Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology

Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass PsychologyAuthor(s): Virginia HunterSource: Hermes, 114. Bd., H. 4 (4th Qtr., 1986), pp. 412-429Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476526 .

Accessed: 09/09/2013 14:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Franz Steiner Verlag is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Hermes.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 9 Sep 2013 14:07:32 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=fsv

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476526?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


412 VIRGINIA HUNTER

Being becomes no more than the best mental disposition (for in this state an individual cognizes reality as Being, that is, attains true knowledge). This transformes the Parmenidean conception of cognition into an inconsistent and unintelligible theory in which man's mental disposition depends not only on the absolute preponderance of one 'form' over the other but also on their ratio, in which a positive mental disposition requires not just an absolute preponderance of light but also 'a certain commensurability'. And in fact, this is precisely how Parmenides' conception is reflected in Theophrastus.

Thus Theophrastus' account provides empirical corroboration of the ex- egesis I proposed above: each of the inconsistencies the account displays is ex- plicable as a necessary result of the distortion of the Parmenidean doctrine that becomes unavoidable when it is taken in isolation from its broad theological context. This, in turn, is a consequence of the exclusively logical and metaphysical understanding of the Parmenidean teaching shared by the ancient authorities and their modern followers.

Jerusalem ARYEH FINKELBERG

THUCYDIDES, GORGIAS, AND MASS PSYCHOLOGY

The question of psychology in Thucydides is one that has tantalized a

variety of scholars, whether their aim has been understanding, or criticism, of

the historian. Illustrative of the latter is R. G. COLLINGWOOD, who described Thucydides' work as >>psychological history<, the chief purpose of which is

>to affirm laws<. Such laws, COLLINGWOOD defined as unchanging rules which govern the relations between events'. The term law may be

anachronistic, and the criticism itself harsh, yet there is some truth in what COLLINGWOOD says. For Thucydides' interest was not just in psychology and

behaviour, but in the rules of human behaviour. To isolate such rules, however, is to move into the area of mass or collective psychology. For

generally Thucydides applies these rules to groups of people - armies, audiences, >>mobs<, or even cities.

How does one approach the subject of mass psychology? Is it a question of sociology, collective mentality, or systematic thought2? The three, of course,

I 'The Idea of History' (Oxford, Oxford Paperbacks, 1961) 29- 30. A work which seeks to

understand the historian is P. HUART'S 'Le vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre

de Thucydide' (Paris, 1968). 2 G. RUDE, 'The Crowd in History, 1730- 1848' (New York and London, 1964) is an

historical work which discusses a sociological approach in its Introduction. For collective

mentality, see P. K. HUTTON, The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History, in:



Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology 413

are not mutually exclusive. Hence it should be possible to study mass psychology at any one of these levels. For the purpose of this paper, however, I propose to narrow my concern to the historian's own thought, and to consider his use of psychology as a species of systematic thought. Does Thucydides' mass psychology, and with it his view of collective man, have intellectual underpinnings? Does it share in the conceptual framework of his day? In order to answer these questions, I shall first consider a series of psychological generalizations found in the 'History'. Those chosen fall under four headings: a) responsibility, b) repentance, c) the unaccustomed or unexpected and its effects, and d) fear.

a) Responsibility. The first two examples are taken from the speech of the Corinthians at Lacedaemon in 432 and from Hermocrates' address to the Congress of Gela in 424. The Corinthians hold the Spartans responsible for the Greek cities' loss of freedom to the Athenians. For, as they believe (1,69,1), the true perpetrator of enslavement is not the one who subjects people to himself, but he who, while able to prevent it, allows it to happen3. Speaking in a similar vein, also in respect of Athenian rule, Hermocrates avows that he does not blame those who wish to rule, but rather those who are overready to submit. For, as he goes on to observe (4,61,5): >>It is a universal trait of human nature for men both to rule those who submit and to resist aggressors4<<. The above generalizations are typical, for most are found in speeches, usually introduced by a yap, and made by way of explanation. At first glance, they appear to be no more than isolated statements.

b) Repentance. Here four connected passages, two of them from speeches of Pericles, will form a single example. At 1,140,1, Pericles makes a public affirmation of his own resolution not to yield to the Peloponnesians, though he knows that men in general do not face action in the same frame of mind as

History and Theory xx (1981) 237 - 259. Finally, a definition of systematic thought might be that of Sir K. R. POPPER in 'Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach', revised edition (Oxford, 1979), Chapter 3, >>Epistemology Without a Knowing Subjecto. Systematic thought approximates what POPPER designates as the inmates of )>the third world((. To the third world belongs )>knowledge or thought in an objective sense, consisting of problems, theories, and arguments as such(<, to be distinguished from >knowledge or thought in the subjective sense, consisting of a state of mind or of consciousness or a disposition to behave or to react (108- 109, POPPER'S italics)o.

3 Cf. 1,71,5. 4 Cf. 5,89. Note too another sort of responsibility which recurs in speeches as part of a

generalization used to explain or justify actual behaviour. Those who lead are more to blame for transgressions than those who follow (3,65,2 and cf. 3,55,4). Diodotus alludes critically to this notion of responsibility as applied to orators and audience (3,43,4 - 5).



414 VIRGINIA HUNTER

when they were being persuaded to fight a war. In the face of misfortune, their resolution alters. And in fact, Athenian resolution does change in the face of the war and the plague. They come to blame Pericles for their misfortunes, and for persuading them to go to war (2,59,1 - 2). Hence Pericles' third great speech, and his return to his former theme of resolution: >> am the same .... It is you who change< (2,61,2). >>What has happened to you is that you were persuaded while unhurt, and changed your mind in distress5<< . This is precisely the point he made by way of a generalization at 1,140,1, as well as by way of prediction, for now the generalization is a fact of life. Here a new dimension is added to our example. For at 2,65,4, the historian himself comments on the behaviour of the Athenian populace. Their anger against Pericles, he notes, did not abate until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however, as a mass is wont to do, they elected him general again, entrusting all their affairs to him. This statement is a clear reference on the part of the historian to mass, even crowd, psychology: swings of mood are one of its characteristics6.

c) The unaccustomed or unexpected and its effect. The passages used by way of illustration here are also connected, comprised in a rather elaborate k6yoi -epya combination of the kind so prevalent in the 'History'. In an exhortation to the Peloponnesians as they are about to invade Attica, Archidamus assures his men that the Athenians will meet them in battle. His reason for believing this? >>AIl men react emotionally when they see some afflication to which they are unaccustomed happening right before their eyes<< (2,11,7). The result is activity carried out in passion rather than with reflection7. Soon after, with the invasion, the Athenians experience just the kind of feelings Archidamus attributed to collective man. >>When they saw their land ravaged right before their eyes, a novel sight for the younger citizens, and one foreign to their elders since the Persian Wars, they thought it a terrible thing< (2,21,2). They determined to go out against the enemy and stop the ravages. For the city the result was division, strife, recourse to the

5 The word for resolution used in all three passages is yv6bgri. For a discussion of this word, as well as the word for anger, opyi, see HUART (n. 1) 48 -49, 156- 162, and 304 - 310.

6 'O7I?p qnXi 6OttXo; ntowiv. In two other instances, Thucydides refers contemptuously to mass behaviour in almost identical language (4,28,3 and 6,63,2), where, however, he uses the word 6XXo; for >>mass< or ?>crowd<.For other examples of repentance or regret, see 4,27,2; 5,14,2, and 7,55,1. (The word used is ria4ttXctct and its cognates.) There are also instances of a swift change of mind at 1,44,1 (prETayiyviox?tv) and 3,36,4 (PFT6voLa). Not all shifts in popular opinion need be construed as bad. See the debate of Cleon and Diodotus on this point at 3,37,1. 40,2, and 46,1.

7 Once again the word used for emotion is 6pyq. Where Xoytoat6; is lacking, activity is Oouw.




irrational (oracles), and anger at Pericles8. Examples of this kind of behaviour are manifold throughout the 'History', indicating that this generalization is one actively used by Thucydides in interpreting human behaviour. Like those already considered, it is not a mere commonplace, but represents a firmly held view on the part of the historian about the workings of collective psychology and the attributes of a common humanity9. Here, in addition, one should observe that examples b) and c) are connected. The unexpected or unaccustomed, after producing deep emotional upsets, can lead to a change of mind, to repentance. In other words, we are dealing not with isolated generalizations but with a configuration.

d) Fear. Our final example is drawn from the policy of action advocated by Lamachus at the outset of the Sicilian expedition. Lamachus proposes that the Athenians strike while the enemy is still unprepared and paralysis is at its height. For, he explains (6,49,2), every expedition is most frightening at first. >>If, however, it is slow to present itself to view, men regain their resolution and they feel rather more disdain when it does appear.(( On the basis of this generalization, Lamachus gives concrete advice about their activity in Sicily. If they attack suddenly while men are still in a state of deep apprehension, they will have the best chance to gain the upper hand and strike terror into the enemy by their appearance (in this case, their numbers) and by the threat they present 1. Again, the generalization set forth by Lamachus is part of a broader configuration which embraces the generalizations about collective behaviour illustrated in b) and c) above. For in the present example, there are also shifting moods, a distinct emphasis on the role of vision, and more than a suggestion that surprise - the unexpected - will have its effect. Here, in addition, one discovers a wealth of vocabulary expressing the notion of fear itself in all its nuances. This is not surprising, for fear is perhaps the predominant emotion in the 'History'l. The psychology of fear is thus a fruitful point at which to linger, and to consider in some depth this

8 Note all three generalizations brought together at 21,3. The Athenians not only reacted emotionally to the unaccustomed but, repenting, felt angry at Pe.icles and held him responsible for their sufferings. See too the contrast of Opyi and yv~tr at 22,1.

9 See, for example, 2,91,4; 4,26,4; 4,55,3-4, and 7,60,5. Further references to this psychological phenomenon in speeches occur at 6,34,8; 7,21,3 - 4, and 7,66,3. On commonplaces (xotvoi T6oto), see G. KENNEDY, 'The Art of Persuasion in Greece' (Princeton, 1963) 52- 54.

10 The word for paralyzed is Lxneutkqyptvot. (On gxntkqit, see below, n. 13.) 1 have construed neplseWiq as ))deep apprehension<< and wx(po3ifoac as >>strike terror<. For this distinction between 8toc, and (p6oIo;, see J. DE ROMILLY, La crainte dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide, in: C. & M. xvii (1956) 119- 127.

11 DE ROMJLLY, ))La crainte? 1 19, notes that >>e r6le de la crainte dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide est consid&rable<. Cf. HUART 122- 123 and his valuable discussion of the vocabulary of fear, 114- 140.



416 VIRGINIA HUNTER

configuration of generalizations about mass psychology and mass behaviour12

The psychology of fear

As a concrete example of fear, let us first consider Demosthenes' night attack on Epipolae (7,43-44), a passage commended by two features. It is straightforward narrative, and it illustrates the kind of night panic to which Thucydides makes reference elsewhere. At such moments, he observes, great armies are wont to be irrationally >>unhinged 13<<. Commenting on his difficulties in assembling the details of the night-battle here, the historian asks: >>How could anyone know anything with certainty?< For darkness and noise made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe. What actually did happen? The picture is one of total confusion, Tapaxrl. Attacking with all speed, the Athenians first forced a retreat on the Syracusans, shocked by the unexpected audacity of a night attack. Flush with victory, the Athenians pushed on, now in rather more disorder owing both to ardour and to speed (43,7: ?v kaTtfia jiOkXXov 8i&j). When part of their force was routed, the result was confusion and perplexity (44,1: F?iV RtoX TapaXi Xai 6inopia). With great numbers of hoplites hemmed into a small area, friend and foe, victor and vanquished, were confounded. Because of the rout, all ahead was in confusion (44,3: &-Tc-rdpaXto), while the noise made every sound indistinguishable. It was a veritable tumult (44,4: O6pu3ov ioki)v), in which the singing of the paean by either side not only induced perplexity but struck terror into the Athenians (44,6: 'anopiav and (p6fov). In the end, massive confusion ensued, friend fighting friend and citizen citizen with panic the result (44,7: ?E'Ti d7tat ?'TapaJX(av .. . ?5 qOOV XaloTvx TvjOrav). But by now the Athenians were in flight.

The second example, Phormio's victories in north-west Greece (2,83 - 92), is a passage which contains a singular incidence of words for fear (qpo6o; and

12 In the examples cited above, the following expressions are used in reference to collective man: 6 or oi with the participle (1,69,1; 1,71,5; 4,61,5, and 5,89), oi with the ad-jective (5,89), oi

dvOponot (1,140,1), divOpnot (6,49,2), naot (2,11,7), and dv6pe; (7,66,3). In turn, the

generalizations of which such expressions are a part are employed to interpret the behaviour of the concrete collective entity of a people - the Athenians, Peloponnesians, etc. and so a city (e. g., 2,21,2; 2,91,4; 4,55,3 -4). There are also references to Mthe masses(<, 6gtko4 (2,65,4) and

6xXo; (4,28,3 and 6,63,2). 13 4,125,1. Cf. 7,80,3. On C?XinjTzrV, see HUART 117-120. This compound of nXkTTEIV,

together with the noun gxnrXT1l4, connotes stupour, fright, and paralyzing fear. It can also

indicate surprise or shock, the kind of blow that takes away one's wits or senses. I have tried to

capture these connotations by the one, admittedly unlovely, word, >>unhinged<. Fright at such

times affects the mind, even deranges it, marring the victim's capacity to think rationally.

KaTanrtXrrTtv and xaTdnXkq,1t, also found in the 'History', though less frequently, seem to be

synonymous with ?XJrXTT?1v and gxnkriE,; (HUART 120- 121).




its cognates alone occur thirteen times) 1. In this case, there is not just a narrative, but a closely knit koyot - ?pya combination, at the centre of which is a debate (an av-rtXoyia) between Phormio and his opposites, the Peloponnesian captains. In presenting arguments which contradict one another, these speeches contain a number of interesting generalizations about fear. In fact, the point of the two exhortations, perhaps of the whole episode, is to show how to overcome fear. The passage is thus doubly valuable in any study of the psychology of fear.

Again, what happened? Here events form a kind of doublet, with Phormio and his small group of Athenian ships succeeding twice, first in the Gulf of Patrae (84,3) and then off Naupactus (91 - 92). As at Epipolae, the scene (or scenes) is one of confusion (-rapacx). In the first battle, at Patrae, the Peloponnesians find themselves hemmed into a narrow space with small craft dashing against them. When the wind suddenly begins to blow, they are thrown into confusion (84,3: Fnapaooovto). Disorder and noise ensue, followed by flight as the Athenians attack. No one, Thucydides comments, thought to act with valour in the confusion (Utno TTJq TapaXiq). The second episode is not very different. The Peloponnesians are now in pursuit of the Athenian ships, but in some disorder owing to their victory (91,4: a&txtW4

8ti)XOVT-rq Atl t6 XpatTv). Suddenly, the unexpected occurs. One of the Athenian ships performs the exploit of circling a merchantman moored near the shore to strike the enemy's lead ship and sink it. Faced with an exploit beyond their expectation, the Peloponnesians panic, losing their presence of mind (ibid., qp6poq Fut'iiT61). A scene of disorder follows, as the Athenians rush forward in confidence. In both incidents, disorder gives way, in the face of the unaccustomed or unexpected, to confusion, fear, and finally flight. Both incidents too replicate what happened at Epipolae.

Both episodes are closely connected to a speech or to the thoughts which precede. In the first case, Phormio's hope for a change of wind, and with it disorder and confusion, anticipates the action (84,2). In the second case, anticipation is far more complex, for here Phormio, fearful about the morale of his men, realizes that they are alarmed at the numbers ranged against them (88,1: E(po,BoivTo). In fact, they are demoralized at the sight before them (88,3: aOo,0oi5vTC). Thus his aim is to overcome both demoralization and fear. The following are some of the psychological generalizations which he applies to the situation at hand in order to instil confidence in them and to persuade them to fight again with courage. >>Confidence depends on experience in a particular sphere<< (89,3). Hence, it is they who have the

14 86,5. 86,6. 87,1 (two instances, one the compound ?xpoI3Ctv), 87,4 (two instances), 88,1. 89,1. 89,5. 89,6. 89,10. 90,3, and 91,4. In addition, forms of 8?i6ltv appear at 87,5. 88,1, and 89,5, while there are two instances of the noun 6ppw6ia, at 88,1 and 89,1.

27



418 VIRGINIA HUNTER

advantage. >>An opponent whose numbers are superior comes into action trusting more to strength than to resolution, while one who voluntarily confronts great odds must have great resolution indeed? (89,6). Knowing this, the Peloponnesians fear their capacity for surprise. ))The defeated do not face danger twice with the same resolute will< (89,11). And they have already beaten the enemy. These generalizations, combined with a plan of attack outside the narrows and some strictures about order and silence in battle, complete the exhortation. Thus is the encounter anticipated, and an explanation provided as to why the inferior Athenian navy was once again victorious.

The preceding examples illustrate the workings of fear in action or situation, and how it develops from disorder, through confusion, to flight 15. Here too one may recognize certain psychological generalizations noted earlier, for example, the effect of the unexpected or unaccustomed and the key role of vision. To these, others can now be added concerning resolution and confidence and their lack or loss. The complete configuration, a kind of psychology of fear, indicates what causes fear, how it develops, what are its results, and how it may be overcome.

But there is another side to fear, not in action but as reaction. This is fear so overwhelming as to cause complete paralysis and demoralization. The word Thucydides employs for this phenomenon, sxnkilXt;, implies a blow to the wits or a shock. One is stunned - or >>unhinged<. After the battle in the harbour at Syracuse, for instance, the Athenians suffered this kind of stupour on an unprecedented scale (7,71,7). So deeply affected were they that they did not think to ask for their dead, but wanted to retreat at once (72,2). Faced with the proposal of trying once again for success at sea, the sailors refused to go on board. So deep was their paralysis at the defeat they had suffered (6ut

TO xaTacn)7rXil0al) and their belief that they could no longer win (72,4). They were full of dejection and self-reproach (75,5)i6. In short, they had

undergone a complete loss of morale and an alteration in their patterns of

Is Other examples of the psychology of fear and the workings of fear in action are to be found

at 4,125 - 127; 5,9- 10, and 7,66-67 and 70. Each passage has a X6yoq (two spoken by Brasidas

and one by Gylippus) discussing fear in some depth. All employ psychological generalizations akin to those expressed by Phormio. In one of the above (7,66 - 67 and 70) Tapaxii is a prominent

feature, as it is at 7,22 - 23 and 25 and 7,80. (See too 1,49,4 and 6,69- 70 and 72). On TapaX as

a recurrent feature of battles in the 'History', see V. J. HUNTER, 'Thucydides, the Artful

Reporter' (Toronto, 1973) 89 - 90, 112, 114 - 117, and 180. Cf. J. DE ROMILLY, 'Histoire et raison

chez Thucydide' (Paris, 1956) 169- 172, a discussion of passages in which Tapaxij or O6puIlo; is

the central point. 16 The verb XatacitiTTr-v at 72,4 echoes the noun sxnXrf,t; of 71,7. The dejection and self-

reproach described at 75,5 represent an intensification of their demoralization after the final sea-

battle, for they have now undergone the trauma of leaving their friends and kinsmen. What they

have seen is dreadful; what they anticipate is worse.




behaviour and response (76: 60uiiobv xati ?v iicy62a pRTaitokXi ov). Thucydides compares their plight in Sicily to what they had themselves inflicted on the Lacedaemonians at Pylos. Both situations, he notes, were hopeless for the vanquished (71,7). But the analogy does not end here, for after Pylos the minds of the Peloponnesians were similarly unhinged. This total paralysis (4,55,3: ?xntXiltv iytionriv), Thucydides explains, was due to the repeated blows of chance, which had been their misfortune in a brief space of time, contrary to all rational calculation17. They became more timid than ever (55,2) and apprehensive about experiencing a second defeat like that on the island (55,3). So lacking in confidence were they that they thought any activity on their part would result in errors. For unaccustomed misfortune had destroyed their resolution'8*

In the above, we have delineated two distinct stages of fear: a) fear's onset and its effects, a process which is not just psychological but physiological; and b) the condition or state which results from such an alteration of the mind and body. We have called this a psychology of fear. And more significantly, I believe that we can find a view of fear, a >>theory<, which approximates Thucydides' psychology in a small work of the Sicilian sophist and rhetor, Gorgias of Leontini. The work referred to is the rhetorical exercise 'Encomium of Helen'. What does Gorgias say here on the subject of fear? His views are found in the fourth and last section of 'Helen', a discussion of the powers of ?pw;, one of several forces against which human beings are generally powerless, and so which absolve them, like Helen, of responsibility for their actions (para. 15-19)19.

17 4,55,3: Tat Tn; T6X'I; ioXkXa Xai ?v 6Xiyw Erup4dv'na itp& X6yov. 18 Note Cx TT-fl lrpiV 9i3Ciac T0o xcaxonpayliv, and see n. 9 above. Here again one of the

generalizations with which we began is employed by Thucydides to interpret human behaviour. 19 What follows is a summary of Gorgias' work. The text used is that of DIELS in H. DIELS

and W. KRANZ, 'Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker', Vol. 2, sixth edition (Berlin, 1952), hereafter referred to as D. K. 82. 1 have also consulted D. M. MACDOWELL'S recent edition, 'Gorgias. Encomium of Helen', edited with notes and translation (Bristol, 1982) and G. KENNEDY'S

translation of D. K. 82 in 'The Older Sophists', edited by R. K. SPRAGUE (Columbia, S. C., 1972). The general works consulted include W. K. C. GUTHRIE, 'A History of Greek Philosophy', Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1969); G. B. KERFERD, 'The Sophistic Movement' (Cambridge, 1981); and M. UNTERSTEINER, 'The Sophists', translated by K. FREEMAN (Oxford, 1954). I am also indebted to the excellent discussion of C. P. SEGAL, Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos, in: H. S. C. P. lxvi (1962) 99- 155. Especially noteworthy are his remarks on the materiality of the 4uX1 (106), the nature of 64t; (106- 107), and the kinship of Gorgias' view of the emotions, which SEGAL describes as >>almost physiological entities(<, with >the scientific rationalism of Greek medicine< (106).

27*



420 VIRGINIA HUNTER

How does spc0; have its effect? Through the eyes. What we see - and we cannot control what we see, since the objects of vision have their own nature outside our wishes - makes a deep impression on the soul20. Gorgias offers an example from war and the behaviour of armies. If vision (wSt;) sees hostile sights, it is confused (or better, disturbed) and in turn disturbs the soul21. At this point, men often flee, paralyzed with fear (iX70cay9vTE, )>unhinged<) at impending danger as if it were already upon them. Such is the effect of fear that it dislodges men's usual norms of accepted behaviour, making them forget the values sanctioned by custom22. At times too, some have lost their wits in the presence of dreadful sights23. So thoroughly does fear extinguish and expel thought24. Many, in addition, have fallen into vain distress, dread diseases, and incurable phobias (madness)25. So deeply does vision inscribe on the mind the images of things seen26. Their frightening impressions linger like words. Here Gorgias offers the parallel of works of art, which offer a pleasant sight to the eyes. Thus, he concludes, it is but natural for some things to make vision grieve, others to provoke it to desire27.

Gorgian fear has three stages: its onset is due either to a) impending danger or to b) dreadful sights right before one's eyes; c) it can also linger as a result of sights seen in the past. The first two stages are rather similar, since they involve vision's capacity to disturb the soul or the mind, shattering normal patterns of behaviour. In stage b) shock can also produce deep mental and physical reactions. These are perhaps the forerunners of stage c), a condition in which the victim's physiology is altered. Recollections of things seen remain to plague him, or perhaps we are to understand that the distress, illness, or madness caused by fear continues or recurs. In any case, his psychological state is one of lingering terror.

That Gorgias and Thucydides employ a similar vocabulary of fear has not gone unnoticed28. Other similarities seem equally striking. For here is the very process and condition identified in Thucydides' work, with its movement from disorder, through confusion, to fear, whether paralysis or panic, and finally flight. For Thucydides, confusion is both an external condition and a

20 D. K. 82 B 11, para. 15, &la 6E Ti; 6Wvuq l WUXf XCIV TOIS Tp6Orot TU4no3Tal. On TunOoV,

see SEGAL 106- 107 and n. 44 ad locum. 21 Para. 16, ?i 0E00S Tat iA 6OIt, cT(XpdiX" xCti LTrpciO, TrV WUXjV. 22 Ibid., ioXupd yap il OUVs0EIca TOO v6pou 86 T6V (p6O,ov xXiON T6V arr6 rTi 6OWE(O. 23 Para. 17, 5ij1 &9 TLv; i86VTC; poPipat xaii ToO ?cp6vo4 tV TrO nap6vTt Xp6vw

DPOVN AaTO S t4t?;TTN3Cav . 24 Ibid., OiTWo dtitoaPeoc xai ,iciXamv 6 (p61o; T6 v6ylga. 25 Ibid., noXXoi &? gcaTai0ot; 16vo1 xcii &tvaci; v6ooit; xai 6uoi&Toi~ gaViIt; rTCPttnrsOV. 26 Ibid., OOT(5)o ?lix6va; TniV 6pWpVWV ipciyidrWv i 6OWq c?VgypactVv ?V Tj ppOVjaTct.

27 Para. 18. Painters Trpn0Uol Trv 6itv, while works of art Otav 6cIav napcoXCro ToI; 6 a.tcoiv. OTo Tn p?V XUnCiV T& 8c o00iV 7Ti(pUXc TnV 6WtV.

28 See SEGAL 108 and n. 50 ad locum.




state of mind, as men's mental processes reflect the confusion around them. They are disturbed, even somewhat deranged. Their psyches are thus fertile ground for FxNnXtXt; and (p6Ipo;, unhinging terror and panic. In fact, the changes that their minds have undergone produce an alteration in character. In other words, a physiological process has been set in motion, the result of which may be long-lasting paralysis and complete demoralization, with its attendant changes in attitudes and values. Here is surely Gorgias' third phase, where lingering images and recollections - perhaps even physical illness and madness - oppress the victim. This can hardly be a coincidence. Let me suggest that we are indeed dealing with a theory of fear, both physiological and psychological, which has its origins in the ideas or teachings of Gorgias, or his milieu.

The psychology of the Ao6yos

There is of course another respect in which one might posit a connection between Gorgias and Thucydides. Consider, for example, what some have called the >>psychology of the X6yo;29<<, a kind of analogue of the psychology of fear, in which the corresponding sense-organ is the ears rather than the eyes. For it is through listening that this psychological (and physiological) process is set in motion. Evidence for the psychology of the X6yoq is found in the third section of 'Helen', a discussion of the powers of Xoyo; or speech (para. 8- 14).

What makes the X6yo; so powerful? Its capacity to alter men's emotional state, by persuading and deceiving the soul. Thus it puts an end to fear, removes grief, inspires joy, and evokes pity30. To illustrate the powers of the Xoyo;, Gorgias turns to poetry, the ultimate medium for producing emotional, even physical, responses. By entering into the listeners' consciousness, poetry makes them feel deep personal sympathy for the

29 See SEGAL passim. 30 Para. 8. Gorgias describes the k6yoq as 6UV6OTTI; g6-yac,. On the notion of deception (Tiiv

WXnv 6ctaxtrx), see T. G. ROSENMEYER, Gorgias, Aeschylus, and Apate, in: Am. Jour. Phil. lxxvi (1955) 225 - 260 and W. J. VERDENIUS, Gorgias' Doctrine of Deception, in: 'The Sophists and their Legacy', edited by G. B. KERFERD, Hermes. Einzelschriften xliv (Wiesbaden, 1981) 116- 128. SEGAL 112 believes that it is )>connected with the apate or pseudos of the poetic tradition ... the logos demands the complete suspension of )>rational<( belief, for it has a pistis all its own; it works through >>magico and >)enchantment< rather than objective factuality of aletheia, and its results correspondingly are a poetic terpsis as well as the sophia of B23.<< In the latter, quoted by Plutarch, Gorgias comments on the justice and wisdom of deception in tragedy.



422 VIRGINIA HUNTER

successes and failures of others, as the soul suffers with them31. And here Gorgias offers a parallel to show how words can have a magical effect. His example is sacred incantations, which insinuate themselves into the soul's opinion, having the power to charm, to persuade, and to alter by magic32.

But why do men give in to this power? Gorgias returns to his main line of reasoning, stating baldly that speakers persuade them, by moulding a false argument33. The key here lies in the notion of opinion (60'a), mentioned above, and the inadequacies of men's rational faculties, whether memory, understanding, or foreknowledge. The X6yoq is effective because men do not remember the past, evaluate the present critically, or have foreknowledge of the future34. Instead, they depend on the counsels of opinion, which, being slippery and unreliable, brings like results35.

At this point, Gorgias returns to Helen's responsibility, by introducing a new concept, compulsion (Ova6yxi). The k6yoq, through persuading her soul, compelled it to believe what was said and approve what was done36. As for responsibility or guilt, it lies with the one who persuades, since he compels, while the one who is persuaded, being compelled, is wrongly criticized. Persuasion's capacity to impress the soul can be seen in the X6yot of three specialized groups, scientists, rhetors, and philosophers37. Each has a slightly different power: scientists render acceptable to opinion that which is incredible and uncertain, rhetors can please and persuade a great crowd,

31 Para. 9. Gorgias defines poetry as A6yov ?XOVTa TpPOV. He states: 'En' &XXoTpiwV TE

npay4i6Tov xai owLaT(Ov CU'TuXialQ xai 600ipayiaiq r&6v Tn ndTipca 1a rTiv X6yOv cna0t:v fT

WvuiX. On Gorgias' aesthetic theory, see SEGAL 1 14- 115, 120- 125, and 132, where he discusses the view that this paragraph anticipates the later catharsis-theory of tragedy. Cf. J. DE ROMILLY, Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poesie, in: J. H. St. xciii (1973) 155- 162 and T. S. DUNCAN, Gorgias' Theories of Art, in: Class. Journ. xxxiii (1938) 402-415.

32 Para. 10. Such incantations are braywyoi i'8oviq, 67ctaywyoi X6nirnq. Note the verb oto charm<, EOcE. For OXyciv, see DE ROMILLY, ibid., 156- 158 and VERDENIUS, 'Gorgias' Doctrine', 122- 123. On magic, see J. DE ROMILLY, 'Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece' (Cambridge, Mass., 1975) Chapter 1, >)Gorgias and Magic<<.

33 Para. 11, wEVuj X6Ayov 7IXdoavTmq.

34 Ibid., OVTE zqCF"vrcval T6 napotX6OEvov oOTe 0XgWaO0al T6 7[ap6v OvTo gavtrnocsa0at T6 VtkXov. The corresponding nouns are pvipsr, EvvoIa (BLASS' conjecture), and irp6voia.

35 Ibid., ij & 864a oppatXpa xai dj1tato; o6oa. 36 Para. 12, X6yo4 y6p tpIux1v 6 ntEioa4, jV EnZ?OEV, ivdyxacE Xai nl7?tOQl TOi;

Xvyojivo4; x(ai ouvaivtoat tl0 7tOO uRtlU0LEW 37 Para. 13. Note again the verb Tuir0ov. The three groups are represented by their

corresponding forms of discourse: a) the X6yot twv rETcwpoX6-ywv, >>astronomerso or >>cosmologists< (MACDOWELL ad locum), b) TovS tvayxaiou; &6a X6ywv aycivac >>logically necessary debateso (KENNEDY), though see MACDOWELL's discussion ad locum, as well as VERDENIUS, 'Gorgias' Doctrine' 117, n. 9, where acvayxaiou; refers to the cogency of an argument, and c) tptXooo&pwv o6ywv dtgikka4.




though they do not necessarily speak the truth, and philosophers display a quickness of wit which makes belief based on opinion equally quick to alter38.

Gorgias ends with another parallel, medicine, which, he avers, is to the body what speech is to the soul. Each has the capacity to be either beneficial or harmful. In the instance of speeches, not only do they produce a variety of emotional states in listeners, but like medicine, they may poison and bewitch the soul by an evil kind of persuasion39.

Compare Thucydides, beginning with the following statements put in the mouths of speakers in his 'History'. Rhetors charm their audience with speech (Cleon: 3,40,3). For there is pleasure in hearing, and >>the Athenians are slaves to that pleasure< (Cleon: 3,38,7: &xoiq '6ovi; cf. 40,2, i1jovi X6ycvY"0. But this kind of pleasure, which comes from speech, is dangerous because >>its charm is momentary<<. Action later calls forth different attitudes, different behaviour (Euphemus: 6,83,3)41. The Athenians at Melos add a new dimension to the way in which words work, at least in the usual k6yo;, which does not permit of interruption. Here words deceive the listeners by being both seductive and unfalsifiable (5,85: 'etaywya xai &vEXEYXta soaditac axofvoavTcq ... &nanTiOb)atv). That is, while they appeal to the emotions, they do not permit the rational faculties to come into play (cross-examination, refutation, etc.)42. Such references may be random, but they have brought us

38 Scientists purvey Ta nuotTa xai d68qa. The crowd which rhetors please is an 6XXoq, which one k6yo; ETEPpv xaXi ZnCtIOF. Cf. Plato's 'Gorgias' 458e6 - 459a3, where Gorgias stresses that it is before a crowd, tv 6oXA, that the rhetor will be more persuasive than the doctor in matters of health. 'OxXo;, ))multitudeo, is also used by Thucydides in both a military (3,87,3 and 4,56,1, e. g.) and a political (e. g., 7,8,2 and 8,48,3) sense. For the most part, it is synonymous with 6ptXko4. Thucydides employs the two interchangeably in those passages where he refers contemptuously to the masses. (See above, n. 6.) The verb T?pirtv is used regularly to express aesthetic effect and the pleasure derived therefrom. See SEGAL 122- 126.

39 Para. 14. The last is oi 6c r7i0d. rTVI XacX TPV YUXfV EpcipdaxCUOcv xai UsyoeTUOav. 40 Cf. 7,14,4, where Nicias complains that the Athenians want to hear what is most pleasant

(OOUXO4tVWV iPxV T& ij1o0 'axournv), only to attribute blame later. In this regard, Pericles' behaviour stands in stark contrast to those who succeeded him, for he did not say anything just to please the people (2,65,8; np6; i'8ovTiv Ti X?y?iv).

4t See 3,40,3: oi Tc TtpR0Vot; k6yo. piTopc and 6,83,3: k6you gPv 86OVi T6 iapauTiXa

TEp7tOgVOUv;. Cf. 2,41,4, where Pericles contrasts the truth of gpyci with the delightful but fleeting impressions created by the verses of Homer and others like him (6OTtq Uarec itV rb Cztixcia TtpYEEc). See above, n. 38, for Gorgias' use of the verb T p tv at para. 13, and see too para. 5 (TEpltv) and para. 14 (ETCpkVav), the same verb and one of its cognates used in respect of k6yot, and para. 18 (t?pirouoI), used to describe the effect of painting.

42 Cf. Diodotus' remarks at 3,43,2, discussed below. See too Gorgias' 'Palamedes', para. 33, where recourse to pity, emotional outbursts, and deception are rejected as inappropriate before a small, elite group of judges. Instead, truth is mtaughto (Md6WT,vCt TdXflO?4, OfX 6&nUTloaVTI). The former methods are, however, appropriate ?v 6-Xo. For the expression ?v 6?X., see above, n. 38.



424 VIRGINIA HUNTER

into the world of the X6yoq with its power to persuade, even to compel, and its capacity to deceive.

It is possible to go beyond mere random remarks and discover a veritable psychology of the koyo; delineated in the debate of Cleon and Diodotus (3,37 - 48). Here the echoes of Gorgias' 'Helen' are striking. Consider Diodotus' analysis of rhetoric in politics and the kind of political decision- making that results. Addressing the question of slander and corruption, and the suspicion people feel toward all advice, both good and bad, Diodotus quickly isolates two abuses that result from popular persuasion: deception and lies. >>The speaker who counsels the better course faces the same problem as the one who would persuade the people of the most dreadful things. The latter must bring them over by deception (aJdt1 itpoodycoOai lo nti?o), while the former must use lies in order to be believed (43,2: i,augcvov MIOTOv ycv'aOct).<< He continues: >>The city alone, because of its finicky attitude, it is impossible to serve well openly without recourse to deception<< (43,3: 4i &'antTcMavTa). The real issue for Diodotus is responsibility, and the fact that those who give advice are held to account, while those who listen are not. ?If both parties, the one who gave advice and the one who followed it, faced the consequences to the same degree, you (the Athenians) would make your judgments with more equanimity<< (43,5). (The latter must include due deliberation as well, for Diodotus has just accused his audience of judging offhand.) As it is, they react with anger at whatever disasters they face, blaming the person who persuaded them and not themselves, though they were just as wrong, for all their numbers.

To do justice to this debate, one must also consider the remarks of Cleon. For in urging the Athenians to make their decision in haste rather than with due deliberation, he too offers a powerful critique of popular persuasion not far different from that of his opponent. His argument hinges on the antithesis of eyes and ears, while his major theme is the pleasure of speech and listening. The Athenians, Cleon charges, >>are spectators of words and listeners to deeds<< (38,4: OctTtai p?V T6RIv X6ywv ... &XpOaMai 6c T?V pyuov). By this he means that they go to watch speakers, but do not demand more than hearsay evidence for events or facts, thus reversing the function of sight and hearing. This criticism is so significant that Cleon makes it again in more elaborate terms, as he continues: >>You consider future deeds practicable on the basis of what you hear from clever speakers. On the other hand, where events are concerned, you believe what has happened to be no more trustworthy because you actually saw it than what you hear, because it has the approval of fine speakers43<<. They are the best men in the world for having the wool pulled

43 Cf. Nicias' articulation of this antithesis at 7,48,3, where seeing is contrasted to hearing, Ta

np6ygaTa ... 6p6vTa; xCai o06x dXXwV C'Tt~los1 &xouOavTa;. Since the Athenians trust to the latter, a clever speaker may easily persuade them by means of calumny.




over their eyes by novel arguments (38,5: il?T& xcttv6TrJTo; 16v X6you 6ThaUaoOai). There follow a series of similar accusations which end with a flourish, describing the Athenians as slaves to the ear, and more like the spectators at an exhibition given by sophists than the counsellors for a city (38,7).

The above debate affords an extraordinary insight into the psychology of the X6yo; as it appeared to both speakers to be undermining the process of political decision-making at Athens. But do these views reflect those of the historian himself? Does he describe popular persuasion in the same manner? More significantly, has he embraced Gorgian teachings on this question sufficiently to employ them, as he employs a Gorgian theory of fear, in interpreting events in his 'History'? I would give an affirmative answer to both questions. Thucydides did understand the power of the x6yo; to persuade, to charm, to bewitch, and even to deceive, and he used that understanding in reconstructing debates, and their antecedents and outcome, at Athens.

In order to demonstrate the validity of this contention, let us return to the example of Pericles, found in a series of connected passages where he has a central role (1,140,1. 145,1; 2,21,3-22,1. 59,3. 61,2. 65,4. 65,9). The series ends with 2,65,9, an analysis of Pericles' abilities as a rhetor: ))Whenever he sensed that they felt the bravado of men unjustifiably carried away by overconfidence, he spoke words that stunned them into a state of fear, while feelings of irrational apprehension he restored to confidence44<". By generalizing what was apparent in concrete examples that preceded, this statement of Thucydides encapsulates one aspect of Pericles' career - his understanding of mass psychology and his ability to manipulate it. He knew, for example, that men can be persuaded to go to war, but that what they feel under the sway of instO6 is a mere illusion (1,140,1). Bewitched as they are by the words they hear, they do not foresee what the reality of war will be. Thus when reality itself, war and its hardships, inspires even stronger emotions, their opinions shift and they change their minds (2,59,1. 61,2). At such a point, emotions overcome rationality and previous advice is forgotten

() ?1 R-.9.1)45

44 Words too can produce vcttaiXi,;, indicating that they have the same power as visions to shock and unhinge men's minds. Thucydides' exact words are: kXyOv XaTrt?XrIooEv bEi T6

pocltoOat. Conversely, 6W6oTa au' &k6yw; a'vTiXaOioGT iraXlv biti n6 OapOCtv. Cf. Gorgias, 'Helen', para. 14, where it is said of the rhetor's words, oi gtv UXfmo%av, oi &t ErTpwav, oit 8

EW6Ihgoav, oi 8E CiS OiPoO; Xac&sTfoav To'; a'Xo60ovTac;. SEGAL 150, n. 99 points out that Gorgias may be >>one of the founders of the ekplexis-theory of later rhetoric<<.

45 Note that we have returned to example b of mass psychology (above, pp. 413 f.), provided to illustrate Thucydides' generalizations about repentance.



426 VIRUINIA HUNTER

Such did occur, and in the face of a drastic alteration in collective opinion, Pericles did not call a meeting of the assembly, for he knew that rationality was minimal and he wanted to avoid mistakes in policy46. Only after the second invasion, when anger and accusations continued, did he call an assembly in order to instil courage in the people and, by diverting their feelings of anger, to produce a milder and less anxious state of mind47. At this point, he did succeed in persuading them in a public capacity, though the price he paid for their lingering private distress was loss of office for a time and payment of a fine. Pericles' words are like those drugs of Gorgias which dispel humours in the body, putting an end to disease. They evoke a whole spectrum of emotions (Odpao;, (p61o;, XUnj, etc.) in the listeners. And though they may charm and bewitch, it is a good kind of persuasion, and one necessary for the patient48.

The examples set forth above illustrate that for Thucydides, men's rational faculties are quite inadequate. Hence the power that the X6yog wields, entering their psyches and altering their moods and opinions. Again this is precisely Gorgias' criticism of >>most men<; they fall under the sway of the

?6yo; because they are deficient in memory, critical thought, and foresight.

Conclusions

The link between Gorgias and Thucydides seems incontrovertible. A second issue, however, has transcended such a link. For the effect of fear and rhetoric on mass psychology has led to a consideration of sensation and perception. How does the outside world impinge on the >>soul<< to affect the emotions, the mind, and ultimately, the character? Further, what is the connection of the physiological and the psychological? I. e., how does the physical pass into the mental, and vice versa? Central to these questions is affect, that which arouses emotional behaviour. Sight and sound, it was discovered, produce such behaviour. In all the examples adduced from the 'History' the eyes or the ears were responsible for a variety of emotional responses. Moreover, in the examples chosen to illustrate the psychology of fear, both frightful noise and terrifying sights combined to produce confusion, unhinging terror, and panic49. Elsewhere too the historian has

46 2,22,1, Pericles >>saw( (Opdw) c6to5; ..0. oT & atptoTa (pPOVOUvTaq.

47 2,59,3: ?Ooiktro OapOOVcii TC XCii &7tayay&v no6 py464E:VOV tfi yV6A; 7tp6; T6

t6TErpov XCti &66soGTpOV XatoTiaat. Again cf. Gorgias, 'Helen', para. 8 and 14. 48 Gorgias, ibid. 49 In each instance, there was a confused din. For example, at Epipolae cries and shouting on

both sides added to the confusion (7,44,3 and 4, Por and xpCauyi ). In the Gulf of Patrae as well, yelling and swearing impaired the sailors' ability to hear orders (2,84,3: ,orj and Xot6opic). Noise in the sea-battle at Syracuse had a similar effect. The enormous din of clashing ships produced

gxnkqXl4, even as it prevented the sailors from hearing the orders of their superiors (7,70,6:




been emphatic in describing the dire effects of sight, in particular, on resolution and morale. Once again, reaction to it can be both physical and psychological, as the eyes respond to the material reality surrounding them and transmit their reactions to the mind50.

Surely we have here something very close to GUTHRIE'S characterization of fifth century views of cognition. Consider the following: a) ?Thought, no less than sensation<<, was explained >>on material lines<. b) This was an age >)when physical faculties themselves were conceived materially as breath or blood<. c) >)Thus knowledge depends on physical condition, which affects our relations with the external world"<<. Both a) and c) concern Empedocles, who fits within the general framework of b) and thus might be considered typical of the age in his materialism. Coincidentally, Empedocles is reputed to be Gorgias' teacher52. Both thinkers espoused a theory of perception based on the existence of effluences and pores53. The latter are the highways to the inner self, producing affective behaviour of all kinds54. By means of the pores, the eyes and ears become >)the way of approach into man's nature

xtr6no;). There was continuous shouting (70,7: natpatX9Xuatq and P1oTl; cf. 71,5 for the cheering and shouting of the Syracusans as they chased the Athenians back to the land). Yelling and shouting were also a prominent feature of the Spartan defeat at Sphacteria (4,34,2 and 3 and 35,2). Here the historian stresses that it was the unaccustomed shouting of the enemy which unhinged the Spartans (again gx1tqt;, 34,2).

50 Examples of the negative effects of sight are 2,11,7-8 and 21,2 (example c, above, pp. 414f., of mass psychology); 6,49,2 (example d, above, pp. 415f.); and 7,71,1-3 and 75,2 - 4. The last two passages are excellent examples of the physical and psychological effects of sight. See especially 71,3, where the spectators are more overcome than the participants in the encounter; the sight affects their yvdb4q. In addition, their bodies sway in sympathy with their thoughts, which are deeply apprehensive. Similarly, at 75,2 - 4 the terrible sight of their unburied comrades reduces the troops to grief and fear (75,3: k; Xforniv irTd (pD6ou). For they must experience scenes that are painful both to the sight and to the mind (75,2: Tt te o6Wet kX6oTrc

itXyEtva xai Tu yvdOtiu). See the discussion of this passage above, p. 418. Sight, of course, ca have positive effects, as it does at 7,71,3, where the spectators are heartened to see their side winning. See too Lamachus' further remark at 6,49,2 about the effects of delay on changing men's attitude to the sight of an enemy army.

51 'A History of Greek Philosophy', Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1965) 151, n. 1, 157, and 243, respectively.

52 D.K. 82 A 2, 3, and 14, from the Suidas, Diogenes Laertius, and Quintilian, respectively. 53 D.K. 82 B 4 and 5. For Empedocles, see D.K. 31 A 86 and 92, 391 and 390 in G. S. KIRK,

J. E. RAVEN, and M. SCHOFIELD, 'The Presocratic Philosophers', second edition (Cambridge, 1983), henceforth referred to as K.R.S.

54 K.R.S. 396 (fr. 133). The inner self is the (ppiiv, which SCHOFIELD contrues as ))mind<. See the discussion of W. VEAZIE, 'Empedocles: His Psychological Doctrine In its Original and Tradi- tional Setting' (New York, 1922) 7. VEAZIE is less certain that (ppiv is precisely mind.



428 VIRGINIA HUNTER: Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology

which in its intricate fashion receives, passes around, separates and combines and reacts against the force (impression) of the outside intruder5S<5.

The above is not to suggest a connection between Thucydides and Empedocles. Nor does this study depend on such a connection. The point is that we have here an entry into a thoroughly recognizable Presocratic view of man and the world. A basic tenet of that view, as Thucydides applied it to history, is that men's minds reflect the circumstances around them56. If those circumstances are sufficiently disturbing, or if disturbances, hardships, or misfortunes are sufficiently enduring, the collective psyche may undergo serious alteration (a >>structural< change). Men are left literally unable to think straight, but experience hopelessness and demoralization, or even avogia, disregard for customs, traditions, and accepted norms of behaviour 57. Starting from this principle, Thucydides evolved a comprehensive psychology of mass man: he is emotional, volatile, ever

55 VEAZIE 8, commenting on Empedocles. Other works consulted on Empedocles are:

J. 1. BEARE, 'Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition' (Oxford, 1906); A. A. LONG, 'Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism?' in: Cl. Qu. xvi (1966)

256-276; W. J. VERDENIUS, 'Parmenides. Some Comments on his Poem' (Groningen, 1942);

and M. R. WRIGHT, 'Empedocles: The Extant Fragments' (New Haven and London, 1981). Two

fragments of Empedocles seem especially tantalizing as expressions of the world-view alluded to

by GUTHRIE. They are fr. 106 (K.R.S. 395): p6; napE6v yatp PiTI4 a eTact &vOp&notoiv, and

fr. 108 (WRIGHT 80), 6OOCov -y'&XXoiot 4CTcPUV, T6oov dp' oqpotv aiei / Xcai r6 (ppOVCtV atxxov

'aXkoia ntapiOTartat. Schofield construes the former as >>Men's wit grows according as they

encounter what is present<. Cf. WRIGHT 79, >>For man's wisdom grows according to what is

present<. As for fr. 108, GUTHRIE 229 translates, >>As much as men change their nature, so much

it also befalls them to think different thoughts<. Both these fragments have important

implications for the view of cognition that we have attempted to establish here as part of

Thucydides' outlook. Here, however, is not the place to pursue a possible Empedoclean influence. Such will require a further study.

56 See especially 1,140,1, Pericles' general remarks about how, in the event of war, men's

resolutions (yvboiat) are brought down to the level of circumstances (aourLpopai). (This change in

attitude actually does occur at 2,59,1 - 2.) The historian himself expresses this principle forcefully

at 3,82,2 in his description of oCdoaLq: 6 ir6Xcto; ... ip6; la ntcp6VTra Ta; opYa TCOV noUXCv

Optotoi. 57 Archidamus' invasion of Attica deeply affected men's ability to think. Or such is Pericles'

view, as he perceives their anger (2,22,1). One aspect of the thinking process affected is memory:

the Athenians remember none of Pericles' previous advice (21,3). See too Thucydides' own

remarks about memory at the time of the plague (2,54,3: oi y&p &vOpwnoi np6; d titaoxov -rlv

gV18LTJV 'EntOlfbVTO). Cf. 2,87,4, the speech of the Peloponnesian captains at Naupactus: q,6Joq

ydp gvwiluv CxnXkioorn. See above for demoralization produced by overwhelming fear, in the

Athenians at Syracuse and the Spartans at Pylos. Examples of &vopua occur in the accounts of

the plague (2,52 - 53) and oTro1; (3,82 - 83). In both cases, vtoro were confounded and behav-

iour ranged from the antisocial to the criminal.



V. J. ROSIVACH: The Stage Settings of Plautus' 'Bacchides', 'Cistellaria' and 'Epidicus' 429

subject to his senses, and profoundly incapable of rational thought58. It is this view of man that provides the historian with the configuration of psychological generalizations with which we began. Such generalizations are in no wise random, but have their source in the systematic thought of his day, sharing in its conceptual framework59.

Toronto VIRGINIA HUNTER

58 Certain leaders, both military and political, seem able, through knowledge, experience, and foresight, to rise above the behaviour of mass man. In addressing their followers, some can even transmit to them their own understanding as well as the courage to face adversity. Phormio is suc- cessful in this, and so is Pericles, for the most part. See too the example of Brasidas at 4,125 - 126. The Spartan leader recognizes that his men are stunned (126, 1: ?xtXinktv !XEtv) at the sight and sound of a large army of barbarians. He warns them against being taken in by their eyes and ears (126,6). This speech is a paradigm of the way knowledge, foresight, and encouragement can deter the demoralization and paralysis affective behaviour like fear may induce.

59 This paper was written while the author was on sabbatical leave from York University and held the position of Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Classics at the University of Exeter. Parts of the paper were presented in a lecture there in March, 1984. In May of the same year, it was also read, in a penultimate version, at Bristol University. Subsequently, it formed the basis of one of the lectures given during the Autumn of 1984 at a number of universities in the Maritimes, while the author was Eastern Lecturer for the Classical Association of Canada.

THE STAGE SETTINGS OF PLAUTUS' 'BACCHIDES', 'CISTELLARIA' AND 'EPIDICUS'

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the exact stage settings of the 'Bacchides', 'Cistellaria' and 'Epidicus' on the basis of a careful analysis of the staging requirements implicit in the Latin texts of the plays, in the belief that an accurate understanding of the stage settings will enhance our apprecia- tion of the plays and of the playwright's craft '. The 'Bacchides', 'Cistellaria' and 'Epidicus' have been chosen for study since the stage settings given for these plays by M. JOHNSTON in her >>Exits and Entrances in Roman Comedy (Plautus and Terence)<<2 are incomplete and inaccurate.

I This paper thus has the same aim and method as V. J. ROSIVACH, Plautine Stage Settings (Asin., Aul., Men., Trin.) TAPA 101, 1970, 445 - 461. See also ROSIVACH, The Stage Settings of the 'Rudens' and the 'Heauton Timorumenos' RSC 26, 1978, 192-206.

2 Geneva, N. Y. 1933. - The second chapter of JOHNSTON'S dissertation (pp. 20- 33) gives a stage setting for each surviving comedy of Plautus and Terence, and so has become, faute de mieux, the standard reference on the subject. The more recent survey of the stage settings of



Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology

Documents

Transcript of Thucydides, Gorgias, and Mass Psychology