To the Shores of Tripoli Why Operation Odyssey Dawn Should Not Stop at Benghazi

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March 21, 2011SNAPSHOT

To the Shores of TripoliWhy Operation Odyssey Dawn Should Not Stop At Benghazi

Dirk Vandewalle

DIRK VANDEWALLE is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.

As Catherine Ashton, the European Union's high representative for foreign affairs and

security policy, wrote in a March 18, 2011, New York Times editorial about the European

Unions options in Libya, sometimes the toughest question in world politics is: And then

what? In light of the furious pace of the negotiations surrounding the previous days

adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 -- which extended a no-fly zone over Libya

and authorized the international community to take whatever additional measures

necessary to protect the country's population short of sending ground troops -- it is not

surprising that no one had really stopped to consider her question. Indeed, more time

seems to have been spent getting the European Union, the Arab League, the G-8, and the

Security Council to agree on the language than on the content. Still, if those hurried

diplomatic negotiations seemed a Herculean task, they may pale in comparison to the

challenge that comes next: keeping Libya intact and on the road to recovery.

For his part, U.S. President Barack Obama promised that intervention would be short -- a

matter of "days, not weeks." And British Prime Minister David Cameron admonished that

international involvement should be limited to stopping Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafisviolence. Both caveats will prove unrealistic.

At this point, the international community has two options: to either protect the opposition

movement in Cyrenaica, the vast eastern province in which Benghazi is located, but not

force Qaddafi out of power, or make Qaddafis ouster an explicit goal. The former seems to

be what Cameron had in mind when he spoke of selective containment -- perhaps in an

attempt to sanitize international involvement. It was also echoed in Obama's call for

short-term intervention. Still, this kind of containment is neither possible nor feasible.

he Shores of Tripoli http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print

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Indeed, it would defeat the very logic of Resolution 1973.

Of course, ongoing military strikes will undoubtedly strengthen the rebels resolve. Seeing

the destruction wreaked by the international coalition, Qaddafi loyalists are unlikely to put

up much opposition. Even if the strikes stopped in the course of a cease-fire, rebels would

likely take advantage of Qaddafis weakness to try to push the remnants of his assault

forces westward, reigniting the fighting.

If international action simply contained Qaddafi by halting his advance, he would be left in

control of Tripolitania, the northwestern province in which Tripoli is located, leaving

Cyrenaica effectively independent. The two provinces are divided by long-standing tensions.

Qaddafi historically neglected the economy of Cyrenaica, because he judged the tribes in

those areas to be potentially disloyal. And tensions between the two provinces were further

exacerbated by Qaddafis attempts to play each off the other in order to stay in power.

Protecting half of the country while leaving the other to Qaddafi would harden the provinces

resolve to go their own ways. And economically speaking, that would be possible; both

provinces have oil fields to rely on for revenue.

But politically speaking, such a division would be disastrous. In Tripolitania, Qaddafi would

still have the resources and territory to continue to wage war against the opposition. If the

brutal state terrorism Qaddafi instituted in the 1980s to secure Libya position in the region

is any indication, he would not hesitate to do so. Even if he does observe a future

cease-fire, selective containment would allow him to play a long-term cat-and-mouse

game, stopping violence while surreptitiously extending his reach into the eastern part of

the country by manipulating or buying such Cyrenaican tribes as the Warfalla, a powerful

group that has so far adopted a cautious wait-and-see policy.

Meanwhile, the weapons that flowed through Libyas porous borders and into the hands of

Cyrenaican opposition forces during the anti-Qaddafi campaign will leave the regional tribes

substantially more powerful than before. Having suffered through Qaddafis violence against

them and then emboldened by Western intervention on their behalf, they would be ready to

fight back at all cost. Thus the specter of all-out intertribal and interprovincial warfare

would rise once more.

A Libya with Qaddafi in even partial control would be unacceptable to the international

community; the country would be highly unstable and a real liability to North Africa andEurope. The worlds inability or unwillingness to displace an unreconstructed Qaddafi would

give succor to a number of groups, including al-Qaeda, that could seize chaos in Libya and

North Africa as an opportunity to extend their influence. Indeed, Qaddafis threat to turn the

Mediterranean into a zone of instability is a reminder of precisely what a divided Libya could

yield.

Internal instability aside, there is another reason why selective containment is unwise: it

would severely constrain the international communitys future options. It seems inevitable


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that EU and U.S. efforts will successfully drive Qaddafi's forces from Benghazi. But selective

containment would require them to stop there. Given Qaddafis rhetoric of the past few

weeks, it seems unlikely that they would be able to pressure him into any kind of settlement

from such a position. Further, it is improbable that, having achieved the limited objective of

securing Cyrenaica relatively quickly, the United Kingdom and France, the leaders of the

intervention forces, would be content to settle rather than march on to Tripoli to dislodge

Qaddafi himself.

Of course, the alternative, forcing Qaddafi out of power, is fraught with its own problems

and complications. Qaddafis departure would leave behind a political vacuum that would

need filling as soon as possible. The choice of local interlocutors would be key. For all the

sympathy the international community may currently feel for the opposition movement

headed by the Libyan National Council, the provisional government, it would have to be

cautious about unconditionally supporting it. Indeed, the threats that the LNC is already

issuing should give the international community doubts about its readiness to lead in

democratic government. Throughout the conflict, the LNC has threatened that there will be

dire consequences for those countries in the West that had not sufficiently supported the

rebel side if it won.

It is worth noting that although there is as yet no other opposition group, the LNC is

national only in its aspirations. Much of Tripolitania still genuinely supports Qaddafi and

would likely be resentful of whatever took his place and refuse to join an LNC-led

government. To overcome antagonism between the provinces and to guide the country

through the arduous process of state building and reconstruction that would follow

Qaddafis departure, institutions would need to be truly national and representative. Since

the settling of scores seems inevitable in Libya after decades of Qaddafis deliberate divide-and-rule policies, the international community would need to help establish a Libyan version

of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that brought political opponents in South Africa

to some kind of understanding. Meanwhile, the international community would also have to

steer the development of democracy and good governance in a country that has not known

anything except tyranny for decades.

It is only such a process of democratization and reconstruction that would truly lessen the

salience of Libyas enduring divisions. The reintegration of Libya with its North African

neighbors after decades of self-enforced isolation under Qaddafi would also help. After

years of ostracism, reintegration in the region could bring some measure of pride and

responsibility to Libyans.

For all of this to happen, Libya, in addition to removing Qaddafi from power, needs what

Ashton called in her article a Marshall plan for North Africa that would help a post-Qaddafi

Libya (and other countries in the region) start building their states, developing their

economies, and improving democratic governance through a number of educational,

economic, and political initiatives. Libya's survival as a unified country will not only depend


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on how its own citizens deal with its long-standing fissures but also on the careful planning

of outside powers.

Unless the United States and the European Union reach a decision quickly, they may wind

up in a self-imposed stalemate that Qaddafi could exploit. The international community

needs a proactive agenda and a clear plan for the intervention, starting now.

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To the Shores of Tripoli Why Operation Odyssey Dawn Should Not Stop at Benghazi

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