Today’s Readings

Today’s Readings- Hardin, G. 1968. Tragedy of the

Commons. Science. 162:1243-1248.

- Berkes et al. 2006. Globalization, Roving Bandits and Marine Resources. Science 5767. 1557-1558

Managing Common Pool ResourcesLecture 7: Natural Resource Management

Management

- Actively making decisions about- “Commons Management” is really “people

management”- Question about how to influence behaviors

of resource use

Managing Common Pool ResourcesLecture 7: Natural Resource Management

Common-Pool Resources (CPR)

A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

Common-Pool Resources (CPR)

A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

Collectively owned and not individually owned

What are the commons, how should they be managed and by whom?

• Garret Hardin and his notion (1968)– Problem definition and solution

• The Old Commons/The New Commons• Elinor Ostrom and her notion (1970s-)

-- Problem definition and solutions• Cooperation and establishing Rules and

Behaviors

Learning Goals

Describe competing theories to solving the problem of the commons (and their history)

Explain mechanisms for commons management

Evaluate the role of incentives in policy development in the context of CPR

Garrett Hardin• Garrett Hardin 1915-2003• Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor,

UC Santa Barbara • “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968;

“Living on a Lifeboat” 1974• “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted

in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

Garrett Hardin• Garrett Hardin 1915-2003• Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor,

UC Santa Barbara • “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968;

“Living on a Lifeboat” 1974• “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted

in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

Environmental/Resource problems were tied to directly to overpopulation of the earth!

The Old Commons

Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons).

The Old Commons

Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons).

Individual benefit > overall resource decline

Each actor has 2 interests; individual interest and collective interest

Exam Results

Exam Results

90 - 99.5 80 - 89.5 70 - 79.5 60 - 69.5 50 - 59.5 40 - 49.50

5

10

15

20

25

Series1

Normally Distributed?

Points to date

If this were your entire score you’d probably get

The exercises, mid-term and paper suggest you have

Because we still have a few exercises, more material and the final exam …

Obviously, improvements can be garnered by

Top fifth A, A- A very good familiarity/foundation

Don’t be lulled into a false sense of security

Reading up Showing up Speaking up Writing up

Second fifth

B+, B A pretty good familiarity/foundation

Middle fifth

B-, C+, C A sufficient familiarity/foundation

Lots of room to move

Fourth fifth

C-, D+ A basic familiarity/foundation

Bottom fifth

D, D-, F Some familiarity/foundation

Don’t give up You have time and opportunities to rebound

Complaints Department

• Pass back exams at the end of class • Take note of what you felt was incorrectly

marked wrong• Go to office hours and bring evidence from

notes or lectures of why you were correct

Paper Assignment• A common-pool resource (CPR) is a type of good consisting of a natural or

human-made resource system (e.g. an irrigation system or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Because of difficulties associated with the exclusion of potential beneficiaries, several scholars have defined the overuse of CPR as a “tragedy” especially as global populations and resource consumption continue to rise. To address these issues, scholars have proposed competing management schemes which all seek to maintain/sustain CPR and reduce costs associated with these unique resources. Please describe competing theories of common-pool resource management. Include in your description (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom); (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”) (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

What to include (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom);• (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is

defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”)

• (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions

• (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

Basics

• Length 20-25 pages

Basics

• Length 20-25 pages (APRIL FOOLS!)

Basics

• Length 4-5 pages• 5 Peer review citations (journal articles):

– Additional Ostrom and Hardin article not included.

• Include 2 examples of CPR that are/could be sustainably managed under different CPR management arrangements

“tragedy” example: fisheries- Fish are commonly held good- Fish provide15% protein for 3 billion people worldwide- Generally agreed that overfishing is taking place

Worm et al. Science, 2006Fig. 1. Global loss of seafood species. Shown is the current trend in fisheries collapses (data points, based on United Nations Food and AgricultureOrganization data base), and extrapolated to 2050 (solid line)

Roving Bandits: Mobile agents can take advantage of resources then move on before the locals can respond…

Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources (Berkes et al 2006, Science)

“tragedy” example: fisheries

Who owns what part of which ocean?

Early and mid-20th Century: • 3 miles out was considered marine domain• 1945 Truman extends US jurisdiction to continental shelf (fishing

and oil resources; 1947 first oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico)

UN: Law of the Sea (1973-1982) enforced 1994• EEZ 0 – 200 nautical miles (Exclusive Economic Zones)• Nations can manage their business, environment, and marine

resources• US has signed by not ratified b/c of International Seabed

Authority (which would establish authority to regulate seabed mineral exploration)

Who owns what part of which ocean?

Roving Bandits: The internet has fueled the ease at which bandits can roam…

“tragedy” 2.0

Kaiser’s Spotted Newt

Hardin’s Problem Definition Hardin’s main concerns: Self Interest (with a biological

basis) and Overpopulation“Freedom to breed is intolerable”Overpopulation harms the world as a whole. The more

people there are, the fewer resources there are available to each person.

As long as we have a welfare state, people will continue to have more children than is good for society. Rational agents maximize their own good (more children), when the cost to them is relatively low because the cost is shared in common with society as a whole.

…but what about conscience and education?

…but what about conscience and education?

Conscience, education, etc., won’t work, he says, because it is in one’s self-interests to breed.

Hardin: contends that individual conscience will not solve the tragedy of the commons because:

1) It discriminates against people of good conscience, and tends to eliminate them from the population.It won’t work in the long run. Nature’s revenge. People without conscience with outbreed the others, and population will increase again eventually.

2) It is not psychologically healthy to force people to act against their own interests on the basis of conscience.

The only “rational” solution

Rights and freedoms must be restricted for the good of everyone!

Mutual coercion to solve population problem (government regulation on number of offspring allowed) and other problems of the commons which are externally imposed.

Enclose the commons as private property which will give incentive to the right holder to maintain the resource for his/her benefit.

“Tragedy” can only be solved by taking one of two roads

Privatization of common property Central Authority

Common property

Only have a personal interest

That support the private good (“protect what is mine”)

Protects the resource

Promote the sustainability and augmentation

1. Private Property (Personal Incentive)

2. Institutional ManagementInstitutions Rules Behaviors Limit

Only have a personal interest

Has no self interest

That support the private good (“protect what is mine”)

That support the public good (“protect what is everyone’s)





1. Private Property (Personal Incentive)

Rules and Behaviors

Harvesting Limitations on Ocean fisheriesTime: Season LimitationsSpace: Marine Protected Areas/ClosuresResource Type: Size Total Allowable Catch: WeightTechnology: Only Specified Types

Sitka Herring Fisheries

“Last season the fishery had five openings from March 22 to April 2, the shortest was 15 minutes and the longest two hours and 30 minutes, for a total of seven hours of fishing and a total catch of 14,776 tons of herring.”

www.JuneauEmpire.com December 18th 2009Klas Stope

You can only fish during the season

You can only fish during the season and during that season you can only be out for 3 days at a time

Rules and Behaviors

Harvesting Limitations on Ocean fisheriesTime: Season LimitationsSpace: Marine Protected Areas/ClosuresResource Type: Size Total Allowable Catch: WeightTechnology: Only Specified Types

Public Transit as a CommonsMonetary: NJ Transit- Peak Travel time tickets are 15%

more expensive

The New CommonsThe tragedy of the commons is a metaphor for anything held in

common, used by all freely.

Everyone will maximize his own benefit to the detriment of the whole.

Modern “commons” include:The sea -- overfishingThe air, the land, rivers -- pollutionThe public noise level -- sound pollutionNational parks – overuseThe earth itself (energy, food supply, living standards) -- overpopulation

Healthcare

Healthcare

• Under the OLD system where people were not required to have healthcare:

Who benefited?Who are the costs placed upon?

Healthcare

• Under the NEW system where people are required to have healthcare:

Who benefits?Who are the costs placed upon?

Elinor Ostrom• Elinor Ostrom 1933-2012• Nobel Prize in Economics 2009• Political Scientist, Indiana University

and Arizona State University• In 1973 began investigating

collective action, trust, and cooperation, specifically in the study of common pool resources.

• tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1xwV2UDPAg

Ostrom’s Problem Definition

“Tragedy” is really a problem with “Open-access” but people have been managing themselves for 1000s of years.

Yes, there are private benefits which do cause public costs…but Hardin over-simplied, you must evaluate

1. The nature of the resource2. Nature of the community and their arrangements

“Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better”

The solution to the “tragedy”

The evolution of complex management arrangements and cooperative behavior.

There are many ways that people organize to use resources in a renewable manner.


“Though many animals display cooperative behavior, human cooperation is distinct”

- Complex communication- Trust and reciprocity - Highly adaptable to fit solution to problem context

E.O. Wilson, biologist, Harvard University

Cooperation yields rules which guide behaviors that are in the interest of the individual, the community and the resource (however size of the community and the ability to exclude interlopers matters)

Rules which are internally developed are more likely to be followed, trusted, and match the resource and community need.

There must be monitors and sanctions for those who violate the rules (negative incentives)


“Tragedy” can only be solved by taking one of two roads

Privatization of common property Central Authority

Common property

Community creating norms by

way ofinstitutions

in multiple ways through cooperation

Institutions Rules Behaviors LimitHave both a personal and public interest and match the social and environmental conditions

That support both the private and public good (“protect what is ours”)


Promote the sustainability and augmentation through internally consistent rules which match social and environmental conditions

Prisoners Dilemma • Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each

prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other, by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. Here's how it goes:

(a) If A and B both betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison

(b) If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa)(c) If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge)

Bet

ray

S

ilent

Silent Betray

Pris

oner

BPrisoner A

1y1y

3y

3y free

2y2y free

Benefits to cooperation and benefits to defect

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3Uos2fzIJ0

Benefits to cooperation and benefits to defect

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8

Cooperation• Cooperation at the regional level can often take the form of

common endeavors leading to common property• There are clear advantages to common property: risk sharing. The

example of pools of water under properties defined at the surface is relevant. For each individual owner of the surface properties, digging a well might not be worth it because of the risks associated with the prospect of not finding any water under a particular property

• Risk sharing in a common property arrangement tremendously increases the possibility of deriving benefits from digging wells in a coordinated fashion. In fact, the greater the number of participants in the risk sharing operation, the lower the costs associated with the enterprise and thus the higher the benefits for each individual owner: Insurance

• Even risk- averse individual owners have an incentive to enter such an insurance scheme, which renders the costs of risk bearing negative

Rules and Behaviors

Mekong River Basin:

Rice fields may become common property for fishing during the peak flood, reverting to private lands as the water recede.

8 “Design Principles” (Ostrom 1990)

1. Clarify defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties);

2. Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources are adapted to local conditions;

3. Collective-choice arrangements allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process;

4. Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators;

5. There is a scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules;

6. Mechanisms of conflict resolution are cheap and of easy access;7. The self-determination of the community is recognized by higher level

authorities8. In the case of larger common-pool resources, organizations in the form of

multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local governance at the base

Is this a positive application to tragedy of the commons?

What is the difference?

Today’s Readings

Documents

Transcript of Today’s Readings