Title: A Recent History of Nationalism and the Military in China

Author: Ahmed Khan

Date: November 2015 Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University

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The Recent History of Nationalism and the Military in China

Throughout history, and particularly in China the military has often been an indicator

of national integrity and unity. For a country as large and diverse as China, the

military has historically been one of the few executive arms of the central government

and by extension a measure of the strength of the country’s nationalist sentiment. The

military is not merely a symptom of the health of nationalist ideology. The regime of

the day has based its actions and policy around the prevalent military systems

available to it and the development of military systems and strategies has been

inextricably tied to the ideology of the governing party.

The establishment of a strong, modern and centralized regular military was essential

for the development of Chinese nationalism from a popular sentiment to the

predominant political ideology of the central government. This was true of Sun Yat

Sen’s Republic, the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

This trend has been seen ever since the Qing dynasty modernized the military

following defeat at the hands of European powers. Throughout the early twentieth

century there has been a clear link between the development of the military, largely

the army until the Korean War, and the growth of nationalist sentiment in China.

The only period between this span where nationalism was on the decline was during

the Warlord Era. After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 the fight for power weakened

the sense of a Chinese national identity as the infighting of the warlord era

discouraged nationalism, stoking ethnic sentiments instead. This coincided with

devolution in military capability. However following Chiang Kai Shek’s Northern

Expedition of 1927-28 the Guomindang (GMD) either beat or incorporated the

warlords, nominally united China and established the National Revolutionary Army.

From that point on, despite the decades long power struggle between the CCP and the

GMD, since the eventual establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the

People’s Liberation Army, nationalism has only grown in China. Simultaneously the

Chinese military has also grown from irregular, ill-trained poorly armed militias to an

efficient, battle hardened and increasingly better equipped and trained force.

The concepts of a modern “one China” and militarism, which is much older, have been

tied inextricably with each other.

While the birth of the modern Chinese military is accepted to be in 1911 with the

Republican Revolution and the establishment of the "New Army", its roots go back to

the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century.[1] Before the Opium Wars the military was used

to establish the writ of the empire and squash dissidence. The ethnically Manchu Qing

held on to power over majority Han China by a combination of feudal alliances and

military power. Given that this was the primary prerogative of the armies, their

methods were not nationalistic at all and instead fueled regionalism. The turning

point for these methods was the Opium Wars where China faced off against the

predominant world powers of the day, France, Britain and Russia.

The outcomes of the wars were humiliating for China, as it was carved up and split

between the European powers. This sparked two major changes in China that would

contribute greatly towards the rise of nationalism. First, the Qing dynasty embarked

on a massive modernization campaign for the military, a development geared

towards dealing with foreign aggression. Secondly the actions of the European

powers gave rise to nationalist sentiment in the Han majority.

This new and fast spreading sentiment resulted first in Xinhai Revolution of 1911,

where early nationalist politicians led by Sun Yat Sen and Yuan Shikai were able to

convince “Last Emperor” Puyi to step down thus ending two thousand years of

imperial rule in China.

There were several nationalistic characteristics of the new republic, chief among

which was the attempt at racial integration. The republic adopted the “Five Races

Under One Union” banner as its flag. The five colors represented the five main

ethnicities of China, Han, Manchu, Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan. Moreover, Sun Yat

Sen and other leaders called for racial integration at the frontiers of China.

The republic also made use of the “New Armies” developed and trained at the end of

the Qing by Yuan Shikai himself. In line with the prevalent nationalist sentiment in

the intelligentsia and continuing with military development in the final years of the

Qing dynasty, various “New Armies” were integrated to form the “Chinese Army” by

1911, although the force was still known popularly as the New Army. Nearly two -

thirds of this force was composed of Yuan Shikai’s own Beiyang Army [2].

Sun Yat Sen had brought in Yuan Shikai into the government because of his close

relations with the military, as it was seen as essential to the Nationalist and

Republican causes. Initially Yuan Shikai’s proximity to the military leadership

maintained stability in the young republic, effectively squashing out dissidence from

the south. However, Yuan Shikai’s decision to declare himself emperor and his death

soon after in 1916 led to weaker control of the state over the New Army.

The New Army fell apart as there was no leadership that could hold it together, and

the republican government of Sun Yat Sen was reduced to the role of a figurehead.

The army degenerated to its old pattern, with loyalties shifting back to regional and

even more local ties. The New Army fragmented, as did China as a whole, dominated

more and more by a group of warlords. These men, such as Wu Peifu and Sun

Chuanfang, were more interested in consolidating power in their own regions and

building private armies than they were in Chinese Nationalism. This was essentially

the end of the Republic and ushered in what came to be known as the Warlord Era.

The warlords had their origins in the Qing dynasty. Their armies originated from the

Qing’s use of regional militias and forces, a carryover of the feudal era. Individual

militias were formed from men of the same province. While this was largely for the

benefit of communication within soldiers, this encouraged regionalist tendencies and

sentiments. The warlords had been brought together after the dissolution of the Qing

dynasty, however their nationalist sympathies were tested by Yuan Shikai’s ill-

advised move to become emperor in 1915 and dissolved completely with his death in

1916. Starting from the South, dissent soon spread throughout the mainland and even

Yuan Shikai’s own Beiyang Army split into two cliques.

The Warlord Era continued until Chiang Kai Shek’s Northern Expedition (1926 -28)

either incorporated the warlords into the regular army or beat them to submission

and nominally reunited China. The Warlord Era is interesting most of all for being the

only period in China during the 20th century that saw a deterioration in military

capability for the country. The deterioration of military order and standardization led

towards a shift from nationalist ideology to more regional sympathies within the

army. Loyalties shifted backwards to positions similar to the Qing dynasty, and a split

between the North and South would persist till the Northern Expedition. This only

reinforces the argument that deterioration in the military leads to devolution from

nationalism to regionalism.

The Warlord Era is of particular interest because the deterioration of the central army

led to a long period of increased regionalism and political factionalism [5], yet it was

precisely these conditions that took Chinese Nationalism to the populace and thus

reinforced political forces with Nationalistic agendas, specifically the GMD and CCP.

Sun Yat Sen’s negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resulted in the

First United Front in 1922, with the aim of ending the fiefdom of the warlords [3].

Though the First United Front was short lived, breaking down over fighting and

distrust between the GMD and the CCP it remains important. Both the GMD and the

CCP, by virtue of entering the alliance, accepted that regionalism had to come to an

end, and a nationalist reunification was more important than fighting each other. This

was even more significant as by 1922 these were the two largest political forces in

the country.

Amidst all this jousting for power another development was underway that would lay

the seeds for a popular nationalist sentiment in China. It began on the 4th of May 1919

with a set of student demonstrations in Beijing protesting the conditions imposed on

China under the Treaty of Versailles. In what grew to become the New Culture

Movement, the May Fourth Movement was crucial in shifting Chinese Nationalism

from a concept largely limited to the intellectual elite to a populist sentiment. As

Zarrow states, “the movement represented an entirely new type of grass roots politics

based largely on nationalistic feelings.” [4] The broader New Culture Movement was

also important for accelerating a transition from traditional Confucian ideals to

modern global and western values, a process that had begun with the removal of the

Qing in 1911.

A key component of squashing the warlords and establishing power at the ce ntre was

developing a strong centralized army. This led to the development of two parallel

forces. For the GMD it meant the establishment of the National Revolutionary Army

(NRA) in 1925. Developed for Chiang Kai Shek’s Northern Expedition, this grew into

the primary military arm of the GMD during the civil war, and later developed into

the Republic of China (Taiwan) military. The CCP simultaneously established the

People’s Liberation Army. This originated as a peasant guerilla force evolved into

China’s armed forces and the largest conventional military organization in the world.

While this parallel development of two armies inevitably led to conflict and

eventually to all out civil war, there are key similarities between the two. An example

of this is the Whampoa Military Academy. Developed by Sun Yat Sen in the early

twenties with Soviet help, the academy aimed to lessen China’s reliance on warlords

for military leadership, and instead train a new generation of professional officers to

lead ever evolving armed forces in China. It was also a symbol of GMD-CCP

cooperation, as both parties worked together on the project. [6] The academies

influence on nationalism and politics is even greater because the academy trained

both GMD and CCP officers and would have a great effect on the ideologies of both the

PLA and the ROC Army. [7]

During the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) the GMD and the CCP again

collaborated, this time to fight the Japanese. While the cooperation was less than

whole hearted, they reinforced the belief that China, and Chinese Nationalism came

first for both parties. Following the eventual Chinese victory, with allied assistance,

China again erupted into civil war. By 1948 however, the CCP was able to use its

massive peasant support base and lessons learnt from fighting the Japanese to route

the GMD forces to the island of Formosa and establish a government in Beijing. While

the GMD was far better equipped, it appears that their leadership was unable to make

use of it. As General Barr stated “Their military debacles can be attributed to the worst

leadership in the world and… a complete loss of will to fight. [7]

The fight was far from over for the PLA. Within a few short years of its birth, the

People’s Republic of China had to face the American forces in Korea (1950-53), the

Indians in the Sino-Indian War (1962) and the Vietnamese (1979). This was

accompanied by a decades long border conflict with the Soviet Union. But Mao and

the CCP were able to use these conflicts to build and cu ltivate a stronger “Chinese”

identity. This sort of almost militant nationalism definitely contributed towards the

development of a stronger, more cohesive and unified China.

The PLA’s doctrine changed considerably after Mao’s death, much in keeping with

other policies in the nation. Mao had seen China under existential threat. Along these

lines, we can see that Mao invested heavily in developing the organizational and

technological prowess of the armed forces, evidenced by the heavy investment into

space and missile technology [8]

Following Mao’s death there was a massive revision in this policy. In Mao’s China, the

assumption was that war, when it came, would be total and global in scope, and the

resulting devastation would also be total. Despite Maoist bravado, this tended to

make China think rather carefully before it used force because of the real dangers of

escalation. Today, from Beijing’s perspective, the dominant trends in the world are

supposed to be “peace and development.” Furthermore, the PLA’s current doctrine of

limited war under high technology conditions also makes it likely that Beijing will see

conflict as an acceptable risk. [9]

This has spawned, firstly a renewed nationalistic feeling among the Chinese populace,

and secondly an almost ultra-nationalistic fervor in the military combined with a

redistribution of military investments to first the air force, and more recently the

navy, “[the] PLAAF is concentrating on shifting from positional, defensive operations

to mobile, offensive operations.” This reflects China’s shift from an existentially

defensive doctrine in most of the 20th century to a more confident, hegemonic, and

aggressive attitude recently, which reflects their newfound power on the world stage

[10]

On the basis of empirical evidence throughout the last century, it is reasonable to

conclude that there is a direct link between Chinese Nationalism and the development

of a strong, centralized and modern military. The concept of Chinese Nationalism a

modern one, it arose near the end of the 19th century. Nationalism throughout the

first half of the 20th century seems to have been only as healthy as the army at the

time. The Warlord Era reinforces this notion as the only period of the 20 th century

that Chinese Nationalism was on the decline coincided with the only period of

deterioration in the military.

China has gone from being a loosely federated empire to a strongly unified nation

with strict centralization. It has also gone from being a poor country at the mercy of

western powers to a leading economic power. A “Chinese” identity was cultivated, a

sense of the Chinese nation developed. That, simultaneously, a regular Chinese

military was formed, developed from a group of ill-trained militias to one of the

largest, most battle hardened and centralized military forces in the world is not a

coincidence.

Notes Throughout this essay the term “nationalist” does not refer to the GMD alone, but rather to the political ideology. Therefore Sun Yat Sen’s Republic, the GMD and the CCP are all considered to be “nationalists”

References

1 Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911 (Vancouver,: University of British Columbia Press, 1980). Pp. 173

2 Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1955)

3 Ibid

4 Zarrow, Peter. China in War and Revolution, 1895 - 1949. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007. Print. Pp. 149

5 Ibid. Pp.214

6 PLA History, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-

history.html, online

7 Ibid.

7. Bianco, Origins of Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, Stanford University Press, 1971, Print. Pp 180

8. Burkitt et Al, The Lessons of History: The People’s Liberation Army at 75,

Washinton: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub52.pdf, Pp. 207

9. Ibid. Pp. 207

10. Ibid. Pp. 90

Bibliography A History of the Modern Chinese Army, Xiabong Li, New York, Johns Hopkins University, 2007. Print Van De Van, Hans. War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Print. Meisner, Maurice J. Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic. New York: Free, 1986. Print. Zarrow, Peter. China in War and Revolution, 1895 - 1949. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007. Print. Burkitt et Al, The Lessons of History: The People’s Liberation Army at 75, Washinton: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub52.pdf Bianco, Origins of Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, Stanford University Press, 1971, Print PLA History, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-history.html, 2008, Online.