Tilman Rasche BE MSc Senior Inspector of Mines, DEEDI

Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation

Tilman Rasche BE MSc

Senior Inspector of Mines, DEEDI

A Regulator’s View of Automation, Proximity Detection and Collision

Avoidance Systems

2© The State of Queensland, Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2010

Link between Proximity Detection and Automation

Triumph of partial and full automation will depend on the success of proximity detection and collision avoidance technologies and approaches.

Therefore ….

We can learn from our current experience (successes and mistakes)


Assumptions…..

Two blondes living in Brisbane were sitting on a parkbench talking........ and one blonde says to the other, "Which do you think is further away..........Melbourne or the moon?"

The other blonde turns and says "Helloooooooooo, can you see Melbourne ...?????"


Dictionary

Assumptions are beliefs or ideas that we hold to be true — often with little or no evidence required.

We make assumptions every day of our lives…

…. blondes have more fun….

…. the earth is flat…..

…. as a driver on the highway, I assume that other drivers will obey traffic signals, so that when I go through an intersection with a green light, I assume that the cross traffic will stop at its red light.


Stats from the US - perspective

http://lifesavers.ky.gov/lifesavers_2006/session17-allred.ppt#671,2,Red Light Running

11%

4.5 in 1000, 1 in 222


Assumptions ‘solve’ a lot of problems we would otherwise have to investigate and answer for


~ 3 out of 4 = ~ 75% - vehicle related

Scientific investigation into large scale accidents has allowed us to

come a long way


Why do we see what we see…

Increasing dependence on mine vehicles – OC & UG

More & more vehicles, increase in size & speed– Visibility and space around machine – Operator & worker behaviour– Recurring accidents– Same picture worldwide

Key mining hazard but there are solutions

– Need to clarify assumptions……

Its up to all of us to solve the problem….


Source : DEEDI - Serious accidents and high potential incidents Mining and Quarrying Compilation of reports for March 2011

HPIs as of March 2011


23232121181814141010MinorMinor

(eg first aid)(eg first aid)

25252424222219191515InsignificantInsignificant

(eg(eg no injury)no injury)

2020171713139966ModerateModerate

(eg medical / (eg medical /

hospital treat)hospital treat)

16161212885533MajorMajor

(eg permanent (eg permanent

disability)disability)

111177442211Catastrophic Catastrophic

(eg fatality)(eg fatality)

RareRare

(almost (almost

impossible)impossible)

Unlikely Unlikely

(not likely to (not likely to

happen)happen)

Possible Possible

(heard of it (heard of it

happening)happening)

Likely Likely

(has (has

happened)happened)

Almost Almost

certaincertain

(common / (common /

repeating)repeating)

Likelihood

Consequence

Assumptions??

Maximum reasonable consequence?

Most likely consequence?

Likelihood?

‘Pegging’ the Risk - Rank


Hazards• Moving equipment (‘tons’ of kinetic energy - CAT 797F, payload 360 ton GVM

623 tons, 3,800 HP, top speed 67 km/h, 14.8m long, ~10m wide) Boeing 747-400 178 tons 3.5*

• LTA visibility• LTA hazard awareness


CAS

NOW

Automation


Basic design assumptions

What is the basis for ….

• Road widths - 3.5 rule• Separation distances – vehicles in motion require ??? m to stop• Maximum allowable speeds to allow safe braking• Queuing and parkup distances• Detection envelopes for proximity detection technology – cloverleaf-

shape???

• Where is the empirical data to substantiate the above???

• Braking distances• Operator reaction times• How will people react?

We too often assume we know what the problem is


Q: What is the minimum length of runway for the safe landing of a Boeing 747?

A: Google

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/airports/acaps/747_4.pdf

Engineering Assumptions

Q: What is the braking distance of xyz haultruck? (50 km/h,

level ground, dry road, loaded)


What is the problem?

V2V V2P slow speed e.g. Parkup areas

V2V collision or reversing over dump

V2V – overtaking collision V2V – high speed rear end collision

V2V - rear end collision

V2V V2P V2I reversing collisions

V2I or V2P forward collision

V2V collision - intersection V2V collision – mining face V2V collision – fast –slow moving vehicles

V2V – head on collisionV2V – slow speed rear end collision


Typical Underground Scenarios, there are many more…..

Shuttle Car Continuous Miner

No Go-Zones !


Example – design decision partially responsible for mining deaths MSHA - UG Fatalities - Continuous Miner

29 fatalities or 72% of victims were operating the remote at the time of the accident.

Most/all could be avoided if Proximity Systems had been available and installed

Not operating the remote

Maintenance activity

Victim locationX

Operating the remote

Legend

A moving RCCM collided withanother at an intersection,causing the stationary RCCM

to pivot and crush the other Op


Stopping distance

Acknowledged braking capability

Behavioural expectation


‘There are only so many ways to kill people, and we know them all’


Visibility = Opportunity to identify a hazard & react in time

??


Shuttlecar or Truck Miner


Person vs. Machine 1

Human Reliability - People are inherently unreliable

Mental processing time• Sensory – perception/recognition• Interpretation – what does this mean – friend or foe? (Car stopped in the

middle of the road)

• Response Selection – what happens next?

Expectation• Expected to brake – 0.7 secs = 0.5 secs perception 0.2 secs

movement• Unexpected – 1.25 secs = 1.05 secs perception 0.2 secs movement• Surprise – 1.5 secs =1.2 secs perception 0.3 secs movement

Movement time• Brake engagement time – foot movement, on pedal, depress,

mechanical delays


Person vs. Machine 2

Other factors• Urgency – time to collision• Cognitive load – ‘non driving’ matters – music, mobile

phone, autopilot• Age ~ lower levels of fitness ~ lower response capability• Gender• Nature of signal – can it be seen? Is it distinct? Is the

vehicle in front accelerating/decelerating? Aspect – frontal/from side

• Visibility vs recognition• Reaction time at night – visual contrast (amber/yellow brown

shooting glasses)

• People will make mistakes (wrong decisions)


Distance travelled (m) vs time (secs)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

1 2 3 4 5 6Time secs

Dis

tan

ce t

ravell

ed

m

5 km/hr

10 km/hr

20 km/hr

30 km/hr

40 km/hr

50 km/hr


RA Tools

Human behaviour

Engineering Control

Administrative Control - Procedure

PPE

Elimination

Substitution

Rel

ianc

e on

Peo

ple

to c

ontr

ol r

isk

Risk

Risk

1. Major HazardBaseline RA

2. Project/ChangeIssue RA eg. Coll.

Awareness

4. Individual ‘continuous’

Face RA

3. Routine & Non Routine Task

Planning RA

HR

Control OptionsPeople to administer risk

Req’d HR Resources

Risk & Issue

RA Tools

‘Sp

ecialists’‘G

eneralists’

Mine workers

1. High Level QRA, Engineering type

analysis, FTA, BTA,

FMEA, HAZOP WRAC

2. FTA, BTA, FMEA, HAZOP, WRAC

3. WRAC

4. JSA Deg

ree

of D

iffic

ulty

Tilmans ‘Meaning of Life’ Ver.1.0


Some CAS Technologies

• RFID – tags and readers• Radar• ‘Magnetic bubble’• Laser scanning• GPS – surface only• Cameras• Combination of the above

• Opencut and Underground metalliferous - available now• Underground Coal – requires IS certification – mid 2011• Cost from $5k per vehicle


Fit for purpose equipment - Selection of the equipment

• Sites to review all risk assessments based on local and published collision scenarios

• Change management – change of system functions • Verify that selected proximity detection system is in fact able to

mitigate the collision scenarios• Need explicit underlying assumptions (speed, distance etc.) • Polar diagrams’ showing the actual detection envelope of their

systems, not assumed envelopes - ‘clover leaf’ vs actual pattern. • Clarify CAS - ‘collision awareness/avoidance system’ • Physics - mine sites must understand what the chosen system can

and cannot do - Manufacturers to declare the capabilities of their systems.



• Manufacturers to declare if their systems are ‘collision awareness’ or ‘avoidance systems’, and provide sound, logical and unambiguous evidence for their judgement.

• Sites to check inference with other radio frequencies • Hardware – veiling (reflection), clarity of display etc.• Placement of screens/ alarming units – should be in field

of vision



• Combination of screens and method of alarming – intuitive exception based alarming based on criticality?

• Mine sites to review the systems ability - future proofing

• Review breaking distances for all vehicles for the range of operating speeds and conditions - verify that current site vehicle separation distances are sufficient


• Review ‘Operations rules’ i.e. if systems deemed safety critical, then operational procedures must ensure consistency of approach.

• Site champions - effective acceptance and utilisation of proximity detection systems – link between site – operations and maintenance and the proximity detection manufacturer.

• Dedicated maintenance personnel to ensure a successful commissioning and implementation of the system.– Who is going to maintain proximity detection and

automation systems – specialised skill• Proximity detection issues - simulator training• Maintainability – easy and safe access to all external

hardware must be achieved.

Competent People


• Sites to review and update relevant site procedures incl. prestart checks to ensure proximity detection systems and their importance as a safety control is assured and recognised.

• Proximity detection system requirements for contractor vehicles operating at different sites. Commonality of approach and rule-set.

• Design and roll out a comprehensive training program that outlines how to use the system effectively. Incorporate a section that explains what the system can do and what it cannot do.

• ‘Nuisance’ alarms or conditions may be in fact real alarms due to the systems design and capabilities (physics)

Safe Work Practises


Controlled Working Environment

• Proximity detection equipment must not be considered as the primary solution to mitigate collision risks.

• Must also consider their pit design & layout – intersection, haulroad, dump designs, road separation human behaviours etc.

• Inherently safer operating environment


Market Place

• Collaboration - several prox detection OEMs integrating their systems into ‘one’

• Combined systems better than sum of all• Some machinery OEMs allowing prox system to

manage their machine – eg. braking

• GPS ( high speed) plus radar (slow speed) – opencut

• ‘Magnetic bubble’ plus … - underground • Ability to create non-detection envelopes on the

equipment


In Summary

• ‘What is the problem, then look for solutions’ - effectiveness• (V2V, V2P V2I) Accidents are preventable• Free lessons from proximity detection systems implementation towards

automation

• Proximity detection systems are not the complete answer but are an essential part of the solution

• Must also look at human factors – human ‘unreliability’• Proximity Detection Technology is available or rapidly becoming

available• Need a side by side integrated combination of approaches• Must be embraced – life saving technology• Key to making automation a safe reality


Every miner home safe and Every miner home safe and healthy every dayhealthy every day

Tilman Rasche BE MSc Senior Inspector of Mines, DEEDI

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