to citizens of an enemy nation

residing within the United States, many used it more broadly to separate and alienate the

Japanese. The members of the Tolan Committee found it difficult to view these people as

Americans, although a large number of persons of Japanese ancestry were in fact citizens

of the United States; this further stigmatized an already despised group.34 The Tolan

Committee showed genuine concern for the property rights of the future internees, and its

report states that the exploitation of property, even of enemy aliens should be prevented.35

The mere fact that the committee needed to emphasize that all property should be

protected reveals the poor treatment of Japanese Americans as less than Americans.

Subversion

Because of their racist views, the Tolan Committee firmly believed that they had

proof of Japanese subversive activities. They argued with conviction that resident

Japanese played an integral role in the attack on Pearl Harbor, that they had settled in

strategic areas and were preparing to assault the infrastructure of the United States, and

that their language schools had the sole purpose of indoctrination. The hostility of the

Committee towards certain witnesses revealed their biases.

Members of the committee claimed that the attack on Pearl Harbor could not have

been carried out without the help of resident Japanese actively preventing and stalling the

American response. The congressmen believed that the Japanese crowded a major bridge

34 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 100. 35 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11023.

15

and succeeded in preventing a more effective American response.36 Their claims portray a

lack of knowledge regarding the facts of the attack, and disrespect for their colleagues in

Congress, the members of the Roberts Commission. President Roosevelt appointed the

Roberts Commission, chaired by Owen J. Roberts, to investigate the facts relating to the

attack made by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. The Commission met first on December 18,

and continued to meet and hold hearings until January 28. All persons, military and

civilian, thought to have any relevant knowledge of the attack were called upon to testify,

and the Commission also investigated hundreds of pertinent documents relating to the

attack.37 Issues of interest to the Commission were the status of American political and

military relations in the Pacific prior to the attack, the readiness of the American military

to withstand and repel such an attack, and, with respect to sabotage, the demographics “of

Hawaii, its composition, and the attitude and disposition of the persons composing it.”38

The Roberts Commission determined that the position of the entire Pacific Fleet at

Pearl Harbor and the status of the installation were precarious. It was well known by

military commanders that the nation's capacity to produce war materials was strained and

that the military installation was lacking in war supplies and munitions. While the lack of

supplies certainly did not help the situation, the failure to effectively defend Pearl Harbor

could not be blamed on this point.39

Conflict with the Empire of Japan was not unforeseen, and some military

commanders believed war to be inevitable due to certain American policies in the Pacific

36 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11109. 37 U.S. Congress. Senate. Attack upon Pearl Harbor by Japanese armed forces. Report of the

commission appointed by the President of the United States to investigate and report the facts relating to the

attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

77th Cong., 2nd sess., January 23, 1942. S.doc.159, 3. This will henceforth be referred to as “Roberts Report.” 38 Roberts Report, 4. 39 Roberts Report, 4.

16

that conflicted with the policies of other states, most importantly, Japan.40 In January

1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox claimed that if war with Japan did occur, a surprise

attack on Pearl Harbor would likely precede it. He argued that the nature of the situation

called for a reanalysis of the defenses of the island. Knox outlined six forms of attack in

descending order of importance and probability: air bombing, air torpedo, sabotage,

submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. He also noted that the defenses

against all but the first two, air bombing and air torpedo attacks, were adequate.41

In assessing the causes which facilitated the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Roberts

Commission placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the commanders of the

Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. General Walter C. Short. While both

commanders believed that war with Japan would likely be preceded by a surprise attack

that ultimately corresponded with the attack on Pearl Harbor, they simply did not believe

that the Japanese actually had any intention of entering into war with the United States.

Therefore, despite warnings such as those delivered to the commanders a mere ten days

prior to the attack, warnings that indicated that war was possible, the commanders failed

to effectively coordinate a response to such threats. This failure to coordinate allowed for

the success of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor.42

In addition to the failure of the commanders of the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese

were well-educated on the defenses and the strategic layout of the installation. Japanese

spies provided the Japanese military with vital information that greatly enhanced the

effectiveness of the attack. The United States, at peace with Japan, was restricted in the

use of certain techniques that would have allowed for the effective surveillance of

40 Roberts Report, 5. 41 Roberts Report, 7. 42 Roberts Report, 19.

17

telephone and radio telegraph messages. This allowed the Japanese to communicate

safely, and prevented the American military from obtaining important knowledge

regarding the plans of the Japanese military, especially the movements of their fleets. The

persons engaging in espionage were Japanese consular agents, of which there were 200 in

the summer of 1941.43 Some of these agents had no open relations with the Japanese

foreign service, and were therefore actively working for the Japanese government without

registering as such, a statutory offense. Ironically, American commanders opposed the

arrests of those in violation of the law, claiming that they did not wish to create

unnecessary hostility towards the American government on the part of the Japanese aliens

and Americans of Japanese descent residing in Hawaii. This refusal facilitated the

espionage efforts of the Japanese consul and, in effect, gave the Japanese extraordinarily

detailed information regarding the strategic layout of Pearl Harbor, and facilitated and

assured the success of the attack .44

The Roberts report, issued in January 1942, does not mention a single act of

sabotage on the part of Japanese Americans.45 There was no mention of any effort on

behalf of the resident Japanese to block important highways in an attempt to disrupt the

defense of the island. The espionage that was detected succeeded because of the inability

of the F.B.I. to act, and the apprehension of some officials to prosecute persons in clear

violation of the law. Furthermore, once the F.B.I. was in a less restricted position to

investigate espionage and sabotage, their efforts were far more successful, as evidenced

by the operations of the organization in the weeks following the attack that resulted in the

arrests of all persons of Japanese descent that were suspected of sabotage or espionage,

43 Roberts Report, 13. 44 Roberts Report, 14. 45 Roberts Report, 21.

18

and especially of those influential enough to coordinate such acts.46 The greatest blame

for the attack lay with, obviously, the Japanese military, and the American military

commanders that failed to heed numerous warnings; not the resident Japanese. Tolan

responded to this claim stating, “The Roberts report did not deny the idea of sabotage and

fifth-column activity. It simply didn’t mention it,” thereby returning to the argument of

last resort: the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.47

Little evidence supports the claim that the Japanese settled near strategic areas.

According to this assertion, many Japanese held land in close proximity to numerous

military installations and factories of great importance. Committee members argued

simply that this could be no mere coincidence and was indicative of some greater sinister

plot.48 Of course, the Committee failed to consider that these patterns of settlement could

indeed have been simply coincidental, or that Japanese Americans settled before the

creation of the facilities, or that, like most people around the world, they settled along

major roads, railroads, and rivers, the same areas often chosen for installations of any

type.49 One witness, James Underwood, actually argued that a Japanese community

established on the Astoria waterfront long before the war began, was dangerous and

subversive. Underwood claimed that, due to the high rate of unemployment among the

Japanese in Astoria, subversion was likely. He believed that the Japanese were signaling

and communicating with offshore Japanese ships. Not surprisingly, the Department of

Justice declared that the aforementioned “signals” were “nothing more than the results of

46 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11211. 47 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11222. 48 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11017. 49 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11212.

19

imperfections in the blackouts50 reported by excited persons.”51 Upon hearing

Underwood’s testimony, congressman Sparkman eagerly suggested that he contact

General DeWitt and request that the region be declared a “critical area.”52

In pursuing subversive agents, military police and the FBI raided the residences of

the Japanese, both citizens and aliens, in an attempt to uncover contraband. They also

conducted “spot-raids” which took place simultaneously and without warrants in

premises occupied solely by aliens.53 Although they discovered prohibited material, this

was mainly due to the extremely broad definition of contraband, which was not defined

in precise terms in order to supply law enforcement officials with substantial power to

detain persons of interest. For example, flashlights and firecrackers were considered

contraband. Of those found with “contraband,” the vast majority could explain their

possession of the item, and in the words of Attorney-General Francis Biddle, “almost

none could in any way be thought of as dangerous to our internal security….A very large

percentage of those apprehended had not willfully violated any regulations.”54 One

witness, Caryl Fumiko Okuma, attempted to discredit an often cited story that supposedly

indicated of the intent of the Japanese to violently revolt: that law enforcement officials

confiscated thousands of rounds of ammunition from the Japanese, who held the items in

direct defiance of the contraband ban. This claim, she argued, was misleading because

many found in possession of contraband were given poor instructions regarding

contraband laws or told by officials that they could keep the items. Such was the case

50

Page Smith, Democracy on Trial: The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World

War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 106. General DeWitt had ordered nightly city-wide blackouts. 51 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 289. 52 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11315. 53 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 8.

54 Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1949), 134-135.

20

with one man who owned a sporting goods store.55 The Tolan Committee was clearly

dissatisfied with these claims. For example, they expressed no reaction to and essentially

ignore the claim that in one raid on German aliens, the FBI secured more contraband of a

dangerous nature than they had collected from the Japanese since the war began.56

Attorney-General Biddle stated that:

We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found among all the sticks of dynamite and gun powder any evidence that any of it was to be used in bombs. We have not found a single machine gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage.57

Among American citizens and aliens, subversion seemed unlikely.

Like many immigrants, the Japanese attempted to preserve some of their culture

from home, while accepting their new cultural surroundings. Many Japanese children

were enrolled in Japanese language schools, which mainly taught the Japanese language,

the history of Japan, and Japanese culture and traditions, after their public school day

ended. Apart from imparting respect and pride for one’s heritage, the language schools

served a practical role. Heavily discriminated against, most employment opportunities for

Japanese Americans came from within the community, and therefore, it was important for

Japanese children to be able to read and write Japanese.58 Unfortunately, many saw the

language schools as a refusal to assimilate and an attempt by Japanese parents, who were

obviously loyal to the Emperor of Japan, to indoctrinate their children with anti-

55 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11232. 56 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11430. 57 Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 135-136. 58 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11354-55.

21

Americanism.59 Once again, this viewpoint represents a complete lack of understanding

of the Japanese experience in the United States; however, in this case, it is the

misunderstanding of Americanized Japanese children. The children did not enjoy the

language schools, which they attended along with their standard public education.60

Many did not know or learn the Japanese language, and if they were not absorbing the

language, they were not being successfully indoctrinated.

The racism exhibited by the members of the Tolan Committee greatly contributed

to the establishment of the internment policy. Much of their reasoning was based on

biased arguments that obviously tainted the perspective from which the Committee made

its decisions. Racism contributed to internment by exploiting the panic that the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor created. Racism created the monsters that the Committee claimed

could only be controlled behind barbed wire.

The Courts

The argument that the Japanese refused to assimilate into American culture also

played a major role in the decision on the Hirabayashi case in 1943. Gordon Hirabayashi,

who once served as the president of the Auburn Christian Fellowship and whose parents

belonged to a pacifist sect similar to Quakerism, was a conscientious objector who

refused to cooperate with the evacuation orders. Initially convicted for violating both the

curfew and evacuation orders, the Supreme Court upheld only the conviction for the

curfew violation, hoping to avoid having to rule on the clearly difficult question of

59 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11539. 60 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11222-23.

22

evacuation.61 Justice Harlan Stone argued that discrimination laws that barred Japanese

immigrants from obtaining American citizenship and owning land had intensified the

solidarity of the group, ultimately preventing their assimilation. Because of this, he

continues, it was reasonable for military authorities to conclude that the Japanese

population was dangerous.62 Justice Stone, however, based his opinion that the Japanese

constituted a danger on the legal brief of a single Harvard graduate.63 His position might

seem more defensible had he consulted more than a single source.

Fred Korematsu was arrested in on May 30, 1942, for evading the evacuation

orders. He had changed his name and had undergone plastic surgery on his eyelids and

nose in order to avoid being identified.64 The Korematsu case of 1944 brought into

question the power of the government to order the evacuation in the first place. The Court

argues almost the same point pursued by Justice Stone in the Hirabayashi case. The

Court takes the argument that the Japanese failure to assimilate created a group of

persons within the United States that was separate from the rest of the population, and

was easily identifiable and targetable. For this reason, they claim, the Japanese must be

interned for their protection, not for the harm that they may cause. The absurdity of

blatantly reversing the argument in such a manner is apparent, but it reflects the reality

that became clear in 1943: the Japanese no longer posed any threat to the West Coast, and

without any danger from invasion, there would be no reason for the state-side Japanese to

rise up against the United States. They would have to wait for another war.65

The third Supreme Court case of major consequence was that of Mitsuye Endo, a

61 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 356. 62 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 357. 63 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 356. 64 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 353. 65 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 359.

23

Japanese American woman who defied the government's detention orders in order to test

the right of the government to do so.66 The case is known as Ex Parte Endo, as it was

addressed along with Korematsu. Interestingly enough, the Court ruled that Endo, who

had been deemed loyal, should be released from the internment center and remain free of

the indefinite leave procedure established by the War Relocation Authority.67 The Court

noted that the release of Endo did not change their opinion regarding Korematsu. They

simply argued that no government order calls for the detention of a loyal American.

Unfortunately, Order 9066 called for Japanese Americans to be treated as guilty until

proven innocent.68

Justification

Besides relying on racism and neglecting logic and fact, the Tolan Committee also

willingly neglected certain democratic principles. When the Mayor of Tacoma,

Washington, Harry P. Cain questioned why the government’s relocation policy allowed

for the indiscriminate relocation of any group, instead of a more careful and judicious

policy, Tolan explains that:

The Executive order made by the President, as you say, provided for the possible evacuation of all citizens….Of course, all citizens will not be evacuated; you know that. But the situation presented one of the most difficult constitutional questions we had. The Executive order could not direct evacuation of any certain class of American citizens. The other alternatives were the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or martial law.

Obviously, law enforcement agencies could already arrest persons suspected of

subversion. This indicates that the “certain class” that Tolan referred to was not persons

66 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 358. 67 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 213. 68 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 214.

24

engaged in subversion. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of

martial law would have resulted in far fewer restrictions on the arrest and detention of all

persons. Therefore, the executive order was not needed in order to more easily detain

those suspected of subversion. The “certain class” must therefore refer to a specific group

or, more precisely, race, of persons. Tolan’s admission that the Constitution would not

allow for the targeting of a race of peoples indicates that Executive Order 9066 was

intended to be exercised unconstitutionally.69

Enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbor, and driven by racism, the members of the

Tolan Committee were prepared to sacrifice democratic principles for revenge. On

numerous occasions the committee members mentioned the poor treatment of Americans

captured by enemy states, which, they assumed, justified the harsh treatment of the

Japanese. Tolan asked a witness, Reverend Gordon K. Chapman, if he knew of the

treatment of the Americans residing in Japan, who had been detained after the attack on

Pearl Harbor. Chapman replied that the Japanese interned approximately one-third of all

Americans. The Japanese government interned those that they considered propagandists,

mainly missionaries, and treated them well. Tolan stated that one-third of all the Japanese

residing in the United States would be about 33,000 people, three times more than the

amount about to be interned.70 Tolan somehow believed that interning fewer people than

the Japanese justified the actions of the U.S. government. Later, he explained to a witness

the tactics of the Japanese government, stating, “You see, according to modern war,

though, nations which we are fighting don’t fuss around with American aliens; they intern

69 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11413-14. 70 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11212-14.

25

them all.”71 The committee members raised this issue several more times, constantly

trying to validate American actions in the context of the Axis powers. “I don’t suppose

that they are holding hearings over in Japan this afternoon as a part of the Japanese

Parliament to find out from Americans what they want. You don’t think they are doing

that, do you?” states Tolan; it seems American actions were considered legitimate as long

as they did not reach the depravity of America’s enemies.72

The decision to intern persons of Japanese descent was complicated and

multifaceted; panic and racism alone do not account for the decisions and arguments of

the Committee. At times, there were clear indications of a desire for revenge that

certainly motivated the Committee, and many other Americans as well. For the Tolan

Committee, internment was not simply a manner in which the safety of the West Coast

could be assured, but it also presented them with the opportunity to take punitive action

against any person of Japanese lineage; and it was the indiscriminate nature of the policy

that exposed this motivation. During the exchange between Tolan and Reverend

Chapman, Tolan simply ignored the idea of selective internment, a policy that would have

been far easier to implement. When arguing with Chapman, he did not claim that wanton

internment was necessary because it was the only way to secure the coast, but because it

was the policy of the Japanese government. Tolan did not want only the dangerous

Japanese interned, he wanted all Japanese interned. Partly driven by revenge, the Tolan

Committee intensified the maliciousness of the policy.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and the

military presented themselves as pillars of strength. They offered stability and a solution


26

to the chaos wrought by the war that the nation had so abruptly entered into. The

existence of ten of thousands of persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast, the

obvious point of a Japanese invasion if one ever was to come, distressed many

Americans. The President offered a comforting solution to the problem: simply remove

them. Most Americans misunderstood the Japanese, and believed them to be a foreign

force resistant to assimilation and unquestionably loyal to their Emperor, and so they

easily believed that the resident Japanese, mostly American citizens, posed a danger to

the security of the United States. The President, the military, Congress, and the Supreme

Court each claimed the removal of the Japanese from the West Coast and their

subsequent internment was a wartime necessity. Now blindly relying on the President and

the military for guidance, the American public, as well as their leaders in Congress,

simply accepted a senseless and abusive solution.

27

Chapter 3: A Much Needed Education

Outnumbered and ultimately ignored, groups and individuals that opposed the

internment of all persons of Japanese descent constituted a vocal force at the Tolan

hearings. Farmers, members of the clergy, and college professors, represented only part

of the diverse group of people that appeared before the Tolan Committee to support the

rights of the Japanese, both citizens and “aliens” alike. They provided much needed

insight into the lives and culture of the Japanese—vital information that the members of

the Tolan Committee simply ignored, preferring to rely on myths and rumors. For those

actually involved with the Japanese population, the Japanese were not obscured by some

racial curtain that prevented assimilation, but were simply new members of a nation of

immigrants.

The members of the Tolan Committee, as well as the entire country, were in

desperate need of information regarding the culture of the Japanese. If the claims made

against the Japanese were true, that they indeed remained loyal to the Emperor of Japan

or they were truly unable to assimilate, then the Japanese may have represented a threat.

Along with the numerous persons ready to defend these generalizations were many that

were willing to refute them. More important than the willingness of these people to

defend the rights of the Japanese, was their experience and familiarity with the Japanese.

They would be the one’s that would educate the Tolan Committee regarding the

“mysteries” of the Japanese, but unfortunately, these lessons would be ignored.

In defending the internment policy, the committee members employed a number

of arguments speculating on the nature of the sabotage that they had deemed “inevitable,”

and bring into question the loyalty of Japanese Americans as a whole. Though evidence

28

of the impending sabotage was not found, Representative Tolan declared that “They

would be fools to tip their hands now, wouldn't they?,” meaning that, although there was

not evidence to substantiate his claims, the Japanese were plotting a massive attack at a

future time.73 Attorney General Earl Warren's response, with which Tolan agreed, both

answered the Chairman's question and provided the solution:

If there were sporadic sabotage at this time or if there had been for the last 2 months, the people of California or the Federal authorities would be on the alert to such an extent that they could not possibly have any real fifth column activities when the M-day comes. And I think that that should figure very largely in our conclusions on this subject.74

His response seems either inaccurate or shortsighted. The FBI was already conducting

heavy investigations throughout the West coast, investigations that had proved successful.

In 1940, before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Department of Justice created the Special

Defense Unit that established criteria to determine the “dangerousness,” or in other

words, the likelihood of persons engaging in sabotage. Using FBI records, the Unit

conducted “advanced screenings” of Japanese citizens that were considered to be security

risks. Those considered dangerous were sorted into categories based on the threat they

posed. Those with greater influence throughout the Japanese community, and considered

likely to be loyal to Japan, were deemed the most dangerous and were sorted into the first

category. Those of minor importance, or who posed a lesser threat, were sorted into a

lower category. Initially, in the event that a war with Japan broke out, the Department of

Justice intended to arrest only those considered high risk; however, the nature of the

attack on Pearl Harbor caused them to arrest all persons who were being investigated.75

Therefore, it is clear that the FBI was addressing the situation in the manner that Warren

73 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11012. 74 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11012. 75 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 101-102.

29

proposed in the event of sporadic sabotage. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the FBI

and the Department of Justice would dilute their investigations after the initial attack; and

if Warren believed that sabotage could be sufficiently guarded against if the “Federal

authorities” were on alert, why would they not simply stay on alert, regardless of the

evidence provided?

Loyalty

The Committee also used another argument throughout the hearings as a means of

justifying Japanese relocation—the nature of Japanese loyalty. Not only did this argument

provide the grounds for internment: they used it to force the Japanese to accept the policy.

When questioning Mike Masaoka, the national secretary and field executive of the

Japanese American Citizens League, Representative Sparkman claimed “it was decided

that it was necessary to evacuate a certain area, that, of course, loyal Japanese who were

loyal Americans could be expected to comply with those orders without complaint and

simply count it as part of the sacrifice in the interest of national security.”76 Masaoka

answered Sparkman's assertion in a statement submitted to the Committee earlier,

asserting that:

If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment, But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens.77


30

In a later statement, Masaoka explains that he and many other Japanese persons would be

happy to evacuate because, “we will all be called upon to make sacrifices.” He also still

trusts the government to protect its citizens, not just in matters of national security, but

also as “a thought as to our own welfare and security because, we may be subject to mob

violence and otherwise if we are permitted to remain.”78 Another Japanese witness, Henry

Tani, the executive secretary of the JACL, agreed “wholeheartedly” to comply with

evacuation orders “without complaint.”79

The question of Japanese loyalty, while already decided upon by the Committee,

was fiercely defended by a variety of witnesses, including Japanese American citizens,

“regular” American citizens, and those representing religious organizations. Masaoka

defended his loyalty in a number of ways. First, he presented numerous letters from

various persons, such as, Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah and the Governor of the State

of Utah, Herbert B. Maw, that affirm his claim of loyalty. Second, Masaoka made a claim

that was used to defend Italian Americans: one of his brothers was a volunteer in the

armed forces, and two more and himself are ready to go.

Religious leaders played a major role in the defense of the rights of Japanese

Americans. Dr. W. P. Reagor, Pastor of the First Christian Church of Oakland, and

president of the California Council of Churches, submitted a declaration of loyalty that

was signed by 1,400 Japanese Christians. Reverend Gordon K. Chapman, who was in

charge of Presbyterian Japanese work of the Pacific coast, provided a strong defense of

Japanese loyalty, especially that of young Japanese persons who were raised in the United

States. He first noted the known disloyalty of citizens of European origin. As to the


31

nature of young Japanese Americans, he stated that he “knows of no other young peoples'

groups which have been exerting so much influence for Americanism among their own

people.” Regarding the impact of Japanese language schools as indoctrinating forces,

Chapman claimed that they had learned only a small amount of Japanese, whereas they

were “very well versed in American ideals.” With respect to the trips taken to Japan by

some of the young Japanese, he argued that it was usually “but a demonstration to them

of the superiority of American ways,” and that many had returned with intensely anti-

Japanese sentiments. Many were not even aware that they held Japanese citizenship, and

those that did were willing to renounce it. Finally, Chapman argued that the

discrimination against Japanese Americans had robbed them of their opportunity to prove

their loyalty to the United States and to defend their homes. The “racial discrimination,”

he asserted, “is likely to embitter a generation of fine young people who have proven that

they can become loyal Americans and drink more deeply of our culture than is the case

with many Mexicans, Italians, and certain other races.”80

A Cultural Divide

The disconnect between the Japanese and other Americans was due to the

obscurity of their traditions and culture. Just as Senator Jones found the Japanese as a

people confounding, the vast majority of Americans viewed the Japanese as an outside

group—non-Americans living in America. The perspective of the Japanese held by those

who were in close and constant contact with them differs vastly from those removed from

them—most Americans. Those who knew Japanese people personally held them in high

regard as intelligent and hardworking Americans. Mrs. Esther S. Boyd, a farm owner


32

whose land was tilled by the Japanese for years rebuked the popular notion that the

Japanese were untrustworthy, stating:

I have come to know the Japanese there very well. I have visited them in their homes. Some of them have been in my home as welcome guests. Each year in my business I charge off several hundred dollars in bad accounts. Never in all this time have I charged off a bad Japanese account, although about one-third of my business is with the Japanese. I trust them, and they trust me. I have on Japanese customer who simply hands me his checkbook and I write out the check for the amount of his account, which sometimes amounts to $100.

Her description pertains mainly to older Japanese who were more likely to have been

born in Japan, but she also provides a positive description of their children, American

citizens of Japanese lineage. According to Boyd, the Japanese were “brilliant students” of

the American spirit and way of life. They have accepted the United States as their home

and were willing to defend it accordingly, as those of the proper age eagerly joined the

war effort and their parents supported them proudly and willingly.81

Just as Esther Boyd recognized the successful assimilation of the Japanese, the

Japanese American Citizens League actively encouraged and promoted the assimilation

of new immigrants and their children. The aim of this program was “to make the

American-born Japanese realize their duties as American citizens, based on the principles

of Americanism.” The JACL wanted to create Americans, not only for the benefit of the

Japanese but also for the benefit of the nation as a whole. James Y. Sakamoto, the

General Chairman of the Emergency Defense Council of the Japanese American Citizens

League stated, “We want our Americans of Japanese ancestry to become wide-awake

public-spirited citizens, who will participate in civic activities for the benefit of the city's

81 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11583-84.

33

interest.82

In addition to the assimilation efforts of the JACL, Sakamoto also explained the

efforts of the organization in aiding the F.B.I. in locating subversive elements, both

Japanese and otherwise. The JACL established a defense council and an intelligence unit

that worked directly with the F.B.I., and although Sakamoto could not provide an exact

figure regarding the success of their cooperation, he noted that “our organization, both

locally and nationally, has, let us say, “turned in” people whom we thought should be

checked into.”83 The efforts of the JACL show that at least one Japanese organization was

not mindlessly controlled by the Japanese empire. In direct contrast to the claims that the

Japanese were unwilling to cooperate with the F.B.I., or that they were actively

concealing and protecting subversive persons, it is clear that the Japanese organizations to

which the Japanese followed unquestioningly were working with the F.B.I. in order to

protect the United States. “...And we have repeatedly stated at our meetings,” argued

Sakamoto, “that it is our loyal duty to ferret out those among us who are disloyal, because

our interest must be first for American, and, secondly, for ourselves.”84

Limited to farming, the Japanese became an integral part of the western

agricultural industry. According to J. F. Steiner, a professor in the department of

sociology at the University of Washington, discrimination caused the employment

limitations of the Japanese. He argued that the Japanese “might tend to go into business.

They attend business colleges, and they hope that they might prepare to go into some

kind of business later. They have tended to go into engineering to a certain degree, but

82 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11470-71. 83 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11475. 84 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11475.

34

there the problem of employment later is too great.”85 The duty of the Tolan Committee

was not only to examine the policy of internment, but also to analyze the impact of

internment on wartime industry. The importance of agriculture during wartime is

undeniable, and, as argued by James Sakamoto, “Already, State after State has reported

farm labor shortages, brought about by the increased drain of men into the fighting

services and defense industries.” Mainly involved with agriculture, the Japanese provided

a great and necessary service to the United States and the war effort. On a sheer

numerical scale, the relocation of every Japanese American and alien would certainly

effect the agricultural production of important crops; however, the Japanese were

involved in an intensive and specific type of farming that numerous witnesses claim

cannot be easily learned or done by the inexperienced. “It must be emphasized,” said

Sakamoto, “that farmers are specialists, especially the truck farmers. They must have

training and experience to get the maximum yield, just as defense workers or soldiers

must have training and experience. It is not practical nor possible to import farm laborers

to take over fields left by Japanese farmers.”86 Dan McDonald emphasized the

importance of Japanese farmers and praised their skill, stating:

For the past 30 years my parents' land has been partly tilled by Japanese families, who raised truck crops principally. I have found that due to their long experience in this work, Japanese farmers are the most skilled truck farmers in the valley. If these Japanese are evacuated; it would take; I should judge, at least four white farmers to raise the same amount of truck crop as one Japanese farmer, due to their lack of knowledge and skilled training in this line.87

The economic importance of the Japanese cannot be overlooked and relocation prevented

the Japanese from assisting in the war effort in a variety of ways. Not only were they

85 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11560. 86 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11453. 87 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11582-83.

35

discouraged from joining the armed forces, they were driven from an industry to which

they had proved to be efficient contributors and moved to internment camps where they

would only be able to make a meager contribution, if any.

Pursuing many of the same points that had secured the safety of Italian Americans

and aliens, numerous witnesses argued against internment because of unjust and

unnecessary hardships. The policy was swift and abrupt, and caused enormous loss of

property, community, and employment. The first major issue pertained to the unnecessary

relocation of civilians that could not possibly have posed any danger to the United States.

Azalia Emma Peet, a Methodist missionary argued against an indiscriminate policy,

stating “As a social worker, I am thinking of the aged; I am thinking of the sick in the

hospitals today, in the Japanese community; I think of the babies that have been born

since Christmas time and those about to be born; I am thinking of the young people in the

schools and college of this State. Are they a menace to this community, that they must all

be moved now?”88 Professor Steiner addressed Peet's concern regarding currently

enrolled students. He noted that those unable to finish the quarter would not receive

credit for their work. An even more extreme hardship threatened those about to graduate

that, according to Steiner, “If they cannot finish this last quarter and they must go

elsewhere, and would enter another university, they would be required to spend one year's

residence before they could get their degree.”89

Alternatives

In the end, the opposition movement pursued a far calmer course of action than


36

those who supported mass evacuation. The lack of evidence indicating past or planned

sabotage assured those opposed to internment that extreme action was not necessary. The

number of innocent Americans to be victimized by the relocation policy simply did not

justify preventing a small number of possible saboteurs from moving freely throughout

society. Estimating the number of subversive persons in the Seattle area, James

Sakamoto, of the JACL stated:

While there is no general agreement on just what portion of the Japanese are dangerous to the safety of the United States, it should be stressed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has already detained some 300 alien Japanese in the Seattle area. Analysis of the total population figures shows that at least half of the Japanese in the State are women, and thus safely to be ruled out of consideration generally as saboteurs and fifth-columnists. This would leave at the very most, 2,700 alien Japanese males in Washington. From these must be subtracted the aged and infirm, no small consideration because the average age of this group is 59 years. From these figures, it can be seen that considerably more than one in every 120 alien Japanese males is under detention by Federal authorities. Many others are doubtless still under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Here is the reply, then, to those who urge mass evacuation so that the 1 in 10, or the 1 in 100 dangerous characters may be removed from the coastal States.90

Aside from the numerically questionable aspect of the policy, there was also a simpler

philosophical argument to be made: how could the loyalty of the Japanese be determined?

Loyalty can be determined, according to Professor Steiner, in the common sense manner

in which the loyalty of any other American would be determined, “by their actions, by the

company they keep, the organizations to which they belong.” The Japanese, who stick out

so sharply in American society, could be easily watched and would have difficulty

congregating in secret. Furthermore, in the pursuit of justice, the systematic

determination of loyalty, although difficult, would be worth the preservation of the rights


37

of an imperiled minority.91

The opposition movement was based in logic and understanding. Once again,

those who had regular contact with the Japanese understood their culture and saw through

the mysterious veil of secrecy behind which many Americans believed that the Japanese

hid. They recognized the relocation policy as an extreme reaction to the attack on Pearl

Harbor and maintained their beliefs in basic American ideas, such as the protection of the

rights of minorities. As Esther Boyd argued, “These people are farmers, they are not

saboteurs.”92 The Japanese were cooperating with the authorities, even when cooperating

meant complying with the evacuation orders. Richard H. Neustadt, the Regional Director

of the Office of Defense, Health, and Welfare Services in San Francisco, explained that:

of approximately 6,500 enemy aliens who have come to our offices voluntarily—6,500 out of the expected nine to ten thousand who are involved in this transfer—most of them have come for information, information with respect to whether their residence is in the prohibited zone or whether where they contemplate moving to is in another prohibited zone or in a restricted area. Of those, only 140 have asked for financial assistance of any kind.93

Not only were the Japanese cooperating, but also they did so at their own expense.

The opposition movement that fought for the rights of the Japanese before the

Tolan Committee did so on a knowledgeable and reasonable basis. The most obvious

difference between the arguments of those opposing internment and those supporting it

was the familiarity of each group with the Japanese. Most witnesses that supported

internment blatantly stated that they did not understand the Japanese, but they were also

willing to condemn them. The witnesses who supported the rights of the Japanese were

91 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11560. 92 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 30, 11583-84. 93 House Committee, National Defense Migration. Part 29, 11024,

38

the people who knew the Japanese, attended school with them, and trusted and respected

them. The Committee ignored the testimony of those knowledgeable about the customs

and traditions of the Japanese when they most desperately needed that very same

information. They made a decision regarding the internment of over 100,000 persons

without considering the entire argument.

39

Chapter 4: Necessity

The internment of the Japanese during the Second World War is in part a prime

and horrifying example of what can happen as a result of the unchecked expansion of

presidential powers. The Tolan Committee, despite the bias with which they argued for

internment, was cognizant of the moral and constitutional issues raised by the policy.

Despite their apparent hesitations, the Committee favored unwavering support for the

decisions of the President and the military. The unwillingness of the Tolan Committee to

pursue any of their reservations regarding the policies of the military not only facilitated

the internment of the Japanese, but it legitimized the action and wasted the greatest

opportunity held by any group at the time to at least slow the policy and allow for some

sensible analysis of the situation.

On February 14, 1942, Lieutenant General DeWitt made his final

recommendation in favor of the mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent

residing on the West Coast. The General recommended:

That the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and authority to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western Theater of Operations (if necessary to include the entire combat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may include all Japanese [my emphasis], all alien enemies, and all other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities of being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth columnists.94

Five days later, February 19, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,

empowering the Secretary of War and all relevant military commanders with the ability

to “determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to

which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever

94 Grodzins, Americans Betrayed, 263.

40

restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in

his discretion.”95 The Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, requested that General DeWitt

not indiscriminately disturb any persons of Italian lineage, stating, “I ask that you take

this action in respect to Italians for the reason that I consider such persons to be

potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities.96

Within two days of the signing of Order 9066, the Tolan Committee, already

investigating the logistics of wartime production, set up hearings in San Francisco to be

held on February 21 and 23. Further hearings were held over the following three weeks,

and by March 19, the Committee issued its preliminary report regarding the proposed

internment of enemy aliens.97 The preliminary report declared that the committee was

“in full agreement with the President's Executive order of February 19, 1942.”98 This

included the necessary evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent from the West

Coast. With regard to Italian and German citizens and aliens however, the Committee

decided that evacuation would be too great a burden, and considered mandatory

relocation unnecessary. Instead, Italian and German enemy aliens would be subjected to

local “hearing boards” that would determine loyalty on an individual basis.99

Logistics

95 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 26. 96 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 25-26. 97 House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Final report of the Select Committee

Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st sess., January 8, 1943, 2. This will henceforth be referred to as “Final Report, Tolan Committee.”

98 House Committee to Investigate National Defense Migration, National Defense Migration Fourth

Interim Report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration House of Representatives

Seventy-seventh Congress second session pursuant to H. Res. 113 a resolution to inquire further into the

interstate migration of citizens, emphasizing the present and potential consequences of the migration caused

by the National Defense Program, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1942, H.rp.2124, 25. This will henceforth be referred to as the “Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee.”

99 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 26.

41

Statistically, the vast majority of the Japanese residing in the United States were

located on the West Coast. The Committee stated that, “Of the 126,947 Japanese,

citizens and aliens, living in the United States April 1, 1940, 117,364, or 92.5% live in

the prohibited and restricted military zones proclaimed by General DeWitt.”

Furthermore, of the 117,364 that lived on the West Coast, 112,353 resided in the coastal

states of California, Oregon and Washington. Nearly all of these 112,000 resided in the

first military zone as declared by General DeWitt. Therefore, 88.5% of all the Japanese

living in the United States were to be evacuated and the movement of another 4% was

restricted. Of the 112,000 that were designated for relocation, 71,000 were American

citizens and the remaining 41,000 were aliens.100

Conversely, Italians and Germans were grouped in significantly fewer numbers

on the West Coast, with Italians numbering only 57,878 and a mere 22,000 Germans.

Furthermore, of the approximately 80,000 Italians and Germans, a large number of them

were older, with few under the age of 25 (only 2.5% of Italians and 9% of Germans).

Therefore, statistically, Italians and Germans posed less of a threat than the Japanese

because of their fewer numbers and demographics.101

In 1940, a little over 20% of all Japanese were between the ages of 20 and 34,

and less than 35% were between the ages of 15 and 25.102 Yet, some of the statistics

regarding the age of the Japanese population are misleading. The overwhelming

majority of foreign-born Japanese are over the age of 35, approximately half of which

are over 50. Therefore, following the reasoning of General DeWitt and the Committee, if

the most likely subversive persons were to be foreign-born, well over half of all foreign-

100 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 12. 101 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 21. 102 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 392.

42

born Japanese were over the age of 40 and were supposedly unlikely to engage in

sabotage. In addition, sabotage was most likely to be carried out by those between the

ages of 15 and 40, and yet the vast majority of persons in this age group were native

born citizens, and despite the racist claims that the Japanese were inherently disloyal and

untrustworthy, they were unlikely to be subversive.103

Condemnation

The demographic analysis provided by the Tolan Committee is important

because it showed some of the bias against the Japanese. “To the aged and the infirm

and those with sons in the armed forces,” stated the Committee, “may be added to those

many thousands of aliens who today are technically enemy aliens rather than citizens

because of delays in the naturalization procedure.”104 Exemptions from hearings boards

were to be provided because of a wide range of hardship cases. Of course, those exempt

from hardship were not Japanese. Then again, by the time of the final report of the Tolan

Committee, hearing boards for Italians and Germans had never even been established.105

The Committee expresses further sympathy for Italian and German refugees,

stating, “Many of these are in the process of becoming citizens, which process has been

lengthened in the case of enemy aliens since the war. Although anxious to prove their

loyalty and to join in the fight against the Axis, these people are being classed in the

same status with the enemy that they have fled.”106 Not only was the Committee less

willing to sympathize with the desire of many Japanese Americans to fight against the

103 Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the Coast 1942, 393. 104 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 22. 105 Final Report, Tolan Committee, 10. 106 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 23.

43

Axis, native born Americans of Japanese lineage were considered suspicious if they

simply visited Japan. It seems unlikely that Japanese refugees would be considered

sincere rather than viewed with suspicion as possible enemy agents.

The Tolan Committee, despite its bias against the Japanese, did recognize the

Constitutional concerns raised by the de facto suspension of habeas corpus to over

100,000 persons, without actually suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Clearly, these

men were not ignorant of Constitutional guarantees, and they noted, “this committee is

also impressed with the fundamental fact that wartime does not automatically suspend

the Constitution.”107 In the Preliminary Report, the analysis of the circumstances that

allow for martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus elucidated the caution with

which the Committee approached the subject. They argue that wartime necessarily

raised the military into the dominant position of power and decision-making, but that

“cruel and arbitrary measures that would violate principles of equity and the

constitutional guarantees afforded by our democratic government,” were still outside the

scope of power of any official.108

Despite their concern for Constitutional rights, the Committee lamented, “The

tragic events of Pearl Harbor have created in the public mind a consciousness, whatever

the character of the evidence [my emphasis], that the dangers from internal enemies

cannot be ignored.” This single sentence defines the particular circumstances that

allowed, and indeed facilitated, the internment of over 100,000 people. The Committee

simply submitted to the frightened masses. The system of American government is

structured in such a way that sudden, emotional changes are nigh impossible. The

107 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 13. 108 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 13.

44

government is not meant to sway with the whims of the people, and it is certainly not

meant to allow for the abuse of minorities. Despite the flawed arguments proposing

internment, the public supported the strong and vocal stance taken by General DeWitt

and like-minded politicians; the fate of 117,364 persons, citizens and aliens, was decided

by neither reason nor fact, but by the words of demagogues.

The extraordinary shock and terror induced by the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor paralyzed the legislative and judicial branches of government. Their power was

not removed by some outside source or even absorbed by the executive. Confusion

rendered both Congress and the Supreme Court unsure of their roles and ultimately led

them to submit to the commands of the military. They hoped that oppression would not

result, but were unable to prevent it. Martial law was not officially declared on the West

Coast, but like the suspension of habeas corpus, it was unofficially enforced. “Justice is

still administered by the courts of our land,” they argue, “and martial law has its

justification only when these courts are removed by the practical exigencies of

warfare.”109 Congress and the Supreme Court allowed the West Coast to be ruled by

martial law without an actual declaration of martial law. Executive Order 9066, which

gave the military the power to designate strategic areas, was not a declaration of martial

law.110 Furthermore, the courts that were meant to administer justice were still active, a

fact that was not lost on the committee members. In three separate cases, Hirabayashi v.

United States, Ex Parte Endo, and Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled

on military policies regarding the Japanese. The Committee simultaneously recognized

the unofficial reality of martial law, which could only be justified in the absence of the

109 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 13. 110 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 14.

45

courts, but called on the courts to decide on “any questions raised as to the constitutional

status of persons affected.”111 The Committee was unable to establish to role of the

courts. Martial law is a last resort, only to be declared when the survival of the Union is

in great peril and when the Constitution must be limited without question, therefore

eliminating the power and the need of the courts. The Committee, as well as Congress

and the Supreme Court tolerated the obscure conditions that allowed for martial law to

exist as both undeclared and unnecessary, stating:

A profound sense of certain injustices and constitutional doubts attending the evacuation of the Japanese cannot shake the committee in its belief that no alternative remains. The decision of the military, whatever the influence brought to bear by public demand, is a prima facie acknowledgment that threats of espionage and sabotage are real and present and not wholly preventable by the constituted authorities. We cannot doubt, and everyone is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country. But the innocent ten in this time of war will perforce suffer for the guilty one.

112 Recognizing that the vast majority of Japanese were loyal, the Tolan Committee

recommended that a system of hearing boards be set up for the Japanese—in internment

camps following relocation.113 Numerous witnesses testified before the committee

recommending that, if relocation was a necessity, that the Japanese should be given an

opportunity to prove their loyalty beforehand. According to the Committee on National

Security and Fair Play, hearing boards under the Appeal Boards of the Selective Service

could successfully examine the population within six weeks. This was a reasonably short

amount of time, especially in the pursuit of liberty, and during that time further planning

and construction could continue on the internment camps. Furthermore, many of the

Japanese were growing bitter and discontent because of the discriminatory treatment

111 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 14. 112 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 15. 113 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 18.

46

that they were receiving at the hands of the government and the military. They continued

to argue that the “evacuation of nisei citizens will in our judgment, weaken rather than

strengthen the civic morale which is an essential element in national security during the

war and of national unity after the war.”114

The Tolan Committee also recognized the danger of ostracizing an entire

minority group of the population. They noted that internment had only two outcomes:

Americanization or deportation.115 The benefits of the Americanization of a group that

was considered to be on the fringe of American society were readily apparent. The

“new” American citizens would be released back into society as cooperative and useful

members. Unfortunately, the likelihood of the Japanese becoming more receptive to

American ideas was greatly diminished once they were interned. Internment, they

argued, would naturally lead to deportation for two reasons. First, any group subjected

to indiscriminate internment could not be expected to remain loyal to the United States

government nor would they ever assimilate into the culture that imprisoned them, and

they could therefore not be allowed to remain in the country. Second, internment

without due process amounts to the withdrawal of citizenship, which would ultimately

lead to deportation.116

Tyranny of the Majority

The crisis of internment was firmly grounded in the unwillingness of the

legislative and judicial branches of government to exercise their powers. It was a crisis

114 Galen M. Fisher, “Japanese Evacuation from the Pacific Coast,” Far Eastern Survey 11, no. 13

(Jun. 29, 1942), http://www.jstor.org (accessed February 27, 2008), 147. 115 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 15. 116 Fourth Interim Report, Tolan Committee, 16.

47

of responsibility; however, just as the Tolan Committee was not solely responsible for

the internment of the Japanese, numerous factors contributed to their decision. The panic

caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had the most obvious effects on the

Committee. The nation, violently drawn into what would become the deadliest war in

human history, looked to the President and the military for support and leadership. This

is a traditional role filled by the military and a strong leader during wartime, and it is no

surprise that President Roosevelt and General DeWitt became beacons of strength and

hope. Unfortunately, Congressmen, as well as Supreme Court justices, felt equally

insecure and they too clung to the strong leadership. Unsure of their own powers, and

nervous that they would hinder the war effort and put the country in danger, they

abdicated their responsibilities. What resulted was a rapid expansion of executive

authority, and the Tolan Committee no longer felt that they, or anyone else, had the

power to question the decisions of the President and the military. Therefore, panic

caused the willing subordination of the legislative and judicial branches of government.

The latent racism present in the United States towards persons of Japanese

lineage also contributed to internment. Racism justified many of the weaker arguments

employed by the Tolan Committee, and it allowed the Committee to construct a negative

image of the group as a whole, depicting them as untrustworthy and more than likely to

engage in sabotage. Unfamiliar with the Japanese, most Americans were forced to rely

on the racist image constructed by the Committee, which prevented the formation of any

widespread public outcry and enhanced the severity of the policy.

Revenge constitutes the most startling factor that contributed to internment. The

Committee clearly sought to punish the Japanese, whether they were American citizens

48

or not. Pursuing revenge, the members of the Committee were willing to ignore logical

oppositional arguments. Thus, where panic opened the door for the internment policy,

the policy itself was defended and supported by racist arguments, and the severity of the

policy was amplified by the malicious goals of the Committee.

The Supreme Court had the opportunity, in fact they had three, to protect the

Japanese. They chose instead, simply to concede to wishes of the military. They actively

evaded the obvious Constitutional questions raised by the policies of the President in

order to avoid having to issue a conflicting ruling, and therefore, the entire policy

“passed through the court without at any point encountering constitutional

condemnation.” The Court did not give the internment policy Constitutional approval,

they merely refused to disapprove of it.117 In refusing to condemn the internment

policies they justified and legitimized the actions of the military. Racism now had legal

precedent.

The Tolan Committee stands apart from Congress as a whole because they were

in a unique position analyze the arguments on both sides of the discussion. After tens of

thousands of pages of testimony, the Tolan Committee arrived at the same conclusion

that they had entered the hearings with: internment was a military necessity. The calls

for reason, and the assurances of the F. B. I., were drowned out by the panicked voices

of those who simply spoke loudest. Military necessity was an undeniable fact, so

obvious that it required no explanation.

It seems unlikely that the Tolan Committee could have single handedly halted

internment; however, they had the opportunity to publicly reject the doctrine of military

necessity. If there were any doubts that internment was not the absolute last resort, the

117 tenBroek, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, 214.

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Committee could have, and should have forced the military to provide more substantial

reasoning. The military should never have received the benefit of the doubt. If the

military succeeded in convincing the public, Congress, and the Supreme Court, the

certain result would be a military and an executive with powers that would be limited

only minimally. Executive Order 9066 could not have been enforced without the

cooperation of Congress. The Tolan Committee had the opportunity to influence

Congress and the public, the support of which would be required for the expansion of

executive powers. The Tolan Committee forfeited a golden opportunity to protect the

Constitution and protect the American system of government that the entire nation was

so concerned with protecting. They constituted more than a simple rubber stamp of

executive policies. They legitimized the actions of the executive. The standard of

military necessity was forever diminished. Their failure to act exposed the weakness of

the American system, and justified the unlimited expansion of presidential powers. The

words of one journalist, Westbrook Pegler, “and to hell with habeas corpus until the

danger is over,”118 would define not only the ignorance of one man, but would concisely

define and immortalize the greatest failure in the history of American government.

118 Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court, 349.

50

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Tolan Committee and the Internment of Japanese Americans

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