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8/10/2019 Time in Patajali's Yogastra - Klostermaier, K. K.
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Time in Patajali's "Yogastra"Author(s): Klaus K. KlostermaierSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 205-210Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398919.
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8/10/2019 Time in Patajali's Yogastra - Klostermaier, K. K.
2/7
Klaus
K.
Klostermaier
Time
in
Patanijali's
Yogasitra
INTRODUCTION
The few
scholars
who have dealt at
any
length
with the notion of time
in
Patanjali'sYogasutra
seem
to
have been
guided
by
an effort
to
prove
that
Patanijali's
deas
are
in
line
with modern
that
is,
contemporary)
Western
conceptions.
Most of them
speak
of time
in
one breath
with
space
(and,
quite
frequently,
with
causality
oo)
as we are used
to
speaking
n
the
West
today:
philosophically
ince
Kant,
physically
ince
Einstein.
Sir
Brajendranath
eal,
writing
before Einstein
had
developed
his
Theory
of
Relativity,
moved
Patanijali's
iew of time and
space
close to Kant's
concept
of
the
a
priori
orms
of
apperception.1
ritjofCapra,
a
modern
physicist,
ries
to
suggest
hat
Oriental
Thought,
as
he
calls
it,
had
developed
more
than
two
thousand
earsago
the idea
of a four-dimensional
pace-time
ontinuum.2
Both
views
appear
o
be mistaken.
t is
my
contention
n this
essay
that
the
notion of
time in patanijali'sYogasutras not intrinsically onnectedwith the notion of
space
and
can
(and
should)
be treated
differently.
The
Yogasitra,
as
is well
known,
has much
in common
with
the
Samkhya-
darsana as far as basic
concepts
are concerned.
Now
Samkhya
is
neither
physics
n the
modern
ense,
nor
psychology,
or
metaphysics -but
it is
something
f
all
of them.The
Yogasutra
hares
his holistic
approach,
where
an
overriding
nterest
n
the
practicalgoal
of
emancipation
s
coupled
with
great
theoretical oncern o offeran
explanation
f
reality
n
termsof an
evolutionary
hierarchy
f
real
principles.
In
Patanijali's
reatment f
time,
these
aspects
have to be
kept
in mindtoo: he
does not
distinguish
etween
psychological
and
physical
ime,
nor
does
he
shy
away
from
extrapolatingmetaphysical
conclusions
from
a basis
of
physical
observations.
This
is
not the
place
to
go
into
the
very importantquestion
of
the
relation
between he
Yogasutra
nd
Buddhism.3
n
spite
of
some
polemicsagainst
some
Buddhist
chools,
both the
terminology
and the
underlyingphilosophy
of the
Yogasutra
uggest
close connections.
An
understanding
f
this
interdependence
wouldgreatlyhelpto clarifyalsothenotionof time,whichPatanjali cceptsor
presupposes.
Georg
Feuerstein,
n
what
might
be the
most
thorough
and critical
recent
study
of
the
Yogasutra,
writes: It is
highly probable
hat
in his
meta-
physics
of
time
Patanijali
as
directly
nspired
by
the
high-powered
peculations
of the
Sautantrika
Buddhists. Since not
enough
research s
available
on
this,
the
attempt
undertaken
ere,
o
study
he notionof
time
n
the
Yogasutra,
may
n
its own
way
contribute
o a
clarification
f
this issue.
An
analysis
of
the scientific basis of
Yoga
is
crucial:
he
success of the
method of
emancipationdepends,
on
the one
hand,
on the
correctness
f
the
Klaus
Klostermaier is
Professor
in
the
Department
of
Religion,
University
of
Manitoba,
Winnipeg,
Canada.
Philosophy
East and
West
34,
no. 2
(April, 1984).
by
the
University
of Hawaii
Press.
All
rights
reserved.
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8/10/2019 Time in Patajali's Yogastra - Klostermaier, K. K.
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206 Klostermaier
scientific
xplanation
f
the
physical
and
psychic
structures
f the universe
n
which
we
live,
and,
on
the other
hand,
on
the correctness
f the method
uggested
to
transcend his
materialuniverse.5
THE
TEXTUALBASIS
Severalsutrain connectionwith the classicalcommentaries,provideinfor-
mationon
Patanijali's
iew
of
time. Others
yield
additional
nformation
nsofar
as
they
provide nsight
nto the
application
whichthis
notion of time has
in the
contextof
Yoga.
Others,
again,
presuppose
he notion
of
time;
he notion
of time
itself s
embedded n
a
pre-notion
of the
universality
f
chang
and
flux.
(a) ksamatatkramayohsamyamad vivekajam ndnam
(III,
52)
6
Vyasa
comments:7
Just
as the
atom
(paramanu)
s the smallest
particle
of
matter
dravya)
o a moment
ksana)
s the
smallest
particle
of
time
(kala).
He
then
gives
a
physical
definition
of
ksana
by equating
t
with
the time
which a
paramanunmotion akes o leaveonepointand reachanotherpointor,in other
words,
o move
through
a
spaceequaling
he
space
t
occupies.
The
continuous
flow
of
these
ksanas
cannot
be
combined
nto a
vastu.
Whatwe call
hours
or
days
are mental combinations.
Thus time as
such
(kala)
is not
a
real
thing
(vdstusunya)
but
is based
on
changes
in the
mind
(buddhinirmana)
nd
known
through
verbalconnotation.
The
moment
ksana),
however,
s a
real
thing
(vastu)
n itselfand
constitutive
of
the
sequence
kramavalambin).
he
sequence
s constituted
by
an
uninter-
rupted
uccession
of
moments.The
Yogis,
who
truly
know the nature
of
time,
call
this time
(kala).
Two moments
(ksana)
cannot exist
together
because
between wo simultaneousmomentsthere cannot
be
a
sequence.
A
sequence
arises whena latermoment succeeds an earlierwithoutinterruption. n the
present moment)
no
earlier
or
later
moment)
s contained.
There
s,
therefore,
no
combinationof them. The
explanation
of
the
(reality)
of
past
and
future
moments
ies
n
the nature
of
change.
The
world
whichexists
n this
one
moment
undergoes hange.
All
dharmas re
superimposed
n this ksana.
By
sariyama
on
this moment
and the
sequence
(of
moments)
these are
caused
to be
visibly
present.
And thus
arises
metaphysical
nowledge
vivekajam
ndnam).8
(b)
atlta
anagatam
svarupato
'sti adhvabheddd
dharmanam
IV,
12)9
Vyasa
comments:10 Future
s thatwhose
manifest xistence
s
still
o
come;
past
is that, whose manifestexistencehad beenexperienced; resent s that upon
which
experience
now is
superimposed.
This three-fold
reality
(vastu)
s the
object
of
knowledge.
f
they
did
not have
their own
forms of
existence,
know-
ledge
of themwould
not
arise
by
which
hey
are
distinguished.
t follows hat
past
and
futuredo exist
n their
own
right.
Further,
f
the
resultsof karman-either
that
productive
of
experience
or of liberation-were
without existence
of
its
own,
then
he
actions
of the
sages
with
regard
o
this
wouldbe
pointless.
Efficient
causality
an render
an
entity
present,
not
produce
t from
nothing.
Unlikethe
present,past
and
futuredo
not
exist in manifest
orm.
The
future
has as its characteristic
ts
coming-to-be-manifest,
he
past
its
having-already-
been-experienced.
he
present
alone
possesses
manifest
existence.
While one
time-forms present,past andfuturedo exist(in theirown subtleway)in the
suppositum.
The
three
time-forms
do
not come
into
existence
out of
nonexistence.
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207
(c)
tatah
krtarthanamr
arinamakramasamaptir unamam
(IV,
32)11
Vyasa
comments:
2
As
a
result of the
rising
of
the
dharmamegha
the
gunas,
having
served their
function,
the
sequence
of
changes
comes to an end.
After
they
have
exhausted their
karman
and exhausted
their
sequence
they
can
no
longer
sustain
even
a
ksana.
(d)
ksanapratiyogiparinama-parantanirgrahyah
ramah
(IV,
33)
3
Vyasa comments:14 a sequence is an uninterruptedseries of moments (ksana)
perceived
as such
at the
end
of a
(process
of)
transformation.
ANALYSIS
OF THE TEXTS
The
conception
of
time
in
these texts
appears
to be
very
close
to
the Buddhist
ksanikavada.15
By pointing
out this closeness to Buddhism it is
implied
that the
notion of
time
is
not,
as
might
seem,
marginal
to
the
Yoga
system
but
very
central. The attainment of the
goal
of
Yoga
depends
on the
theory
as well as
the
reality
of
ksana. The Buddhists
haye defended
very
vigorously
the
reality
of
ksana
against
the contention of their enemies
that,
if
they
were
consistent,
they
would
consider the ksana a mere name without
any
corresponding reality-as
they
are
wont to
do
with
regard
to
every
other
thing.
The
Buddhists
maintain that
the
shortest
time,
the
mathematical
point-instant
is
something
real,
since
the
astronomer
makes
it
the
basis
of
all
his
computations.
It is an
indivisible time-
particle;
it
does
not contain
any
parts
standing
in
the relation of
antecedence
and
sequence.
The
only thing
in
the
universe which
is
a
nonconstruction,
a nonfic-
tion,
is
the
sensible
point-instant:
it
is the
real
basis of all
constructions.
It is
true
that it is a reality which cannot be representedin a sense-image, but this is just
because it is not
a
thought-construction.
The
absolutely unique
point-instant
of
reality,
as
it
cannot be
represented,
can also not be
named.
Consequently,
it is no
name at
all;
it
has
no
name:
reality
is
unutterable. What is
utterable
is
always
a
thought
construction.
Thus it is
that the
mathematical
point-instant
is a
fiction
for
the Realist
and
a
reality
for
the
Buddhist,
and vice
versa,
empirical
time or
gross
time,
substantial
time,
is
a
reality
for
the
Realist and a fiction for
the
Buddhist. Just as the
mathematician
constructs
his
velocities out
of
differentials,
so
does
the human
mind,
a natural
mathematician,
construct duration
out of
momentary sensations.
Though
the
Yogasutra
does
not
explicitly
mention
it,
it
seems to assume an
identity
of
the
ksana
that
becomes the
object
of
direct
experience
in
samyama
(constraint)
on
time and the
interval between
(and
the duration
of)
individual
vrttis
(modifications).
There is
reason
to
mention
this
point
because there
is
a
(Hinayana)
Buddhist
theory
which
calculates the
external-world ksana
to
be
equal
in
length
to
seventeen
thought-ksanas.16
There
is
reason, then,
to
speak
in
connection with
the
Yogasutra's
notion of
time not
only
of
an
(objective) time-quantum (close
to
ideas
of
'chronons'
maintained
by
some
physicists today)
but
also
of
a
consciousness-quantum
as
unit of
change.
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208
Klostermaier
This
again
has a twofold
function. In the
application
of
sariyama
on the
point
of
time he
yogin
s enabled
o
perceive
hat
which
s
vastu
a
real
hing)
n
time-a
mutual
corroboration
f
the
reality
of
consciousnessand
its
object,
which
is
responsible
or
it. In the
stage
of
dharmameghasamadhi
he
quantum-
natureof
time
again
offers
the
explanation
or
the
possibility
of
totally
trans-
cending
t.
Because
t
is a
dharma,
t
is
at
one and the same ime
an ultimate
n
the levelof
sense-perception
nd
cognition
derived
rom
t
and also
nonultimate
on
the levelof the
reality
which
emerges
after
the
gunas qualities)
ollapse
nto
themselves.
This
seems
o
suggest
hat time
n the form
of the moment
ksana)
s
fundamentaln
the
physical
universe
which
restson the interactionbetween
he
gunas.
It
wouldfollow
then,
that
it is intrinsic o samsaric
xistence
o
consider
kala
(gross
ime)
as vastu-whereas
in
reality
t is
an
imagination,
creation
of
the
buddhi
intellect),
based
on the
constantly changing
vrttis.
To
perceive
the
emptinessvastusunya)f time n that senseandto realize he vastu-characterf
the
three
modesof
the existence
f
ksana
s
at
one
and
the same
ime ndication
f
a
high
degree
of
insight
into the true nature
of
things
and also a
means
of
transcending
amsaric xistence.
The
insight
nto the
true nature
of
time,
so it
seems,
s
the borderline
nsight:
inceksana
s the dharma
which
s most elemen-
tary
(all
other dharmas
presuppose
t
and
inhere
n
it,
and
beyond
it-in the
process
of resolution f dharmas-there
are,
as
it
were,
he
gunas
n their
raw
forms)
its
dissolution,
or the
recognition
of its
dharma-character,
orms
the
essential
breakthrough
nd
is
both result
of,
and
generating,
viveka
discern-
ment).
When
vivekajnana
arises,
it
leads
to
dharmameghasamddhi,
which
almost
by
itself
glides
over into the
condition
of
kaivalya isolation,
namely,
of the
spirit).Although
he term
dharmamegha
as
not
yet
beenstudied
properly
nthis
context,
t
would it into the
picture
o translate
megha
not as cloud
(as
is
usually
done)
but as
field
n the
sense
of modern
physics.18
It would then
be a
condition
n
which
the
dharmas,
which on a lower
level
of consciousness
have
been
perceived
s differentiated
nto
a
great
number
f
specific
dharmas,
ow are
perceived
n
their
unified)
dharma-character:
s a
field
urrounding
ltimate
reality ather hanas things. Again,thecrucial unctionwouldbegiven o the
ksanadharma.
In the worldview
f the
Yogasuitra,
he
irreversibility
f
time,
a
problem
which
has
greatly
roubled
modern
physics,
would
find a
plausibleexplanation.
The
wholecosmic
process
samsara)
an be seen-after
it
has
come
to an end-as
a
krama:
a
sequence
of
ksanas.
The constituents
of
krama,
the
ksanas,
have-
amongst
hemselves-an
irreversible rder:
he ksana
of
the
past
is once
and
forever
haracterized
y
its
having
been
experienced.19
hat
means
t can
never
revert o a mode
of existence
of a
momentto
be
experienced
future)
nor
to a
modeof
being
experienced
ust
now
(present).
t is inherentntheirreversibility
of
order
tself,
order
being
constitutive
f
time-experience.
lso
in the
kaivalya
state,
the
state
of
freedom
rom the
bondage
of
samsaric
existence,
when
the
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209
gunas
have
collapsed
nto
prakrti
without
differentiation,
here
s no reversal
f
time: t is
an
existenceoutsidethe dharmas
altogether,
and therefore
timeless
existence.But
also heresamsaric
past
and futureare not
interchangeable.
That
wouldalso serve
another
problem.
The
yogin
is,
by
the
development
f
siddhis
(extraordinary ttainments),
capable
both of
looking
into
the
past
(coming
to know his own
pastbirths)
and
of
looking
into
the future
(divining
things
o
come).
Sinceall ksanasare
differentiated
y
the differenceo
the
present
ksana,
here
s no
danger
of
confusingpast
with
future,
or
vice versa.
It
is
only
given
o
the
yogin
to
have
insight
nto the
vastu
hat
are
the
ksanas: nsofaras he
knows
a
ksana,
he also knows ts
position
n the
sequence
which s
established
y
them.
Furthermore,
he
key
function of
dharmameghasamadhi
s
zero-time ex-
perience
would
appear.
f
kala
is
saidto be
vastusunya,
hat seems
o
suggest
not
a mere
negation
but
a transition:
corresponding
o
the function of
zero
as
transitionalratherthan terminal n the differentiation f experienceand re-
ality.20
The
vastusunya
ealization
s
essentialas
point
of
transition
betweena
buddhi-centeredonsciousness
nd the
purusa-awareness.
ince
kala
is
the
most
basic
of
the forms
created
by
buddhi,
he
realization
of
its
emptiness
mplies
a
radical
reversal
f
the
direction
of
activity
of
the
buddhi nd a
withdrawal f all
support
for
buddhi-baseddharmas.
NOTES
1. Sir
Brajendranath
Seal,
The
Positive Sciences
of
the Ancient
Hindus,
(reprint,
Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass:
1958),
p.
18ff.
2.
Fritjof
Capra,
The Tao
of
Physics (Berkeley,
California:
Shambhala
Publications,
1975),
p.
161ff.
3. In a
general way
the
question
of
the relation
between the
Yogasutra
and
Buddhism had
been
treated
already
by
Louis de la
Vallee Poussin in his
essay
Le
Bouddhisme et le
Yoga
de
Patafijali,
Melanges
chinois et
bouddhiques
5
(Louvain:
Institut
Belge
des Hautes
Etudes
Chinois,
1936/37):
223ff.
4.
Georg
Feuerstein,
The
Philosophy
of
Classical
Yoga (Manchester
University
Press,
1982),
p.
95.
5. An observation
by
TilmanVetteris
quite
pertinent
here:One is
getting
out from the world
only
by
going
to
the
ground
of
things,
and
not
by
going
anywhere
else.
One
is
not
getting
to the
ground
of
things by
an
analysis
of
any
kind of
stupidity,
but
by
an
analysis
and a
transcendence
of
the
most
important
concepts
and
truths which can
be found
about
the world....
Zum
Problem der
Person
in
Nagarjuna's Mula-Madhyamaka-Karikais.
In
Walter
Strolz
and
Shizuteru
Ueda, eds.,
Offenbarung
als
Heilserfahrung
im
Christentum,
Hinduismus
und
Buddhismus
(Freiburg-Basel-Wien,
Herder,
1982),
p.
171.
6.
James
Haughton
Woods,
The
Yoga
System
of
Pataijali,
Harvard
Oriental
Series,
vol. 17
(Harvard
University
Press,
1914),
p.
287,
translates: As a
result
of
constraint
upon
moments
and
their
sequence
(there
arises
the
intuitive)
knowledge proceeding
from
discrimination. I.
K.
Taimni,
The Science
of
Yoga
(Wheaton,
Illinois:
Theosophical
Publishing
House,
1967),
p.
368,
translates:
Knowledge born of awareness of Reality by performing samyamaon moment and (the process of)
its
succession
(in
his
ed.
III,
53).
It
is
presupposed
here
that the
reader knows
(or
is
being
informed
about
it
in
some other section of this
book)
what
the basic
term
samyama (translated
by
Woods as
constraint )
means.
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210 Klostermaier
7.
The
edition used
is that
by
Swami
Vijfianasrama (Ajmer:
Madanlal Laksminivas
Chandak,
1961)
which,
besides the
Vydsa-bhasya,
also
contains
the
Bhojavrtti.
For
convenience
sake,
one-word
English
translations
have
been
added
to the
technical Sanskrit terms.
For more detailed information
on the
meaning
of these notions and the various translations
adopted
by
Western
scholars
see
Feuerstein,
Philosophy, especially
on
guna:
33ff;
vrtti:
61ff.;
sarhyama:
104ff;
kaivalya:
51ff;
siddhis:
10lff.
8.
My
translation of
vivekajam ]dnarh
as
metaphysical
knowledge
should
indicate that it
is
considered to be true and certain knowledge but not yet identical with the objectless awareness
characteristic
for the condition
ofpurusa
in
kaivalya.
9.
Woods,
Yoga,
p.
315: Past and future as such
exist;
(therefore subconcious-impressions
do
not
cease to
be).
For the different time-forms
belong
to
the
external-aspects.
I.
K.
Taimni, Science,
p.
403: The
past
and
the future exist
in
their
own
(real)
form. The difference
of
Dharmas or
properties
is on account
of
the difference
of
paths.
10.
Op.
cit.,
pp.
449f.
(relevant
ortions
only).
11.
Woods,
Yoga,
p.
343: When as a result of this
the
aspects
(guna)
have fulfilled their
purpose,
they
attain
to
the
limit
of the
sequence
of
mutations.
12.
Op.
cit.,
p.
505.
13.
Woods,
Yoga,
p.
343: The
positive
correlate to
the
moment,
recognized
as such at the
final
limit of the mutation is a sequence.
Taimni, Science,
p.
439: The
process corresponding
to
moments
which
become
apprehensible
at
the
final end of
transformation
(of
the
gunas)
is kramah.
14.
p.
507.
15. In the
following exposition
of the ksanikavdda
I am
closely following
Theodore
Stcherbatsky,
Buddhist
Logic
(Reprint,
Dover,
1962),
vol.
1,
pp.
78ff.
16.
See Shwe Zan
Aung,
Compendiumof
Philosophy
(London:
Pali Text
Society,
1972),
p.
26.
17.
Also
according
to
the
Bhdmati the
nitydnityaviveka
is the most crucial adhikdra
for
brahmajijnafsa.
18. G.
Feuerstein,
Philosophy
(p.
98ff),
after
examining
a
great
many
suggested
translations
for
dharmamegha,
adopts
the view
of J.
Hauer,
who
wrote:
The meditator
is in
this state
enveloped
by
the supportingprimalpowerof the world;he has become a dharma-kdyaike 'thegreatMuni'. This is
an
expression
for the
Buddha who has
entered
Nirvana. Feuerstein
goes
on,
stating
that
the
concept
ofdharmamegha
does not
appear
to be mentioned
by any
Hindu
authority
prior
to
Patafijali,
though
it is
evidently
an
integral part
of
early Mahayana-Buddhism.
19. P. C. W.
Davies,
in The
Physics of
Time
Asymmetry
(Berkeley,
California:
University
of
California
Press,
1974)
discusses the
peculiar
phenomenon
that observation
in
quantum physics
introduces
a
time
asymmetry
into natural
processes.
Could
the difference
between
macroscopic
and
quantum
physics
be set
in
parallel
to the ancient Indian laukika and
vivekaja
nnam?
(This
is not to
suggest,
of
course,
the
possibility
of
observation
of
subatomic
processes,
but
the
possibility
of
a
development
of
a
corresponding
theoretical
framework.)
20. See
Betty
Heimann,
The
Discovery
of Zero and
Its
Philosophical
Implications
in
India and
Counter-Tensionof the Zero-Point, in Facetsof IndianThought London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1964),
pp.
95-104.
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