TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf ·...

75
TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317 Phone: 865-5317 email: [email protected] Webpage: http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/ For a .pdf file of this syllabus click here This course provides an advanced overview of contemporary approaches to the analysis of political economy. Emphasis is placed on trade policy and competition policies. Specifically, we will focus on the development of a variety of micro- analytic models of the interaction between economics and politics. We begin with a derivation of citizen preferences over policies based on economic attributes in a general equilibrium context. With political preferences in hand, we examine a number of alternative “institutional” environments: single-issue referendum; single-issue lobbying; electoral competition; and agency models. Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 problem sets (worth 100 points) and 1 takehome examination (worth points 100 points). To receive an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole. Readings: The core readings for the course will be drawn from classic and current research papers. Where possible, I will assign papers that are available online. The attached syllabus contains a large number of references. We will only read a fraction of these (those marked by stars–“n”). However, a person contemplating research in political economy would be wise to read more widely.

Transcript of TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf ·...

Page 1: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

TI 0 114

The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy

Professor Douglas NelsonOffice Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute) Phone 865-5317

Phone 865-5317email dnelsontulaneedu

Webpage httpwwwtulaneedu~dnelsonFor a pdf file of this syllabus click here

This course provides an advanced overview of contemporary approaches to theanalysis of political economy Emphasis is placed on trade policy and competitionpolicies Specifically we will focus on the development of a variety of micro-analytic models of the interaction between economics and politics We begin witha derivation of citizen preferences over policies based on economic attributes in ageneral equilibrium context With political preferences in hand we examine anumber of alternative ldquoinstitutionalrdquo environments single-issue referendumsingle-issue lobbying electoral competition and agency models

Evaluation Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2problem sets (worth 100 points) and 1 takehome examination (worth points 100points) To receive an A you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performancerelative to that of the class as a whole

Readings The core readings for the course will be drawn from classic and currentresearch papers Where possible I will assign papers that are available online

The attached syllabus contains a large number of references We will only read afraction of these (those marked by starsndashldquonrdquo) However a person contemplatingresearch in political economy would be wise to read more widely

Some helpful surveys on the Political Economy of Trade

Douglas Nelson (1988) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Theory A Critical Surveyrdquo American Journal of Political Science V32-3 pp 796-837

Arye L Hillman (1988) The Political Economy of Protection ChurHarwood Academic Publishers

Robert Baldwin (1989) ldquoThe Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo Journalof Economic Perspectives V3-4 pp 119-135

Dani Rodrik (1995) ldquoPolitical Economy of Trade Policyrdquo in G Grossmanand K Rogoff eds Handbook of International Economics--VIIIAmsterdam North-Holland pp 1457-1494

Raymond Riezman and John Wilson (1995) ldquoPolitics and Trade Policyrdquo InJeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek eds Modern Political EconomyCambridge Cambridge University Press pp 108-144

Robert Baldwin (1996) ldquoThe Political Economy of Trade PolicyIntegrating the Perspectives of Economists and Political Scientistsrdquo InRobert Feenstra Gene Grossman and Douglas Irwin eds The PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 147-173

Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski (1996) ldquoThe Impact of theInternational Economy on National Policies An Analytical Overviewrdquo InRobert Keohane and Helen Milner eds Internationalization and DomesticPolitics Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 25-47

James Alt Jeffry Frieden Michael Gilligan Dani Rodrik and RonaldRogowski (1996) ldquoThe Politics of International Trade Enduring Puzzlesand an Agenda for Inquiryrdquo Comparative Political Studies V29-6 pp689-717

Elhanan Helpman (1997) ldquoPolitics and Trade Policyrdquo In D Kreps and KWallace eds Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory andApplications Volume I Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 19-45

Stephen Magee (1997) ldquoEndogenous Protection The Empirical Evidencerdquoin Dennis C Mueller ed Perspectives On Public Choice A HandbookNew York Cambridge University Press pp 526- 561

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1998) ldquoAn Overview of the Modeling ofthe Choices and Consequences of US Trade Policiesrdquo In A Deardorff andR Stern eds Constituent Interests and US Trade Policies Ann ArborUniversity of Michigan Press pp 29-55

Helen Milner (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of International TraderdquoAnnual Review of Political Science V2 pp 91-114

Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrade Policy Empirical Approachesrdquo In E Kwan Choi and JamesHarrigan eds Handbook of International Trade Oxford Blackwell pp213-250

William Kaempfer Edward Tower and Thomas Willett (2003) ldquoTradeProtectionismrdquo in C Rowley editor Encyclopedia of Public ChoiceRoutledge pp 550-576

Some recent advanced texts in political economy

Avinash Dixit (1998) The Making of Economic Policy A Transaction CostPolitics Perspective Cambridge MIT Press

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political EconomicsExplaining Economic Policy Cambridge MIT Press

Allan Drazen (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics CambridgeMIT Press

Jean-Jacques Laffont (2000) Incentives and Political Economy OxfordClarendon Press

John Roemer (2001) Political Competition Theory and ApplicationCambridge Harvard University Press

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics

Cambridge MIT Press

Prerequisites It is assumes that you have completed graduate levelmicroeconomic theory This and the mathematical tools used in microeconomictheory will be used in the readings the lectures the exercises and theexaminations We will be reading a number of papers applying standardeconometric tools and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of thesetools to read such material

Homework The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading thatyou are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date Several problemsets will be distributed in class Homework is due on or before the first class inwhich that material is discussed Late homework will not be accepted and willreceive a score of 0 The percent of total available homework credit will be takenas your homework score For example if you answer 90 of the homeworkquestions correctly your homework score is 90

Short Syllabus

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium

Topic II Referendum Models

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Topic V Lobbying Models

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Topic XI Industry-Level PolicyndashAntidumping

Topic XII Industry-Level PolicyndashCompetition Policy

TI 0 114SyllabusReading List30 May - 4 July 2002

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

Theory The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

nNelson notes Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizationsoptional]

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) ldquoProtection andReal Wagesrdquo Review of Economic Studies V9-1 pp 58-73

Ronald Jones (1965) ldquoThe Structure of Simple GeneralEquilibrium Modelsrdquo Journal of Political Economy V73-6 pp557-572

Ronald Jones and Joseacute Scheinkman (1977) ldquoThe Relevance of theTwo-Sector Production Model in Trade Theoryrdquo Journal of PoliticalEconomy V85-5 pp 909-935

James Cassing (1981) ldquoOn the Relationship between CommodityPrice Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positionsrdquo Journal ofPolitical Economy V89-3 pp 593-595

Ronald Jones (1985) ldquoRelative Prices and Real Factor Rewards AReinterpretationrdquo Economics Letters V19-1 pp 47-49

S Tokarick (1995) ldquoFriends Enemies and Factor DiversificationImplications for Protectionist Pressurerdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V10-4 pp 434-443

Peter Lloyd and A Schweinberger (1997) ldquoConflict GeneratingProduct Price Changes The Imputed Output Approachrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V41-8 pp 1569-1587

Peter Lloyd (2000) ldquoGeneralizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 2: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Some helpful surveys on the Political Economy of Trade

Douglas Nelson (1988) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Theory A Critical Surveyrdquo American Journal of Political Science V32-3 pp 796-837

Arye L Hillman (1988) The Political Economy of Protection ChurHarwood Academic Publishers

Robert Baldwin (1989) ldquoThe Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo Journalof Economic Perspectives V3-4 pp 119-135

Dani Rodrik (1995) ldquoPolitical Economy of Trade Policyrdquo in G Grossmanand K Rogoff eds Handbook of International Economics--VIIIAmsterdam North-Holland pp 1457-1494

Raymond Riezman and John Wilson (1995) ldquoPolitics and Trade Policyrdquo InJeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek eds Modern Political EconomyCambridge Cambridge University Press pp 108-144

Robert Baldwin (1996) ldquoThe Political Economy of Trade PolicyIntegrating the Perspectives of Economists and Political Scientistsrdquo InRobert Feenstra Gene Grossman and Douglas Irwin eds The PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 147-173

Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski (1996) ldquoThe Impact of theInternational Economy on National Policies An Analytical Overviewrdquo InRobert Keohane and Helen Milner eds Internationalization and DomesticPolitics Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 25-47

James Alt Jeffry Frieden Michael Gilligan Dani Rodrik and RonaldRogowski (1996) ldquoThe Politics of International Trade Enduring Puzzlesand an Agenda for Inquiryrdquo Comparative Political Studies V29-6 pp689-717

Elhanan Helpman (1997) ldquoPolitics and Trade Policyrdquo In D Kreps and KWallace eds Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory andApplications Volume I Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 19-45

Stephen Magee (1997) ldquoEndogenous Protection The Empirical Evidencerdquoin Dennis C Mueller ed Perspectives On Public Choice A HandbookNew York Cambridge University Press pp 526- 561

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1998) ldquoAn Overview of the Modeling ofthe Choices and Consequences of US Trade Policiesrdquo In A Deardorff andR Stern eds Constituent Interests and US Trade Policies Ann ArborUniversity of Michigan Press pp 29-55

Helen Milner (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of International TraderdquoAnnual Review of Political Science V2 pp 91-114

Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrade Policy Empirical Approachesrdquo In E Kwan Choi and JamesHarrigan eds Handbook of International Trade Oxford Blackwell pp213-250

William Kaempfer Edward Tower and Thomas Willett (2003) ldquoTradeProtectionismrdquo in C Rowley editor Encyclopedia of Public ChoiceRoutledge pp 550-576

Some recent advanced texts in political economy

Avinash Dixit (1998) The Making of Economic Policy A Transaction CostPolitics Perspective Cambridge MIT Press

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political EconomicsExplaining Economic Policy Cambridge MIT Press

Allan Drazen (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics CambridgeMIT Press

Jean-Jacques Laffont (2000) Incentives and Political Economy OxfordClarendon Press

John Roemer (2001) Political Competition Theory and ApplicationCambridge Harvard University Press

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics

Cambridge MIT Press

Prerequisites It is assumes that you have completed graduate levelmicroeconomic theory This and the mathematical tools used in microeconomictheory will be used in the readings the lectures the exercises and theexaminations We will be reading a number of papers applying standardeconometric tools and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of thesetools to read such material

Homework The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading thatyou are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date Several problemsets will be distributed in class Homework is due on or before the first class inwhich that material is discussed Late homework will not be accepted and willreceive a score of 0 The percent of total available homework credit will be takenas your homework score For example if you answer 90 of the homeworkquestions correctly your homework score is 90

Short Syllabus

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium

Topic II Referendum Models

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Topic V Lobbying Models

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Topic XI Industry-Level PolicyndashAntidumping

Topic XII Industry-Level PolicyndashCompetition Policy

TI 0 114SyllabusReading List30 May - 4 July 2002

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

Theory The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

nNelson notes Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizationsoptional]

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) ldquoProtection andReal Wagesrdquo Review of Economic Studies V9-1 pp 58-73

Ronald Jones (1965) ldquoThe Structure of Simple GeneralEquilibrium Modelsrdquo Journal of Political Economy V73-6 pp557-572

Ronald Jones and Joseacute Scheinkman (1977) ldquoThe Relevance of theTwo-Sector Production Model in Trade Theoryrdquo Journal of PoliticalEconomy V85-5 pp 909-935

James Cassing (1981) ldquoOn the Relationship between CommodityPrice Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positionsrdquo Journal ofPolitical Economy V89-3 pp 593-595

Ronald Jones (1985) ldquoRelative Prices and Real Factor Rewards AReinterpretationrdquo Economics Letters V19-1 pp 47-49

S Tokarick (1995) ldquoFriends Enemies and Factor DiversificationImplications for Protectionist Pressurerdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V10-4 pp 434-443

Peter Lloyd and A Schweinberger (1997) ldquoConflict GeneratingProduct Price Changes The Imputed Output Approachrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V41-8 pp 1569-1587

Peter Lloyd (2000) ldquoGeneralizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
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            • 22
Page 3: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Stephen Magee (1997) ldquoEndogenous Protection The Empirical Evidencerdquoin Dennis C Mueller ed Perspectives On Public Choice A HandbookNew York Cambridge University Press pp 526- 561

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1998) ldquoAn Overview of the Modeling ofthe Choices and Consequences of US Trade Policiesrdquo In A Deardorff andR Stern eds Constituent Interests and US Trade Policies Ann ArborUniversity of Michigan Press pp 29-55

Helen Milner (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of International TraderdquoAnnual Review of Political Science V2 pp 91-114

Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrade Policy Empirical Approachesrdquo In E Kwan Choi and JamesHarrigan eds Handbook of International Trade Oxford Blackwell pp213-250

William Kaempfer Edward Tower and Thomas Willett (2003) ldquoTradeProtectionismrdquo in C Rowley editor Encyclopedia of Public ChoiceRoutledge pp 550-576

Some recent advanced texts in political economy

Avinash Dixit (1998) The Making of Economic Policy A Transaction CostPolitics Perspective Cambridge MIT Press

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000) Political EconomicsExplaining Economic Policy Cambridge MIT Press

Allan Drazen (2000) Political Economy in Macroeconomics CambridgeMIT Press

Jean-Jacques Laffont (2000) Incentives and Political Economy OxfordClarendon Press

John Roemer (2001) Political Competition Theory and ApplicationCambridge Harvard University Press

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics

Cambridge MIT Press

Prerequisites It is assumes that you have completed graduate levelmicroeconomic theory This and the mathematical tools used in microeconomictheory will be used in the readings the lectures the exercises and theexaminations We will be reading a number of papers applying standardeconometric tools and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of thesetools to read such material

Homework The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading thatyou are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date Several problemsets will be distributed in class Homework is due on or before the first class inwhich that material is discussed Late homework will not be accepted and willreceive a score of 0 The percent of total available homework credit will be takenas your homework score For example if you answer 90 of the homeworkquestions correctly your homework score is 90

Short Syllabus

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium

Topic II Referendum Models

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Topic V Lobbying Models

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Topic XI Industry-Level PolicyndashAntidumping

Topic XII Industry-Level PolicyndashCompetition Policy

TI 0 114SyllabusReading List30 May - 4 July 2002

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

Theory The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

nNelson notes Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizationsoptional]

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) ldquoProtection andReal Wagesrdquo Review of Economic Studies V9-1 pp 58-73

Ronald Jones (1965) ldquoThe Structure of Simple GeneralEquilibrium Modelsrdquo Journal of Political Economy V73-6 pp557-572

Ronald Jones and Joseacute Scheinkman (1977) ldquoThe Relevance of theTwo-Sector Production Model in Trade Theoryrdquo Journal of PoliticalEconomy V85-5 pp 909-935

James Cassing (1981) ldquoOn the Relationship between CommodityPrice Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positionsrdquo Journal ofPolitical Economy V89-3 pp 593-595

Ronald Jones (1985) ldquoRelative Prices and Real Factor Rewards AReinterpretationrdquo Economics Letters V19-1 pp 47-49

S Tokarick (1995) ldquoFriends Enemies and Factor DiversificationImplications for Protectionist Pressurerdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V10-4 pp 434-443

Peter Lloyd and A Schweinberger (1997) ldquoConflict GeneratingProduct Price Changes The Imputed Output Approachrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V41-8 pp 1569-1587

Peter Lloyd (2000) ldquoGeneralizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 4: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Cambridge MIT Press

Prerequisites It is assumes that you have completed graduate levelmicroeconomic theory This and the mathematical tools used in microeconomictheory will be used in the readings the lectures the exercises and theexaminations We will be reading a number of papers applying standardeconometric tools and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of thesetools to read such material

Homework The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading thatyou are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date Several problemsets will be distributed in class Homework is due on or before the first class inwhich that material is discussed Late homework will not be accepted and willreceive a score of 0 The percent of total available homework credit will be takenas your homework score For example if you answer 90 of the homeworkquestions correctly your homework score is 90

Short Syllabus

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium

Topic II Referendum Models

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Topic V Lobbying Models

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Topic XI Industry-Level PolicyndashAntidumping

Topic XII Industry-Level PolicyndashCompetition Policy

TI 0 114SyllabusReading List30 May - 4 July 2002

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

Theory The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

nNelson notes Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizationsoptional]

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) ldquoProtection andReal Wagesrdquo Review of Economic Studies V9-1 pp 58-73

Ronald Jones (1965) ldquoThe Structure of Simple GeneralEquilibrium Modelsrdquo Journal of Political Economy V73-6 pp557-572

Ronald Jones and Joseacute Scheinkman (1977) ldquoThe Relevance of theTwo-Sector Production Model in Trade Theoryrdquo Journal of PoliticalEconomy V85-5 pp 909-935

James Cassing (1981) ldquoOn the Relationship between CommodityPrice Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positionsrdquo Journal ofPolitical Economy V89-3 pp 593-595

Ronald Jones (1985) ldquoRelative Prices and Real Factor Rewards AReinterpretationrdquo Economics Letters V19-1 pp 47-49

S Tokarick (1995) ldquoFriends Enemies and Factor DiversificationImplications for Protectionist Pressurerdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V10-4 pp 434-443

Peter Lloyd and A Schweinberger (1997) ldquoConflict GeneratingProduct Price Changes The Imputed Output Approachrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V41-8 pp 1569-1587

Peter Lloyd (2000) ldquoGeneralizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 5: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

TI 0 114SyllabusReading List30 May - 4 July 2002

Topic I Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

Theory The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

nNelson notes Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizationsoptional]

Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) ldquoProtection andReal Wagesrdquo Review of Economic Studies V9-1 pp 58-73

Ronald Jones (1965) ldquoThe Structure of Simple GeneralEquilibrium Modelsrdquo Journal of Political Economy V73-6 pp557-572

Ronald Jones and Joseacute Scheinkman (1977) ldquoThe Relevance of theTwo-Sector Production Model in Trade Theoryrdquo Journal of PoliticalEconomy V85-5 pp 909-935

James Cassing (1981) ldquoOn the Relationship between CommodityPrice Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positionsrdquo Journal ofPolitical Economy V89-3 pp 593-595

Ronald Jones (1985) ldquoRelative Prices and Real Factor Rewards AReinterpretationrdquo Economics Letters V19-1 pp 47-49

S Tokarick (1995) ldquoFriends Enemies and Factor DiversificationImplications for Protectionist Pressurerdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V10-4 pp 434-443

Peter Lloyd and A Schweinberger (1997) ldquoConflict GeneratingProduct Price Changes The Imputed Output Approachrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V41-8 pp 1569-1587

Peter Lloyd (2000) ldquoGeneralizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 6: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

A Tale of Two Matricesrdquo Review of International Economics V8-4 pp 597-613

Theory Deriving Preferences

nNelson notes Deriving trade policy preferences

Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoShifting Comparative AdvantageProtectionist Demands and Policy Responserdquo in J Bhagwati edImport Competition and Response Chicago University of ChicagoPress pp 153-184

Elias Dinopoulos (1983) ldquoImport Competition International FactorMobility and Lobbying Responsesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V14-34 pp 395-410

Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982) ldquoTrade AdjustmentPolicies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype DevelopingEconomiesrdquo Journal of Development Economics V10-1 pp 67-92

Robert Baldwin (1984) ldquoRent-Seeking and Trade Policy AnIndustry Approachrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V120-4 pp 662-676

James Cassing (1996) ldquoProtectionist Mutual Fundsrdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-1 pp 1-18

Andy Baker (2003) ldquoWhy is Trade Reform so Popular in LatinAmerica A Consumption Based Theory of Trade PolicyPreferencesrdquo World Politics V55-3 pp

ApplicationEmpirics 1 Revealed PreferencesndashThe Magee Test

nStephen Magee (1978) ldquoThree Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo in P Oppenheimer ed Issues in InternationalEconomics Stocksfield Oriel Press pp 138-153

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoThe Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 7: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Congressrdquo Review of International Economics V10-2 pp 343-360

Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004) ldquoFour SimpleTests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferencesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V16-2 pp 163-187

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoThe Magee Test Revisited IndustryLobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theoremrdquo MsHarvard University

ApplicationEmpirics 2 Case Studies Firms

Moran Theodore (1973) ldquoForegin Expansion as a lsquoInstitutionalNecessityrsquo for Corporate Capitalism The Search for a RadicalModelrdquo World Politics V25-3 pp 369-386

T Pugel and I Walter (1985) ldquoUS Corporate Interests and thePolitical Economy of Traderdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V67-3 pp 465-473

IM Destler and John Odell (1987) Anti-Protection ChangingForces in US Trade Politics Washington DC IIE

V Aggarwal R Keohane and D Yoffie (1987) ldquoThe Dynamics ofNegotiated Protectionrdquo American Political Science Review V81-2pp 345-366

Helen Milner (1988) Resisting Protectionism Global Industriesand the Politics of International Trade Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989) ldquoBetween Free Trade andProtectionism Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of CorporateTrade Demandsrdquo International Organization V43-2 pp 239-272

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy Trade Policy and GlobalCompetitionrdquo California Management Review V39-2 pp 145-169

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 8: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Michael Lusztig (1998) ldquoThe Limits of Rent Seeking WhyProtectionists Become Free Tradersrdquo Review of InternationalPolitical Economy V5-1 pp 38-63

Oona Hathaway (1998) ldquoPositive Feedback The Impact of TradeLiberalization on Industry Demands for Protectionrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-3 pp 575-612

Strom Thacker (2000) ldquoPrivate Sector Trade Politics in MexicordquoBusiness and Politics V2-2 article 3

Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001) ldquoGlobalization orNational Capitalism Large Firms National Strategies and PoliticalActivitiesrdquo Business and Politics V3-1 pp 5-19

James Alt Fredrik Carlsen Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999)ldquoAsset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms Lobbying forSubsidies in Norwayrdquo International Organization V53-1 pp 99-116

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Case studies labor

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979) ldquoAmerican Laborrsquos Stakein International Traderdquo In ICS ed Tariffs Quotas and Trade ThePolitics of Protectionism San Francisco Institute for ContemporaryStudies pp 125-148

Anne Krueger (1980) ldquoProtectionist Pressures Imports andEmployment in the USrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics V82-2 pp 133-146

Peter Donohue (1993) ldquolsquoFree Tradersquo Unions and the State TradeLiberalizationrsquos Endorsement by the AFL-CIO 1943-1962rdquoResearch in Political Economy Vol 13 pp 1-73

John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted against theNAFTA Trade Unions versus Free Traderdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 9: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

James Shoch (2001) ldquoOrganized Labor versus GlobalizationNAFTA Fast Track and PNTR with Chinardquo In Lowell Turner et aleds Rekindling the Movement Laborrsquos Quest for Relevance in the21 Century Ithaca Cornell University Press pp 275-313st

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Public Opinion Poll Data

Edward Balistreri (1997) ldquoThe Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces atthe Individual Levelrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V30-1 pp1-17

Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001) ldquoProbing theAftermyth of Seattle Canadian Public Opinion on InternationalTrade 1980-2000rdquo International Journal V56-2 pp 234-260

Eugene Beaulieu (2002) ldquoFactor or Industry Cleavages in TradePolicy An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson TheoremrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-2 pp 99-131

Matthew Gabel (1998) ldquoEconomic Integration and Mass PoliticsMarket Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European UnionrdquoAmerican Journal of Political Science V42-3 pp 936-953

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoTrade Winds NAFTA and the RationalPublicrdquo Political Behavior V20-4 pp 341-360

nKenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) ldquoWhat DeterminesIndividual Trade Policy Preferencesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V54-2 pp 267-292

nKevin OrsquoRourke and R Sinnott (2001) ldquoThe Determinants ofIndividual Trade Policy Preferences International Survey EvidencerdquoBrookings Trade Policy Forum 2001 Washington DC Brookings

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 10: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

pp 157-206

nAnna Maria Mayda and D Rodrik (2004) ldquoWhy Are Some People(and Countries) More Protectionist Than Othersrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review forth

Hermann Richard Philip Tetlock and Matthew Diascro (2001)ldquoHow Americans Think about Trade Reconciling Conflicts AmongMoney Power and Principlesrdquo International Studies QuarterlyV45-2 pp 191-218

Skonieczny Amy (2001) ldquoConstructing NAFTA MythRepresentation and the Discursive Construction of US ForeignPolicyrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-3 pp 433-454

David Rankin (2001) ldquoIndentities Interests and ImportsrdquoPolitical Behavior V23-4 pp 351-376

Michael Bailey (2003) ldquoThe Politics of the Difficult The Role ofPublic Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policiesrdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V28-2 pp 147-177

H Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2000) ldquoThe Peculiar PoliticalEconomy of NAFTA Social Learning and Footloose PolicyPreferences in a Simple Political Economy Modelrdquo Ms MurphyInstitute of Political Economy

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989) ldquoImport Competitionand Stock Market Return to Capitalrdquo American Economic ReviewV79-5 pp 1065-1087

Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989) ldquoTwo is Not EnoughA Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theoryrdquo msMurphy Institute Tulane University

James Brander (1991) ldquoElection Polls Free Trade and the StockMarketrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V24-4 pp 827-843

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 11: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Aileen Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment tothe Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An Event StudyAnalysisrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V26-2 pp 253-271

Aileen Thompson (1994) ldquoTrade Liberalization ComparativeAdvantage and Scale Economies Stock Market Evidence fromCanadardquo Journal of International Economics V37-12 pp 1-27

Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001) ldquoGlobalization DerailedMultinational Investorsrsquo Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-TrackTrade Authorityrdquo Journal of International Business Studies V32-3pp 479-496

Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002) ldquoMeasuring the Cost ofEnvironmental and Trade Protests to Globalization An Event Studyof the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talksrdquo World Trade Journal V16-2 pp 129-160

Fiona McGillivray (2003) ldquoRedistributive Politics and Stock PriceDispersionrdquo British Journal of Political Science V33-3 pp 367-395

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998) ldquoCostly CapitalReallocation and the Effects of Government Spendingrdquo Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 48 pp 145-194

Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001) ldquoDisplaced Capital AStudy of Aerospace Plant Closingsrdquo Journal of Political EconomyV109-5 pp 958-992

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992) ldquoRegionalEvolutionsrdquo Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 pp 1-61

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoRegional Labor Markets and theDeterminants of Wage Inequalityrdquo American Economic ReviewV84-2 pp 17-22

Robert Topel (1994) ldquoWage Inequality and Regional Labour

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 12: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Market Performance in the USrdquo in T Tachibanaki ed LabourMarket and Economic Performance Europe Japan and the USANew York St Martins Press pp 93-127

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoInterindustry Factor Mobility andTechnological Change Evidence on Wage and Profit DispersionAcross US Industries 1820-1990rdquo Journal of Economic HistoryV62-2 pp 383-416

Robert Hall (2004) ldquoMeasuring Factor Adjustment CostsrdquoQuarterly Journal of Economics V119-3 pp 899-928

Topic II Referendum Models

Theory The Basic Referendum Model

Peter Wagstaff (1975) ldquoConsensus Tariff Policyrdquo EconomicRecord V51-133 pp 105-108

nWolfgang Mayer (1984) ldquoEndogenous Tariff FormationrdquoAmerican Economic Review V74-5 pp 970-985

nJulio Rotemberg (2003) ldquoCommercial Policy with AltruisticVotersrdquo Journal of Political Economy V111-1 pp 202-226

Ronald Fischer and P Serra (1996) ldquoIncome Inequality and Choiceof Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Traderdquo Quarterly Journalof Economics V111-1 pp 41-64

Satya Das (2001) ldquoEndogenous Distribution and the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policyrdquo European Journal of Political EconomyV17-3 pp 465-491

Theory Dimensionality 1ndashSpatial Models

Charles Plott (1967) ldquoA Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibilityunder Majority Rulerdquo American Economic Review V57-4 pp 787-806

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 13: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Richard McKelvey (1976) ldquoIntransitivities in MultidimensionalVoting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Controlrdquo Journalof Economic Theory V12-3 pp 472-482

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987) ldquoNecessary and SufficientConditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial VotingGames An Intuitive Geometric Approachrdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V31-4 pp 709-728

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1985) ldquoPolitical InfluenceMotives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotasrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V19-34 pp 279-290

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987) ldquoEndogenousChoice of Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V23-34 pp 377-381

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989) ldquoTariff Formationin a Multidimensional Voting Modelrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1pp 61-79

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990) ldquoVoterPreferences for Trade Policy Instrumentsrdquo Economics amp PoliticsV2-3 pp 259-273

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoSystematic Political Grass-Root Supportfor Tariffsrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp 657-670

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986) ldquoTariffs Quotas andDomestic-Content Protection Some Political EconomyConsiderationsrdquo Public Choice V50-13 pp 221-242

Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986) ldquoThe Choice of Instrument forIndustry Protectionrdquo in R Snape ed Issues in World Trade PolicyGATT at the Crossroads New York St Martins pp 152-170

Alan Deardorff (1987) ldquoWhy Do Governments Prefer NontariffBarriersrdquo Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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    • 15
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            • 22
Page 14: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

24 pp 191-216

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989)ldquoOptimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst ThePolitically Efficient Policyrdquo Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs andEndogenous Policy Theory New York Cambridge University Presspp 257-263 [Mathematical appendix pp 363-364]

William Kaempfer J Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989)ldquoIncremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice BetweenTariffs and Quotasrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V22-2 pp228-236

Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992) ldquoLobbying vsAdministered Protection Endogenous Industry Choice and NationalWelfarerdquo Journal of International Economics V32-34 pp 289-303

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoEndogenous Trade Restrictions andDomestic Political Pressurerdquo in R Feenstra G Grossman and DIrwin eds The Political Economy of Trade Policy Cambridge MITpp 245-264

B Peter Rosendorff (1996) ldquoVoluntary Export RestraintsAntidumping Procedure and Domestic Politicsrdquo American EconomicReview V86-3 pp 544-561

Devashish Mitra (2000) ldquoOn the Endogenous Choice betweenProtection and Promotionrdquo Economics amp Politics V12-1 pp 33-51

Giovanni Maggi and Andreacutes Rodriguez-Clare (2000) ldquoImportPenetration and the Politics of Protectionrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V51-2 pp 287-304

Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003) ldquoNontariff Barriersand Trade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Inquiry V41-1 pp 80-97

Carol McAusland (2003) ldquoVoting for Pollution Policy The

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 15: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Traderdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-2 pp 425-451

Kenneth Shepsle (1979) ldquoInstitutional Arrangements andEquilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Modelsrdquo American Journalof Political Science V23-1 pp 27-58

Theory Dimensionality 2ndashCitizen Candidate Models

Osborne M and A Slivinski (1996) ldquoA Model of PoliticalCompetitionrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V111-1 pp 65-96

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoAn Economic Modelof Representative Democracyrdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV112-1 pp 85-114

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) ldquoSources ofInefficiency in a Representative Democracy A Dynamic AnalysisrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-1 pp 139-156

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

Hamlin Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000) ldquoProportionalRepresentation with Citizen Candidatesrdquo Public Choice V103-34pp 205-230

De Sinopoli Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002) ldquoA Remarkon Votersrsquo Rationality in a Model of Representative DemocracyrdquoJournal of Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 163-170

De Sinopoli Francesco (2003) ldquoA Note on Forward Induction in aModel of Representative Democracyrdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 41-54

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoMultiple Equilibria inthe Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracyrdquo Journalof Public Economic Theory V4-2 pp 171-184

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 16: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Dhillon Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002) ldquoWhen are PluralityRule Voting Games Dominance Solvablerdquo Games and EconomicBehavior V46-1 pp 55-75

Didier Laussel (2002) ldquoDelegation Effects in RepresentativeDemocracies Do They Foster Extremismrdquo Journal of PublicEconomics V85-2 pp 191-205

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoOn the Public ChoiceCritique of Welfare Economicsrdquo Public Choice V114-34 pp 253-273

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003) ldquoCentralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods A Political EconomyAnalysisrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp 2611-2637

Caselli Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004) ldquoBad PoliticiansrdquoJournal of Public Economics V88-34 pp 797-782

Laussel Didier and Christian Montet (1997) ldquoLes DeacuteterminantsPolitiques du Protectionnisme un Apercu de Developements RecentrdquoIn Patrick Aruts Andre Cartapanis and Didier Laussel edsPolitiques Economiques Fondements Theacuteoriques Paris Economica

Laussel Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001) ldquoThe Sources ofProtectionist Drift in Representative Democraciesrdquo Ms University ofIowa

Gerald Willmann (2003) ldquoWhy Legislators are Protectionists TheRole of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffsrdquo Ms Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992) ldquoThe Politics of1992 Fiscal Policy and European Integrationrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 689-701

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoRepresentativedemocracy and capital taxationrdquo Journal of Public Economics V55-

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 17: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

1 pp 53-70

Persson Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996) ldquoFederal FiscalConstitutions Risk Sharing and Moral Hazardrdquo Econometrica V64-3 pp 623-646

ApplicationEmpirics 1 National Voting and Trade Policy

Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990) ldquoProtectionism in DirectDemocracyrdquo Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsV146-3 pp 389-418

Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980) ldquoReciprocity ImperialSentiment and Party Politicsrdquo Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience V13-4 pp 711-729

Eugene Beaulieu and JC Herbert Emery (2001) ldquoPork PackersReciprocity and Lauriers Defeat in the 1911 Canadian GeneralElectionrdquo Journal of Economic History V61-4 pp 1083-1101

John Conybeare (1984) ldquoPoliticians and Protection Tariffs andElections in Australiardquo Public Choice V43-2 pp 203-209

Douglas Irwin (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Free TradeVoting in the British General Election of 1906rdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V37-1 pp 75-108

Douglas Irwin (1996) ldquoIndustry or Class Cleavages over TradePolicy Evidence from the British General Election of 1923rdquo in RFeenstra G Grossman and D Irwin eds The Political Economy ofTrade Policy Cambridge MIT pp 53-75

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

nPushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous TradePolicy through Majority Voting An Empirical InvestigationrdquoJournal of International Economics V58-1 pp 107-133

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 18: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

ApplicationsEmpirics 2 Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

Robert Baldwin (1976) ldquoThe Political Economy of Postwar USTrade Policyrdquo NYU CJ Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--4

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoImport Policy at the CongressionalLevelrdquo Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 33-78

Cletus Coughlin (1985) ldquoDomestic Content Legislation HouseVoting and the Economic Theory of Regulationrdquo Economic InquiryV23-3 pp 437-448

Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987) ldquoThe Textile Bill of1985 The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patternsrdquo PublicChoice V54-1 pp 19-25

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988) ldquoConstituent Interestvs Legislator Ideology The Role of Political Opportunity CostrdquoEconomic Inquiry V26-3 pp 461-470

John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989) ldquoEmpirical Analysesof the Determinants of Protection A Survey and Some New Resultsrdquo in J Odell and T Willett eds International Trade Policies Gainsfrom Exchange Between Economics and Political Science AnnArbor University of Michigan Press pp 105-139

Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990) ldquoExplanations ofProtectionism in International Traderdquo Public Choice V66-2 pp137-153

Larry Wade and John Gates (1990) ldquoA New Tariff Map of theUnited States (House of Representatives)rdquo Political GeographyQuarterly V9-3 pp 284-304

James Lutz (1991) ldquoDeterminants of Protectionist Attitudes in theUnited States House of Representativesrdquo International TradeJournal V5-3 pp 301-328

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 19: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoEconomic Interests and Voting on theOmnibus Trade Bill of 1987rdquo Public Choice V75-1 pp 21-42

William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993) ldquoThe ExpectedEffects of Trade Liberalisation Evidence from US CongressionalAction on Fast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

Ellison Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995) ldquoEconomics andPolitics The Case of Sugar Tariff Reformrdquo Journal of Law andEconomics V38-2 pp 335-366

Krishna Srinivasan (1997) ldquoAn Empirical Analysis of the PoliticalEconomy of Tariffsrdquo Economics amp Politics V9-1 pp 55-70

Erik Gartzke and J Mark Wrighton (1998) ldquoThinking Globally orActing Locally Determinants of the GATT Vote in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V23-1 pp 33-55

Bruce A Blonigen David N Figlio (1998) ldquoVoting for ProtectionDoes Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator BehaviorrdquoAmerican Economic Review V88-4 pp 1002-1014

nMichael Bailey and David Brady (1998) ldquoHeterogeneity andRepresentation The Senate and Free Traderdquo American Journal ofPolitical Science V42-2 pp 524-544

Benjamin Fordham (1998) ldquoEconomic Interests Party andIdeology in Early Cold War US Foreign Policyrdquo InternationalOrganization V52-2 pp 359-396

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoCommerce Coalitions and FactorMobility Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade LegislationrdquoAmerican Political Science Review V96-3 pp 593-608

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoLame Ducks and Safe Seats Effects ofMarginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATTAgreementsrdquo Ms Harvard University

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 20: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

ApplicationsEmpirics 3A Time Series AnalysisndashMacro Analysis

T McKeown (1984) ldquoFirms and Tariff Change Explaining theDemand for Protectionrdquo World Politics V36-2 pp 215-233

J Cassing T McKeown and J Ochs (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of the Tariff Cyclerdquo American Political Science ReviewV80-3 pp 843-862

R Dornbusch and J Frankel (1987) ldquoMacroeconomics andProtectionrdquo in R Stern ed US Trade Policies in a Changing WorldEconomy Cambridge MIT pp 77-130

Magee Stephen P (1987) ldquoThe Political-Economy of USProtectionismrdquo in H Giersch ed Free Trade and the WorldEconomy Towards and Opening of Markets Tubingen JCB Mohrpp 368-402

Magee Stephen P and Leslie Young (1987) ldquoEndogenousProtection in the United States 1900-1984 in Stern ed US TradePolicies in a Changing World Economy Cambridge MIT pp 145-195

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) ldquoDividedGovernment and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 592-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe PartisanParadox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

HK Hall C Kao and D Nelson (1998) ldquoWomen and TariffsTesting the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Modelrdquo Economic Inquiry 1998 V36-2 pp 320-332

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 21: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992) ldquoGrowth WavesSystemic Openness and Protectionismrdquo International OrganizationV46-2 pp 493-532

R Reuveny and W Thompson (1997) ldquoThe Timing ofProtectionismrdquo Review of International Political Economy V4-pp 179-213

W Thompson and R Reuveny (1998) ldquoTariffs and TradeFluctuations Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We ThinkrdquoInternational Organization V52-2 pp 421-440

William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001) ldquoExplainingProtectionism Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term CommonDenominatorrdquo Global Society V15-3 pp 229-249

ApplicationsEmpirics 3B Time Series AnalysisndashTariff Endogeneity

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989) ldquoThe Behavior of USTariff Ratesrdquo American Economic Review V79-1 pp 91-110[comment by Sadorsky 1994 V84-4 pp 1097-1103]

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoA Test of TariffEndogeneity in the United Statesrdquo American Economic ReviewV81-4 pp 952-960

Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991) ldquoTesting theEndogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US Further EvidencerdquoEconomics Letters V35-3 pp 311-315

Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994) ldquoQuantitative Assessmentof Tariff Endogeneity Interwar vs Postwarrdquo Economics LettersV44-12 pp 139-146

G Gardner D Slottje and K Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTariff Behaviorin Five European Countriesrdquo Economics Letters V 39- pp 73-78

A Bohara and W Kaempfer (1994) ldquoTariff Behavior in FiveEuropean Countries Further Evidencerdquo Economics Letters V45-pp 213-216

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 22: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994) ldquoThe Determinants andPersistence of Canadian Tariff Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V27-1 pp 112-128

Robert Krol (1996) ldquoTesting Tariff Endogeneity in Japan AComparison of Pre- and Post-War Periodsrdquo Economics Letters V50- pp 399-406

John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997) ldquoTariff EndogeneityEvidence from 19 Century Europerdquo Economics Letters V56- ppth

345-350

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoImport Prices and the Political Economyof Tariffs Evidence from Germany Japan and the United States1954-1994rdquo Economics Letters V76-1 pp 11-17

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

Charles Kindleberger (1951) ldquoGroup Behavior and InternationalTraderdquo Journal of Political Economy V59-1 pp 30-46

James Kurth (1979) ldquoThe Political Consequences of the ProductCyclerdquo International Organization V33-1 pp 1-34

Alan Milward (1981) ldquoTariffs as Constitutionsrdquo in S Strange andR Tooze eds The International Politics of Surplus CapacityLondon Allen and Unwin pp 57-66

Peter Gourevitch (1986) Politics in Hard Times ComparativeResponses to International Economic Crises Ithaca CornellUniversity Press

Paul Bairoch (1988) ldquoEuropean Trade Policy 1815-1914rdquo in PMathias and S Pollard eds Cambridge Economic History of EuropeV8 Industrial Economies Cambridge CUP pp 1-160

Ronald Rogowski (1987) ldquoPolitical Cleavages and ChangingExposure to Traderdquo American Political Science Review V81-4

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 23: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

pp 1121-1137

Ronald Rogowski (1989) Commerce and Coalitions How TradeAffects Domestic Political Alignments Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Douglas Nelson (1991) ldquoNo Theorems without Theory OnRogowskirsquos Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policyrdquo

Paul Midford (1993) ldquoInternational Trade and Domestic PoliticsImproving on Rogowskirsquos Model of Political AlignmentsrdquoInternational Organization V47-4 pp 535-564

Douglas Irwin (1989) ldquoPolitical Economy and Peelrsquos Repeal of theCorn Lawsrdquo Economics amp Politics V1-1 pp 41-59

G Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985) ldquoIdeology InterestGroups and the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo Journal of Institutionaland Theoretical Economics V141-2 pp 197-212

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoSpecific Factors CapitalMarkets Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade DomesticDeterminants of the Repeal of the Corn Lawsrdquo World Politics V43-4 pp 545-569

Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) ldquoIdeology Party and Interests inthe British Parliament of 1841-1847rdquo British Journal of PoliticalScience V33-4 pp 581-605

Iain McClean (1998) ldquoIrish Potatoes Indian Corn and BritishPolitics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal of the CornLawsrdquo In A Dobson and J Stanyer eds Contemporary PoliticalStudies 1998ndashVol 1 Nottingham PSA pp 124-141

Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999) ldquoIrish Potatoes andBritish Politics Interests Ideology Heresthetics and the Repeal ofthe Corn Lawsrdquo Political Studies V47-5 pp 817-836

Daniel Verdier (1994) Democracy and International Trade

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 24: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Britain France and the United States 1860-1990 PrincetonPrinceton University Press

Mark Brawley (1997) ldquoFactoral or Sectoral Conflict PartiallyMobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial GermanyrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V41-4 pp 633-653

Zahariadis Nikolaos (2001) ldquoAsset Specificity and State Subsidiesin Industrialized Countriesrdquo International Studies Quarterly V45-4 603-616

John Conybeare (1991) ldquoVoting for Protection An ElectoralModel of Tariff Policyrdquo International Organization V 45-1 pp57-81

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996) ldquoLog-Rolling andEconomic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley TariffrdquoCarnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 45 pp 173-200

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoClass Versus Industry CleavagesInter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of TraderdquoInternational Organization V55-1 pp 1-46

Michael Hiscox (2001) ldquoFactor Specificity Inter-industryMobility and Technological Change Evidence from ManufacturingWages and Profits in the USrdquo Journal of Economic History V62-2 pp 383-416

Michael Hiscox (2001) International Trade and Political ConflictCommerce Coalitions and Mobility Princeton Princeton UniversityPress

Fiona McGillivray Iain McLean Robert Pahre and CherylSchonhardt-Bailey (2002) International Trade And PoliticalInstitutions Instituting Trade in the Long 19 Century Brookfield th

VT Edward Elgar

ApplicationsEmpirics 5 CGE Analysis

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 25: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998) ldquoA ComputableEquilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economyrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V42-2 pp 628-660

Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993) ldquoCoerciveRedistribution and the Franchise A Preliminary Investigation UsingComputable General Equilibrium Modellingrdquo In Albert BretonGianluigi Galeotti Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe eds Preferences and Democracy Dordrecht Kluwer Academic pp351-375

Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001) ldquoPolitical InfluenceEconomic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a ComputableEquilibrium Framework With Application to the United States 1973and 1983rdquo Public Choice V109-12 pp 69-99

Ken Kollman John Miller and Scott Page eds (2003)Computational Model in Political Economy Cambridge MIT

Topic III Organizing for Political Action

Theory Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986) ldquoInterest Groups Government and thePolitics of Protectionismrdquo Aussenwirtschaft V41-23 pp 273-302

nWilliam Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991) ldquoEconomic Modelsof Interest Groupsrdquo American Journal of Political Science V35-2pp 512-546

James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy ofTrading States Factor Specificity Collective Action Problems andDomestic Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Political Philosophy V2-2 pp 165-192

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995) ldquoModels of InterestGroups Four Different Approachesrdquo In N Schofield ed CollectiveDecision-making Social Choice and Political Economy BostonKluwer pp 337-362

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 26: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action BostonHarvard University Press

Richard Wagner (1966) ldquoPressure Groups and PoliticalEntrepreneursrdquo Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making V1 pp161-170

Robert Salisbury (1969) ldquoAn Exchange Theory of InterestGroupsrdquo Midwest Journal of Political Science V13-1 pp 1-32

David Austen-Smith (1981) ldquoVoluntary Pressure GroupsrdquoEconomica V48-190 pp 143-153

David Yoffie (1987) ldquoCorporate Strategies for Political Action ARational Modelrdquo In A Marcus et al Eds Business Strategy andPublic Policy Westport Quorum Books pp 43-60

Todd Sandler (1992) Collective Action Theory and ApplicationsAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press

Wolfgang Mayer (2002) ldquoOn the Efficiency of By-ProductLobbyingrdquo Public Choice V112-34 pp 275-292

Dani Rodrik (1986) ldquoTariffs Subsidies and Welfare withEndogenous Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V21-34pp 285-299

Arye L Hillman (1991) ldquoProtection Politics and MarketStructurerdquo in E Helpman and A Razin eds International Trade andTrade Policy Cambridge MIT Press pp 120-140

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996) ldquoLobbying forProtection by Heterogeneous Firmsrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V12-1 pp 19-32

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997) ldquoCollective RentSeeking with Endogenous Group Sizesrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V13-1 pp 121-130

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 27: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoIs There a Free-Rider Problem inLobbying Endogenous Tariffs Trigger Strategies and the Numberof Firmsrdquo American Economic Review V88-3 pp 652-660

Paul Pecorino (2001) ldquoMarket Structure Tariff Lobbying and theFree-Rider Problemrdquo Public Choice V106-34 pp 203-220

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

nDevashish Mitra (1999) ldquoEndogenous Lobby Formation andEndogenous Protection A Long-Run Model of Trade PolicyDeterminationrdquo American Economic Review V89-5 pp 1116-1134

Richard Damania and Per G Fredriksson (2000) ldquoOn theFormation of Industry Lobby Groupsrdquo Journal of Economic Behaviorand Organization V41-4 pp 315-335

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy and LobbyFormation An Application to the Free-rider Problemrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V57-2 pp 449-471

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

Koichi Kagitani (2003) ldquoResistance to Trade Liberalization in theUnionized Sectorrdquo Open Economies Review V14-4 pp 419-435

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004) ldquoTariff Rate as a Public Goodrdquo Reviewof International Economics V12-1 pp 95-107

ApplicationEmpirics

Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996) ldquoInterest Groups A Surveyof Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influencerdquo EuropeanJournal of Political Economy V12-3 pp 403-442

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 28: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985) ldquoCreating PoliticalAdvantage The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneurrdquo California Management Review V28-1 pp 124-139

Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988) OrganizingBusiness Trade Associations in America and Japan WashingtonDC AEI

nCheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) ldquoLessons in Lobbying for FreeTrade in 19th-Century Britain To Concentrate or Notrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V85-1 pp 37-58

Iain McLain (2002) ldquoFalsifying Olson The UK Victories of FreeTrade 1846 and 1906rdquo Ms Nuffield College Oxford

Stephanie Lenway Carol Jacobson and Judith Goldstein (1990)ldquoTo Lobby or Petition The Political Environment of US TradePolicyrdquo Journal of Management V16-1 pp 116-134

Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991) ldquoLeadersFollowers and Free Riders An Empirical Test of Variation inCorporate Political Involvementrdquo Academy of Management JournalV34-4 pp 893-906

Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991) ldquoFirm Participation inSteel Industry Lobbyingrdquo Economic Inquiry V29-1 pp 134-147

Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991) ldquoThe Determinantsof Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection The Case ofthe Steel Industryrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBERpp 75-105

Douglas Schuler (1996) ldquoCorporate Political Strategy and ForeignCompetition The Case of the Steel Industryrdquo Academy ofManagement Journal V39-3 pp 720-737

Stephanie Lenway Randal Morck and Bernard Yeung (1996)

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 29: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

ldquoRent Seeking Protectionsim and Innovation in the American SteelIndustryrdquo Economic Journal V106-435 pp 410-421

Randall Morck Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001)ldquoHabitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EMAlgorithm Approachrdquo Economic Inquiry V39-3 pp 365-79

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1991) ldquoTheIndustrial Organization of Corporate Political ParticipationrdquoSouthern Economic Journal V57-3 pp 727-738

Kevin Grier Michael Munger and Brian Roberts (1994) ldquoTheDeterminants of Industry Political Activity 1978-1986rdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V88-4 pp 911-926

Timothy McKeown (1994) ldquoEpidemiology of Corporate PACParticipation among Large Corporationsrdquo Journal of EconomicBehavior and Organization V24-2 pp 153-168

Kathleen Rehbein (1995) ldquoForeign-owned Firmsrsquo CampaignContributions in the United States An Exploratory Surveyrdquo PolicyStudies Journal V23-1 pp 41-61

Hansen Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000) ldquoDisaggregating andExplaining Corporate Political Activity Domestic and ForeignCorporations in National Politicsrdquo American Political ScienceReview V94-4 pp 891-903

Micky Tripathi Stephen Ansolabehere and James M Snyder Jr(2002) ldquoAre PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked NewEvidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Actrdquo Business andPolitics (Online Version) V4-2 Article 2

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoUS Non-Tariff Barriers as PrivatelyProvided Public Goodsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V64-1 pp61-81

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoStigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior inProtectionist Industries Evidence from the Lobbying Power

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 30: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Functionrdquo Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization V35-4 pp 477-499

Schiller Wendy (1999) ldquoTrade Politics in the American CongressA Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest GroupBehaviorrdquo Political Geography V18-7 pp 769-789

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000) ldquoGeography InternationalTrade and Political Mobilization in US Industriesrdquo AmericanJournal of Political Science V44-4 pp 703-719

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDo Political Action Committees GiveMoney to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motivesrdquo PublicChoice V112-34 pp 373-399

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996) ldquoEndogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies Theory and Evidencerdquo MsUniversity of Texas

Topic IV Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Theory Regulation Theoretic Models (Active StatelsquoPassiversquo Groups)

George Stigler (1971) ldquoThe Theory of Economic Regulationrdquo BellJournal of Economics and Management Science V2-1 pp 3-21

Sam Peltzman (1976) ldquoToward a More General Theory ofRegulationrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V19-2 pp 211-240

Bruce Gardner (1983) ldquoEfficient Redistribution throughCommodity Marketsrdquo American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsV65-1 pp 225-234

Patrick Messerlin (1981) ldquoThe Political Economy ofProtectionism The Bureaucratic Caserdquo Weltwirtschaftliches ArchivV117-3 pp 469-495

nArye L Hillman (1982) ldquoDeclining Industries and PoliticalSupport Protectionist Motivesrdquo American Economic Review V72-

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 31: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

5 pp 1180-1187

James Cassing and Arye L Hillman (1986) ldquoShifting ComparativeAdvantage and Senescent Industry Collapserdquo American EconomicReview V76-3 pp 516-523

nNgo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991) ldquoProtectionist Responsesand Declining Industriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V30-12 pp 87-103

JP Choi (2001) ldquoProtectionist Response to Import Competition inDeclining Industries Reconsideredrdquo European Journal of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 193-201

David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996) ldquoRevenue Motives and TradeLiberalizationrdquo Review of International Economics V4-3 pp 276-281

Michael Leidy (1994) ldquoTrade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking ASynthesis of Recent Workrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-2 pp 97-118

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999) ldquoGrowth the ExternalTerms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalizationrdquo PublicChoice V98-12 pp 43-57

ApplicationEmpirics Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

K Anderson and R Baldwin (1987) ldquoThe Political Market forProtection in Industrial Countriesrdquo in AM El-Agraa ed ProtectionCooperation Integration and Development New York Macmillan

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoThe Determinants of Tariffs and NontariffTrade Restrictions in the USrdquo Journal of Political Economy V89-1 pp 105-121

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 32: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Edward Ray (1981) ldquoTariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in theUS and Abroadrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V63-2 pp161-168

Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983) ldquoThe Kennedy RoundEvidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the USrdquo American Economic Review V73-1 pp 190-197

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoThe Impact of Special Interests onPreferential Tariff Concessions in the United Statesrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V69-2 pp 187-193

Edward Ray (1987) ldquoChanging Patterns of Protectionism The Fallin Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriersrdquo Northwestern Journalof International Law and Business V8-2 pp 285-327

Edward Ray (1991) ldquoProtection of Manufactures and the USrdquo inD Greenaway ed Global Protectionism Is the US Playing on aLevel Field London MacMillan pp 12-36

Reacuteal Lavergne (1983) The Political Economy of US Tariffs AnEmpirical Analysis Toronto Academic Press Canada

William Dougan (1985) ldquoTariffs and the Economic Theory ofRegulationrdquo Research in Law and Economics V6 pp 187-210

Paul Godek (1985) ldquoIndustry Structure and Redistribution ThroughTrade Restrictionsrdquo Journal of Law and Economics V28-3 pp687-703

Rod Tyers (1990) ldquoImplicit Policy Preferences and the Assessmentof Negotiable Trade Policy Reformsrdquo European Economic ReviewV34-7 pp 1399-1426

nDaniel Trefler (1993) ldquoTrade Liberalization and the Theory ofEndogenous Protection An Econometric Study of US Import PolicyrdquoJournal of Political Economy V101-1 pp 138-160

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 33: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Andrew Dick (1996) ldquoExplaining Managed Trade as RationalCheatingrdquo Review of International Economics V4-1 pp 1-16

nJong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997) ldquoTrade Barriers andTrade Flows across Countries and Industriesrdquo Review of Economicsand Statistics V79-3 pp 372-82

Kishore Gawande (1997) ldquoTesting Theories of EndogenousProtection Robust Evidence From US Nontariff Barrier Datardquo in KMaskus P Hooper E Leamer and JD Richardson eds QuietPioneering Robert M Stern and His International Economic LegacyAnn Arbor University of Michigan Press pp 37-70

nKishore Gawande (1998) ldquoComparing Theories of EndogenousProtection Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using GibbsSampling Outputrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V80-1 pp128-140

Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000) ldquoErrors-in-VariablesBounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protectionrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V66-4 pp 881-905 [ProQuest]

Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999) ldquoIndustrial Location andProtection The Political and Economic Geography of US NontariffBarriersrdquo American Journal of Political Science V43-4 pp 1028-1050

Topic V Lobbying Models

Theory Active Lobbies Passive State

nRonald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982) ldquoEndogenousTariffs the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfarerdquo inJ Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 223-234

nLeslie Young (1982) ldquoComment on Findlay and Welliszrdquo in JBhagwati ed Import Competition and Response Chicago Universityof Chicago Press pp 238-243

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 34: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983) ldquoSome Aspects ofthe Political Economy of Trade Restrictionsrdquo KYKLOS V36-3 pp469-481

Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985) ldquoLobbying forTariffs and the Cost of Protectionrdquo Recherches Economiques deLouvain V51-1 pp 21-27

Gary Becker (1983) ldquoA Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influencerdquo Quarterly Journal of EconomicsV98-3 pp 371-400

Gary Becker (1985) ldquoPublic Policies Pressure Groups andDeadweight Costsrdquo Journal of Public Economics V28-3 pp 329-347

Stanislaw Wellisz and John D Wilson (1986) ldquoLobbying andTariff Formation A Deadweight Loss Considerationrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V20-34 pp 367-375

John D Wilson (1990) ldquoAre Efficiency Improvements inGovernment Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in PoliticalEquilibriumrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-3 pp 241-258

Raul Fabella (1991) ldquoThe Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff LobbiesrdquoJournal of Public Economics V44-1 pp 87-93

Lorenzo Kristov Peter Lindert and Robert McClelland (1992)ldquoPressure Groups and Redistributionrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV48-2 pp 135-163

Jay Coggins Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991)ldquoExistence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V32-3 pp 533-550

Kazuharu Kiyono Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda(1991) ldquoIndustry Specific Interests and Trade Protection A GameTheoretic Analysisrdquo Economic Studies Quarterly V42-4 pp 347-

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 35: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

361

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (1997) ldquoCooperative Lobbying andEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Public Choice V93-34 pp 455-475

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2002) ldquoStrategic Political Participationand Redistributionrdquo Economics amp Politics V14-1 pp 19-40

Aidt Toke Skovsgaard (2003) ldquoRedistribution and DeadweightCost The Role of Political Competitionrdquo European Journal ofPolitical Economy V19-2 pp 205-226

Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994) ldquoIllegal Trade andEndogenous Tariff Formationrdquo Public FinanceFinance PubliqueV49-supplement pp 182-194

Paul Pecorino (1997) ldquoExogenous Tariff Changes withEndogenous Lobbying Responserdquo Public Choice V92-12 pp 91-108 [errata Public Choice V94-12 pg 221]

John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998) ldquoPrimary and SecondaryReformrdquo Economic Inquiry V36-4 pp 590-602

Paul Pecorino (1999) ldquoEndogenous Export Subsidies as aRevenue-Seeking Activity Some Implications for the Evolution ofProtectionrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V32-3 pp 785-798

Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001) ldquoA Dynamic Model ofEndogenous Trade Policyrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V34-1 pp 225-239

Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986) ldquoEndogenous TariffPolicy under Uncertaintyrdquo ms Ohio State University

Robert Baldwin (1982) ldquoThe Political Economy of Protectionismrdquoin J Bhagwati ed Import Competition and Response ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press pp 263-292

Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) ldquoTariff Seeking and

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 36: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

the Efficient Tariffrdquo in J Bhagwati ed Import Competition andResponse Chicago University of Chicago Press pp 245-258

Ronald Findlay (1990) ldquoThe New Political Economy ItsExplanatory Power for LDCsrdquo Economics amp Politics V2-2 pp193-221

Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991) ldquoEndogenousComparative Advantage Government and the Pattern of TraderdquoNBER Working Paper 3813

Richard Baldwin (1987) ldquoPolitically Realistic Objective Functionsand Trade Policy PROFs and Tariffsrdquo Economics Letters V24-pp 287-290

David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997) ldquoBuilding TradeBarriers and Knocking Them Downrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V5-2 pp 256-271

Richard Smith (1995) ldquoInterest Group Influence in CongressrdquoLegislative Studies Quarterly V20-1 pp 89-139

Theory 2 Active LobbiesActive StatendashMenu Auction Models

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoMenuAuctions Resource Allocation and Economic Influencerdquo QuarterlyJournal of Economics V101-1 pp 1-31

B Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986) ldquoCommonAgencyrdquo Econometrica V54-4 pp 923-942

Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001) ldquoConflict andCooperation The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in CommonAgencyrdquo Journal of Economic Theory V100-1 pp 93-128

nGene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) ldquoProtection forSalerdquo American Economic Review V84-4 pp 833-850

Avinash Dixit (1996) ldquoSpecial-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 37: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Commodity Taxationrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4 pp 375-388

nAvinash Dixit Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997)ldquoCommon Agency and Coordination General Theory andApplication to Tax Policyrdquo Journal of Political Economy V105-4pp 752-69

S Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994) ldquoLobbying andAdjustment in Declining Industriesrdquo European Economic ReviewV38-34 pp 586-595

nS Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Declining Industries Senescent Industry CollapseRevisitedrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12 pp 221-237

Richard Damania (2002) ldquoInfluence in Decline Lobbying inContracting Industriesrdquo Economics and Politics V14-2 pp 209-223

Christopher Magee (2002) ldquoDeclining Industries and PersistentTariff Protectionrdquo Review of International Economics V10-4 pp749-762

Christopher Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Tariffs and TradeAdjustment Assistancerdquo Journal of International Economics V60-1 pp 203-222

nScott Bradford (2003) ldquoProtection and Jobs Explaining theStructure of Trade Barriers across Industriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V61-1 pp 19-39

Raymond Riezman and John D Wilson (1997) ldquoPolitical Reformand Trade Policyrdquo Journal of International Economics V42-12pp 67-90

Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998) ldquoLobbying by Capitaland Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policiesrdquo European

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 38: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Economic Review V42-7 pp 1295-1316

Y Stephen Chiu (1998) ldquoPolitics Structure of Protection andWelfarerdquo Review of International Economics V6-3 pp 472-487

Hideo Konishi Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber (1999)ldquoEndogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investmentrdquo Journalof International Economics V49-2 pp 289-308

Paola Conconi (2003) ldquoGreen Lobbies and TransboundaryPollution in Large Open Economiesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V59-2 pp 399-422

Richard Boylan (2000) ldquoAn Optimal Auction Perspective onLobbyingrdquo Social Choice amp Welfare V17-1 pp 55-68

Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) ldquoLobbying andWelfare in a Representative Democracyrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V68-1 pp 67-82

nGeorg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001) ldquoInefficient Equilibriain Lobbyingrdquo Journal of Public Economics V82-3 pp 349-375

Lai Yu-Bong (2003) ldquoInterest Groups Economic Competition andEndogenous Public Policyrdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V159-2 pp

Michel Le Breton and Franccedilois Salanie (2003) ldquoLobbying underPolitical Uncertaintyrdquo Journal of Public Economics V87-12 pp2589-2610

ApplicationEmpirics

EE Schattschneider (1935) Politics Pressure and the TariffEnglewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall

Raymond Bauer Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A Dexter (1963)American Business and Public Policy The Politics of Foreign TradeChicago Aldine Publishing Company

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 39: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994) ldquoFree Trade Fair TradeStrategic Trade and Protectionism in the US Congress 1987-1988rdquoInternational Organization V48-3 pp 491-525

nRobert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) ldquoIs Trade Policyfor Sale Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Billsrdquo PublicChoice V105-12 pp

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000) CongressionalTrade Votes From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track DefeatWashington DC IIE

Michael Bailey (2001) ldquoQuiet Influence The Representation ofDiffuse Interests on Trade Policy 1983ndash94rdquo Legislative StudiesQuarterly V26-1 pp 45-80

nPinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999) ldquoProtection forSale An Empirical Investigationrdquo American Economic ReviewV89-5 pp 1135-1155

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000) ldquoIs Protectionfor Sale Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of EndogenousProtectionrdquo Review of Economics and Statistics V82-1 pp 139-152

nTheo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002) ldquoProtection for Sale AnEmpirical Investigation commentrdquo American Economic ReviewV92-5 pp 1702-1710

Olivier Cadot Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)ldquoLobbying and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and PoorCountriesrdquo Ms University of Geneva

Giovanni Facchini Johannes Van Biesebroeck and GeraldWillmann (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale with Imperfect Rent CapturerdquoMs Christian-Albrechts-Universitaumlt zu Kiel

Jean-Marie Grether Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001)

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 40: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

ldquoWho Determines Mexican Trade Policyrdquo Journal of DevelopmentEconomics V64-2 pp 343-370

Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002) ldquoTrade and ForeignDirect Investment in China A Political Economy Approachrdquo Journalof International Economics V58-2 pp 335-358

nDevashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2002) ldquolsquoProtection for Salersquo In A Developing Country Democracyvs Dictatorshiprdquo Review of Economics amp Statistics V84-3 pp497-508

Devashish Mitra Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet UlubaOtildeolu(2004) ldquoProtection versus Promotion An Empirical InvestigationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V16-2 pp 147-162

Fordham Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003) ldquoSelection andInfluence Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on TradePolicyrdquo International Organization V57-3 pp 519-549

McCalman Phillip (2004) ldquoProtection for Sale and TradeLiberalization An Empirical Investigationrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V12-1 pp 81-94

Michael Gilligan (1997) Empowering Exporters ReciprocityDelegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy AnnArbor University of Michigan Press

Erinc Yeldan and Terry Roe (1991) ldquoPolitical Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimesrdquo WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv V127-3 pp 563-583

Marcel Fafchamps Elisabeth Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry (1993)ldquoTariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Frameworkrdquo Journal ofInternational Trade and Economic Development V2-2 pp 167-189

Marcel Fafchamps Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999)ldquoSocial Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbyingrdquo Public Choice V98-

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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    • 15
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            • 22
Page 41: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

12 pp 5-27

Kym Anderson (1995) ldquoLobbying Incentives and the Pattern ofProtection in Rich and Poor Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V43-2 pp 401-423

Topic VI Contributions Elections and Trade Policy

Partisan Competition with Contributions MageeBrockYoung

Stephen Magee William Brock and Leslie Young (1989) BlackHole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press

David Austen-Smith (1991) ldquoRational Consumers and IrrationalVoters A Review Essay on Magee Brock and Youngrdquo Economics ampPolitics V3-1 pp 73-92

Theory Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

Peter Coughlin (1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory CambridgeCambridge University Press

nAlex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003) ldquoWhen is the MedianVoter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in aRepresentative Democracyrdquo Economics amp Politics V 15-3 pp247-284

Wolfgang Mayer (1993) ldquoLobbying for Tariff Policiesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V1-3 pp 221-233

Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994) ldquoInterest Groups ElectoralCompetition and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policiesrdquo Economicsamp Politics V6-1 pp 59-77

Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995) ldquoProbabilistic VotingCampaign Contributions and Efficiencyrdquo American EconomicReview V85-1 pp 254-259

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 42: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

CC Yang (1995) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Formation underRepresentative Democracy A Probabilistic Voting Modelrdquo AmericanEconomic Review V85-4 pp 956-963

Wolfgang Mayer (1998) ldquoTrade Policy Platforms of CompetingParties What Makes Them Differentrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V6-2 pp 185-203

Topic VII Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory Institutions Organization and Outcomes

Theodore Lowi (1964) ldquoAmerican Business Public Policy CaseStudies and Political Theoryrdquo World Politics V16-4 pp 676-715

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoInstitutional Structureand Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model The LowiEffectrdquo International Spectator V24-34 pp153-173

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004) ldquoThe Impact ofLeadership Turnover on Trading Relations between StatesrdquoInternational Organization V58-3 pp 567-600

Jonas Pontusson (1995) ldquoFrom Comparative Public Policy toPolitical Economy Putting Political Institutions in their Place andTaking Interests Seriouslyrdquo Comparative Political Studies V28-1pp 117-147

EmpiricsApplications 1 Fiscal InstitutionsndashThe Income Tax

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoSpecial Interests and theAdoption of the Income Tax in the USrdquo Journal of EconomicHistory V45-3 pp 607-625

Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985) ldquoThe Political Economy of

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 43: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Taxrdquo in R Higgsed Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in EconomicHistory supplement 4) Greenwood JAI Press pp 121-138

John Mark Hansen (1990) ldquoTaxation and the Political Economy ofthe Tariffrdquo International Organization V44-4 pp 527-551

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Regimes TariffRevenues and Government Spendingrdquo Economica V59-1 pp 75-92

Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992) ldquoTax Smoothing andTariff Behavior in the USrdquo Journal of Macroeconomics V14-4 pp711-729

John Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States A ComparativeSociology of International Economic and Political ChangeCambridge CUP

EmpiricsApplications 2 Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

Stephan Haggard (1988) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations ofHegemony Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934rdquoInternational Organization V42-1 pp 91-119

Douglas Nelson (1989) ldquoDomestic Political Preconditions of USTrade Policy Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamicsrdquo Journalof Public Policy V9-1 pp 83-108

Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1994) Politics Process and American TradePolicy Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press

Michael Bailey Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997) ldquoTheInstitutional Roots of American Trade Policy Politics Coalitionsand International Traderdquo World Politics V49-3 pp 309-338

Daniel Nielson (2003) ldquoSupplying Trade Reform PoliticalInstitutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income PresidentialDemocraciesrdquo American Journal of Political Science V47-3 pp

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 44: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

470-491

Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999) ldquoInterestsInstitutions and Ideology in Securing Policy Change The RepublicanConversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawleyrdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V42-2 pp 643-674

Michael Hiscox (1999) ldquoThe Magic Bullet The RTAAInstitutional Reform and Trade Liberalizationrdquo InternationalOrganization V53-4 pp 669-698

Karen Schnietz (2000) ldquoThe Institutional Foundations of USTrade Policy Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal TradeAgreements Actrdquo Journal of Policy History V12-4 pp 417-444

Karen Schnietz (2003) ldquoThe Reaction of Private Interests to the1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Actrdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 213-233

ApplicationsEmpirics 3 Parties Partisan Change and Trade Policy

Richard Watson (1956) ldquoThe Tariff Revolution A Study ofShifting Party Attitudesrdquo Journal of Politics V18-4 pp 678-701

Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992) ldquoStacking theSenate Changing the Nation Republican Rotten BoroughsStatehood Politics and American Political Developmentrdquo Studies inAmerican Political Development V6-2 pp 223-271

Eric Uslaner (1994) ldquoPolitical Parties Ideas Interests and FreeTrade in the United Statesrdquo In Charles Doran and GregoryMarchildon eds The Nafta Puzzle Political Parties and Trade inNorth America Boulder Westview

William Keech and K Pak (1995) ldquoPartisanship Institutions andChange in American Trade Politicsrdquo Journal of Politics V57-4 pp1130-1142

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoThe Partisan

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
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            • 22
Page 45: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Paradox and the US Tariff 1877-1934rdquo International OrganizationV50-2 pp 301-324

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Role of the MedianLegislator in US Trade Policy A Historical Analysisrdquo EconomicInquiry V35-1 pp 97-107

nFiona McGillivray (1997) ldquoParty Discipline as a Determinant ofthe Endogenous Formation of Tariffsrdquo American Journal of PoliticalScience V41-2 pp 584-607

David Brady Judith Goldstein and Daniel Kessler (2002) ldquoDoesParty Matter An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in ThreeInstitutional Settingsrdquo Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationV18-1 pp 140-154

nH Keith Hall Chihwa Kao and Douglas Nelson (1998) ldquoWomenand Tariffs Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer ModelrdquoEconomic Inquiry V36-2 pp 320-332

Michael Hiscox (2000) ldquoFloor Debates over International TradePartisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on TradeLegislationrdquo Ms Harvard University

Michael Hiscox (2002) ldquoWill Trade be Partisan Again (and WhyIsnt it Already) Trade and the American Political Parties in the1890s and 1990srdquo Ms Harvard University

James Shoch (1998) ldquoParty Politics and International EconomicActivism The Reagan-Bush Yearsrdquo Political Science QuarterlyV113-1 pp 113-131

James Shoch (2001) Trading Blows Party Competition and USTrade Policy in a Globalizing Era Chapel Hill University of NorthCarolina Press

ApplicationsEmpirics 4 Divided Government

Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn OHalloran (1994) ldquoDivided

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 46: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Government and US Trade Policy Theory and EvidencerdquoInternational Organization V48-4 pp 595-632

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1996) ldquoDividedGovernment and the Design of Administrative Proceduresrdquo Journalof Politics V58-2 pp 373-398

Helen Milner and B Peter Rosendorff (1997) ldquoDemocratic Politicsand International Trade Negotiations Elections and DividedGovernment as Constraints on Trade Liberalizationrdquo Journal ofConflict Resolution V41-1 pp 117-146

John Coleman (1998) ldquoBipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder inPostwar Trade Policyrdquo Ms University of Wisconsin PoliticalScience

David Karol (2000) ldquoDivided Government and US Trade PolicyMuch Ado About Nothingrdquo International Organization V54-4pp 825-844

Richard Sherman (2002) ldquoDelegation Ratification and US TradePolicy Why Divided Government Causes Lower TariffsrdquoComparative Political Studies V35010 pp 1171-1197

Robert Pahre (2001) ldquoDivided Government and InternationalCooperation in Austria-Hungary Sweden-Norway and the EuropeanUnionrdquo European Union Politics V2-2 pp 131-162

James Sundquist (1988) ldquoNeeded A Political Theory for the NewEra of Coalition Government in the United Statesrdquo Political ScienceQuarterly V103-4 pp 613-635

David Mayhew (1991) Divided We Govern Party ControlLawmaking and Investigations 1946-1990 New Haven YaleUniversity Press

Morris Fiorina (1996) Divided Government (2 ed) Bostonnd

Allyn amp Bacon

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 47: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

David Brady (1993) ldquoThe Causes and Consequences of DividedGovernment Toward a New Theory of American Politicsrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review V87-1 pp 189-194

David McKay (1994) ldquoDivided and Governed Recent Researchon Divided Government in the United Statesrdquo British Journal ofPolitical Science V24- 4 pp 517-534

Keith Krehbiel (1996) ldquoInstitutional and Partisan Sources ofGridlock A Theory of Divided and Unified Governmentrdquo Journal ofTheoretical Politics V8-1 pp 7-40

John Coleman (1999) ldquoUnified Government Divided Governmentand Party Responsivenessrdquo American Political Science ReviewV93-4 pp 821-35

David Epstein and Sharyn OrsquoHalloran (1999) Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making underSeparate Powers New York Cambridge University Press

Topic VIII Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

J deMelo A Panagariya and D Rodrik (1993) ldquoThe NewRegionalism A Country Perspectiverdquo in J deMelo and APanagariya ed New Dimensions in Regional Integration New YorkCambridgeCEPR pp159-193 [esp section 3)

M Richardson (1993) ldquoEndogenous Protection and TradeDiversionrdquo Journal of International Economics V34-34 pp 309-324

M Richardson (1994) ldquoWhy a Free Trade Area The Tariff AlsoRisesrdquo Economics amp Politics V6-1 pp 79-96 [also in BhagwatiKrishna and Panagariya pp 357-376]

M Richardson (1995) ldquoTariff Revenue Competition in a FreeTrade Areardquo European Economic Review V39-7 pp 1429-1437

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 48: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

D Desruelle and M Richardson (1997) ldquoFortress Europe Jerichoor Chateau drsquoIfrdquo Review of International Economics V5-1 pp32-46

S Nagaoka (1994) ldquoDoes Regional Integration PromoteLiberalization A Case of Endogenous Protectionrdquo Journal of theJapanese and International Economies V8-4 pp 551-564

A Panagariya and R Findlay (1995) ldquoA Political EconomyAnalysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unionsrdquo in G GrossmanR Feenstra and D Irwin eds The Political Economy of Trade PolicyCambridge MIT pp 265-287 [also in Bhagwati Krishna andPanagariya pp 335-356]

S Bandyopadhyay and H Wall (1999) ldquoCustoms Union or FreeTrade Area The Role of Political Asymmetriesrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V7-4 pp 665-672

G Grossman and E Helpman (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Free TradeAreasrdquo American Economic Review V85-4 pp 667-690 [also inBhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 299-334]

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ldquoThe Valueof Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressuresrdquo Journalof Political Economy V106-3 pp 575-601

Devashish Mitra (2002) ldquoEndogenous Political Organization andthe Value of Trade Agreementsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V57-2 pp 473-485

Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002) ldquoPolitics of FreeTrade Areas Tariffs versus Quotasrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V58-2 pp 413-427

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999)ldquoRegional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-membersrdquo International Economic Review V40-3 pp 635-657

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 49: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002)ldquoHarmonizing External Quotas in an FTA A Step BackwardrdquoEconomics amp Politics V14-3 pp 259-282

Olivier Cadot Jaime deMelo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003) ldquoTheProtectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks Evidence from MercosurrdquoJournal of International Economics V59-1 pp 161-182

Ronald Cox (1995) ldquoCorporate Coalitions and IndustrialRestructuring Explaining Regional Trade Agreementsrdquo Competitionamp Change V1- pp 13-30

William Avery (1998) ldquoDomestic Interests in NAFTABargainingrdquo Political Science Quarterly V113-2 pp 281-305

James Shoch (2000) ldquoContesting Globalization Organized LaborNAFTA and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fightsrdquo Politics andSociety V28-1 pp 119-150

Chase Kerry (2003) ldquoEconomic Interests and Reciprocal TradingArrangements The Case of NAFTArdquo International OrganizationV57-1 pp 137-174

Constantinos Syropoulos (2003) ldquoRules for the Disposition ofTariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffsin Customs Unionsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 387-416

Christopher S Magee (2003) ldquoEndogenous Preferential TradeAgreements An Empirical Analysisrdquo Contributions to EconomicAnalysis amp Policy V2-1 Article 15

Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

B Hoekman and M Leidy (1993) ldquoWhat to Expect from Regionaland Multilateral Trade Negotiations A Public Choice Perspectiverdquo in K Anderson and R Blackhurst eds Regional Integration and theGlobal Trading System London Harvester Wheatsheaf pp 246-269

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 50: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

AO Krueger (1995) ldquoThe Role of the NAFTA Debate in USTrade Policyrdquo Australian Economic Papers V34-64 pp 5-16

Wei S-J and J Frankel (1996) ldquoCan Regional Blocs be aStepping Stone to Global Free Traderdquo International Review ofEconomics and Finance V5-4 pp 339-347

R Baldwin (1996) ldquoA Domino Theory of Regionalismrdquo In RBaldwin P Haaparanta and J Kiander eds Expanding Membershipof the EU Cambridge CUP pp 25-48 [also in Bhagwati Krishnaand Panagariya pp 479-502]

P Krishna (1996) ldquoA Political Economy Analysis of PreferentialTrading and Multilateralismrdquo Eastern Economic Journal V22-4pp 477-483

P Krishna (1998) ldquoRegionalism and Multilateralism A PoliticalEconomy Approachrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics V113-1 pp228-250 [also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 453-477]

P Levy and TN Srinivasan (1996) ldquoRegionalism and the(Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Accessrdquo American EconomicReview V86-2 pp 93-98

P Levy (1997) ldquoA Political-Economic Analysis of Free-TradeAgreementsrdquo American Economic Review V87-4 pp 506-519[also in Bhagwati Krishna and Panagariya pp 429-451]

P Levy (1998) ldquoLearning from Trade Agreementsrdquo ms YaleUniversity

O Cadot J de Melo and M Olarreaga (2001) ldquoCan BilateralismEase the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalizationrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V45-1 pp 27-44

Empirics 1 Macro Perspectives

S Bilal (1998) ldquoPolitical Economy Considerations in the Supply ofTrade Protection in Regional Integration Agreementsrdquo Journal of

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 51: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Common Market Studies V36-1 pp 1-31

Stephen P Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999) ldquoEndogenousRegionalisms Free Trade Bias Special Interests in the EEC 1968-1983rdquo in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini eds PressureGroups and Self Regulation New York Oxford Press 1999 51-85

S Magee and H-O Lee (2001) ldquoEndogenous Tariff Creation andTariff Diversion in a Customs Unionrdquo European Economic ReviewV 45-3 pp 495-518

S Magee and H-O Lee (1997) ldquoTariff Creation and TariffDiversion in Customs Unions The Endogenous External Tariff of theEEC 1968-1983rdquo Nota di Lavoro V38-97 pp 1-39

M Olarreaga and I Soloaga (1998) ldquoEndogenous TariffFormation The Case of Mercosurrdquo World Bank Economic ReviewV12-2 pp 297-320

Empirics 2 Legislative Voting on NAFTA

W Kaempfer and S Marks (1993) ldquoThe Expected Effects of TradeLiberalisation Evidence from US Congressional Action onFast-Track Authorityrdquo World Economy V16-6 pp 725-740

F Boadu and M Thompson (1993) ldquoThe Political Economy of theUS-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Analysis of the CongressionalFast Track Voterdquo Journal of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsV25-2 pp 27-35

L Kahane (1996) ldquoSenate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extensionof the Fast Track Trade Procedures Prelude to NAFTArdquo PublicChoice V87-1 pp 35-53

L Kahane (1996) ldquoCongressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA AnEmpirical Analysisrdquo American Journal of Economics and SociologyV55-4 pp 395-409

J Conybeare and M Zinkula (1996) ldquoWho Voted Against the

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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    • 15
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            • 22
Page 52: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

NAFTArdquo World Economy V19-1 pp 1-12

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions PAC Contributionsand the NAFTA Voterdquo Journal of Labor Research V17-3 pp 515-521

J Steagall and K Jennings (1996) ldquoUnions and NAFTArsquosLegislative Passage Confrontation and Coverrdquo Labor StudiesJournal V21-1 pp 61-79

J Garand CD Livingston and K Wink (1996) ldquoDispositionsConstituencies and Cross-Pressures Modelling Roll-Call Voting onthe North American Free Trade Agreementrdquo Political ResearchQuarterly V49-4 pp 729-748

J Box-Steffenmeister L Arnold and C Zorn (1997) ldquoTheStrategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress A Study of theNorth American Free Trade Agreementrdquo American Political ScienceReview V91-2 pp 324-338

W Thorbecke (1997) ldquoExplaining House Voting on the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreementrdquo Public Choice V92-34 pp231-242

D Holian T Krebs and M Walsh (1997) ldquoConstituency OpinionRoss Perot and Roll-Call Behavior in the US House The Case ofthe NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V22-3 pp 369-392

C Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997) ldquoThe Passage of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement in the US House ofRepresentatives Presidential Leadership or Presidential LuckrdquoPresidential Studies Quarterly V27-1 pp 52-70

Eric Uslaner (1998) ldquoLet the Chits Fall Where they MayExecutive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional VotingBehavior on NAFTArdquo Legislative Studies Quarterly V23-3 pp347-371

Kamdar Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998) ldquoAn Empirical

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 53: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Analysis of the US Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATTrdquoInternational Advances in Economic Research V4-2 pp 105-14

I-B Kang and K Greene (1999) ldquoA Political Economic Analysisof Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTArdquo Public Choice V98-34 pp 385-397

K Schnietz and T Nieman (1999) ldquoPolitics Matter The 1997Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authorityrdquo Business andPolitics V1- pp 233-251

K Bardwell (2000) ldquoThe Puzzling Decline in House Support forFree Trade Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTArdquo LegislativeStudies Quarterly V25-4 pp 591-610

Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004) ldquoLabor PACContributions and NAFTA Legislators Rhetoric or RedistributionrdquoIn M Plummer ed Empirical Methods in International TradeEssays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Topic IX Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Simple Models

J Bhagwati (1985) ldquoStructural Adjustment and InternationalFactor Mobility Some Issuesrdquo in K Jungenfelt and D Hague edsStructural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies New York StMartins pp 127-149

Hillman Arye L (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of MigrationPolicyrdquo in H Siebert ed Migration A Challenge for EuropeTubingen Mohr (Siebeck) pp 263-282

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoBeyond International FactorMovements Cultural Preferences Endogenous Policies and theMigration of People An Overviewrdquo in R Faini J deMelo and KZimmermann eds (1999) Migration The Controversies and theEvidence Cambridge CUP pp 76-90

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
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    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
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            • 22
Page 54: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

F Sollner (1999) ldquoA Note on the Political Economy ofImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V100-34 pp 245-251

S Bilal J-M Grether and J de Melo (1998) ldquoAttitudes TowardsImmigration A Trade-Theoretic Approachrdquo Review of InternationalEconomics V11-2 pp 253-267

J Benhabib (1996) ldquoOn the Political Economy of ImmigrationrdquoEuropean Economic Review V40-9 pp 1737-1743

AL Hillman and A Weiss (1999) ldquoA Theory of PermissibleIllegal Immigrationrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V15-4 pp 585-604

J-M Grether J deMelo and T Muller (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Modelrdquo In S Djajic edInternational Migration Trends Policy Impact London Routledgepp 42-68

Nelson Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001) ldquoPolitical Economy ofIllegal Migrationrdquo Ms Murphy Institute

Facchini Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2001) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of International Factor Mobilityrdquo Stanford Institute forEconomic Policy Research 00-20

J Atsu Amegashi (2004) ldquoA Political Economy of ImmigrationQuotasrdquo Economics of Governance forth

Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004) ldquoA PositiveAnalysis of Immigration Policyrdquo Ms Universitaacute di Bologna

Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004) ldquoThe Struggle OverMigration Policyrdquo Ms Bar-Ilan University

JE Campos and D Lien (1995) ldquoPolitical Instability and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Journal of Population Economics V8-1 pp 23-33

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L Ursprung Heinrich W (1999)

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 55: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

ldquoThe King Never Emigratesrdquo Review of Development EconomicsV3-2 pp 107-121

Epstein Gil S Hillman Arye L (1998)rdquoHerd Effects andMigrationrdquo CEPR Discussion Paper 1811

Fiscal Effects

G Freeman (1986) ldquoMigration and the Political Economy of theWelfare Staterdquo Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 485 pp 51-63

D Epple and T Romer (1991) ldquoMobility and RedistributionrdquoJournal of Political Economy V99-4 pp 828-858

Lejour AM and H Verbon (1994) ldquoLabour Mobility andDecision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated MarketrdquoPublic Choice V79-12 pp 161-185

I Mazza and F van Winden (1996) ldquoA Political EconomicAnalysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistributionrdquo PublicChoice V88-2 pp 333-363

U Scholten and M Thum (1996) ldquoPublic Pensions andImmigration Policy in a Democracyrdquo Public Choice V87-34 pp347-361

O Flores (1997) ldquoThe Political Economy of Immigration QuotasrdquoAtlantic Economic Journal V25-1 pp 50-59

A Haupt and W Peters (1998) ldquoPublic Pensions and Voting onImmigrationrdquo Public Choice V95- pp 403-413

Ph Michel P Pestieau J-P Vidal (1998) ldquoLabor Migration andRedistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies The SmallEconomy Caserdquo Regional Science and Urban Economics V28-3pp 363-377

H Cremer and P Pestieau (1998) ldquoSocial Insurance Majority

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 56: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Voting and Labor Mobilityrdquo Journal of Public Economics V68-3pp 397-420

A Razin and E Sadka (2001) ldquoInteractions between InternationalMigration and the Welfare Staterdquo In S Djajic ed InternationalMigration Trends Policy Impact London Routledge pp 69-88

A Razin E Sadka and P Swagel (2002) ldquoTax Burden andMigration A Political-Economy Theory and Evidencerdquo Journal ofPublic Economics V85-2 pp 167-190

Alexander Kemnitz (2002) ldquoOn the Political Economy of LowsSkilled Immigration and the Welfare Staterdquo International Tax andPublic Finance V9-4 pp 423-434

G Epstein and L Hillman (2003) ldquoUnemployed Immigrants andVoter Sentiment in the Welfare Staterdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV87-78 pp 1641-1655

T Leers L Meijdam and H Verbon (2004) ldquoAgeing Migrationand Endogenous Public Pensionsrdquo Journal of Public EconomicsV88-12 pp 131-159

J Dolmas and G Huffman (2004) ldquoOn the Political Economic ofImmigration and Income Redistributionrdquo International EconomicReview V45-4 pp 1129-1168

A Cukierman Z Hercowitz and D Pines (1994) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigrationrdquo Foerder Institute for Economic ResearchWorking Paper 1793

R Benabou and E Ok (2001) ldquoSocial Mobility and the Demandfor Redistribution The POUM Hypothesisrdquo Quarterly Journal ofEconomics V116-2 pp 447-487

Empirics 1 Preferences

J Citrin B Reingold and D Green (1990) ldquoAmerican Identityand the Politics of Ethnic Changerdquo Journal of Politics V52-4 pp

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 57: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

1124-1153

T Espenshade and K Hempstead (1996) ldquoContemporaryAmerican Attitudes Toward US Immigrationrdquo InternationalMigration Review V30-2 pp 535-570

R de la Garza A Falcon FC Garcia and J Garcia (1996)ldquoAttitudes toward US Immigration Policy The Case of MexicansPuerto Ricans and Cubansrdquo Migration World V21-23 pp 13-17

J Lapinski P Peltola G Shaw and A Yang (1997) ldquoImmigrantsand Immigrationrdquo Public Opinion Quarterly V61- pp 356-383

J Citrin DP Green C Muste and C Wong (1997) ldquoPublicOpinion Toward Immigration Reform The Role of EconomicMotivationsrdquo Journal of Politics V59-3 pp 858-881

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1997) ldquoUS Public Perceptionsand Reactions to Mexican Migrationrdquo in F Bean et al eds At TheCrossroads Mexican Migration and US Policy Lanham MdRowman and Littlefield

T Espenshade and M Belanger (1998) ldquoImmigration and PublicOpinionrdquo In M Suaacuterez-Orozco ed Crossings Mexican Immigrationin Interdisciplinary Perspectives Cambridge Harvard UniversityPress pp 365-403

M Hood and I Morris (1997) ldquoAmigo or Enemigo ContextAttitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigrationrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V78-2 pp 309-323

N Binder J Polinard and R Wrinkle (1997) ldquoMexican-Americanand Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform A View from theBorderrdquo Social Science Quarterly V78-2 pp 324-337

S Cummings and T Lambert (1997) ldquoAnti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americansrdquo Social ScienceQuarterly V78-2 pp 338-353

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 58: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

K Lee (1998) Huddled Masses Muddled Laws WhyContemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public OpinionWestport Praeger

Burns Peter and James Gimpel (2000) ldquoEconomic InsecurityPrejudicial Stereotypes and Public Opinion on Immigration PolicyrdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V115- pp 201-225

J Fetzer (2000) Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the UnitedStates France and Germany Cambridge CUP

K Scheve and M Slaughter (2001) ldquoLabor Market Competitionand Individual Preferences over Immigration Policyrdquo Review ofEconomics and Statistics V83-1 pp 133-145

RC Chandler and Y-m Tsai (2001) ldquoSocial Factors InfluencingImmigration Attitudesrdquo An Analysis of Data from the General SocialSurveyrdquo Social Science Journal V38- pp 177-188

I Gang F Rivera-Batiz and M Yun (2002) ldquoEconomic StrainEthnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in theEuropean Unionrdquo IZA Discussion Paper 578

AM Mayda (2004) ldquoWho is Against Immigration A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward ImmigrantsrdquoMs Georgetown University

Empirics 2 The Prop 187 Referendum

C Tolbert and R Hero (1996) ldquoRaceEthnicity and DirectDemocracy An Analysis of Californiarsquos Illegal ImmigrationInitiativerdquo Journal of Politics V58-3 pp 806-818

K MacDonald and B Cain (1997) ldquoNativism Partisanship andImmigration An Analysis of Prop 187 in M Preston B Cain andS Bass eds Racial and Ethnic Politics in California BerkeleyInstitute for Governmental Studies

RM Alvarez and T Butterfield (2000) ldquoThe Resurgence of

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 59: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Nativism in California The Case of Prop 187 and IllegalImmigrationrdquo Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 167-179

L Newton (2000) ldquoWhy Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypothesesrdquo SocialScience Quarterly V81-1 pp 180-193

M Hood and I Morris (2000) ldquoBrother Can You Spare a DimeRacialEthnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187Social Science Quarterly V81-1 pp 194-206

Empirics 3 Enforcement

W Shughart R Tollison and M Kimenyi (1986) ldquoThe PoliticalEconomy of Immigration Restrictionsrdquo Yale Journal of RegulationV4- pp 79-97

A Daacutevila J Pagaacuten and M Grau (1999) ldquoImmigration Reform theINS and the Distribution of Interior and Border EnforcementResourcesrdquo Public Choice V99-34 pp 327-345

G Hanson and A Spilimbergo (2001) ldquoPolitical EconomySectoral Shocks and Border Enforcementrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V34-3 pp 612-638

Topic X Political Economy of Policy Reform

Theory

nR Fernandez and D Rodrik (1991) ldquoResistance to Reform StatusQuo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyrdquoAmerican Economic Review V81-5 pp 1146-1155

Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003) ldquoRedistributive Promisesand the Adoption of Economic Reformrdquo American Economic ReviewV93-1 pp 256-264

Antonio Ciccone (2004) ldquoResistance to Reform Status Quo Biasin the Presence of Individual-Specific UncertaintyndashCommentrdquo

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
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            • 22
Page 60: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

American Economic Review V94-3 pp 785-795

Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992) ldquoEconomicReform and Dynamic Political Constraintsrdquo Review of EconomicStudies V59-4 pp 703-730

nA Alessina and A Drazen (1991) ldquoWhy are StabilizationsDelayedrdquo American Economic Review V81-5 pp 1170-1188

Raul Labaacuten and Federico Sturzenegger (1994) ldquoDistributionalConflict Financial Adaptation and Delayed StabilizationrdquoEconomics amp Politics V6-3 pp 257-276

nDouglas Nelson (1999) ldquoProblems in the Political Economy ofTrade Policy Reformrdquo Journal of International Trade and EconomicDevelopment 1999 V8-1 pp 3-26

ApplicationEmpirics

Joan Nelson (1984) ldquoThe Political Economy of StabilizationCommitment Capacity and Public Responserdquo World DevelopmentV12-10 pp 983-1006

nStephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993) ldquoWhat Do We Knowabout the Political Economy of Economic Reformrdquo World BankResearch Observer V8-2 pp 143-168

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990)ldquoMacroeconomic Populismrdquo Journal of Development EconomicsV32-2 pp 247-277

Jeffrey Sachs (1990) ldquoSocial Conflict and Populist Policies inLatin Americardquo in R Brunetta and C DellAringa eds LabourRelations and Economic Performance New York NYU Press in pp137-169

Karen Remmer (1991) ldquoThe Political Impact of Economic Crisis inLatin America in the 1980srdquo American Political Science ReviewV85-3 pp 777-800

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
          • Page 8
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          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 61: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Nouriel Roubini (1991) ldquoEconomic and Political Determinants ofBudget Deficits in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance V10-supplement pp 49-72

Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991) ldquoExplaining FiscalPolicies and Inflation in Developing Countriesrdquo Journal ofInternational Money and Finance V10-Supplement pp 16-48

nSebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994) ldquoPoliticalInstability Political Weakness and Inflation an Empirical AnalysisrdquoIn C Sims ed Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress--VII Cambridge CUP pp 355-376

Sebastian Edwards (1994) ldquoThe Political Economy of Inflation andStabilization in Developing Countriesrdquo Economic Development andCultural Change V42-2 pp 235-266

Andreacutes Velasco (1994) ldquoThe State and Economic Policy Chile1952-1992 in B Bosworth R Dornbusch and R Laban eds TheChilean Economy Policy Lessons and Challenges Washington DCBrookings pp 379-429

Aaron Tornell (1995) ldquoAre Economic Crises Necessary for TradeLiberalization and Economic Reform The Mexican Experiencerdquo inR Dornbusch and S Edwardseds Reform Recovery and GrowthLatin America and the Middle East Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 53-73

Barbara Geddes (1995) ldquoThe Politics of Economic LiberalizationrdquoLatin American Research Review V30-2 pp 195-214

Javier Corrales (199798) ldquoDo Economic Crises Contribute toEconomic Reforms Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990srdquoPolitical Science Quarterly V112-4 pp 617-644

nAllan Drazen and William Easterly (2001) ldquoDo Crises InduceReform Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional WisdomrdquoEconomics amp Politics V13-2 pp 129-157

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
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            • 22
Page 62: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Topic XI Industry-Level Policy Anti-Dumping Policy

Theory Some Economics of Administered Protection

Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003) ldquoAntidumpingrdquo In EKwan Choi and James Harrigan eds Handbook of InternationalTrade Oxford Blackwell pp 251-284

Klaus Stegemann (1985) ldquoAntidumping Policy and the ConsumerrdquoJournal of World Trade Law V19-5 pp 466-484

Michael Webb (1987) ldquoAnti-Dumping Laws Production Locationand Pricesrdquo Journal of International Economics V22-34 pp 363-368

George Yarrow (1987) ldquoEconomic Aspects of AntidumpingPoliciesrdquo Oxford Review of Economic Policy V3-1 pp 66-79

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989) ldquoDumping Anti-dumping and Emergency Protectionrdquo Journal of World Trade V23-1 pp 27-44

Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990) ldquoProduction Effectsof Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under FlexibleExchange Ratesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics V23-4 pp 873-895

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992) ldquoThe Effect of DomesticAntidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopolyrdquo Journal ofInternational Economics V32-34 pp 265-287

Joseph Francois (1992) ldquoCountervailing the Effects of SubsidiesAn Economic Analysisrdquo Journal of World Trade V26-1 pp 5-13

Robert Willig (1998) ldquoEconomic Effects of Antidumping Policyrdquoin R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 57-79

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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            • 22
Page 63: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Avinash Dixit (1988) ldquoAnti-Dumping and Countervailing DutiesUnder Oligopolyrdquo European Economic Review V32-1 pp 55-68

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCountervailing Duty Laws and Subsidiesto Imperfectly Competitive Industriesrdquo in Baldwin et al eds Issuesin US-EC Trade Relations Chicago University of ChicagoPressNBER pp 313-334

Barbara Spencer (1988) ldquoCapital Subsidies and CountervailingDuties in Oligopolistic Industriesrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V25-12 pp 45-69

David Collie (1991) ldquoExport Subsidies and CountervailingTariffsrdquo Journal of International Economics V31-34 pp 309-324

David Collie (1992) ldquoExport Subsidies Entry Deterrence andCountervailing Tariffsrdquo Manchester School V60-2 pp 136-151

Michael Webb (1992) ldquoThe Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Lawsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp 437-448

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991) ldquoStrategic Use ofAntidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusionrdquo msStanford University

James Reitzes (1993) ldquoAntidumping Policyrdquo InternationalEconomic Review V34-4 pp 745-763

James Cassing (1994) ldquoStrategic Responses to Antidumping Lawsand Legal Interpretations Producing for Export Markets usingLawyers and Other Factors of Productionrdquo Journal of EconomicIntegration V9-2 pp 156-171

Thomas Prusa (1994) ldquoPricing Behavior in the Presence ofAntidumping Lawsrdquo Journal of Economic Integration V9-2 pp260-289

James Hartigan (1994) ldquoDumping and Signalingrdquo Journal of

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
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            • 22
Page 64: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Economic Behavior and Organization V23- pp 69-81

James Hartigan (1995) ldquoCollusive Aspects of Cost RevelationThrough Antidumping Complaintsrdquo Journal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics V151-3 pp 478-489

James Hartigan (1996) ldquoPredatory Dumpingrdquo Canadian Journalof Economics V29-1 pp 228-239

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999) ldquoOn the Effects ofAntidumping Legislationrdquo Regional Science and Urban EconomicsV29-1 pp 53-72

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999) ldquoEuropeanAnti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National andInternational Collusionrdquo European Economic Review V43-1 pp1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001) ldquoInflictingInjury through Product Quality How European Antidumping PolicyDisadvantages European Producersrdquo European Journal Of PoliticalEconomy V17-1 pp 101-116

Wilfried Pauwels Hylke Vandenbussche and Marcel Weverbergh(2001) ldquoStrategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Dutiesrdquo International Journal of the Economics of Business V8-1 pp 75-99

Theory Political Economy of Administered Protection

nH Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992) ldquoInstitutional Structurein the Political Economy of Protection Legislated versusAdministered Protectionrdquo Economics amp Politics V4-1 pp 61-77

J Michael Finger (1992) ldquoDumping and Antidumping TheRhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countriesrdquo WorldBank Research Observer V7-2 pp 121-143

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoBureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
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        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
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          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 65: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Repeated Gamerdquo Journal of Institutional and TheoreticalEconomics V148-4 pp 607-627

Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992) ldquoCascadingContingent Protectionrdquo European Economic Review V36-4 pp883-892

Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoFishing DownstreamThe Political Economy of Effective Administered ProtectionrdquoCanadian Journal of Economics V26-1 pp 150-158

Simon Anderson Nicolas Schmitt and J-J Thisse (1995) ldquoWhoBenefits from Antidumping Legislationrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomics V38-34 pp 321-337

David Baron (1997) ldquoIntegrated Strategy and International TradeDisputes The Kodak-Fujifilm Caserdquo Journal of Economics andManagement Strategy V6-2 pp 291-346

Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998) ldquoAnti-Dumpingversus Price Negotiationrdquo World Economy V21-8 pp 1003-1019

Wolfgang Mayer (1999) ldquoThe Political Economy of AdministeringTrade Lawsrdquo in J Piggott and A Woodland eds International TradePolicy and the Pacific Rim London Macmillan pp 245-262

Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003) ldquoAntidumping andRetaliation Threatsrdquo Journal of International Economics V60-2pp 249-273

Empirics

J Michael Finger HKeith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982) ldquoThePolitical Economy of Administered Protectionrdquo American EconomicReview V72-3 pp 452-466

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoThe International Trade CommissionrdquoChapter 3 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 79-114

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
          • Page 8
          • Page 9
          • Page 10
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          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 66: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992) ldquoPolitical Aspects ofthe Administration of the Trade Remedy Lawrdquo in R Boltuck and RLitan eds Down in the Dumps Administration of the Unfair TradeLaws Washington DC Brookings pp 253-280

Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989) ldquoInterests orInstitutions An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC RelationsrdquoInternational Studies Quarterly V33-3 pp 303-327

Wendy Hansen (1990) ldquoThe International Trade Commission andthe Politics of Protectionrdquo American Political Science ReviewV84-1 pp 21-46

Robert Baldwin and J Steagall (1991) ldquoAn Analysis of FactorsInfluencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping Countervailing Duty andSafeguards Casesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V130-2 pp290-307

Michael Moore (1992) ldquoRules or Politics An Empirical Analysisof Antidumping Decisionsrdquo Economic Inquiry V30-3 pp449-466

Thomas Prusa (1991) ldquoThe Selection of Antidumping Cases forITC Determinationrdquo in R Baldwin ed Empirical Studies ofCommercial Policy Chicago University of Chicago PressNBER pp47-71

Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997) ldquoThe Economics andPolitics of Trade Policy An Empirical Analysis of ITC DecisionMakingrdquo Review of International Economics V5-2 pp 230-245

J Michael Finger (1981) ldquoThe Industry-Country Incidence ofLess-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Traderdquo Quarterly Reviewof Economics and Business V21-2 pp 260-279

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994) ldquoMeasuring Industry-specific Protection Antidumping in the USrdquo Brookings Papers onEconomic Analysis 1994 Microeconomics pp 51-118 [comments]

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
          • Page 8
          • Page 9
          • Page 10
          • Page 11
          • Page 12
          • Page 13
          • Page 14
          • Page 15
          • Page 16
          • Page 17
          • Page 18
          • Page 19
          • Page 20
          • Page 21
          • Page 22
          • Page 23
          • Page 24
          • Page 25
          • Page 26
          • Page 27
          • Page 28
          • Page 29
          • Page 30
          • Page 31
          • Page 32
          • Page 33
          • Page 34
          • Page 35
          • Page 36
          • Page 37
          • Page 38
          • Page 39
          • Page 40
          • Page 41
          • Page 42
          • Page 43
          • Page 44
          • Page 45
          • Page 46
          • Page 47
          • Page 48
          • Page 49
          • Page 50
          • Page 51
          • Page 52
          • Page 53
          • Page 54
          • Page 55
          • Page 56
          • Page 57
          • Page 58
          • Page 59
          • Page 60
          • Page 61
          • Page 62
          • Page 63
          • Page 64
          • Page 65
          • Page 66
          • Page 67
          • Page 68
          • Page 69
          • Page 70
          • Page 71
          • Page 72
          • Page 73
          • Page 74
          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 67: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996) ldquoDifferences in Uses andEffects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sourcesrdquo in A Kruegered The Political Economy of American Trade Policy ChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressNBER pp 385-415

Robert Baldwin (1981) ldquoUS Political Pressures AgainstAdjustment to Greater Importsrdquo in W Hong and L Krause edsTrade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin Seoul Korea Development Institute

Robert Baldwin (1985) ldquoDecision Making at the PresidentialLevelrdquo Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of US Import PolicyCambridge MIT Press pp 115-174 [especially 115-133]

Frederick Boadu Fred Ruppel and A Angel (1992) ldquoAn EmpiricalModel of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in TradeRestrictionsrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V8- pp281-293

Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996) AntidumpingIndustrial Policy Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What ToDo About It Washington DC AEI Press

Patrick Messerlin (1990) ldquoThe EC Antidumping Regulations AFirst Economic Appraisalrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V126-3pp 562-587

PK Matthew Tharakan (1991) ldquoThe Political Economy ofAntidumping Undertakings in the European Communitiesrdquo EuropeanEconomic Review V35-6 pp 1341-1359

PK Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994)ldquoAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and inthe US An Experiment in Comparative Political EconomyrdquoEuropean Economic Review V38-1 pp 171-193

Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996) ldquoAntidumpingPolicy in the European Community Political Discretion or Technical

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
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            • 22
Page 68: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Determinationrdquo Economics amp Politics V8-2 pp 111-131

PK Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998) ldquoContingentProtection and International Trade An Analysis of the AntidumpingPolicy of the European Unionrdquo In PKM Tharakan and D Van DenBulcke eds International Trade Foreign Direct Investment and theEconomic Environment New York St Martinrsquos Press Pp 41-58

Donald Feaver (1997) ldquoForces Affecting the Administration ofAnti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia StatutoryFailure or Regulatory Capturerdquo Australian Journal of PublicAdministration V56-4 pp 67-77

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998) ldquoUnlocking AustraliarsquosContingent Protection Black Boxrdquo Economic Record V74-224 pp62-73

Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999) ldquoUnravellingCausation An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection inAustraliardquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V135-4 pp 692-708

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001) ldquoTrade Policy in Transition ThePolitical Economy of Antidumping in Japanrdquo Journal of the AsiaPacific Economy V6-1 pp 22-46

Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000) ldquoMacroeconomicFactors and Antidumping Filings Evidence from Four Countriesrdquo Journal of International Economics V61-1 pp 1-17

Topic XII Industry Level Policy Competition Policy

Theory

Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979) ldquoMonopolistic ExportIndustries Trade Taxes and Optimal Competition Policyrdquo EconomicJournal V89-355 pp 559-581

Homi Katrak (1980) ldquoMultinational Monopolies and MonopolyRegulationrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V32-3 pp 453-466

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
          • Page 8
          • Page 9
          • Page 10
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          • Page 12
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          • Page 41
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          • Page 49
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          • Page 54
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          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 69: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982) ldquoDomestic Regulation and thePreservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Marketsrdquo SouthernEconomic Journal V49-4 pp 954-965

I Dierckx C Matutes and Damien Neven (1991) ldquoCostDifferences and Survival in Declining Industries A Case for lsquoPickingWinnersrsquordquo European Economic Review V35-8 pp 1507-1528

Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994) ldquoIndustrial Policy andNational Welfare in the Presence of Monopolyrdquo Japan and the WorldEconomy v6-1 pp 61-73

Janusz Ordover Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983) ldquoUnfairInternational Trade Practicesrdquo International Law and Politics V15- pp 323-337

Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986) ldquoPerspectives on Mergersand World Competitionrdquo In Ronald Grieson ed Antitrust andRegulation Lexington Lexington Books pp 201-218

Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994) ldquoMerger Policy in OpenEconomiesrdquo European Economic Review V38-5 pp 1041-1055

Simon Cowan (1989) ldquoTrade and Competition Policies forOligopoliesrdquo Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv V125-3 pp 464-483

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995) ldquoThe Effects of TradeLiberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergersrdquo Review ofInternational Economics V3-2 pp 141-155

Christopher Bliss (1996) ldquoTrade and Competition Controlrdquo in JBhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade and Harmonization V1Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 313-328

James Levinsohn (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and InternationalTraderdquo in J Bhagwati and R Hudec eds Fair Trade andHarmonization V1 Economic Analysis Cambridge MIT pp 329-356

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
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        • 4
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        • 7
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            • 22
Page 70: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996) ldquoTrade Policy andCompetition Policyrdquo Giornale degli Economisti e Annali diEconomia V56-12 pp 67-97

Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996) ldquoEntry Policy in an OpenEconomyrdquo Indian Economic Review V31-1 pp 41-56

Keith Head and J Ries (1997) ldquoInternational Mergers and Welfareunder Decentralized Competition Policyrdquo Canadian Journal ofEconomics V30-4B pp 1104-1123

Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997) ldquoTrade Liberalizationand the Coordination of Competition Policyrdquo in L Waverman WComanor and A Goto eds Competition Policy in the GlobalEconomy Modalities for Cooperation London Routledge pp 381-406

Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001) ldquoMerger Policies andTrade Liberalizationrdquo Economic Journal V111-470 pp 244-276

PJ Lloyd (1998) ldquoGlobalisation and Competition PoliciesrdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 161-185

Rod Falvey (1998) ldquoMergers in Open Economiesrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8 pp 1061-1076

Martin Richardson (1998) ldquoForeign Entry and Domestic WelfarerdquoWeltwirtschaftliches Archiv V134-2 pp 250-262

Martin Richardson (1999) ldquoTrade and Competition Policiesconcordia discorsrdquo Oxford Economic Papers V51-4 pp 649-664

Michihiro Ohyama (1999) ldquoMarket Trade and Welfare in GeneralEquilibriumrdquo Japanese Economic Review V50-1 pp 1-24

Theresa Greaney (1999) ldquoStrategic Trade and Competition Policiesto Assist Distressed Industriesrdquo Canadian Journal of Economics

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
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        • 4
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        • 7
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          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 71: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

V32-3 pp 767-784

James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999) ldquoEntry Policy and EntrySubsidiesrdquo Review of International Economics V7-4 pp 732-743

Hylke Vandenbussche (2000) ldquoTrade Policy versus CompetitionPolicy Complements or Substitutesrdquo De Economist V148-5 pp625-642

Makoto Yano (2001) ldquoTrade Imbalance and Domestic MarketCompetition Policyrdquo International Economic Review V42-3 pp729-750

Rodney D Ludema (2001) ldquoMarket Collusion and the Politics ofProtectionrdquo European Journal of Political Economy V17-4 pp817-833

Stephen F Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001) ldquoVerticalCoordination Antitrust Law and International Traderdquo Journal ofLaw and Economics V43-1 pp 143-156

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001) ldquoExternal effects of domesticregulations comparing internal and international barriers to traderdquoInternational Review of Law and Economics V21-2 pp 135-155

Vivek Ghosal (2002) ldquoPotential Foreign Competition in USManufacturingrdquo International Journal of Industrial OrganizationV20-10 pp 1461-1489

LegalInstitutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

H Applebaum and D Grace (1987) ldquoUS Antitrust Law andAntidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of1979 Antitrust Law Journal V56-2 pp 497-518

Kenneth Elzinga (1987) ldquoAntitrust Policy and Trade Policy AnEconomists Perspectiverdquo Antitrust Law Journal V56-

Joel Davidow (1980) ldquoCompetition Trade and the Antitrust

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
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            • 22
Page 72: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Divisionrdquo Northwestern Journal of International Law and BusinessV- pp

Diane Wood (1989) ldquolsquoUnfairrsquo Trade Injury A Competition-BasedApproachrdquo Stanford Law Review V41- pp

Joel Davidow (1991) ldquoThe Relationship between Anti-Trust Lawsand Trade Laws in the USrdquo World Economy V14-1 pp 37-52

Robert Feinberg (1991) ldquoAntitrust Policy and International TradeLiberalizationrdquo World Competition V14-4 pp 13-19

Ronald Cass (1993) ldquoPrice Discrimination and Predation Analysisin Antitrust and International Trade A Commentrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 877-888

Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoEmpirical Analysis for Antitrust andInternational Trade Lawrdquo University of Cincinnati Law ReviewV61-3 pp 889-902

Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993) ldquoConflictingEntitlements Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation beReconociledrdquo University of Cincinnati Law Review V61- pp903-917

Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993) ldquoPerspectives on theEffects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industriesrdquo University ofCincinnati Law Review V61-3 pp 919-944

Frederic M Scherer (1994) Competition Policies for an IntegratedWorld Economy Washington DC Brookings

Patrick Messerlin (1994) ldquoShould Antidumping Rules Be Replacedby National or International Competition Rulesrdquo AussenwirtschaftV49-23 pp 351-374

Patrick Messerlin (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and AntidumpingReform An Exercise in Transitionrdquo In Jeffrey Schott ed The WorldTrading System Challenges Ahead Washington DC IIE pp 219-

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
        • 2
        • 4
        • 6
        • 7
          • Page 6
          • Page 7
          • Page 8
          • Page 9
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          • Page 73
          • Page 74
          • Page 75
            • 22
Page 73: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

246

Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995) ldquoCompetition and TradePolicy Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Roundrdquo WorldEconomy V18-5 pp 681-705

Alexis Jacquemin (1995) ldquoTowards an Internationalisation ofCompetition Policyrdquo World Economy V18-6 pp 781-789

Pierre Buigues Alexis Jacquemin and Andreacute Sapir eds (1995)European policies on competition trade and industry Conflict andcomplementarities Brookfield Vt Elgar

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994) ldquoCompetitionCompetition Policy and the GATTrdquo World Economy V17-2 pp121-150

Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996) ldquoDumpingAntidumping and Antitrustrdquo Journal of World Trade V30- pp27-52

Michael Trebilcock (1996) ldquoCompetition Policy and TradePolicyndashMediating the Interfacerdquo Journal of World Trade V30-4pp 71-105

Edward M Graham (1996) Global Corporations and NationalGovernments Washington DC Brookings

American Bar Association (1996) ldquoSymposium The Role ofForeign Competition in US Merger Enforcementrdquo Antitrust LawJournal V65-1

Bernard Hoekman (1997) ldquoCompetition Policy and the GlobalTrading Systemrdquo World Economy V20-4 pp 383-406

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies An Agenda Washington DC Institute forInternational Economics

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

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    • 1
    • 3
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    • 9
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    • 16
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            • 22
Page 74: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

J David Richardson and Edward M Graham eds (1997) GlobalCompetition Policies Washington DC Institute for InternationalEconomics

Alan Sykes (1998) ldquoAntidumping and Antitrust What ProblemsDoes Each Addressrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum1998 Washington DC Brookings pp 1-43

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoRegulatory Protectionism and the Law ofInternational Traderdquo University of Chicago Law Review V66-1pp 1-46

Merit Janow (1998) ldquoUnilateral and Bilateral Approaches toCompetition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experiencerdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 253-285

J David Richardson (1998) ldquoMultilateralizing Conventionsrdquo in RLawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998 Washington DCBrookings pp 335-374

IM Destler (1998) ldquoUS Approach to International CompetitionPolicyrdquo in R Lawrence ed Brookings Trade Forum 1998Washington DC Brookings pp 395-418

PK Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd eds ldquoSpecial IssueCompetition Policy in a Changing Economic Environmentrdquo WorldEconomy V21-8

Alan Sykes (1999) ldquoThe (Limited) Role of RegulatoryHarmonization in International Goods and Services MarketsrdquoJournal of International Economic Law V2-1 pp 49-70

Joel Davidow (1999) ldquoAntitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual orPotential Enforcement of Trade Lawsrdquo Journal of InternationalEconomic Law V2-4 pp 681-93

Alan Sykes (2000) ldquoRegulatory Competition or RegulatoryHarmonization A Silly Questionrdquo Journal of International

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
      • Page 2
      • Page 3
      • Page 4
      • Page 5
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            • 22
Page 75: TI 0 114 The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policydnelson/COURSES/GPE/sylPEti.pdf · The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy Professor: Douglas Nelson Office:

Economic Law V3-2 pp 257-264

Daniel Tarullo (2000) ldquoNorms and Institutions in GlobalCompetition Policyrdquo American Journal of International Law V94-3 pp 478-504

Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001) ldquoRegional Approaches toCross-border Competition Policiesrdquo In S Lahiri ed Regionalism andGlobalization Theory and Practice London Routledge pp 282-304

Final Examination Distributed Due

  • Page 1
    • 1
    • 3
    • 5
    • 8
    • 9
    • 15
    • 16
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The Political Economy

The Political Economy

The Political Economy of Decentralization Reformssiteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDSRE/Resources/Decentralization... · Through a political economy lens, ... The Political Economy of

The Political Economy of Decentralization Reformssiteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDSRE/Resources/Decentralization... · Through a political economy lens, ... The Political Economy of

Political Economy

Political Economy

Int Political Economy

Int Political Economy

Economics and Political Economy: Marx, Keynes, and Schumpeterinstruct.uwo.ca/economics/320a-570/Economics and Political Economy... · Economics and Political Economy: Marx, Keynes,

Economics and Political Economy: Marx, Keynes, and Schumpeterinstruct.uwo.ca/economics/320a-570/Economics and Political Economy... · Economics and Political Economy: Marx, Keynes,

Political Economy Media.pdf

Political Economy Media.pdf

Irish Political Economy, Lecture One: what is Political Economy?

Irish Political Economy, Lecture One: what is Political Economy?

Public Power and the Political Economy of …mcohen/publications/Electric/BChydro.pdfPublic Power and the Political Economy of Electricity Competition: The Case of B.C. Hydro By Marjorie

Public Power and the Political Economy of …mcohen/publications/Electric/BChydro.pdfPublic Power and the Political Economy of Electricity Competition: The Case of B.C. Hydro By Marjorie

International Political Economy (IPE) - bifrost.is Political Economy ... globalisation and growing international trade, international political economy ... facilitate or impede international

International Political Economy (IPE) - bifrost.is Political Economy ... globalisation and growing international trade, international political economy ... facilitate or impede international

Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu …kcfung/lobbyst3.pdfPolitical Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu-Auctions with Imperfect Competition… K.C. Fung and Chelsea

Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu …kcfung/lobbyst3.pdfPolitical Economy of Strategic Trade Policy: Menu-Auctions with Imperfect Competition… K.C. Fung and Chelsea

Political Economy of Trading States International Political Economy Prof. Tyson Roberts.

Political Economy of Trading States International Political Economy Prof. Tyson Roberts.

Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in Maharashtra · Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in Maharashtra ... “Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in

Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in Maharashtra · Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in Maharashtra ... “Political Economy of Electricity Distribution in

Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political ... · Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation ... Protestant

Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political ... · Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation ... Protestant

Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy … Files/LandMEMDec2015_Full_a0f3435a...Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy 1 Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy:

Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy … Files/LandMEMDec2015_Full_a0f3435a...Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy 1 Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy:

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE …556.pdf · THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: COMPETITION, COLLUSION AND UNCERTAINTY ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER ABSTRACT.Infrastructure,

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE …556.pdf · THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: COMPETITION, COLLUSION AND UNCERTAINTY ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER ABSTRACT.Infrastructure,

ECO 4119 POLITICAL ECONOMY Chapter 1 Politics, Economics, and Political Economy.

ECO 4119 POLITICAL ECONOMY Chapter 1 Politics, Economics, and Political Economy.

Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic ...eprints.lancs.ac.uk/1004/1/Microsoft_Word_-_E-2008f_Memorial.pdf · Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic Socialism

Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic ...eprints.lancs.ac.uk/1004/1/Microsoft_Word_-_E-2008f_Memorial.pdf · Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic Socialism

Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic ...€¦ · Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic Socialism Bob Jessop all twentieth-century political theory has

Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic ...€¦ · Political Economy, Political Ecology, and Democratic Socialism Bob Jessop all twentieth-century political theory has

Philippine Political Economy

Philippine Political Economy

Public Power and the Political Economy of Electricity ...€¦ · 4 Public Power and the Political Economy of Electricity Competition: The Case of B.C. Hydro Introduction THE ELECTRICAL

Public Power and the Political Economy of Electricity ...€¦ · 4 Public Power and the Political Economy of Electricity Competition: The Case of B.C. Hydro Introduction THE ELECTRICAL