“TIPS FOR PREPARING FOR YOUR OSHA PSM...

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Texas Chemical Council Environmental, Health & Safety Seminar

Moody Gardens Convention Center Galveston, Texas

“TIPS FOR PREPARING FOR YOUR

OSHA PSM INSPECTION” June 5, 2013

Mark S. Dreux, Esq. Arent Fox LLP

1717 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

202-857-6405 (o) 703-628-6742 (c)

E-mail: [email protected] © Mark S. Dreux 2013

mailto:[email protected]�


OVERVIEW

♦ CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS CRITICIZING OSHA ♦ OSHA’S RESPONSE TO CRITICISM – TWO NEP’S ♦ WEST FERTILIZER ♦ REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ CHEMICAL NEP

♦ Overview ♦ Chemical NEP Enforcement Statistics

♦ LESSONS LEARNED FROM PSM CITATION PATTERNS ♦ INDUSTRY STANDARDS CITED MOST FREQUENTLY ♦ OSHA INTERPRETATION LETTER ON THRESHOLD QUANTITIES ♦ RECOMMENDATIONS


CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON BP DISASTER – MARCH 22, 2007

♦ Chairman Miller ♦ Is OSHA doing its job? ♦ OSHA has failed to protect workers ♦ BP is the story of the failure of OSHA ♦ OSHA’s penalty structure is ineffective

♦ Congressman Holt ♦ “OSHA is the lap dog of the industry”


KEY WITNESS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

♦ Carolyn Meritt – Chairperson of CSB ♦ OSHA’s regulatory oversight was

ineffective ♦ Rigorous enforcement of PSM would have

prevented this incident ♦ OSHA has few trained inspectors.

♦ All witnesses agreed Chemical Industry and Refining Industry have similar safety issues.


OSHA’S RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM

♦ Two National Emphasis Programs ♦ Released in June 2007 – Refining NEP ♦ Released in July 2009 – Pilot Chemical NEP ♦ Released in November 2011 – Chemical NEP

♦ Interpretation letters pulled from OSHA’s website ♦ New interpretation letters and aggressive

enforcement to expand PSM coverage ♦ More PSM trained compliance officers


CRITICISM SURROUNDING THE WEST FERTILIZER

♦ Numerous New Articles ♦ OSHA does not have the resources. ♦ OSHA and state plans have 2,000 inspectors for

8 million workplaces or once every 131 years. ♦ OSHA’s penalties are too low.

♦ Congressional hearings ♦ Potential legislation ♦ Increased enforcement by OSHA


REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

♦ Based on the 65 NEP citations:

♦ Total Citations 1,542

♦ PSM 1088 (70%) ♦ Non-PSM 454 (30%)

♦ Total Fines $9,401,472.00


REFINING NEP CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CITATIONS

Serious 1335 87%

OTS 77 5%

Willful/Unclassified

92 8%

Repeat

38

Total 1,542 100%



♦ Most Citations 93 (88 PSM)

♦ Fewest Citations 1 (0 PSM)

♦ Highest Penalty $3,042,000

♦ Lowest Penalty $1,125

♦ Average 24 citations $144,638 penalty


Mechanical Integrity 202 Process Safety Information 189 Process Hazard Analysis 188 Operating Procedures 184 Management of Change 92 Incident Investigation 71 Compliance Audits 47 Contractors 33 Training 29

REFINING NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (65 NEP Citations Issued as of 3/14/11)

855 79%


Emergency Planning and Response 17 Employee Participation 15 Pre-Startup Safety Review 13 Hot Work Permits 8 Trade Secrets 0 Total PSM Citations

1088

REFINING NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

(65 NEP Citations Issued as of 3/14/11) (cont’d)


REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

J(1) Process equipment 0

J(2) Written procedures 37 J(3) Training 3

J(4) Inspection and testing 0

J(4)(i) Inspection and testing 29

J(4)(ii) Engineering practices 22

J(4)(iii) Frequency 23

J(4)(iv) Documentation 14

J(5) Equipment deficiencies 61

J(6)(i) Quality assurance 0

J(6)(ii) Inspections 9

J(6)(iii) Materials and spare parts 4

TOTAL 202

88


♦ J-2 Mechanical Integrity Program ♦ No Procedures for:

♦ Pressure vessels with integrally bonded liners ♦ Corrosion under insulation inspections for pressure

vessels and piping ♦ Addressing anomalous readings pertaining to metal

thickness ♦ Determining thickness measurement frequency for

pressure vessels ♦ Determining the representative number of thickness

measurements



♦ J-4 Testing and Inspections ♦ Failure to follow own scheduled T/I

♦ Visual inspections ♦ Ultra sound ♦ Internal corrosion ♦ TML’s ♦ Vibration analysis

♦ Failure to follow RAGAGEP ♦ Testing of wrong locations ♦ Testing of wrong frequency ♦ Insufficient number of tests

♦ Failure to document the T/I results



♦ 119(J)(5) Equipment Deficiencies ♦ TML’s below recommended thickness ♦ H2S, HF & LEL detectors not working ♦ Temperature gauge broken ♦ Chains for operating valves missing ♦ Relieve valve set at 270 PSI when

MAWP was 150 PSI




PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D Schedule/Prioritization 2 D(1) Information re: Hazards 0 D(2) Technological Information 17 D(3) Equipment Information 170

Total

189


REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D(3)(i) Information on Equipment 5 D(3)(i)(A) Materials of Construction 5 D(3)(i)(B) P&ID’s 38 D(3)(i)(C) Electrical Classification 7 D(3)(i)(D) Relief System Design and Design Basis 27 D(3)(i)(E) Ventilation System Design 2 D(3)(i)(F) Design Codes and Standards 9 D(3)(i)(H) Safety Systems 1 D(3)(ii) Document Equipment complies with

RAGAGEP 72

D(3)(iii) Equipment Designed on a Code no Longer in General Use

4

Total 170


♦ P&ID’s ♦ Inaccurate info on P&ID’s

♦ Vessel or pump out of service ♦ Wrong pressure or temperature ♦ Lines mislabeled

♦ Omissions from P&ID’s ♦ Temperature indicator ♦ Sight glass ♦ By-pass line ♦ New equipment ♦ New lines




♦ 119(d)(3)(i)(D) – Relief System Design and Design Basis ♦ Blowdowns/Atmospheric Discharge

♦ Lack of technical data to show safe release to atmosphere

♦ Relief Systems – ♦ Adequacy following changes especially

changes in thru-put ♦ Design basis – lack of technical support



♦ 119(d)(3)(ii) – Equipment with RAGAGEP ♦ Facility Siting – NFPA 496 and API 752 ♦ Electrical classifications—API 500 ♦ Trailers – API 753 ♦ Relief Valves and Design – ASME & API 520

♦ Adequacy and sizing of valves ♦ No PSV’s ♦ Intervening valves


REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

E(1) Appropriate PHA/Prioritization 12 E(2) Methodologies 0 E(3) PHA addresses 0 E(3)(i) Hazards 15 E(3)(ii) Incidents 10 E(3)(iii) E and A Controls 15 E(3)(iv) Failure of Controls 11 E(3)(v) Facility siting 31 E(3)(vi) Human factors 23 E(3)(vii) Qualitative evaluation 2 E(4) Team of Experts 0 E(5) Findings/recommendations 53 E(6) Revalidation 15 E(7) Revalidation records 1

TOTAL 188

107


♦ 119(e) PHA’s ♦ PHA

♦ Failure to consider all scenarios ♦ Loss of utilities or control rooms ♦ Fires and releases of HHC’s

♦ Failure to consider near misses ♦ Propane leaks ♦ Oil Spills ♦ Fires

♦ Failure to adequately consider ♦ Facility Siting ♦ Human factors



♦ Failure to address findings – ♦ Ranged 2-15 years ♦ Complexity – gravity – time (citation factors)

♦ Failure to document corrective measures




OPERATING PROCEDURES

F(1) Written procedures 18 F(1)(i) Operating phases 65 F(1)(ii) Operating limits 26 F(1)(iii) Safety and health 12 F(1)(iv) Safety systems 9 F(2) Access 3 F(3) Certification 23 F(4) Safe work practices 28

TOTAL 184

130


♦ SOP’s ♦ Lack operating limits or consequences

of deviation ♦ Missing essential step in procedure ♦ Referring to outdated equipment, step

or specific manager ♦ Error with locks or carseals on valves

for startup



♦ Safe Work Practices ♦ Procedures/practices for controlling

motorized vehicles in process areas ♦ OSHA relies electrical classification

drawings to show a “hazard”



REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

L(1) Written procedures 40 L(2) Considerations 2 L(2)(i) Technical basis 3 L(2)(ii) Impact of change 9 L(2)(iii) Operating procedures 1 L(2)(iv) Time Period 3 L(2)(v) Authorization requirements 2 L(3) Employee training 4 L(4) Update PSI 22 L(5) Revise operating procedures 6

TOTAL 92

60

32



♦ MOC’s ♦ Failure to do MOC’s (adequacy)

♦ Throughput increases ♦ Changing startup pressures ♦ Rerating boilers ♦ Removing column, quench water

♦ Failure to do related updates ♦ PSI ♦ Procedures ♦ Training


Summary of OSHA’s Chemical NEP

♦ Pilot Program has ended.

♦ National Program started in November 2011.

♦ Applies to chemical plants subject to PSM.

♦ Applies nationwide to all OSHA regions and state plans.

♦ State plans must implement the chemical NEP within 6 months or develop one that is “at least as effective.”


Chemical NEP Programmed and Unprogrammed Inspections

♦ Programmed inspections under this NEP shall be randomly selected sites from the Region’s revised lists

♦ 3-5 programmed inspections per Area Office per year (52 Area Offices)

♦ Unprogrammed inspections: other triggers for a Chemical NEP inspection: ♦ Accident ♦ Catastrophe ♦ Complaint ♦ Referral ♦ Site-specific targeting plan


Chemical NEP Dynamic Lists ♦ “CSHO’s should verify the implementation of PSM

elements to ensure that the employer’s actual program is consistent with their written program.”

♦ Three OSHA inspection protocols called “Dynamic Lists”:

♦ PSM General

♦ Ammonia Refrigeration

♦ Chemical Processing

♦ These lists will be periodically updated and are not available for public review


Chemical NEP Prior PSM Citations: Abatement Requirement

♦ “During the course of the inspection, the CSHO shall review abatement for all PSM citations issued within the previous 6 years to determine whether the hazard still exists.”

♦ “If a hazard exists, the CSHO shall determine whether there has been a failure to abate in accordance with CPL 02-00-148-FOM, and issue a notice for failure to abate as appropriate.”

♦ FTA penalties can be up to $7,000 per day per violation.


Chemical NEP Staffing and Duration of Inspection

♦ Usually 1-2 compliance officers

♦ Inspectors must take specialized PSM training classes

♦ 134 man hours for Chemical NEP inspection (includes preparation, opening, site work and drafting citations and reports)

♦ 25 man hours for average OSHA inspection

♦ 1000 man hours for Refining NEP inspection


♦ CHEM NEP data from May 1, 2009 to Nov. 9, 2012 Total Inspections..........................................536 Unprogrammed.................................. 215 Programmed......................................321

♦ CHEM NEP Violations (Federal only).....2,339

Current Inspection Data for Chemical NEP


♦ New citation data system still being implemented

♦ Current Statistical Breakdown for Top Five PSM Violations for Chem NEP.

OSHA – New Citation Data Tabulation System

1. (j) – Mechanical Integrity 2. (d) – Process Safety Information 3. (f) – Operating Procedures 4. (e) – Process Hazard Analysis 5. (l) – Management of Change

♦ Same top five PSM citations as in Refining NEP.


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (Based on Sample of 98 Citations)

♦ Based on the 98 NEP citations sampled:

♦ Total Citations 1031

♦ PSM 678 (65%) ♦ Non-PSM 353 (35%)

♦ Total Fines $4,147,267.50


CHEMICAL NEP CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CITATIONS

Serious 856 83%

OTS 153 15%

Willful/Unclassified

7 2%

Repeat

15

Total 1031 100%


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

♦ Most Citations 49 (25 PSM)

♦ Fewest Citations 1 ( 0 PSM)

♦ Highest Penalty $441,000

♦ Lowest Penalty $ 0

♦ Average 11 citations $42,300 penalty

♦ Approximately 20 Facilities with No Citations (No PSM Process)


Mechanical Integrity 156 Process Safety Information 140 Operating Procedures 114 Process Hazard Analysis 106 Management of Change 44 Compliance Audits 35 Training 21 Incident Investigation 19 Employee Participation 16

CHEMICAL NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (98 NEP Citations Sampled)

560 84%


Contractors 14 Emergency Planning and Response 7 Pre-Startup Safety Review 5 Hot Work Permits 1 Trade Secrets 0 Total PSM Citations

678

CHEMICAL NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (98 NEP Citations Sampled)


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

J(1) Process equipment 0

J(2) Written procedures 41 J(3) Training 5

J(4) Inspection and testing 0

J(4)(i) Inspection and testing 28

J(4)(ii) Engineering practices 11

J(4)(iii) Frequency 21

J(4)(iv) Documentation 10

J(5) Equipment deficiencies 28

J(6)(i) Quality assurance 2

J(6)(ii) Inspections 6

J(6)(iii) Materials and spare parts 4

TOTAL 156

70


♦ J-2 Mechanical Integrity Program ♦ Summary

♦ No procedures for mechanical integrity ♦ Procedures Inadequate

♦ Inconsistent with RAGAGEP ♦ Critical Step Wrong ♦ Critical Omissions

♦ Written procedures contained no reference to applicable RAGAGEP

♦ No procedures in place for piping or valves showing signs of degradation or rust

♦ The employer’s critical equipment list did not include certain storage tanks and air compressors

♦ Procedures did not specify the necessary torque for flange bolts



♦ J-4 Testing and Inspections ♦ Summary

♦ No Inspection Schedule ♦ Did Not Follow Own Inspection Schedule ♦ Schedule Inconsistent with RAGAGEP

♦ Examples ♦ Inspections were not done on storage tanks for anhydrous

ammonia, liquid chlorine, and sulfur dioxide ♦ Inspections were not done on pre-existing TML locations ♦ Employer did not conduct inspections per IIAR Bulletin 110 or its

equivalent ♦ Pressure relief valves had not been inspected every 5 years to

comply with ASHRAE-15 ♦ Inspection and NDE were not done on process equipment per

RAGAGEP such as API 570, API RP 575, and ASME/ANSI B31.3



♦ 119(J)(5) Equipment Deficiencies ♦ Visual concerns – detected during walkaround

♦ Poor condition of paint/external coating was not addressed

♦ Rusted, pitted, and corroded piping were in use

♦ Valves were missing handles and could not be operated

♦ Calculated data ♦ TML’s below recommended thickness

♦ Emergency exhaust and relief discharge piping were undersized




PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D Schedule/Prioritization 4 D(1) Information re: Hazards 0 D(2) Technological Information 21 D(3) Equipment Information 115

Total

140


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D(3)(i) Information on Equipment 7 D(3)(i)(A) Materials of Construction 2 D(3)(i)(B) P&ID’s 26 D(3)(i)(C) Electrical Classification 5 D(3)(i)(D) Relief System Design and Design Basis 11 D(3)(i)(E) Ventilation System Design 6 D(3)(i)(F) Design Codes and Standards 7 D(3)(i)(G) Material and Energy Balance 1 D(3)(i)(H) Safety Systems 3 D(3)(ii) Document Equipment complies with

RAGAGEP 43

D(3)(iii) Equipment Designed on a Code no Longer in General Use

4

Total 115


♦ P&ID’s ♦ Current P&IDs were not available ♦ Errors

♦ Two valve tags were reversed ♦ Pressure indicators were missing in the field ♦ Pipe sizes were labeled improperly ♦ Valves were in the wrong place

♦ Omissions ♦ P&ID did not include information required by RAGAGEP,

ANSI/ISA S5.1 Code ♦ Valves or equipment missing




♦ 119(d)(3)(i)(D) – Relief System Design and Design Basis ♦ No worst case scenario had been developed

♦ No information for the relief system was available

♦ No documentation for design basis for the relief system for tanks and vessels


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ 119(d)(3)(ii) – Equipment with RAGAGEP

♦ No documentation of compliance with the HFIPI Guideline for the Bulk Storage of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride

♦ No documentation of compliance with IIAR Bulletin 110 where relief valves could relieve to an unsafe location

♦ No documentation that relief valves complied with IIAR Bulletin 114

♦ No documentation of compliance with RAGAGEP where a vessel’s U-1 had not been maintained

♦ Failure to document compliance with API 520 for relief systems ♦ Technical Engineering Issues and Non-Compliance

♦ Co-location of equipment using combustion air and equipment containing refrigerant did not comply with ANSI/ASHRAE 15

♦ Location of discharge for pressure relief devices did not comply with ANSI/IIAR 2-2008

♦ Relief systems not located properly ♦ Pipes and valves not labeled properly


CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

E(1) Appropriate PHA/Prioritization 10 E(2) Methodologies 1 E(3) PHA addresses 1 E(3)(i) Hazards 17 E(3)(ii) Incidents 4 E(3)(iii) E and A Controls 9 E(3)(iv) Failure of Controls 6 E(3)(v) Facility siting 11 E(3)(vi) Human factors 9 E(3)(vii) Qualitative evaluation 0 E(4) Team of Experts 1 E(5) Findings/recommendations 26 E(6) Revalidation 10 E(7) Revalidation records 1

TOTAL 106

57


♦ 119(e) PHA’s ♦ Failure to conduct an initial PHA on a covered process ♦ Failure to consider all scenarios

♦ Loss of power ♦ Hazards associated with combustible dust ♦ Outdoor environmental factors affecting the safe operation of

process equipment ♦ Failure of pressure relief devices ♦ Specific incident that occurred at the plant (either before the

PHA was done or after) ♦ Failure to adequately consider

♦ Facility Siting ♦ Human Factors



♦ 119(e) PHA’s (cont’d) ♦ Failure to address findings

♦ Employer could not verify that recommendations from a 1998 PHA were resolved

♦ Failure to establish a “system” to address recommendations ♦ Failure to document the reasons an alternative resolution was

adopted rather than that recommended by the PHA team ♦ Failure to communicate resolutions of PHA recommendations

to affected employees ♦ Complexity – gravity – time (citation factors)

♦ Failure to re-do or revalidate a PHA within 5 years




OPERATING PROCEDURES

F(1) Written procedures 21 F(1)(i) Operating phases 38 F(1)(ii) Operating limits 10 F(1)(iii) Safety and health 14 F(1)(iv) Safety systems 6 F(2) Access 2 F(3) Certification 17 F(4) Safe work practices 6

TOTAL 114

89


♦ SOP’s ♦ Operating procedures were not being implemented

by employees ♦ Factual errors

♦ Listing out of service equipment ♦ Omitting steps

♦ Regulatory errors ♦ Steps were unclear ♦ Procedures did not address which employees were

authorized to perform the various steps ♦ Procedures had not been developed for each phase of

operating the process



♦ Annual Certification of Operating Procedures ♦ Certification was not done ♦ Certification was not valid because procedures

were not accurate




♦ Management of Change (44 Citations) ♦ Failure to do MOC

♦ Throughput changes ♦ Change in PPE for employees opening a vessel ♦ Change in TML location ♦ MOC was not completed before the equipment change

occurred ♦ Failure to evaluate

♦ Impact of the change on safety and health ♦ Failure to do related updates

♦ PSI ♦ Procedures ♦ Training


LESSONS LEARNED FROM PSM CITATION PATTERNS

♦ OSHA’s aggressive interpretations of PSM standard

♦ OSHA’s selective interpretations of RAGAGEP

♦ OSHA demands documentation for PHA, audit and incident investigation findings.

♦ Citation patterns show OSHA’s PSM priorities


OSHA’S AGGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS

♦ Piping and Instrumentation drawings ♦ Applying steam constitutes a change ♦ Covering mixtures of less than 10,000 lbs

of flammables under the PSM standard. ♦ Facility siting: Determining that 1 in 100

million years risk basis for a willful citation.

♦ Required to keep PHA documentation from 1994 and 1998.


OSHA’s Use of RAGAGEP

♦ API 752 ♦ Management of Hazards Associated with Location of

Process Plant Permanent Buildings ♦ API 570

♦ Piping Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping

♦ API 510 ♦ Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection,

Rating, Repair, and Alteration ♦ API 521

♦ Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems

Most Frequently Referenced RAGAGEPs


OSHA’s Use of RAGAGEP

♦ API 574 ♦ Inspection Practices for Piping System Components

♦ API 520 ♦ Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving

Devices in Refineries ♦ API 753

♦ Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings

♦ ANSI/ISA S.84.01 ♦ Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the

Process Industry Sector ♦ ASME/ANSI B31.1 and B31.3 (piping)


CHEMICAL NEP MOST FREQUENTLY CITED NON-PSM CITATIONS

Electrical Safety

Respirators

Lockout/Tagout

Subpart D - Walking/Working Surfaces

Machine Guarding



♦ Electrical ♦ Working space around equipment was not kept clear ♦ Covers for electrical installations were not secured/all

unused openings were not effectively closed ♦ Improper grounding ♦ Flexible cords and cables were used as a substitute for fixed

wiring ♦ Unclassified electrical equipment was used in a classified

area ♦ Defective electrical equipment was not removed from service ♦ Proper electrical protective equipment was not provided

where necessary (FR clothing, face shields, NFPA 70E considerations for arc flash)



♦ Respirators ♦ Employer failed to determine a reasonable estimate of

employee exposure to respiratory hazards ♦ Written respiratory protection program was not in place

when respirators were necessary ♦ Medical evaluations were not provided before employees

were fit-tested or required to use respirators ♦ Fit-testing was not provided prior to initial use of the

respirator ♦ Employees did not receive training before being allowed

to use tight-fitting respirators ♦ Respirators were not cleaned and disinfected as often as

necessary to be maintained in a sanitary condition



♦ Lockout/Tagout ♦ Failure to develop, document, and utilize written lockout

procedures for specifically identified equipment ♦ Lockout/tagout devices did not meet the requirements of

1910.147(c)(5) – identify employee, tagouts must be non-reusable, etc.

♦ Periodic inspections of the lockout/tagout procedures were not completed

♦ Lockout/tagout training was deficient where each employee had his own way of locking out

♦ Lockout/tagout procedures were not implemented as required – employees failed to follow the procedures

♦ In group lockout scenarios, each employee failed to affix his own lockout device



♦ Subpart D – Walking/Working Surfaces ♦ Ladderways and platforms were not adequately guarded ♦ Wall openings over 4 feet from the level below were not

adequately guarded ♦ Open-sided floors and platforms over 4 feet from the level

below were not adequately guarded



♦ Machine Guarding ♦ Inadequate guarding for:

♦ Drill presses ♦ Augers ♦ Conveyors ♦ Lathes ♦ Milling machines

♦ Fans ♦ Saws ♦ Grinders ♦ Shafts and shaft ends ♦ Chains and belts


♦ Question: Is the total mass of a mixture consisting of a fine, non-soluble, non-combustible solid combined with a flammable liquid considered when determining if a threshold quantity (TQ) is present in a process?

♦ Rationale: If the mixture as a whole meets the 29 CFR 1910.1200(c)(iii) definition of a flammable liquid, then the total amount of flammable liquid is 10,000 pounds, even if some components(s) of the mixture alone would not meet the required flash point.

♦ Answer: Because the mixture in question meets the definition of a liquid and has a flashpoint of less than 100°F, it is a flammable liquid. A process containing 10,000 pounds or more of the mixture would be covered under the PSM standard.

Regulatory Update: May 21, 2009 Kaster Letter PSM - Calculating TQ’s


RECOMMENDATIONS

♦ First Recommendation – Use of the Citation Data ♦ Auditing ♦ Preparing for inspections ♦ Settlements and potential repeat citations ♦ Due diligence


RECOMMENDATIONS

♦ Second Recommendation ♦ Review prior citations for PSM violations ♦ Go to osha.gov – Check OSHA’s records on

citations for PSM violations ♦ Gather documents to show abated ♦ Audit to ensure not recurring

♦ Third Recommendation ♦ Do the Unit selection analysis for the “most

hazardous process”

http://www.osha.gov/�


RECOMMENDATIONS (cont’d)

♦ Fourth Recommendation – Conduct an Audit of Selected Unit



♦ Traditional Safety Focus – include in Unit audit

♦ Consider whether you want to do audit under privilege. See case where we successfully defended a claim of attorney privilege for a gap analysis under Refining NEP.

Electrical LOTO PPE Guarding Respirators Walking/Working

Surfaces



♦ Fifth recommendation: ♦ Train a team to manage the inspection

♦ Sixth recommendation: ♦ Interview disgruntled employees

“TIPS FOR PREPARING FOR YOUR OSHA PSM...

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