8/12/2019 Three Scenarios for Ukraine

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In the last two weeks Ukraine has experienced twomajor shocks. The Ukrainian revolution was one ofthe most violent transitions to date, and not just inthe post-Soviet space. And the Russian military in-tervention in Crimea arguably constitutes the big-gest European security crisis since the Balkan wars

of the 1990s.These events will continue to be accompanied bycompeting narratives and conflicting propagandafrom both inside and outside Ukraine. But whatmatters now is how to manage the political fall-outfrom the crisis and draw the right lessons to preventa recurrence of similar events in the future. A use-ful way to consider future policy responses is to or-ganise them around possible scenarios. For Ukraine,there may be at least three: a return to the status quoante, a Transnistrisation of Crimea, and a futurewith more military interventions.

Status quo ante?

The status quo antewould see the return of Crimea tothe legal jurisdiction of the Ukrainian state. In thisscenario, local authorities in Crimea would acceptto be subordinate to Kiev, and local police, borderguards and tax authorities would again operate with-in Ukraines legal framework. Such a scenario nowappears highly unlikely. The moment Russia movedin militarily and disrupted the normal functioningof the Ukrainian state institutions from the army to

police and border guards there was not much thatcould be done to reverse this fait accompli.

Whereas it took two to three years for the secession-ist entities to gradually and painfully secede de

facto from Georgia and Moldova, it took three daysfor the same to happen in Crimea. In the conflictsof the early 1990s, this process was mostly drivenfrom the bottom-up, with Russia, preoccupied with

its own domestic crisis, offering only limited sup-port. In Crimea, the opposite is true. First, Russiasent in troops, and thenlocal actors mobilised to dis-mantle the Ukrainian state institutions in the region.Change was driven by swift and targeted military ac-tion that took hours, not years.

A Ukrainian Transnistria?

The second scenario is a Transnistrisation of Crimea.Just like Crimea is planning now, Transnistria al-ready held a referendum in 2006 in which 98% of

voters opted for joining Russia. Full annexation didnot happen, though the region is to a large extenteffectively under Russian control.

Again like the secessionist region of Moldova, this im-plies ade factoloss of control and the holding of longand fruitless negotiations over status, coupled witha steady hollowing out of the structures of the stateand the consolidation of de facto Russian control ofthe region in political, economic and military terms.State structures in Crimea would therefore refuse torecognise Kiev as a legitimate and higher authority.

In order to gain direct access to Crimea and ensureits dominance, Russia would also most likely build

Three scenarios for Ukraine

by Nicu Popescu

DARKOVOJINOVIC/AP/SIPA

European Union Institute for Security Studies March 2014 1

8/12/2019 Three Scenarios for Ukraine

2/2 EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014. | QN-AL-14-016-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1129

a bridge over the Kerch Strait. In addition, it is like-ly that Russia would at some point accept OSCE orUN mediation, and push for talks between Crimeaand Kiev on power sharing. Throughout these ne-gotiations, Russia would maintain its stance that,while it supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine,it is up to Kiev and Simferopol to sort out their dif-ferences. In the case of Transnistria, such a processhas lasted 22 years and has not brought the con-flicting parties any closer to finding a solution.

This scenario would suit Russia quite well. It wouldnot place too great a strain on Russian coffers, andMoscow can certainly afford, and is even willing, tosubsidise Crimea. If faced with external diplomaticpressures, it can always blame the Crimeans forthe lack of progress. In the event that Kiev movestowards NATO and potentially the EU, Moscowalways has the options of either recognising the

independence of or even annexing Crimea. AndRussia would be in a position to keep any Ukrainiangovernment in check, waiting for various geopoliti-cal concessions in exchange for progress on conflictsettlement in Crimea.

This model has been tried and tested by Russia inTransnistria and it has worked well. It costs littleand, potentially, brings wider geopolitical benefits.

Yet this may be neither the worst-case scenario northe most likely one.

A future of interventions?

If Moscow is not seriously reprimanded for its ac-tions in Crimea, there is nothing to prevent it fromdoing something similar again in the future. Onlyone month ago, few thought that Russia couldlaunch an unprovoked invasion of a neighbouringcountry. If such interventions can occur withoutany significant consequences, there will be little todeter Moscow from embarking on further militaryventures in Ukraine itself (again) or other post-So-viet countries.

Of course, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war was awarning that Moscow considers full-scale mili-tary invasions as a possible foreign policy tool. Butas Russia and Georgia are both perceived to haveplayed a role in the escalation of their disputes,there was a certain degree of shared responsibil-ity for the militarisation of the conflict. But in thecase of Crimea, guilt cannot be attributed to theUkrainians: not a single Russian was killed in theregion and the only Russian who died in a politicalcontext in Ukraine in recent weeks as Kadri Liik

noted was killed by sniper fire during the protestson Maidan Square.

Unless there are some tangible and lasting lossesfor Russia beyond several months of relativediplomatic isolation Putin may well end up in astronger position. The seizure of Crimea has boost-ed his domestic standing, even among groups thathave traditionally opposed him, such as commu-nists or ultra-nationalists. Putin also believes thatit is his responsibility to reverse the disintegrationof the USSR wherever possible and Crimea is apowerful symbol in honouring that historical duty.Finally, keeping de facto control of Crimea is an-other plus. Not only is it a valuable asset in itself,but it also acts as a constraint on the foreign policyoptions of any future Ukrainian government.

A few cancelled summits, followed by a presumednormalisation in a year or so, will not seriously af-fect Moscow. The behaviour of the Russian stockmarket was indicative of this: it suffered on the first

Monday after the intervention, but had almost fullyrecovered within a couple of days. Putin is certainthat his countrys diplomatic standing will recoverquickly, too. Once this occurs, the president mayask himself why not try this tactic again?

Military ventures such as this in Crimea may en-tail risks, but they also may pay off handsomely.Opportunities and possible pretexts for such futureventures in the post-Soviet space abound. If, in theend, the situation in Crimea works out in Putinsfavour, what prevents a similar military takeover

of other parts of eastern Ukraine or even Odessa,Ukraines biggest port situated roughly half an hourfrom Transnistria where 1300 Russian soldiers arestationed? Perhaps a succession crisis will occurin a post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan, in which politi-cal violence leads to Russia moving in to protectits compatriots. If a deterioration of the economicsituation in Azerbaijan leads to a possible stand-offbetween the countrys current rulers and protesters,could Russia move to ensure that north Azerbaijanis not affected by the instability affecting the restof the country?

Any of these worrying scenarios are quite conceiv-able following what has happened in Crimea. Tominimise the chances of such scenarios materialis-ing, Russias actions may have to be met with re-sponses that go beyond mere diplomatic signals.Asthe 6 March EU summit conclusions clearly state,the future of EU-Russia relations is now dependenton Russias actions in Ukraine.

Nicu Popescu is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS.

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