Tinkering with Technology: Human Factors,Work Redesign, and Professionalsin Workplace Innovation

Richard BadhamDepartment of Management and BHP Institute for Steel Processing andProducts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

Pelle EhnSchool of Art and Communication, Malmö University, S-20506 Malmö,Sweden

I have been an organisation tinker for about twenty years. I tinker for, and with, many types oforganisations. . . The Concise Oxford Dictionary (21951) defines a tinker (among other things) as:“a mender (especially itinerant), a rough and ready worker, a botcher, one who patches in an am-ateurish and clumsy fashion by way of repair or alteration. . . .” Organisation tinkers patch, alter,and repair organisations in a rough and ready fashion. The practice has a long and honourablehistory . . . but whatever tools he may be carrying in his knapsack, whatever his sales pitch, thetinker is fundamentally a botcher, a patcher, and, in the pejorative sense of the word, an amateur.His approach is that of trial-and-error, suck-it-and-see. His tools are simple, his techniques crudeand clumsy, his familiarity and understanding of his raw material relatively slight. To tinker withsomething is not to know what it is you are doing . . . Few organisation development consultantsare craftsmen. Most of us are tinkers exhibiting some degree of skill but little artistry. Our practiceruns well ahead of our understanding. . . (Mangham, 1978, pp. xiii–xiv)

ABSTRACT

Professionals in workplace innovation operate in practice as collective designers and political en-trepreneurs as well as applied scientists. They apply and adapt human factors and organizationalknowledge and techniques to enable projects to succeed in complex, culturally diverse, and polit-ically charged change processes. This creates a major challenge for their professional training. Theyrequire a self-understanding, ability, and will that enables them to act as reflective practitionerscontinuously improving the practical skills of their “craft.” This article draws on the reflections ofprofessionals in workplace innovation to argue this case, and seeks to inform further reflection bypresenting a view of their role as professional bricoleurs. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

1. INTRODUCTION: INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND “HUMAN FACTORS”

At the heart of the traditional industrial ethos is the belief that science and industry arecapable of solving the problems that they cause (Badham, 1986). One of the prime ex-amples of this ethos has been the enduring quest to deal with the “human factor” inproduction—whether this is seen as a problem of “motivation,” “resistance,” or simply

1For elaboration on this point I am especially indebted to an unnamed referee of an earlier version of this article.

Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, Vol. 10 (1) 61–82 (2000)© 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 1090-8471/00/010061-22

61

lack of appropriate skills or “match” between aptitudes, equipment, and jobs. While theadvance of material technology has continued apace, this has not been matched, it isargued, by equivalent progress in the “human” domain. There is a problem of “culturelag” as knowledge and action in the adaptation of “man” to “industry” has fallen behindmaterial technological knowledge and application. The answer lies, so it is further ar-gued, in more scientific knowledge, but this time in the human rather than the naturalsciences. Once this most complicated science has been completed, the whole of industry,and society, will be amenable to prediction and control for the benefit of all.

Since World War I, a number of professions have arisen to help address this task. In thepost–World War I period, the study of fatigue and personnel selection and training wasreplete with such hopes and rhetoric (Hollway, 1996). The scientific management move-ment subsequently became highly influential in its quest to rise above managerial andworker ideology to provide a scientific analysis of work. In partial reaction against sci-entific management, the human relations movement in the 1920s and 1930s discovered“social” man and developed counseling and leadership techniques in order to integratethis “man” into the common industrial purpose (Gillespie, 1993). Similarly critical of theearlier focus on methods for adapting people to their work, the development of ergonom-ics and human factors engineering from the 1950s on focused on using information fromwork physiology, biomechanics, and engineering psychology to design workstations andindustrial processes that fit the people working with them. In the United States, thisdevelopment was closely linked to military research on the use of sophisticated equip-ment, whereas in Europe it was more closely related to worker safety, health, and comfort(Helander, 1997). Since the classic work of the Tavistock Institute in the 1950s, socio-technical systems professionals have developed a broader concern with the overall tech-nical and social structure of work systems, and their links to organization as well astechnology design (Badham, forthcoming). The latter has expanded in a number of dif-ferent directions. It includes different national sociotechnical traditions (Einjatten, 1993;Taylor & Felten, 1993). It has also extended what were often work redesign methods intothe design of “human centred” or “work oriented” man–machine systems. It has also beenaccompanied by the growth of a widely encompassing “macroergonomic” tradition link-ing sociotechnical systems approaches to organizational and work systems design and thedesign of related human–machine, human–environment, and user–system interfaces (Hen-drick, 1997).

The result has been a growth in the number of what could be broadly called profes-sionals in workplace innovation. This broad category includes what many commonly de-fine as the human factors profession, that is, the more traditionally defined disciplines ofergonomics and human factors engineering, understood as primarily concerned with ap-plying scientific knowledge of humans to the design of man–machine interface systems,focusing mainly on human physical and perceptual characteristics, but more recently ex-tending into “cognitive” or “software” ergonomics (Helander, 1997). This is the area thatU.S. companies still consider to be the central “human” consideration in technology de-sign and implementation (Lund, Bishop, Newman, & Salzman, 1993). In a broader sense,however, professionals in workplace innovation extend far beyond this central core. Theycan be seen to include a wide gamut of interdisciplinary workers applying knowledge andmethods from a variety of disciplines to design technology, jobs, and organizations tomore effectively mobilize and control the “human factor” in production—with more orless strong links to technology. These range from cognitive science and psychology tosociotechnical systems theory, organizational development, and ethnographic and socio-

62 BADHAM AND EHN

logical explorations of technology and organizational design. Their effects can be foundin job and work redesign; work-oriented, user-oriented, or human-centered system de-sign; as well as computer-supported cooperative work and broader human resource de-velopment and strategic organizational redesign.

In recent years, this broader grouping of workplace innovation professionals has re-ceived greater recognition by ergonomists and human factors engineers, as well as criticsof the restricted scope of the human factors professions. Human factors professionals, ina strict sense, are strongly focused on the technological, biomechanical, and informationprocessing characteristics of man–machine systems. However, in the papers of confer-ences organized by the International Ergonomics Association, as well as interlinked con-ferences such as the HCI Conference, there has been a broadening of scope to includecontributions from other disciplines. This is clearly evidenced in the development of whatsome take to be a subdiscipline of ergonomics—“macroergonomics” (Hendrick, 1997). Itis also notable, for example, that the second edition of theHandbook of Human Factorsand Ergonomics(1997) adopts a very broad view of human factors. It includes wide-ranging articles on participatory ergonomics, job and team design, organizational designand macroergonomics, and socially centered design. The latter, in particular, points to thecontributions made by ethnography to an understanding of work roles, organizationalstructure and informal work practices, and cultures in the design of man–machine systems.

The broad category of professionals in workplace innovation also incorporates the par-ticularly dynamic area of human–computer interface design. This area clearly continuesand overlaps with traditional ergonomic and human factors concerns and has been thefocus of a widening variety of disciplines. These disciplines have adopted a more or lessbroad and “deep” view of interface design and implementation. The broad interest inresearch, knowledge, and practice in the more general area of workplace innovation hasalso been confirmed in the establishment of this journal and the range of articles that itpublishes.

The characterization of this broader interdisciplinary grouping is difficult and contro-versial. Many researchers and consultants well versed in traditional human factors theoryand practice have preferred to deliberately distinguish more general approaches to man–machine systems from “human factors.” Rasmussen (1993), for example, argued that

“in a period of rapid technological change and large integrated socio-technical systems, it is a ques-tion of whether a separate human factors profession can be maintained or whether human factorsproblems call for cross-disciplinary cooperation in a study of the mechanisms governing the be-haviour of large socio-technical systems in a turbulent environment. This research involves severalengineering and human sciences. To distinguish the topic from classical human factors, we aretalking aboutcognitive engineering, which is to be seen as a conceptual marketplace for interdis-ciplinary exchange, not as a separate profession.” (pp. 91–92). This use of the termcognitive en-gineeringdevelops upon the pioneering work of Norman (1986), who coined the term to refer to“an entirely new discipline, one moreover that combines two already complex fields: psychologyand computer science. Moreover, it requires breaking new ground, for our knowledge of what fos-ters good interactions among people and between people and devices is young, without a well-developed foundation . . . (it is neither Cognitive Psychology, nor Cognitive Science, nor HumanFactors. It is a type of applied Cognitive Science, trying to apply what is known from science to thedesign and construction of machines.” (Norman, 1986, pp. 32, 59).

From a different perspective, and more critically, Bannon (1991) argued for an approachthat extends from “human factors” to “human actors”:

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 63

Within the HF approach, the human is often reduced to being another system component with cer-tain characteristics, such as limited attention span, faulty memory, etc., that need to be factored intothe design equation for the overall human-machine system. This form of piecemeal analysis of theperson as a set of components de-emphasises important issues in work design. Individual motiva-tion, membership in a community of workers, and the importance of the setting in determininghuman faction are just a few of the issues that are neglected. . . By using the term human actors,emphasis is placed on the person as an autonomous agent that has the capacity to regulate andcoordinate his or her behaviour, rather than being simply a passive element in a human-machinesystem. (pp. 27–28)

While such critics argue for a broader interdisciplinary study of man–machine systemsthat goes beyond the narrowness of traditional human factors, proponents of the humanfactors profession aptly point to the dangers of any careless adoption of a looser andbroader definition of human factors. Similarly to critics of the failure of sociotechnicalsystems projects to adequately address technology (Badham & Naschold, 1994), theypoint to the neglect of technology in many work and organizational redesign projects, andthe long-established initiatives by the human factors profession to overcome the technology–human sciences divide by integrating education in technology, biomechanics, informa-tion processing, work psychology, and organization design.1

In this article, the termprofessionals in workplace innovationwill be used to refer tothose involved in developing and applying knowledge about the “human factor” in pro-duction to the design of new man–machine systems and the broader organizational con-ditions that bear on man–machine systems. It incorporates the work of human factors,work redesign, cognitive engineering, sociotechnical, human–computer interface, humanresource development, and organizational design and development professionals. The termis used here to provide a relatively neutral characterization of this range of professions,and to focus our attention on those professions, and their members, that are concernedwith bringing about innovation in both work and technology.

Despite this proliferation of academic research and professional practice in the generalarea of workplace innovation, it continues to be underrepresented at crucial stages intechnological advance. Knowledge and expertise in this area is not given comparableweight to natural science and engineering, and it remains politically weak (Clegg, 1993;Perrow, 1983). This has occurred despite the fact that there continues to be well-documented high levels of underperformance or failure in the introduction of new tech-nologies (Buchanan and Badham, 1999a), and one of the key factors most commonlyrecognized as contributing to high failure rates continues to be the lack of effective actionin dealing with human and organizational factors in technology design and implementa-tion (Badham, Couchman, & McLoughlin, 1997; Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Majchrzak& Gasser, 1991).

One strategy for addressing this problem has been to press for greater power and le-gitimacy for the professionals in workplace innovation, focusing in particular on increas-ing their scientific and educational standing. Explicitly or implicitly, this often assumesthat the pressure of scientific authority, the language of science—and the human factorssciences in particular—might increasingly become the currency and influence the prac-tice of technical designers and users. This assumption has often been linked to the searchfor improved methods, databases of successful examples, and other techniques to assistprofessionals in workplace innovation to apply their knowledge. During the 1980s and1990s, there was a concerted effort by many groups of professionals in workplace inno-vation to pursue this path, particularly within Europe, by further developing new and

64 BADHAM AND EHN

improved methods and software tools knowledge (Badham, Couchman, & Linstead, 1995).In Europe, this has been extended to attempts to influence international standards in suchareas as human centered design (ISO, 1997), while in the United States it has been em-bedded in the statutory requirement for human factors courses in the training of industrialengineers. Another factor is that the human factors professions draw much of their sup-port from more traditionally scientific disciplines such as work psychology and ergonom-ics, and are closely linked to subfields of technical disciplines such as industrial engineeringand information technology and computer science. It is not surprising, therefore, that thesearch for improved methods has been accompanied by attempts to strengthen the “sci-entific” legitimacy of the workplace innovation disciplines within the research community.

Another strategy for improving the effectiveness and impact of professionals involvedin workplace innovation, and the strategy argued for in this article, is to create a differentkind of self-understanding and language amongst such professionals in workplace inno-vation. This approach argues for a greater understanding of the social and political pro-cesses of collective design, and stresses the importance of improving the process knowledge,experience, and practices of professionals in workplace innovation. It locates the exper-tise of these professionals more centrally in such knowledge and practices. It also en-courages proactive involvement in collective design processes to realize and championhuman factors considerations in projects. This incorporates an understanding of what Hen-drick (1997) described as the “ergonomist as an organisational change agent” but extendsthis to include a broader reconsideration of the nature of applied professional knowledgeand practice.

In arguing this case, this article draws on three sources: first, established research onthe nature of professional knowledge and design practice; second, published reflectionsby professionals in workplace innovation on the nature of their “craft”; and third, reflec-tions by sociotechnical researchers and practitioners in the United Kingdom, the Nether-lands, and Denmark on the political practices they pursue in order to achieve successfuloutcomes in change projects. The latter reflections were the product of three workshopsfacilitated by the first author of this article in 1997 in the relevant countries (Buchanan &Badham, 1999a). In conclusion, it is argued that professionals in workplace innovationare best understood as operating in a somewhat paradoxical manner as “professional bri-coleurs,” making do with what is at hand, creating a bricolage that is feasible and mean-ingful in context, yet doing so in a way that is both informed by theory and improvedthrough ongoing systematic reflection. The termprofessional bricoleuris used deliber-ately to point to the tension between this activity and traditional understandings of thework of the professional and processes of applying scientific and technical knowledge.

2. PROFESSIONALS IN WORKPLACE INNOVATIONAS REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONERS

What does it mean to say that researchers and practitioners in the area of workplace in-novation are professionals? While there is a long-standing debate about the nature ofprofessions and professionalism, and particularly what this means for those involved inpersonnel areas in organizations (e.g., Legge, 1978), it is generally agreed that profes-sions can be said to exist where five conditions hold: (a) some level of skill based ontheoretical knowledge (e.g., degrees in ergonomics or macroergonomics); (b) provisionof training and education (e.g., delivery of university courses or consultancy workshopsin job redesign); (c) testing of the competence of members or evaluating their peers (e.g.,

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 65

from formal academic qualifications in psychology to evaluation of research publica-tions, grants, etc. in international journals such asErgonomics); (d) formal professionalassociations (e.g., international ergonomic or work psychology associations); and, (e) ad-herence to some professional code of conduct (e.g., ethical training and formal or infor-mal code of ethics such as that adopted by particular institutes of work psychology).

Analysts of professions have also stressed the control dimension of professionalism.Professions are identified as groupings having some level of control over expertise, knowl-edge, methods, and services that “clients” feel they need in order to address their ownproblems. In the more developed professions, they are accorded legal status and monop-olies over particular areas of knowledge, with authority to diagnose “clients”’ problemsand prescribe and apply remedies or solutions. Clearly, professionals in workplace inno-vation are quite fragmented and loosely organized and have far less monopolistic controlover the “tools of their trade” than such more established professions as law and medi-cine. It is significant that the National Science Foundation’s Manufacturing Processesand Equipment Program confirmed that health and safety and narrowly defined ergonom-ics continue to be the main human factors concerns amongst U.S. firms, closely related tothe demands of health and safety legislation (Lund et al., 1993). In broader human factorsareas, extending into sociotechnical redesign and organizational development and change,managerial groups may not really see themselves as “clients” in the sense understood bysuch developed professions. Management groups quite appropriately often question theirimplicit “lay” status compared to such “expert” professionals, and see their relationshipas more collegial than professional, with their own “practical” knowledge often exceed-ing that of mere “academics” and “consultants” (Legge, 1978).

For the purposes of this article, therefore, professionals in workplace innovation areunderstood as a loosely knit, fragmented, and relatively weakly institutionalized set ofthree intersecting groupings. The first grouping is composed of scientists and researchersworking within universities and other research institutions as members of the human fac-tors disciplines. This refers, in particular, to ergonomics, and more recently macroergo-nomics as part of industrial engineering, human–computer interface studies as part ofinformation technology and computer science, work and group psychology as part ofpsychology, and sociotechnical theory and organizational development as part of orga-nizational behavior. The second grouping comprises consultants applying methods andresearch results from these disciplines, and the third is made up of members of user or-ganizations acting as “internal” consultants in applying disciplinary methods and results.

As noted earlier, the self-understanding of these professional groupings has tended tobe dominated by a highly scientistic and rational view of professionals as applied scien-tists. While there has been some recognition that branches of workplace innovation re-search such as sociotechnical theory take the form of a “practical paradigm,” rather than“pure” research (Einjatten, 1993), this has not led to general systematic reflection on theprofessional role of workplace innovation researchers and consultants as “reflective prac-titioners.” This limitation has continued despite the emergence of an increasingly sub-stantial body of research on professionals that supports such understanding and reflection.

The influential work of Donald Schon (1983) and his colleagues has led to an aban-donment of the traditional knowledge hierarchy of basic science, applied science, andtechnical skills as a guide for understanding the actual practices of professionals. Whilethe “espoused theory” of the professions may present their work as the systematic appli-cation of formal knowledge, “theories in use” are different. Professional practice, as is

66 BADHAM AND EHN

tacitly known and recognized by professionals, is characterized by an integration of allthese areas of knowledge in indeterminate zones of practice where decisions have to bemade in unique and uncertain situations. Information and values often conflict. Profes-sional competencies come not from formal training alone but are an acquired “craft” de-veloped through practice and reflections on this practice. Mediating applied science andtechnique and effectiveness in practice is professional artistry in problem solving, imple-mentation, and improvisation. As summarized in work on software design by profession-als in workplace innovation such as Winograd (1996) and Ehn (1988; 1996) and in thesociologists of science and technology (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987), this model of thereflective practitioner accords strongly with current research on the work of designersand of scientists and technologists in general.

2.1. The Design Profession

In recent years, there has been an increasing convergence in the training of engineeringand information technology professionals, creative arts, and architectural design. Thissynergy has helped throw more light on the breadth of the role of professionals in work-place innovation asdesigners per se, and the central importance of deepening the sys-tematic yet nonscientific component of design knowledge and practice.

Traditional historical analyses of the rise of design work have tended to focus on thegradual formal separation of “thinking” from “doing,” and the dominance of a technicalproblem-solving or “engineering” view of the design object (hardware, software, etc.)and the design process (formalization, manipulation and logic, rational control, creationof correct and predictable “firm” results, etc.). Within software design, as well as otherareas of design, the limitations of this model have been recognized and supplemented bya more “social” model of design. This focuses not just on the objective character of thedesign object but its practical and symbolic use, the perceived utility and value of de-signs, the importance of communication, participation and learning in the design process,and the achievement of improved social interaction and democratic values as final re-sults. Finally, drawing more on artistic design, the argument has also been made thatdesign also involves the creation of aesthetic experiences and forms, the achievement ofbalance and style in the process of design, the provision of creative and expressive envi-ronments for design, and the release of creativity and innovation as a product (Ehn, 1988;1996). A better understanding of design is provided if we take the focus away from en-gineering models of rational individuals working in technical processes and, instead, seedesign as a social, political, and aesthetic process in which “collective designers” areinvolved not only in technical analysis but also in ongoing communication, collaboration,and negotiation.

In seeking to broaden and integrate the understanding of design, such critics have soughtto enrich our understanding by reexamining the epistemological and aesthetic philoso-phies of Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers, drawing on the work of modernphilosophers seeking a less formalized and more experience-based model of design (Bern-stein, 1992; Macintyre, 1981). Aristotle’s concept of “phronesis” as one of the intellectual“virtues,” has been used by Ehn (1996) and others as a counterpoint to modern rational-ized and intellectualized views of knowledge. Phronesis, identified by Aristotle as a formof knowledge, is focused on pragmatic and context dependent knowledge, the exercise ofwisdom in action. It is this action-oriented, ethical and political as well as technical, form

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 67

of knowledge that has been reduced in status, if not actually rejected, by modern Westernrationalized views of knowledge, design, and the professions. It is the importance of thisaspect of knowledge and design that, it is argued, needs to be reasserted and built into theeducation and training of all designers, including workplace innovation design. Design asphronesis would, for such professionals, mean a critical and reflective recognition of thepolitical dimensions of design understood somewhat flamboyantly as “an anxious act ofpolitical love” (Bernstein, 1992, p. 274).

2.2. Scientific and Technological Professions

The focus on the situational, pragmatic, and inherently political nature of knowledge is atheme that also predominates in current research by historians and sociologists on thework of scientists, technicians, and engineers. The traditional developmental “progress”view of science and technology portrayed knowledge as a gradual process of evolution,punctuated by radical discoveries, on a path toward increasing understanding and control.Investigations of the actual practices of scientists and technologists have provided a dif-ferent picture. Knowledge and artifacts are produced within specific contexts and aregiven a specific character and direction by the concepts, culture, paradigms, and politicsof specific knowledge communities and social groups. Alternative paths of knowledgeand technological development are neglected as particular trajectories are selected on thebasis of social, economic, and political as well as scientific and technical criteria. The“successful” scientist or technician is one who is able to marshal the necessary technical,rhetorical, and social support for their “facts,” “discoveries,” or “inventions” (Bijker et al.,1987). For some researchers on science and technology, the knowledge and innovationprocess is best described as the result of a complex interaction of people and artifactslocated in different “social worlds” (Garrety, 1997; Kling & Gerson, 1978). The formtaken by science and technology is the result of the complex interactions and negotiationsbetween scientific groups, technical experts, funding agencies, corporations, regulatorybodies, and so forth. This has led other researchers to emphasize the need for scientistsand innovators to be “heterogeneous engineers,” able to cut across boundaries, manipu-lating scientific and technical knowledge as well as political and social resources in a“seamless web” of innovative activity (Latour, 1987, 1988).

These bodies of research all have direct implications for the way in which the activitiesof professionals in workplace innovation should be understood and, most importantly,how strategies should be developed for improving their “professionalism.” It is the argu-ment of this article, drawing on these perspectives, that such professionals should not beunderstood as professionals in the traditional sense of experts applying technical knowl-edge according to generic methods and rules. Quite the reverse. Their analysis and self-understanding should be based on recognition of the tacit and situated nature of theirprofessional knowledge and activities. It should also recognize the inherently social andpolitical nature of their work, and how technical, social, and political skills need to becombined to successfully achieve their desired outcomes. The next two sections of thisarticle will use the reflections of professionals in workplace innovation to explore howthis occurs in the collective process of man–machine and work redesign and the politicalprocesses involved in getting human factors considerations, broadly defined, to be takenseriously in technology projects.

68 BADHAM AND EHN

3. PROFESSIONALS IN WORKPLACE INNOVATIONAS COLLECTIVE DESIGNERS

Merely having the inputs from these three perspectives (business, technical expertise, and organi-zational expertise) does not ensure a successful project. The project team itself must work togetherto understand and leverage each other’s expertise. Each may have unique and specific goals, ob-jectives, priorities, schedules, politics, language, values, norms and reward structure. Specifically,the technical systems experts are often particularly focused on technology and its design, the hu-man resources professionals usually direct their attention to the people of the company; while theline managers are typically concerned with the business objectives and goals and the “bottom line.”(Krobertson & Dray, 1991, p. 185)

In discussing the work of professionals in workplace innovation, practitioners havemade a number of observations about the social and collective design process in whichthey are involved. They have, particularly, remarked on the problems created for suchprofessionals by the multidisciplinary and, frequently, multi-institutional contexts withinwhich they have to work. The problem of cutting across and integrating different socialworlds is a part of all design, but it is a particular concern for designers who are explicitlyinvolved in the creation of “hybrid” designs that integrate human and technological fac-tors in system designs. A key component of the work and competencies of professionalsin workplace innovation is thus his or her ability to understand, operate effectively within,and facilitate such complex collective design processes. Despite this fact, there has beenno systematic review by such professionals of the multifaceted nature of the collectivedesign processes in which they are involved, or the range of boundaries that have to becrossed in integrating participants from different social worlds into the design of work-place innovations. What does exist are a variety of different comments and insights bypractitioners on specific boundary problems and solutions. These reflections have tendedto identify professionals in workplace innovation as working with participants from fourmain social worlds with boundaries that have to be transcended in order for cooperationand communication to occur during the design process. These social worlds are schemat-ically represented in Figure 1.

One of the particular problems of professionals in workplace innovation is that theyare not as “centered” as this diagram suggests. They range from human factors profes-sionals with technical and engineering backgrounds, working out of engineering schoolsand departments, to work psychologists and human resource management specialists withlittle or no knowledge or concern with technology. The role of spanning the differentsocial worlds involved in the design of man–machine systems cannot, and should not, beseen as the role of a specific social science discipline—the particular role of “psycholo-gists,” “sociologists,” “organizational designers,” and so forth. If professionals in work-place innovation are to effectively integrate human factors concerns into collective designprocesses, their role—whatever their disciplinary or institutional origin—must be to tran-scend the boundaries between participants from the different social worlds involved inthe design process. There is a similarity here with Rasmussen’s (1993) argument for cross-disciplinary research in the area of “cognitive engineering.” Professionals in workplaceinnovation need to have an ability to understand and sympathize with participants fromthe different scientific, technical and social design, and user worlds, and create local lan-guages, cultures, and artifacts that enable these participants to communicate and coop-erate sufficiently to achieve a successful system design. There is clearly no “free floating”

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 69

workplace innovation intelligentsia free of stronger or weaker linkages with actors fromthe different social worlds. However, this creates specific issues for their practices ratherthan undermining their role as professionals.

3.1. Technical and Social Design

At the heart of the professional in workplace innovation’s design practice is the need toestablish cooperation between technical and social scientific designers. Norman (1998),for example, listed the importance of at least six disciplines within the field of user ex-perience alone. These include: field studies (anthropology and sociology); behavioral de-sign (cognitive science and experimental psychology and human–computer interfaceprograms); model building and rapid prototyping (computer programming, electrical andmechanical engineering, and architect and industrial design model building); user testing(experimental psychology, only speeded up); graphic and industrial design (art, design,and architecture); and user manuals (technical writers). Bringing together the many dif-ferent areas of interest and expertise is a particularly difficult and problematic activity forprofessionals in workplace innovation, involving understanding and integrating partici-pants from within the technical and social scientific worlds as well as between them.

3.1.1. The Technical Designers. Within the traditional instrumental technical world-view, the design process is formally viewed as proceeding in a linear fashion from initialidea through basic concept, detailed concept design and engineering analysis to planning,manufacturing, and delivering the product. Complex engineering products are created by

WorkplaceInnovation

Design

Figure 1 The social worlds of workplace innovation design.

70 BADHAM AND EHN

dividing labor between expert specializations and integrating these together in the finalproduct. The technical design process is seen as one of facts and logic, rule following andprocedures, application of knowledge and verification of results. The management of thisprocess follows a simple command and control model, assigning tasks and responsibili-ties, and monitoring performance and delivery. Yet, the real world of technical design, asuncovered by anthropologists and known all along by practitioners, is somewhat differ-ent. Design is a place where worlds collide, where individuals and groups compete within“communities of practice” or where different communities confront each other in coop-eration or conflict. It is a messier, more contingent, and culturally embedded process ofconflict and compromise, half-understandings and dissensus.

While formally working on the “same” project, technical specializations operate withinwhat Bucciarelli has called their own “object worlds.” They literally “see” the designobject differently through their own professional and cultural lenses. The electrician seeselectrons and the mechanical engineer sees pressures and temperature. The design pro-cess and the final design is the result of the conflict, compromise, and collusion thatinevitably occurs between different object worlds “of technical specialisation, with theirown dialects, systems of symbols, metaphors and models, instruments and craft sensitiv-ities” (Bucciarelli, 1996, p. 162). Often technical participants in the same design process,working within their own object worlds, are little more than “ships passing in the night,”little aware of or concerned with the detailed knowledge, perspective, or world view oftheir design colleagues. As Bucciarelli put it inDesigning Engineers,

Most engineering practitioners know that designing is not simply a matter of synthesising solutionsto independent problem sets . . . the working world of engineers is filled with negotiations acrossspecialties, with decision making under uncertainty within contexts in which scientific principle ismixed in with social, political, and financial “constraints.” (1996, p. 110)

Key to the importance of successful technical design is, therefore, creating a commonspace for these diverse specialties to work together, facilitating the emergence of a “com-posite framework for common discourse” accepted by the members of the different ob-ject worlds by the end of the design process. This common discourse includes establishinga common language, and determining what are honorable claims to be made, what countsas significant conjectures, and what constitutes valid proof. It may involve the effectivecollective technical designer actively seeking for communication and understanding acrossthe various object worlds by creating puzzles, stories, diagrams, schedules, and plans thatenable this to occur. The first task of the collective designer of workplace innovation is,therefore, to understand how such activities are actually being carried out within the tech-nical part of the project, and how social scientific designers may link into these processes.

3.1.2. The Social Science Designers. The social scientific designers are also fre-quently fragmented. As noted earlier, there are major differences in focus and orientationbetween traditional human factors professionals and other professionals in workplace in-novation. This is one example of what Blackler and Shimmin (1984) have observed asmany different “paradigms of practice” in applied social science disciplines, that is, “com-mon practices emerge from a developing consensus within a community of practitionersas to appropriate theoretical, methodological and ideological frameworks” (Blackler &Shimmin, 1984, p. 127). As an example, they contrast, within the discipline of work psy-chology, an “NIIP approach” consisting of a pragmatic orientation toward selection and

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 71

training issues, with a “Tavistock approach” referred to as an action-oriented stance to-ward the psychodynamics of groups and reconciling technical and psychosocial require-ments at work. Pettigrew (1976), in a discussion of internal social scientific redesignagents, observed that a “major source of internal consultant ineffectiveness stems from. . . (this) . . . apparent inability to present a unified political force within their organisa-tion in dealings with clients. Often major differences in values, work style and careerinterests disrupt consultancy units and leave clients bewildered about the range and qual-ity of service they can expect” (Pettigrew, 1976, p. 193).

In addition, as observed by commentators on actual work redesign projects, this pro-cess of diversity and disagreement between social scientific designers is further con-founded by the uncertainties of the overall design projects. As Ketchum (1982) observed,

Work redesign is a political process, the art of the possible. It is done in the real world where thereare limits to power, where what “is” rather than what “ought to be” is dominant and stakeholdersare numerous. . . . Workredesign must take place in an ever-changing situation. Things won’t standstill while the organisation and its technology are redesigned. People retire, quit, get promoted, arereassigned, and are not re-elected. Replacements may come in from the outside. Product demandchanges. Products and technologies change. Raw materials change. Economics change. Companiesmerge, are taken over: units are spun off. (p. 76)

Pettigrew (1976) identified the failure of organizational designers to recognize and pro-actively respond to such crises as the second principle source of consultant ineffective-ness. The ability of professionals in workplace innovation to overcome the divisionsbetween the social scientific groups and develop a common understanding of the com-plex nature of the design process is their second major task.

3.1.3. Technical and Social Scientific Designers. The ability to integrate par-ticipantswithin each of the technical and social scientific design worlds is a major chal-lenge, yet needs to be accompanied by the achievement of effective cooperationbetweenthese worlds. While the human factors professions are committed to integrating the ideasand work of technical–engineering and social science–human resource disciplines andprofessions, there remains, as Klein (1994) has observed, a “deep institutionalised split-ting” between engineering and social science communities. Klein observes the differentmodels of science, relations to values, types of outputs and methods within as well asbetween these communities, and emphasizes the deep divide between the technical andsocial sciences.

So powerful is it (institutional splitting) that large parts of both professions see no relevance incollaborating with the other at all. A feature of the situation is that some social scientists are afraidof technology and some engineers are afraid of getting into the human area. These fears are difficultto acknowledge and from such fear, the human aspect may get turned into pseudo-mechanical form,like “the Man-Machine Interface” or “the Human Factor.” There is also a substantial history ofmutual criticism. (Klein, 1994, p. 82)

3.2. Basic Research and Applied Research or Design

A major boundary that also has to be crossed is that between “basic” scientific researchand “applied” practically oriented research and consulting. Not only do scientists andapplied researchers often work for different organizations, but also the culture, reward

72 BADHAM AND EHN

systems, and general “orientation complexes” of these two groups are often in conflict.These can range from a general bias toward “analysis” and “specialized expertise” versus“action” and “mobilizing diverse groups to achieve desired ends,” or more specific ori-entations toward publications and peer approval, on the one hand, and project success andclient approval, on the other. A somewhat stereotyped contrast between these viewpointsis provided in Table 1.

Institutional Splitting in Action. On an enlightened human-centered design project tocreate a computer numerically controlled lathe that built on and developed operator skills,a social scientist on the engineering–social science steering committee asked for an in-troduction to the technology so that she could play a more effective role. The result: “fora week (I) was treated like an undergraduate learning about metal-cutting. Among otherthings, I was shown a video, which is used in teaching first-year students. It was an ex-cellent teaching aid, but within the first five minutes two things had happened: (a) theoperator had been referred to as a constraint, a cost. He was never mentioned again. And(b) the content itself, the engineering, was very fascinating and absorbing. These twothings together would, of course, help to set a student’s attitudes for life and be verydifficult to counteract later” (Klein, 1994, p. 82).

As collective designers are necessarily oriented toward achieving results in context,they need to use the experiences of others, build upon their experiences, and improvetheir effectiveness. In so doing, they also need to draw on theoretical knowledge; “mine,organize, and evaluate” generic methods; pursue, at a minimum, a systematic eclecti-cism; and develop new and effective systematic methods and approaches.

The Translator Role between Scientists and Practitioners. There has always beentension between practitioners, on the one hand, and both theoreticians and researchers(scientists), on the other. Practitioners face the immediate, and often desperate, needs oftheir clients on a daily basis; they want to use whatever will work and use it now. Re-searchers very often focus on such small parts of the helping process that applications tointeractions with clients are not immediately evident. Furthermore, there is a tendency

TABLE 1. Comparison of the value and problem-solving assumptions of managers and re-searchers (Source: F. Blackler and S. Shimmin, 1984, p. 69.)

Researchers Managers

Value assumptions:• Goal Understanding Accomplishment• Criterion of excellence Validity Effectiveness• Application Abstract/general Concrete/specific

Problem-solving assumptions:• Time perspective Long-term Short-term• Methodology Control inputs for valid

explanationControl inputs for effective

influence• Viewpoint Objective Involved

A negative result is: Information (for furtheranalysis)

Failure

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 73

among some researchers to argue that their findings are not yet ready to be translated intopractice. Finally, some scientists criticise practitioners for using methods that have noscientific basis . . . Clinical psychologists were supposed to avoid these pitfalls by beingtrained in the so-called scientist-practitioner model. This model has not worked very well,but we still cling to it. Therefore, there is desperate need in psychology, and especially inthe helping professions, for a third role, which I have calledtranslator. Translators stay intouch with the best in theory and research and with the needs of practitioners in theirservice to clients. Their role is to translate the best of theory and research into models,methods, and skills that will benefit practitioners and clients alike . . . There needs to besomething of the translator in the scientist and in the practitioner. (Egan, 1994, p. xvii)

3.3. Designers and Users or Professional and Nonprofessional Worlds

As design and engineering have been institutionalized in a set of specialized professions,a great divide has emerged between the formal, written, and codified knowledge and dis-course of these professions and the informal, frequently spoken, and often tacit knowl-edge of practitioners who become the object or client of these professions and the unwittingor reluctant user of their products. This problem has been frequently commented on in theliterature of workplace innovation and redesign. This issue of developer–user communi-cation and cooperation was one of the key “language” problems recognized in the cel-ebrated UTOPIA project to create a newspaper typesetting software program that wouldsupport and enhance the skills of craft typesetters.

Multi-languages in the Utopia Project. As project leader, and the only full timeemployee, one of my main tasks was to facilitate a common understanding between peo-ple who spoke so many different “languages.” The difference between national languageswas only a minor problem: we all pretty quickly learned to speak “Scandinavian.” Thereal challenge was to establish the project as a language-game where all participants couldmake use of their professional language. This meant developing a research and designapproach where researchers with as different backgrounds as computer science and sys-tems design, ergonomics, organization theory, sociology and history could not only speakwith each other, but also—just as importantly—with the users in the design team, ie.skilled typesetters, page make-up persons, graphic artists, and experienced trade union-ists. When we later on established cooperation with a vendor who was willing to try toimplement our UTOPIAN specifications, the project as language-game also had to takeinto account the specific technical and financial language of a commercial producer. Fi-nally, when we came to “test site” implementation, the language at that workplace, asused not only by the local graphic workers, but also by journalists and management, alsoaffected our UTOPIAN language. (Ehn, 1988, p. 18)

4. PROFESSIONALS IN WORKPLACE INNOVATIONAS POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

Much of the reflections on collective design are about “communication,” “translation,”and “languages”—there is little attention or much less attention paid to the politics ofcollective design, that is, the “theories in use” employed by professionals in workplaceinnovation to “get things done their way” in the face of different and conflicting interests.This occurs as a necessary counterpart of all of the activities listed above, and is a phe-

74 BADHAM AND EHN

nomenon that is commonly recognized by practitioners but rarely formally acknowl-edged or publicly analyzed and discussed (Buchanan & Badham, 1999a, 1999b).

Professionals in workplace innovation often point to a general failure to adequatelyconsider human factors in technology projects. This is commonly attributed to a lack ofawareness or interest in human factors issues by design engineers, a lack of sophisticatedquantitative evidence for human factors judgments, and an absence of easily useable hu-man factors tools and methods. While some explanatory power must be given to suchconditions, analysts of organizational power and politics do not regard them as the mainreason for the frequent marginalization of human factors considerations. The neglect ofhuman factors is, rather, attributed to organizational factors. This refers, in particular, tothe ideas and interests of different affected groups and the distribution of power and re-sources between them. Perrow (1983) pointed to the lack of incentives and legitimationfor human factors considerations, resulting from a number of factors. These include: lackof interest from senior management; the culture, training, and resources of design engi-neers; the lack of organizational authority of human factors professionals; and the rela-tive weakness of operators or users of technology who are most immediately disadvantagedby inadequately designed technologies. Clegg (1993) observed that broader organiza-tional, institutional, and educational systems have evolved and operate to marginalizehuman and organizational issues without the deliberate intervention of any particular in-dividual or group. He points in particular to the characteristics of technology develop-ment organizations, user firms, education and training cultures, regulatory institutions,and public funding bodies. These institutions systematically foster:

• disempowering attitudes toward end users and a lack of end user skills, knowledge,and organization;

• technology development processes that have goals, design criteria, and control mech-anisms that foster a narrow technical orientation;

• technology investment and commissioning practices that systematically undervaluehuman factors;

• an education and training system that is biased toward technical skills and createstwo antagonistic scientific and humanistic cultures; and

• a research and development profile that underresources and narrows the scope ofhuman factors research.

The analysis of such influences and how to address them leads professionals in work-place innovation into the broader area of organizational power and politics.

For the purposes of discussion in this article, we shall look at one area of politics withwhich one branch of professionals in workplace innovation is involved—that of achiev-ing sociotechnical change in a specific client organization. In this case, it is argued, theprofessional in workplace innovation (as collective designer) plays an ongoing iterative“integrative” role in bringing together and helping to maintain support for projects at thelevel of senior management, middle management, and the shopfloor. The data is drawnfrom three international workshops with sociotechnical professionals from the Nether-lands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, in which the participants were encouraged toreflect on how effective sociotechnical practitioners “get things done” within organiza-tions. These workshops were held at the Danish Technological Institute, Nijmegen Uni-versity Business School, and the University of Sheffield Institute for Work Psychology inAugust, October, and November 1995. Each workshop had between 15 and 25 partici-

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 75

pants and was organized by Richard Badham in collaboration with sociotechnical changepractitioners in each of these institutions. While sociotechnical redesign is clearly one ofthe broader and more organizationally focused applications of human factors expertise,we would argue that the principles of organizational intervention and practice are genericacross the human factors professions.

The majority view of workshop participants was that there were a number of problemswith traditional linear models of their change role. The traditional model identified thefirst stage as that of obtaining senior management “commitment”—“initiating,” “vision-ing,” and “sponsoring” change. The second stage involves middle management “driving”and “implementing” change. The final stage is taken up with persuading lower middlemanagement and the shopfloor to become “adopters” rather than “resistors” of change. Incontrast, they argued, the realities of sociotechnical change projects was more like an

Figure 2 Circuit of change agency.

76 BADHAM AND EHN

ongoing iterative “circuit of change” as, at different times, senior managers, middle man-agers, and shopfloor take on roles of visionaries, sponsors, drivers, implementers, andresisters.

Senior management, for example, is not just responsible for initiating and sponsoringprojects at a general level in the “start-up phase.” At various times throughout the projectthey will be needed to respond to problems resulting from initiatives from change agentslower down the organizational hierarchy. As Beatty and Gordon (1991) observed of ad-vanced manufacturing technology projects, middle level “evangelist” change agents “willneed approval, empowerment and active support and often protection from top manage-ment to effectively promote AMT across organizational boundaries. Otherwise they mayget bogged down in ‘turf wars”’ (p. 93). In the “initiation” phases, key visioning andsponsoring activities may also be initiated from middle management or the shopfloor, asthey enthusiastically champion human factors ideas and dedicate resources under theircontrol to “push start” the change. Senior management may then be the targets of change,the enthusiastic adopters, or the subversive resistors.

The professional in workplace innovation can either ignore the building of such changecoalitions as the “external context” of their work, or act to support them (Pettigrew, 1976).In playing a supportive role, the formal and informal work of integrating participantsfrom these three different worlds within the organization is an essential part of workplaceinnovation projects. It is quite common for the literature on workplace innovation projectmanagement to recommend placing user representatives on project teams, and projectteam representatives on steering committees that are intended to transcend the differ-ences between numerous project “stakeholders.” Sociotechnical projects, for example,have often sought integration across these tiers. Suggested methods have been “deep slice”strategic and diagnostic workshops, higher level steering committees as core project teams,and issue or problem solving groups cutting across design team–user tiers (Benders, deHaan, & Bennett, 1995; Cobbenhagen & den Hertog, 1994).

The key role of formal and informal integrators in forming an effective multitieredchange coalition was observed in all three international workshops and has been the sub-ject of both theoretical reflection and project team training. At the theoretical level, Beattyand Gordon (1991) stressed the key relationship between “patriarchs” and “evangelists”in change processes, and the role of cross-functional “organizational mavericks” in cut-ting across boundaries. This confirmed Law and Callon’s (1992) analysis of the key toproject success being the effective linkage of resource providing “global networks” anddetailed configuration of change in “local networks,” with project leaders as an “obliga-tory point of passage” for innovation politics. Ashridge Teamworking Services providestraining for such project leaders. This involves integrating the “visible” project team withthe required “invisible” team, and continually “managing up” as well as “managing down”in securing the successful continuation of the project (Geddes, Hastings, & Briner, 1990).One crucial area, for example, is the socialization and resocialization of senior level projectchampions as the “legitimacy” of any change project has a short half-life—as senior man-agement attention turns to other matters or, as is commonly observed, they leave theirposts for other jobs.

Latour (1988), in his analysis of “The Prince for Machines as well as Machinations,”stresses the central role of political negotiations in this process. He argues, in particular,for the ongoing need to enroll and re-enroll workers, colleagues, staff, peers, and con-sumers by continually “translating” their interests in order to gain their commitment tochange projects. As one of Beatty and Gordon’s (1991) “evangelists” remarked, there is

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 77

a continual need to translate project activities into the local “language” of different in-terests at the three different levels. As one stated, “It’s hard to preach Christianity to theEskimos if you only speak English.” He continues to stress the difficulty of such a task,and its essential nature, “I am able to make about one good conversion a year. . . . Whoyou convert matters” (Beatty & Gordon, 1991, p. 87). Latour also emphasizes, however,that the content as well as the definition of the project will change in the course of de-velopment in the process of enrolling such elements. “Communication” is, crucially, linkedto political negotiation in this formal and informal coalition building.

Successful workplace innovation comes up against a number of technical and organi-zational barriers. If these are to be overcome, a change coalition has to be established toensure that necessary circuits of change are not broken. The participants in the sociotech-nical workshops saw the professional in workplace innovation as playing a key role inkeeping such circuits running if they wish to see their objectives realized. A part of thisactivity is identifying what Hughes (1983) called “reverse salients” and Rosenberg (1982)called “bottlenecks” in the change process, that is, breakdowns in the circuit or “lags” inparticular sections of the circuit that are holding back overall progress. Once these re-verse salients or bottlenecks are understood, however, the task of the professional in work-place innovation is to ensure that they are addressed. While this may involve a morelimited “facilitator” role, advising on problems and solutions, it often also requires play-ing a range of more proactive and inevitably political roles. This does not exclude butnecessarily includes political and other activities necessary to facilitate the circuit of change.In this manner, the integrative actions of the professional in workplace innovation as acollective designer become interweaved with integrative political entrepreneurial activities.

5. CONCLUSION: THE PROFESSIONAL BRICOLEUR

In order to enhance their ability to influence technology design and implementation, pro-fessionals in workplace innovation need to learn about and work to improve their under-standing ofhowto operate effectively in both the design and implementation dimensionsof change processes (Parker & Wall, 1998, p. 137). It is the argument of this article thata systematic improvement of professional capabilities in this area is required to help ad-dress the many barriers to effective human factors interventions (Badham, Couchman, &McLoughlin, 1997). This improvement, it has been further argued, should be based onthree main “planks” in a particular self-understanding of these professions.

First, professionals in workplace innovation should become more acquainted withtheirrole as“ reflective practitioners.” There is now considerable evidence and theoretical sup-port for the simple observation that scientific knowledge and methods cannot be simply“applied” or “diffused” in practical settings. They require configuration, tailoring, or trans-lation by individuals or groups whose capabilities and legitimacy span the general and thespecific, the theoretical and the particular, the development and the user contexts. Thereis inevitably a degree of tinkering or bricoleur activity in tailoring universal principles orgeneric methods to local circumstances. Professionals in workplace innovation need tounderstand this fact and continuously reflect on and improve their practices in this area.In part, initial training may support this, but it can be significantly developed and refinedonly through reflective practice.

Second, professionals in workplace innovation require a better understanding of andability to act within thecomplex collective design activitiesof which they are a part. This

78 BADHAM AND EHN

doesnot mean that they have to act as a heroic leader of the collective design process. Itdoes mean, however, that they need to understand the complex nature of collective de-sign, and bothunderstandandpromotea more realistic and sociologically informed modelof the design process. Without such an informed view, it is much more likely that work-place innovation projects will be overwhelmed by miscommunication and conflict amongdesigners and a lack of communication and cooperation between designers and users.One example of this was recently outlined by Okamura, Orlikowski, Fujimoto, and Yates(1998). In the case of computer supported cooperative work systems, there is substantialevidence that a central tailoring and translating role is played in implementation by whatthey termmediators, that is, “individuals who intervene deliberately and with organisa-tional authorisation in the ongoing use of technology within its context of use” (Okamuraet al., p. 2). They continue to argue that workplace designers—if they wish to produceuseable and effective systems—need to understand, advise, and assist such mediationactivities rather than restricting design to “workshop” activities.

Third, professionals in workplace innovation need to improve theirpolitical under-standing and skillsif they are to be effective actors in technology design and implemen-tation. Pettigrew (1975) observed that “Specialists do not merely advise, they persuade,negotiate and exercise the power they can mobilise” (p. 15). In so doing, they utilize fivepower sources: (a) expertise, (b) control over information, (c) political access and sensi-tivity, (d) assessed stature, and (e) the amount and kind of group support given to thespecialist by his or her colleagues in his or her own and related specialist groups. Theprofessional in workplace innovation, like other specialists, needs to establish credibilityif he or she is to be effective. This inevitably involvesanticipating the varying needs,expectations, and reference groups of different groups of executives and specialists in-volved in or affected by a workplace innovation project. Those specialists who work ontheir own tasks, become preoccupied with the intricacies of their own expertise, and onlysee clients when task issues are involved are unlikely to be able to anticipate such needsvery well. Successful specialists develop multiplex relationships with other significantpartners or clients in a project, and succeed in demonstrating competence in areas salientto the other actors. Buchanan and Badham (1999) argued that such “power skills” shouldbe part of the skills of all professional innovators.

As Pfeffer documented, most organizations have great difficulty in just “getting thingsdone,” and this inevitably affects the success of more uncertain and complex projectssuch as those attempting to systematically and explicitly address human and technologyfactors in workplace innovation. In general terms, Pfeffer argued that it is the politicalability to mobilize “enabling power” to achieve the goals of projects that is often a crucialproblem. “Until,” argued Pfeffer, “we are willing to come to terms with organisationalpower and influence, and admit that theskills of getting things doneare as important astheskills of figuring out what to do, our organisations will fall further and further behind”(1992, p. 13). Given the substantial barriers that exist to addressing human factors con-siderations in technology design and implementation, the professional in workplace in-novation neglects this political dimension at his or her peril.

The stress on the reflective, collective, and political nature of professional tinkering orbricoleuring should not be seen as antithetical to professionalism and science. It should,rather, be associated with a different understanding of both professionals and scientists.Professional training, accreditation, communication, and cooperation can support im-proved collective design skills and practices. The outcome is professionals who are ableto act more effectively as reflective practitioners in collective design processes that are

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 79

social and political in character as well as technical. Thisinevitablyinvolves a degree ofad hoc “tinkering” or “bricoleuring.” A professional bricoleur is one who admits to andunderstands the necessarily ad hoc and context-specific nature of much of their activitybut alsosystematically improves their abilities in this area and mentors others in theseactivities. In this task, professionals in workplace innovation are not acting as rationaldesigners instrumentally applying expert rules and procedures. Scientific languages andnew methods and techniques may enhance the effectiveness and ease of activity and ed-ucation in bricoleuring and tinkering processes. In playing this role, however, they shouldbe understood as bridging mechanisms and boundary objects. In this instance, they aremeans for facilitating communication and cooperation in the design process, not the sourceof scientific truth or the application of purely instrumental knowledge.

Whether or not this view of the professional in workplace innovation as collectivedesigner and political entrepreneur can be effectively communicated and work as a newdesign language is a matter of conjecture. One thing is certain, however, the alternativehas not been highly successful. The history of developing and defending the legitimacy ofthe workplace innovation professions by their “scientific” status and expertise, and sub-ordinating the innovation design process to scientific rules and technical procedures, hasnot been a triumphant one. The self-conscious view of professionals in workplace inno-vation as playing and continuously improving their role as professional bricoleurs as wellas scientists may be not only a more accurate self-image but also one that helps them tobe more effective in influencing workplace innovation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This article has been prepared with the help of Dr. Karin Garrety, who suggested the title“Tinkering With Technology.”

REFERENCES

Argyris, C. (1970). Intervention theory and method: A behavioural science view. Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley.

Badham, R. (1986). Theories of industrial society. London: Croom Helm.Badham, R. (forthcoming). Sociotechnical theory. In Waldemar Karwowski (Ed.), International

encyclopedia of ergonomics and human factors. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Badham, R., & Buchanan, D. (1998). Power assisted steering: The new princes of sociotechnical

change. In W. Karwowski & R. Goonetilleke (Eds.), Manufacturing agility and hybrid automa-tion II (pp. 89–92). Santa Monica: International Ergonomics Association Press.

Badham, R., Couchman, P., & Linstead, S. (1995). Power tools: Narrating the factory of the future.Proceedings/Abstracts of the 13th Annual International Labour Process Conference (pp. 119–122). Blackpool, April 5–7.

Badham, R., Couchman, P., & McLoughlin, I. (1997). Implementing “vulnerable” socio-technicalchange projects. In I. McLoughlin & N. Harris (Eds.), New perspectives on technology, orga-nization and innovation. London: Routledge, 30–44.

Badham, R., & Naschold, F. (1994). New technology policy concepts. In G. Aicholzer & G. Schien-stock (Eds.), Technology policy: Towards an integration of social and ecological concerns. Ber-lin: De Gruyter, 110–135.

Bannon, L.J. (1991). From human factors to human actors: The role of psychology and human-computer interaction studies in system design. In J. Greenbaum & M. Kyng (Eds.), Design atwork. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 20–33.

Baritz, L. (1960). The servants of power. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.

80 BADHAM AND EHN

Beatty, C., & Gordon, J. (1991). Preaching the gospel: The evangelists of new technology. Califor-nia Management Review, Spring, 73–94.

Bell, D. (1960). The end of ideology. New York: Collier Macmillan.Benders, J., de Haan, J., & Bennett, D. (1995). The symbiosis of work and technology. London:

Francis Pinter.Bernstein, J.M. (1992). The fate of art: Aesthetic alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno.

University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Bijker, W.E., Hughes, T.P., & Pinch, T.J. (Eds.). (1987). The social construction of technological

systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Blackler, F., & Shimmin, S. (1984). Applying psychology in organizations. London and New York:

Methuen.Brown, O., Jr. (1990, July). Macroergonomics: A review. In K. Noro (Ed.), Human factors in or-

ganisation design and management III. Proceedings of the 3rd Intellectual Symposium on Hu-man Factors in Organization Design and Management. Kyoto, Japan, 350–360.

Bucciarelli, L.L. (1996). Designing engineers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Buchanan, D., & Badham, R. (1999a). Power, politics and organizational change: Winning the turf

game. London: Sage.Buchanan, D., & Badham, R. (1999b). Politics and organizational change: The lived experience.

Human Relations, 52(6), 1–21.Burns, T. (1966). On the plurality of social systems. In J.R. Lawrence (Ed.), Operational research

and the social sciences. London: Tavistock Publications.Chin, R., & Benne, K. (1969). General strategies for effecting changes in human systems. In W.

Bennis, K.D. Benne, & W. Chin (Eds.), The planning of change. New York: Rinehart and Winston.Clegg, C. (1993, February). Social systems that marginalise the psychological and organisational

aspects of Information Technology (Memo 1395, MRC/ESRC). Sheffield University, Socialand Applied Psychology Unit.

Cobbenhagen, J., & den Hertog, F. (1994, May). Successful innovating firms: What differentiatesthe front runners? Paper presented to the 1994 Spring Meeting of the Six Countries Programme:Innovation—Applying New Ideas for Profit. London, May 25–26.

Den Hertog, F. (1995, May). Metaphors for the strategy of change: The socio-technical perspective.Paper presented to the Organisation, Innovation and Change: History of Socio-Technical ThoughtWorkshop. Melbourne, Australia, May 10–14.

Egan, G. (1994). Working the shadow side: A guide to positive behind-the-scenes management. SanFrancisco: Jossey Bass.

Ehn, P. (1988). Work oriented design of computer artefacts. Stockholm: Arbetslivcentrum.Ehn, P. (1996, May). The collective designer. Paper presented to the Department of Management

Seminar Series. Wollongong, Australia: University of Wollongong, May 12.Einjatten, F. van (1993). The paradigm that changed the workplace. Stockholm: Arbetslivcentrum.Elam, M. (1993). Innovation as the craft of combination: Perspectives on technology and economy

in the spirit of Schumpeter. Linkoping, Sweden: Kanaltryckeriet I Motala AB.French, W.L., Bell, C.H., & Zawacki, R.A. (1989). Organization development: Theory, practice and

research. Homewood, IL: BPI-Irwin.Garrety, K. (1997). Actor networks, social worlds and controversy: The case of cholesterol, dietary

fat and heart disease. Social Studies of Science, 27, 727–773.Geddes, M., Hastings, C., & Briner, W. (1990). Project leadership. Aldershot, England: Gower.Gillespie, R. (1993). Manufacturing knowledge: A history of the Hawthorne experiments. Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press.Helander, M. (1997). The human factors profession. In G. Salvendy (Ed.), Handbook of human

factors and ergonomics (pp. 3–17). New York: John Wiley & Sons.Hendrick, H. (1997). Organizational design and macroergonomics. In G. Salvendy (Ed.), Hand-

book of human factors and ergonomics (pp. 594–637). New York: John Wiley & Sons.Hollway, W. (1996). Work psychology and organizational behaviour: Managing the individual at

work. London: Sage.Hughes, T. (1983). Networks of power: Electrification in Western society, 1830–1930. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press.ISO/DIS 13407 (1997). Draft international standard: Human centred design processes for inter-

active systems.

TINKERING WITH TECHNOLOGY 81

Kakabadse, A., & Parker, C. (1984). Power, politics and organizations: A behavioural science view.Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Ketchum, L.D. (1982). How to start and sustain a work redesign program. National ProductivityReview, Winter, 75–86.

Klein, L. (1976). A social scientist in industry. London: Allen & Unwin.Klein, L. (1994). The social science and engineering divide. In H. Rosenbrock (Ed.), Designing

human centred technology. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Kling, R., & Gerson, E.H. (1978). Patterns of segmentation and intersection in the computing world.

Symbolic Interaction, 1, 24–43.Krobertson, M.M., & Dray, S.M. (1991). Linking perspectives: Using macroergonomics to make

technology work in organisations. In K. Noro & A. Imada (Eds.), Participatory ergonomics.London: Taylor & Francis.

Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Latour, B. (1988). The pasteurization of France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Law, J., & Callon, M. (1992). The life and death of an aircraft: A network analysis of technical

change. In W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping technology/building society: Studies in socio-technical change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Legge, K. (1978). Power, innovation, and problem-solving in personnel management. London:McGraw-Hill.

Lund, R.T., Bishop, A.B., Newman, A.E., & Salzman, H. (1993). Designed to work: Productionsystems and people. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Macintyre, A. (1981). After virtue: A study in moral theory. London: Duckworth.Majchrzak, A., & Gasser, L. (1991, December). HITOP-A: AI to support human factors decision

making. AI and Society, 3, 35–44.Mangham, I. (1978). Interactions and interventions in organizations. Chichester, England: John

Wiley & Sons.Mayo, E. (1949). The social problems of an industrial civilisation. London: Routledge & Kegan

Paul.Muller, M., Hallewell Haslwanter, J., & Dayton, T. (1997). Participatory practices in software de-

sign. In M.G. Helander, T.K. Landauer, & P. Prabhu (Eds.), Handbook of human-computer in-teraction. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Norman, D.A. (1986). Cognitive engineering. In D.A. Norman & S.W. Draper, User centered sys-tem design. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Norman, D.A. (1998). The invisible computer: Why good products can fail, the personal computeris so complex, and information appliances are the solution. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Okamura, K., Orlikowski, W.J., Fujimoto, M., & Yates, J. (1998). Helping CSCW applications suc-ceed: The role of mediators in the context of use. Unpublished working paper, MIT. (Internetsource: W.Orlikowski at wanda@mit.edu).

Parker, S., & Wall, T. (1998). Job and work design. London: Harvester.Perrow, C. (1983). The organisational context of human factors engineering. Administrative Sci-

ence Quarterly, 28, 521–541.Pettigrew, A.M. (1976). Towards a political theory of organizational intervention. Human Rela-

tions, 28(3), 191–208.Pfeffer, J. (1992). Managing with power: Politics and influence in organization. Boston: Harvard

Business School.Rasmussen, J. (1993). What are we looking for in the black box? International Journal of Human

Factors in Manufacturing, 3(1), 91–5.Rosenberg, N. (1982). Inside the black box: Technology and economics. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.Schon, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. New York: Basic

Books.Taylor, J., & Felten, D. (1993). Performance by design: Sociotechnical systems in North America.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Townley, B. (1994). Reframing human resource management: Power, ethics and subjectivity at

work. London: Sage.Winograd, T. (Ed.). (1996). Bringing design to software. New York: ACM Press, Addison-Wesley.

82 BADHAM AND EHN