INESAP Information Bulletin No.25, April 2005 20

The forthcoming Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conference inNew York is devoted to discuss andfind ways how to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, how to precludethe appearance of new de facto nu-clear states and how to prevent nu-clear weapons from falling into thehands of terrorists. Unfortunately, asequence of recent events called intoquestion the effectiveness of the Treaty.The most notable developments werethe withdrawal of the Democratic Peo-ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fromthe NPT and its announcement of pos-session of nuclear weapons. Besidesthat, a network of ‘black market’ tech-nologies and materials for nuclearweapons production was uncovered.The network was coordinated by DrA.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistaninuclear bomb. On the other hand, thedifference in the US approach in deal-ing with Iraq and the DPRK clearlydemonstrated the advantages of posses-sion of nuclear weapons to those statesthat are not considered friendly withthe United States.

The future of the NPT largelydepends on how existing contradic-tions between its States parties will beresolved, and the main responsibilityfor the preservation of the Treatyregime will undoubtedly fall on nu-clear states. Thus, adherence of nu-clear states to fulfillment of their NPTobligations, particularly to those out-lined in Article VI, and compliance oftheir actual nuclear policies with theirdeclarations are of great importance.

It is not news that NPT Statesparties have serious complaints againstthe official five nuclear weapons states.In particular, Ambassador HusseinHaniff, a representative of the Non-Aligned States, reprimanded the P5(permanent five members of the UNSecurity Council) at the 3rd PrepatoryCommittee meeting for the NPT Re-view Conference in April 2004.1 Hispresentation pointed out the lack ofprogress towards achieving the total

elimination of nuclear weapons de-spite announcements of bilateral andunilateral reductions. It underscoredthat, although the Strategic OffensiveReduction Treaty (SORT) was signedin May 2002, reductions in deploy-ment and in the operational statuscannot substitute for irreversible cutsin nuclear weapons. According to theNon-Aligned States, the non-entryinto force of START II is a setback tothe 13 practical steps toward nucleardisarmament adopted at the 2000NPT Review Conference. Amb. Han-iff also criticized the development ofnew types of nuclear weapons and thelack of progress to bring the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) intoforce. The Non-Aligned States alsoemphasized the tendency of growingroles for nuclear weapons in militarydoctrines of nuclear states. They ex-pressed concern that abrogation of theAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treatyand deployment of strategic defensivesystems may trigger a new nucleararm race and lead to deployment ofweapons in outer space.

The presentation of the Non-Aligned States representative did notspecify the nuclear states that hadfailed to carry out their NPT commit-ments. However, it is quite clear thatthe criticism is directed mainly at theUnited States and Russia, who stillpossess the largest nuclear arsenals inthe world. Sadly, the listed accusationsare in general fair.

One of the main reasons for thecurrent state of affairs is that the Unit-ed States and Russia continue to be ina mutual nuclear deterrence relation-ship in spite of the end of the ColdWar and repeated declaratory state-ments from both parties about entire-ly new partnership relations. Objec-tively the nature of mutual nucleardeterrence is such, that, if one side un-dertakes any measures that may be re-garded by the other side as breakingthe existing balance of strategic capa-bilities, the other side is forced to re-

act. At the same time, it does not mat-ter that the first side declares its meas-ures as not directed against the secondside. It matters that the second sideperceives that measures as a potentialdanger to its interests.

In particular, in 2002, the UnitesStates unilaterally abandoned theABM Treaty. Russia responded bywithdrawing from the START IITreaty and taking a decision to pro-long the service live of its land-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) with multiple independentlytargetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV)until 2020-2030,2 although previousplans assumed elimination of thesemissiles by 2008 in accordance withthe Helsinki agreements of 1997. Fre-quently repeated statements of Russ-ian officials on future “unique sys-tems, that no other countrypossesses”3 may also be regarded as areaction to US abrogation of the ABMTreaty. The Russian response will like-ly also follow in the case that US bal-listic missile interceptors are deployedon the territory of new NATO mem-bers, as Russian officials warn.4

Another example can be given:The future of the CTBT is obviouslyin question because of the current at-titude of the United States. Althoughthe US keep the moratorium of onnuclear tests which are forbidden bythis Treaty, the readiness of the testsite in Nevada is maintained at an ap-propriate level. Unlike the US, Russiahas ratified the Treaty, but also keepsits range at Novaya Zemlya ready forresumption of full-scale nuclear tests,referring to similar US practice and totheir development programs for newtypes of nuclear weapons.5

The deadlock on negotiations onfurther reductions of strategic offen-sive arms certainly represents the cen-tral problem in the bilateral US-Russ-ian dialog on nuclear issues. In spite ofoptimistic statements of both partieswith respect to the SORT agreement,this treaty is at most is declaration of

Time for Nuclear States to Recall Their Obligations

Anatoli Diakov and Eugene Miasnikov

From the NPT to Nuclear Abolition

INESAP Information Bulletin No.25, April 200521

good will. It is not a document likeSALT, SALT II, START and START IIthat contained clear mechanisms forreductions and their objective verifi-cation.6 As many experts foresaw, theparties interpret the SORT provisionson reductions entirely differently. TheUS side proposes to replace reduc-tions by decreasing the alert status ofstrategic systems. The Russian sidecontinues to insist on strict coordina-tion of the reductions with elimina-tion of delivery systems, which wouldbetter ensure the irreversibility ofstrategic offensive arms cuts. Over-coming the existing differences in thetwo countries’ approaches seems veryproblematic, not to speak of concretesteps for further reductions of strate-gic arms.7 To some extent, the situa-tion is eased while START is still inforce. The parties regularly exchangedata on their strategic forces and veri-fy the nuclear cuts in accordance withSTART provisions. However, STARTrun out after December 2009, andprospects for its prolongation arevague. Thus, in five years, indeed, a le-gal vacuum may occur, which was amajor fear of the Russian side when itinsisted on signing SORT.

Another problem is the reduc-tion of non-strategic nuclear arms. USand Russia never made progress withregard to reductions of weapons ofthis type since the US and Soviet Pres-idents pledged unilateral obligations in1991. Moreover, in fact, the US recent-ly blamed Russia for failing to fulfillits part.8 Most likely, the cause was re-lated to a delay in the elimination ofnuclear weapons of Russian GroundForces. A number of publications inrecent years suggest that Russia recon-sidered its previous plans to eliminateall nuclear weapons of the GroundForces,9 and these weapons continueto be viewed as promising payloadsfor tactical missiles of the ‘Tochka’(SS-21) and ‘Iskander’ (SS-26) type.10

Russia’s concerns about US nu-clear weapons deployed in Europe areeven better grounded. According toan expert from the Natural ResourceDefense Council (NRDC), about 480nuclear bombs are currently deployedon the territories of US European al-lies, so that NATO tactical aircraftcan be armed with these weapons.11

Russia considers these weapons asstrategic, because most of the Euro-pean part of Russia falls within reach ofNATO tactical aircraft. The urgency ofthis problem inevitably grows asNATO expands and therefore thezone of US influence covers more for-mer Soviet Union states in CentralAsia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe.

Russian non-governmental armscontrol experts express deep concernon the state of affairs and propose a setof measures in order to transform themutual nuclear deterrence relationshipbetween Russia and the UnitedStates.12 Suggestions of the Russianexperts may provoke arguments aboutthe pros and cons, but the key prob-lem is a lack of political will both inthe United States and Russia to comeback to the bilateral dialog.

In the context of the NPT, thesituation looks even more illogical.On one hand, nuclear states toughenrequirements with respect to obliga-tions of non-nuclear weapon states(IAEA Additional Protocol, an at-tempt to close the club of states thatpossess uranium enrichment and plu-tonium separation facilities, etc.). Onthe other hand, they lower the burdenof their own NPT obligations, caus-ing criticism from non-nuclearweapons states and losing legitimatepower in punishing the states thatbreach the Treaty. Growing imbalancein the rights and obligations betweennuclear and non-nuclear weaponstates may destroy the NPT regime,which is likely not in the interest ofeither the US or Russia. Therefore,the sooner the politicians of the twocountries begin substantive negotia-tions on bilateral nuclear cuts, the bet-ter the chances for delaying prolifera-tion of nuclear weapons in the world.

1 Statement by H.E. Ambassador HusseinHaniff, Permanent Representative ofMalaysia to the United States in Vienna, OnBehalf of the Non-Aligned States Parties tothe Treaty of Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, New York, April 30, 2004;http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/2005/PC3-listofdocs.html.

2 Nadyozhny I Dostatochny (Reliable andSufficient), an interview with Colonel-Gen-eral Nikolay Solovtsov, Commander inChief of the Russian Strategic RocketForces, Krasnaya Zvezda, December 17,2004; Gennady Miranovich, Kozel’skii Re-dut (Kozel’sk Redoubt), Krasnaya Zvezda,

December 17, 2004.3 Aleksandr Babakin, Vladislav Kramar and

Igor Plugtaryov, Ministr Grozit Ne-suschestvuyuschim Oruzhiyem (MinisterThreatens With A Non-Existent Weapon),Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 14, 2005.

4 See, for example, Presentation of RussianMinister of Defense Sergei Ivanov at theConference The World in the 21st Century:Addressing New Threats and Challenges,Council for Foreign Relations, New York,January 13, 2005; www.cfr.org/.

5 Alexandr Orlov, Vozrozhdeniye YadernogoPoligona (Rebirth of the Nuclear TestRange), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Curier,November 17-23, 2004.

6 Anatoly Diakov, Timur Kadyshev, EugeneMiasnikov, Pavel Podvig, Ratificirovat’Nel’zya Otklonit’. Chto Delat’ s Dogov-orom o Strategicheskih Nastupatel’nyh Po-tencialah Rossii i SShA? (What to Do withthe Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduc-tions?), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie,September 20, 2002.

7 Wade Boese, US-Russian Nuclear RivalryLingers, Arms Control Today, January-Feb-ruary 2005; www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/NA_US_Russia.asp.

8 Wade Boese, US, Russia, Debate TacticalNuclear Arms, Arms Control Today, No-vember 2004; www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Tactical_Nukes.asp.

9 In particular, this fact was mentioned in thepresentation of A.I. Antonov, Chief of theRussian delegation at the 3rd PrepatoryCommittee Meeting for the NPT ReviewConference, April 28, 2004; www.mid.ru.

10 Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, andTimur Kadyshev, Non-strategic NuclearWeapons. Problems of Control and Reduc-tion, Center for Arms Control, Energy andEnvironmental Studies at MIPT, Dolgo-prudny, May 2004; www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/nsnw0406.htm.

11 Hans M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weaponsin Europe, Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, February 2005; www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp.

12 See, in particular: Anatoli Diakov et al.,2004; Eksperty Predlagayut Kompleks MerDoveriya Po Strategicheskim Vooruzheniyam(Experts Propose a Set of Confidence BuildingMeasures On Strategic Arms), NezavisimoyeVoyennoye Obozreniye, July 2, 2004; Alex-ei Arbatov, Superseding US-Russian NuclearDeterrence, Arms Control Today, January-February 2005; www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Arbatov.asp.

Anatoli Diakov (diakov@armscontrol.ru) isDirector of the Center for Arms Control,Energy and Environmental Studies(CAEES) at the Moscow Institute ofPhysics and Technology.Eugene Miasnikov (miasnikov@armscontrol.ru) is Associate at CAEES and Editor of theStrategic Arms Reductions (STAR) website(www.armscontrol.ru/start).

Time for Nuclear States to Recall Their Obligations