THREE MILE ISLAND

Tara Capece, Alexis Oetting, Rahul Sharma,

Chris Martin-Gill, & Susan Winters

OUTLINE

Background on Three Mile Island

Circumstances of TMI which lead to cessation of new construction

Lessons learned

Public policy/regulation relating to preparedness

Contaminating species and GIS of surrounding areas

Health effects; public health interventions

Sabotage?!?!

Harrisburg vs. Philadelphia

INTRODUCTION &

BACKGROUND

THREE MILE ISLAND HISTORY

March 28, 1979 Middletown PA

The most serious accident in U.S. commercial

nuclear power plant operating history despite no

deaths or injuries

Led to changes in emergency response planning,

reactor operator training, human factors

engineering, radiation protection, and other

areas of nuclear power plant operations

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission had to

tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight

•www.pahighways.com/features/threemileisland.html

THREE MILE ISLAND REACTOR

•4am: Main feedwaterpump stops working. Steam generators are not able to remove heat http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html

INSTRUMENT READINGS CONTRIBUTED

TO CONFUSION

Coolant continues to flow from the core through

the pressurizer

No instrument showed the level of coolant in the core

Instead, level of water in the core was based off the

level in the pressurizer

No signal that the pilot-operated relief valve was

open

Operators did not know the cause was a loss-of-

coolant accident and took steps that made

matters worse

CONTAINMENT

6:22am: Operators closed a block valve between the

relief valve and the pressurizer, stopping the loss of

coolant water through relief valve. Superheated steam

and gases blocked flow of water through core cooling

system

7:50pm: Restored forced cooling of the reactor core

CONTAINMENT

March 29 &30: Operators attempted to remove

radioactive gases from reactor cooling systems. A leak

released radioactive gases to the environment

March 30-April 1: Operators attempt to remove a

hydrogen gas bubble that formed at the top of the

reactor vessel. No oxygen in the vessel so the

hydrogen was not at risk to explode

SEVERE CORE MELTDOWN

Lack of adequate coolant caused the nuclear fuel to

overheat, causing the zirconium cladding to rupture

and fuel pellets to melt

½ of the core melted during the early stages

A severe core meltdown is the most dangerous type of

nuclear accident

However, the melting of nuclear fuel did not breach

the walls of the containment building and release

massive amounts of radiation

CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION

Friday March 30th had most significant impact on

public opinion

The NRC became aware of the hydrogen burn on

Friday, although it occurred on Wednesday

Deliberate venting of radioactive gases from the

plant Friday morning that released 1,200

millirems directly above the stack of the auxiliary

building

Poor communication among officials led to

confusion among the public

CHANGES IN PUBLIC OPINION

Governor Thornburg delegated responsibility to Lt. Gov. Scranton.

Initial reports of “no threat to public”.

Later reports of “situation is more complex than initially thought”.

NRC also involved, but not prepared for emergency response. No chain of command.

No authority to order evacuations.

Unclear authority over Metropolitan Edison.

Voluntary evacuations 36 hours after start of incident.

No public health consequences.

Serious public relations consequences for nuclear power.

LESSONS LEARNED

Mechanical failure was the “cause” but human factors made it infinitely worse. Control room staff was overwhelmed with irrelevant or incorrect info.

Improve nuclear reactor operator training.

Shift focus from “diagnosing problem” to proceeding through a standardized checklist.

Practice emergency plans / operations.

Improve design of control room.

Placement and types of warning signals.

Sight lines to instruments.

Improve surveillance and instrumentation of critical systems required to cool the reactor and stop the escape of radionuclides.

Communication with government and public was slow and ineffective Develop emergency plans.

Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ):

Areas with preplanned emergency responses and notification channels

Plume Exposure Pathway: 10 mile radius zone with pre-planned evacuation methods or shelter-in-place directives as appropriate.

Ingestion Exposure Pathway: 50 mile radius zone with focus on reducing exposure from food and water supplies.

Practice emergency plans with local, state and federal agencies to ensure proper operation.

GO FROM THIS…

TO THIS!

EMERGENCY

PREPAREDNESS

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Formalized lessons learned from TMI

Emergency Action Plans

Required for proposed and existing facilities.

Must include accidental and deliberate events.

Inspected by NRC.

Protective Action Recommendations must be

included.

Clear chain of command

NRC in advisory and support role only.

Local and state officials responsible for public

notification and evacuation orders.

Made with advice of facility operator and NRC

PUBLIC POLICY / REGULATIONS

Public Policy not directly involved with

nuclear power plants.

Political bodies charge and authorize

administrative framework to license, regulate

and oversee nuclear power operations.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, division of

Dept. of Energy.

Training/Accreditation.

Oversight.

Approval of new plans.

Emergency preparedness.

CONTAMINATING SPECIES

3H, 51Cr, 54Mn, 58Co, 60Co, 59Fe, 65Zn, 110mAg, 131I, 133Xe*, 133mXe*and 135Xe* (nuclear power plant products)

OTHER CONTAMINANTS EXPECTED TO BE FOUND:

10Be, 14C, and 129I (produced by cosmic rays)

214Pb, 226Ra, 228Ac, and 232Th (naturally occurring uranium and thorium products)

7Be and 40K (naturally occurring)

103Ru, 134Cs, 137Cs, 131I,140Ba, 141Ce (weapons testing fallout )

131I (medical/industrial waste facilities)

Sources: Palms et al 2007, Gerusky 1981, Upton 1981

Palms et al 2007

•13.72 4.72

•0.76 0.38

•2.01 0.31

•0.85 0.27

•0.5 0.28

•2.20 1.51

•0.48 0.22

•0.65 0.30

•E•NE

Levin 2008

CHANGE IN EXPOSURE PATTERN

Talbott et al 2000

Talbott et al 2003

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PLAN FOR ACTION IN SEQUENCE

Agency in Charge and Call for help

Protect the responders

Triage patients

Decontamination

Patient transport

Hospital response and medical therapies

INITIAL RESPONSE TO THREE MILE

ISLAND EVENT

Nuclear Regulation Commission (Lead Agency)

NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, MD was activated

Sent response team and inspectors to the site

No direct report of specific PPE used

Environmental Protection Agency

Stationed experts with radiation monitoring equipment

around the power plant to assess for radiation exposure

EPA remained in the area for eight years, maintaining a

field office monitoring the air.

Sources:

•Three Mile Island Accident. US Nuclear Regulation Commission, 2009. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf (Accessed on April 5, 2010).

•Nuclear Incidents: Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/rert/tmi.html (Accessed on April 5, 2010).

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

4 Levels of Protective Clothing

Level A•Gas-tight

•Positive pressure respirator

•Splash protection

Level B•Not gas-tight

•Positive pressure respirator

•Splash protection

Level D•Not gas-tight

•No respiratory protection

•No splash protection

Level C•Not gas-tight

•Air-purifying respirator

•Splash protection

General description and discussion of the levels of protection and protective gear . US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2010. Available at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9767 (Accessed April 5, 2010).

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Level D with respiratory protection or Level

C protection recommended if only low level

radiation contamination expected

Higher level (A, B) recommended if nature of

incident is unknown or if additional hazards

are present

All personnel should have a personal

dosimeter

Radiation Event Medical Management. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2010. Available at: www.remm.nlm.gov/ext_contamination.htm (Accessed April 4, 2010).

SMART TRIAGE

Red (Immediate) – Critical, life threatening

E.g. Airway compromise, severe bleeding

Yellow (Delayed) – Serious, may be life

threatening

E.g. Controlled bleeding, open fracture

Green (Minor) – Not considered life threatening

E.g. “Walking wounded”,

minor extremity injuries

Black (Expectant) – Mortally

wounded or clinically dead

DECONTAMINATION

Steps for decontamination:

Remove all clothing, shoes, and other property

Radiation survey for high-exposure areas

Conduct decontamination if following order:Whole body

Radioactive shrapnel

Open wounds

Body entrance cavities: nose, mouth, ears

Localized contaminated skin

Goal is to decrease external contamination to 2x background radiation level

Use radiation meter to assess high-risk areas

Radiation Event Medical Management. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2010. Available at: www.remm.nlm.gov/ext_contamination.htm (Accessed April 4, 2010).

PATIENT TRANSPORT

Transport of patients to appropriate facilities

Trauma Centers

Facilities must have capabilities for decontamination

Repeat decontamination for transported patients

Walking wounded (more common in

mass casualty hazmat events)*

Communication with facilities

Transport by appropriate means

Limit exposure to respondents

Ability to provide medical care if needed

* Okumura T, Suzuki K, Fukuda A, et al. The Tokyo subway sarin attack: disaster management, Part 1: Community emergency response. Acad Emerg Med 1998;5:613-7.

IN-HOSPITAL RESPONSE

Must have radiation disaster plans

Collaboration between Emergency, Health

Physics, and Nuclear Medicine Departments

Hospital Incident Command

Decontamination capabilities & PPE

Triage methods for high volume of patients

Surge capacity plan

Cancelling elective surgery procedures

Discharge of appropriate patients

Opening alternate care sites

Schleipman AR, Gerbaudo VH, Castronovo FP, Jr. Radiation disaster response: preparation and simulation experience at an academic medical center. J Nucl Med Technol 2004;32:22-7.

MEDICAL THERAPIES

Potassium Iodide (KI)

Blocks radioactive iodine from entering

the thyroid gland

Best if taken early or before exposure

Single dose is protective for 24 hours

Doses:

Adult and/or Pregnant: 130 mg

Children ≥3 years and <150 lb: 65 mg

Infants & Children 1 mo -3 yrs: 32 mg

Newborns up to 1 month: 16 mg

Potassium Iodide Fact Sheet. Centers for Disease Control, 2006. Available online at: www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation (Accessed on April 4, 2010).

MEDICAL THERAPIES

Prussian Blue

Traps radioactive cesium and thallium in the intestine, limiting absorption and speeding up elimination

Reduces biological half-life of:

Cesium from 110 days to 30 days

Thallium from 8 days to 3 days

Diethylenetriamene Pentaacetate (DTPA)

Chelating agent that binds plutonium, americium, and curium

Available in two forms:

Ca-DTPA and Zn-DTPA

Ca-DTPA is 10x more effective

Materials are then passed in the urine

Potassium Iodide Fact Sheet. Centers for Disease Control, 2006. Available online at: www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation (Accessed on April 4, 2010).

RISK ASSESSMENT

SABOTAGE DEFINITIONS

NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) Radiological sabotage: “any deliberate act directed against a plant or

transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the regulations in this chapter is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation”

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Sabotage: “any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility,

nuclear transport cask or nuclear material and associated fission products which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of the worker, the public and the environment by exposure to radiation”

DOE (Department of Energy) Radiological/toxicological sabotage: “a malevolent act that results in

the release of hazardous materials stored, produced, or used at DOE facilities, that may adversely impact the health and safety of employees, the public or the environment”

Industrial sabotage: “any deliberate act, not involving radiological releases, which could have unacceptable impact to DOE programs”

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SABOTAGE

EXAMPLES

Forced intrusion (outsider initiation)

Missiles

Toxic gas release

Aircraft as missile

Forced intrusion (insider initiation)

Theft of radioactive material

RISK ASSESSMENT DETERMINATION

Is the nuclear power plant sufficiently robust to prevent immediate, uncontrolled release of significant amounts of fission products (i.e. catastrophic failure) in the event of an attack?

Do the essential safety systems continue to perform their functions (e.g. to cool the nuclear fuel and contain the release of radioactive material), or can they be started and operated as needed?

Following an attack, can the essential safety systems be operated until repairs can be carried out, even given related effects such as fire, smoke and structural damage?

Are the design and operation of the nuclear power plant and the response procedures and capabilities such that any exposure of the public and facility personnel is minimized in the event of a large external attack?

SABOTAGE CONSEQUENCE VALUES

Consequen

ce Value

Impact Effects

1.0 Catastr

ophic

On- and off-site fatalities and injuries

Long-term (>2yrs) facility damage

Off-site denial of food, water, habitat (>1yr)

0.8 High Off-site injuries and on-site fatalities

Facility damage (1-2yrs)

Off-site denial of food, water, habitat (<1yr)

0.5 Modera

te

On-site injury only

Facility damage (6mo – 1yr)

Off-site denial of food, water, habitat

(<6mo)

0.2 Low On-site injury

Facility damage (<1mo)

No impact on food, water, habitat

HARRISBURG VERSUS PHILADELPHIA

Population density

Surrounding area

Wind patterns

Public opinion

Waterways

Bordering states

Current land use & Availability

Security concerns (Airport locations)

POPULATION DENSITY

http://www.census.gov/geo/www/maps/st_profile.htm

WATERWAYS & BORDERING STATES

http://www.pennsylvania-map.org/

CONCLUSION

Many factors contributed to the incident at Three

Mile Island

Highlighted a lack of preparedness for the

situation that ensued

Heightened awareness has led to better

preparedness plans

Future events could come from other accidents or

terrorism

REFERENCES

Introduction & Background (Slides 3 – 15):

Kemeny, J G., Chairman. President's Commission: The Need For Change: The Legacy Of TMI. (1979) pp 7 – 16. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf Accessed on April 12, 2010.

“Lessons learned From the Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Advisory Panel,” NUREG/CR-6252. Report for NRC (1994) http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/10176845-MjBNIo/native/Accessed on April 12, 2010.

Meshkati, N. Human Factors in Large-Scale Technological Systems’ Accidents: Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl. Organization & Environment. 5(2): 133-154. 1991. DOI: 10.1177/108602669100500203

Nuclear Regulatory Legislation: 110th Congress (NUREG-0980). http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/ Accessed on April 13, 2010.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident” http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html Accessed on April 11, 2010.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website: Emergency Preparedness and Response Section. http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness.html Accessed on April 12, 2010.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website: Governing Legislation. http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html Accessed on April 12, 2010.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Website: Regulations http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory.html Accessed on April 12, 2010.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html

www.pahighways.com/features/threemileisland.html

REFERENCES (CONTINUED)

Emergency Preparedness (Slides 16 – 27):

Gerusky, TM. “Three Mile Island: Assessment of radiation exposures and environmental contamination.” Annals New York Academy of Sciences. 1981, 54-62.

Hatch, C., Wallenstein, S., Beyea, J., Nieves, JW., Susser, M. “Cancer rates after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and proximity of residence to the plant.” American Journal of Public Health. 1991 81 (6), 719 –724.

Levin, RJ. “Incidence of Thyroid Cancer in residents surrounding the Three Mile Island nuclear Facility.” Laryngoscope. 2008 118, 618-628.

Mangano, J. “First Study of in-body radiation begins at Three Mile Island.” Press Release: November 14 2005. http://radiation.org/press/tmi1105.html (Last accessed: 4/5/2010)

Mangano, J. “A short latency between radiation exposure from nuclear plants and cancer in young children.” International Journal of Health Services.2006 36 (1), 113–135.

Palms, J., Patrick, R., Kreeger, D., Harris, C. “25-y study of radionuclide monitoring with terrestrial and aquatic biomonitors” Health Physics. 2007. 92 (3), 219-225.

Talbott, EO, Youk, AO, McHugh, KP, Shire, JD, Zhang, A, Murphy, BP, Engberg, RA. “Mortality among the residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-1992.” Environmental Health Perspectives. 2000 108 (6), 545-552.

Talbott, EO, Youk, AO, McHugh-Pemu, KP, Zborowski, JV. “Long-term follow-up of the residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-1998.” Environmental Health Perspectives. 2003 111 (3), 341-348.

Upton, A.C. “Health impact of the Three Mile Island Accident”. Annals New York Academy of Sciences. 1981, 63-75.

REFERENCES (CONTINUED)

Emergency Response (Slides 27 – 37):

General description and discussion of the levels of protection and protective gear . US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2010. Available at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9767 (Accessed April 5, 2010).

Nuclear Incidents: Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/rert/tmi.html (Accessed on April 5, 2010).

Okumura T, Suzuki K, Fukuda A, et al. The Tokyo subway sarin attack: disaster management, Part 1: Community emergency response. Acad Emerg Med 1998;5:613-7.

Potassium Iodide Fact Sheet. Centers for Disease Control, 2006. Available online at: www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation (Accessed on April 4, 2010).

Radiation Event Medical Management. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2010. Available at: www.remm.nlm.gov/ext_contamination.htm (Accessed April 4, 2010).

Schleipman AR, Gerbaudo VH, Castronovo FP, Jr. Radiation disaster response: preparation and simulation experience at an academic medical center. J Nucl Med Technol 2004;32:22-7.

Three Mile Island Accident. US Nuclear Regulation Commission, 2009. Available at: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf (Accessed on April 5, 2010).

Risk Assessment (Slides 38 – 45):

International Atomic Energy Agency. Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Sabotage. January 2007. Available at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1271_web.pdf

Purvis, JW. Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants. August 1999. Available at www.nti.org/e-research/official_docs/labs/sabo_nuc_plant.pdf

Honnellio AL and Rydell, S. Sabotage Vulnerability of nuclear power plants. Int J Nuclear Governance, Economy and Ecology 2007; 1(3), 312-321.

http://www.census.gov/geo/www/maps/st_profile.htm (for PA census map)

http://www.pennsylvania-map.org/ (for roadwaywaterway map)