TM 44897 Working Group 2 Report - Pages - GNSSN Home Documents/Transport Safety/ISC8...
Transcript of TM 44897 Working Group 2 Report - Pages - GNSSN Home Documents/Transport Safety/ISC8...
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TechnicalMeetingtoProduceConsolidatedDraftsoftheIAEA’sNewTransportSafetyStandardsTakingintoAccounttheResultsofthe2011International
ConferenceontheSafeandSecureTransportofRadioactiveMaterial
WORKINGGROUP2–DENIALOFSHIPMENTS
1. WorkingGroupStructure
Theworkinggroupwasstructuredasfollows:MarioCésarMallaupomaGutierrez–Peru:WorkGroupLeaderRonaldBeckPope–USA:RecordingSecretaryNatanaelBruno–BrazilZhengcaiChen–ChinaMeenamkunnuChandrasekharanDinakaran–IndiaLaurentKueny,FranceBernardMonot,FranceJustinEmmanuelNgaile–UnitedRepublicofTanzaniaJuliusRijpkema,InternationalSourceSuppliersandProducersAssociation(ISSPA)ZsofiaSzepes–Hungary(parttime)JosephLucienRadaorolalaZafimanjato–Madagascar
2. Worktobedone–TermsofReference
TheparticipantsofthisWorkingGroupwererequestedbytheSecretariattoconsider,andprepareaworkinggroupreportonthefollowingissues:
1) Whatrevisionstotheregulationswouldreduceincidencesofdenial?
2) ReviewofDraftSecurityRequirementsDocuments:
a.Ifimplemented,couldthesecurityrequirementsinthedocumentsleadtodenials?
b.Ifso,aretherechangesinthetransportregulationsthatcouldprecludethis?
c.Ifnot,theproposedsecurityprovisionsthatcouldcausedifficultiesintransportshouldbehighlighted.
3) ProvisionsoftheISCactionplanshouldbereviewed.Doanyoftheactionplanprovisionsrequirechangestotheregulations?
TheWGaddressedtheitemslistedintheTermsofReferenceaswellasotheritemsdeemedrelevanttoWorkingGroup’smandate.
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3. FindingsandRecommendationsofWG2
ThefollowingsummarizesthefindingsandrecommendationsoftheWG,eachisidentifiedbythesectionofthisreportwhereitisdiscussedandjustified.
TheWGgenerallydidnotidentifyanychangesthatmightbeneededtotheTransportRegulationsasaresultofD/DOSissues,recognizingthatthecurrentmorecomprehensivereview/revisionprocesscurrentlyunderwaymightproviderecommendationsforchangerelatedtoD/DOSissue.[Section4.1]However,itwasnotedthatconflictsbetweenvariousformsoftheregulationscanincreaselikelihoodofdelayordenial.
TheWGrecommendsconsiderationbegiventoexpandingthesubsectioninChapter3ofSSR‐6dealingwith“Training”toalsoaddress“Education”,ensuringthatallthoseinvolveincarriageofradioactivematerialareproperlyeducated,focusingoneachfunctionalelementinthesupplychain;considerationcouldalsobegiventoexpandingtheguidancedocumentstoreflectthesechanges.[Section4.1]
TheWGrecognizedthatafeedbackprocessisabsolutelyessentialfortheSecretariatandTRANSSC;andthebasisforthechangescausedbydelayanddenialofshipmentsmustbeeffectivelycommunicatedtotheCSS.[Section4.1]
TheWGrecommendsthatconsiderationcouldbegiventowritingaseriesofimplementingguidesandpreparingassociatedtrainingmaterials,similartothosebeingdevelopedforsecuritytransport,structuredaroundspecifictypesofshipments,focusinginpartonhowtointeractandinterfacewithcarriers,customsagenciesandotherentitiesthatcancauseproblemswithdelayanddenial.Thedevelopmentofthismaterialshouldconsiderandtakeadvantageoftheexperienceandtrainingmaterialalreadygainedinregionaltrainingcourses(e.g.thecourseinPanama).[Section4.1]
TheWGconcludedthatNST022couldpotentiallyimpactdelayanddenialinapositive,ratherthannegativefashion;enhancingpropertransferofinformation,educationandunderstanding.[Section4.2]
TheWGdeterminedthatneitherthesecurityofnuclearmaterialintransportdocumentnortheradiologicalcrimescenemanagementdocumentappearedtoposeanydifficultieswithregardtodelayordenialofshipments.[Section4.2]
TheWGrecommendsthat,iftheActionPlanisrevised,thefocusshouldbeonsimplificationandworkability.[Section4.3.2]
TheWGsuggeststhatimplementationofnationalandregionalnetworksshouldgiveprioritytothecreationand/orimplementationofacommunicationstrategy.[Section4.3.4]
TheWGencouragestheestablishmentofthenewinter‐UNagencycommitteeforthelongtermandeffectivemanagementofDOSissues.[Section5]
TheWGsuggestedthattheSecretariatinvestigatewhetherchangestotheradiationprotectionprogrammecouldbeimplementedtoeasedelaysanddenialswithoutsacrificingtheadequacyofradiationprotection.[Section5]
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TheWGconcurredwiththecurrenttransportsafetyworkplanandrecommendedthatitcontinuetobeapplied.[Section6.1]
TheWGrecommendedconsiderationshouldbegivenbytheAgencytosendingaletterdirectedtoallMemberStatesencouragingMemberStatestobecomemembersofTRANSSCandtoappointanNFPiftheyhavenotalreadydoneso.Thisissignificantlyimportantsinceabout2/3rdoftheMemberStatesarenotmembersofTRANSSC.[Section6.2]
TheWGrecommendsthatcollaborativeeffortsbetweensafetyandsecurityentitieswithintheIAEAandelsewhereshouldbeencouraged.[Section6.3]
TheWGnotedthatthenewUNinter‐agencycommitteeforimplementingtheDOSActionPlanneedstobeproperlystructuredandimplemented.[Section6.4]
TheWGfurtherrecognizedthatitmayalsobenecessarytoconsiderfocusingontrainingoftheNFPsandRCs–somethingthathasnotbeenaccomplishedinthepast.[Section6.4]
TheWGrecommendsthat(a)theISCreviewandapprovetheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial,andthen(b)ameetingbeconvenedbytheAgencytoreviewandfinalizethehandbook,andrecommendingthemethodandtimingofpublicationandissuance(possiblyasatechnicalreportoftheIAEA).[Section6.5]
TheWGsupportsinvitingthead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.[Section6.6]
TheWGrecommendsthattheISC,workingwiththeAgencyandotherinvolvedagencies,explorewhoshouldbetheownerofthedelay/denialdatabasesandresponsibleforassessmentofthedata.[Section6.7]
TheWGfullysupportsactionsneededtodevelopguidanceforcustomsofficials,whichisespeciallyneededintheareaofradiationprotection,whilenotingthatNSNShasalreadyissuedguidanceforcustomsandborderofficials.[Section6.8]
TheWGsuggeststhattheAgencyshouldconsiderconveningatechnicalmeetingtocollectexperienceonissuesrelatingtocustomsoperationsthathavecauseddelaysordenialsinshipments.[Section6.8]
TheWGsuggeststhatTRANSSCtakeonthistaskaspartofitsTermsofReferencesuchthat,whenitisreviewingdraftsecuritydocuments,theissueofdenialofshipmentsisaddressed.[Section6.9]
TheWGendorsestherecommendationoftheISCwithregardtothenewlyproposedspreadsheetprocess,recognizingthattheprocessneedstobeclarifiedonhowtousetheforms.[6.10]
TheWGrecommendsthatthesafetyandthesecuritystaffattheAgency,workingtogether,evaluateexistingtrainingmaterialstoensuretheinformationpresentedto
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participantsissufficienttoaddressconcernsandactionsneededasrelatedtosafetyandsecurityissuesthatmayaccruefromadelayordenialofashipment.[6.11]
TheWGalsorecommendsthattheSecretariatworkwithintheAgencytodefinetheadequacyoftrainingmaterialfornationalandregionaltrainingneedsandtheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtosupportthiseffort.[Section6.11]
TheWGrecommendsthattheSecretariatmustprovideadetailedsitemapofacountryandregionaltemplatefortheSharePointsite,inordertodefineaharmonizednationalandregionalnetworksothattheMemberStatescanprovidefeedbackearlyinthedevelopmentofthenetwork.[Section7]
TheWGrecommendsthattheAgencyconsiderenhancingthetrainingcourseforcustomsandborderofficialstoincludedelayanddenialofshipments.[Section8]
4. InitialDeliberations
Theworkinggroup(WG)initiateddiscussionsbyconsideringboththetermsofreferencenotedabove,andthedetailedissueslistedonslide7oftheWorkPlanAgendaItem1.
ItwasagreedthattheWGwouldproceedfirstwiththethreeitemslistedspecificallyinthetermsofreference.
4.1. GeneralDiscussiononIssuesRelatingtoDenial–ImpactofRegulatoryRequirements
Regulatoryrequirementsalonedonotcausedenial.However,conflictsbetweendifferentregulatoryrequirementsimposedbycontrollingbodies(e.g.nuclearauthoritiesandmodalauthorities)canresultindelaysordenials.Lackofcommunicationandunderstandingcontributesgreatlytodenialanddelayofshipments.TheseconclusionsaresupportedbytheChairman’sReportofTM‐43560.
Thus,theWGdidnotidentifyanychangesthatmightbeneededtotheTransportRegulationsasaresultofD/DOSissues,recognizingthatthecurrentmorecomprehensivereview/revisionprocesscurrentlyunderwaymightproviderecommendationsforchangerelatedtoD/DOSissue.
However,itwasnotedthatconflictsbetweenvariousformsoftheregulationscanincreaselikelihoodofdelayordenial.Inadditionitwasnotedthatoverzealous,over‐readingandmisinterpretationbynon‐technicalcontrollerscanalsoresultindenialsanddelays.
AnexamplewascitedofaradionuclidesupplierinSouthAfricathatwashavingdifficultieswithitslocalaircarrier,wheremanyshipmentswerebeingdeniedordelayed.Thesupplierworkeddirectlywiththecarrier,educatingthemontheregulations,thetypesofpackagestheyused,theimportanceofthecontentstomedicaldiagnosticsandapplications,andtoagriculturalandindustrialapplications.Theconsignorandthecarriermutuallyagreedonstandardizingthedesignsofpackages,onatrainingprogramthatthesupplierwouldprovidetoitscargohandlers(bothattheoriginlocationandthedestinationlocations),andfurtheragreedthatthesupplierwouldhavea“rapidresponseteam”
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availablewheneverashipmentwasprovidedtoquicklyaddressanyissuesthatmayariseatthedepartureairport.Thismutualcommunicationeffortandtheresultingagreementsandproceduresresolvedtheirdelayanddenialproblems.
Educationandtrainingisimportant,tobuildtrustbetweentheoperatorsandthecarriers.Theyneedtoknowandunderstandtheimportanceofthematerial,whyitneedstobetransported,whatcanbedonetosimplifytheprocess.PossiblytheSecretariatshouldlookatChapter3toseewhatcanbeplacedintheRegulationstoimprovetheproducer/carrierrelationships.
Forexample,theWGrecommendsconsiderationbegiventoexpandingthesubsectioninChapter3ofSSR‐6dealingwith“Training”toalsoaddress“Education”,ensuringthatallthoseinvolveincarriageofradioactivematerialareproperlyeducated,focusingoneachfunctionalelementinthesupplychain;considerationcouldalsobegiventoexpandingtheguidancedocumentstoreflectthesechanges.
StateshavealreadybeenencouragedbyTRANSSCtohaveindividualstatesreportonexperienceswithapplicationoftheTransportRegulations,andhowspecificissuesimpactdelayordenialofshipments.
TheWGrecognizedthatafeedbackprocessisabsolutelyessentialfortheSecretariatandTRANSSC;andthebasisforthechangescausedbydelayanddenialofshipmentsmustbeeffectivelycommunicatedtotheCSS.
TheWGrecommendsthatconsiderationcouldbegiventowritingaseriesofimplementingguidesandpreparingassociatedtrainingmaterials,similartothosebeingdevelopedforsecuritytransport,structuredaroundspecifictypesofshipments,focusinginpartonhowtointeractandinterfacewithcarriers,customsagenciesandotherentitiesthatcancauseproblemswithdelayanddenial.Thedevelopmentofthismaterialshouldconsiderandtakeadvantageoftheexperienceandtrainingmaterialalreadygainedinregionaltrainingcourses(e.g.theregionaltrainingcourseinPanamawithonedaydedicatedtodelayanddenialofshipments).
Educationactivitiesshouldaddressthetechnicalfeaturesofthepackagings,thepurposeandimportanceoftransportingthematerials,theeconomicsinvolved,theneedforadvancedcommunicationwithinvolvedentities,etc.
4.2. GeneralDiscussiononDraftSecurityDocuments
TheNSNSrepresentativereviewedthedraftdocumentspresentedtowhichare:(a) SecurityofNuclearMaterialinTransport(NST017),(b) RadiologicalCrimeSceneManagement(NST013),and(c) ProtectionandConfidentialityofSensitiveInformationinNuclearSecurity
(NST022).
Thediscussionconcernedhow,ifanyofthesedocumentsimpacttransportsafetywhichpotentiallycouldimpactdenialoffutureshipmentslateron.
ItwastheviewoftheNSNSrepresentativethatnoneofthesedocumentshaveasignificantimpactonthedenialofshipmentsofradioactivematerial.Followingpreliminarydiscussion,theWGprovisionallyagreedwiththeAgencyrepresentative’sassessment.
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However,theWGconcludedthatNST022(theNSSdocumentoninformationsharing)couldpotentiallyimpactdelayanddenialinapositive,ratherthannegativefashion.Applicationoftheserecommendationsonprotectionandconfidentialityofsensitiveinformationcouldassistinthepropertransferofinformation,andcouldenhancetheeducationandunderstandingofthoseinvolvedinashipmentchain.Thisdiscussionpromptedelaborationontwoactualscenarios.
InBrazil,arecentconvoyofashipmentofradioactivematerialwasblockedbyasmallcommunity’sactivistgroup.Theactionbythisgroupwastheresultofmiscommunicationregardingthecontentsanddetailsoftheshipment,andresultedinvariousdemonstrationsandproblemsreachingtohighlevelsofgovernment.Demonstrations,causedbyimpropercommunicationsandmisunderstandingscanleadtostoppageswhichcouldthenleadtoadversarieshavingopportunitiestotakeadvantageofthestoppedshipmentinapublicdomainwhereprovidingsecuritycouldbedifficulttoachieve.
ConsideringtheproblemsexperiencedinrecentshipmentsofvitrifiedhighlevelwastefromFrancetoGermany,theprotectionandconfidentialityofsensitiveinformationdocumentcouldpossiblyhelpreducetheimpactofdelaybyestablishingprotocols(whichwouldneedtobeagreedtoandimplementedbygovernments)forproperlymanagingtheconfidentialityofinformation;limitingsuchcommunicationstoonlythosewhohaveaneedtoknow.Properapplicationofsuchprocedureswouldrequireaproactiveapplicationoftherecommendationsbygovernments.
Incontrast,theWGdeterminedthatneitherthesecurityofnuclearmaterialintransportdocumentnortheradiologicalcrimescenemanagementdocumentappearedtoposeanydifficultieswithregardtodelayordenialofshipments.
4.3. GeneralDiscussiononProvisionsoftheISCactionplan
Annex21oftheISCreportwasconsideredbytheWG.
TheChairoftheISCpresentedthefollowingconclusionsbasedontheobjectivesoftheseventhmeetingoftheISC,whichwerethenassessedbytheWG:
4.3.1 ReviewthemilestonesintheimplementationoftheActionPlanandthestatusofimplementationofactionsbymembersoftheSteeringCommittee
Relatedtothesubstanceofthispoint,onthefirstdayofthemeetingthestatusandupdateoftheActionPlanwaspresentedtoallmembersoftheISC.Itresultedintheidentificationofaseriesofweaknessesandstrengthsthatshouldbeconsideredintheupdateoftheactionplan.
Acrucialconsiderationthatwasmentionedwastheneedtoimprovecommunication.Inthisrespect,theexperiencedevelopedbyBrazilwasmentionedwiththecreationofaNationalCommitteeondenialanddelayofshipmentsthatconsideredtheparticipationofvariousstakeholders.Ithaspermittedtobetteridentifythebottlenecksandtofindappropriatesolutions.Thankstotheimplementationofthisstrategyithasbeenpossibletosignificantlydecreaseinstancesofdenialanddelay.
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DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:
ThisdoesnotgenerallyapplytoconsiderationsoftheWG;however,thetextthatstates:“Itpermittedtheidentificationofaseriesofweaknessesandstrengthsthatshouldbeconsideredintheupdateoftheactionplan”shouldbefurtherconsideredbytheWG.
Withregardtothe2ndparagraph,thisissuedoesnotdirectlyimpacttheregulatoryrequirementsinanywayotherthanhowcommunicationscouldbeenhancedbywayoftheregulatoryrequirementsinChapter3ofSSR‐6;asidentifiedearlierindiscussingSection3.1above.
4.3.2 Reviewandrevise,ifnecessary,theActionPlanonDenialofShipmentsofRadioactiveMaterial
Theactionplanondenialofshipmentsofradioactivematerialwasreviewedandupdated.Someadvanceswereidentifiedaswellassomeactionswhichhavenotbeenimplemented.
DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:
Mr.DinakaranreferredtotheActionPlanfromthelastmeeting(February2012),asreproducedfromtheISCreport(seeAnnex1,below;Annex17‐BoftheISCReport),andelaboratedoneachofthe12pointsprovidedinthatplan.
ArethereprovisionsintheRegulationsthatshouldbeconsideredforrevision,baseduponthese12points?Thefeelingofthegroupwasgenerally,thattheansweris“NO”.
Forexample,specificregulatoryprovisionscouldbeconsideredforsimplificationwithaviewtomakingthemmoreunderstandableormoreuser‐friendlywithoutremovinganyconstraintsimposed.
TheWGrecommendsthat,iftheActionPlanisrevised,thefocusshouldbeonsimplificationandworkability,whilenotchangingtheintentandimpactpackagingoroperationsforthepurposesofsafety.
Thequestionthatneedstobeaskedis“arethereactionslistedthatpointtoanyunderpinningtojustifychangingtheregulations?”TheWGfeltthattheanswertothiscouldrequireadetailedreviewoftheRegulations,whichwasbeyondthescopeoftheWG.
4.3.3 Discussspecificactionsfor2012
DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:
Thespecificactionsfor2012weredevelopedconsideringtheneedtofocusattentiononsomespecificmainactionsneededforreducingdelaysanddenials,asdevelopedbytheNFPineachcountry.
4.3.4 Adviseonthecontinuationofregionalwork,includingwhetherthereisaneedforupdatingtheRegionalNetworks
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DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:
TheWGsuggeststhatimplementationofnationalandregionalnetworksshouldgiveprioritytothecreationand/orimplementationofacommunicationstrategy.Communicationwasconsideredessentialamongstakeholders.
4.3.5 ProvideadditionalrecommendationsforAgencyconsideration.
DiscussionandConclusionbytheWG:
ProvidingadditionalrecommendationswasnotspecificallyaddressedbytheWGatthistime;however,furtherdiscussionoftheISCfindingswasdirectedtowardsthereportofthelastISCmeeting.ItwasnotedinthatvisuallypresentedreportthatthelastISCmeetingtaskedfiveworkinggroupstoaddressthefollowingareas:1 ThefuturefortheISC;2 TheISCActionPlan;3 Self‐AssessmentTestquestions;4 Anewdenialsreportingmethod;5 DefinethecontentoftheIRPApaper.
5. Generaldiscussionofthesecondday
TheWGleaderinitiateddiscussionusingaofactionsderivedfromthepresentationsmademyMr.BajwaonMonday.ItwasemphasizedthattheWGshouldfocusondevelopingactionsforIAEAconsideration,addressingbothtransportsafetyandsecurity.WG2needstofocusondenialofshipments,andanychangestotheRegulationsthatshouldbeconsideredduringthecurrentreviewcycle,and/oranyadditionalstudiesthatmaybeneededtodetermineifachangetotheregulationsshouldbeconsidered.
Specifically,theWGneedstofocusondefininganyprovisionsthatrequirechangestoregulationsthatcanreducetheincidentsofdenialofshipments.
Forexample,the2011TransportConferenceandthe2011follow‐uptechnicalmeetingdefined11potentialactionsrelatingtodenialofshipmentsaspresentedintheWorkPlanAgendaItem2.1,asfollows:
1. Continuetransportsafetyworkplan
2. UseTRANSSCtodistributedenialreportingforms
3. EffortsshouldbemadetoovercomebarriersattheIAEAandelsewhereincreatingjointsafetyandsecuritynetworksandcollaborationshouldcontinuetobeencouraged
4. ContinueISCactionplanviaproposednewUNinter‐agencycommittee
Utiliseinformationavailableonindustry,IAEA/IMO/ICAO/NGOandcompetentauthoritywebsites
Surveybroadertransportsafetynetworkoncommunicationneeds
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WebbasedregulationaccessreferstoMSsafetyandsecurityregulations
Emphasisoneducationandtrainingatalllevelsimportant
Makeuseofbroadertransportsafetynetworktoencouragedenialreporting5. DistributeconsolidatedISCactionplantowideraudience(safety,securityandinter‐
agency)requestingthattheseactionsbeconsideredintheirworkplans.
6. Invitead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.
7. Considerfundingissuesfordatabasetoensureitcanremainoperational
8. Supportdevelopmentofguidanceforcustomstofacilitateshipmentsofradioactivematerialcrossingbordersaswellastrainingmaterial
9. Ensuredenialcontinuestobeconsideredwhendevelopingsecuritydocumentsandinparticulartheirapplication
10. AskIndustrytosurveyportproblemsandreportairandseaproblemstoNationalFocalPoints(NFP) Extendtosupplychain ConsideraspossibleresourcetheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey
11. Developtrainingmaterialonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerial. ConsiderwhetherTechnicalCooperation(TC)cansupportconductofthis
trainingTheWGconsideredTM‐43560Chairman’sreport:(Introduction)‐‐‐presentationbyPaulGrayonsustainability(AgendaItem2.4).TheWGreviewedthispresentationondenialofshipments(DOS)asaguidetoitsdeliberations,presentinganddiscussingthefollowinginsights:
DOSisacontinuingproblem DOSishinderingradioactivesourcereturnsandbeneficialuses EffortstoreduceDOSwillhavebothsafetyandsecuritybenefits ISCwasdevelopedtohelpaddresstheDOSissues,consistsofvariousstakeholders ParticipationofNationalFocalPoints(NFP)hasbeensignificant(morethan80
countriesrepresented),hasresultedinsignificantbenefits RegionalNetworks(RN)–directedtofacilitatedcommunication,withbenefitsof
countriesworkingtogethertoresolvelocaldenialissues ReasonsfordenialperIMOandIAEAfindings
o Negativeperceptiono Costandextentoftrainingo Multiplicityanddiversityofregulations;includinglackofharmonizationof
regulationsbetweenmemberstatesandbetweenmodalorganizationso Lackofoutreach,resultinginlackofpublicawareness
ISCactionplanembodiedsixproposedactivities:
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o Awarenesso Trainingo Communicationo Lobbyingo Economicso Harmonization
FromtheseactivitiesitbecomesclearthatDOSisaglobalproblem,andthereforerequiresaglobalsolution
Problems:o Budgetshavebeen/arebeingreduced,thisimpactstheabilityoftheISCtofunction
properly.o DenialReportDatabase–morethan230reportsindatabase(manyofthesehave
insufficientinformationtodefinerootcause);andthereareseveralhundredadditionaldenialreportsareoutstandingduetoconfidentialityconcerns.
FiveworkinggroupswereformedatthelastISCmeetingo ThegoalwastohaveDOS“insignificant”in2013.o Greaterinvolvementbyinternationalorganizationswasencouraged.o Discussions/integrationbetweenvariousinternationalorganizationswas
suggested.o DevelopmentofaSelfAssessmentTool(SAT)bytheIAEAtoassistmemberstates.o Newmethodforrecordingdenialswassuggested;specificallycollectingdatafrom
shippers.o DiscussissueswithIRPA.
Harmonization–significantnumberofdenialsislackofharmonizationwithregulations;thusintegrationofinter‐agencymodelwouldhelpfacilitateimprovedglobalharmonization.Thiswillrequirecoordinationbetweenvariousinternationalbodies.
RecommendedthatISCbemaintained,andthatanewinter‐UNagencycommitteebeestablishedforlongtermmanagementofDOSissues;wherethecommitteewouldinvolvetheIAEAandtherelevantmodalorganizations.Theestablishmentofthiscommitteeisstillpending,butinthemeantimeanad‐hocworkinggroupisaddressingDOS.Thus,theWGencouragestheestablishmentofthenewinter‐UNagencycommitteeforthelongtermandeffectivemanagementofDOSissues.
ConsideringthelackofconsistencybetweenregulationsattheMSandinternationallevel–needtoo IDvarianceso Resolvedifferenceso Establishacommunicationmechanismo IntegrateRNsandNFPs
ManyrecommendationsweremadetocontinueintegrationandtoutilizethevariousRNsandNFPsandtheISCtoenhancecommunication;andtoaddressconcernsinotherareas.
Analternatereportformwasthendiscussed.Thepresentationofthisformalsoaddressedcommunications(brochure,trainingmaterials,videodevelopmentandawebsite).
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EmphasiswasonhowtodiscussClass7,whereemphasisshouldbeplacedontheimportanceoftheshipmentofthesematerialscanbelifesaving.Thepresentationalsolooksatvariationsinthemodalregulations(primarilyonairandmaritimecarriage).Thesituationwithaircarriageisimprovingbecauseithashigh‐levelsupportofICAOinhelpingtoresolveDOSissues.ItwasillustratedthattheISCforDOSiswellorganized.
DiscussionthenturnedtotheexperienceofonememberstateinapplyingtheguidelinesandprogramoftheISCattheStatelevel.
Next,theresultsofthefirstdaydeliberationofWG4wereintroducedbytheSecretariat.ItwasnotedthattheWG4members’viewisthattheradiationprotectionprogrammerequirementsofSSR‐6couldpotentiallybecontributingtotheDOS.AsaresultofthisinputfromWG4,theWGsuggestedthattheSecretariatinvestigatewhetherchangestotheradiationprotectionprogrammecouldbeimplementedtoeasedelaysanddenialswithoutsacrificingtheadequacyofradiationprotection.
TheSecretariatalsodiscussedthepotentialfutureoftheISC. Thefocusisonensuringthatitisafunctionalinteragencygroup. TheSelfAssessmentToolisupandfunctioning. Thenewmethodforreportingdenialshasbeentestedbyacoupleofcompanies,andit
hasproventobesuccessful. TheIMOisdiscussingtheIMOdatabasethisweek. Harmonization–recenteffortsareaddressingestablishingstandardproceduresfor
addressingshipmentproblemsthroughouttheworld.
6. ConsiderationoftasksfromWorkplanAgendaItem2.1
Withalloftheforegoingdiscussion,theWGreturnedtothelistofelevenitemstaskedbytheSecretariattotheWG(pages7and8ofWorkplanagendaitem2.1);specificallythesesixitemsarelistedanddiscussedasfollows:
6.1 Continuetransportsafetyworkplan
Discussion/Conclusions:
TheTMChairbrieflyoutlinedwhatthetransportsafetyworkplanfortheWG.Basedonthisdiscussion,theWGconcurredwiththecurrenttransportsafetyworkplanandrecommendedthatitcontinuetobeapplied.
6.2 UseTRANSSCtodistributedenialreportingforms
Discussion/Conclusions:
BriefingswereprovidedbytheSecretariatandtheTMChairman,indicatingthatsomeofthemembersofTRANSSCarealsoinvolvedintheISC.
Itwasnotedthat,intheeventthatanNFPhasnotbeenformallyappointed,theTRANSSCmembersessentiallyfunctionastheNFP.DiscussionconcernedhowMemberStates
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shouldbeinformedofthispolicy.
TheWGrecommendedconsiderationshouldbegivenbytheAgencytosendingaletterdirectedtoallMemberStatesencouragingMemberStatestobecomemembersofTRANSSCandtoappointanNFPiftheyhavenotalreadydoneso.Thisissignificantlyimportantsinceabout2/3rdoftheMemberStatesarenotmembersofTRANSSC.
Otherwise,theWGconcurswiththisrecommendation,accordingtothelevelofparticipationofeachMemberStateinTRANSSC(activemember,correspondingmember,ornon‐member).
6.3. EffortsshouldbemadetoovercomebarriersattheIAEAandelsewhereincreatingjointsafetyandsecuritynetworksandcollaborationshouldcontinuetobeencouraged
Discussion/Conclusions:
Suchjointnetworksmayexistinformally,butitmaynotbeappropriatetoformallycreatesuchnetworks.However,TheWGrecommendsthatcollaborativeeffortsbetweensafetyandsecurityentitieswithintheIAEAandelsewhereshouldbeencouraged.
Itwasnotedthat,inmanyMemberStates,theroleofbothtransportsafetyandtransportsecurityisaccomplishedbyoneentity.
ItwasalsoacknowledgedthattheIAEAhasnowestablishedaninterfacegroupbetweensafetyandsecurity,butthisgrouponlyaddressespublicationsissues;whereasthechairsofthevariouscommittees(includingthechairofTRANSSC)areworkingtogethertoenhancecollaborationwithintheAgency.
6.4. ContinueISCactionplanviaproposednewUNinter‐agencycommittee Utiliseinformationavailableonindustry,IAEA/IMO/ICAO/NGOand
competentauthoritywebsite Surveybroadertransportsafetynetworkoncommunicationneeds WebbasedregulationaccessreferstoMSsafetyandsecurityregulations Emphasisoneducationandtrainingatalllevelsimportant Makeuseofbroadertransportsafetynetworktoencouragedenialreporting
Discussion/Conclusions:
Itwasnotedthatthenewplanessentiallymovestheprocessfromvoluntaryactionstoinvoluntaryactions;thusTRANSSCbecomescrucialinmakingtheprocesssuccessful.
TheWGnotedthatthenewUNinter‐agencycommitteeforimplementingtheDOSActionPlanneedstobeproperlystructuredandimplemented.
TheWGfurtherrecognizedthatitmayalsobenecessarytoconsiderfocusingontrainingoftheNFPsandRCs–somethingthathasnotbeenaccomplishedinthepast.
Thereisaneedtostrengthenthenationalnetworksandthecollaborationbetweenthe
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regionalcoordinatorsandtheNFPs.
6.5 DistributeconsolidatedISCActionPlantowideraudience(safety,securityandinter‐agency)requestingthattheseactionsbeconsideredintheirworkplans.
Discussion/Conclusions:
TheWGgenerallyagreeswiththisrecommendationwiththefollowingcaveatsandconsiderations.
Thefocusneedstobewellthoughtout.
Thedistributionoftheactionplanshouldfocusonallinvolvedstakeholders,andshouldbeaccompaniedbyappropriatefollow‐upactions.
TheActionPlan(seeAnnex1)delineatesspecificresponsibilitiesforimplementingthedifferentactivities,andthisshouldbeusedasaguideforeachMemberState.
Abetterstructuredactionplan,adequatebudget,appropriatemanpowerandmechanismsforcontrollingtheactionplanmaybeneeded.
Furthermore,itwasnotedthattheSecretariathaspreparedvariousbriefingpackagestoaddressspecificinvolvedentities.ThesematerialscouldhelpinimplementingtheactionplanattheStatelevel.
Themannerbywhichauthority,atalllevels,forimplementingtheactionplanneedstobeclear;thiscouldbepartlyaccomplishedbyspecifyingthefunctionsandresponsibilitiesoftheNFP.TheempowermentultimatelydependsupontheNFP’sownorganization.
MemberStatesshouldassignresponsibilities,authoritiesandresourcestosupporttheNFP,subjecttoindividualMemberStatesituationsandconcerns.
AllofthesefactorsneedtobeclearlyspecifiedandemphasizedintheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial–currentlyindraftform.ThishandbookneedstobegivenanappropriatelevelofexposurewhichcouldenhanceMemberStateimplementationoftheactionplanattheStatelevel.
Inconclusion,theWGrecommendsthat(a)theISCreviewandapprovetheHandbookforAddressingInstancesofDenial/DelaysofShipmentofRadioactiveMaterial,andthen(b)ameetingbeconvenedbytheAgencytoreviewandfinalizethehandbook,andrecommendingthemethodandtimingofpublicationandissuance(possiblyasatechnicalreportoftheIAEA).
6.6 Invitead‐hocexpandedinter‐agencygroupandTRANSSCrepresentativetothe8thmeetingoftheISCinJune2013.
Discussion/Conclusions:
TheWGsupportsthisrecommendation.
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6.7 Considerfundingissuesfordatabasetoensureitcanremainoperational
Discussion/Conclusions:
Thedatabaseisdefinitelyneededanditneedstobeproperlyfunded.
ItwasinitiallyrecommendedthatthedatabasebeshiftedtotheAgency,andmaintainedbytheAgency;whereeachmodalagencywouldhaveitsownsupplementarydatabase,feedingtheglobalbasemaintainedbytheAgency.However,itwasrecognizedthattheAgencymaynothavethemanpowerandeconomicresourcestosatisfythisrecommendation,norshouldithavethatresponsibilitysincetheDOSissueisnotasafetyissue.
Alternativestofindingthehostforthedatabase(ordatabasesifmorethanoneistobeused)needstobefullyexplored,takingintoaccountpastexperienceandresourcesthatmaybeavailableatvariousentities.Thiseffortshouldreallybedirectedtotheentity(orentities)whereitbelongs,recognizingthattheIAEAmaynotbethatentity.
ConsiderationshouldbegiventohavingeachMemberStatemaintainitsowndatabase.Thisapproachthiswouldimposeasmallburdenoneachcountry,whereasshouldtheAgencybeassignedtheresponsibilityforthedatabase,theburdencouldbesignificant.
AssigningtheresponsibilityforthedatabasetoindividualStateswouldrequirethatastandardizedapproachbefollowedtodevelop,andmaintainandcommunicatebetweentheindividualState’sdatabases.ThisapproachwouldalsocreatemorefocusonDOSattheStatelevel.
Thus,theWGrecommendsthattheISC,workingwiththeAgencyandotherinvolvedagencies,explorewhoshouldbetheownerofthedelay/denialdatabasesandresponsibleforassessmentofthedata.
6.8 Supportdevelopmentofguidanceforcustomstofacilitateshipmentsofradioactivematerialcrossingbordersaswellastrainingmaterial
Discussion/Conclusions:
Thisissuewaspreviouslycoveredindiscussiononthefirstday;e.g.seethediscussioninSection3.1ofthisreport.
TheWGfullysupportsactionsneededtodevelopguidanceforcustomsofficials,whichisespeciallyneededintheareaofradiationprotection,whilenotingthatNSNShasalreadyissuedguidanceforcustomsandborderofficials.
Considerationmayalsobeneededtoprovidingsuchguidancetootherentities,suchascoastguards,portauthorities,variousimportersandexporters,etc.
TheAgencyandsomeMemberStatesarealreadyprovidingtrainingtoportauthorities,etc.fortransportsecuritypurposes;thusconsiderationcouldbegiventocoordinatingwiththeseactivitiesandbuildingDOSissuesintotheirguidanceandtraininginformationtoreducedelaysanddenials.Forexample,theTransportSafetyUnitalreadyprovides
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inputstothecustoms‐relatedactivitiesattheAgency.
TheWGsuggeststhattheAgencyshouldconsiderconveningatechnicalmeetingtocollectexperienceonissuesrelatingtocustomsoperationsthathavecauseddelaysordenialsinshipments.
6.9 Ensuredenialcontinuestobeconsideredwhendevelopingsecuritydocumentsandinparticulartheirapplication.
DiscussionConclusions:
TheWGsuggeststhatTRANSSCtakeonthistaskaspartofitsTermsofReferencesuchthat,whenitisreviewingdraftsecuritydocuments,theissueofdenialofshipmentsisaddressed.
6.10 AskindustrytosurveyportproblemsandreportairandseaproblemstoNationalFocalPoints(NFP)
Extendthesupplychain ConsideraspossibleresourcetheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey
Discussion/Conclusions:
Inthecurrentreportingsystem,manyoftheincidentshavenotbeendocumentedduetoconfidentialityofinformation,whichthenofcoursedoesn’tmakeitintothedatabase.
Proposednewspreadsheetsweredistributed(seeAnnex2)thataddressthecollectionofdatainaformthatessentiallyeliminatestheneedforincorporatingconfidentialinformation.Theformsfocusoncollectingdatabyindividualmodes(e.g.airandsea).
TheproposednewreportingsystemwasapprovedatthelastISCmeeting.TheISCproposedthatthenewspreadsheetsbeusedbyconsignorsforthecollectionoftheneededdataandthisdatawouldthenbeprovidedtoandcoordinatedwiththeNFPsandRNsonatwiceperyear(everysixmonths)basis.
TheWGendorsestherecommendationoftheISCwithregardtothenewlyproposedspreadsheetprocess,recognizingthattheprocessneedstobeclarifiedonhowtousetheforms.Forexample,theterm“transshipmentrefusal”canbeinterpretedinmultiplewayswhichcouldresultininconsistentdatareporting.The“refusals”canbemotivatedbypoliticalissues,interveneractions;andeconomicssuchaswhencarriersviewthetransportofradioactivematerialassuchasmallmarketthatitisnotworththeircooperation.
TheWGchosetonotaddressissueswithregardtotheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemsurvey;itdoesnotappeartoberelevanttotheDOSproblemduetolimitedresourcesattheIMO.TheCargoIncidentNotificationSystemphilosophywasincorporatedintothenewspreadsheets.Withoutaddedinformation,theWGchosetonotaddressthisissuefurther.
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6.11 Developtrainingmaterialonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerial.
ConsiderwhetherTechnicalCooperation(TC)cansupportconductofthistraining
Discussion/Conclusions:
Thediscussionrevolvedaroundthefactthatdenialordelayofshipmentscanhavebothsafetyandsecurityimplicationsshouldapackageofradioactivematerialbedeniedtransshipmentandthepackagegoesoutofcontrol.
TheIMOtrainingcoursewasacknowledged,butitwastheviewoftheWGthatitcouldbeenhancedtobetteraddressdelayanddenialissues.
TheWGrecommendsthatthesafetyandthesecuritystaffattheAgency,workingtogether,evaluateexistingtrainingmaterialstoensuretheinformationpresentedtoparticipantsissufficienttoaddressconcernsandactionsneededasrelatedtosafetyandsecurityissuesthatmayaccruefromadelayordenialofashipment.
TheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtoadequatelyfundthetrainingonthesafetyandsecurityimplicationsofshipmentsbeingheldasaresultofdenialfororganizationsinvolvedintransportofradioactivematerialwillneedtoresolvedbytheSecretariat.
TheWGthereforerecommendsthattheSecretariatworkwithintheAgencytodefinetheadequacyoftrainingmaterialfornationalandregionaltrainingneedsandtheabilityofTechnicalCooperationtosupportthiseffort.
7. ConsiderationonProposalofcountry’stemplateforIAEASharePoint
TheWGthenconsideredanadditionaltopicidentifiedbytheWGmembersthatwasviewedasanissueofhighprioritybecausecommunicationisessentialtosuccessinresolvingtheD/DOSissues.
ThepotentialuseofSharePointcapabilityforeachMemberStateforsharingkeydocumentsamongMemberStatesandwithinMemberStateswasaddressed.
TheWGLeadersharedwiththeWGaconceptofatemplateforpotentialuseonSharePointfortransportingeneral.Thispresentationprovidedaverydetailedsetofwebpages(asapossibletemplate)forconsiderationforuseinSharePoint.Itwouldgiveuserstheopportunitytoexploreforinformationonpackagingandtransportofradioactivematerial,organizations,etc.bycountryorwithinacountry.Insummary,theproposedtemplatecontainedsixmajorelementsasfollows:1. GeneralInformation2. Libraries/Publications3. Lists
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4. Discussions5. Sites(Links)6. PeopleandGroups
TheScientificSecretarythensharedwiththeWGanexamplediagramofwhattheAgencyisconsideringforSharePoint;whichisidentifiedas“OneEntryPoint:“TransportWebPortal”(seeAnnex3).ThisportalwillprovideallinformationthatisavailableatandtotheAgency.
AsillustratedinAnnex3,atthetoplevelitiscurrentlyenvisionedtohavefiveelementsasfollows:
1. CalendarandCurrentEvents2. RegulationsandGuidance3. HotTopics4. MemberStatesPortal5. Tools
TheviewoftheSecretariatisthattheSharePointsitewouldnotduplicatesitesorinformation;itsgoalwouldbetoprovideauser‐friendlytooltoassistMemberStatesincommunicatingwitheachotherandwiththeIAEAandpotentiallyotherinternationalorganizations.
ConcernsoftheWGmembersfocusedaroundthemaintainingofthematerialontheSharePointsite,whatwillbethecommitmentintermsoftime,personnelandcosts.
ThediagramaspresentedbytheSecretariatwasviewedasaverypositivestepforward.
TheWGrecommendsthattheSecretariatmustprovideadetailedsitemapofacountryandregionaltemplatefortheSharePointsite,inordertodefineaharmonizednationalandregionalnetworksothattheMemberStatescanprovidefeedbackearlyinthedevelopmentofthenetwork.ThisshouldbeprovidedwithaviewtoobtaininginputsfromNFPsandRFsandotherstakeholders,asappropriate.
8. CustomsTraining–BriefingbyAgencyStaff
Mr.HazemSumanoftheSecretariatprovidedabriefingontrainingthatisavailableforcustomsandborderagents.Acoursewasdevelopedapproximatelytenyearsago,basedonTS‐R‐1,andhasbeengivenatbothregionalandnationallevelsinvariousMemberStates.Itisaone‐weekcourse.Thefocusisoneducatingcustomsofficerstoproperlydealwithshipmentsofradioactivematerialpassingthroughtheirborder.Itoutlineswhatisneededforradiationsafety.Ithasalsobeenincorporatedtrainingelementsonsecurity.
ItwasmentionedbytheWGthatthecoursemightbeexpandedslightlytoaddressissuesrelatingtodenialanddelayofshipments.Inaddition,thecourseneedstobeupdatedtoreflectSSR‐6.
TheWGrecommendsthattheAgencyconsiderenhancingthetrainingcourseforcustomsandborderofficialstoincludedelayanddenialofshipments.
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Annex1
TheActionPlanfor2012,aspresentedintheISAReport(inAnnex17‐b)isasfollows:
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Annex2
NewReportingFormatforDenialandDelayofShipments
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Annex3
ExampleDiagramoftheAgency’sProposedSharePointSite