TITLE: RIOHARD PRIOE'S THE ORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION

John Krauser MA Thes1s March 17, 1972

RICHARD PRICE'S THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION

AB S TRACT

Richard Price's theory of moral obligation is his account

of both the origin of our moral idea of obligation and its

relationship to moral knowledge, i.e., the idea of moral rectitude.

This thesis provides an interpretation of Price's theory which is

substantially different from the previous interpretations by D. D.

Raphael and A. S. Cua. Raphael and Cua interpret Price as holding

that the only relationship between the moral terms "right" and

"ought" is one of being two names for the same moral idea. The

new interpretation proposed here is that, for Price, our moral idea

of obligation is part of, and implied by, our idea of moral rectitude.

Based on this more complex picture of a logical relation between

"right" and "ought," the is-ought question in ethics is raised, and

Price is defended against Nowell-Smith's criticism that his intui-

tionism embodies the is-ought fallacy.

John B. Krauser Master of Arts Degree

Department of Philosophy

RICHARD PRICE'S THEORY OF MORAL OBLIGATION

A THESIS Presented to

the Facu1ty of Graduate Studies and Research of

McGi11 University

In Partial Fu1fi11ment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts In the Department of Phi1osophy

by John Krauser Mar ch , 1972.

@ John Krauser 1972

/

-~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION. • • • . • • • . • . • • • • • • . • • • . . • . • • . . • . • • • • • . • . • • . . • • 1

A. Biography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. Phi1osophica1 Influences on Price ••••••••••••••••••• 4

C. Price, and Later Phi1osophy •••••••••.••••••••••••••• 5

D. The Importance in the Review of Price's Theory of Obligation •••••••••••••••••••••••• 8

1. The textua1 argumen t •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 2. The historica1 argument ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10

II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE REVIEW •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16

A. Objective and Subjective Ideas •••••••••••••••••••••• 17

B. Simple and Comp1ex Ideas •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 21

C. The Moral Idea of Right

1. rts objectivity ................................. 25 2. rts simp1icity .................................. 27

D. More on Price's Notion of Objectivity ••••••••••••••• 30

E. Price's Notion of Intuition ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36

III. THE THE ORY OF OBLIGATION IN THE REVIEW •••••••••••••••••• 44

A. The Princip1e of Ref1ection

1. John Locke (1632-1704) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 45 2. The Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) •••••.•••••.• 46 3. A Comparison of Price and Shaftesbury ••••••••••• 49

B. The Historica1 Connection of Moral Obligation with Moral Know1edge

1. Bishop Butler (1692-1752) ••••••••••••••••••••••• 50

C. The Linguistic Connection between Obligation and Know1edge •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51

(ii)

D. Prior Work on Price's Theory of Obligation ••••••••• 54

E. Price's Theory of Obligation ••••••••••••••••••••••• 55

F. Arguments for My Interpretation of Price's Theory of Obligation •••••••••••••••••••••• ~ 58

1. The textua1 evidence ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 60 2. The historica1 evidence •••••••••••••••••••••••• 65 3. The consistency of my i~terpretation

with Price's notion of "simple" ideas ••••••••••• 66 4. The consistency of my interpretation

with Price's notion of "inclusion" •••••••••••••• 67

G. The Meaning of "implication" ••••• ".................. 69

H. The Phi1osophica1 Import of My Interpretation of Price's Theory of Moral Obligation ................................... 75

IV. PRICE' S THEORY OF OBLIGATION AND THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION IN ETHICS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 92

(iii)

CHAPTER l

INTRODUCTION

Biography

Richard Price, the subject of this study, was born February 23,

1723 at Tyton, Wales. His father was a minister whose extreme

Calvinism alienated him from his fellow dissenters and prevented a

successful academic career. From the beginning, therefore, it is clear

that Price's biography is also one record within the history of English

Dissent. Price's father chose for him a business career, but this would

have little influence on the direction of his education. For dissenters,

a good education was essential irrespect ive of intended vocation. l

At twelve, Price, while studying under a minister with Unitarian

views, was recommended readings which introduced him to Samuel Clarke,

a member of the intellectualist school of moralists. The drift of Price

away from orthodox Calvinism and into arianism could be said to have had

its beginnings here. It was during the year after his father died in

1739 that Price read Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion, which contains

besides religious considerations the philosophically important Disserta-

tion on Virtue. Finally, when his mother died in 1740, Price decided on

the dissenting ministry as a vocation. After four years at Coward's

lCarl B. Cone, Torchbearer of Freedom (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1952), p. 9. The other source of biographical data has been Roland Thomas, Richard Price (London: Humphrey Milford, 1924).

-1-

-2-

Academy in London (1740-44), Priee, twenty-one, was ordained in the

ministry. He then became a family chaplain and private secretary, which

only entailed light duties. This left him time to reflect on the pro-

blems that are discussed in his A Review of the Principal Questions in

MoraIs later published in 1758. 2

Price's education developed in him an interest in mathematics to

which he turned a great deal of attention after 1758. His special

interest was probability theory which he applied to the calculation of

life expectancies. Priee was concerned with providing an accurate basis

for the calculation of insurance premiums in order to avoid the hard-

ships resulting from the bankruptcy of life insurance plans. His con-

tributions to our knowledge of mortality rates and life expectancy earn-

ed for him the title of "the founder of Life Insurance" and a membership

in the Royal Society (1765).3

2This was Price's only major work on ethics and it will be herein­after referred to by Review. AlI references to this work are taken from D. D. Raphael's 1948 edition (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press) which was a reproduction of the Third Edition of 1787. The First Edition was entitled A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in MoraIs, particularly those respecting the origin of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, relation to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter, and Sanctions. A corrected Second Edition appeared in 1769 and a Third Edition with further corrections in 1787. An appendix containing additional notes and a dissertation on the deity was added to the Third Edition, whose title had the words "and Difficulties" deleted. The editor of Price's Review, D. D. Raphael, says on the basis of the three editions of the Review that Price's ethical views did not change substantially during his life­time. It should be mentioned at this point that there were a series of letters between Priee and Priestley published in 1778. The work was entitled A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, and Philoso­phical Necessity, In a Correspondence between Dr. Priee and Dr. Priestley. Two of the main currents of discussion were centered around Priestley's materialistic theory of mind which Priee opposed, and the problem of freedom and determinism.

3Thomas, Richard Priee, p. 58.

-3-

Sometime during the period 1758 and August, 1762, Price met and

became good friends with Benjamin Franklin. Price's interest in science

1ed him to finance some of Joseph Priest1ey's experiments, and it was

Price, Franklin, and John Canton who introduced Priestley to the Royal

Society. Frank1in's friendship began Price's long and close association

with Americans concerned over the injustice of Eng1and's treatment of

the Colonies. This association 1ed to his unpopu1ar pro-revo1utionary

stand; a modest refusa1 to accept American citizenship and to contribute

his know1edge of finances to he1p the Congress; and a pamphlet wide1y

read in America which formed "part of the story of the making of the

Constitution·~,.,4

C10ser to home, it was Price's idea of a Sinking Fund as a means

to reduce the Eng1ish national debt that was accepted by William Pitt

and the Eng1ish Par1iament of 1786. 5 In November of 1789, Price gave a

sermon which was immediate1y pub1ished praising the virtues that he saw

in the French Revolution as personified by the fa11 of the Bastille on

Ju1y 14, 1789. The ideas that Price passionate1y enunciated set off a

storm of controversy not in the 1east because Price had 1inked the

French Revolution with the cause of further reform in Eng1and. The

pub1ished version of the sermon occasioned Edmund Burke's attempt in

Ref1ections on the Revolution in France to refute the position that

4Cone , Torchbearer of Freedom, p. 104. "Anything Price wrote wou1d be heeded by American leaders, his Observations was wide1y read in America, and the views Price expressed were in harmony with the trend of thought during the years 1784-1787. One may say that Price's pamphlet encouraged these American leaders to continue their efforts and he1ped to convince them that strengthening the genera1 ~overnment was wise and necessary~"~ Ibid., p.122. - ...... _--, ................. "'"

5Ibid., pp. 148-149. See a1so Thomas, Richard Price, pp. 103-106.

-4-

Price represented. 6

These two final events in Price's life are noteworthy of his

interests during the years prior to his death in 1791 in the London

suburb of Hackney.

Philosophical influences on Price

Among contemporary moralists greatly admired by Price, Joseph

Butler, the Bishop of Durham, is given an especially high place and

acknowledged as a major influence and as one of the writers that he most

respected. In the preface to the first edition of the Review, Price

remarks that:

There is no writer to whom l have near so much reason to acknowledge mYself indebted, as Dr. Butler. 7

In the Review itself Price speaks of Butler as "this incomparable writer,,,8

and referring to Butler's Analogy, Price, late in life, says:

l reckon it happy for me that this book was one of the first that fell into my hands. It taught me the proper mode of reasoning on moral and religious subjects, and particularly the importance of paying a due regard to the imperfection of human knowledge. 9

But Butler is not the only philosopher to whom Price explicitly

pays his respects; next to Butler's works, writes Price~ "1 have always

6Cone , Torchbearer of Freedom, p. 187. Price's position is reported to be as follows. (1) The right to liberty of conscience in religious matters. (2) The right to resist power when abused. (3) "The right to chuse our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct; and to frame a government for ourselves." Ibid., p. 182.

7price, Review, p. 3.

8Ibid., p. 119.

9Richard Price, Observations on the lm ortance Revolution and the means of ma ing it a Bene it Printed for L. White, et al., 1785), pp. 61-62.

-5-

been an admirer of the writings of Dr. [Samuel] Clarke. ,,10 Un1ike in

the case of Butler, Price does not attribute to Clarke any specific ro1e

in the formation of his ethics as opposed to his theo10gy. There is no

doubt however that C1arke's influence on Price's ethics is by way of

those important princip1es of truth and reason which were 1ater modified

when Price began to examine the ground on which his ethics stood. It

was Clarke and Butler that were considered by Price in 1787 as two of

the greatest names his wor1d had ever known. 11

David Hume was an important and positive influence on Price

during the years 1744 to 1758, the formative period of the Review. Hume

pub1ished his Treatise in 1739-40 and his Phi10sophica1 Essays (later

ca11ed Enquiry) Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. Price's

acknow1edgement of the influence of these works on his thinking was re-

corded many years 1ater in the fo110wing manner:

And l cannot he1p adding, however strange it may seem, that l owe much to the phi10sophica1 writings of Mr. Hume, which l 1ikewise studied ear1y in 1ife. Though an enemy to his Scepticism, l have profited by it. By attacking, with great abi1ity, every princip1e of truth and reason, he put me upon ex­amining the ground upon which l stood, and taught me not hasti1y to take anything for granted. 12

Price, and later phi10sophy

Price is more exp1icit about who inf1uenced his moral phi10sophy

than others have been able to be about Price's own influence on 1ater

ethics. A1though bom on1y a year ear1ier than Kant, Price's Review

10Ibid ., p. 62.

11The third was Isaac Newton. Price, Review, p. 291.

12 Price, Observations, p. 62.

-6-

appeared 27 years before the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Mora1s. In

the 1iterature, Priee has frequent1y been compared to Kant on the basis

of the apparent simi1arity of their moral phi1osophy.13 It is c1ear

that Priee anticipated some distinctive1y Kantian views on ethics, but

one author perceives such a resemb1ance that he suggests that perhaps

Kant was direct1y inf1uenced by price. 14 Another, H. Sidgwick, found a

method of argumentation in the Review which suggests that Priee had a1so

anticipated the new method of doing phi1osophy, name1y, the 1ater common

sense approach characterized by Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and the

Scottish schoo1 of phi1osophy.15

Around the 1940's, Price's work in ethics was of current interest

as a good representative of a position in ethics about which much dis-

cussion was then taking place. Sor1ey wrote in 1937 that "the system

which Priee bases on his view has become, more than any other, the type

of modern intuitiona1 ethics.,,16 During this period Price's' Review

was the acknow1edged influence behind some work in ethics by C. D. Broad

13J • M. Wilson and T. Fow1er, The Princip1es of Mora1s, (2 vols.; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1886), l, 63; J. Seth, Eng1ish Phi1o­sophers and Schoo1s of Phi1osophy (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1925), p. 227;" J. M. Mitche1, "Priee, Richard," Encyc10paedia Britannica, Handy Volume Issue, 11th ed., XXII, 314-15; Winston Barnes, "Richard Priee: A Neg1ected Eighteenth Century Mora1ist," Phi1osophy, XVII (April, 1942), 159-60.

14Giorgio Tone11i, "Deux sources britanniques oubliees de la morale kantienne," Melanges Alexandre Koyré II, Vol. VIII of Histoire de la Pensee (8 vols.; Paris: Hermann, 1964), pp. 496-505.

15Henry Sidgwick, Out1ines of the History of Ethics (3rd ed.; London: Macmillan and Co., 1892), p. 226.

16 W. R. Sor1ey, A History of Eng1ish Phi1osophy (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1937), p. 199

-7-

and E. F. Carritt. 17 Because of the relevancy of Price's Review (1758)

and Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) to then current

discussions, A. N. Prior in 1946 wrote the following:

A study of the main eighteenth century moralists would form a very complete introduction to ethical discussion and speculation generally., an ideal elementary Ethics course. 18

And since the debate over claims to objective moral knowledge is still

going on, William Blackstone can suggest in 1965 that the issues in-

volved in these debates would be clarified by a study of the similar con­

troversy between Price and Hutcheson. 19

Of two recent works on Price, Reason and Virtue by A. S. Cua

seeks to examine his relationship to the positions of modern ethical

intuitionists. The other, The Moral Philos.ophy of Richard Price, by

L. Aqvist has confined itself to a coherent presentation and elucidation

of the Review with the help of the concepts· and methods of deontic

logic. In addition, Price's work in ethics is held in high esteem

l7C• D. Broad, "Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. XLV (London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1945), p. 131; E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1947), Preface.

l8A• N. Prior, "Eighteenth Century Writers on Twentieth Century Subjects," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXIV, ~o. 3 (1946), 182.

19William T. Blackstone, Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1965), pp. 9-10 It should be noted that Hutcheson died in 1746, 12 years before Price criticized him in the Review. The controversy between Priee and Huteheson was one-sided, and therefore Blaekstone's way of putting the point is somewhat misleading.

-8-

by such writers as D. D. Raphael, H. Rashdall, and J. S. Morell. 20

On the other hand during the nineteenth century, Price was not

considered as a significant moralist by some philosophers for two main

reasons. First because his work seemed to them to contain nothing

original, but only to represent what is already in two preceding

members of the intellectualists school of ethics, Ralph Cudworth (1617-

1688) and Samuel Clarke (1675-1729).21 Secondly, Price's theory was

not important because it rests on the belief, which was alleged to be

mistaken, that Reason can serve as a motive to action without the need

for the emotions. 22

The importance in the Review of Price's theory of obligation

As part of this introduction to Price and his ethics, l wish to

establish his theory of obligation as not just one part of the Review,

or even as an important part, but as a fundamentally important part.

This is a necessary beginning because the literature on the Review has

in the main been concerned with his theory of moral knowledge. lt has

20D• D. Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 101; Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (2 vols.,

2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1924), l, 80-81 (Footnote 1); J. D. MoreIl An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philo­sophy of Europe in the Nineteenth centu~ (2 vols., 2d ed.; Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1847), l, 215; Lennart ~vist, The Moral Philosophy of Richard Price (Uppsale: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1960), p. 201; J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory (2 vols., 3d ed.; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1889), II, p. 475; A. S. Cua, Reason and Virtue (n.p.: Ohio University Press, 1965), p. 125

2lWilson and Fowler, The Principles of MoraIs, l, 63; Seth, English Philosophers, p. 227; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, II, 476.

22 Wilson and Fowler, The Principles of MoraIs, l, 69; J.

Mackintosh, "Dissertation Second," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 7th ed., l, 361-62.

-9-

therefore presented a fa1se impression of the scope of Price's funda-

mental con cern in the Review, and this has resu1ted in his theory of

obligation being ignored. 23

In the fo11owing discussion the expression "theory of obligation"

encompasses both Price's account of the origin of our moral ide a of

obligation and his account of the re1ationship of our ide a of obligation

to our moral ide as of right and wrong. To avoid confusion at the outset,

l must point out that l am not using "idea" here in the usua1 sense of

some genera1 conception of obligation, but "idea" is a1ways a technica1

term whose genera1 meaning is to be found in the epistemo1ogy of Locke.

l will return to this matter when l discuss Price's epistemo1ogy.

l will try to show the importance of Price's theory of obligation

by the fo11owing two arguments. The first is based on the text of the

Review, and largue that a genuine part of Price's overa11 aim in the

Review, providing a foundation for virtue, is a theory about the origin

of the moral ide a of "ought". The second is based on the history of

ethica1 argumentation just prior to and contemporary with Priee. l

argue here that Price's theory of obligation is intimate1y 1inked to the

goals of the Review on the basis of the dual ro1e of reason as a source

of moral authority and moral know1edge.

23 To be fair and accurate l must be more specifie. Price's

notion of Reason as the moral authority has a1ways been noticed, but on1y as a basis of comparison to Kant and not rea11y examined in its detai1s. There is one article on Price's theory of obligation which does get into detai1s in order to go on to discuss G. E. Moore's theory of obligation: Samuel E. Gluck, "Richard Priee,· G. E. Moore, and the Ana1ysis of Moral Obligation," Phi1osophica1 Quarter1y (Calcutta), XXXI, No. 3 (1958), 163-172.

-10-

The textual argument.

Price clearly states that his aim in the Review is to show that

our moral ideas of right and wrong do denote something real in the

nature of things. 24 But this is not aIl that he aims at, for he also

wishes to trace our moral obligations to the truth and naturecf'things. 25

In these introductory remarks Price is only speaking generally about

our moral obligations and their source, and he does not appear to be

referring to an account of the origin of our moral idea of "ought~JI~ But

what can immediately be gathered from the stated goals of the Review is

that his discussion of the foundation of virtue will touch on two

features of ethics, namely, moral knowledge and moral obligation. How­

ever, this is important here because, in fact, Price provides such a

foundation by accounting for the origin of our moral ideas. This paper

will be an attempt to clarify Price's account of the origin of our moral

ide a of "ought;'.' and consequently the origin of moral obligation.

But it is apparent here, as it was to Price, that there should

be an explanation of the relationship between our moral idea of "right"

a"nd our idea of "ought.',' In Price' s view one necessary result of his

theory must be that moral obligation is in close touch, so to speak, with

moral knowledge. This is the other part of his theory of obligation.

By way of the path 1 have just traced, Price's theory of obligation can

be seen to be a fundamentally important part in the design of the Review.

The historical argument,

l wish to follow another path to the same conclusion because this

24Price, Review, p. 4.

25Ibid., p. Il. See also Review, p. 295.

-11-

procedure will further serve to put Price's designs into an historica1

perspective. Specifica11y, the conclusion that Price's theory of

obligation is an important part of the Review can be reached by putting

his theories of know1edge and obligation in the context of eighteenth

century phi1osophica1 discussions of mora1ity.

By way of the first argument, we saw that Price was faced with

exp1aining the re1ationship between our moral ide a of "right" and our

idea of "ought.;" Whatever this re1ationship was, Price fe1t that the

facu1ty which is responsib1e for our moral know1edge must a1so be the

source of moral authority in man. Because he thought that Reason was

the facu1ty of moral know1edge, therefore it must a1so be the source of

moral authority. Because Reason appeared to have these two features,

Price was 1ed to try to detai1 just how moral obligation is bound up in

moral truth, i.e., to a theory of obligation. From this it is c1ear

that the rational facu1ty is going to have some ro1e in the exp1anation

of· the re1ationship between "right" and "ought:'! Therefore, it is

important to note that Price does not understand by the'!Eacu1ty of Reason"

what Samuel Clarke understood, and that this change appears due to the

criticisms of Francis Hutcheson, Bishop But1e~.and David Hume. This

change in Price's understanding of the nature of Reason resu1ts in a

fundamenta1 difference in the way he expresses his theory of know1edge

and, more important1y for this paper, his theory of obligation.

A brief (and incomp1ete) survey of British ethics in the ha1f­

century before publication of the Review may revea1 the detai1s that 1ed

up to Price's understanding of the nature of Reason and his theory of

obligation. From C1arke's Discourse concerning the unchangeab1e obliga­

tions of Natura1 Religion (1705), l have abstracted what l be1ieve to be

-12-

four points of his theory. l think that he wishes to claim the follow-

ing:

(1) We have absolute knowledge of the various morally relevant relations between things.

(2) From this knowledge, certain moral princip1es can be deduced.

(3) Since these moral princip les are the resu1t of va1id deductive arguments from certain1y true know1edge of the mora11y relevant relations between things, they must be true. Therefore, it wou1d be irrational not to assent to the fact that one shou1d govern himse1f according1y, i.e., it is irrationa1 to try to deny or not to see the truth.

(4) Obligation and our conscience arise as the resu1t of assenting (necessari1y for a rational being) to the proposition that it is T.easonab1e and fit to govern a11 our actions according to the true moral princip1es. 26

What did Price wish to defend in this theory? He thought Reason

discerned moral truth. After a11 throughout the history of phi1osophy,

it was Reason that perceived Truth, and Price will go on to justify

his be1ief in the existence of moral know1edge by showing Reason to be

the moral facu1ty. Second1y, Price wanted Reason to be the moral facu1ty

of obligation as we11 as know1edge. What appears to be the criticism

of Samuel Clarke that forced Price to seek original arguments justifying

what he thought worthy in C1arke's moral phi1osophy? F. Hutcheson

pub1ished his Inquiry into the original of our Ideas of Beauty and

Virtue in 1725. His Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with

Illustrations upon the Moral Sense appeared in 1728. In the Inguir~

26L• A. Se1by-Bigge, ed., British Mora1ists (2 vols.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965), II, 12-37 ~ passim. See especia11y paragraphs 491, 498-500, 504,and 511.

-13-

Hutcheson claims that our fundamental moral distinctions are immediate

and that moral knowledge is not the result of an intellectual deduction.

He argues that if Reason is characterized as being only a faculty of

deduction, then it cannot give rise to any new ideas, including there-

fore our ideas of moral goodness and moral evil, and thus the moral

faculty must be a kind of moral sense. 27

Hume's work in ethics began to appear in 1739-40. In it he

claims that distinctions between right and wrong are made through

impressions and feelings, and not through intellectual ideas. He exam-

ines Clarke's vague talk of relations and finds it inadequate. Until

Clarke or the other rationalists can find distinctly moral relations,

he says it must be concluded that Reason is not the moral faculty. Mo re-

over both Hutcheson and Hume found that Reason alone does not serve as

a sufficient motive to action, and so does not account for moral

behavior. 28 Hume's epistemology and analysis moved Price to examine the

grounds that served to give Clarke his confidence in the certainty of

his moral knowledge. This involved Price in epistemological considera-

tions that Clarke seems to have ignored.

Butler argued against Clarke's suggested origin of moral obliga-

tion. Our experience of moral obligations arises for Butler from our

27Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, l, 70-72. That Price saw Hutcheson in this light is indicated by the following: "He [Hutcheson] appears, indeed, to have taken for granted, that if virtue and vice are immediately perceived, they must be perceptions of an implanted sense." Price, Review, p. 42.

28David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby­Bigge (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 455-476. These pages contain sections 1 and 2 of Part l of Book III.

-14-

conscience, a natura1 authority in man; it does not arise on1y from

assent to a moral ru1e. Butler thinks we can sometimes do without moral

ru1es and re1y on our interna1 moral authority a10ne to guide us. 29

Brief1y, how does Price respond to these criticisms of C1arke's

position, criticisms of Reason as the source of moral distinctions, the

nature of moral know1edge, and the source of moral obligation? Price's

response to the first criticism is to argue that Reason·is intuitive

as we11 as deductive. He is carefu1 to point out that it is through

intuition that we have immediate know1edge of fundamenta1 moral princip1es.

Moreover, in Price's conception of intuitive reason, moral distinctions

are made by the inte11ectua1 intuition of rea1 moral qua1ities of acts,

and not by impressions or by ideas of relations. In this paper, l wish

to c1arify Price's hand1ing of moral obligation. The sense of obligation

did not originate from a natura1 authority as Butler taught, nor from

assent to moral ru1es, but for Price the idea of "ought" is an imp1ica-

tion from the intuited moral rightness of an act.

Price's rejoinder to the criticism of the rationa1ist position

presented here can be summed up in two short theses.

(1) Reason, ,if intuitive, can still be the moral facu1ty.

(2) A term of moral know1edge, "right", imp1ies the term of moral dut y, "ought", and this accounts for our idea of moral obligation.

Price tries to support these two theses with arguments in the Review.

As l have sought to show, this brief historica1 introduction a1so points

to Price's theory of obligation as being of fundamenta1 importance in

29Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, ed. by W. R. Mathews (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1953), p. 64. See a1so page 16.

-15-

the Review.

There are two reasons, besides rectifying the epistemological

bias of most of his commentators, to consider Price's theory of

obligation important. In the first place, it is to Price's credit as

a moral philosopher that he saw the necessity, if he was to provide a

foundation for virtue, of accounting for moral obligation as weIl as

moral knowledge. It appears as if his contemporaries were satisfied to

emphasize one or the other. 30 Secondly, Price's description of the

relation between moral knowledge and moral obligation appears to be

original in comparison with his contemporaries, and this marks an

advancement in the sophistication of the eighteenth-century rationalist

position in ethics. It appears to me to be of contemporary interest to

note that, implicit in Price's theory of obligation, is the recognition

that there might be a logic to our moral terminology. Therefore, the

insight that Price uses against the positions of Hutcheson and Hume is

based on the presence of a "logical" relationship between two ethical

terms. This would be some evidence that such terms could not be wholly

reducible to emotions or feelings, on the reasonable assumption that

affective terms are not logical in this same way, if at aIl.

After reviewing the epistemological features of the Review, l

will concentrate on the text itself in order to present my interpretation

of Price's theory of obligation. In conclusion l will offer sorne

suggestions on the philosophical import of my interpretation of Price's

theory of obligation.

30A possible exception is Francis Hutcheson. A discussion of obligation is found in both early books. But, of course, Price would have a theory different from that suited to the moral sense.

CHAPTER II

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE REVIEW

In this chapter, l want to discuss what Price means by calling

some of our ideas "simple ideas." It is important to make some effort

to be clear about what the simplicity of an idea involves because

Price claims that our moral idea of right is simple. This doctrine is

a very important meeting point between his epistemology and his ethics,

and, consequently, any interpretation of Price's theory of the

relationship between our ideas of right and obligation will have to be

consistent with his view that "right" denotes a simple idea. In

connection with this particular discussion, l will also mention what

use Price makes of the term "immediacy" to characterize how we come by

our moral knowledge.

The second objective of this chapter will be to bring out Price's

understanding of the objectivity of our fundamental moral terms. Later,

l will try to show what reasons there are to believe that, for Price,

our idea of ought is not an objective idea as is our moral idea of right.

This chapter will help make it apparent that an objective idea is one

which denotes something really existing in acts, after which it will be

easier to see that for Price our idea of ought is not objective in this

way.

Finally, l will touch on Price's notion of intuition and his

belief about the role of moral rules in our moral experience. Only the

-16-

-17-

first of these two topics direct1y affects the content of his theory of

obligation, but they both are essentia1 in order to understand one

feature of Price's concept of intuition, i.e., intuition is prior to,

and makes possible, the moral experience of judging what it is right to

do. Such a moral experience depends on the prior existence of those

moral ru1es and the prior implication that we have a dut y to act from

those ru1es. On Price's view, both resu1t from inte11ectua1 intuition.

l do not want to 1eave the impression that l think the fo110wing

discussion is in any way a complete exposition of Price's epistemo10gy,

for it is note l have on1y tried to mention what will 1ater be of use

for the main intent of this paper, the interpretation of Price's theory

of obligation.

Objective and subjective ideas

Price's understanding of the distinction between those ideas

that are subjective and those which are objective is a good place to

begin a discussion of his epistemo10gy. It cou1d be said that what is

rea1 or objective is just what we attribute to things independent1y of

our perception of them. On first viewing most wou1d agree with Priee

when he writes:

The weakness of our discerning facu1ties cannot in any case affect truth. Things themse1ves continue invariab1y the same, however different our opinions of them may be, of whatever doubts or difficu1ties may perp1ex us. 1

In this case we wou1d go on to ca11 subjective such things as

our feelings and the ideas which denote these feelings. For examp1e,

the pain we fee1 when we touch something hot is not a rea1 attribute of

1Price, Review, p. 168.

-18-

the object, but on1y the effect in us arising from a certain condition

of the objecte Price be1ieves that the sensations we experience as

co10urs, tastes, and sounds are on1y modes of feeling in the mind2 which .. are due to the particu1ar frame and structure of our nature. 3 Our

ideas of sense denote the effects arising from the impressions made on

our minds by externa1 objects. 4 Because Price is thinking within the

context of Locke's epistemo10gy, he accepts the thesis that a11 ideas

that denote immediate features of our sense expericnce are subjective

in the same way as is the feeling of pain described above. 5 This means

that a11 those ideas which denote co10urs, tastes, and sounds cannot be

said to denote qua1ities that can be attributed direct1y to the objects

themse1ves.

In an ana10gous fashion, Price formu1ates in the fo110wing

manner what it wou1d mean for our moral experience to be pure1y subject-

ive.

Virtue (as those who embrace this scheme'say) is an affair of taste. Moral right and wrong, signify nothing in the objects themse1ves to which they are app1ied, any more than agreeab1e and harsh; sweet and bitter; p1easant and painfu1; but on1y certain effects in us. 6

2Ibid ., p. 20.

3Ibid., p. 15.

4Ibid ., p. 17.

5price is not a Lockean in his epistemo10gy because of a crucial addition he makes to Locke's the ory of know1edge and not because he rejects "ideas" as a way of knowing rea1ity. After a11, his main thesis is just that the understanding, as we11 as sensation and ref1ection, "is a spring of new ideas." Price, Review, p. 18. See a1so Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 127.

6price, Review, p. 15

-19-

For Price, the subjective position in mora1s is the one which asserts

that the term "mora11y right" signifies nothing more objective than

the term "sweet." If this is the case, then these statements have the

same status in being reports of our own subjective experience: "This

app1e is sweet" is just 1ike "This act is right."

In short, an idea is objective if it denotes something rea11y

in objects, and it is subjective if it denotes on1y certain effects in

us. The question Price dea1s with in the Review, and to which he gives

an affirmative answer, is whether "right" and "wrong" are any ~

objective than those terms which refer to our immediate sense experience.

For convenience of exposition, l wish to separate into two

distinct parts the concept of objectivity that is to be found in the

Review. The first part c1aims that there are some ideas which do not

denote any part of our sense experience. The second part c1aims that

ideas objective in the first sense are objective in a second sense, that

is they denote something rea11y existing in objects. The first part

wou1d not show that moral judgements are ever true, i.e., that they

refer correct1y to something rea1, but on1y that they do not refer sole1y

to our sense experience. Thus, the latter c1aim is the more inclusive

one because it asserts that moral judgements are capable of describing

some feature of rea1ity. l have found that the first c1aim is the

easier to dea1 with, but it shou1d be remembered that Price's main

epistemo1ogica1 thesis c1aims our moral ideas to be objective in the

more inclusive sense.

The fo11owing passages contain a discussion of some of the ideas

which, according to Price, must originate in an intuitive rational

facu1ty because they do not seem to denote a part of our sensible ex-

-20-

perience. The first example is our idea of a cause, about which Price

writes the following:

What we observe by our external senses, is properly no more than that one thing follows another, or the constant conjunction of certain events •••• That one thing is the cause of another, or produces it, we never see. 7

This of course presupposes that what we mean by causality is not wholly

reducible to the constant conjunction of certain events. Price

believes that this presupposition could be shown to be true if another

idea could be found to be both part of what we mean by "cause" and yet

be more clearly not among the ideas we owe to a sense. Such a pro-

cedure is exemplified in the case of our idea of solidity which is

another example of an idea independent of our sense experience.

The idea of solidity has been generally reckoned among the ideas we owe to sense; and yet perhaps it would be difficult to prove, that we ever had actual experience of that impenetrability which we include in it, and consider as essential to all bodies. 8

One need not use the phrase "subjective experience" in conjunction with

Price's notion of subjectivity. This is because "experience" for Price

means "the information conveyed to the mind through the senses"9 by

which he is referring to our feelings and our sensations of the quali-

ties of taste and colour, etc. These sensations, we have seen, are

just the sorts of things that do not give us any direct knowledge of

the external world. A further example of an idea which is objective in

Price's sense is the scientific idea of inertia. Our idea of inertia,

or the inactivity of matter, is basic to all our reasoning about matter,

7Ibid., p. 25.

8Ibid., p. 21.

9Ibid., p. 22.

-21-

and it is an idea which resu1ts from a perception of reason rather than

an idea "conveyed to the mind through the senses." As Price writes,

"what furnishes us with our ideas of resistance and inactivity?---Not

experience: for never did any man yet see any portion of matter that

was void of gravity.,,10

Simple and comp1ex ideas

A1though according to Price these ideas do not refer immediate1y

to anything sensib1y given in experience, it might be suggested that

their remoteness from experience is due to the fact that they are

comp1ex ideas, which must first be ana1ysed into their simp1er com-

ponent ideas, and on1y these latter wou1d be seen to refer immediate1y

to part of our sense experience. This suggestion introduces the c1aim,

made by empiricists 1ike Locke and Hume, that even though sorne ideas

do not denote immediate1y sorne sensible feature of experience, it can

be shown that these ideas are on1y comp1ex ideas, i.e., ideas made up

of simp1er component ideas which themse1ves can be seen to refer to

sensible experience. Although, as we will see, Price prefers another

classification based more explicitly on his distinction between subject-

ive and objective ideas, he accepts the division of aIl our ideas into

those which are simple and those which are complex. ll

It is important to see what the terms "simple" and "complex"

are designed to emphasize because this distinction plays an important

role in helping us to understand what Price wishes to claim about our

10 Ibid., p. 23.

llThis is also recognized by D.D. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 127.

-22-

moral idea of right. This is a1so important because it is in the con-

text of this distinction that Price states his disagreement with the

empiricist epistemo1ogy, which asserts that a11 our ideas have their

origins in sense experience or in our ref1ection on the operations of

our mind.

We can begin this discussion with Locke's examp1e of our

experience of a cube of ice. If l pick up a cube of ice, l have at

1east two distinct impressions, one of hardness and one of co1dness.

They are distinct a1though the feelings of hardness and co1dness do

appear a10ng with many other sense impressions which make up my sense

experience of picking up the ice. Locke sees our ideas of hardness

and co1dness as simple ideas not on1y because they "contain" their

respective impressions, but becaus.e those impressions are pure, that is,

they are not made up of other pure impressions. Simple ideas, Locke

says, "being each in itse1f uncompounded, contains in it nothing but

~ uniform appearance, ~ conception in the mind, and is not dis­

tinguishab1e into different ideas.,,12 It is important to note, besides

the fact that they are uncompounded, one other aspect of those ideas

Locke ca11s simple. The phrase, "not distinguishab1e into different

ideas," found at the end of the above definition is a reference to the

view that· an idea which can be ana1ysed into simp1er ideas does not

denote an original feature of our sense experience. The importance

"origina1ity" has for the concept of a simple idea is that the original

features of our sense experience contained in simple ideas "are a11 from

12John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (2 vols.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), Book II, Chapter ii, Section 1. Hereinafter referred to as Essay.

-23-

things themse1ves, and of these the mind ~ have no more, nor other

than what are suggested to it.,,13 In Locke's Essay we can see that his

conception of simple ideas of sense is intimate1y 1inked with the

notion of what u1timate1y can be known. In discussing what the mind

has to work with when using its power to form comp1ex ideas, Locke

writes that the mind is confined to the simple ideas received from

sensation and ref1ection which are the "ultimate materials of al1 its

compositions. ,,14 Because they are part of the given, immediate, and

original experience we have of reality, the feelings of hardness and

co1dness give rise to ideas that are simple.

Price understood Locke's claim that from these simple ideas we

should be able to derive a1l our other important ideas. l5 The method-

ology seeking to prove this thesis consists in showing that all our

ideas are either those simple ide as derived immediately from sense

experience or complex ideas which can be analysed into ideas so derived.

The prob1em of analysis arises with ideas 1ike those of "cause,"

"solidity," and "inertia" which do not appear to have an immediate re-

ference to some simple sense experience. Locke c1aims that these ideas

are comp1ex ideas formed only from other simple ideas of sense. l6 He

wou1d argue for this claim from his be1ief that the mind can compound

13Locke, Essay, Book II, Chapter xii, Section 2 •

. l4Ibid.

,l5Price, Review, p. 18.

16See for examp1e Locke' s discussion of "cause" in Essay, :, Book II, Chapter xxvi, Sections 1 and 2, and "solidity" in Essay, Book II, Chapter iVe Locke does not seem to have considered the origin of Newton's idea of inertia in the Essay.

-24-

simple ideas in three different ways which give rise to corresponding

types of complex ideas. 17 Thus, the three ideas above must be: an idea

of a relation, an abstract idea, or an idea only compounded out of

simpler ones, for these are the three kinds of complex ideas. Ideas

which are complex are remote from experience in the sense that they are

not derived immediately from sense experience, but from ideas that are

already in the mind. 18 In other words, complex ideas are ultimately

grounded on our sensible ideas, but unlike our simple ideas, they are

not immediately grounded in sense experience.

We can now return to the two-part question of the objectivity

of our ideas. One part concerned those ideas which do not denote any

part of our sense experience, and. the other part claimed that those

ideas denoted something really existing in external objects. Focusing

only on the former part for the moment, we can see Locke asserting

that no matter how remote from experience an idea appears to be it

can eventually be analysed into the simple ideas of sense. In con­

trast, Price argues that there are some ideas that are remote from

experience, but which cannot be analysed at aIl, let alone analysed

into simple ideas of sense. They cannot be analysed because they are

not complex ideas. On the contrary, they are simple ideas, and the

source of these ideas is the understanding. It was Locke's mistake,

argues Price, to think that the power of reasoning was limited to

merely "compounding, dividing, abstracting, or enlarging ideas pre­

viously in the mind.,,19 It is Price's main epistemological thesis that

l7Locke, Essay, Book II, Chapter xii, Sections 1 and 2.

l8Ibid., Book II, Chapter xii, Section 8.

19price, Review, p. 18.

-25-

the power within us that understands is a1so a spring of new ideas. 20

l have given examp1es of those ideas which Price thinks are remote

from experience and simple, but the two most important ones are yet

to be inc1uded in the 1ist. They are our moral ideas of right and

wrong.

The moral idea of right

Its objectivity

In Locke's epistemo1ogy the simple ideas of sense contain the

basic sense experiences and these experiences are pure or uncompounded •

• Price appears to adopt these two attributes of being basic or original

and pure or uncompounded as characteristic of simple ideas per ~

irrespective of whether they are based on sense experiences or note

For examp1e, Price writes: "The reader is desired to remember, that

by ideas, l mean here a1most constant1y simple ideas, or original and

unco~ounded perceptions of the' mind.,,21 When Price begins to extend

the foregoing observations to our moral ideas of right and wrong, the

first c1aim he makes about these ideas is that they are simple, the

resu1t of an immediate perception by the mind, and that they represent

an irreducib1e or u1timate fact of human experience. 22

Phi1osophers such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume wou1d

have objected to Price's classification of our moral ideas as among

those ideas which are remote from sense experience. Hutcheson seems

20Ibid •

21Ibid •

22Ibid ., p. 41.

-26-

to have convinced Hume of the fo11owing:

That mora1ity is nothing in the abstract nature of things, but is entire1y relative to the sentiment or mental taste of each particu1ar being, in the same manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and co1d arise from the particu1ar feel­ing of each sense or organ. Moral perceptions, therefore, ought not to be c1assed with the operations of the understand­ing, but with the tastes or sentiments. 23

It will be remembered how Price argued that we have some simple ideas

that cannot be accounted for in the context of an empiricist

epistemo1ogy. He suggested that certain of our ideas in.c1uded other

ideas which never direct1y denoted any sense experience. Price saw at

1east two features of our moral ideas of right and wrong that 1ed him

to be1ieve that they do not denote a particu1ar feeling present in our

sense experience. One reason the moral term "right" is correct1y said

not to denote any part of our sense experience is that there is no

greater absurdity than to suppose that,

the moral rectitude of an action is nothing abso1ute and unvarying; but capable, 1ike a11 modifications of p1easure and pain, of being intended and remitted, of increasing and 1essening, or rising and sinking with the force and 1ive1iness of our fee1ings. 24

What Price seems to be emphasizing here is the fact that our sense ex-

perience of co1ours, sounds, and tastes can vary in intensity or

strength. Price is ca11ing our attention to the fact that the moral

rightness of an act and, therefore, our ideas of right and wrong or

our moral judgements are not things which f1uctuate in intensity, and,

consequent1y, must not denote any part of our experience which is of

23David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Charles W. Hende1, The Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis, Ind.: BOBBS-MERRILL Company Inc., 1955), p. 23.

24Price, Review, p. 47.

-27-

the same nature as our experience of hot and co1d or sweetness and

sourness. There is a second reason to think that moral rightness is

not one of our ideas which we owe to a sense. It is common1y

be1ieved that we can never be mistaken in our reports on what we

sensib1y experience. But, writes Price:

How strange wou1d it be to maintain, that there is no possibi1ity of mistaking with respect to right and wrong; that the apprehensions of a11 beings, on this subject, are a1ike just, since a11 sensation must be a1ike true sensation?25

If the idea of right denotes some distinct feature of my sense ex-

perience, th en a11 moral judgements become reports on what I am ex-

periencing. This would entail that I should never bother to try to

correct another person's moral judgement through argumentation.

Price thinks that the distinction between what is morally the case and

what I fee1 to be morally the case cannot be rejected

without asserting, that whatever we think things to be, that theyare; that we can, in no sense, ever do wrong, ••• that while-wë follow our judgments, we cannot err in our conduct. 26

According to Price, the consequences of asserting that "right" and

"wrong" are terms wholly denoting distinct sense experiences do not

agree with our common moral experience. And since Price is trying

to explicate the foundation for that common moral experience, he con-

cludes that our moral ideas of right and wrong must be remote from

any distinct sense experience.

Its simplicity

Up to this point, the empiricist could agree with Price that

25Ibid •

26Ibid., p. 178.

-28-

these ideas seem distant from any familiar sense experience, but he

would go on to assert that our moral ideas of right and wrong can be

analysed into other ideas which denote and ultimately derive from

some distinct sense experience. It is at this juncture that Price

asserts that "right" is a term for a simple idea, not a complex idea,

by claiming the unanalysability of that moral idea.

Before even beginning to discuss the foundation of our moral

experience, Price writes that it is

a very necessary previous observation, that our ideas of right and wrong are simple ideas, and must therefore be ascribed to some power of immediate perception in the human mind. 27

His argument for the simplicity of our idea of right is based on an

equivalency between the analysis of ideas and the definition of the

terms denoting those ideas. An idea is analysed by showing those

simpler ideas that make it up, and which represent all that is con-

tained in the idea being analysed. Analogously, the definition of a

word involves representing the meaning of the word in other terms

which, when takentogether, are synonymous with the meaning of the

word being defined. Price believes that conceptual analysis is

carried out by way of definition. It follows th en that only complex

ideas can be analysed; and, vice versa, if a term cannot be analysed,

then it is not'complex but simple. 28 All that will result from trying

27I bid., p. 41.

281 agree with Cua's suggestion that Price would have accepted the following slightly modified statement originally found in G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The most important sense of "definition" is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense "right" has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. Cua, Reason and Virtue, pp. 60-61. Cua does not doubt that Price accepted Locke' s view that "the

-29-

to define the word referring to a simple idea will be other words

which are just different names for the same idea. 29 The reason Price

asserts that "right" is indefinab1e is that any proposed definition of

"right" in its moral use will be found to be inadequate. A definition

is inadequateif it does not fu11y capture the rneaning of the word to

be defined. In tl = case of a proposed definition of "right" it shou1d

a1ways be meaningfu1 to ask whether this particu1ar definition is what

is meant whenever one uses the term "right" in its moral sense. If we

assume that we are defining the meaning of "right" as "advantageous"

and the meaning of "wrong" as "disadvantageous,"·these definitions can

be seen to 1ead to absurd consequences. For th en it wou1d be impossible

to ask whether it is right to do what is advantageous or wrong to do

what is disadvantageous (which is not the case) because the proposition

"Doing what is advantageous is right" wou1d, with substitution of our

definition, be trif1ing as it wou1d express no more than "Doing what is

advantageous is advantageous."30 A. S. Cua presents another examp1e.

If one de fines 'right' as 'that which promotes happiness, , it is a1ways sensible to ask whether that which promotes happiness is right, showing that the proposed definition

names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition; the names of a11 comp1ex ideas are." (Locke, Essay, Book III, Chapter iv, Section 4. Furthermore, Cua says that "Price appears to have read carefu11y Locke's Essay. When he ta1ks of 'simple perceptions of the mind' as being indefinab1e, he is undoubted1y influenced by Locke's doctrine expounded in Essays, Book III, Chapter IV, Sections 4 and 11.'' Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 65 (Footnote 32).

29Price, Review, p. 41 and p. 125. This is a c1aim about the indefinabi1ity of a simple idea, and the fact mistakes can be made which do not give rise to just different names for the same idea do es not detract from the original c1aim.

30Ibid., pp. 16-17. See a1so Price, Review, p. 283.

-30-

is inadequate. 3l

Price is 'àrguing that if the meaning of the word "right" in its moral

sense is equated to any particular formula by way of definition, it can

always be shown that the meaning of "right" is not wholly captured by

that formula. This is demonstrated by meaningful1y using the word

"right" with regard to a moral judgement involving the rightness of the

formula itse1f (not "Is this formula right?" but "Is it always right to

act to my advantage?"). If any proposed definition of moral rightness

can be shown to be inadequate in this way, th en this indicates to Price

that "right" must be indefinab1e. 32 Being "indefinable" means being

"unanalysab1e" which consequently establishes the moral idea of right-

ness as a simple idea.

More on Price's notion of objectivity

l have sought to show how Price supports the claim that our

ideas of right and wrong do not denote an aspect of sense experience,

and cannot be analysed into other ideas which do. This, as l have said,

is only the first part of what Price means by calling some of our ide as

objective. For an idea to be objective, as Price further understands

this term, it must a1so satisfy the condition of denoting something

external to, and independent of, the perceiving subject.

31Cua , Reason and Virtue, p. 60.

32This argument might be thought on1y to show that Price had not yet found the correct definition, but it does not force us to con­c1ude that one is impossible. However, this "prob1em of induction" misses the crux of the argument which is independent of the wording of any particular examp1e, and works whenever one tries to make non­evaluative language do the work of evaluative language.

-31-

This more inclusive requirement is obviously involved in

Price's formulation of the main thesis of the Review. This thesis goes

beyond the simple effort to show that we have moral ideas of right and

wrong, and that they neither denote parts of our sense experience, nor

can they be analysed into simple ideas of sense. Compare, for example,

these two formulations of the thesis, which are put forward as questions

about how to account for the fact that we have the moral experience that

we do.

The present enquiry therefore is: whether this be a true account of virtue or not; whether it has or hasnot a foundation in the nature of its object; whether right and wrong are real characters of actions, or only qualities of our minds; whether, in short, they denote what actions are, or only sensations derived from the particular frame and structure of our natures. 33

It may be said either, that right is a species of sensation, like taste or colour, and therefore denotes nothing absolutely true of the actions to which we apply it; which lays the foundation of it entirely in the will and good pleasure of the author of our natures. Or, on the other hand, it may be said, that it denotes a real character of actions, or something true of them; something necessary and immutable and independént of our perceptions, likeequality, 'difference, proportion, or connection; and, therefore, that no other account is to be given, why such and such actions are right, than why the natures of things are what they are. 34

It should be noted in Price's second formulation of his thesis that

moral rightness is a necessary character of those acts to which it is

correctly attributed. 35 What Price is trying to persuade us to believe

33price, Review, p. 15.

34Ibid., p. 233.

35Price writes that, "we express necessary truth, wh en we say of some actions, they are right," but he is not specific about what he means by "necessary." (Price, 'Review, p. 47.)

Lennart Âqvist considers several possible meanings of "necessary," but he admits that he is unable to suggest which is the

-32-

is that our basic moral judgements are examp1es of necessary truths.

If on1y this is acknow1edged, he writes, then the main point that he is

arguing for is granted and he is quite wi11ing that necessary truth

and mora1ity "shou1d stand and fa11 together.,,36 It appears as if here

Price has introduced a third notion of objectivity, name1y, one of

necessary truth. But because this third conception of objectivity is

based on a notion of truth which equates what is with what is seen to

be necessari1y true about our ideas, Price seems to be able to treat

these two aspects of objectivity (necessary truth and objective exist-

ence), as if they are equiva1ent and amount to the same thing, to, i.e.,

the existence of a rea1 moral character in our actions.

In answer to the question "How do we come to know [what] the

nature of an act [is]?", it seems that Price thinks that the understand-

ing can perceive the natures of things which are externa1 to and

independent of the perceiving subject because these natures somehow

accompany our sense experience. Price writes, for instance, that our

reason "discerns truth" or distinguishes what is rea1 and not rea1 in

the perceptions of the senses. Yet when he writes considering sounds

one Price is using. Aqvist, Richard Price, pp. 41-47. D. D. Raphael thinks that Price is trying to formu1ate a

concept of the synthetic'a priori proposition as the mode1 for our basic moral judgements. Thus when Price uses the tr.cm "necessary" to qua1ify our basic moral judgements, he means to ew~hasize that they are informative (synthetic), and are not direct1) re1ated to any dis­tinct part of our sense experience (a priori). Raphael, "Editor's Introduction,..~ Review, p. xvi.

A. S. Cua fee1s that Price provides no clue to interpret what he means by "necessity~',' Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 28.

36Price, Review, p. 85. Geometry is another form of necessary truth. Price, Review, p. 169.

-33-

and co1ours that we can "observe" the rea1ity in them that is

responsib1e for our ideas of "essence, number, identity, diversity, &c.,"

Price is asserting that the natures of objects can be given to our

understanding through our sense experience. 37 To remind us that this

externa1 rea1ity is given in sense experience, but is not made ~ of

those sense experiences, Price credits Hutcheson with, as Price ca11s

it, the "very just" observation that,

extension, figure, motion, and rest, are more proper1y ideas accompanying the sensations of si§ht and touch, than sensa­tions of either ofthese senses. 3

The question then is this: how can Price exp1ain his be1ief that the

.immutab1e moral nature of an object is given to the understanding in

its ref1ection on ideas, when ail the ideas the understanding has to

work with seem to be ideas denoting secondary qua1ities, ideas denot-

ing interna1 feelings or sensations, or primary ideas of the non-

ethica1 properties of materia1 substances? This prob1em revo1ves

around the unexp1ained phenomena of objective natures being present to

our understanding. It appears to me that Price does not c1arify this

puzzle even when he turns to discussing inte11ectua1 intuition. It

wou1d on1y be speculation on my part to suggest that Price was forced,

by the difficu1ty of exp1aining how the understanding cou1d "perceive"

the natures of things, to insist that our ideas give rise to necessary

truths. It is an easy step to insist further that what is necessari1y

true about our ideas must ref1ect the natures of the objects of those

ideas, but, as l have pointed out, Price has a notion of truth which

37Ibid., pp. 18-21.

38Ibid., p. 39.

-34-

equates what is, with what is seen to be necessarily true about our

ideas. This notion of truth allows Pr.ice to have a. thesis about

virtue being in the nature of things, and yet switch without warning

to talking in terms of morality being a branch of necessary truth.

On the other hand, one reason Price claims our moral ideas

are objective is because they denote something existing in~ependently

in the nature of acts. The question is whether Price ever gets

beyond this handy phrase, and actually explains what it is in the act

that "right" denotes. First, there is one objection to this question

whichrefers to Price' s claim that "right" is unanalysable. In a

real sense, if l could explain in non-moral terms what "right"

denoted, then l would have done what Price claims cannot be done, that

is, reduced our moral idea of right to other ideas of immediate sense

experience or to non-moral ideas of primary qualities. If this

objection is legitimate, and on Price's terms l think it is, then it

is wrong as well as useless to attempt this type of elucidation of the

denotation of "right." However, one question which can be discussed

in this connection is whether Price believes "right" denotes a cons ti-

tutive property of actions, or a relational property between an act

and a given situation or between an agent and a moral situation. 39

39The question about what "right" refers to in the nature of an action, a moral quality or a moral relation, is only indirectly relevant to the topic of this paper as an explication of this funda­mental moral concept. The only way that it could become directly relevant would be through the problem of Price's theory of obligation somehow asserting that non-moral facts, denoted by "right~'~ imply an obligation. It has been a common belief, somewhat disputed recently, that there cannot be an implicative relation between non-moral and moral propositions; and therefore, if this was found to be part of Price's theory of obligation, it would count against its credibility. l have already said that on my interpretation "right" denotes a

-35-

In contrast to A. S. Cua, who argues for the "relational"

interpretation, l believe that Price's position can be shown to be

"denotative," that is, that "right" denotes a quality of a completed

action. 40 He apparently believes that we do perceive some acts from

which we become intellectually aware, upon reflection, of moral

qualities. 4l In support of "right" denoting a moral quality of an act,

aR opposed to a moral relation, l present the following phrases used

by Price in his discussions of the denotation of our moral idea of

right.

(1) "right" denotes something "in the nature of actions.,,42

(2) "right" denotes a "quality of the action.,,43

moral quality, and Cua, who is not as clear as l would like, probably should be read as claiming that "right" denotes a moral relation of "fitness~'" l have found that to argue persuasively against Cua would involve a great deal of digression. Therefore, because the argument between us is not that important for the development of the main topic, l think it sufficient to present only some of the textual grounds for my view. For further details of Cua's position, see below, p. 87 (Footnote 8).

40Without elucidating, D. D. Raphael writes the following: "1 doubt if it is reasonable to conclude that Price ••• considers ••• rightness to be a quality (though it looks as if he would have to say that, if pressed •••• )." Raphael, "Editor's Introduction," Review, p. xxxiii.

4lIf a property of an act can be seen by consideration of the act itself whereas a relation involves the act with something else, then consider the sense of being a quality or property of an act that is implied by Price in the following statement: "Moral distinctions ••• are ••• included in the ideas of certain actions and characters." Price, Review, p. 61. l am indebted to L. Âqvist for calling my attention to this passage. Aqvist, Richard Price, p. 43.

42Price, Review, p. 42. My use of "denotes" follows Price. See, for example, Review, pp. 15, 41, and 42.

43Ibid., p. 117.

-36-

(3) Objective rightness "is, most properly, a quality of the external action or event."44

(4) Our idea of rightness denotes or expresses some "real characters of actions."45

Price's notion of intuition

Price believes that intuition is the fundamental cognitive

instrument in morals, and some explanation of its place in our moral

experience should preceed my discussion of it. To begin with, let me

pose this question: Is it Price's position that in each moral situation

we "see" how to act, Le., that by our intuition we learn what is the

right thing to do in that situation? On the contrary, Price feels that

we approach each situation which calls for a moral judgement already

knowing the basic moral rules that we ought to follow. Therefore, the

moral problem is one of deciding in a particular case which moral

rules apply and what empirical knowledge is relevant to that decision;

neither calls for any "intuition." It is Price's notion that our

intuition of the moral quality of an act, which gives rise to the basic

moral truths, preceeds the moral experience of deciding how to act in

any particular case. Our idea of right originates in our intuition of

the moral quality of some acts, but our common moral experience is not

one of moral intuition; rather, it is one of deciding how to apply

the results of that intuition, moral rules, in particular situations. 46

If we understand by "moral experience" the experience of

44Ibid., p. 177

45I bid., p. 15. See also Price, Review, p. 50.

46Ibid., pp. 164-176, passim.

-37-

applying moral rules, as Price does, then intuition is necessary for

the possibility of any moral experience. If, in this way, intuition

is the epistemological source of our moral experience, then it is

clearly appropriate that Price term his study of what is denoted by

our intuition of rightness a study in the foundation of virtue. It

follows then that Price's theory of obligation is concerned with the

obligation arising from our intuition of the rightness of some acts,

which provides us with basic moral truths or rules of conduct. In

this way, an obligation to conduct ourselves in some manner is prior

to any moral experience as Price understands this terme Consequently,

the origin of moral obligation is not to be found in the particular

judgement that such and such an act is the right one for this situa-

tion.

Intuition, an act of our reason, is one mode of coming to know

what is necessarily true about reality. One can give an example of

what Price is referring to by the word "intuition" if one first begins

with the familiar experience of feeling pain. My sense of pain is

part of my general sense experience. However, l can abstract myself

from this immediate awareness and reflect on the pain l feel in order

to go about discovering its causes and possible remedies. Here the

experience we undergo when the pain itself is made "an object of the

mind's reflexion,"47 is contrasted with the immediate sense experience

47I bid., p. 20. Cua writes that "the word 'intuition' is introduced to emphasize the non-reflective and immediate nature of our moral judgements of right~)'~ Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 76. Intuition is "reflective" in the sense of being an intellectual stance towards our sense experience, and it is "non-reflective and immediate" in the sense that this intellectual stance ia not equivalent to drawn out meditation or calculation of the rightness of an act.

-38-

of pain. l know pain because l feel it, l sense it. But upon reflection

l can come to know its causes. It is partially this knowing upon

reflection that Price calls intuition.

Price extends this distinction between immediate sense

experience and reflection to our moral experience. For example, l can

see an act performed, but it is only when l reflect on the act, as l

conceive it to be, that l can judge its causes and possible effects.

In the same reflective mode, l can come to "see" the moral qualities of

the act, which l th en distinguish by using the terms "right" and "wrong."

But to say that intuition is a mode of knowing by way of

reflection is not yet to bring out its special rale in Price's epistem­

ology: the act of intuition is a mode of knowing that gives rise to

entirely new, simple ideas by way of reflection. When we reflect on

something we are using our rational faculty of understanding, and it

can and does give rise to new, simple ideas which denote some feature

of the thing upon which we are reflecting. If the object of our re­

flection is part of our sense experience, as pain is, th en the new ideas

that originate in our reflection on this object, i.e., our idea of the

cause of the pain, will not be part of our immediate experience of the

objecte They will be, as Price tells us, objective. It is the case

that some acts~ Price claims, give rise, when reflected on, to the

objective moral ideas of right or wrong.

Because it is in reflection, and not in our immediate sense

experience that these moral ideas arise, Price believes that there must

be something in the act to which they refer. There is something about

48 Price, Review, p. 36.

-39-

the act which forces the idea of rightness or wrongness to arise. 49

Price describes the nature of intuition in two ways, which we

shall need to compare.

After the mind, from whatever possible causes, has been furnished with ideas of any objects, they become themselves objects to our intellective faculty; from whence arises a new set of ideas, which are the perceptions of this faculty.50

The second ground of belief is INTUITION; by which l mean the mind's survey of its own ideas, and the relations between them, and the notice it takes of what is or is not true and false, consist;ent and inconsistent, possible and impossible in the natures 'of things.5l

In the first formulation, we can see that the simple ideas of reason

presuppose the existence of ideas derived from all other sources. The

ideas derived through intellectual intuition are the result of the

understanding's perception of the natures, connections, and qualities

of these original subjects of contemplation. 52 In keeping with this

description of intuition, Price divides all our simple ideas into

original and subsequent ideas. The original ideas are, of course, the

ideas "conveyed to us immediately by our organs of sense." The sub-

sequent ideas, the new, simple ideas of our understanding "presuppose

other ideas and arise from the perception of their natures and relations."53

49 The use of the word "forces" here is just another way of in­dicating the necessity that Price feels is involved in our most basic moral judgements. In short, intuition is a rational act that is part of our reflective experience, and which gives rise to new, simple ideas, the most important for this paper being our moral ide as of right and wrong.

50Ibid., p. 39.

5lIbid., pp. 97-98.

52Ibid., p. 38.

53Ibid.

-40-

This conception of intuition seems very appropriate to the concept of

objectivity which de fines an objective idea,. like moral rightness, as

a new idea which results from what we perceive to be necessarily true

about an idea we are reflecting upon, our idea or conception of an

act, for instance.

There is another conception of intuition, reflected in Price'·s

preferred classification of our ideas, which implies that the

intuitional origin of our idea of right results from an intellectual

perception of the real moral quality of an act. This second conception

of intuition seems more appropriate to satisfy the second part of

Price's notion of an objective idea. This conception of objectivity

de fines an objective idea as a new idea denoting something which exists

independently of our perception of it.

Price says that he prefers to divide aIl our ideas into those

of class one, "implying nothing real without the mind; that is,

nothing real besides its own affections and sensations," and those of

class two, "which denote something distinct from sensation; and imply

real and independent existence and truth." Each class is subdivided,

with our simple ideas of the secondary qualities of things and more

sophisticated ideas of sense comprising the first class. Class two is

made up of those ideas which "denote the real properties of external

objects," i.e., our ideas of the primary qualities of things, and

those ideas that Price describes as "derived immediately from intelli­

gence."54 Our ideas of right and wrong are among these latter ideas.

Therefore, Price seems to be ambiguous about the nature of

54rbid.

-41-

intuition, or, at the least, intuition is more complex than one might

think. In one case, intuition is thought of as an intellectual

reflection on ideas previously in the mind. In the other case, intuition

is described as the intellectual perception of the real moral quality

of acts. The former concept of intuition suits weIl the idea of

objectivity being what is necessarily true about our ideas, and the

latter, with objectivity being what really exists independently of the

perceiving subject. Of course, Price's notion of truth would probably

go part way towards collapsing these two conceptions of intuition into

one. But l agree with Cua who has pointed out the conflicting implica­

tions these two views can have for an explanation of our moral

experience. 55 In the first case, our moral experience is based on the

intuition of a self-evident truth, "Act X is right"; in the second case

our moral experience is based on the intuition that "Act x is right,"

which means here that we attribute a moral quality to act X. It is up

to us to judge from Price's formulation of the thesis of the Review

which aspect of intuition he believes to be the foundation of our moral

experience, for to the process of intuition he explicitly credits our

belief in those truths that we find to be self-evident, our moral ideas

of right and wrong, and "whatsoever else we discover, without making

use of any pro cess of reasoning." It is clear to me that intuition, as

the foundation of our moral experience, is associated by Price with the

more inclusive claim, namely, that "right" denotes a real quality of

actions.

This discussion of Price's epistemology has attempted to

55Cua , Reason and Virtue, p. 81. See also pp. 152-161.

-42-

establish several epistemological claims that are important preliminaries

to a discussion of his theory of obligation. The first claim Price

makes is that "right" is a simple idea. l have tried to bring out what

l think Price means by calling "right" simple. First, a simple idea

is uncompounded, which means it is not reducible to other simple ideas

of sense. Second, simple ideas must therefore denote an original per­

ception of an autonomous feature of the reality of our actions. Auto­

nomous in the sense of not being merely an experience resulting from

more basic features of reality, especially any non-moral ones.

Price has also claimed, l have tried to show', that our moral

ideas are objective in these senses. Fi.rst, the moral terms, "right"

and "wrong/' do not denote a feature of our sense experience; second,

our intuition of the moral quality of an act gives rise to a necessary

moral truth about that act; and last, the moral terms "right" and

"wrong" denote some real character of acts. This last claim is the

more inclusive or more basic, for it is this last source of objectivity

that permits those cognitive moral judgements which give rise to the

basic moral rules. Being cognitive means that they tell us something

about the world, namely, which acts have the moral quality of rightness

and which do note

l am inclined to think that Price believes "right" denotes

some quality of the act, and not a relation between the act and the

surrounding situation.

The last important claim involves "immediacy." In the first

place, Price's notion of "immediacy" opposes the view which asserts

that a reasoning process or deduction, or drawn-out arguments, charac­

terize how we come by our moral knowledge. On the other hand, Price

-43-

does not mean that as we observe an act we perceive its rightness as

when we are observing an apple we perceive its redness. Rather, it

is upon intellectual reflection that we come to see.the rightness of

an act. In the context of this reflective experience, "immediacy"

calls our attention to the direct relationship between the moral

quality of the act as we conceive the act to be, our intellectual

discernment of the quality, and the resulting origin of our moral idea

of right. Calling our sense perception "immediate';'.' is just another

way of saying that our ideas derived from sense are simple and basic,

ultimate perceptions. It appears to me that, by claiming the immediacy

in intellectual reflection, Price is claiming the simplicity and

ultimacy of our moral ideas ofright and wrong.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF OBLIGATION IN THE REVIEW

The principle of reflection

Priee believes that any account of the origin and objectivity

of moral knowledge would be insufficient as a moral theory unless it

could in some way also explain the source of moral obligation. He

says that the source of moral princip les is the same as the source of

the rest of the necessary truths to be found in mathematics and

science, i.e., in the nature of things. On the other hand, despite

their common epistemological origin by way of an intellectual intuition,

only our moral ideas imply a moral obligation: a concept foreign to

science and mathematics. Therefore, he must present an explanation of

this unique, differentiating property of our moral ideas.

In the first section of this chapter, an historical link between

moral obligation and moral knowledge will be dealt with. This

association will reflect Butler's influence on Priee, and show the

importance of the princip le of reflection for Price's attempt to relate

these two features of moral experience. As a second part of this sec­

tion, l wish to discuss the association between the non-moral senses

of "right" and "ought" as an independent source of inspiration for the

relation Priee wishes to draw between the moral sense of "right" and

"ought." The second section will discuss the more important interpreta-

-44-

-45-

tions of the relationship between the moral ide as of right and obliga-

tion as discussed in the Review. My concern in the third section will

be with price's theory of obligation particularly as developed by those

statements in the Review which suggest some relationship between "right"

and "ought." Fourthly, l will end with some explication of Price's

theory of obligation.

The important role played in morality by the princip le of re-

flection influenced the direction of Price's thought on the origin of

moral obligation. The principle of reflection was the means by which

moral distinctions were made, and it appears to be Butler's contribu-

tion to ethics to have pointed out the authority that belongs to that

principle. This association of moral description and moral authority

seems to be the general idea for which Price's theory of obligation

provides specifie details and supportive arguments.

John Locke (1632-1704)

Reflection was one of two ways that Locke thought we derived

our ideas. In contrast to sensation, reflection is non-cognitive in

the important sense of not giving us knowledge of the external world.

By "reflection," Locke means the following:

That notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. l

Reflection is a kind of internaI sense concerned with our cognition, not

only of the mind's operations, but of any emotional response to an idea

as well. 2

lLocke, Essay, Book II, Chapter i, Section 4.

2Locke explains what he understands by the term "operations."

-46-

The Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713)

Shaftesbury calls "Reflection" a "reflected Sense,,,3 and he

appears to make it the basis of what he says:ià. a moral sense. It is

this moral sense which is responsible for our ability to make moral

distinctions, according to Shaftesbury. This is indicated by the

following:

That it is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection,to have a Liking or Dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a Sense of Right and Wrong •••• 4

The princip le of reflection as Shaftesbury conceives of it differs

from "reflection" in Locke's Essay. Instead of thinking of affections

as "operations," Shaftesbury thinks that they are objects before the

mind, and the mind's notice of them can give rise to new affections,

i.e., specifically moral ones. 5

"The term operations here l use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought." Ibid.

3Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of, An Inquiry Con­cerning Virtue or Merit in British Moralists, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, The Library of Liberal Arts (2 vols.; Indianapolis, Ind.: BOBBS­MERRILL Company Inc., 1964), l, Il.

4Ibid., p. 23.

5The princip le of reflection can also refer to the necessary condition for ascribing merit to a virtuous agent, namely, that his actions flow from an intention to act virtuously. But in what follows the principle of reflection is used .in .. the more .t.e.c.hnical sense, Le., to refer to thatreflection on previous non-moral ideas or affections which gives rise to subsequently specifically moral ideas and moral affections. Both intention to act virtuously and reflection in the latter sense are necessary for virtuous action, but the technical sense of reflection gives rise to the very possibility of moral behavior because through the act of reflection we become aware of those moral distinctions which guide our conscious behavior.

-47-

Or, as Shaftesbury says:

In a Creature capable of· forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the affection; but the very Actions themselves, and the Affections of Pit y, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Aff.ections themselves, which have been alreadK felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike.

It would appear that the first step towards becoming a virtuous

agent is to be able to reflect on such motives as Pit y, Kindness, and

Gratitude; from this reflective stance, one must develop a positive

feeling about them. Here part of the foundation of virtue is constituted

by an "exercise of the Heart" which is responsible for our favourable

response to certain motives. But virtue requires more than this emotion-

al response. In the broader context, we learn that judgements about the

rightness or wrongness of motives are based on discerning how the actions

due to a particular motive will effect society as a whole. 7 A moral

agent is capable of virtue

when it can have the Notion of a publick interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. B

6L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, l, Il.

7The following is a relevant passage in the Inquiry. "Thus the several Motions, Inclinations, Passions, Dispositions, and consequent Carriage and Behavior of Creatures in the various Parts of Life, being in several Views or Perspectives represented to the Mind, which readily discerns the Good and III towards the Species or Publick; there arises a new Trial or Exercise of the Heart: which must either rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and dis affect what is contrary; or, corruptly affect what is ill, and dis affect what is worthy and good." Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Blbid., p. 13.

-48-

By quoting these passages, l want to bring out the idea,

implicit in Shaftesbury's writings, that not only can one act on motives

of kindness, etc., but also, by reflecting on these motives, i.e., by

making them objects of mental reflection, one engenders new affections

towards those motives seen to be favourable to the public interest.

The first point of interest in Shaftesbury's doctrine is the

fact that reflection can make subjective experiences, namely, "the

several Motions, Inclinations, Passions, Dispositions," etc., objects

of an immediate judgement. ~iecond, the result of a judgement that such

and such a motive is favourable to the public interest is a new,

positive affection towards that motive because it is favourable. Third,

this pro cess of reflection gives rise to the possibility of the agent's

acting virtuously, but that reflection itself does not constitute the

foundation of virtue. Virtue has its origin in the nature of things

in the sense that the possibility of virtuous behavior rests on the

natural affections with which man is endowed and their real effects on

a larger whole of which he :iS:apart. 9 One main difference between Price

and Shaftesbury is in what can become an object of this moral reflection.

For Shaftesbury, only affections qualify, and l would suggest that this

is because he is concerned mainly with the psychological question of

why men act morally. Shaftesbury believes that

no Animal can be said properly to act, otherwise than thro' Affections or Passions, such as-are proper to an Animal. IO

In this sense only affections can come under moral judgement, since

9Ibid., p. 7. See especially the last two paragraphs in marginal Sëëtion #5 on this page.

IOIbid., p. 29.

-49-

they determine behavior. Man differs from anima1s in that he can act

from kindheartedness due to a secondary affection for the perceived

worth of kindheartedness.

A Comparison of Price and Shaftesbury

Without bringing up the debate about whether a know1edge of our

dut y can be an efficient motive to action (Price is convinced that it

can. 11), it is sufficient to note the para11e1s between Price and

Shaftesbury. We have a1ready seen that Price's epistemo10gica1 account

of the origin of our ideas of right and wrong is based on the mind's

abi1ity to make ideas themse1ves objects of ref1ection. 12 His use of

11Price, Review., p. 185.

12For actua1 citations of passages that indicate Price's acceptance of the princip1e of ref1ection as a forma1 device which gives rise to our moral ideas of right and wrong, see above, p. 36ff. Price's acceptance of this princip1e is further indicated by this passage in the Review where it becomes a factor differentiating animal from human intelligence.

"Brutes seem possess'd chief1y, if not sole1y, of those ideas derived from the externa1 senses. They think, and will, and remember; but are not capable of making these the objects of a reflex act, so as to obtain ideas,of them."

But here, Price is still using the idea of ref1ection that, we have seen, is to be found in Locke's Essay, i.e., the mind's ref1ection on its own operations. (See above, p. 45n) Price's original use of this princip le is more obvious in the 1ast ha1f of this same paragraphe

"They may hear a11 the sounds in music, and see a11 the 1ines and co~s in a picture; but they perceive not harmony, or beauty. A11 the ideas, therefore, founded ~ inward ref1exion, E!!.!!. previous assemblage and comparison of ideas, ~ on Intelli­gence, seem, in' a great measure, pecu1iar to ourse1ves:rr

(Price, Review, p. 40. The ita1ics are mine.

-50-

the princip1e of ref1ection is simi1ar to Shaftesbury's use of that

princip1e except that in the Review this process gives rise to entire1y

new, simple ideas instead of secondary affections. The formation of

these "subsequent" ideas is a1so coincident with the abi1ity or the

possibi1ity of an agent's acting virtuous1y because their origin is in

our perception of moral distinctions; and unti1 we have these speci­

fica11y moral ideas,.we have no moral know1edge. 13 Fina11y, this

princip1e of ref1ection is for both mora1ists not the u1timate founda-

tion of virtue; for that is to be found, bearing in mind their

respective senses of "nature," in the natures of things outside the

ref1ective being.

The historica1 connection of moral obligation with moral know1edge

Bishop Butler (1692-1752)

But Shaftesbury has missed something, something that Price

credits Butler with observing, name1y, that intrinsic to this princip le

of ref1ection is a sense of authority or obligation. Price writes the

fo11owing:

Dr. Butler, 1ikewise, in his Sermons on Human Nature, and the exp1anatory remarks upon them in the Preface, insists strong1y on the obligation imp1ied in reflex approbation; the supremacy be10nging to the princip1e of ref1exion within us; and the authority and right of ï~perintendency which are constituent parts of the idea of it.

It is not easy to understand how Price wou1d exp1ain that a moral being

cou1d have over1ooked such a thing in his self ref1ection, but this is

what Price accuses Shaftesbury of doing.

13Ibid., p. 39.

14Ibid., pp. 118-19.

-51-

His account of virtue in his Enquiry, is, indeed, on severa1 accounts extreme1y deficient, particu1ar1y on account of his 1imiting virtue so much as in genera1 he seems to do, to the cu1tivation of natura1 affection and benevo1ence; and over100king entire1y, as Dr. Butler observes, the authority be10nging to virtue and the princip1e of ref1exion. 15

What l hope now to have estab1ished can be summarized as

fo110ws.

Price appears to have accepted the princip1e of ref1ection as a forma1

device which gives rise to our moral ideas of right and wrong, and

that this seems to be an original variation on an historica1 precedent

set by Locke and Shaftesbury. Moreover Price's notion of this

princip1e was inf1uenced by Butler, who saw, as Shaftesbury had not,

a necessary association between the princip1e of ref1ection and duty.

Therefore, if Price is to use the princip1e of ref1ection to account

for our ideas of mora1ity, th en he can a1so use it to account for our

idea of obligation. History in this way showed Price where to look

to discover the re1ationship between the moral idea of right and the

moral idea of obligation.

The 1inguistic connection between obligation and know1edge

Quite expected1y, this historica1 association is not the on1y

association between "right" and "ought" which 1eads Price to attempt

to account for the origin of obligation by dea1ing with the origin of

our idea of right. It appears as if Price saw some re1ationship

between "right" and "ought" from his ordinary experience of judging

the appropriateness of some means to an end. As Price puts it (using

for "right" the synonymous term "fitness"):

15Ibid., p. 190 (Footnote).

-52-

Fitness and unfitness must frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude of any means to accomplish an end. 16

A modern example has it that if one has a stated goal in mind, say,

trying to unlock a door, and someone points out the key that is the

right one to use, then that is the key that ought to be employed. 17

If the end in mind changes, then the key which is the right one to

use also changes. For example, if one wishes to hide the fact that

he can open the door, th en the right key to use is the wrong one. In

this non-moral example, aIl that need be noticed at first is that

there is some immediate affinity between the judgements, "This is

the right key," and "I ought to use it." Second, it would appear

that the judgement that one key is the right one refers to some real

attribute of the key, 1. e., " r ight" signifies the property of being a

successful means which is identical with the key's ability to fit the

lock. This property is truly or falsely attributed to the key pointed

to, and the judgement of rightness gives the individual a direction

in his attempt to unlock the door.

It is easy to see that aIl these features of the non-moral use

of "right" are claimed by Price as features of the moral use of

"right." For example, "fitness," whether in the moral sense or in the

non-moral sense, has its origin in "a simple perception of the under­

standing.,,18 Non-moral""fitness" signifies something "real in objects,"

l6Ibid., p. 104.

l7p. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 187.

l8Price, Review, p. 104.

-53-

and we have seen that Price's main objective in the Review is to show

that m~ra1 "fitness" denotes something in the "nature of things," 1. e. ,

that "right and wrong are rea1 characters of actions," and not mere1y

"qua1ities of our minds."19 As with judgements of non-moral fitness,

moral judgements can be true or fa1se, and the agent can be mistaken,

as we11 as mora11y b1ind. 20 Price is a1so anxious to support the

thesis that the perception of moral rectitude has an effect on be­

havior, as does the non-moral judgement of right in the ab ove" examp1e.

He writes that, "to perceive or to be informed how it is right to act,

is the very notion of a direction to act. 1l21 Price thinks that the

simple attention to experience will show that, "the perception of

right and wrong do es excite to action, and is a10ne a sufficient

princip1e of action."22 One main difference between non-moral and

moral perception of fitness is that the latter is "app1ied to actions"

and in this case on1y does "fitness" then "genera11y signify the same

with [moral] right and wrong."23

The point of this section is to show that Price thought the

judgements invo1ved in fitting means to ends were the same, in some

important and relevant respects, as moral judgements. In this non­

moral use of "fit" or "right," there is a sense in which the key judged

to be the right one is the one that ought to be used. Consequent1y,

19I bid. , p. 15.

20Ibid. , p. 178.

21rbid. , p. 108.

22Ibid. , p. 185.

23Ibid., p. 104.

-54-

the thesis of this section is that Price was led to tie the origin of

the idea of obligation to the origin of the idea of right by the

assumption that the moral situation was also analogous to the non­

moral one with respect to the close relationship between "right" and

"ought" that is to be found in the latter.

Prior work on Price's theory of obligation

The relationship between the ideas of moral rightness

and moral obligation in the Review has not received much attention,

though several have dealt with the issue. D. D. Raphael, for example,

believes that the fundamental moral perception in Price's ethics is

one of the rightness of an act, and this perception gives rise to the

simple, indefinable idea of rightness. Raphael goes on to suggest

that "obligation" is ano~her name for the same fundamentalperception,

or the same moral characteristic of an act. He writes about Price's

ethics that "to say that an action is right is the same as saying

that we are obliged to do it." Further, Raphael finds in the Review

that "rectitude is its own obligation." So what do es this amount to

in terms of the relationship between "right" and "ought"? Raphael

interprets Price as holding that both terms denote the same character

of actions, and, therefore, they appear to make but one idea. In

this case, only an unimportant relation between the terms "right" and

"ought" could appear to Raphae1. 24 A. S. Cua, in his study of Price,

concurs in this, and he go es on to say that, in general, Price makes

no distinction between such terms as "virtue," "rightness," and

24Raphael, "Editor's Introduction," Review, p. xxx.

-55-

"obligation." Cua writes of Price that a "dutifu1 or ob1igatory

action is to him the same as a right or fitting action.,,25

Therefore, the conclusion of these reviewers is two-fo1d.

(1) "Right" and "ought" are on1y two names for one idea.

(2) This idea contains our inte11ectua1 perception of a rea1 moral property or moral relation.

L. Âqvist is an exception to the above, for he has recognized

that for Price there is a non-trivial relation between "right" and

"ought," and that this relation is a "10gica1 relation." Âqvist says

that this re1ationship is one of entai1ment between the statements,

"Act X is right" and "Act X is a dut y." He do es not use Price's

language of "ideas" to express the 10gica1 re1ationship between the

fundamenta1 moral terms, and, therefore, what support he cou1d give

to my interpretation is somewhat 1imited. However, he has recognized

in the Review a 10gic of basic moral terms which, in my opinion,

ref1ects Price's discussions of the "implication" re1ationship which

ho1ds between our moral ideas of right and ought. 26

Price's theory of obligation

The text of the Review is the source for exp1icating the

nature of the re1ationship that Price sees between "right" and "ought."

In the chapter "Of the Origin of our Ideas of Moral Right and Wrong,"

Price writes the fo110wing in a footnote:

Moral right and wrong, and moral obligation or dut y, must remain, or vanish together. They necessari1y accompany one another, and make but as it were one idea. As far as the former are fictitious and imaginary, the latter must be so

25Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 107.

26Âqvist, Richard Price, pp. 32-33.

-56-

too. This connexion or coincidence between moral rectitude and obligation, will be at large considered hereafter. 27

It will become apparent that there is a crucial difference between

saying "right" and "ought" make one idea and in saying that they

make "but as it were one idea." There is a hint of the priority of

the idea of right here, for Price suggests that the objectivity of

moral obligation depends on the objectivity of our moral judgements

concerning the rectitude of acts. This priority supports, however

slight1y, the interpretation that l will give to Price's theory of

obligation. rrice is exp1icit here that he is considering the

relationship between moral rectitude and obligation, but the re1ation-

ship between "right" and "ought" is mentioned only as a necessary

"connexion or coincidence." This leaves the impression that there

is an independent intuitive origin for the ideas of right and ob1iga-

tion, that each has an independent foundation in the perceived moral

nature of an act. 2B There is an historical reason (which l will

discuss later) for be1ieving what Price has in mind is rather that

"ought" is dependent on our idea of right for its foundation in the

nature of things.

Price does not specifical1y discuss the subject again unti1

he reaches the chapter on moral obligation. There he opens the

discussion of obligation by repeating what he said above.

Obligation to action, and rightness of action are p1ainly coincident and identica1; . so far so, that we cannot form a notion of the one, without taking in the

27Price, Review, p. 49.

2BThis seems to be the final conclusion reached by Gluck, "Richard Price," p. 167.

,

-57-

other. 29

Then a 1itt1e 1ater on he says:

It is not indeed plainer, that figure imp1ies something figured, solidity resistance, or an··effect a cause, than it is thatrightrtéss imp1ies 'oughtnéss (if l may be a110wed this word) or'éb1igatérirtéss. 30

And e1sewhere he adds:

And had there been nothing right in this, had there been no reason from the natures of things for obeying God's will; it is certain, it cou1d haveinduced no obligation, nor at a11 inf1uenced an inte11ectualu"a"ture as'-suëh~31' ..

Price conc1udes that "right, fit, ought, shou1d, dut y , obligation,

convey, then, ideas necessari1y inc1uding one another."32

One can summarize as fo110ws what Price has said of the

re1ationship between the moral ideas of right and ought:

(1) They accompany one another.

(2) They "make as it were one idea."

(3) They necessari1y inc1ude one another.

(4) They are coincident.

29Price, Review, p. 105.

30I bid.

31price, Review, p. 52 (My ita1ics)

32The words "right" and "fit" go together as terms of moral know1edge. The words "ought," "shou1d," "dut y," and "obligation" go together as terms of moral obligation. What Price means here is that the basic idea of moral know1edge inc1udes the basic idea of moral obligation, and he is not referringto six different ideas by a11 these words, but on1y two. Ibid., p. 105.

In an excellent sermon by Dr. Adams on the nature of obliga­tion, according to Price, there is an account of the re1ationship between "right" and "ought" that agrees with Price's own. The most significant agreement cornes where Dr. Adams writes "'that right implies dut y in its idea'." Ibid., p. 117n.

-58-

(5) They are identica1.

(6) "Rightness imp1ies oughtness."

(7) There must be something right about an act in order to induce an obligation.

It wou1d appear from this 1ist that Priee cou1d be maintaining any one

of three positions regarding the re1ationship between our moral idea

of right and our idea of moral obligation:

A. They are real1y on1y one idea. (From #5 and #2)

B. They are two separate ideas which happen in fact to a1ways accompany one another. (From #1 and #4)<

c. The idea of ought is a part of the idea of right and therefore relations of inclusion and implica­tion ho1d between them. (From #3, #6, and #7)

However, it seems to me that 'B' fo110ws from 'C~' and hence the on1y

rea1 opposition is between 'Cf and 'A.'

My interpretation of Price's theory of obligation is based on

taking serious1y the third possibi1ity. l am partia11y justified in

my view that there is a significant re1ationship between "right" and

"ought," Le., that they are not mere1y identica1, by the fa ct that the

possibi1ity of an imp1icative relation is mentioned by Priee, though

."

at the same time we have seen that the other interpreters are a1so 1ed

to their conclusions by.some parts of the text. However, l suggest

that their view of what is relevant in the text is too narrow. If they

had taken serious1y the third possibi1ity, they wou1d have been 1ed

to other features of the Review, and a much different picture of a 10gica1

relation between the moral ideas of right and obligation.

Arguments for ~ interpretation of Price's theory of obligation

l wish to present at this point severa1 arguments in favour

-59-

of my interpretation of the "right"-"ought" re1ationship. Because

the thesis of this paper revo1ves around a prob1em of interpretation,

these arguments are somewhat comp1ex, and they are not as direct or

decisive as one might wish. l begin my argument against thesis 'A'

by first pointing out that the "right"-"ought" re1ationship is

essentia1 to Price's understanding of the moral idea of right. A

presentation of some direct evidence in support of my interpretation

"of Price' s theory of obH,gation and two historica1 arguments against

thesis 'A' then fo11ow. Next, l hope to be able to show that my

interpretation is consistent with the important terms, "simple" and

"inc1ude," found in Price's genera1 epistemo1ogy. After offering an

explication of Price's notion of "implication," l will end this chapter

with a suggestion as to how my interpretation of Price's theory of

obligation is an improvement over those of Cua and Raphael.

l intend to show that the moral idea of ought is not associated

in an externa1 relation to the idea of right, but rather it is intern-

a11y re1ated as a part of the idea of right. This interpretation of

Price's theory of obligation imp1ies that the moral idea of rightness

wou1d not be the same idea if the idea of ought was not inc1uded in it.

Price is exp1icit about the nature of the moral idea of right. In

this passage Price is c1aiming that the abse~ce of the idea of obliga­

tion from the idea of moral rectitude is inconceivab1é.

And as easi1y can we conceive of figure without extension, or motion.without a change of place, as that it can be fit [right] for us to do an action, and yet that it may not be what we shou1d do, what it is our dut y to do, or what we are under an obligation to do. 33

33Price, Review, p. 105.

-60-

The second examp1e of this be1ief does not dea1 with the term "right,"

but it is c1ear from the context that what ho1ds for an act that is

judged to be "on1y more proper to be done" will ho1d for the moral

judgement of rectitude. Therefore, Price can be seen to be saying

that, if our use of the moral term "right" does not imp1y "ought,"

then the who1e sense and meaning of asserting the moral rectitude of

an act is taken away. In effect, without the implication of moral

obligation, the concept of right is no longer the same concept. The

passage that l am referring to begins:

It is impossible to put a case, in which we sha11 not be ob1iged to conform ourse1ves to the right of it, whatever that is. Even what, at any time, or in any circumstances, is, upon the who1e, on1y more proper to be done, ought th en to be done; and to suppose the contrary, wou1d be to take away the who1e sense and meaning of such an assertion. 34

The textua1 evidence

Direct textua1 evidence in favour of my interpretation of the

re1ationship between the ideas of right and ought is confined to

statements in the Review which show Price to be arguing that the

obligation to act on moral know1edge of the rectitude of an act is

essentia11y a part of moral rectitude itse1f. In view of this argu-

ment, it seems reasonab1e to assume that the re1ationship between the

corresponding moral ideas is such that the idea of ought is part of

the idea of right (if not imp1ied by it). What l hope will appear to

be c1ear1y inconsistent with these passages is the notion that we are

dea1ing in the Review with one moral idea expressed by either of the

terms "right" or "ought," i. e., thesis 'A.' In this way, my interpreta-

34Ibid., p. 122.

'" -61-

tion of Price's theory of obligation is more consistent with a prima

fàcia understanding of severa1 passages which form part of one

important argument in the Review. l will present this argument first,

and then turn to specific remarks in the texte

According to Price, a close re1ationship between moral

rectitude and moral obligation contradicts those mora1ists who teach

that moral know1edge needs he1p from other, non-moral sources in order

to have any power of obligation. For these phi1osophers, an agent may

know what is the right thing to do and still wonder what obliges him

to act. Some of the various reasons given to pursuade an agent to

act virtuous1y are as fo11ows: the right act is conducive to happiness;

the right act is enjoined by civil 1aw; the right act is one wi11ed

by God, who has the power to punish or reward; the right act is an

act of self-love. Each of these answers to the question, "What obliges

us to practice virtue," were fami1iar to Price as purported reasons

why one ought to be virtuous. 35 When it is remembered that Price has

c1aimed that moral princip les are necessari1y true, it becomes easier

to see why he must reject these various answers to the question about

the origin of moral obligation. If, as Price is convinced, the

rectitude of an act arises from some necessary moral property of the

act itse1f, but, as is being proposed, the obligation to act in some

case is on1y a function of God's will or civil 1aw, then, as a resu1t

of this apparent independence of moral rectitude from moral obliga­

tion, Price sees the possibi1ity arising that with a change in God's

will or the civil 1aw we cou1d be ob1iged to do what is not right.

35price, Review, p. 104ff.

-62-

Or, in other words, we wou1d not be ob1iged to do what is necessari1y

right. In effect, these various origins proposed for moral obligation

can give rise to arbitrary moral obligations, and this arbitrariness

is inconsistent with the necessary truth of the moral princip1es.

The impression here that Price is arguing against a straw man is to be

avoided. Price has a1ready argued for a theory of the origin of our

moral idea of right which, if correct, exc1udes the possibi1ity that

God's will or civil 1aw accounts for both the origin of our idea of

the rightness of acts as weIl as the obligation to perform them.

A second argument against these various sources of moral

obligation is that they appear to reduce virtuous conduct to a form

of prudence. This is especia11y so of the theo10gica1 "ought." For

Price, this is a sufficient1y damaging consequence'to justify rejecting

the who1e notion that an obligation to right conduct cou1d originate

independent1y of the rectitude of an act. 36

MY interpretation of the relation between the ideas of moral

rectitude and moral obligation in the Review is not concerned with

the positions Price rejects, but with what he puts in their place.

Yet, the arguments out1ined above he1p to show, as the fo110wing text-

ua1 evidence a10ne does not, how much my interpretation of the

imp1icative and inclusive re1ationship between "right" and "ought" is

in accord with Price's aim to estab1ish the independence of virtue.

The textua1 evidence that fo110ws is drawn from the context of the

preceeding arguments in the Review, and l be1ieve these passages to be

damaging .to eua and Raphae1's interpretation of the "right"-"ought"

36 Ibid., p. 106.

-63-

relationship, i.e., thesis 'A.'

Price writes that it follows from his theory of obligation that,

"virtue, ~ such, has a real obligatorypower antecedently to all

positive laws, and independently of all will; for obligation, we see,

is involved in the very nature of it.,,37 Referring again to this

theory, Price continues:

From the account given of obligation, it appears how absurd it is to enquire, what obliges us to practice virtue? as if obligation was no part of.the idea of virtue, but something adventitious and foreign to it. 38

He goes on immediately to say that, "the authority it possesses is

native and essential to it, underived and absolute.,,39 As a conse-

quence of this feature of moral rectitude, it is entirely our percep-

tion of the rectitude of an act that is responsible for our being

morally bound (obliged) to act or not to act in a certain way. Price

generalizes this position by giving an example of moral reasoning

that he feels holds universally, once again showing that moral

obligation flows from the moral rectitude of an act.

Let a person be supposed to have under his consideration, any action proposed to be performed by him. The performance of it must be either right, or wrong, or indifferent. Now it is self-evident, that, if it is not the last, it must be one of the other two, and that obligation will ensue. 40

In these passages, Price has said about virtue that:

(1) obligation "is involved in the very nature of it."

37Ibid. , p. 105.

38Ibid. , p. 110.

39Ibid.

40Ibid • , p. 122.

r ., ; .

-64-

(2) obligation is "part of the idea of virtue."

(3) virtue possesses a native and essential authority.

(4) if one considers the performance of an act right, obligation ensues.

These examples fairly clearly distinguish rectitude and obligation

in three ways: obligation is a part and not the whole of virtue;

virtue possesses a moral authority, but it is not identified with it;

obligation follows the judgement of rectitude and is not simultaneous

with it. That Price 'implies in these passagesthat obligation is

neither the·whole of virtue, identical with virtue, nor simultaneous

with moral knowledge, constitutes to some degree direct evidence

that the idea of moral obligation is neither identical to, nor

simultaneous with, the idea of moral rectitude. Because these two

ideas of moral obligation and moral rectitude are differentiated in

this way, the above passages seem to be direct textual evidence that

Cua and Raphael are wrong to believe that there is just ~ moral

idea in the Review which is referred to by the two terms, "right" and

"ought."

l have tried to give some direct textual evidence in favour

of my interpretation of the relation between the moral ideas of

right 'an~ ·ought. l have also tried to show that these passages in the

Review are part of an argument to establish the moral rectitude of an

act as the source of moral obligation. That the idea of rectitude

incluâes and implies the idea of obligation is Price's theory of

obligation as l interpret i~, and this interpretation seems consistent

with what is put forward in this important argument by Price for the

independence of virtue.

-65-

The historica1 evidence

We need to reca11 the conclusions of Chapter l, for it is

from these that l draw some historica1 support for my view, as against

thesis 'A.' In Chapter l it was shown that Price was faced with the

prob1em of accounting for moral know1edge and moral authority. l

stated then that when Price thought of moral rectitude he had Clarke

in mind, and when he thought of moral obligation he had Butler in

mind. The fact that Price associated moral know1edge with Clarke and

not with Butler, l be1ieve, partia11y supports the conclusion that,

for Price, moral rightness is a cognitive concept, and that moral

obligation is not a cognitive concept. That is to say, moral right

is the concept re1ating to moral know1edge, and moral obligation is

the concept re1ating to moral authority. It is this important

difference between them that prevents one from taking them to be

synonymous, and consequent1y, prevents the assimilation of "ought"

with cognitive concepts so that "ought" then wou1d 'direct1y denote

the same characteristic of acts as does "right. ,,41 P:rice thinks that

part of our moral idea of right denotes some rea1 property of actions,

and that moral obligation is a part of the idea of right, but our

idea of obligation does not itse1f denote anything. In effect, l do

not think that Price thought of these terms as just two "names" for

the same idea.

Another historica1 argument against 'A' is the fo110wing. l

41A term that is cognitive is used to refer to something, and imp1ies the rea1, objective existence of its referent. l be1ieve that Price thinks of "right" as cognitive and "ought" as non-cognitive.

-66-

previously quoted a passage in which Price referred to Butler's

strong insistence on the "obligation implied in reflex approbation."

It is interesting to note what this statement becomes when we turn

to the Review for help in interpreting what constitutes the

approbation of an act. Price writes the following:

Approving an action is the same with discerning it to be right; as assentin§ to a proposition is the same with discerning it to be true. 2

If reflex approbation implies obligation and approving an act is

"the same as" discerning it to be right, then putting ail this

together gives us the main thesis of Price's theory of obligation as

l have interpreted it. It is that the reflex discernment of the

rightness of an act implies obligation.

The consistency of my interpretation with Price's notion of \~simplé' ideas

It might be said in reply to 'c' that l have implicated Price

in a fiat contradiction by extending my view of his theory of

obligation to the whole texte This could arise from Price's pre-

vious claim that right and wrong are simple ideas of "original and

uncompounded perceptions of the mind.,,43 If "ought" is not one idea

with "right," then do es not "right" become a compound idea and Price

become inconsistent? To defend my interpretation of Price, it needs

only to be recalled that "uncompounded" was Price's attempt to pre-

vent moral ideas from being reduced to ideas of sensation or ref1ec-

tion. It seems to me that Price does consistent1y ho1d moral intui-

42price, Review, pp. 104-05.

43I bid., p. 18 (Footnote).

-67-

tion to be a complex affair in a sense that accords with thesis 'C.'

It is the thesis of chapter two that "simple" as Price uses it

really means "primitive," and this chapter makes way for the conclu-

sion that thesis 'c' is the correct interpretation of the theory of

obligation in the Review.

The consistency of my interpretation with Price's notion of "inclusion"

Here l will try to provide some details on the theory l have

attributed to Price in the hope that l will also provide further

clarity. It is Price's theory of obligation that the moral idea of

ought is a part of the idea of right, and therefore relations of

inclusion and implication hold between them. My discu~sion will

center on these two relations as they appear in Price's formulation

of his theory of obligation.

The notion that one idea can be included in another is not

restricted to Price's theory of obligation. We came across this

relationship between ideas in Chapter II, where l discussed his

claims that our simple idea of solidity includes the idea of

impenetrability, and that in the idea of every change is included the

idea that it is also an effect. 44 In the case of the idea of

solidity we have seen that Price tried to show that this idea is not

one derived from our sense experience. Of the relationship between

our idea of solidity and our idea of impenetrability, Price ex-

plicitly says that impenetrable is necessarily part of what we mean

by calling a body solide The relationship between the idea of change

and the idea of effect is a necessary relationship because Price

44 2 d i 26 Above, p.O, an Price, Rev ew, p. •

-68-

be1ieves that a11 change is necessari1y an effect of some cause. 45

This necessary relation between the idea of effect and the idea of

change is more than the relation of just being part of what we

indirect1y mean by ca11ing an event a change. These non-moral

examp1es show that the relation of one idea being inc1uded within

another imp1icit1y means "necessari1y" inc1uded. lt a1so shows that

this re1ationship of inclusion occurs in those new, simple ideas

derived from the understanding. Right is such a new, simple idea,

and thus it is possible that the relation between "right" and "ought"

is the same one of necessary inclusion to be found between some non­

moral ideas. 46

Price has noticed that not a11 our uses of the term "right"

to characterize acts necessari1y imp1y an obligation to perform

those acts.

A11 right actions are not so in precise1y the same sense; and it might ••• be granted, that some things are right in such a sense as yet not to be our indispensable duty.47

A1though the ide a of right seems to be more genera1 than the idea of

obligation such that in some instances the right act to do is not

a1so my indispensable dut y, Price thinks that this is not the case with

45 Price, Review, p. 26.

46This interpretation is supported by severa1 previous1y quoted passages from the Review. Ab ove , p. 55 and p. 56.

47price, Review, p. 120. Price is distinguishing here between the strict dut y to do a positive good to others (a moral princip1e); and the particu1ar acts by which we fu1fi11 this obligation and which are 1eft to our own judgement. Each particu1ar act is mora1ly right, but not our "indispensible dut y" which is only to do ~ positive good.

-69-

our idea of wrong. The idea of wrong and obligation are of the same

extention, i.e.,

there are no cases in which it cannot be said, that what is wrong to be done, or omitted, ought ~ to be done or omitted. 48

Therefore, the idea of right which is the direct counterpart to this

idea of wrong is the one that necessarily includes the ide a of ought.

Price believes that,

it holds universally and incontestably, that whatever is right in such a sense, as that the omission of it would be wrong, is always and indispensably obligatory.49

When Price says above that what is right in the moral sense

is also "universally and incontestably" obligatory, he seems to be

adding weight to the correctness of the first two of the three

previous conclusions that l have drawn. The first conclusion

suggested that the moral idea of right would not be the same ide a if

"ought" was not included in it. The second is that "included" in

this case should read "necessarily included." The third is that this

'. relation between ideas is not an ad hoc device that Price uses only

in his moral theory, but it is an extended use of a relation he

thinks is to be found between other non-moral ideas.

The meaning of "implication"

Next, l wish to take up the other relation between our ideas

48Ibid • The previous distinction, between the strict dut y of a principle and the freedom to instantiate that principle in any particular way, does not hold in the case of what we should not do, i.e., any particular wrong should be strictly avoided, and we should not just observe the principle involved.

49Ibid.

-70-

of right and ought, namely, that of implication. On first view it

would appear that Price does not mean anything more by the word

"imply" than what is expressed by the phrase "necessarily included."

Therefore, one might go on to define the relation of implication as

a relation between ideas such that one idea is a necessary part of

another, and leave the relation between "right" and "ought" at that.

In what follows, l do not mean to exclude this possibility. Although

l do not think that Price is explicit about the force of the word

"imply," l do think that he gives some clues as to how the word is

to be taken.

Let us begin a clarification of the relation of implication.

The experience of having an idea and upon reflection drawing out

necessary truths about it is partly what Price means by "implication."

Here what is important is the process of making explicit what is

"hidden" in our conception of something. Price does this with the

concept of space when he finds this idea necessarily implies that

space is infinite. 50 Although using the notion of deduction, he

pursues the same idea with geometric concepts like the circle when he

writes the following:

Just as from having a complete idea of the real essence of a circle, we can de duce the several properties of it depending on that essence, and de termine what will be the proportion of lines and angles drawn, after a certain manner, in it. 5l

In a more specific example, Price writes that in our deliberations on

the concept of motion we have the unavoidable perception that,

50Ibid., p. 24.

51Ibid .• _, p. 28.

-71-

motion implies something that moves; extension some5~ing extended; and, in general, modes something"modified.

What this something is, is the source of our idea of substance. The

idea of modes implies the idea of substance; the point here is to

note that instead of "implies" Price writes that this idea of

substance "is an idea to which our minds are necessarily carried."53

This suggests that the word "imply" as used by Price has the connota-

tion of "leads a reflective consciousness unavoidably to." In this

way, Price unites by the term "imply" the notion of necessity and the

result of an analysis of the basic idea in question.

In the case of our moral idea of rectitude, the analysis is

informative because what "right" implies could not have been an

explicit part cf the idea of right. If "right" explicitly included

"ought" in its unreflective meaning, then the question of what is

the foundation for our mo~al obligations would never have arisen in

the form that it did. That is, people would never have concluded

that the obligation to perform an act lay in its relation to self-

interest or in the happiness or pleasure it produces; rather they

would have seen that the source of"obligation is simply a part of

our ide a of moral rightness. It is because the idea of obligation

is implicitly, and not explicitly part of the idea of right that is

responsible for people's confusion about the foundation of moral

obligation. Obligation arises from the idea of right which is part

of the judgement that it is right to do those acts most productive

52I bid., p. 23.

53Ibid •

-72-

of happiness, but does not arise from the fact that certain acts have

this resu1t. This seems to be what Price is saying when he writes

the fo110wing:

From the account given of obligation, it appears how absurd it is to enquire, what obliges us to practise virtue~ as if obligation was no part of the idea of virtue, but some­thing adventitious and foreign to it; ••• To ask, why are we ob1iged to practise virtue, to abstain from what is wicked, or perform what is just, is the very same as to ask, why we are ob1iged to do what we are ob1iged to do?---It is not possible to avoid wondering at those, who have so unaccountab1y embarrassed themse1ves, on a subject that one wou1d think was attended with no difficu1ty; and who, because they cannot find any thing in virtue and dut y the~ se1yes, which can induce us to paya regard to them in our practice, f1y to self-love, and maintain that from hence al one are derived a11 inducement and ob1igation. 54

Therefore, by using the term "imp1y" in this theory of moral

obligation, Price seems to mean, beyond mere1y "a necessary part of,"

at 1east the fo110wing: "to imp1y" is to invo1ve the truth or

existence of something not express1y asserted or maintained.,,55

Up to this point, we have seen in the Review that "ought" is

a necessary part of the idea of right, but in an imp1icit fashion

~ld not exp1icit1y. A11 this signifies is that we are not immediate1y

aware of a11 the implications imp1icit in our ideas. Sure1y, one

might object, that is an unexceptiona1 point in connection with our

ideas of space or time, or our ideas of geometric concepts, but does

this commit Price to saying that one can be unaware of a dut y to act

on those princip1es one understands to be mora11y right? He does not

54 Ibid., p. 110.

55This is part of the definition of "imp1y" that is to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary. The other part is "To invo1ve or comprise as a necessary 10gica1 consequence."

-73-

want to say this becauüe it does not, he thinks, accord with our

moral experience. In the case of our moral idea of right, Price

be1ieves that we cannot avoid awareness of the implication of duty.

Therefore, to be free of the sense of dut y one must have avoided the

perception of the moral rightness of an act. However, if l judge

that some act is the right one to do, then from this intuition of

its rectitude, l will experience a sense of obligation to act

according1y. And if l come to a situation in which l find myse1f

re1uctant to fo11ow through with this obligation, and consequent1y

dissemb1e from myse1f the implication of dut y in order to avoid

acting, then l will have the experience of a dissolution of my

integrity. Price puts it this way:

Reason is the guide, the natura1 and authoritative guide of a rational being. Where he has no discernment of right and wrong, there, and there on1y, is he (mora11y speaking) free. But where he has this discernment, where moral good appears to him, and he cannot avoid pronouncing concerning an action, that it is fit to be done, and evi1 to omit it; here he is tied in the most strict and abso1ute manner, in bonds that no power in nature can dissolve, and from which he can at no time, or in any single instance, break loose, without offering the most unnatura1 violence to himse1f; without making an inroad into his own sou1, and immediate1y pronouncing his own sentence. 56

A1though Price has written that we have a sense of dut y after

judging an act to be right, he does not inconsistent1y mean that the

re1ationship of implication between "right" and "ought" is therefore

exp1icit for the moral consciousness. It appears as if Price con-

ceives of the relation between the moral judgement and a sense of

dut y in this way: our judgement that a certain action is fit to be

56 Price, Review, p. 109.

-74-

done implies that it ought to be done. The judgement that an act X

is morally right is one in which the empirical aspect predominates,

i.e., it is a judgement phenomenally similar to the one about the

equality of the opposite angles at the intersection of two straight

lines. But the judgement that l ought to do act X is not empirical,

and one is driven to it ~~ internal process of implication from

the original intuition of the rightness of X alone. So obligation

is implicitly part of the moral use of "right," but because it is only

implicit it is not an immediately conscious and explicit part of the

moral judgement of rightness. However, once attention is off the

subject matter that has given rise to the moral judgement of right­

ness, then the heretofore hidden implication of obligation begins to

make itself felt.

It seems to me that Price would counter by two claims those

who need to base all obligation to act in a certain manner on some

principle such as self-interest or utility. Price might claim that

they have failed to have a moral perception of the rectitude of acts

instantiating that principle. Or he might claim that if they did

intuit the rightness of these acts, then they have confused the lack

of a sense of obligation at the moment of the moral judgement of

rightness with the absence of the idea of obligation as any part of

and implied by the moral idea of rightness. Thus, whenever the·

implication of obligation does make itself felt, the philosopher of

mora~accounts for its origin by its association with the content of

whatever principle is being considered at the time instead of seeing

that its true origin is in the judgement of the rectitude of the

-75-

principle itself. In this way could Price have used Hume's device of

customary association as an account of how the various grounds for

obligation could have had any credibility.

In conclusion, what finally emerges as the significance of

the relations of implication and inclusion between our ideas of right

and ought? Price's theory of obligation asserts that "ought" is a

necessary part of the idea of right. l briefly suggested that "imply"

could mean the same thing, but there is sorne indication that its

force is more to emphasize that "ought" is implicitly part of the idea

of right. This seems to allow Price to compare, phenomenologically,

moral judgements of the rectitude of an act and non-moral judgements;

and yet to claim that we cannot avoid the implication of dut Y

included in the idea of right. The moral idea of right has more to

it than just denoting sorne property of actions, and this wider aspect

contains at least one implication, namely, that of obligation. The

moral concept of right seems to be the basic idea for both moral

knowledge and moral authority, and, therefore, can and do es serve as

the foundational concept in ethics.

The philosophical import of my interpretation of Price's theory of moral obligation

Cua and Raphael's interpretation of the "right"-"ought"

relationship implies that the two forms of a moral judgement, "Act X

is right" and "1 ought to do act X," are really the same judgement.

largue that their interpretation of the "right"-"ought" relationship

would make Price's main argument in the Review for the objectivity

of moral judgements much less credible and would, at least, attribute

-76-

to Priee a very serious confusion. These results are avoided on my

interpretation of Price's theory of obligation and a more synthetic

view of the overall aims of the Review is achieved. l think that

this is enough to show my interpretation of the "right"-"ought"

relationship to be of some importe

Price compares ethical judgements to mathematical judgements

in order to support his contention that ethical judgements are

objective and necessarily true. Self-evident mathematical judgements

can be seen to be objective, Price writes, if only one considers,

whether he is not sure, that certain lines or figures are really equal, and that their equality must be perceived by aIl minds, as soon as the objects themselves are perceived. 57

To satisfy oneself in a preliminary way about the objectivity of

ethical judgements, Price suggests recalling our feeling that these

judgements reflect some reality in the actions judged. l have already

explained that Price's conception of objectivity cent ers around

whether or not a judgement reflects some independent reality.58

Consequently, the key similarity between moral and mathematical

judgements is the phenomenological one that we have "a like conscious-

ness, that we discern the one [moral rectitude], as weIl as the

other [equality], in certain objects.,,59 The comparison between

mathematical judgements and moral judgements is important because it

is a significant part of Price's central argument for the objectivity

57price, Review, p. 44.

58Above, p. l1ff.

59Price, Review, pp. 44-45.

-77-

of moral judgements, and it is c1ear from this that he wou1d not want

to hinder this comparison.

In order to see what improvement my interpretation of Price's

theory of obligation makes over that of Cua and Raphael, it is

sufficient to show what each interpretation contributes to Price's

attempt to draw out the relevant simi1arities he finds between

mathematica1 and moral judgements. The position of Cua and Raphael

is that "right" and "ought" in the Review express the same moral idea.

Raphael expresses one consequence of this interpretation of the

"right"-"ought" re1ationship in the Review in this way: "To say that

an action is right is the ~ ~ saying that we are obliged to do it. ,,60

In effect, their interpretation suggests that "Act X is right" is the

~ judgement as "1 ought to do act X." This means that they must

think Price finds no differences when either form of the moral

judgement is compared to a mathematica1 judgement. On their interpreta-

tion, Price wou1d have to ho1d that the fo11owing two judgements are

essentia11y simi1ar, i.e., they exemp1ify the conclusion that

mathematica1 and moral judgements are phenomeno1ogica11y the same,

and, therefore, both are objective.

(1) l ought to do act X (11) Angles opposite each other at the intersection of two straight 1ines are equa1. 61

There may be some way that Cua and Raphael can see Price arguing for

the simi1arity between mathematica1 and moral judgements at this point.

60Raphae1, "Editor's Introduction," Review, p. xxx. The ita1ics are mine.

61Ibid ., p. 36.

-78-

But sure1y the main effect of (1) is to influence our conduct "in a

way that significant1y differs from the effect that (11) has on us.

This imperativeness, or this c1aim on our behavior, is characteristic

of moral judgements of obligation and is certain1y 1acking as a

feature of the necessary truths of mathematics and science. On the

view of Cua and Raphael, Price must be accused of ignoring this

rather important difference between moral and mathematica1 judgements

in favour of pressing their simi1arity in terms of objectivity and

being necessari1y true. l think any interpretation that puts Price

into the position of asserting judgements of obligation are pheno­

mena11y simi1ar to mathematica1 judgements is probab1y mistaken.

In addition, even estab1ishing the objectivity of moral

judgements, so central to the main aim of the Review, now seems to

run into a difficu1ty. From Cua and Raphae1's understanding of the

"right"-"ought" re1ationship, there resu1ts a difficu1ty in

reconci1ing the "ought" judgement and the mode1 of objectivity that

Price is using. The judgement, "1 ought to do act X," does not

appear to direct1y and immediate1y ref1ect some rea1 qua1ity of an

act as does the judgement, "Act X is right." This difference between

"Act X is right," which looks 1ike it ascribes a property to an act,

and "1 ought to do act X," which does not have this appearance, cou1d

have been recognized by Priee, and this wou1d partia11y exp1ain why

he confines his epistemo10gica1 discussion to the concept of right.

In any case, the intuition of the objective moral qua1ity of an act

gives rise direct1y to the moral idea of right, and "ought" is on1y

imp1icit in that idea and imp1ied by it.

-79-

On my view of Price's "right"-"ought" relationship, only the

judgement that "Act X is right" is claimed by him to bear phenomeno­

logical comparison to our mathematical judgements. The statement

that "r ought to do act X" is an implication from the judgement of

moral rectitude, and it is not an explicit, and therefore phenomeno­

logical, part of the initial judgement. Price's doctrine that

"ought" is only implicitly and not explicitly part of our judgement

of moral rectitude leaves him free to bring out all the important

similarities that he finds between the moral judgement of rectitude

and judgements of necessary truths in other fields without being in

the position that he must ignore, without explanation, the imperative

quality of moral judgements.

CHAPTER IV

PRICE'S THE ORY OF OBLIGATION AND THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION IN ETHICS

The question of whether a moral conclusion can be logica11y

entai1ed by on1y factua1 premises is known in .ethics as the is-ought

question. If, as in the case of R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowe11-Smith, and

A. N. Prior,l one be1ieves that by themse1ves factua1 propositions

cannot entai1 moral propositions, then from this point of view, any

mora1ist who seeks to justify a particu1ar moral obligation by c1aiming

that it logica11y fo11ows from certain facts, whether moral facts or

non-moral facts, is arguing fa11acious1y.2 l will conc1ude my ana1ysis

1R. M. Hare, The Language of Mora1s (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 28; P. H. Nowe11-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 37; A. N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p.. 30.

2A1though today, after further ana1ysis, there might be grounds against ca11ing in some instances the move from "is" to "ought" fa11acious, yet it wou1d appear that this label is still a very appro­priate description of how some eighteenth century moralists tried to justify their moral conclusions. A. N. Prior writes:

"Ethical rationalism---the belief that the mind may perceive real and distinctive ethical qualities in actions (Cudworth), or real and distinctive ethical relations between acts and situations (Clarke), or between elements in our personality (Butler)---fell into considerable disrepute in the middle of the eighteenth century, precisely through its entang1ement with this new form of the illusion that ethical conclusions may be drawn from 'natural' premisses" (A. N. Prior, Logic, p. 30).

-80-

-81-

of Price's theory of obligation by re1ating it to this important

question in ethics, i.e., the is-ought question. l wish to show that

my interpretation of Price's theory of obligation makes a difference as

to whether Price can be defended against the serious criticism by

Nowe11-Smith that his foundation for ethics embodies this fa11acy. l

want to bring out why, in Cua and Raphae1's view of the right-ought

re1ationship, Price cannot be defended against Nowe11-Smith, and to

suggest how he can be defended in my view of this re1ationship. The

importance of my interpretation of Price's theory of obligation for

phi1osophy genera11y is that it brings out how one intuitionist and

rationa1ist provides a foundation for mora1s that seems to avoid

committing the is-ought fa11acy. Because of their interpretation of the

right-ought re1ationship, Cua and Raphael have fai1ed to bring out and

describe Price's method of avoiding this fa11acy and unti1 this is done,

his method cannot be eva1uated and a fortiori neither can Price's

exp1anation of the foundation of mora1s.

Price's main aim is to review the princip1e question in mora1s,

and one important question he dea1s with is, what are the grounds which

justify or exp1ain why we have the particu1ar moral obligations we have?

A11 that is necessary to justify one's particu1ar actions is, Price

thinks, to show that they are instances of, or fa11 under, one of the

more basic moral ru1es. 3 The question of moral justification becomes

3price is making this point, that to justify an act is to show that it fa11s under a more genera1 ru1e, when he writes,

"When an action, otherwise indifferent, becomes ob1igatory, by being made the subject of a,promise; we are not to imagine, that our own will or breath a1ters the nature of things by making what is indifferent not so; ••• A11 that the promise does, is, to alter the connexion of a particu1ar effect; or to cause that to be

-82-

more acute when we are asked to justify those basic ru1es themse1ves.

Using one of Price's examp1es of a necessary moral truth, justification

in the first case seems to invo1ve this 1ine of argument.

Gratitude ought to be shown to a benefactor

Mr. S. is my benefactor

Therefore, l ought to show gratitude to Mr. S.

Here we have va1id1y deduced a particu1ar obligation from a more genera1

moral princip1e. Next, we want to justify the genera1 princip le itse1f,

i.e., gratitude ought to be shown to a benefactor. The prob1em is, if

moral justification is usua11y achieved through deduction from a more

genera1-"ought" princip le , and in the case of our most genera1 princip1es

there are none more genera1 to refer to, then must we conc1ude that our

most basic princip les cannot be justified? If in the Review "justifica-

an instance of right conduct which was not so before. There are no effects producib1e by us, which may not, in this manner, fa11 under different princip1es of mora1ity; acquire connexions sometimes with happiness, and sometimes with misery; and thus stand in different relations to the eterna1 ru1es of dut y." Price, Review, p. 51-52.

"What is meant by demonstrating mora1ity, can on1y be reducing these [particu1ar:effects or acts] under the genera1 se1f-evident princip1es of mora1ity, or making out with certainty their relation to them." Ibid., p. 169.

"When we enquire what is the foundation of virtue, we may me an , 'what are the primary princip1es and heads of virtue; or, the considerations inferring obligation in particu1ar cases and rendering particu1ar actions right?' Thus, shou1d l enquire why a person ought to act in such or such a particu1ar manner, in certain circumstances: it wou1d be proper to rep1y, because he has received benefits from others; because it conduces to his happiness; or because God commands it. And, in this sense, there will be as many foundations of virtue, as there are first princip1es of it." Ibid., p. 234.

-83-

tion" means "can be shown to follow logically from," then Price must

think that they cannot be justified. But this admission does not mean

for him that the most basic moral truths are arbitrary, irrational, or

without foundation. It only means that Price will have to explain

the objective foundation of our moral rules rather than jus tif Y them. 4

Why is it that the five moral rules Price gives in the Review

constitute our moral knowledge and not some other rules? The reason

lies not in man's nature or in God's will, but in the independent

natures of things. It is because things are the way they are that we

have the moral knowledge we have. One would not demand an explanation,

Price thinks, why the opposite angles at the intersection of two

straight lines are equal, or why we see the colours we see and not some

others (in the sense that after a full mathematical proof or scientific

explanation one would still ask "Why?"). In the same way, once Price

has explained how we come by our moral knowledge (by way of intellectual

intuition), and has shown our moral rules to be based on the objective

nature of things (real moral quality to acts), th en a full explanation

of why we have these rules and not others has been given. Once it is

shown that our moral knowledge is a result of the way the world is, i.e.,

that it is real knowledge, then further explanation or justification

is unnecessary. In Price's own words:

4price believes that a full explanation, or to give a full account of a fact, requires that we trace "a subject to the natures of things" because only when this is done can we, in all cases, feel completely satisfied (Ibid., p. 234; cf. p. 27). The point l wish to make here is that Price, in the case of providing an objective foundation for moral truths, uses this same language of explanation, i.e., recourse to the natures of things, rather than the language of justification (Ibid., pp. 233-34).

-84-

Or, on the other hand,.it.may.besaid,. that .. it [the moral idea of·right] denotes ~'real'character'of'acti6ns, of something ~ of them; something necessary and .. innnutable .. and .. independent of our perceptions, like'equality,difference; 'proportion, or connection; and, therefore, that no other account is to be given, why such and such actions are right, than why the natures of things are what they are; why, for example, the opposite angles made by the intersection of two right lines are egual, or why it is impossible, that any thing should exist without a cause.---It would be extremely unreasonable for any person to pretend to want farther [sic] information here, and to ask, what is the foundation of TRUTH? When we have traced a subject to the natures of things, we are, in all cases, completely satisfied; and it is trifling and impertinent to des ire any farther account. Would he deserve an answer, or could we think him quite in his senses, who should seriously ask, why the whole is greater than a part, or two different from twenty?5

In this spirit, Price reminds us that acts have natures and that these

natures include moral qualities which, when intellectually perceived

by an intuitive reason, give rise to the moral idea of right. From

the fact that an act, like showing gratitude to a benefactor, has this

quality of moral rectitude, we experience the moral judgement that

expresses a basic moral truth, e.g., showing gratitude to a benefactor

is right. But now an interesting problem presents itself. When l

was discussing the logic of moral justification, l gave an example of

a general moral rule that was deliberately formulated in this manner:

gratitude ought to be shown to a benefactor. From this rule, l showed,

in ideal forro, an example of judtifying a particular dut Y to show

gratitude to Mr. S. However, in my outline of Price's explanation of

how we come by our moral truths that we use to justify particular

acts, the form of the general moral truth arrived at was, "showing

gratitude to a benefactor is right." (Since the idea of right denotes

5Price, Review, pp. 233-34.

-85-

a moral quality of an act, it seemsthat Price wou1d natura11y write

the basic moral truths in the same form as sentences in which a

qua1ity is attributed to an object) The question arises, does how

we formu1ate the basic moral ru1e, Le., with "right" or with "ought,"

make any difference to the process of justifying a particu1ar

obligation? In other words, is the former argument still va1id even

when we replace the first princip1e with "ought" by the second with

"right"?

Showing gratitude to a benefactor is right

Mr. S. is my benefactor

Therefore, l 01"..... to show gratitude to Mr. S.

It is an accepted tenet since Hume that pure1y descriptive

statements cannot 10gica11y entai1 a moral conclusion containing the

word "ought."6 The forma1 reason why this is so is that in a va1id

argument form no term can be introduced into the conclusion that does

not appear somewhere in the premises. Since any pure1y descriptive

statements have "is" as a copula, the copula, "ought," in the moral

6This tenet is he1d by those who wish to assert that the meaning of moral terms cannot be who11y captured by the language of psycho10gy, or more genera11y, any other non-moral language. Interesting1y enough, Price asserts that our moral language is auto­nomous in this way, but he does not exp1icit1y ho1d this tenet. This tenet is first enunciated, according to the standard interpretation of the relevant passage, in Humers Treatise (At the end of Section l, Part l of Book III). In this way, Nowe11-Smith rs criticism of Price wou1d be Humers criticism; and by showing, on my interpretation, how Price avoids the is-ought fa11acy, there is a vei1ed suggestion that the Review cou1d have set the direction 1ater phi10sophers, 1ike Thomas Reid who makes exp1icit reference to the "is-ought" passage in Humers Treatise, wou1d have to take in order to secure a 10gica11y proper foundation for mora1ity (T. Reid, Essays on the Active Powers 3 vols.; Edinburgh, 1819, III, 577-79).

-86-

conclusion is a new term, hence the moral conclusion results in a

fallacious argument. Any such argument can avoid the fallacy with

the addition of one moral premis, i. e., a premis with "ought." An

example of an argument which is fallacious in this way is,

Act X will produce the "most happiness for allconcerned

Therefore, we ought to do act X.

With the addition of one moral premis the argument becomes valide

We ought to do those acts which will produce the most happiness

Act X will produce the most happiness

Therefore, we ought to do act X

The central thesis is that statements of obligation cannot be deduced

frompurely descriptive statements.

The objection to deducing particular obligations from a fact

about the relationship between an act and happiness can be extended

to the deduction of obligation from moral facts about an act. The

objection in this case is the same as before because, it is insisted,7

our knowledge of what an act is, what moral characteristics it has,

can only result in purely descriptive statements. If, for instance, ·a

moral philosopher wishes to insist that "right" denotes some moral

property of an act, then the moral judgement "Act X is right" becomes

one bit of theoretical know~edge about one feature of the world; and

statements that only describe the world (whatever part is not

important) do not by themselves entail conclusions (for the formaI

reason given) about what l ought to do.

Now we can return to the syllogism which served as a model for

7See below p. 88

-87-

justifying a particular obligation and answer the question of its

validity. It had for its major premis, "showing gratitude to a bene­

factor is right." If, as Cua believes,8'this first premis is a

purely descriptive statement which tells us that an act is in the

particular moral relationship of fitness, and if it is agreed that the

second premis, which remains the same, is also descriptive, then this

argument is invalid because there is an "ought" in the conclusion and

no "ought" in any of the premises. It seems we must conclude that it

does make a difference how the basic moral rule is formulated because

to use a basic rule to justify a particular obligation formally

requires an "ought" in one of the premises. 9 Price explains how we

8As l only mentioned before (see above p. 35 footnote 39) Cua believes that Price is inclined to see the particular moral property of rightness as "a relation between the agent and the moral situation." This is shown, according to Cua, by Price's "constant use of 'fitness' as synonymous with 'rightness' and 'obligation'" (Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 67). Cua characterizes the denotation of the moral use of "fit" in this way:

"The fitness of action to be performed is real in the sense that it is one feature of any moral situation referring to the relation between the agent and his immediate environment" (Ibid.) •

Perhaps the denotation of "fitness" is better brought out through C. D. Broad's formulation which, according to Cua, resembles that of Price (Ibid., p. 73). Broad writes that, 'fittingness or unfittingness is a direct ethical relation between an action or emotion and the total course of events in which it takes place' (C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory [New York: The Humanities Press, 1930], p. 219, and quoted in Cua, Reason and Virtue, p. 73). Therefore, on Cua's inter­pretation of Price, the moral property of rightness that gives rise to the moral ideas of right and wrong by way of an intellectual dis­cernment originates in the way sorne particular act fits or suits sorne particular contexte

9In Cua and Raphael's view of the Review, the judgement, "Act X is right," is a descriptive statement, and, qua descriptive, it has been argued, it cannot by itself imply an "ought" conclusion. But, also in their view, "right" and "ought" are synonymous and "Act X is

-88-

come by our moral idea of right and our basic moral rules expressing

what is right. Yet we have seen in what way these basic rules con-

taining the idea of right, because they are purely descriptive of

which acts have the property of rectitude, cannot logically entail

any particular conclusion of the form, "1 ought to do act X." If we

accept Cua's interpretation of the moral idea of right in the Review

as purely denotative, then there must be a basic fallacy involved in

Price's foundation for morals. In this case, Cua and Raphael's

interpretation would help to point out the poverty of proposing the

natures of things as a foundation for morals. In the rest of this

chapter, l wish to deny Cua's interpretation of the moral idea of

right as purely denotative and to point out how Price seems to avoid

this basic fallacy in its most obvious forme

Nowell-Smith's criticism of intuitionism in ethics, and con-

sequently of Richard Price, is just that the analysis, by the

right" means the same as "Act X ought to be done." Therefore, one can substitute one form of the moral judgement for the other depending on the circumstances (for instance, to have an "ought" premis in order to justify a moral conclusion). But l have argued at the end of the last chapter that this option is not open because it means attributing to Price a serious confusion. Thus we are forced back to the fact that, on Cua's interpretation "Act X is right" is purely descriptive and as such, with only other descriptive premises, it cannot imply a moral conclusion. Yet in the Review, Price argues that he is pro­viding a foundation for virtue that can account for and "justify" our moral obligations. Therefore if he does this on Cua's interpretation of "right" as purely denotive, th en he involves himself in the fallacy of deriving an "ought" conclusion from purely descriptive premises. l contend my interpretation of Price's theory of obligation shows Price avoids this mistake, in its most obvious form, because on his under­standing of the moral idea of right this idea is not purely descriptive.

-89-

intuitionists, of our basic moraljudgements makes them out to be

purely descriptive statements. lO As a result, Nowell-Smith argues,

it would be repeating the fallacy for them to derive logically from

the purely descriptive premis, "Act X is right," the particular moral

conclusion "I ought to do act X." l have argued that Price's theory

of obligation commits him to saying that from the judgement "Act X is

right" one can de duce "I ought to do act X." The question arises

for my interpretation as to whether Price avoids Nowell-Smith's

criticism, and if so, how? Nowell-Smith's criticism depends on his

understanding the intuitionists to mean that ":i:'ight" only denotes

some moral, i.e., some non-natural property of acts. That the idea

of right only denotes a moral relation is A. S. Cua's interpretation

of what Price means by the moral term "right." Whether "right"

denotes a property of an act or a relation of fitness does not affect

the force of Nowell-Smith's criticism of the intuitionists because

his criticism is based on their understanding the moral judgement

"Act X is right" to be only a descriptive statement. As such, his

criticism is not concerned with what the intuitionists purport to be

describing. In other words, the question is not whether "right" in

the Review denotes a moral property of acts (as l believe) or a moral

relation of fitness (Cua's view) , but it is whether "right" is purely

descriptive. Nowell-Smith's criticism can be seen to be applicable

to Price if we adopt Cua's interpretation of what Price says about

the moral idea of right, i.e., that it only denotes a moral relation

lOp. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics, pp. 36-43.

-90-

of fitness. Cua's interpretation of "right" in the Review commits

Price to the view of moral judgements as descriptions. Consequently,

Cua's interpretation, if Nowell-Smith and the anti-naturalists are

correct, forces us to see Price's foundation for morality, the nature

of acts, as logically incapable of justifying particular obligations.

This result would, of course, suggest that Price was very wrong in

his theory as to the real, objective grounds for those basic moral

truths which we use, he thinks, to justify our particular acts.

It is central to my development of Price's theory of

obligation that "right" in the Review is not purely denotive and as

a consequence of this point, Price is not committed to the view that

"Act X is right" is purely descriptive. It is part of Price's thesis

that the idea of right denotes a moral property of acts. But what is

essential to Price's position concerning the moral idea of rectitude

is that the idea of right not only denotes some property of acts, but

also necessarily includes the idea of ought which by itself does not

denote anything. This feature of Price's conception of the basic

moral idea of rectitude has been elucidated through this study of

Price's theory of obligation. With this established, l can show that

the criticism by Nowell-Smith misses the mark when applied to the first

ethical intuitionist. Nowell-Smith says the intuitionists assert that

the idea of right only denotes a non-natural property, and, therefore,

"Act X is right" is a purely descriptive statement. On his under­

standing of Intuitionism, and on Cua's interpretation of the moral idea

of right in the Review, this argument,

Act X is right

Therefore, l ought to do act X,

-91-

is invalid because the "ought" is a new term in the conclusion, i. e. ,

it does not appear in the purely descriptive premis. Priee, on the

other hand, asserts that the ide a of moral rectitude not only denotes

a property of acts, but also necessarily includes and implies the

idea of obligation, and therefore, "Act X is right" is not purely

descriptive. The idea of right is an explicit part of the moral

judgement, "Act X is right," and the idea of "ought" becomes an

implicit part of this judgement which means that it is quite valid

to infer "1 ought to do act X" from this judgement of rectitude.

My interpretation of Price's the ory of obligation provides a

clearer picture of the nature of his idea of moral rectitude. What l

understand Priee to be saying about the moral idea of right, as

opposed to what Nowell-Smith accuses intuitionists of asserting,

avoids the criticism that Nowell-Smith brings against them. He

believes the intuitionists provide a foundation for morality that

necessarily involves them in fallacious reasoning. As a result of my

interpretation of Price's theory of obligation, his conception of the

moral idea of right, which includes the implicative relation between

our idea of right and our idea of ought, must be evaluated on other

grounds than the is-ought fallacy suggested by Nowell-Smith. This .

would not be the case if Cua and Raphael's interpretation were correct

because their conception of the right-ought relationship would place

Priee in the same class with those intuitionists whose purely denota­

tive concept of "right" Nowell-Smith is referring to. ll

llTo my knowledge, Cua and Raphael do not treat the is-ought question in relation to Price's Review.

.Aqvist, Lennart. Uppsale:

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Moral Philosophy of Richard Price. Almqvist & Wiksells, 1960.

Barnes, Winston. "Richard Price: A Neglected Eighteenth Century Moralist." Philosophy, XVII (April, 1942), 159-73.

Blackstone, William T. Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1965.

Broad, C.D. IfSome Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series. Vol. XLV. London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd., 1945.

Butler, Joseph, Bishop of Durham. Fifteen Sermons. Edited by W.R. Matihews. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1953.

Carritt, E.F. Ethical and Political Thinking. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1947.

Cone, Carl B. Torchbearer of Freedom: The Influence of Richard Price on Eighteenth Century Thought. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1952.

Cua, A.S. Reason and Virtue. n.p.: Ohio University Press, 1965.

Gluck, Samuel E. "Richard Price, G.E. Moore, and the Analysis of Moral Obligation." Philosophical Quarterly (Calcutta), XXXI, No. 3 (1958), 163-72.

Hare, R.M. The Language of MoraIs. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1952.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1888.

______ ~. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Charles W. Hendel. The Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis, Ind.: BOBBS-MERRILL Company Inc., 1~55.

Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959.

Mackintosh, J. "Dissertation Second." Encyclopaedia Britannica. 7th ed. Vol. 1.

-92-

-93-

Martineau, J. Types of Ethica1 Theory. 2 vols. 3d ed. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1889.

Mitche1, J.M. "Priee, Richard." Encyc10paedia B~itannica. Handy Volume Issue. 11th ed. Vol. XXII.

More11, J.D. An Historica1 and Critica1 View of the Speculative Phi1osophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century. 2 vols. 2d ed. Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1847.

Nowe11-Smith, P.H. Ethics. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954.

Priee, Richard. A Review of the Principal Questions in Mora1s. Edited by D. Daiches Raphael. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1948.

________ • Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution and the means of making it a Benefit to the Wor1d. Dublin: Printed for L. White, et al., 1785.

Prior, A.N. "Eighteenth Century Writers on Twentieth Century Subjects." Austra1asian Journal of Phi1osophy, XXIV, No. 3 (1946), 168-82.

________ • Logic and thè'Basis of Ethics. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1949.

Raphael, D. Daiches. The Moral Sense. London: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Rashda11, Hastings. The Theory of Good and Evi1. 2 vols. 2d ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1924.

Se1by-Bigge, L.A., ed. British Moralists. 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965.

Seth, J. Eng1ish Phi1osophers and Schoo1s of Phi1osophy. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1925.

Sidgwick, Henry. Out1ines of the History of Ethics. 3d ed. London: Macmillan and Co., 1892.

Sorely, W.R. A History of English Phi1osophy. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1937.

Thomas, Roland. Richard Priee. London: Humphrey Milford, 1924.

Tonelli, Giorgio. "Deux sources britanniques oubli~es de la morale kantienne." M~langes Alexandre Koyré II. Vol. VIII of Histoire de la Pensée. 8 vols. Paris: Hermann, 1964.

Wilson, J.M., and Fow1er, T. The Princip les of Mora1s. 2 vols. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1886.