To Arm or to Ally? - Princeton University · ... (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ... To Arm or to...

Under what condi-tions do great power patrons offer client states arms, alliances, or both? Whydo great powers sometimes provide arms to their clients and why do theysometimes form alliances with their clients?

These questions are important in international politics because great powersface a “patron’s dilemma.” Great powers must adopt policies to provide secu-rity to their allies without becoming entrapped in an unwanted conºict. Strongcommitments, such as treaty alliances, worsen the risk of entrapment—that is,the patron’s fear of being dragged into an undesirable war. Weak commit-ments, such as verbal assurances, intensify a client’s fears of abandonment—inother words, the client’s fear of receiving inadequate support should a crisisdevelop. Such is the traditional alliance dilemma that has been analyzed byGlenn Snyder and other scholars.1

Grasping the patron’s dilemma is central to understanding not only U.S.security commitments but also many related patterns of interstate behavior.For example, efforts to secure an Iranian nuclear deal have produced calls forstronger defense ties between the United States and Israel, Saudi Arabia, andthe United Arab Emirates, among others. Such ties could include formal treatyalliances or the sale of additional arms. Some analysts warn that insufªcientassurances could trigger nuclear proliferation or even regional war. Elsewherein the world, China’s recent assertiveness has made U.S. allies, such as Japanand the Philippines, and partners, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, anxious.This alliance anxiety has forced the United States to reconsider its provision ofarms and alliances. Similar issues are at play with Ukraine. Actual and poten-tial Russian aggression toward Eastern Europe has fueled debate aboutwhether existing U.S. security guarantees are sufªcient and whether Ukraine

Keren Yarhi-Milo is an assistant professor of politics and international affairs in Princeton University’s Pol-itics Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. Alexander Lanoszkais Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. Zack Cooper is a fel-low at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

For their insights and suggestions, the authors thank Thomas Christensen, Timothy Crawford,Avery Goldstein, Joseph Grieco, Robert Jervis, Daniel Kurtzer, Benjamin Miller, Jeremy Pressman,the anonymous reviewers, and participants in international relations seminars at Columbia Uni-versity and Lehigh University.

1. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

International Security, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 90–139, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00250© 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

To Arm or to Ally?

To Arm or to Ally? Keren Yarhi-Milo,Alexander Lanoszka,andZack Cooper

The Patron’s Dilemma and the StrategicLogic of Arms Transfers and Alliances

90

should receive lethal U.S. arms. In all these regions, we expect the patron’s di-lemma to remain intense. This article elucidates the choices and constraintsfacing decisionmakers managing this dilemma.

The decisions of great powers to transfer arms or form alliances often pres-ent intriguing empirical puzzles. In 2015, the United States supported thirty-two treaty allies and allocated billions in security assistance worldwide.Surprisingly, U.S. treaty allies received only 2 percent of all U.S. foreign mili-tary ªnancing, whereas ªve non-allied countries received more than 90 per-cent. Among this group of ªve non-allied U.S. partners, Israel received$3.1 billion (55 percent of U.S. foreign military ªnancing), Egypt $1.3 billion(23 percent), Jordan $300 million (5 percent), Pakistan $280 million (5 percent),and Iraq $250 million (5 percent).2 This variation is even more intriguing whenconsidered historically. During the Cold War, the United States providedweapons and alliances to many states, including Pakistan and Taiwan, buttransferred arms to Israel without a formal defense pact. Yet Pakistan andTaiwan eventually lost their alliances despite seeing U.S. arms transfers con-tinue, if not increase. Why did the United States modulate its arms and alli-ances provision during the Cold War? And why would it today decline to offersome states defense pacts but give them more military ªnancing than it does toits treaty allies?

A patron’s choice to provide arms, alliances, or both, raises academic ques-tions because extending alliances and transferring arms produce many similarbeneªts. Both policies are useful for deterring adversaries and reassuringclients while exerting some inºuence over them. Alliances strengthen deter-rence and defense by aggregating capabilities and enhancing combined opera-tions and planning. Arms transfers deter and defend by altering the localmilitary balance. Like alliances, arms transfers can signal a patron’s commit-ment to maintain its client’s security. Still, the conditions under which greatpower patrons transfer arms and extend defense pacts have not been thor-oughly examined. In the relatively small literature on this topic, prominentscholars have argued that U.S. military assistance—arms or alliances—to cli-ents is driven by nonstrategic calculations, such as domestic political factors orcommercial motivations.3

To Arm or to Ally? 91

2. U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary” (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of State, 2015), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm.3. For domestic political explanations, see Galen Jackson, “The Showdown That Wasn’t: U.S.-Israeli Relations and American Domestic Politics, 1973–75,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4(Spring 2015), pp. 130–169. See also John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby andU.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008); Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish

In this article, we offer a uniªed strategic logic that explains how patronscalibrate the provision of arms and alliances. We argue that patrons make suchdecisions primarily on the basis of two factors: ªrst, the extent to which thepatron believes that it and its client have common security interests; and sec-ond, whether the patron believes that its client has military capabilities suf-ªcient to deter its main adversary and prevail should deterrence fail. Thesetwo variables interact to shape the bundle of security commitments—arms andalliances—that the patron offers to its client. Our analysis reveals when pa-trons use these security goods as substitutes and complements.4 We shed lighton how patrons manage the alliance dilemma by using arms transfers to affectthe behavior of their clients. We show that arms and alliances can help to reas-sure clients and mitigate their fears of abandonment by complementing exist-ing alliances while minimizing entrapment risks. Simply put, the patron’sdilemma revolves around how best to use arms transfers to address the alli-ance dilemma.

Our theoretical framework builds on previous work regarding how greatpowers calibrate the provision of arms, alliances, or both, to serve their inter-ests while managing their clients’ behavior.5 We extend this approach by dem-onstrating how security commitments change over time. In so doing, we showhow decisionmakers concerned with entrapment take measures to mitigatesuch concerns. Our analysis thus challenges the notion that clients can entrappatrons that are providing arms rather than alliances. Using primary docu-ments, we assess how decisionmakers regard the risks and opportunities thatcome with providing arms and alliances.

Our empirical ªndings provide weak evidence for claims that domestic poli-tics and commercial interests explain patrons’ decisions to transfer arms orform alliances. Rather, our evidence strongly suggests that even in controver-

International Security 41:2 92

Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Robert H. Trice,Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the Middle East (Beverly Hills, Calif.:Sage, 1976); and Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Deªning the Limits to DomesticInºuence on United States Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1991). For explana-tions based on commercial motivations, see Lawrence Freedman, “British Foreign Policy to 1985,IV: Britain and the Arms Trade,” International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (July 1978), pp. 377–392. On amixture of motives, see Edward A. Kolodziej, “France and the Arms Trade,” International Affairs,Vol. 56, No. 1 (January 1980), pp. 54–72.4. On foreign policy substitution, see T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, “A Model of ForeignPolicy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s),” Journal of Conºict Resolution,Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 11–32; and Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, “InternationalRelations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and ‘Nice’ Laws,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3(April 1984), pp. 383–406.5. David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1999).

sial cases where such alternative explanations are plausible, strategic variablesare more salient to U.S. decisionmakers. We do not dismiss the importanceof these alternative explanations, but instead show how U.S. decisionmakersfocused primarily on the commonality of security interests and the local mili-tary balance in determining which bundles of military assistance to give to cli-ent states.

More broadly, our argument contributes to a growing literature on interstatesignaling by examining the conditions under which arms transfers and alli-ances serve as alternative or complementary costly signals of support to a cli-ent. Of course, patrons can use other goods (e.g., forward deployments andjoint military exercises) to further their clients’ security interests. We focus onarms transfers and alliances, however, because both can be described as dis-tinct signals of patron support with separate cost structures. Alliances reflectex post reputational costs that would be imposed on the patron if it did not de-fend the ally in a crisis, whereas arms transfers hinge on the logic of ex antesunk costs, referring to the financial costs paid by the patron before the crisis.Together, our theory and empirical analysis demonstrate how variation inthese cost structures explains utilization of these policies, and how leaders per-ceive the relative utility of these tools.6

We proceed as follows. The ªrst section reviews existing conceptualizationsof alliances and arms. The second section describes our theory. The third sec-tion discusses our research design and reviews the two main alternative argu-ments: domestic political and commercial explanations. The fourth and ªfthsections examine U.S. efforts to provide arms and alliances to Taiwan andIsrael, respectively. The conclusion summarizes our argument and outlinespolicy implications drawn from our analysis.

Alliances and Arms: A Theoretical Overview

In this section, we discuss the factors that great power patrons consider in de-termining whether to support a potential client through an alliance commit-ment or through arms transfers. We explain the extent to which both of thesesecurity goods serve similar functions, and how differences between themshape when each is selected.


6. Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying andSunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 4(October 2014), pp. 919–935.

alliance commitments

Alliances are written pledges between two or more states that are intended toformalize some form of security cooperation.7 In this article, we set aside of-fensive alliances and nonaggression pacts to focus on defensive alliances (ordefense pacts), in which members pledge to come to each other’s aid in theevent that one member experiences external aggression. Alliances deter adver-saries by aggregating and, through joint military exercises and operationalplanning, enhancing capabilities. Alliances are ex post commitments that bol-ster the credibility of a state’s promise to intervene on behalf of an ally by put-ting the state’s reputation at stake.8 Reneging on commitments is costlybecause it affects a state’s ability to negotiate future alliance treaties.9

States face a dilemma in deciding the strength of their alliance commit-ments. Too weak a commitment could embolden an adversary and inspireabandonment fears in an ally because the patron might decline to assist it dur-ing a crisis. Too strong a commitment, such as one that is explicit, broad, andbinding, could embolden a client to pursue risky or aggressive policies. Thislatter possibility fuels a patron’s fear of being militarily entrapped by a risk-taking ally that could drag the patron into an unwanted war.10 Of course, allalliance commitments imply some risk of entanglement, which Tongª Kimdeªnes as “the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costlyand unproªtable enterprise because of the alliance.”11

Institutional arrangements sometimes enable the patron to mitigate this en-tanglement risk.12 Ambiguous commitments can make both clients and adver-saries cautious, because they are unsure which obligations and conditions will


7. On alliances as a bundle of mixed security goods, see ibid. For alliances as written pledges, seeJames D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3(2000), pp. 63–83.8. James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Jour-nal of Conºict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68–90. Some formal alliance commit-ments also feature extensive military cooperation and coordination. Many alliances include fewsignals of commitment beyond verbal promises. See Fuhrmann and Sechser, “Signaling AllianceCommitments.”9. See Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal ofConºict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (June 2008), pp. 426–454; Mark J.C. Crescenzi et al., “Reliability,Reputation, and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2012),pp. 259–274; and Gregory D. Miller, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances beforethe First World War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012).10. For a discussion of how the United States has prioritized the risk of being dragged into un-wanted wars by its allies, see Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing theSecurity Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7–48.11. Tongª Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies, Vol. 20,No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 350–377 (emphasis in the original).12. Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances.”

trigger an alliance response. Defense pacts are unconditional if they leaveunspeciªed the terms under which the patron will aid its client. Defense pactsare conditional if they attach public or private terms or contain ambiguous lan-guage designed to reduce an ally’s moral hazard—that is, its willingness totake risky actions knowing that its patron will come to its defense.13 Thesearrangements are imperfect, however. For example, determining whetheran attack was provoked can be difªcult, thereby calling into question the ap-plicability of a conditional defense pact. Accordingly, conditional alliances canundercut deterrence if a potential adversary believes that it can circumvent agreat power’s alliance commitments.14

arms transfers

In an arms transfer, a state gives another state weapons to augment its militarycapabilities. Like alliances, arms transfers deter and defend by shifting the lo-cal balance of power in the recipient’s favor. Yet, they differ from alliances inthree ways. First, a patron can decide to transfer arms quickly and sometimeswithout involving domestic legislatures, whereas alliances often take time tonegotiate and ratify. Second, a patron can modulate the magnitude and type ofmilitary assistance it provides over time. Alliance commitments are generallymore static and difªcult to calibrate. Third, although alliances are mainly an expost indicator of a patron’s commitment to a client, arm transfers are primarilyan ex ante signal of such a commitment—the costs of which result from a pa-tron supplying a loan or grant to its client to purchase weapons or directly pro-viding arms.15

Arms transfers can signal a patron’s intentions by demonstrating its interestin maintaining the security of its client. Three characteristics of arms transfersaffect their signaling value. The ªrst characteristic is the size of the arms trans-fer. A large transfer can function as a sunk cost. Such costly signals cause a cli-ent and its adversary to reason that only a patron with a strong interest inmaintaining the security of its client would signiªcantly augment its arsenal.We deªne the size of an arms transfer as the percentage of the patron’s total


13. Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 99–100.14. Snyder, Alliance Politics.15. If the arms transfer comprises advanced weapons, then the patron might have to bear not onlya budgetary burden but also some risk of undesirable technological transfer to the client. Suchtechnological spillover could make the client less dependent on the patron for arms in the future,thereby depriving the patron of leverage.

military transfer budget devoted to a certain client relative to other re-gional clients.16

The second characteristic concerns the type of weapons being transferred.Defensive weapons limit the client’s ability to conquer territory or to launch aªrst strike. By contrast, offensive weapons (i.e., those that favor mobility overprotection or ªrepower) constitute a more costly signal.17 The adversary mighteven regard the patron’s willingness to supply offensive weapons as a signalthat the patron approves of a client’s offensive aims. The adversary and otheroutside observers are therefore more likely to believe that the patron will cometo its client’s aid in a crisis. Alternatively, whatever the patron’s intentions, anadversary might blame the patron for providing weapons that enabled itsclient to undertake offensive operations, thereby implicating the patron inthe conºict and increasing the likelihood that the adversary will target the pa-tron.18 Transferring offensive weapons to a client thus means that the patron isaccepting a higher risk of entrapment.

The third characteristic of arms transfers is institutionalization. The more in-stitutionalized the practice of transferring arms, the stronger its signalingvalue. A single arms transfer is an ambiguous signal of a client’s future com-mitment, because it provides limited information about the patron’s future be-havior. More institutionalized arrangements produce expectations of futureweapons transfers, increase the anticipated cost of the client’s commitment tothe patron and the anticipated beneªt to the client, and are much harder to re-verse. With institutionalization, the patron is more likely to suffer reputationcosts if its client is defeated. At stake is not the patron’s reputation for resolve,but rather the patron’s desire to be seen as being on the winning side. Institu-tionalized arms transfers can take many forms. Patrons might commit toprovide a certain amount or type of arms within a speciªed time frame. Alter-natively, patrons might offer some guarantee that their clients maintain asufªcient self-defense capability. By creating expectations of future arms trans-fers, institutionalization provides a new focal point for relations between the


16. See U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary.” Arms transfersmay be a substitute for crisis intervention should hostilities between the client and the adversarybreak out. Yet it remains unclear how the patron can remain neutral and not be dragged into anundesirable conºict.17. Some offensive weapons are indistinguishable from defensive ones. In such cases, the signal-ing logic of arms transfers might be less pronounced compared with cases where unambiguouslyoffensive weapons are supplied.18. Sophistication might be another criterion. The more technologically sophisticated theweapon—operationalized by measuring the time passed since its initial ªelding—the strongerthe signal. Newer weapons are often qualitatively superior and may embolden the client. We omitthis category because newer weapons are often more expensive and thus costly.

patron and its client. Thus, arms transfers convey the most signiªcant andcostliest signal of a patron’s support when they include the institutionalizedprovision of a large quantity of offensive and defensive weapons.19 Costly armtransfers have at least two of these characteristics. When arms transfers are adhoc and feature small quantities of defensive weapons, we argue that the sig-nal conveys insigniªcant support.

This conceptualization of arms transfers covers multiple methods of provi-sion, including sales, grants, and loans. Although the payment mechanismsmay differ, each type of arms transfer requires a similar set of decisions by thepatron’s leaders. In the United States, for example, both foreign military salesand ªnancing are governed by the Arms Export Control Act, determined bythe secretary of state, and executed by the secretary of defense. The presidentmust formally decide that providing arms will “strengthen the security of theUnited States and promote world peace.”20 The central policy questions aresimilar even though the exact structure of each arms transfer arrangementmay differ.

Arms transfers have disadvantages that limit their deterrence, defense, andsignaling value. First, arms transfers provide a quick solution to slight shifts inthe local conventional military balance, but they cannot rapidly induce largechanges in a client’s wartime military capabilities relative to a much morepowerful adversary. The supply of arms is unlikely to achieve battleªeld re-sults similar to intervention by a major power. When the client faces asigniªcant disadvantage and thus cannot deter or defend against an adversary,the transfer of weapons might be insufªcient to turn the tide of a conºict. Itcould, however, buy the client time while the patron decides whether and howto intervene. A second limitation is that ex ante arms transfers do not consti-tute a promise to rescue the client in a militarized crisis, though they couldentangle a patron perceived as complicit in a conºict. The steady supply ofsigniªcant military arms could establish the perception of a close partnershipbetween the patron and its client, but such partnerships typically do not in-


19. Arms transfers sometimes create reputation costs. An illustrative example is the alleged use byinsurgents in eastern Ukraine of Russian anti-aircraft missiles against ºight MH17. This accidenthurt Russia’s reputation and led to economic sanctions. Suspending arms transfers during a crisiscould also create reputation costs. For example, the United States risks appearing unreliable if itsuspends military aid to Israel during a conºict.20. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Financing” (Washington, D.C.:Defense Security Cooperation Agency, n.d.), http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-ªnancing-fmf; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales” (Washington,D.C.: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, n.d.), http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-ªnancing-fms.

clude an explicit commitment from the patron to support its client in wartime.Therefore, relative to formal alliance commitments, even signiªcant armstransfers are unlikely to entrap a patron concerned about its reputation.

Theoretical Framework

To highlight the patron’s dilemma, and to explain the complementarity andsubstitutability of arms transfers and alliances, we offer a new theoreticalframework. Building on the realist observation that threat perceptions drive al-liance formation, our theory emphasizes two independent variables, both ofwhich are perceptual. The ªrst independent variable is the patron’s assessmentof the commonality of security interests with a potential client. The second isthe patron’s assessment of the client’s military capabilities relative to a sharedadversary.21 We argue that patrons assess these two variables in turn.

Commonality of security interests refers to the extent of the threat that theclient’s primary adversary poses to the patron’s core security interests. Thisvariable is perceptual because it depends on decisionmakers’ threat assess-ments. In situations of high compatibility of interests, the patron must deter-mine whether its client’s most severe security threat also poses a signiªcantthreat to the patron’s core security interests. The patron must also determinewhether the client is in an adversarial relationship with a third country withwhich the patron has an alliance or wishes to improve diplomatic relations. Ifthe client is not in such a relationship, then the security interests of the patronand the client will be highly compatible, making the patron more likely to signa formal defense pact with its client than not. A formal alliance is attractivefor clarifying the deterrent signal for adversaries, protecting the alliance fromchanges in government, and facilitating military-to-military cooperation inpeacetime.22 In these situations, the patron will regard such a commitment asenhancing its own security and will be less concerned with entrapment.23 Anexample of a patron and a client exhibiting highly compatible security interestsis the case of the United States and West Germany. Both countries saw theSoviet Union and its allies as their principal adversaries during the Cold War,and West Germany did not face another signiªcant adversary.


21. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).22. Relatively strong patrons can also better deter adversaries from attacking their allies. See PaulK. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 82,No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 423–443.23. Of course, major powers have more interests than their weaker allies, but they can still priori-tize threats similarly.

In relationships with limited compatibility, the primary threat confrontingthe client does not appear to pose a threat to the security interests of thepatron. Divergences in security threats are also signiªcant for the patron whenthe enemy of its friend is also its friend, thereby complicating the making of ahand-tying commitment—that is, a commitment that constrains future deci-sions. All else being equal, we expect alliances that are based on only limitedcommon interests to exhibit a lower level of commitment compared with thosebased on high commonality, because the patron prefers not to be involved di-rectly in the disputes that the client has with unshared adversaries. In such sit-uations, an unconditional formal defense treaty between a patron and a clientis very unlikely.24 An example of a security relationship with limited compati-bility is that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Although Iraniannuclear capabilities have long concerned both countries, Saudi Arabia has sig-niªcant security concerns that the United States does not share, includingIsrael. Consequently, no formal U.S.-Saudi defense treaty exists.25

Our second independent variable is the client’s military capabilities. The pa-tron evaluates whether the client can effectively deter an attack from the cli-ent’s main adversary and prevail militarily if deterrence fails. In this situation,the patron conducts a net assessment that combines quantitative measure-ments and qualitative indicators to infer the strength of the opposing militar-ies. It must consider dynamic and contextual factors that affect the client’scapabilities in both the present and short terms. When the client enjoys a fa-vorable military balance, a transfer of arms could encourage the client to un-dertake offensive operations. In such situations, particularly when the patronand the client have a formal alliance, the patron is unlikely to transfer armsthat could embolden its client and thereby entrap the patron. When the client’smilitary capabilities are low relative to those of its adversary, however, armstransfers could enhance the client’s deterrence and defense capabilities whilesignaling the patron’s support. An example of a U.S. client with high (conven-tional) military capabilities is South Korea relative to North Korea. An exam-ple of a U.S. client with low military capabilities is Taiwan relative to China.26

Before describing the predicted outcomes generated by interacting these two


24. Benson, Constructing International Security.25. To be exhaustive, consider a situation of zero compatibility. The patron could offer at best aweak commitment to the potential client in return for something that the patron values. Yet suchcommitments should be empirically rare. Our theory cannot explain such alliances given its em-phasis on shared threat assessments.26. Scott L. Kastner, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for ArmedConºict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Winter 2015/16), pp. 54–92.

variables, we must clarify our assumptions. First, we assume that the patronalways wants to preserve the status quo between the client and the client’s ad-versary. Indeed, the patron faces an optimization problem: it wants to deter anadversary from challenging its client (and ensure the client’s ability to prevailif deterrence fails) but at the lowest possible cost. Second, we assume that theclient wants to extract the greatest commitment possible from its patron, re-gardless of the form it takes.27

Figure 1 displays our four predicted outcomes. Consider, ªrst, the situationin which the patron perceives highly compatible security interests but the cli-ent faces an unfavorable local military balance (the top-left cell). Because theirsecurity interests overlap and the client needs military assistance, the patronwill provide its client both costly arms and a defense pact. In this scenario, adefense pact is desirable because it issues a strong deterrent signal to adversar-ies, facilitates military-to-military coordination, and sustains the partnershipagainst changes in either government. Arms transfers bolster the deterrentvalue of the alliance by making the ally more capable of at least holding off po-tential aggressors until reinforcements arrive.28

The second situation involves highly compatible security interests but a mil-itary balance that favors the client rather than the adversary (the top-rightcell). For the patron, providing costly arms would be redundant and even dan-


27. Admittedly, clients might have domestic reasons that could, for instance, lead them to preferarms to a formal alliance. For example, Roseanne W. McManus and Keren Yarhi-Milo show thatthe United States is less likely to provide highly public signals of support to its more autocratic cli-ents because of fears of domestic backlash in both the United States and the client country. SeeMcManus and Yarhi-Milo, “The Logic of ‘Backstage’ Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type,and Major Power–Protégé Relations,” Baruch College, CUNY, and Princeton University, 2016.28. James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conºict Resolution,Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 270–297.

Figure 1. The Patron’s Dilemma

gerous because it could encourage the client to press its claims against the ad-versary.29 In this scenario, the patron would still provide or maintain analliance commitment to deter the common adversary. The alliance offers someleverage over the client and a hedge in case the client’s relative military advan-tage suddenly deteriorates. Although alliances carry some costs and risks, theyremain a more cost-effective way of thwarting aggression against the clientthan having to intervene on behalf of a non-treaty security partner should localdeterrence fail. To minimize moral hazard, however, the patron could add con-ditions to the alliance to ensure that it is activated only after an unambiguousattack on its client. For the client, notwithstanding its relative military prepon-derance vis-à-vis the adversary, an alliance with the patron remains attractivebecause it enhances deterrence, reduces the risk of a simultaneous attack bymultiple adversaries, and lowers the overall cost of providing for its own de-fense by way of burden-sharing.

In the third and fourth situations, the patron and the client have only some-what compatible security interests. Although the patron does not wish to leaveits client vulnerable, it does not want to provide the client with an uncondi-tional defense pact for fear of getting entrapped in a conºict with an unsharedenemy. If the patron were to offer a commitment, then it would at most be ahighly conditional defense pact to reduce this entrapment risk. Designing con-ditional defense pacts is difªcult, however, because clarifying the terms of as-sistance could invite either the client or the adversary to skirt the treaty. Suchpacts are also difªcult to implement because when a conºict breaks out, it isoften unclear which state was the primary aggressor. Also, adversaries mightªnd conditional alliances threatening. Consequently, the patron could abro-gate the alliance to reassure the courted adversary.30

Whether the patron transfers costly arms in these two situations depends onits assessments of the client’s military capabilities. When the patron concludesthat the military balance is unfavorable to the client (the bottom-left cell), thepatron is likely to send costly arms to enable the client to deter its main adver-sary. If the patron desires cooperative relations with that adversary, then rely-ing on arms transfers can also signal continued diplomatic support without acommitment to intervene militarily. Still, the patron will likely prefer to trans-


29. The patron might still choose to supply some arms occasionally to maintain the client’s deter-rent capability, ensure interoperability should deterrence fail, and allow time to come to the cli-ent’s defense. We do not expect the provision of costly arms in this scenario, so institutionalizedprovisions of a large amount of offensive weapons are unlikely.30. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4(July 1984), p. 471.

fer weapons that would reduce instability and hence potential entrapmentrisks, thus supplying defensive rather than offensive weapons.31 The resultingambiguity still has deterrent value: potential challengers might refrain from at-tacking the patron’s client if they cannot be sure how the patron will aid theclient in response. Moreover, the relative ºexibility of arms transfers is advan-tageous for the patron when it desires the cooperation of both its client andthat client’s adversary. By providing arms to both parties, the patron couldextract mutual concessions and create strategic ambiguity about which side itwould support in a crisis, thereby decreasing the chance for war.32

Finally, if the patron and the client have somewhat compatible security in-terests and the patron assesses that the military balance is favorable to the cli-ent (the bottom-right cell), costly arms are unnecessary. Arms will probablyoffer marginal deterrent value but nevertheless allow the client to sabotage thepatron’s efforts to avoid regional conºict or pursue relations with the client’sadversary. Anticipating these dangers, the patron will likely withhold both analliance and costly arms. The patron is likely to consider an alliance unde-sirable because the client’s interests do not overlap sufªciently with those ofthe patron and the client is militarily superior to its main adversary.33 Thepatron might still choose to arm its client occasionally if it believes that the cli-ent’s deterrent capabilities are likely to erode in the near future, but such trans-fers will be sporadic, relatively limited, and restricted to defensive weapons.

If the patron believes that its client has revisionist intentions, then its fears ofentrapment will be greater. The patron’s security commitments will mirrorthose shown in ªgure 1. But because of its concerns about entrapment, thepatron will increase the number or type of conditions attached to its alli-ance with the client, and it will impose limitations on arms across all cells.Thus, the higher the degree of conditionality, the lower the moral hazard. Alli-ance conditions could appear in secret annexes either to render them invisi-ble to potential domestic opposition groups or because the patron wishes tomaintain the deterrent value of the alliance.


31. The patron could also attach end-use agreements to provisions of arms so as to clarify that itwould not tolerate their use against a particular target state. Clients can, however, violate suchagreements during crises. Verifying any violations could also be difªcult.32. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).33. Some security ties between the patron and client could continue under these circumstances.For example, a client may desire to decrease its defense spending by relying increasingly on exter-nal support. A patron may also wish to lessen its requirements for global military deployments byseeking to increase its client’s defensive capabilities. Thus, although we predict that new alliancesand major arms sales will be unlikely, they might still occur in highly conditional or limited formsthat would minimize moral hazard.

Research Design and Alternative Explanations

Using primary documents and newly declassiªed materials from the presiden-tial libraries of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, we test our the-oretical predictions. We focus on U.S. commitments to two client states:Taiwan and Israel.

These historically important cases allow us to test the causal mechanisms ofour theory.34 Each case features signiªcant variation in one of our independentvariables over time. In the Taiwan case, our ªrst independent variable—commonality of security interests—changes in value. In the Israel case, our sec-ond independent variable—the patron’s assessment of its client’s militarycapabilities—changes in value. The extensive documentary evidence in eachcase permits us to process trace how perceived shifts in threats and client capa-bilities causally affected the commitments the United States offered its clients.Moreover, because neither client had credible alternative sources of patronage,both were beholden to the United States, thus validating our exclusive focuson U.S. decisionmaking and our decision to hold client preferences constant.

Finally, our theoretical framework highlights the role of threat perceptionsand military capabilities, but we recognize that other factors could affect armstransfer and alliance decisions. We have selected cases that are relatively“easy” for the domestic political and commercial motivations arguments be-cause they involve countries with major political lobbies in the United Statesas well as large arms packages for which strong commercial interests would beat stake. By examining both Democratic and Republican administrations, wetake into account potentially confounding variables.

U.S. Commitments to Taiwan

Taiwan today occupies an ambiguous place in the U.S.-led security order inEast Asia.35 At one time, however, its security relationship with the UnitedStates was much more clear-cut. In 1954, the United States formed an alliancewith, and began sending costly arms to, Taiwan to contain communist expan-sion. No direct high-level ties existed between the United States and Chinauntil sweeping changes took place during Richard Nixon’s presidency, culmi-


34. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the SocialSciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).35. Consistent with U.S. government records, we refer to the People’s Republic of China as“China” and the Republic of China as “Taiwan.”

nating in his famous 1972 visit to Beijing. In 1979, the United States normalizedrelations with China and ended its alliance and formal diplomatic ties withTaiwan while maintaining its policy of arms transfers. Our theory predicts thatbefore normalization, the United States would have coupled an alliance com-mitment to Taiwan with a steady supply of costly arms (ªgure 1, upper-leftcell). During this period, the United States and Taiwan had common securityinterests, as both were highly concerned about the Chinese communist threat.U.S. threat perceptions changed dramatically in the early 1970s, however, asgrowing tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship allowed the United States touse China for containing the Soviet threat. Accordingly, U.S. interests divergedfrom those of Taiwan, resulting in the United States’ rapprochement with themainland. Following normalization, costly arms transfers to Taiwan shouldhave become the United States’ preferred means of signaling reassurance andpracticing deterrence (ªgure 1, bottom-left cell).

common interests: relations before normalization with china

In the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers assessed that mainland China was a pri-mary threat to the United States and that it was stronger militarily than theRepublic of China in Taiwan. Driven from the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek’sNationalist government became a bulwark against communism during theKorean War. President Harry Truman provided Taiwan with economic aid anddeployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, thereby pre-venting cross-strait attacks by either Taiwan or China. Truman’s successor,Dwight Eisenhower, viewed Taiwan as central to the United States’ Asiapolicy. Eisenhower thought that Taiwan’s “existence, under American protec-tion, was essential in maintaining the belief in Asia that the mainlandjuggernaut could be stopped and that the United States would stand by itsanticommunist friends.”36 Eisenhower therefore lifted Truman’s neutraliza-tion policy toward the Taiwan Strait, allowing Chiang’s forces to fortify theislands of Quemoy and Matsu off the mainland’s coast. These develop-ments prompted China to begin shelling Quemoy in August 1954.37 Chinesemedia declared contemporaneously that “China must liberate Taiwan.”38


36. Stephen M. Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks,1955–1970,” in Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang, eds., Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Di-plomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 201.37. Gordon H. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation overQuemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence,” American Historical Review,Vol. 98, No. 5 (December 1981), p. 1508.38. See Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, eds., Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Rela-tions (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1998), p. 351.

Alarmed by China’s belligerence, the United States signed a Mutual DefenseTreaty with Taiwan on December 2, 1954. The treaty required the United Statesto defend Taiwan if the main island of Formosa or the outlying PescadoresIslands were attacked. In exchange, the treaty permitted the United States tobase troops on Taiwan’s territory.39 Concerned about Taiwan entrapping theUnited States in a conºict, Washington insisted on a secret provision stipulat-ing that the United States would assist Taiwan only for its defense.40 In1954, the Eisenhower administration conditioned the transfer of F-84 ªghter-bombers to Taiwan, pledging restraint.41 Moreover, the treaty did not explicitlyoblige the United States to defend the offshore islands closer to the mainland,suggesting that it would do so only if the main islands of Formosa and Penghuwere threatened. U.S. decisionmakers in private, however, made explicit com-mitments to Chiang to defend some of the offshore islands.42 In late January1955, Eisenhower supported legislation—the Formosa Resolution—thatgranted the president the authority to intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwanshould it be attacked.43 Early that year, U.S. decisionmakers even intimatedthat the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Taiwanagainst China.44

Although Washington and Taipei sometimes disagreed on strategy towardBeijing, even clashing over whether to use military force against the mainland,both viewed China as a signiªcant threat. In 1956, during a visit to Taipei,President Eisenhower noted: “There is no way in which Asia can be free ofcommunism until mainland China is free.” Furthermore, he suggested that “itwas time to work out the strategy for liberating Asia.”45 John Foster Dullescommented, “The Chinese Communists seem to be much more violent and fa-natical, more addicted to the use of force than the Russians are or havebecome.”46 Beijing’s aggressive behavior required a response to reinforce


39. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan, March 3, 1955, TIAS 3178;6 UST 433–438, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm.40. Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplo-macy in Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 239.41. Ibid., p. 143. On U.S. fears of entrapment, see ibid., pp. 142–143.42. Steven M. Goldstein, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949–1978: SuspiciousAllies” (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, 2000), pp. 7–9.43. Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,”International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 104.44. Matthew Jones, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 251–252.45. Memorandum of a Conversation, March 16, 1956, 9:30 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS) 1955–1957, Vol. 3: China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 1986),p. 329.46. Assistant Secretary for East Asia Walter Robertson also warned that the Soviet Union, “though

Taiwan’s security, which, Robert Accinelli notes, “was critically dependent onU.S. aid and backing.”47 The United States augmented Taiwan’s defenses byproviding defensive military assistance. In December 1956, U.S. policy towardTaiwan was crystallized in NSC (National Security Council) report 5503, whichasserted that the United States should “not agree to [Taiwan’s] offensiveactions against mainland Communist China.”48 It would, however, providedefensive arms and station nuclear-capable Matador missiles on Taiwan.49

Notwithstanding the United States and Taiwan’s highly compatible secu-rity interests, Chiang’s rhetoric and actions suggested that he might entan-gle the United States in a war with China to facilitate the Nationalists’ returnto the mainland.50 A 1957 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)warned that although in the next year “Chinese Nationalists are very unlikelyto launch an invasion . . . the Nationalists might attempt within the periodof this estimate to embroil the U.S. in major hostilities against the ChineseCommunists.”51 And so, despite his desire to appear resolute againstChina, Eisenhower had to consider the possibility of entrapment. Accordingly,Eisenhower sought assurances that Chiang would renounce the use of force tounseat mainland communist leaders.52 Rather than providing Taiwan with po-tentially offensive weapons when Chinese forces shelled the Quemoy andMatsu Islands during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States deployedits own forces. Eisenhower ordered a massive force to Taiwan, including F-100and F-86 aircraft, the latter of which was equipped with air-to-air Sidewindermissiles so as to signal U.S. determination.53

Clariªcations were needed, however, regarding whether “[t]he intent ofNSC 5503 was to oppose the development of [Taiwan’s] forces to conductoffensive operations against mainland Communist China.”54 To simplify thisissue, Eisenhower directed: “We should provide Chiang Kai-shek with a lim-


great and dangerous, is not as active as the Chinese Communist menace to Asia.” See NancyBernkopf Tucker, The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2012), p. 176.47. Robert Accinelli, “A Thorn in the Side of Peace: The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958Offshore Islands Crisis,” in Ross and Jiang, Reexamining the Cold War, p. 109.48. National Security Council Report, January 15, 1955, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 2: China (Washing-ton, D.C.: GPO, 1986), pp. 30–34.49. On what these weapons signaled, see Tucker, The China Threat, p. 141.50. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 14–15.51. Special National Intelligence Estimate, April 9, 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 3, pp. 515–518.52. Jones, After Hiroshima, p. 380.53. Tucker, The China Threat, p. 145.54. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Na-tional Security Council, September 9, 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 3, p. 595.

ited capability in terms of amphibious equipment, but we should concentrateour assistance on the provision of defensive equipment.”55 In the followingyears, the United States would provide Taiwan tactical ªghter aircraft andsmaller surface vessels, but no large-scale amphibious capabilities such astroop transports.56 U.S. ofªcials were concerned that amphibious transports,combined with long-range bombers, could provide the mobility Taiwan re-quired to invade the mainland. According to the U.S. embassy in Taiwan, a“request for B-57’s and landing craft” was “war material obviously of an offen-sive character. . . . Its aggressive nature is self-evident.”57 Later in 1962,Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averill Harriman asked theU.S. ambassador to Taiwan to “clearly state our unwillingness [to] providethese items.”58 Although scholars express concern about the distinguishabilityof offensive and defensive weapons, the primary documents indicate thatpolicymakers dealing with military assistance to Taiwan differentiated be-tween those weapons that would provide Taiwan with an invasion capabilityand those that would not.59

Throughout the 1960s, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Chinawas stronger militarily than Taiwan, but leaders in Washington remained con-cerned that Chiang might attempt an attack on the mainland.60 Divergenceover preferred strategies and political goals gave rise to mutual distrust andsuspicion. In 1962 and 1963, President John Kennedy restrained Chiang fromlaunching attacks on China,61 and a 1964 National Policy Paper warned thatTaiwan’s “dependence on the U.S. for its very existence will continue, in the


55. Memorandum of Discussion at the 338th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 2,1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 3, p. 615.56. U.S. decisionmakers recognized that Taiwan could not launch military operations beyond irri-tating but minor incursions: “[W]e know of no [Taiwanese] plans to mount any large-scale militaryor paramilitary operations now or in the near future, such operations are unlikely and beyond Tai-wanese capabilities.” See National Intelligence Estimate, August 27, 1957, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 3,p. 591. The remote possibility of an attack on the Chinese mainland was nevertheless discussed.See Telegram from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Smythe) to theCommander in Chief, Paciªc (Stump), September 18, 1955, 1:30 p.m., FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. 3,pp. 91–92.57. Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, July 27, 1962,6 p.m., FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 22: Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), pp. 294–295.58. Message from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Am-bassador to the Republic of China (Kirk), August 8, 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 22, pp. 301–302.59. Goldstein, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949–1978,” p. 14. See also Memo-randum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to PresidentNixon, December 9, 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 17: China, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,2006), p. 144.60. See, for example, Memorandum of Discussion at the 338th Meeting of the National SecurityCouncil, pp. 611–619.61. See Memorandum for the Record, March 31, 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 22, pp. 204–205; and

ªnal analysis, to provide the principal basis for U.S. inºuence. We face, how-ever, the problem of adjusting to the declining importance of two of the spe-ciªc instruments—our economic and military aid programs—through whichwe have made our inºuence felt.”62 Indeed, from 1951 to 1966, the UnitedStates provided Taiwan with a large quantity of military assistance, amountingto more than $2.4 billion in value. Such sales helped bolster Taiwan’s defensivecapabilities, assured Taiwan of continued U.S. support, and deterred Chinesemilitary action across the strait, while providing the United States with addi-tional inºuence over the Nationalist government.

Also throughout the 1960s, “the United States and China both held extremeviews of the other’s strategic, long-term objectives and potential threat to theirrespective security.”63 By the end of the Kennedy administration, U.S. leaderswere contemplating military strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.64

Chinese leaders publicized their intention to eliminate Chiang’s government,likely through military action.65 In response, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reit-erated that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan was “not open to negotiation.”66

This sense of a Chinese threat was rooted not only in Chinese military and eco-nomic capabilities, but also in China’s “Maoist revolutionary propaganda and. . . popularity of the Maoist economic model in the Third World.”67 Neverthe-less, President Lyndon Johnson worried about reports that Chiang believed“now is the time for [Taiwan] to attack and overthrow the Chinese Communistregime on the Mainland.”68 In fact, Chiang’s vice president had gone so far asto tell Johnson: “We have our aspirations” about regaining the mainland.69


Telegram from the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, September 11, 1963, 7 p.m.,FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 22, pp. 392–395.62. National Policy Paper, September 11, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 30: China (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1998), p. 88.63. Robert S. Ross, “Introduction,” in Ross and Jiang, Reexamining the Cold War, p. 12.64. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: TheUnited States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3(Winter 2000/01), pp. 54–99.65. U.S. leaders were apparently not aware that Chinese leaders had scaled back their ambitionsby the late 1950s. See “Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong,” October 2, 1959,Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088.66. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, February 13,1968, 0250Z, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 30, p. 638.67. Ross, “Introduction,” p. 12; Hal Brands, “Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Com-mittee, and U.S. National Security Policy,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 2006),pp. 83–113; and Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War inVietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).68. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, March 16,1967, 3:43 p.m., FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 30, p. 539.69. Memorandum of Conversation, May 9, 1967, 12–12:55 p.m., FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 30, pp. 556–

Thus, U.S. leaders sought to provide Taiwan an alliance, but not offensivearms, through the late 1960s.

divergent interests: relations after rapprochement

The eruption of a Sino-Soviet border conºict in 1969 worsened relations be-tween Beijing and Moscow, convincing President Richard Nixon and NationalSecurity Adviser Henry Kissinger that a conciliatory approach to China suitedU.S. strategic interests.70 Moreover, growing incompatibility in the security in-terests of the United States and Taiwan led U.S. leaders to end the alliance withTaiwan and to rely only on arms transfers.

In the early 1970s, the United States assessed that the local balance of powercontinued to favor China. The Chinese had begun their nuclear program in1955, carried out a nuclear test in 1964, and were building a deterrent force bythe late 1960s.71 Meanwhile, the Nixon Doctrine, which called on U.S. allies tobear more of the conventional defense burden, meant that Taiwan would re-ceive less support from the U.S. military than it had previously. One reportnoted that “China could almost certainly take Taiwan in the absence of U.S.military intervention . . . [but] Peking would be constrained by the necessity ofproviding for defense needs elsewhere.”72 Recognizing Taiwan’s insecurity,one internal U.S. memorandum cautioned that “a sudden drop in the U.S.military presence on Taiwan that exceeded reductions consonant with ourwithdrawals from Viet-Nam should probably not be taken.”73 In 1974, theycommented: “[Taiwan] has thus shown increasing resignation to the inevit-ability of a growing [Chinese] military superiority.”74 Throughout this period,however, they continued to believe that China could not launch a successfulinvasion across the Taiwan Strait.

U.S. leaders did worry that perceptions of U.S. irresoluteness would inspireChinese aggression.75 Yet they also worried that Taipei might seek to spoil a


561. See also Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cam-bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 532.70. National Security Decision Memorandum 17, June 26, 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 17, p. 40.71. “China” (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2015), http://www.nti.org/country-proªles/china/.72. “China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces,” National Intelligence Estimate, July 20,1972, NIE 13-3-72, National Security Agency Electronic Brieªng Book 372, doc. 6, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB372/docs/Underground-China72.pdf, p. 4.73. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 124, May 27, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976,Vol. 17, pp. 330–331.74. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and thePaciªc, November 12, 1974, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 18: China, 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,2007), pp. 545–558.75. Ibid.

U.S.-China agreement by initiating a conºict with the mainland. In a July 1971discussion with Kissinger, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai warned that although“[i]t’s not possible for them to send troops en masse . . . there are those amonghis troops who deliberately want to make adventures—deliberately to createtrouble for him, and for you.”76 To address these concerns, Taiwan assured theUnited States that it would not seek revisionist goals through military meansin the near term. The vice premier told Nixon in April 1970, “[Taiwan] willnot use armed force against the mainland, even on a small scale.”77 In1972, under pressure once again from Kissinger and other U.S. ofªcials,Chiang Kai-shek gave “categorical assurances that [Taiwan] would refrainfrom any actions of an offensive or provocative nature” around Nixon’s visit toChina.78 Washington was adamant about these assurances, with the U.S. am-bassador to Taiwan warning that actions by Taiwan or its sympathizers onthe mainland “would put [Taiwan] in position to be plausibly blamed foruntoward incident.”79

Courting China while calibrating U.S. policy toward a militarily disadvan-taged Taiwan proved a delicate balance. China’s eight demands for improvingrelations with the United States included the statement that “[a]ll U.S. armedforces and military installations should be withdrawn from Taiwan and theTaiwan Strait area. . . . [The United States] must recognize [China] as the solelegal government representing China.”80 To reassure and to deter China simul-taneously, Kissinger took several “symbolic steps.” He explained to hisChinese interlocutors, “We have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed asquadron of air tankers from Taiwan, and reduced the size of our military ad-visory group by 20 percent. . . . We are prepared to begin reducing our otherforces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions neednot be a principal obstacle between us.”81 Kissinger did not inform Zhou thatthe United States would increase the amount of military assistance it providedTaiwan despite the U.S. troop withdrawals. Therefore, the United States could


76. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Presi-dent Nixon, November 19, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 18, p. 433.77. Memorandum of Conversation, February 21, 1973, 6 p.m., FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 18, p. 198.78. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 17, pp. 636–637.79. Ibid.80. Jing Huang and Xiaoting Li, Inseparable Separation: The Making of China’s Taiwan Policy (Singa-pore: World Scientiªc, 2010), p. 76.81. The Taiwan Strait Patrol was a group of U.S. Navy vessels based in Keeling, Taiwan, that pa-trolled the waters near China’s Fujian province. See Bruce A. Elleman, High Seas Buffer: The TaiwanPatrol Force, 1950–1979 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2012). Quotes from Alan D. Romberg,Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washing-ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp. 26–27.

appear to be decreasing its military support while increasing Taiwan’s defen-sive capabilities.

The United States continued to provide costly military systems to Taiwanduring the 1970s. It did not transfer troop transports that would helpTaiwan launch offensive amphibious operations against China, but U.S. lead-ers allowed Taiwan to purchase Hawk surface-to-air missiles and permittedthe co-production of F-5E ªghter aircraft. These systems were not as techno-logically advanced as Taiwan desired, but they conveyed a sustained U.S.commitment, even after the United States’ rapprochement with China in 1972(see table 1).

Costly U.S. arms sales to Taiwan persisted after the U.S. alliance commit-ment dissolved. Because Washington worried that “Peking would be botheredby an indeªnite and formal U.S. military involvement with Taiwan,” it soughtto avoid “weapons which were clearly offensive in nature (e.g., strategicbombers, long-range missiles, or modern amphibious equipment) . . . sophisti-cated weapons (e.g., advanced aircraft or major missile production capabili-ties); the most advanced weapons in the U.S. inventory (e.g., F-15 aircraft, TVguided bombs, advanced ECM [electronic counter-measure] systems) . . . [or]rapid introduction of large quantities of weapons into Taipei’s inventory.”82

U.S. ofªcials still believed that they could differentiate between offensive anddefensive weapons and avoid transferring them. The United States wantedTaiwan to have “an Air Force designed primarily for air-to-air capabilityagainst ªghters, bombers and airlift forces, and for countering a PRC naval at-


82. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and thePaciªc, pp. 548–549.

Table 1. Planned U.S. Military Assistance to Taiwan, 1972–76

Fiscal Years($ million)

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Foreign military sales credit 45 44 65 135 124Military assistance/aid program 11 10 5.8 5.8 0.5Enhance Plus grant (Vietnam related) — 18 28 — —

Total 56 72 99 141 125

SOURCE: “Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff tothe President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” April 7, 1973, in For-eign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 18: China (Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Ofªce), p. 240.

tack; a navy capable of withstanding attacks by PRC submarine forces andmissile-equipped surface craft and of countering PRC amphibious forces incoordination with the [Taiwan] Air Force; a relatively small but mobile andwell-equipped [Taiwan] Army, including surface-to-air missiles for air de-fense, backed by a trained reserve force.”83 In suggesting how the UnitedStates could help develop Taiwan’s forces, a 1974 U.S. government memolisted several criteria: “1) the impact on our objective of reducing the mili-tary component of Taiwan’s security; 2) the effect on U.S.-PRC normalization;3) the effect on Taiwan’s conªdence and stability; 4) the deterrent effectagainst a PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue; 5) the effect on chancesof [Sino-Taiwan] political accommodation; 6) [Taiwan’s] economic and techno-logical capabilities.”84

Public statements by U.S. ofªcials now featured what Kissinger called“constructive ambiguity.” The “one China” policy and the Republic of China’sremoval from the United Nations in 1971 were heavy political blows forTaiwan. These developments prompted concern that “[d]esperation engen-dered by the feeling that we were completely abandoning Taiwan inproceeding with normalization might provoke [Taiwan’s] declaration of inde-pendence.”85 U.S. ofªcials privately tried to reassure Taiwan’s leaders of con-tinued U.S. support, but it became clear by the late 1970s that the United Stateswould normalize relations with China and end formal diplomatic ties withTaiwan. Responsibility for normalization fell to the Carter administration.86 Itwanted to provide enough arms for Taiwan to deter China and to ensurepeaceful cross-strait relations.87 A 1976 NIE found that neither side couldlaunch an offensive operation across the strait without incurring unacceptablecosts. This situation of mutual deterrence was to hold until at least the early1980s.88 Nevertheless, the United States had to walk a ªne line in balancing its


83. Ibid., p. 552.84. Ibid., p. 554.85. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, July 24, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13: China (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2013), pp. 115–116.86. On normalization, see William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, eds., Normalization ofU.S.-China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).87. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum, July 26, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13,pp. 116–118.88. National Intelligence Estimate: PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces, November 11, 1976,NIE 13-76, Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room,pp. 65–68, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001097855.pdf. A later RANDreport corroborates this view. See David A. Shlapak et al., “A Question of Balance: Political Con-text and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora-tion, 2009), pp. 22–23.

regional interests.89 A 1978 joint State and Defense Department memorandumon arms sales to Taiwan advised, “Taiwan’s self-defense capability will con-tinue to be linked to its ability to buy arms from the U.S. . . . There are some in-dications that Peking views our existing relationship to Taiwan as a deterrentto Taipei’s looking elsewhere for support, or seeking unilaterally to alter the is-land’s status. . . . We do not wish to so arm [Taiwan] that we do damage to ourrelations with [China] or that we encourage [Taiwan] to behave without re-straint toward [China]. In short, our arms sales must be carefully calibrated tomaintain an adequate balance in the Strait.”90 Although China still facedsigniªcant challenges in mounting cross-strait operations, the local balance ofpower was shifting further in its favor. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance noted in1977, “For a number of years, Peking will not be capable of taking the islandby force except at a cost it would probably consider unacceptable both in mili-tary terms and in terms of China’s international relations.”91 Nevertheless,“PRC military strength will increase over time,” requiring a new approach toprevent cross-strait conºict.92 Accordingly, U.S. decisionmakers believed thatarms transfers to Taiwan could substitute for the alliance.93 Carter himselfnoted, “For a long time—with arms purchases—Taiwan will be able to with-stand any attack.”94 The Carter administration mistakenly believed, however,that China would not protest the United States’ continued transfer of weaponsto Taiwan. It had to disabuse Chinese leaders of the belief that normalizationwould cease all U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan.95

On December 15, 1978, Washington instructed the U.S. ambassador toTaiwan to tell Chiang that the United States and China “have agreed to estab-lish diplomatic relations. . . . the United States will recognize the People’s


89. To prevent Taiwan from undercutting U.S. policies, Brzezinski’s adviser wrote that “we shouldlink weapons sales to progress on normalization . . . to indicate to Taipei that they will bear somecosts in the event momentum on normalization is lost.” Memorandum from Michel Oksenberg ofthe National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Brzezinski), September 23, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, pp. 231–238.90. Memorandum from Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’sAssistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), March 1, 1978, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13,pp. 295–297.91. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, April 15, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 77.92. Ibid.93. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) toPresident Carter, June 14, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, pp. 94–95.94. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, April 15, 1977, p. 82 n. 5.95. Memorandum of Conversation, July 30, 1977, 9:30–11:15 a.m., FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13,pp. 130–132; and Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 88–89.

Republic of China as the government of China.”96 The same cable instructedthe ambassador to reassure Chiang that in a year he would “be able to resumepurchase of carefully selected defensive weapons.”97 Yet U.S. decisionmakershesitated when they received Taiwan’s request for ªghter jets. They wanted toreassure China of bona ªde U.S. intentions for rapprochement.98 By this timeU.S. ofªcials had assessed that “China is now actively engaged in attemptingto build a durable, world-wide anti-Soviet consensus.”99 Ultimately, theUnited States agreed to offer Taiwan the “limited range” F-5, but decidedagainst more capable F-4s and F-16s.100 This decision aligned with the NSCstaff’s suggestion to reinforce “our willingness to put Taiwan in a better posi-tion to defend itself while protecting the Administration against charges that itis abandoning Taipei. . . . We should, therefore, indicate at an early date ourwillingness to sell a Hawk missile battalion, a substantial number of additionalF-5E aircraft, and, perhaps, the Harpoon missile system to [Taiwan]. Thiswould provide reassurance to Taipei, ease the concerns of Taiwan’s friends inthe U.S., and send the right signal to Peking.”101 U.S. leaders believed that suchsteps were reasonable because the arms were “defensive in character andcould be applied to meet Taiwan’s legitimate security needs without undulydamaging our relations with [China].”102

Whatever its intent, the Carter administration failed to anticipate Congress’snegative reaction regarding the lack of consultation on the termination of for-mal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979 and the end of the MutualDefense Treaty in 1980. Members were also outraged because they perceivedCarter’s actions as abandoning an ally and damaging the United States’ repu-tation. Indeed, shortly after China received diplomatic recognition fromWashington, it invaded North Vietnam—an action that ampliªed the concerns


96. Backchannel Message from Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Unger), December 15,1978, 1518Z, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 650.97. Ibid., p. 651.98. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum, July 26, 1977.99. Memorandum from Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’sAssistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), August 21, 1978, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13,p. 518.100. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) toPresident Carter, October 26, 1978, with attachment Memorandum from Acting Secretary of StateNewsom to President Carter, October 20, 1978, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, pp. 577–581.101. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, n.d., FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 305.102. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) toPresident Carter, October 26, 1978, with attachment Memorandum from Acting Secretary of StateNewsom to President Carter, October 20, 1978, p. 578.

expressed in Congress.103 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which came intoforce on April 10, 1979, committed the United States to provide Taiwan with“arms of a defensive character . . . in such quantity as may be necessary to en-able Taiwan to maintain a sufªcient self-defense capability . . . based solelyupon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.”104 The TRA also required thatWashington maintain the capacity to “resist any resort to force or other formsof coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic sys-tem, of the people of Taiwan.”105 Nevertheless, the TRA differed from an alli-ance because it did not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. Rather,“[t]he President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with consti-tutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to anysuch danger.”106 In addition, the TRA did not stipulate which weapons wouldbe sold to Taiwan, how often, or in what quantity. Its purpose instead wasto reassure Taiwan of U.S. diplomatic support despite the termination of a for-mal defense pact. Its inherent ambiguities were intended to address three U.S.goals: to convey support for Taiwan, to support local deterrence and defense,and to continue normalization with China.107

U.S. leaders still faced a dilemma after the TRA came into force. Chinacautioned in the spring of 1979 that “[i]f things which will bring severe harmto this political basis are allowed to happen again and again, it will bringharm to our bilateral relations.”108 In a memorandum to President Carter,Secretary of State Vance noted: “We have a dual problem in determining ourposition on the resumption of arms sales to Taiwan. On the one hand, our ac-tion should be taken in such a way as to reassure Congress and Taiwan that wecontinue to have an interest in Taiwan’s legitimate defense requirements. Onthe other hand, we wish to avoid provoking the PRC to react in a mannerharmful to our developing bilateral relationship.”109 Nevertheless, Vancewarned: “Taiwan views our arms sales commitment as the keystone of theirsecurity policy and will be anxious for reconªrmation of our pledges early inthe new year.”110 Indeed, on November 8, 1979, Taiwan placed a request for


103. See Editorial Note, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, pp. 857–869.104. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, U.S. Code 22 (1979), § 3301, http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html.105. Ibid.106. See ibid, section 3.107. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, pp. 108–110.108. Memorandum of Conversation, May 3, 1979, 3:18–4:25 p.m., FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 872.109. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, December 19, 1979, FRUS1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 1022.110. Ibid.

“high-performance ªghter aircraft . . . with most other requests focused on airand sea defense weapons.”111 U.S. ofªcials now reconsidered selling F-4s toTaiwan, noting that “F-4 sale would dramatize that the U.S. is not ‘abandon-ing’ Taiwan. . . . Both with Congress and on Taiwan, an F-4 sale is probably themost popular step we can take.”112 Responding to Taiwan’s demands, how-ever, Vance reasoned in December 1979 that an upgrade in the U.S. militarycommitment to Taiwan was unlikely. To him, there was “no reason atthis point to change our position of denying sales to Taiwan of F-4, F-16 or F-18aircraft, all of which have offensive capability as well as violate the arms trans-fer policy.”113

President Ronald Reagan’s administration also struggled to balance armssales to Taiwan against normalization concessions to China. During his presi-dential campaign, Reagan expressed concern about Chinese intentions and theeffects of normalization on Taiwan. Reagan’s election elicited hope in Taipeithat Washington would upgrade its military commitment by supplyingTaiwan with newer ªghter aircraft. Threatened by Reagan’s stance toward nor-malization, China demanded in 1981 that the United States commit not only todenying Taiwan advanced ªghters, but also to ending all arms sales. Ulti-mately, the Reagan administration rejected the sale, explaining that “[t]he mili-tary and intelligence communities agree that for the foreseeable futureTaiwan’s legitimate defense needs can be fully met, by continuing the F-5E co-production line on Taiwan with the possibility in addition of replacing olderworn out aircraft with used aircraft of a comparable type.”114 Beijing was ada-mant that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should cease, arguing that even a supplyof defensive military capabilities could have negative effects on U.S.-China re-lations. Yet China eventually yielded to a “phase-down” instead of a “phase-out” of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, without an explicit U.S. commitment to endthem. The Third Joint Communiqué of August 18, 1982, embodied this com-promise. The communiqué acknowledged that “the United States Governmentstates that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to


111. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Paciªc Affairs (Hol-brooke), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Paciªc Affairs (Abram-owitz), and Michael Armacost and Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff toSecretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President’s Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs (Brzezinski), April 4, 1978, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 335.112. See document NLC-133-995-3-7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCL), Atlanta, Georgia,p. 12.113. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13,p. 1022.114. The F-5Es were aging, short-range aircraft on which Taiwan was reliant.

Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or inquantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the estab-lishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and thatit intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a periodof time, to a ªnal resolution.”115

Despite U.S. concessions to China, Reagan took several actions to demon-strate his intention to support Taiwan’s security. Many documents from theReagan years remain classiªed, but available primary documents and second-ary sources indicate that Reagan wished to redirect U.S. policy toward Taiwan.First, he authorized Taiwan to publicly release his “six assurances,” which in-cluded commitments that the United States would not alter the terms of theTRA, that the administration would not consult the Chinese government inadvance of arms sales to Taiwan, and that the United States would not pres-sure Taiwan to negotiate with China. Former U.S. Ambassador to China JamesLilley suggests that these efforts “were designed to be a sign to Taiwan that itwas not going to be abandoned by the Reagan administration. . . . The assur-ances cushioned the anxiety and uneasiness of the Taiwan leadership.”116

Reagan also provided an even more forceful private assurance to Taiwan’sleadership that the United States was committed “to the security and well-being of its people” by promising to provide it with “sufªcient arms to enableTaiwan to maintain a sufªcient self-defense capability.”117 An additional stepapparently intended to ensure the long-term viability of U.S. Taiwan policywas Reagan’s issuance of a classiªed presidential directive that incorporatedhis interpretation of the communiqués. The directive noted that “the U.S. will-ingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon thecontinued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRCdifferences. . . . It is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms pro-vided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.”118

None of these commitments was as binding as the Mutual Defense Treatyhad been. They left signiªcant room for interpretation of Taiwan’s future de-fense needs. Reagan merely promised that Washington would “continue tomonitor carefully Beijing’s military production and deployment, and to ana-lyze all indicators of Beijing’s intentions toward Taiwan. If any of those factors


115. “Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,”August 17, 1982, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm.116. James Lilley with Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplo-macy in Asia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p. 247.117. Ibid., p. 139.118. Ibid., p. 248.

change, that will of course affect our judgment of Taiwan’s defense needs.”119

Still, the combination of U.S. public and private pledges of reassurance, to-gether with the extension of the F-5E co-production line and a substantial armssales package, tempered Taiwan’s reaction to the 1982 Joint Communiquéwithout rupturing U.S. relations with China. Reagan’s policies effectivelysought to substitute the hand-tying commitment the United States had withTaiwan before normalization with one that gave the United States moreºexibility. This policy reassured Taiwan while the United States courted China.

summary and alternative arguments regarding the taiwan case

The Taiwan case conªrms our theory. When U.S. leaders assessed that Chinaposed a signiªcant security threat to U.S. interests, they entered into a formaldefense pact with Taiwan and supplied it with costly arms to preserve its de-terrent capabilities (top-left cell of ªgure 1). But when the Sino-Soviet splitmade normalization with China possible, U.S. leaders’ perception of the threatfrom China changed. More friendly relations with the Chinese government de-creased the U.S. perception of the military threat from China to U.S. forces inEast Asia. Moreover, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam made Taiwan less vitalas a forward staging area for U.S. forces deploying to Southeast Asia. The com-monality of security interests between the United States and Taiwan subse-quently decreased.

As our theory predicts, the United States engaged China and rescinded itsalliance with Taiwan despite the worsening military balance between Chinaand Taiwan. Nevertheless, the United States continued to provide Taiwan withsubstantial military assistance to maintain the status quo across the strait. Con-sistent with our theory, the United States provided a large, steady, and (withthe TRA) institutionalized ºow of weapons to Taiwan (top-right cell of ªg-ure 1). The provision of arms remained limited to defensive weapons, espe-cially when U.S. leaders worried that Taiwan’s military was planning orpreparing for an offensive against the mainland.

Our research ªnds little evidence that U.S. decisionmakers were motivatedprimarily by other factors, such as domestic politics or commercial interests.Regarding domestic politics, the documents reveal that U.S. decisionmakerswere keenly aware of the domestic constraints on Taiwan policy. As a WhiteHouse memo noted in 1978, “There is no domestic constituency actively push-


119. Ibid. Reagan also wrote a secret memo stating that any willingness to reduce arms transfersto Taiwan (as implied by the 1982 communiqué) should be conditioned on China’s commitment tothe peaceful resolution of those countries’ differences. See Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 152.

ing for or even interested in normalization, but there is such a constituencyvigorously opposing it. Thus, there is no political plus in normalization; thereis only minus.”120 Despite this domestic political opposition, the United Statesabrogated its defense pact with Taiwan. We do not suggest that U.S. domesticpolitics played no role in Washington’s relations with Taipei. Indeed, domes-tic politics prompted the creation of the TRA: had it not been for Congress,U.S. defensive weapons sales might not have been institutionalized. Neverthe-less, as Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, observed at thetime: “Until the mid-1960s, the Taiwan Lobby was thought to have great politi-cal clout. Then, in the late sixties and even more after Nixon’s 1972 visit, theLobby fell into disarray.”121 The Taiwan lobby’s inability to maintain the alli-ance is evidence that it was a secondary concern for policymakers. AsBrzezinski noted in 1977, “The Taiwan Lobby does not constitute a major ob-stacle to normalization.”122 In short, the strategic interest in normalizationwith China was greater than the domestic political power of the Taiwanlobby. Similarly, government reports regarding the advantages and disadvan-tages of providing arms to Taiwan seldom mention either commercial interestsor inºuence-seeking. Both motivations could have been considerations forpolicymakers, but the lack of discussion about them in interagency meetingsforces us to question their importance. U.S. leaders understood that Taiwanhad few other sources of support, so it was unlikely to abandon the UnitedStates. Moreover, leverage-seeking does not explain why the United Stateschose to end its ofªcial relationship with Taiwan in the 1970s. Therefore, al-though domestic politics, commercial interests, and leverage-seeking mayhave driven some U.S. decisions on Taiwan, the evidence suggests that strate-gic considerations primarily motivated U.S. policymakers. (See ªgure 2 for asummary of our predictions and evidence.)

U.S. Commitments to Israel

Few today doubt the United States’ close alignment with Israel. Yet, during theªrst half of the Cold War, this relationship was both uncertain and contingent.


120. Memorandum from the Vice President’s Chief of Staff (Moe) to Vice President Mondale, thePresident’s Assistant (Jordan), the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), May 15, 1978, FRUS1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 376.121. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) toPresident Carter, July 29, 1977, FRUS 1977–1980, Vol. 13, p. 122.122. Ibid.

Although the United States had limited diplomatic relations with Israel in the1950s, the Eisenhower administration eventually regarded Israel as a “poten-tial strategic asset.” Nevertheless, both it and the Kennedy administrationprovided Israel only minimal defensive arms and extended no alliance commit-ment (the bottom-right cell in ªgure 1).123 Late in the Johnson administrationand throughout the Nixon administration, the United States moved toward us-ing costly arms transfers to improve and to maintain Israel’s deterrence capabili-ties in the absence of an alliance (the bottom-left cell). U.S. leaders’ commitmentdecisions hinged on assessments of the local military balance.

favorable balance: u.s.-israel security relations before 1968

On May 12, 1963, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote to PresidentKennedy asking for a public bilateral security pact or “all the equivalent kindsof armament with which the armed forces of Egypt and the other Arab statesare equipped” in return for Israel forgoing a nuclear weapons capability.124

The letter came four days after Kennedy remarked at a press conference thatthe United States “support[s] the security of both Israel and her neighbors.”125

Ben-Gurion’s letter prompted debate within the Kennedy administration over


123. Abraham Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origin of the American-Israeli Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 69.124. Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’sSpecial Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), May 14, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18:Near East, 1962–1963 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), pp. 528–529. Israel subsequently pressuredU.S. leaders to receive such assurances. See Memorandum for the Record, May 14, 1963, FRUS1961–1963, Vol. 18, pp. 535–538.125. John F. Kennedy, press conference, May 8, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the UnitedStates: John F. Kennedy, Vol. 3: 1963 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), p. 373.

Figure 2. Summary of Predictions and Evidence for Taiwan

whether to extend an alliance to Israel. In considering this request, Kennedythought that an explicit security guarantee could make Arab states more con-ciliatory and reduce uncertainty over U.S. intentions in the region.126

The evidence shows that the two factors highlighted in our theory drove theU.S. decision ultimately to reject Israel’s request for a hand-tying commitment.First, the United States assessed that Israel was capable of deterring its adver-saries without one. Kennedy’s ªnal reply noted that the United States had car-ried out an assessment of its own ability to “deter or halt swiftly anyaggression against Israel” and found that “existing informal arrangements”were sufªcient.127 The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that “there is little or no ad-vantage to the U.S. in going beyond the type of public assurances contained inthe President’s May 8th statement.”128

A second, more fundamental, factor that limited U.S. commitments to Israelwas the incompatibility of the two countries’ security interests. Both Israel andthe United States did not want Arab states to strengthen their ties with theSoviet Union.129 Nevertheless, the United States saw Arab nationalism as a po-tential bulwark against communism, whereas Israel saw it as a threat to itsown security.130 The administration was thus reluctant to make a formal andpublic commitment to Israel for fear of damaging diplomatic relations with itsArab neighbors. As Kennedy wrote, “Our policies and programs in regard tothe Arab states have resulted in improved relationships which permit usto talk frankly and realistically to them and enable us to exert some leverageon their actions.”131 The Kennedy administration was optimistic about work-ing with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on regional arms control andother issues. It saw a need to prevent the Middle East from being divided into


126. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)to the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Badeau), May 20, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18,p. 545.127. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, October 2, 1963, 6:26 p.m.,FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, p. 721.128. Letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs(Sloan) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Af-fairs (Grant), August 22, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, p. 684.129. As one internal State Department memorandum reported, “New United States arrangementswith Israel could result in comparable Soviet-Arab ties, bringing the Soviets back in, probably in amore permanent and damaging fashion.” Quoted in Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: AllianceRestraint in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 90.130. See Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’sSpecial Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), September 6, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963,Vol. 18, doc. 321.131. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel.

the two superpower camps. Indeed, losing Egypt to the Soviet Union woulddiminish U.S. inºuence in the Arab word.132

Kennedy therefore rejected a defense pact with Israel, but did offer theIsraelis a one-time, non-costly transfer of defensive Hawk missiles. Justifyingthe sale was a Defense Department memorandum that identiªed Israel as“vulnerable to [Egyptian] air attack . . . increasingly so with the arrival of addi-tional Soviet TU-16’s.”133 For Kennedy, the arms transfers were intended tomaintain the local balance of power and deter Arab attacks. In a memorandumarticulating his thinking, the president asked: “Could we get away with armsaid or joint planning in lieu of a guarantee? If we argue Israel doesn’t reallyneed any tighter assurances than it has already there may be other ways toprove we mean to protect her. Hawk set a precedent.”134 This provision ofarms aside, the administration made clear that the United States did not wantto become a “major supplier of offensive or sophisticated weapons to parties tothe Arab-Israeli conºict. It is [a] single decision designed [to] meet [a] speciªcneed for an improved air defense.”135 The reasoning used by the Kennedy ad-ministration thus accords with our theoretical predictions, placing U.S.-Israelisecurity cooperation circa 1963 in the bottom-right cell of ªgure 1.

The Johnson administration similarly saw Israeli and U.S. security interestsas not compatible enough to justify a commitment that could underminebroader U.S. interests in the Middle East. Johnson began wrestling with the pa-tron’s dilemma when, in November 1963, Israel requested surface-to-surfacemissiles, tanks, and naval vessels. These weapons would have given Israel thecapacity to strike Egyptian artillery locations and launch penetration raids intoEgyptian territory. U.S. ofªcials were skeptical as to whether Israel neededthese weapons. One NIE early that year had concluded that “Israel will proba-


132. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, May 27,1963, 2:54 p.m., FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, pp. 556–557. Kennedy was also concerned that Egyptmight be contemplating a preventive war against Israel’s nuclear program, and that a defense pactwith Israel might entrap the United States. See Memorandum of Conversation, July 23, 1963,4:30 p.m., FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, p. 659.133. Letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Bundy) to the Deputy Assistant Secre-tary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant), July 16, 1962, FRUS 1961–1963,Vol. 18, pp. 8–9.134. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to PresidentKennedy, July 23, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, p. 652. The documents are ambiguous as towhether Kennedy linked the Hawk sale to an Israeli renunciation of nuclear weapons or an initia-tive to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. For conºicting accounts, see Douglas Little, “TheMaking of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68,” International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 1993), pp. 568–569; and Ben-Zvi, Decade of Transition.135. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conºict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from Tru-man to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 108.

bly retain its overall military superiority vis-à-vis the Arab states for the nextseveral years. As long as the present balance of forces remains substantiallyunchanged, we believe that neither side is likely to initiate major hostilities.”136

McGeorge Bundy, Johnson’s special assistant for national security, argued thatIsrael’s request was ªnancially “wasteful” and “unnecessary” from a strategicperspective.137 The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, claiming that a “signiªcantincrease in Israeli Army units does not appear to be justiªed by the existingstrength [sic] relationship between the Israeli and Arab Armies.”138 Meetingthis request would have also antagonized Arab governments, especially be-cause U.S. ofªcials worried that the “good relations [the United States] hasbuilt up with the Arabs are in increasing jeopardy” given Arab tensions withIsrael.139 In January 1964, the Departments of State and Defense afªrmed theneed to consider both Israeli and Arab interests because “the key to a construc-tive Near Eastern policy is maintaining a balance in our relationships with theArabs and Israel.”140 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that U.S. arms policycould proceed “without positively identifying the United States with either ofthe sides in the Arab-Israeli conºict.”141

Johnson nevertheless sought to reassure Israel by maintaining non-costlyarms transfers. Indeed, the United States recognized Israel’s need for newtanks to preserve the local balance of power. A memorandum circulated by theJoint Chiefs of Staff stated that “there is a military need for Israel to modernizeits tank force because the bulk of its tank inventory is obsolescent.”142 OtherU.S. government ofªcials, however, asserted that the “U.S. wishes to avoid sig-niªcant area arms imbalance [sic] in either direction; if Israel attained clear mil-itary superiority a dangerous escalation would surely ensue.”143 Moreover,


136. National Security Estimate, January 23, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 18, doc. 139.137. Memorandum for Record, January 10, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, pp. 11–12. Bundy laternotiªed the Israeli government that the tank order would cost about 7.5 percent of its total budget.See Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) toPresident Johnson, March 13, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 71.138. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 18,1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 25.139. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to PresidentJohnson, February 26, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 43.140. See Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, January 16, 1964, FRUS1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 17.141. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 18,1964, p. 24.142. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, March 12,1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 67.143. Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, April 7, 1964, 12:30 p.m.,FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, pp. 84–85.

the United States had to consider the likely reaction of the Arab world, as“tanks from [the] U.S. would strengthen U.S. commitment to Israel in Arabeyes.”144 In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Deputy SpecialCounsel Myer Feldman explained that “an important factor in these consider-ations was how the U.S. could best maintain and expand its inºuence in theArab world.”145 Still, Washington did not want to leave Israel empty-handed.The U.S. government thus actively encouraged third-parties such as WestGermany to supply tanks instead.146 Arms transfers done in this indirect man-ner enhanced Israeli security without compromising U.S. relations with theArab states.147

On June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the WestBank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria, thereby reinforcing U.S.views that Israel faced a favorable military balance. Acting Secretary of StateNicholas Katzenbach informed President Johnson that “the military balance isin Israel’s favor and should remain so for at least a year.”148 U.S. military ob-servers agreed, pointing to Israel’s air superiority and its success in destroyingArab “morale, motivation, and conªdence”—intangibles that “cannot be re-covered quickly.”149 Supporting this characterization is a secret NSC memoproduced during Jimmy Carter’s presidency that reviews the history of U.S.arms sales to Israel: “Up to the Six-Day War in 1967, the U.S. objective was tosell limited quantities of selected defensive weapons to Israel, such as theHawk antiaircraft missile system.”150 That said, in the wake of this war, U.S.decisionmakers still saw Israel and U.S. security interests as only somewhat


144. Ibid.145. Memorandum of Conversation, May 17, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, p. 131.146. Memorandum for the Record, April 30, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, pp. 113–114.147. Ibid., p. 113. Third-party supplying of tanks to Israel would prove unreliable. Pressure on theUnited States to supply tanks directly to Israel subsequently mounted when the United States wasnegotiating an arms transfer to Jordan, a state that Israel saw as hostile. To make this transfer pal-atable to Israel, the United States placed conditions on its sale of tanks to Jordan. Also, it agreed toprovide Israel with tanks and, should no other supplier be forthcoming, small numbers of ªghterjets. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs(Komer) to President Johnson, February 22, 1966, 6 p.m., FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, pp. 556–557; andMemorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson,June 16, 1965, 9:30 p.m., FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 18, pp. 473–474.148. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson, Decem-ber 11, 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–68 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001),p. 29.149. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Decem-ber 15, 1967, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, p. 39. See also Memorandum of Conversation, January 8,1968, Session 2, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 88, 92.150. “The U.S.-Israeli Military Relationship,” undated, JCL.

compatible. As our theory predicts, given the limited convergence of U.S.-Israeli security interests, and Israel’s ability to continue deterring its regionaladversaries, U.S. leaders were reluctant to become Israel’s major arms sup-plier. They eschewed commitments to supply costly arms in the future,thereby placing the overall relations in the bottom-right cell of ªgure 1.

shaky balance: u.s.-israeli security relations, 1968–73

The defeat of Arab states in the Six-Day War prompted the Soviet Union to sig-niªcantly increase its involvement on their behalf. As a January 1968 NIE con-cluded, “Since the June War in 1967, the Soviet military presence has grown inthe area: roughly 5,000 Soviet military advisers are now stationed in severalarea countries; the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean has beenstrengthened, and is supported by air and port facilities in Egypt.”151 Johnson“express[ed] his deep concern over the odds working against Israel. He knewthe Israeli people were superior in ability to their neighbors, but he feared theymight not be superior to the Soviets. The President recalled how the Sovietshad poured arms into the Arab countries after the war. He said he was not surewhat Soviet intentions were.”152 Secretary of State Rusk observed severalmonths later that “the inºuence of the Soviet Union in such key countries asEgypt, Syria, and Iraq continues to grow at the expense of our and other West-ern interests.”153 Yet Walt Rostow, Johnson’s special assistant for national secu-rity affairs, explained that “the ‘overriding consideration’ must be ouravoiding a polarization of the Middle East in which a small Israel, backed by aU.S. with an ambiguous commitment, faces the Arabs, led by extremists andbacked by a determined USSR.”154

Against this backdrop, in early 1968 Israel requested additional aircraft fromthe United States, including F-4 Phantoms.155 The F-4 was among the most ad-vanced in service and its ªrepower, speed, and adaptability would augmentIsrael’s offensive capabilities. The A-4 Skyhawk, another aircraft that Israelidesired but found less appealing, was lighter, slower, and cheaper. Worried


151. National Intelligence Estimate, March 5, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 12: Soviet Union, January1969–October 1970 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006), p. 415.152. Memorandum of Conversation, February 7, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, p. 150.153. These statements suggest that U.S. decisionmakers saw Israel as security-seeking rather thanrevisionist. See Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, May 23, 1968,FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, p. 356.154. Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas, Janu-ary 6, 1968, 2333Z, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 71–73.155. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, February 6, 1968,FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, p. 141.

about the Arab reaction, the Johnson administration was reluctant to authorizethe F-4 request. Rostow opined: “More than just seeking a speciªc number ofaircraft, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol may be looking for a ªrmer commitmentto Israel’s security. He must understand that security guarantees and treatiesare out, but he may seek a guaranteed source of arms.”156 Still, he noted, “It’shard to know how much the Israelis are pushing the Soviet threat merely tojustify their case for more arms.”157 Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessedthat the “Israeli Air Force can cope for the next 18 months with any potentialthreat they face.” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted that “Israelcan prevail over any potential Arab enemy” and expressed concern that actingon the plane request could invite “further Russian support” for the Arabstates.158 Rusk asserted the need for Israel to court international opinion, par-ticularly in the United Nations.159 Accordingly, Johnson pledged only “to keepIsrael’s military defense capability under active and sympathetic examinationand review in the light of all relevant factors.”160 He thus delayed making a de-cision on the Phantoms.

The Johnson administration did not see an immediate Israeli need for thePhantoms, but it did envision that such a need could develop in the futuregiven reports of increased Soviet involvement in the region.161 Despite mount-ing domestic political pressure in 1968 for the Johnson administration to ap-prove Israel’s aircraft requests, the president was unyielding. He argued withcongressional leaders, “We don’t want to be in a position of just being armsmerchants and starting an arms race with the Russians there.”162 Soviet aircraftdeliveries to Egypt and congressional pressure to maintain a U.S. commitmentto Israel’s security, however, led Johnson to reassess his earlier decision.163 Theimportance of domestic politics should not be overstated, however. As DavidPollock writes, “[D]omestic political considerations had a greater effect on thetiming than on the substance of [the Phantom decision].”164 Nevertheless,


156. Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas, Janu-ary 6, 1968, 1639Z, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, p. 70.157. Ibid., p. 71.158. Both quotes from Memorandum of Conversation, January 8, 1968, p. 92.159. Ibid., p. 94.160. David Pollock, The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy since the Six Day War(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), p. 34.161. Telegram from Rostow to President Johnson, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 75–79; and Memo-randum of Conversation, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 96–97.162. Notes on President Johnson’s Meeting with Congressional Leaders, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20,p. 487.163. Telegram from Department of State to Selected Posts, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 548–550.164. Pollock, The Politics of Pressure, p. 38.

Johnson used the opportunity to extract Israeli promises to exercise “nuclearrestraint.”165 Israel reafªrmed “that it will not be the ªrst power in the MiddleEast to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft suppliedby the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.”166 This quid pro quo not-withstanding, the sale of offensive airplanes made the United States the mainsupplier of arms to Israel, reºecting a shift in U.S. leaders’ assessments ofIsrael’s ability to deter its enemies.

When Nixon became president in 1969, Egypt had already begun its so-called War of Attrition against Israel. Preoccupied with other major for-eign policy issues, Nixon delegated the Arab-Israeli conºict to the StateDepartment, which claimed that the United States should adopt an impartialpolicy toward the Middle East to curb growing Soviet inºuence. The rationalefor refusing a defense pact remained, as one NSC paper averred, that “[w]eshould avoid any open-ended and uncontrollable commitment [a securityguarantee] because it would subordinate the United States to Israeli conceptsof defense and security, and because it would polarize the area between us andthe USSR. . . . Apart from a speciªc guarantee . . . we could give Israel a ªrmcommitment to provide it the military equipment we believe needed to main-tain a reasonable balance in the area.”167

Indeed, in 1969 Israel requested an additional 100 A-4 Skyhawks and 25 F-4Phantoms, once again creating a dilemma for U.S. decisionmakers.168 After all,“the sale of sophisticated equipment [carried] the implied obligation to con-tinue supply.”169 U.S. decisionmakers feared that a negative response would“not only risk a vehement political and propaganda reaction but could fostera go-it-alone psychology in Israel, encourage an even harder line towardthe Arabs and diminish further our already limited inºuence there.” Neverthe-


165. Ibid, pp. 584–585. Because Israel chose not to clarify its nuclear weapons capability, it still de-pended largely on conventional military power to deter adversaries. Indeed, Israel’s nuclearweapons were useless against the sort of aggression that characterized the War of Attrition. Thefrequent allusions to Israel’s conventional military power in the documentary record demonstratethat U.S. decisionmakers understood this aspect of Israel’s strategic situation.166. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) tothe Israeli Ambassador (Rabin), November 27, 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 20, pp. 661–662.167. Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, February 20,1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2015),p. 33.168. Memorandum from Richard Helms for Nixon, September 24, 1969, folder “Israel Vol. II: June1, 1969 to Sep 20, 1969,” box 605, NSC Files, Country Files, Richard M. Nixon Library (RMNL); andThe Situation in the Middle East—Summary, September 24, 1969, folder “Israel Vol. II: June 1, 1969to Sep 20, 1969,” box 605, NSC Files, Country Files, RMNL.169. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) toPresident Nixon, August 28, 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 156.

less, “Any decision which added to Israel’s already demonstrably superiormilitary strength would produce seriously adverse reactions in the Arabworld.” A positive decision would also provoke greater Soviet military in-volvement in the Middle East, but a negative decision could imply a “successfor Soviet diplomacy.”170

Mindful of these considerations, the Nixon administration postponed its de-cision on the Phantoms, concluding that “detailed analysis has identiªed nomilitary need for the additional aircraft Israel has requested for the time being.If as a result of actions by others, in particular the Soviet Union or France, or asa result of unusual losses, Israel’s clear cut air superiority is threatened, wewould be in a position to move quickly to maintain Israel’s margin ofsafety.”171 This line of reasoning appeared in many memoranda and docu-ments circulating among U.S. decisionmakers from December 1969 to March1970. These reports reiterated the view that the local military balance of powercontinued to favor Israel, notwithstanding the Israeli government’s insistenceto the contrary.172 Indeed, calculations of the balance of power were directlylinked to assessments about arms transfers. For example, one report stated:“Given the analysis of the present military balance above, it seems fair to con-clude that the U.S. obligation to contribute to Israel’s chances of survival couldbe fulªlled without any commitment right now to increase further Israel’s air-craft inventory.” The authors of these reports also recognized the need to re-strain Israel and warned that further arms sales would only embolden it andcreate risks for the United States to be dragged into the Arab-Israeli conºict.The “unqualiªed judgment” of all members of the NSC Working Group on theMiddle East was that a decision to accept in full Israel’s arms requests would“‘blow the place apart.’”173

During this time, U.S. decisionmakers began to see that a strong Israel could


170. “Responses to Israel’s Arms and Economic Assistance Requests,” undated, RMNL. See alsoMemorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to PresidentNixon, September 10, 1969, FRUS 1969–76, Vol. 23, pp. 159, 161.171. Department of State Telegram 29464, folder “Israel Vol. IV: 01 Mar 70 to 21 May 70,” box 606,Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.172. Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger from Ambassador Charles W. Yost, May 18, 1970, folder“Israel Vol. IV: 01 Mar 70 to 21 May 70,” box 606, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL; “The US Re-sponse to Israel’s Aircraft Needs—An Assessment,” March 26, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. IV: 01 Mar70 to 21 May 70,” box 606, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL; and Memorandum for the Assistant tothe President for National Security Affairs, April 6, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. IV: 01 Mar 70 to 21May 70,” box 606, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.173. Memorandum by David E. Mark (INR), undated, folder “Israel Vol. IV: 01 Mar 70 to 21 May70,” box 606, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL; and Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger from HaroldH. Saunders, March 16, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. IV: Mar 70 70–21 May 70,” box 606, Country Files,NSC Files, RMNL.

help manage the Soviet Union, now becoming a shared adversary of Israel andthe United States. As Nixon bluntly asked, “Why should it not be our policy tolet Israel scare them a little bit more?”174 Indeed, although the United Statesdid not see Arab countries as adversaries the way Israel did, growing Sovietinvolvement in the Arab-Israeli conºict began to exert greater inºuence onU.S. diplomacy toward Israel.175 At one meeting, Nixon reasoned, “Assumefor the sake of discussion that there is no domestic political pressure and thatthere is no moral question of continuing support involved, would the U.S. for-eign policy interests be served by dumping Israel? . . . Looking at this from theSoviet viewpoint, if we save the UAR’s [United Arab Republic’s] bacon,the Soviets would gain by our act. In my view, Soviet-U.S. relations are theoverriding concern. Therefore, the overriding question is: Who gains?”176 Onanother occasion, Nixon stated to Rabin: “I told you before to give it to them[the Egyptians and Russians] and to hit them as hard as you can. Every time Ihear that you go at them, penetrate into their territory, I am delighted. As faras they are concerned, go ahead and hit them. The trouble is the rest of theArabs. I very strongly believe that you are right, they are testing both you andus and we have to enable you to deter them.”177 Although U.S. and Israelithreat perceptions began to converge, the Nixon administration’s desire tomaintain positive relations with the Arab world and to preserve the balance ofpower prevented additional U.S. arms transfers.

Starting in April 1970, U.S. intelligence began to indicate that grow-ing Soviet involvement in the region would soon shift the balance ofpower against Israel. As part of the War of Attrition, the Soviets had givensurface-to-air missiles to Egypt, provided the Egyptians access to 10,000 Sovietadvisers, and deployed Soviet combat pilots to ºy over the Egyptian main-land. The United States had to rethink its initial reluctance to offer Israel arms.As Soviet involvement in the ªghting deepened, Israel requested electroniccountermeasures from the United States.178 Designed to neutralize Sovietsurface-to-air missiles in Egypt, the electronic countermeasures would have


174. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, December 10, 1969, 10 a.m., FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 246.175. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 393.176. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, December 10, 1969, 10 a.m., p. 254. The UARwas a political union between Egypt and Syria that lasted from 1958 to 1961.177. Editorial Note, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 393.178. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, July 4, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. V [1 of 3]: 22 May70–Jul 70,” box 607, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL; and Memorandum for the Secretary of De-fense, July 4, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. V [1 of 3]: 22 May 70–Jul 70,” box 607, Country Files, NSCFiles, RMNL.

provided “Israel the ability to mount deep raids against Soviet manned targetsin Egypt.”179 Moreover, Israel sought unmanned aerial vehicles and RF-4Cs,which were Phantoms repurposed to engage in reconnaissance missions.180

The Nixon administration agreed to give Israel an anti-missile package andthus “compensate Israel for the military advantage gained by [Egypt]and Soviets [sic] as a result of the improvements in their dispositions westof the Suez Canal.”181 When Egypt violated a cease-ªre agreement, Nixonpromised Israel additional military equipment as a “riposte to ceaseªre viola-tions.”182 He expressed his keenness to “offset the military advantages gainedby [Egypt].”183 Indeed, U.S. decisionmakers linked the necessity of givingthese arms to the changing balance of power in the region. As Secretary ofDefense William Rogers wrote to Nixon:

Your decision . . . to hold in abeyance Israel’s request for additional aircraftwas based on the judgment that Israel’s qualitative superiority compensatedamply for its numerical inferiority in planes. The direct Soviet involvement inan operational role has injected a new qualitative capacity and a reinforcedquantitative capacity on the UAR side. In short, the intelligence evaluations in-dicate that the weight of the Soviet presence has already reduced the materialand psychological advantages previously enjoyed by the Israelis. Funda-mentally, the Arab-Israeli military balance now depends on Soviet actions anddecisions which have already created a situation in which Israel’s air superior-ity could be rapidly neutralized.184

Still, some U.S. decisionmakers criticized the provision of arms transfers toIsrael. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, for example, argued that the UnitedStates should not provide Israel with a “deep penetration raid capability.”185

By contrast, Kissinger reasoned that providing offensive weapons of the sortdescribed above would have a pacifying effect because “the provision of moresecurity to Israel to enable her to cope with the Egyptians would be the factor


179. Ibid.180. Memorandum of Conversation, July 29, 1970, folder “Israel Vol. V [1 of 3]: 22 May 70–Jul 70,”box 607, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.181. Memorandum for the President, undated, folder “Israel August 1, 1970–September 30, 1970,”box 607, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.182. Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, September 12, 1970, folder “Israel August 1, 1970–September30, 1970,” box 607, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.183. Memorandum from President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of DefenseLaird, September 23, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 552.184. Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, June 9, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 416.185. Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, August 29,1970, folder “Israel August 1, 1970–September 30, 1970,” box 607, Country Files, NSC Files,RMNL.

most likely to deter Israeli thoughts of attack.”186 These disagreements not-withstanding, U.S. decisionmakers consistently drew on their assessments ofthe current and projected local balance of power to determine whether Israelhad sufªcient deterrent capabilities and, by extension, whether Israel requiredmore arms.

Kissinger’s memos to Nixon indicate that Kissinger believed that it was un-productive to restrict arms sales to Israel to pursue better relations with theSoviet Union and its clients.187 Concerned about direct Soviet involvement andimpressed with Israel’s performance during the Jordan crisis, in which Israelsupported the United States and the Jordanian monarchy against the PalestineLiberation Organization, Kissinger told Nixon that Israel’s interests weremore compatible with U.S. interests than previously believed. Arguing thatthe State Department policy had “backªred,” Kissinger believed that Israel’smilitary superiority should be restored with a supply of additional armsand reassurances.188 In a December 1970 memorandum written for Nixon,Kissinger noted “the progress the Soviet Union has recently made toward es-tablishing hegemony in the [Middle East],” and observed that “the Sovietshave . . . substantially increased their military presence in the region.”189 Basedon Kissinger’s assessment, Nixon approved an arms package to Israel worth$90 million. The transfer was costly in its scope, nature, and promise for moreinstitutionalized arms transfers, comprising anti-tank weapons and reconnais-sance aircraft, among other items. Still, Israel wanted more, including a guar-anteed supply of high-performance aircraft (54 F-4As and 120 A-4s) and “long-term agreements that would prevent the periodic supply disruptions andquarrels that had marked the previous two years.”190

With Nasser’s death in September 1970 and the ascendancy of Anwarel-Sadat to the Egyptian presidency, the Nixon administration sensed an op-portunity to break the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conºict. Yet Israel proved


186. Memorandum for the President, September 29, 1970, folder “Israel August 1, 1970–Septem-ber 30, 1970,” box 607, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.187. Memorandum of Conversation, March 12, 1970, 11:15 a.m., FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 330–331. For policy papers on how to handle these developments, see Paper Prepared by the NationalSecurity Council Staff, May 7, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 370–376; and Paper Prepared bythe National Security Council Staff, May 20, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 383–386.188. Kissinger and the State Department vehemently disagreed on U.S. policy toward Israel. SeeDavid A. Korn, “U.S.-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan,” Middle East Journal,Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 43.189. Memorandum for the President from Kissinger, December 1970, folder “Israel December 1–January 30, 1970,” box 608, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.190. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conºict since 1967,3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 97. Pollock claims that the White Housewas decoupling military transfers from concessions. See Pollock Politics, pp. 121, 128–129.

obstinate despite Sadat’s overtures to the United States. Nixon lamented, “Wecannot be in a position where we [continue to provide aid] and Israel sayswe won’t talk. . . . That’s what it gets down to.”191 At an NSC meeting, Nixonemphasized that “we will go all the way with Israel in maintaining the balanceof power in its favor. . . . [The Israelis] assume that the U.S. will see themthrough regardless of what they do. This is not true.”192 In May 1971, Nixonwrote to Secretary of State Rogers that “it is essential that no more aid pro-grams for Israel be approved until they agree to some kind of interim actionon the Suez or some other issue.”193 Even when Sadat signed a new treaty withthe Soviet Union that same month, Nixon and Rogers left U.S. policy un-changed, arguing that a defense pact with Israel would have “all sorts of prob-lems.”194 Nixon withheld additional military aid transfers to Israel throughoutmuch of 1971.195 This policy irked Kissinger, who argued that the military bal-ance of power was tilting against Israel, and therefore it needed a steady ºowof arms.196

In November 1971, the U.S. government conducted a major assessment ofthe balance of power in the Middle East. It noted that although Israel hadmaintained its qualitative advantage, two developments threatened Israel’sposition. First, “the shift in the balance that has taken place as a result of theSoviet-installed defense capability mainly affects Israel’s pre-emptive strike ca-pability . . . [which] is important to Israel because it deprives Israel of the abil-ity to impose a short war.”197 The second development was the “continuingbuildup in the USSR’s own position in Egypt,” given that it “improve[d]Soviet capability against the U.S. and even, in an extreme situation, againstIsrael.”198 As Kissinger concluded, “Everyone here admits that Israel will needmore planes over a 1–3 year span to continue normal modernization and up-


191. Nixon quoted in Craig A. Daigle, “The Russians Are Going: Sadat, Nixon, and the SovietPresence in Egypt, 1970–1971,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March2004), p. 14.192. Memorandum of Conversation of a National Security Council Meeting, February 26, 1971,11:45 a.m., FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 761–762.193. Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, January 16, 1969, 0204Z,FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 8194. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, January 11, 1971, 10:55–11:45 a.m., FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 692.195. Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, pp. 10–11.196. National Security Study Memorandum 2, January 21, 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 11.Kissinger also notes the continuing U.S. efforts to court Egypt. See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Up-heaval (New York: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 204–206.197. Quotes from Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger) to President Nixon, November 27, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 950–951.198. Ibid.

grading of its air force. The main question is when those planes will be pro-vided and in what political context.”199 In November 1971, Washington agreedto provide a new costly transfer of arms to Israel that would allow Israel tomaintain its superiority for the years to come.200

The steady growth in U.S. military assistance to Israel continued over thenext two years, during which opportunities to break the impasse betweenIsrael and its Arab neighbors seemed possible. Sadat expelled Soviet militaryadvisers from Egypt in 1972. Still, the Soviet Union continued to make largearms transfers to other Arab clients such as Syria.201 More importantly,the peace overtures that Sadat made toward Israel at this time went nowhere.Israel was not ready to surrender the Sinai Peninsula and, skeptical of theovertures, Kissinger dismissed Sadat’s last major attempt for peace inFebruary 1973 as “far-reaching but one-sided.”202 The following month, Israelmade another major request for ªghter jets. Nixon was initially ambivalent butsoon supported Kissinger’s position. Kissinger maintained that the militarybalance was tilting against Israel, adding that “only if the Arabs saw the Sovietarms did not hold the promise of a military solution would they turn to diplo-macy in a serious way.”203 This policy developed despite Secretary of DefenseElliott Richardson’s assertions that Israel still enjoyed a geostrategic advan-tage, thereby justifying a more evenhanded U.S. approach to the region.204 Inthe end, the Nixon administration made the promised Phantom and Skyhawkdeliveries, fulªlling Israel’s requirements for the next four years.205

Notwithstanding U.S. efforts to augment Israel’s deterrent capabilities,Egypt and Syria coordinated a surprise attack on Israel in October 1973. Thiswar sparked a ªerce debate within the Nixon administration and the U.S.Congress over whether to supply Israel with signiªcant military aid. But withheavy Israeli losses, mounting domestic pressure, a massive Soviet resupplyeffort, and Sadat’s rejection of a cease-ªre, this debate became moot. Nixonsought a congressional appropriation for a $2.2 billion airlift to help Israel pre-


199. Ibid.200. Pollock argues that this package might have been linked to Israel’s agreement to “proximitytalks” on an interim Suez accord. See Pollock, Politics, p. 126.201. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 1973, FRUS1969–1976, Vol. 25: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2011), pp. 195–198.202. Uri Bar-Joseph, “Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat’s Peace Initiative of February 1973 and ItsFailure,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July 2006), p. 549.203. Ibid.; and Quandt, Peace Process, p. 93.204. Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, February 27,1973, folder “Israel Vol. 11: October 1972–Feb 1973,” box 610, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.205. Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, May 17, 1973, folder “Israel Vol. 12:Mar 1973–Oct 1973,” box 610, Country Files, NSC Files, RMNL.

vail in the war.206 The 1973 war provided an opportunity for the United Statesto strengthen Arab relations, especially with Egypt, and take a leading role inpostwar negotiations—a task made all the more urgent because of the Arab oilembargo. Still, Israel remained desperate for a long-term U.S. arms commit-ment, forcing Washington into a dilemma about how to reassure both sides.

summary and alternative arguments regarding the israel case

During the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, U.S. decision-makers used two primary indicators to determine whether to offer Israel an al-liance commitment or costly arms: the extent to which Israel and the UnitedStates had compatible security interests, and whether the current and pro-jected military balance in the Middle East suggested that Israel could deter anddefeat its adversaries. Because the United States never truly shared Israel’ssense of threat, it was concerned that an alliance commitment would jeopar-dize its broader regional interests, particularly its desire for stronger ties withArab states. U.S. assessments of Israel’s relative military capabilities variedduring this period. Much debate took place regarding Israel’s projected mili-tary capabilities and its ability to maintain qualitative superiority over its Arabneighbors in the absence of costly arms transfers and in the presence of an in-creasingly assertive Soviet patron. Those who argued that Israel’s military su-periority could not be sustained without signiªcant U.S. assistance, such asKissinger, often suggested more costly transfers. Those who believed inIsrael’s ability to maintain superiority without signiªcant assistance arguedagainst continuous and unconditional support. The magnitude of U.S. armstransfers increased after 1968 in response to growing Soviet involvement inthe region and the anticipated effect it would have on the balance of powerin the region. The objective of U.S. assistance during the remainder of the1970s was “to sustain Israeli military superiority,” according to a secretNSC memo.207

Critics may assert that domestic politics shaped U.S. commitments to Israel,yet the evidence in support of this alternative explanation is weak during theperiod we examine. The pattern of arms transfers during the Johnson adminis-tration represents a most-likely case for domestic political explanations. TheDemocratic Party captured most of the Jewish vote in the 1960s, and pro-Israelmembers of Congress pressed the administration to meet Israeli demands.208


206. For a discussion of emergency aid, see Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Schlesingerto President Nixon, November 1, 1973, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 25, p. 804.207. “The U.S.-Israeli Military Relationship.”208. Memorandum for the President, January 6, 1966, folder “Israel, January 1965–March 1966

Nevertheless, domestic pressures did not convince Johnson to offer Israel aformal defense pact, a nuclear security guarantee, or even a long-term armscommitment. Moreover, rarely did U.S. decisionmakers allude to U.S. domes-tic politics in their arms transfer reasoning. Some transactions—such as thePhantom delivery in 1968—do offer admittedly mixed evidence for our theory.Nevertheless, domestic factors should not be overstated. Johnson hesitated,and his delay reºected several strategic considerations: ªrst, the Soviets wereincreasing their support to Egypt; and second, Israel offered an important con-cession to the United States by renewing its pledge not to introduce nuclearweapons into the region. During the Nixon years, notwithstanding high do-mestic support for Israel, U.S. policies still exhibited signiªcant ºuctuations.Moreover, throughout this period decisionmakers privately discussed geo-strategic factors, speciªcally the evolving local military balance of power, intheir deliberations over whether to transfer arms to Israel.209

We do not ªnd signiªcant evidence favoring other alternative arguments.The commercial logic for arms transfers is not supported by the documentaryevidence, nor is the rationale that U.S. decisionmakers wished to recoup pro-duction costs by selling additional aircraft to Israel. Discussions involvingthe production line sometimes appear in the documentary record, but onlybecause U.S. decisionmakers were unsure whether they could fulªll Israelirequests within a particular time frame. Occasionally, Israel’s requests foradvanced aircraft required U.S. inventory, thereby adversely affectingU.S. capabilities.

Finally, the documents reveal that U.S. decisionmakers often discussed us-ing arms to obtain leverage with Israel.210 That these discussions took placedoes not validate this alternative argument because U.S. decisionmakers rec-ognized the difªculties associated with using arms for such purposes. On theone hand, they feared that withholding aid would make Israel anxious and ag-gressive while emboldening the Soviet Union and its Middle Eastern clients.On the other hand, they worried that giving military aid to Israel would antag-onize Arab countries and invite further Soviet involvement. Moreover, a failedeffort to inºuence Israel’s policies risked damaging the United States’ regional


[1 of 4],” box 29, Files of Robert W. Komer, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson PresidentialLibrary, Austin, Texas.209. For similar conclusions, see David Rodman, Arms Transfers to Israel: The Strategic Logic behindAmerican Military Assistance (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2007); and Pollack, Politics,p. 295.210. See, for example, Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, June 5,1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 405–406; Memorandum for the Record, June 10, 1970, FRUS1969–1976, Vol. 23, p. 423; and Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National SecurityAffairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, June 16, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 23, pp. 439–440.

reputation. U.S. decisionmakers wrestled with these issues with little resolu-tion. (See ªgure 3 for a summary of our predictions and evidence.)

Conclusion

This article has argued that great powers follow a clear strategic logic whendeciding whether to ally with or give arms to client states. In contrast to pre-vious studies, which claim that such decisions are shaped by domestic politicsor commercial factors, we ªnd that great powers signal reassurance whileavoiding entrapment by offering their clients different bundles of securitygoods. Patrons assess the degree of shared threat and the local balances of ca-pabilities in determining whether to support their clients with arms, alliancecommitments, or both (see ªgure 4). This strategic logic helps to explain howgreat powers manage the “patron’s dilemma.” A wealth of primary documentsprovides strong empirical support for our theory in the cases of U.S. securitycommitments to Taiwan and Israel.

Our argument suggests numerous avenues for future research. First, ourªndings could be tested by applying our theory to other patron-client relation-ships. Although our ªndings do not support the notion that domestic politicalconsiderations or commercial motivations guided U.S. commitment choices inthe Taiwan and Israel cases, we readily acknowledge the potential inºuence ofthese factors. Future work could further theorize and test which types of for-eign and security policies are most likely to be driven by domestic political orcommercial logics rather than strategic considerations.211 Indeed, Roseanne


211. Our analysis shows that commercial considerations occasionally affected the timing of armstransfers. Nevertheless, we imagine that commercial motivations for transferring arms could be-come prominent when the security risks associated with providing weapons are small.

Figure 3. Summary of Predictions and Evidence for Israel

McManus and Keren Yarhi-Milo show that while strategic concerns primarilyinºuence which countries receive U.S. signals of support, the regime type ofthe recipient has great inºuence on whether the signal is sent in public, such asan alliance or formal presidential visits, or in private, such as with arms salesand military aid. This difference in signaling strategies toward democratic ver-sus autocratic states can be attributed to concerns over domestic backlash.212

Second, further research could explore the strategic logic of a more compre-hensive set of tools that patrons could use to manage security relations withtheir clients. We have shown that patrons use arms transfers and alliances toconvey different forms of commitment. Yet it is possible that other tools shouldalso be considered. Forward deployments of military assets, joint military ex-ercises, and military basing are just some of the security tools that patronscould use as either complements or substitutes in supporting clients.

Third, future work should evaluate the preferences and perceptions of clientstates and adversaries regarding arms transfers and alliances. In this article,we focus exclusively on the patron’s decisions, but what about those of the cli-ent or the client’s adversary? How do clients interpret the receipt of thesesecurity goods? Do potential aggressors perceive arms-only partnerships assignaling a weaker commitment than formal alliances? These are importantquestions that require further theorizing and empirical testing.

Fourth, scholars should examine how patrons’ provision of arms and alli-ances affects nuclear proliferation. Because Israel developed nuclear weaponsand Taiwan had a nuclear program, it appears prima facie that conventionalmilitary arms did not eliminate their interest in nuclear weapons. Thus, in ad-


212. McManus and Yarhi-Milo, “The Logic of ‘Backstage’ Signaling.”

Figure 4. Summary of Argument

dition to delineating the range of policy tools at the disposal of patrons,researchers should examine their effects on extended deterrence.

Our research has important practical implications for U.S. policy toward al-lies and partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Many states are facinggrowing challenges as China becomes increasingly assertive, Russia coerces itsneighbors, and Iran pursues nuclear capabilities. The United States and its al-lies and partners must consider how to mitigate these risks collectively. Our re-search sheds light on the dilemmas that U.S. decisionmakers are facing and thetypes of commitments that they are likely to provide different states. ConsiderEast Asia, where China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly asser-tive behavior will likely fuel the perception that the United States and manyregional states have common security interests. We expect increased coopera-tion under existing alliances, such as those with Japan and the Philippines, andsuggest that additional alignments are possible. For example, if domestic polit-ical opposition can be overcome, Vietnam could become a major security part-ner of the United States. With Vietnam in an unfavorable military positionrelative to China, arms transfers are possible, especially now that U.S. sales oflethal weapons to Vietnam are no longer banned. Accordingly, in June 2015,U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced a new “Southeast AsiaMaritime Security Initiative” devoting $425 million to “capacity-building ef-forts” over the next ªve years.213 Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shearcommented, “We’re looking at maritime security shortfalls among our part-ners and we will be ready to discuss with them what it is they need and howthey expect to use it.”214 If China’s behavior continues to push the UnitedStates and Vietnam closer together, we suggest that it is even possible that anextended U.S. deterrent commitment could emerge. In short, facing an increas-ingly capable and assertive China, states in East Asia could receive increasedarms transfers and, in some cases, expanded alliance commitments from theUnited States.

Russian activities in Eastern Europe pose a somewhat different challenge.Ukraine is far weaker than Russia, so our theory suggests that the UnitedStates is likely to provide arms to Ukraine. Indeed, in 2015, U.S. Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey recommended: “I think we


213. Ashton Carter, “A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises,” speech deliveredin Singapore, May 30, 2015 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID�1945.214. Aaron Mehta, “Carter Announces $425M in Paciªc Partnership Funding,” DefenseNews, May30, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/05/30/carter-announces-425m-in-paciªc-partnership-funding/28206541/.

should absolutely consider lethal aid and it ought to be in the context of NATOallies.”215 A group of former senior U.S. ofªcials, including NATO militarycommanders and ofªcials, agreed: “The West needs to bolster deterrence inUkraine. . . . That requires providing direct military assistance—in far largeramounts than provided to date and including lethal defensive arms.”216 Ac-cordingly, the United States has provided military assistance to Ukraine, al-though most of this support has been categorized as non-lethal given NATO’sunwillingness to provide lethal arms. The lack of debate about incorporatingUkraine into NATO is also instructive. Our theory suggests that the withhold-ing of NATO membership from Ukraine was the result of either the UnitedStates or Europe not viewing Russia as a common security concern. Indeed, in2008, France and Germany blocked Ukraine’s membership, despite U.S. sup-port. Thus, the United States has pursued other options, including jointmilitary exercises, greater consultations, and military assistance.

Finally, in the Middle East, U.S. partners are facing a rare but not unprece-dented situation. The United States shares concerns about Iran’s nuclear pro-gram with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among others.The 2015 negotiation and implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan ofAction with Iran, however, might indicate a shift in U.S. perceptions about thecommonality of security interests with Iran and, consequently, Iran’s regionaladversaries. If such a transformation continues, then it would make a defensepact between the United States and Israel or Saudi Arabia less likely. Still, itcould lead the United States to provide Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others witheven more defensive arms if U.S. policymakers assess that Iran’s military capa-bilities are growing vis-à-vis its neighbors.


215. David Stout, “Top U.S. General Says Washington Should Consider Arming Ukraine,” Time,March 4, 2014, http://time.com/3731247/us-arm-ukraine-russia-general-martin-dempsey-putin/.216. Ivo Daalder et al., “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: Whatthe United States and NATO Must Do” (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2015), http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/ªles/UkraineReport_February2015_FINAL.pdf.

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