Tobacco Industry PAC Contributions & U.S. Congressional Activity Saint Louis University School of...
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Transcript of Tobacco Industry PAC Contributions & U.S. Congressional Activity Saint Louis University School of...
Tobacco Industry PAC Contributions & U.S.
Congressional Activity
Saint Louis UniversitySchool of Public Health
Prevention Research Center
Douglas Luke, Ph.D.Missy Krauss, MPH
Study Aims• Examine the effect of tobacco industry
(TI) PAC contributions from 1993-2000 on U.S. Congressional voting activity from 1997-2000.
• Determine if the effects of TI contributions differ by political party.
• Discuss policy implications of these findings.
Sample & Timeframe
• Senators & Representatives from 106th Congress who participated in > 25% of tobacco-related votes (N=527)
• Timeframe– All contributions from 1993-2000
– All bills from 1997-2000 (N=49)
Data Sources
• Tobacco Bills– Project Vote Smart, Public Citizen,
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
– Congressional Quarterly, Thomas, CIS Congressional Universe
• TI PAC Contributions– Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
– Federal Election Commission
Example Bill - 1 2000 House Bill 4635, Roll Call 293
Waxman (D-Calif.) amendment that would allow the Veteran’s Administration to transfer medical care funding to the Justice Department for use in government lawsuits against tobacco companies.
Pro-tobacco vote: No Amendment rejected 197-207 (R 34-
173; D 162-33)
Example Bill – 2 1998 Senate Bill 1415, RC 143
Kerry (D-Mass.) motion to table (kill) Ashcroft amendment. The Ashcroft amendment would strike all provisions from the bill concerning an increase of tobacco taxes.
Pro-tobacco vote: No Motion approved 72-26 (R 27-26; D 45-
0)
Tobacco PAC Contributions1993-2000
# (%) Receiving
Contributions Mean ($) Median ($) U.S. House of Representatives Democrats (n=211) 122 (58%) 8,677 500 Republicans (n=224) 175 (78%) 16,189 9,000 All Representatives (n=435) 297 (68%) 12,545 4,000 U.S. Senate Democrats (n=41) 18 (44%) 6,057 0 Republicans (n=51) 45 (88%) 22,004 17,812 All Senators (n=92) 63 (68%) 14,898 7,000 Combined All Members (n=527) 360 (68%) 12,956 4,500
Pro-Tobacco Industry Votes1997-2000
Mean (%) Median (%) SD (%) U.S. House of Representatives Democrats (n=211) 25.1 20.0 23.7 Republicans (n=224) 79.8 88.9 19.5 All Representatives (n=435) 53.3 60.0 34.9 U.S. Senate Democrats (n=41) 10.6 10.3 10.2 Republicans (n=51) 72.3 78.4 16.4 All Senators (n=92) 44.8 45.5 33.8 Combined All Members (n=527) 51.8 59.4 34.8
AL
AK
AZ AR
CA
CO
CT
DEDC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PARI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Avg. Tobacco Contribution ($K)
30 to 60 (5)13 to 30 (13)
7 to 13 (16)2 to 7 (12)
-0.2 to 2 (5)
Average Tobacco PAC Contributions to Congress Members - 1993 to 2000
AL
AK
AZ AR
CA
CO
CT
DEDC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PARI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Avg. Pro-Tobacco Vote %
0.75 to 1 (9)0.6 to 0.75 (13)0.4 to 0.6 (10)0.25 to 0.4 (12)0 to 0.25 (7)
Average Pro-Tobacco Vote Percentage by Congress Members - 1997 to 2000
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Relationship of Contributions to Voting by Party
Total PAC Contributions ($K)
Pro
-Tob
acco
Vot
es (
%)
DemocratRepublican
Rationale for Multi-Level Model
• Congress members not independent, clustered by state
• ICC = 0.27, indicating that state differences account for mor than 25% of the variability in voting behavior
• Multi-level models allow inclusion of important state-level predictors
HLM Model of Voting Behavior
Parameters & Test Statistics Multilevel Model Coefficient SE t Ratio p
Mean Pro-Tobacco Vote (%) Intercept, 00 .1460 .0159 9.20 .000
Acres, 01 .0022 .0003 6.56 .000
Political Party (0=D,1=R) Intercept, 10 .5634 .0227 24.81 .000
Acres, 11 -.0011 .0004 -3.10 .004
Total Contributions ($K) Intercept, 20 .0091 .0017 5.28 .000
Acres, 21 -.0000 .0000 -1.52 .134
Party X Contributions Intercept, 30 -.0056 .0019 -2.92 .006
Acres, 31 .0000 .0000 .467 .642
Simple Model Summary
• Interpretation– Political party is largest factor
– Contributions, and CxP interaction are strongly significant after controlling for political party, state, and state tobacco acreage
• Predictions– E[Democratic Voting %] = .15 + .0091(Contributions)
– E[Republican Voting %] = .71 + .0035(Contributions)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
HLM Bayesian Estimated Regression Linesfor 50 States by Political Party
Tobacco Industry Contributions ($K)
Pre
dic
ted
Pro
-To
ba
cco
Vo
ting
(%
)
DemocratsRepublicans
Summary
• Confirms previous research on influence of TI contributions and importance of political party
• TI gets bigger ‘bang for their buck’ with the Democrats
• Policy implication – we need to work closely with our political allies to ensure that TI political contributions are kept to a minimum