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"Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure" by Robert David SteeleStrategic Alternatives Report (Strategic Studies Institute, Nov 2000)

A 20-page version also appeared as Chapter 9 in Steven Metz (ed.), Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm (Strategy Studies Institute, April 2001).

Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure:An Alternative Paradigm for

National Security in the 21st Century

Robert David Steele

While suffering substantial reductions in manpower, and failing to modernize the conventional force, the American military claims to be ready so as to support the political claims of its current master in the White House. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The American military is not ready, either for two simultaneous theater conflicts, or for a range of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In fact, we have real culture shock within our military, where a serving Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be heard to say "Real men don't do OOTW"1 at the same time that units are stretched to the breaking point while they do exactly that: OOTW in every clime and place. The other elements of our national power—the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and justice elements of our government—are also not ready to make their contribution to national security in the 21st Century.

We require a comprehensive evaluation of the threat, a reconstitution of our national security strategy, and a deliberate but prompt investment in training, equipping, and organizing the forces needed to protect our Nation in the 21st Century. The "2+" strategy, of structuring the force to address two major theater war (MTW) scenarios at once, is driving our military into severe degradation. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not a substitute for strategy and it is bankrupting our military by diverting what disposable funds we have toward an overly technical "system of systems" that is neither financially nor militarily sound. At the same time, RMA is creating an enormous interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—between our forces and those of allied nations, and between our commanders and the 98% of the Relevant Information they need that is in the private sector and not accessible by our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems.

This review, after evaluating the real-world threat, outlines a change in our national security strategy from 2+ to 1+iii—we need four forces after next, not one—and an increase in national security spending on the order of $40 billion a year for traditional military capabilities and $10 billion a year for non-military capabilities in direct support of our long-term national security strategy. Regardless of funding, however, we need to restructure the force.

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Arriving at the Bottom Line Figure

Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, said in the 1990's, with perfect clarity:

I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line defense number. I don't know of any logical way to arrive at such a figure without analyzing the threat; without determining what changes in our strategy should be made in light of the changes in the threat; and then determining what force structure and weapons programs we need to carry out this revised strategy.

This review follows Senator Nunn's cogent tasking by first discussing the threat, then recommending a strategy appropriate to the threat, and finally proposing specific force structure modifications as are necessary to execute the new national security strategy, a strategy I call the "1+iii" (One Plus Triple I) Strategy. This new strategy will reinforce our conventional military; substantially enhance our expeditionary, constabulary, and special operations forces; create a bold new program to achieve force protection through global intelligence coverage that inspires economic and cultural investments; and assure home front security through a much expanded and better integrated combination of electronic security and economic counter-intelligence that extends the concept of national security down to the state & local level through revolutionary new uses of our National Guard and Reserve forces.

Analyzing the Threat

The "threat" to the United States of America in the 21st Century must be evaluated in the larger context of a world where conflict is the norm, where major ethnic fault lines cut across all major continents, where transnational criminals and local warlords are amassing fortunes through trade in women, diamonds, food, and medicine; and where water—our most precious resource—is approaching a "tipping point" of non-renewability.

Let us being with conflict. Each day, today, we have on-going 26 severe low-intensity conflicts that have killed over 300,000 people in 1999 alone, and cumulatively, have killed roughly 8 million over time. There are 78 less severe low-intensity conflicts, and over 178 violent political conflicts internal to specific nation-states.2 India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, China, Russia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, all populous countries, are engaged, today, in between 6 and 32 conflicts each!

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Conflict trends are troubling. Severe low-intensity conflicts (defined as conflicts with over 1000 casualties per year), have leveled off.3 However, lesser low-intensity conflicts are increasing steadily in number each year, while violent political conflict, often ethnically-based, has leaped toward geometric increases year by year. Figure 1 shows the actual number of conflicts per year from 1995 to 2000.

Figure 1: Conflict Trends from 1995-2000

In addition, relying on the aggregate data collected and analyzed by centers of excellence such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), we see that our world, today, endures 29 complex emergencies as declared by the United Nations; millions of refugees and internally-displaced persons across 67 countries; food scarcity and related disease in 27 countries; modern plagues, from AIDS to the West Nile disease, creeping across 59 countries and rising; 4 and child soldiers murdering one another in 42 countries. Peacekeeping forces are in 38 countries; landmines

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desecrate 62 countries; torture is common in 92 countries; corruption is common in 78 countries; and censorship is very high in 63 countries.

Those are simply the conflicts and the obstacles to effective government management of scarce resources on behalf of their people. Let us turn to the special cases of ethnicity and water. Ethnicity, despite the popular case made for a "clash of civilizations", is really most relevant when it is combined with desperate shortfalls in the basics of life, such as water. Figure 2 combines a map of the current state of water for the world with genocidal fault lines corresponding to major ethnic divisions.

Figure 2: Intersection of Water Scarcity and Genocidal Fault Lines5

The coincidence of water scarcity and ethnic fault lines in the Slavic-Islamic and Slavic-Chinese border regions is of special concern. Closer to home, we must be conscious of both the increasing hyper-aridity and declining aquifers of the American mid-west, and the substantial pollution characterizing all of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

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The greatest threat to both national security and national prosperity in the 21st Century stems from a combination of water scarcity, failed states, ethnic fault lines, and opportunistic thugs thriving under conditions of chaos.6

We are close to a "tipping point", and it is we who are creating the ultimate crisis that results from a combination of global water pollution and the degradation of flood plains (no longer receiving nutrients because of dams blocking the silt) and the effects of irrigation (raising the salinity of soil to a point where it cannot produce food) and vanishing aquifers (being mined into extinction); with genocidal fault lines and the attendant instability that gives rise to rogue warriors.7

Our national intelligence communities, while focusing primarily on strategic nuclear and conventional threats and those aspects of the threat that are secret, are fully aware of these dangers, but unable to make a compelling public policy case for action. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did an excellent job of forecasting the spread of Anti-Immunal Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the 1970's, but the policy community was not willing to make this an international issue nor to allocate resources for preventive measures. More recently, Dr. John Gannon, Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis & Production (ADCI/A&P), has rather carefully pointed out that the major threats facing us in 2015 are related to mass migrations, disease, and other non-traditional factors.8 Despite a major new story this year on the gap between intelligence warning of AIDS in the 1970's and policy action on AIDS for a quarter century thereafter,9 Dr. Gannon's accurate and timely warning about emerging non-military threats is being ignored by both the Administration in power, and those competing for the Presidency in 2001.10

At the same time, selected experts and the occasional rare reporter have begun to focus on "modern plagues" as well as water shortages, but they do so only within their professional circles and fail to get a hearing at the policy level. Even those books that receive Presidential and broadcast television endorsements, such as Laurie Garrett's BETRAYAL OF TRUST: The Collapse of Global Public Health (Hyperion, 2000), fail to impact on the national and other state budgets for the simple reason that the voters—the citizens—will not buy a 754-page book, much less read it, and still less act upon its well-documented and urgent message. The heart of Garrett's message merits our attention.11

It is in this context that we must acknowledge the importance of the new definition adopted by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992, where the “magnitude of human suffering” in Somalia was recognized as constituting a threat to peace and security. We do this for

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two reasons: because such suffering creates waves of migration that carry disease, and because our "home defenses" against epidemics have been allowed to atrophy to the point that we are at serious risk in the developed world and at the provincial, state, and local levels.

The threat in the 21st Century is more complex than ever before and cannot be defined in strictly military terms. Figure 3 provides a means of understanding this complexity while structuring the threat in a manner that leads logically to both strategic and force structure equivalencies.

Figure 3: Four Threat Classes Requiring Strategic Consideration12

In fact we face four general kinds of threats: the traditional nuclear and conventional forces sponsored by a state; those that are violent but not necessarily associated with a state—including both transnational criminals and terrorists or warlords able to acquire weapons of mass destruction; those that are non-violent and often stateless, including environmental conditions imposing a high "magnitude of human suffering" as well as the refugees—often

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gravely ill—from those conditions, the child soldiers bound into armed slavery, and the women and children traded for money and often laden with disease; and finally those threats to home defense, be they state-sponsored or not, that surround our critical infrastructures—including our public health infrastructure—and the core of our economic well-being. At times, it is ourselves that we have to blame for the scope and imminence of our vulnerability, as is the case with public health.

Seen another way, these four threat classes confront us with four distinct "ways of war": Systemic War, Dirty War, Peacewar, and Cyberwar. 13

Further complicating our planning and programming, conflict between differing forces takes differing forms, and we must evaluate how they fight and how we might fight in the context of a world that does not favor heavy armor formations—a world in which only 50% of the ports are usable, where there is almost no cross-country mobility, bridge loading is limited to 30 tons and less in most Third World countries, and the aviation climate is hot and humid.14

Changing the Strategy

Fundamental strategic thinking should include an appreciation for the fact that a national security strategy must be holistic—managing all sources of national power including diplomacy, economic assistance, cultural outreach, and information operations, not just the military—simultaneously. "War proper" is not just about military force, but rather about imposing one's will and assuring one's security in a complex world. Within this larger context, power without purpose is wasted, time is priceless, technology is not a substitute for strategy or thinking, asymmetric threats must receive co-equal attention with symmetric threats, and strategic culture matters.15

Determining our national security strategy for the 21st Century must therefore be guided by two related principles: co-equal standing for asymmetric versus symmetric threats; and co-equal structure and funding, or at least some semblance of a rational balance, between military forces designed for the traditional symmetric threat, and largely unconventional or non-miitary forces designed to deal with the asymmetric threat.16

On this basis, "forward engagement" and "shaping" of the theater environment make a great deal of sense, but with two enormous caveats: there must be a force structure as well as funding for non-military investments, and we are probably better off talking about "nurturing" peaceful environments instead of the more imperial "shaping."17 At a minimum a strategy that is

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seriously committed to force protection through economic, cultural, and information peacekeeping must recognize the vital role played by the non-governmental organizations (NGO), the critical importance of being able to communicate and cooperate with indigenous organizations that are not part of a military force, and the overwhelming influence on any situation of environmental conditions including the availability of clean drinking water, sufficient food for the children, and such medical provisions as might be needed to at least keep disease from spreading through epidemics.

Our new national security strategy must actually have five elements that are in complete harmony with one another: our global intelligence strategy, for ensuring that we can maintain global coverage and global warning; our interoperability strategy, for ensuring that what we build and buy is interoperable with both military and civilian coalition partners in a wide variety of "come as you are" circumstances; our force structure strategy for ensuring that we build to both the most likely as well as the worst case threats while balancing the relative roles of our military, the rest of the Federal government, the reserve force, the private sector, and external allies or coalition partners; our preventive diplomacy strategy for directly addressing conditions around the globe that spawn conflict and crises; and finally, our home front strategy for fully developing and integrating the defensive capabilities of our state & local governments and the private sector.

Global Intelligence Strategy

The threat conditions that have been described earlier in this review demand "global coverage"—constant monitoring and the casting of a very wide net with which to achieve early warning of conditions that warrant immediate intervention. Unfortunately, global coverage is unaffordable and unachievable by any single nation, even the powerful and wealthy United States of America. Our global intelligence strategy requires that we undertake three "revolutions in intelligence affairs" (RIA): first, an internal revolution, in which we create an intelligence community that is dedicated to informing policy rather than simply collecting secrets; second, a national revolution, in which we create the "virtual intelligence community" of America, fully engaging and harnessing the distributed intelligence of our business community, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the academy;18 and third, an international revolution, in which we create a largely unclassified but fully multi-level security capable Global Information Consortium (GIC) within which to share the financial and intellectual burden of achieving global coverage. 19 The latter consortium would have two major added advantages besides the obvious one of improving our policy-level understanding of the world in generic terms: it

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would permit us to see Chinese, Muslim, Dutch, and other perspectives on East Timor, to take one example, in a side-by-side fashion; and it would immediately support the internationalization of education that Senator Boren so wisely demands,20 by immediately creating a real-world real-time distance learning environment with substantive analysis and structured raw information on every country and topic in the Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Capabilities Plan (FIRCAP).

Interoperability Strategy

This is not the place for a complete critique of the RMA,21 but we need to grasp three core ideas at this juncture: first, the Internet will be the backbone of 21 st

Century C4I and ISR, and we must therefore transfer our proven security technologies to the Internet at large, abandoning our fruitless pursuit of unilateral "Codeword high" electronic bunkers; second, the RMA must be applied to all four threat classes and be about more than technology; and third, the RMA has created a strategic deficit—an interoperability gap—between the US and its allies, and between US commanders and the 98% of the Relevant Information they require to plan and execute any operation. Consider Figure 4.

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Figure 4: The Old versus the New C4I Paradigm

The old C4I paradigm, still in effect and very counterproductive to the needed strategic shift, assumes unilateral operations, top-down decision-making and command hierarchies based on secret sources, and relatively short-term time frames within which to both make and effect the decision.

The new C4I paradigm, based on the new reality, demands a multi-cultural approach to information-sharing that supports bottom-up consensus and cooperation, relies predominantly on open sources, and focuses on relatively long time-frames that require both longer sustainment of the C4I system, and much greater reliance on external sources of both information and processing.

The existing RMA flies in the face of common sense, and fails to leverage the natural development of critical technologies in the private sector, technologies that should be the basis for our Command and Control, Communications, Computing, and Intelligence (C4I) and related ISR investments.

RMA is a good concept, but it must be driven by real-world needs rather than domestic military-industrial complex wish lists. Consider Figure 5.

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Figure 5: RMA in Context of Four Threat Classes

Asterisks in Figure 5 identify the three areas where the existing RMA does focus its attention. It is, however, neglectful of each of the other areas and therefore gets a "25%"—a failing grade—in the larger context of the real-world threat and the real-time needs of the United States of America.

Even in relation to High Intensity Conflict (HIC) and Major Regional Conflict (MRC), the RMA falls short because it fails to learn from history and recognize that old technology—old radars, old communications, old mobility systems, old nuclear devices—are a major factor that cannot be overlooked. Even as simple a threat as mines fail to get the attention they deserve—we continue to focus on sensing the container rather than the contents, and this is why we still do not have a stand-off device for rapidly and safely detecting the landmines that are prevalent across 62 countries of the world.22 We continue to deny the importance of processing and modeling and simulation technologies at a time when all four threat classes will be sure to tax the decision-making capabilities of even the most brilliant and dedicated of commanders and policy-makers.

In the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) and Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) arena of confrontation, it might be said that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is working effectively on relevant

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HIC/MRC1/3 leap forward*

1/3 anti-old technologies1/3 focus on people

CYBERWAR1/3 electronic security*1/3 counterintelligence

1/3 economic intelligence

SOLIC/LEA1/3 sensing technology*

1/3 peace/civil technology1/3 focus on people

PEACE1/3 historical thinking1/3 cultural thinking1/3 strategic thinking



sensing technology, but this will probably not be helpful at the tactical level, where we do not have enough remotely-deliverable ground sensors, nor the right kind of sensors, to be useful in multiple complex emergencies around the world. We need to do vastly more in peace and civil technology, to include major government commitments to delivering water desalination and cleansing technology in affordable packages to virtually every country in the world, including the major countries of Europe. We can do much more with people-related technology, including a long-overdue and major investment in extending two-way foreign language translation as best represented by SYSTRAN23, as well as automated packages for collecting, clustering, weighting, and then displaying—in English and in a side-by-side fashion—the applicable views of the Australians, Chinese, Dutch, Filipinos, Portuguese, and various Indonesian factions on East Timor, to take one example. We spend billions on collecting selected secrets, and have not paid due heed to the need for generic machine translation capabilities that are vital to exploiting the 98% of the information available through overt "global coverage" and relevant to Operations Other Than War and preventive diplomacy or "Peacewar."

In the PEACE arena, where we gather all those non-state and non-violent threats to global and U.S. stability, we fail completely to apply technology to historical, cultural, or strategic understanding. There is absolutely no reason other than executive myopia, for the United States to fail to create an automated system that digitizes and translates the essential historical, cultural, and strategic works relevant to each state and to each non-state group, and in this way makes available to both policymakers and commanders, as well as the media, non-governmental organizations, and the public at large, useful and unclassified "templates" that visualize, summarize, and guide the end-user to specific Relevant Information in both English and the original language and then—let's get really serious—enables direct electronic communication with any of a number of international authorities easily identified by citation analysis and other forms of referral, who can create new knowledge in real time, answer direct questions, and do so securely and for appropriate micro-cash payments. The U.S. Government is simply not taking the Internet, or other commercial technologies that are now readily available, seriously.

Finally we come to Cyberwar, where Information Operations (IO) and Economic Competition (ECON), including economic espionage, are the core aspects of our future national security and national prosperity. One could say that the RMA has been applied here, at least to the area of electronic security. It has been, however, in a fragmented fashion, with each service having its own Information Warfare (IW) cadre, and without being properly integrated with the

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capability managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), without migrating capabilities down to the state and local levels, and without establishing standards of due diligence for the private sector that would actually make America's critical infrastructures defensible. We have done almost nothing in relation to global electronic counterintelligence and overt economic intelligence, areas where we are indisposed to do anything as straight-forward as supply-chain analysis or strategic comparisons on an industry by industry basis. 24

The existing approach to RMA is unaffordable by anyone else while it also precludes us from achieving the strategy and force structure this broader review outlines. RMA, in short, has pretended to be a substitute for strategy, at the same time that it has diverted all of the available financial resources toward complex systems that have not been validated in relation to either the actual threat or the strategy that must be developed to deal with the actual threat.

RMA as it exists has created a strategic deficit—an interoperability gap—between our forces and those of everyone else, and between our leadership and the 98% of the Relevant Information that we required to be effective in the 21st Century. We must go forward with the RMA, but it must elevate the security of the Internet and recognize that interoperability must be a "come as you are" option; and the RMA must be applied to all four threat classes.Force Structure Strategy

A truly "transformative" defense strategy would recognize that in this complex world with four threat classes we must adopt a "total mobilization" approach to national security, and ensure that every element of government at the federal, state, and local levels is empowered and integrated into an effective "total force" while we also ensure that the private sector is doing its part, particularly in relation to documenting supply-chain vulnerability for high-technology forces and in applying new "due diligence" electronic security measures to raise the over-all security of our national financial, communications, power, and transportation infrastructures. Figure 6 illustrates the kinds of trade-offs that must be made if we are to have a "transformative" force structure strategy.

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"WAR"80% Military – 20% Other75% Active – 25% Reserve75% USG – 25% Private

SOLIC/LEA50% Military – 50% Other50% Active – 50% Reserve50% USG – 50% Private



Figure 6: Transformative Force Structure Trade-Offs

Without spending too much time on these trade-offs, let us just note that there are three kinds of trade-offs shown above: between the military and the rest of government; between the active force and the reserve force; and between the government as a whole and the private sector. We will leave the issue of US versus allied or US versus NGO coalition levels of effort for another day.

"Real WAR" (HIC/MRC) forces must protect the core military and rely almost completely on active duty personnel "ready to go" without waiting for reservists; and will draw on private sector capabilities to the minimal extent possible.

SOLIC/LEA forces, by contrast, will see the U.S. Government (USG) fielding an even mix of military and diplomatic or justice or economic capabilities, while also drawing equally on active and reserve forces, and dividing the responsibility for dealing with terrorism and transnational crime equally between U.S. Government endeavors and private sector security and intelligence activities.

In PEACE, the military continues to provide a global logistics and communications infrastructure, but civilian elements of the U.S. government are in the majority role. Reservists skilled at foreign languages and with occupations vital to civil affairs and the restructuring of failed states come to the fore, while the overall effort is balanced between USG-funded and manned activities, and "overt action" by private sector elements including NGOs.

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HOME FRONT20% Military – 80% Other50% Active – 50% Reserve25% USG – 75% Private

PEACE40% Military – 60% Other25% Active – 75% Reserve50% USG – 50% Private



Finally, for IO/ECON, there remains a 20% commitment of military forces-—largely in the National Security Agency (NSA) and related service Information Warfare centers—while the Justice, Treasury, and other Departments come to the fore; there is an even split between active duty forces carrying out Information Operations duties, and elements of the National Guard carefully positioned across all critical infrastructure nodes, with the funding—and the ultimate responsibility for day-to-day security—resting primarily with the private sector.

On the basis of this kind of approach, one can readily validate a need for four regional Commanders-in-Chief (Pacific, Southern, European, and Central) while conceptualizing four "threat-type" Commanders-in-Chief (WAR, SOLIC, PEACE, and HOME).25 It would be these eight CINCs that should comprise the working level of the new Joint Requirements Board under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Such a force structure strategy would at a minimum restructure the relationships between the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; would establish minimal mandatory defense structure needs within the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation as well as the Federal Reserve; and would create selective new relationships—including secure interoperable communications networks—with state and local agencies, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and such other civilian elements of government as must be better integrated into our "total force" strategy. The President's immediate staffs—the National Security Council and National Economic Council and other odds and ends, should also be restructured to conform to the need for matrixed management of integrated operations against each of the four threat classes.26 Such a force strategy would also establish, in clear terms suitable for a news media report as well as legislation, the minimal mandatory responsibilities of the private sector in support of our national security strategy, with a special emphasis on very high standards for electronic security.27

Preventive Diplomacy Strategy

$100 million will buy a major military platform such as a big ship, or a fully-equipped ground unit, or 1,000 potential George Kennan's for a year, or 10,000 Peace Corps volunteers for a year, or it will desalinate 100 million cubic meters of water and perhaps prevent a war, or it will pay for one day of war in the Middle East, most likely over water.28 As we confront quasi-catastrophic global "tipping points" in water, public health, and transnational crime, it

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becomes ever more important that our President be sufficiently informed—in a globally strategic sense with the finest all-source intelligence possible—so that we can make better choices among these options than we have in the past. The 21st Century demands that we redress our human attacks on the environment, and devise new means of living within our means while helping others evolve in an increasingly less forgiving international environment.

As was discussed in the preceding section on the force structure strategy, we must make provision for the training, equipping, and organizing of those non-military forces that are required to execute our national security strategy. With the exception of the post-World War II period, when the Marshall Plan and other initiatives were readily funded and clearly understood to be part of the strategy to contain communism and restore the democracies of Europe, America has never properly provided for preventive diplomacy and the related economic, cultural, and information investments.

Preventive Diplomacy is a vital part of force protection. It is preventive diplomacy that lays down the pre-conflict security grid of water, food, medicine, cultural interaction and information exchange. It is preventive diplomacy that offers incentives to indigenous personnel to accept clandestine

1 As found in the transcript of the Robert McCormick Tribune Foundation—U.S. Naval Institute Address, March 2000, by General Anthony C. Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, then serving as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command.2 The "World Conflict & Human Rights Map 2000", prepared by the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM, under the direction of Professors Alex Schmidt and A. J. Jongman) for the Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution, is quite extraordinary and a valuable educational and political resource. For more information go to http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm. Copies (each the size of a bulletin board with complete text documentation on the reverse of the map) can be ordered for US$10 per map from Berto Jongman [email protected] Unless otherwise noted all threat data comes from PIOOM, supra note 2.4 This one number comes from a rough count using The New State of the World Atlas by Michael Kidron and Ronald Segal, (Simon & Schuster, 1991), pages 42-43, "Modern Plagues". All other numbers are from the PIOOM chart, supra note 2.6 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict (Simon & Shuster, 2000) documents both the complexity of peacekeeping operations, and the manner in which humanitarian assistance might actually prolong a conflict and give rise to a thriving sub-culture of black-market thugs. Martin Van Crevald and Ralph Peters have published brilliant pieces in this area. As a general observation, the author would note that many worthy publications, including the existing national security and national military strategies of the United States, have been read but are not cited here as they would unnecessarily lengthen the review.

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mailto:[email protected]

http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm



relationships as well as overt relationships. It is preventive diplomacy, in theory, that serves as the overt information collection grid essential to global coverage and early warning.

There must be a clear linkage between the national military strategy and the national preventive diplomacy strategy, and there must be a clear and unbroken link between the force structure and the funding for these two essential elements of the national security strategy. This must include a more structured approach to funding for the Departments of State and Justice as well as the defensive aspects of Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation.

7 Marq de Villiers, WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource (Houghton Mifflin, 2000) provides an exceptional combination of scholarship and field exploration that in combination document in very powerful way the increasingly desperate state of our global water resources. On page 12 he quotes Mr. Ismail Serageldin, then the World Bank's vice president for environmental affairs and also Chairman of the World Water Commission, as having stated bluntly that "the wars of the twenty-first century will be fought over water." He goes on to mention former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali as having said something similar. 8 Dr. Gannon's speech on "Intelligence Challenges Through 2015" was first presented at the Smithsonian in October 1999, and more recently to the Columbus Council on World Affairs on 27 April 2000. The CIA web site is increasingly useful; this text is atwww.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/gannon_speech_05022000.html.9 Cf. Barton Gelman, "DEATH WATCH: Global Response to AIDS in Africa: World Shunned Signs of The Coming Plague", The Washington Post, 5 July 2000. A representative current story on the situation is "U.S. Bills Take Aim at Global AIDS", Newsday, 03/07/2000. The Post appears to have improved its national security coverage somewhat in recent years. The hiring of 17-year Philadelphia Inquirer veteran Mr. Vernon Loeb, to cover intelligence qua spies and satellites, has been especially productive. Mr. Loeb can be reached at [email protected] and I for one would be delighted if we all helped him expand his mandate to cover both international and unclassified intelligence qua "knowledge-based decision-making."10 For one candidate to state on national television that he would not have intervened in Rwanda and Burundi to prevent genocide against hundreds of thousands, and for another candidate to earnestly maintain that U.S. forces are ready for anything, suggests that neither candidate for the Presidency is willing to carefully consider global realities that are outlined in this review. At a time when Senators and Congressmen are bragging that they do not have passports and do not need to see the world beyond our water's edge, and at a time when serious people like Senator David Boren and Mr. David Gergen are calling for an internationalization of education because our population has become so ignorant of the world we share we others, it would appear that we are ourselves the greatest threat to our own national security, and our biggest challenges will be in relation to educating powerful leaders with closed minds—and their voting constituencies. It is for this reason that I believe the third era in national intelligence (the first was one of secret wars, the second one of strategic analysis) must

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http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/gannon_speech_05022000.html



This is the Achilles' heel of U.S. military strategy and force structure. It is because we have failed to get this part right that our forces are over-extended and ineffective while supporting peacekeeping operations in 38 countries around the world. The next President has no alternative but to go to the mat with Congress, speaking directly to the American people, on why we must play a constant and strong role in foreign affairs. Senator David Boren, now President of the University of Oklahoma, understands the real challenge: neither our people nor many of our elected representatives "get it." Obtaining bi-partisan support for this part of the national security strategy will be the first major test of the next President.

Home Front Strategy

focus on intelligence as a public good—on treating the public as the primary constituent and customer for national strategic intelligence estimates that in turn will guide public policy investments based on a deeper public understanding of the long-term threats. The author's paper on "The New Craft of Intelligence: Reconstruction and Globalization" extends these ideas and is at www.oss.net/Papers/white/CASIS2000.rtf. 11 Tens of millions are dying of new, untreatable forms of tuberculosis, malaria, strep, staph, and other organisms. Millions more are dying of AIDS. Measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases still kill hundreds of thousands more children every year. Hospitals have become primary vehicles for the spread of diseases—not of their cure. These are not the results of mysterious malicious microbes. The system we trust to ensure safe water, food, hospitals, and communities can no longer in this globalized world rise to the challenge. Laurie Garrett, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: The Collapse of Global Public Health (Hyperion, 2000), front cover.13 The author was glad to receive this elegant formulation directly from Professor Ian Roxborough and Colonel Dana Eyre, USAR, as published in their thoughtful article, "Which Way to the Future" in Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1999). Their matching distinctions between high and low technology forms of war, and their attention to the applicability of "hard" versus "soft" power, are useful and reinforcing concepts that support the need to think in terms of four "forces after next.14 As the founding Special Assistant and Deputy Director of the U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Center, from 1988 to 1992, the author served as Study Director for the first edition of what is now the flagship product of the Center, in its 4 th edition, The Expeditionary Factors Study. This study, relying exclusively on open sources of information, and reflecting the needs of the warfighters we serve, analyzes 80 countries in relation to 143 mission area factors spanning military mission areas, geographic factors, and civil infrastructure factors. The "strategic generalizations" that emerge from such a study should—but do not—impact on how we train, equip, and organize our forces. For published summaries of the expeditionary environment and what it means to how we should structure forces, see "Muddy Waters, Rusting Buckets: A Skeptical Assessment of U.S. Naval Effectiveness in the 21st Century", accepted for

18

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Finally, we must have a home front strategy. The home front strategy cannot be developed without careful regard for the concerns, needs, and capabilities of state and local authorities, and without making legislative provision for defining the roles and responsibilities of private sector enterprises—ideally in relation to all four threat classes, but at least initially in relation to electronic information and information operations security. A clever strategy would also address national information productivity issues, and ensure that high standards are set that encourage "mix and match" software integration as well as easy data conversion from one software application to another.

publication by the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, withdrawn due to delays and instead published at www.defensedaily.com/reports/gonavy.htm (17 November 1999) and also ), available in RTF at www.oss.net/Papers/white/EE21.rtf; "First to Fight but Not Fighting Smart: A Skeptical Assessment of U.S. Marine Corps Effectiveness in the 21st Century", Marine Corps Gazette (May 1999; and “Intelligence Support to Expeditionary Planners,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1991).15 These are among eight specific key points extracted by the author from a reading of Colin Gray's Modern Strategy (Oxford University Press, 1999). A longer review of the book, and reviews by the author of 150 other books, can be found at www.amazon.com.16 "Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated", was the focus on the Ninth Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College in 1998. The conference is summarized, and the 1+iii strategy first discussed, in "TAKEDOWN: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation" in Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 1998-1999) and at www.defensedaily.com/reports/takedown.htm for Defense Daily Network.17 Vice President Al Gore and his National Security Advisor Leon Fuerth are credited with both these concepts, but neither has been seriously implemented. Theater commanders do not have the force structure nor the funds to carry out "Peacewar", and have been limited to token endeavors in military "presence" (port visits), education, and coalition exercises that contribute nothing to the stability of the local economy. Cf. Jordan, Thomas M., Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, Shaping The World Through Engagement: Assessing The Department Of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Apr 2000, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/shaping/shaping.htm.. At the same time, in an impassioned comment from the audience at Georgetown University, at the conference on Alternative National Military Strategies for the U.S. (21 September 2000), a senior British representative derided the reference to "shaping" anything, and urged those present to find another expression more acceptable to the "shapees."18 The needed internal and national revolutions, including necessary changes in White House management of "national intelligence" are fully outlined in the author's 495-page book, ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA International Press, 2000), available at bulk discounts from AFCEA at (703) 631-6100, or by overnight mail from http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0916159280/.

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http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/takedown.htm

http://www.amazon.com/

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Federal funding for state and local capabilities in relation to the four threat classes, and especially in relation to joining an integrated national intelligence and security network, must be provided. Training in the process of intelligence and counterintelligence, and special training with regard to electronic counterintelligence and security, must be provided.

Legislation must be defined to establish due diligence standards that mandate minimal mandatory levels of accountability within private enterprises for data encryption, audit trails, and other measures needed to defeat electronic epidemics. Stable and transparent Application Program Interfaces (API) should be included in this legislation as a national security imperative.29

An Integrated National Security Strategy

An integrated national security strategy, then, must carefully develop, in tandem and with appropriate fiscal resources as well as force structure being assured for each element of this holistic strategy, each of the following: a global intelligence strategy; an interoperability strategy; a force structure strategy; a preventive diplomacy strategy (including economic assistance and

Over ten years work on intelligence reform, with a special focus on open source intelligence (OSINT), and including over 5,000 pages from over 500 international speakers, is readily exploitable at no cost to the public at www.oss.net. An index to the twenty-two volumes of Proceedings is at www.oss.net/Papers/white/index.rtf. 19 The third revolution has emerged from the hard lessons learned by CIA and DIA since trying to come to grips with open source intelligence in the late 1990's. The author's most recent paper "The New Craft of Intelligence: Reconstruction and Globalization" was prepared for and presented to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), meeting in Ottawa to discuss "The Future of Intelligence", 28-30 September 2000. This paper is available at www.oss.net/Papers/white/CASIS2000.rtf. Mr. Jan Herring, former National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology (NIO/S&T) has conceptualized a triangle of intelligence services, the first of which-—global coverage—can and should be shared by those willing to help either collect ground truth information, or pay for others to do so. If the Internet is giving adequate NSA-level security, then the way is open for an infinite variety of bilateral and multilateral information-sharing arrangements at multiple levels of security. Over ten years work on intelligence reform, with a special focus on open source intelligence (OSINT), and including over 5,000 pages from over 500 international speakers, is readily exploitable at no cost to the public at www.oss.net. An index to the twenty-two volumes of Proceedings is at www.oss.net/Papers/white/index.rtf. 20 Boren, David L. and Edward J. Perkins (eds.), Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); ); see especially David L. Boren, "Introduction: The Context and the Challenge" (Chapter 1), and David Gergen, "The Media and International Relations and Foreign Policy" (Chapter 20).

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cultural programs); and a home front strategy. Those who would persist in limiting our national security strategy emphasis to conventional military forces are demeaning Clausewitz and undermining the security of the Nation.

Determining the Force Structure

A national security strategy that addresses all of these factors, with all of the legal, financial, and political implications that are associated with

21 The author's "Non-Traditional Threats", supra note 6, contains several slides that illustrate how the existing RMA is addressing only 3 of 12 strategic investment areas. The author has also reviewed a number of the more popular books on the RMA and the "system of systems" at www.amazon.com. A consolidated bibliography of articles, books, and Internet publications in the RMA/Strategy arena is maintained at www.oss.net/Papers/white/RMA.rtf. Below are just a few key works with capsule commentary: David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins (eds.), Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999)—foundation document for discussing future strategy, outlines disconnect between the predominantly non-military threats and our existing structure, calls for a new National Security Act; Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE: A New Security Strategy for America (Brookings, 1999)—serious bi-partisan discussion of half of the problem, outlining a Preventive Defense and "defense by other means strategy, but most useful for their discussion of how deliberate changes in national government organization are required to be effective against emerging threats that are non-state in nature and potentially catastrophic within our borders; Noam Chomsky, Ramsey Clark, and Edward W. Said, Acts of Aggression: Policing "Rogue" States (Seven Stories Press, 1999)—useful offset that we might see ourselves as others see us, as aggressors in our own way; Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, with a Foreword by James R. Schlesinger, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium (CSIS, 1999)—brilliant display of defense economics prowess, documents in a compelling way that we must spend another $60-100B a year on defense, but too accepting of unrealistic and unhelpful service-based acquisition plans that bear no relation to real-world needs; Bill Owens and Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (Farrar Straus Giroux, 2000)—the "system of systems" manifesto, it is helpful in making the case for a truly joint acquisition authority, but it is blind to the plain fact that 98% of the Relevant Information the commander, the acquisition manager, and the policy-maker require is outside this Compartmented, unilaterally-managed, overly-complex "system of systems" that none of our allies and much less others can afford to connect to. 22 A remote sensing capability for explosives was in fact my nomination for early Measurements and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) efforts when I was asked in 1989. The Israeli approach is more down to earth—when I asked them what they did to sense explosives at 500 meters, one of their Colonels laughed and said, "We use a dog on a 500 meter leash."

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different kinds of "engagement", must inevitably find that we need four forces after next, not one.

While it is certainly possible to have one "core force" that includes the world-wide mobility, logistics, and communications capabilities that we are justly proud of, in fact our strategy must find that we need

1) a nuclear and conventional force that is smaller but very well equipped, fully modernized, and never committed to OOTW—the WAR force;

23 Originally funded by the National Air Intelligence for the U.S. Air Force, SYSTRAN (www.systransoft.com) is an independent company that now offers reliable machine translation for all of the major languages of Europe, for Russian, Japanese, and Korean, and shortly for Chinese as well. We should be funding Arabic and ideally each of the following languages that have been found relevant to monitoring world-wide terrorism: Danish, Dari, Indonesian, Kurdish, Kurmanji, Norwegian, Pashto, Serbian, Swedish, Tamil, Turkish, and Urdu…to name just the most obvious candidates.24 Supply-chain analysis refers to deliberate examination of potential "choke points" in the provision of specific ingredients vital to our economic prosperity. It was not until there was a fire in a specific Japanese factory for silicon chips, for example, that America realized it was dependent on this one foreign-owned factory for 75% of its computer chips. That is an old story, but you get the idea. Strategic comparisons require the application of the process of intelligence (requirements definition, collection management, source discovery and validation, multi-source fusion, compelling presentation, timely and relevant delivery) to both U.S. domestic capabilities and foreign capabilities, industry by industry. As Ellen Seidman, then Special Assistant to President Reagan and responsible within the National Economic Council for the U.S. textile and automobile industries, told one of the author's monthly lunch club meetings, and we paraphrase here: CIA reports only focus on foreign economic conditions. They don't do domestic economic conditions and so I cannot get a strategic analysis that compares and contrasts strengths and weaknesses of the industries I am responsible for. On the other hand, Treasury, Commerce, and the Fed are terrible at the business of intelligence--they don't know how to produce intelligence. From ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 16, page 204.25 The demise of both the Service Secretaries and the Services would appear to be inevitable. It would make sense for the Army to migrate toward becoming CINC WAR, for the Marine Corps to migrate toward fleshing out CINC SOLIC, for the Navy to migrate toward becoming CINC PEACE, and for the Air Force to migrate toward becoming CINC HOME, inclusive of national missile defense.26 See, by the author, "Presidential Leadership and National Security Policymaking", a funded paper for the 10th Army Strategy Conference, April 1999, published at www.defensedaily.com/reports/securpolicy1099.htm (17 Nov 1999).27 DoD will continue to be cut off from the rest of the world—from 98% of the Relevant Information—until it finally comes to grips with the fact that we have to raise the river

22

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http://www.systransoft.com/



2) expanded and enhanced expeditionary, constabulary, and special operations forces able to put increasing force packages anywhere in the world within 24 to 48 to 72 hours—the SOLIC force including direct support to LEA;

3) a PEACE force, possibly combining substantial elements of the Civil Affairs, Army Engineers, and the Agency for International Development with new liaison elements specially trained to interact with civilian rescue units, as well as a new humanitarian assistance fleet within the U.S. Navy and also new Air Force lift capabilities relevant to peacekeeping; and finally,

(elevate Internet security standards with unencumbered Presidential-level Codeword security) rather than keep trying to lower the bridge (selectively import "dirty" unclassified information into our "clean" Top Secret/Codeword environment). All data in the private sector and all communications links in the private sector, should be encrypted at NSA-levels of security, with no back doors. This will be a fundamental differentiator and foundation for national security in the information age.28 I draw on two sources for these comparisons. Senator Boren, in his recent book on foreign policy, says "A thousand (diplomatic) officers could easily be added for the cost of one battalion or one piece of expensive military hardware." This is on page 389 of David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins, Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st

Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). Marq de Villiers, in WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource (Houghton Mifflin, 2000) on page 286 quotes Amikam Nachmani who in turn quotes Frank Fisher, who said that "100 million cubic meters of water, which is the bone of contention between Israel and its neighbors, is not worth a war; a day of war costs $100 million, whereas desalination of 100 million cubic meters [of water] also costs $100 million."29 The issue of Microsoft concealing its API should never have been a court case. It should have been a law that applies to all software providers, effective immediately with respect to the revelation and stabilization of existing APIs, while a new standard for API transparency is placed into effect over the course of 2 years. Without such a law, it will never be possible to fully develop national knowledge worker productivity by creating commercial off the shelf desktop toolkits that can easily mix and match data entry, data processing (including geospatial visualization and modeling and simulation programs) and data production capabilities.5 The water information is drawn from Michael Kidron & Ronald Segal, The State of the World Atlas (Simon & Schuster, 1981), chart 54, "The Dying Earth". Surprisingly, this chart was not repeated in the 1991 or later editions of the book. The genocidal fault lines are from a map created by Dr. Greg Stanton, at the time responsible for a portion of the OSS genocide monitoring and global instability project. Dr. Stanton, who has done some very original work in this area, can be reached at [email protected]. Figure 2, for a black & white publication, does not do justice to the originals, which can be seen in color in the author's briefing on "Non-Traditional Threats" (Conference on Alternative Military Strategies, Georgetown University, 21 September 2000), at www.oss.net/Papers/white/Strategy.ppt (Powerpoint—ppt—must be installed on the

23

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4) a fully developed HOME Defense force that gives state and local authorities, not just federal authorities, everything they need to legally carry out their duties in preventing economic espionage and electronic attack against any of our critical infrastructures, while integrating the U.S. Coast Guard and appropriate national missile defense and other "continental" defense capabilities.30

We cannot rely any longer on just the military, or on a "one size fits all" military where our people and equipment are assigned to all kinds of missions for which they have not been trained, equipped, and organized.

The "Core Force", as opposed to General Colin Powell's "Base Force" approach, draws a distinction between core functionalities and capabilities that are needed for a global presence—communications, logistics, mobility, manpower management—and very distinct and carefully focused force structures and organizational arrangements that are self-sustaining and are very deliberately trained, equipped, and organized for optimal effectiveness in one of the eight "core competency" areas shown in Figure 7 below.

receiving workstation to download this type of file). 12 This conceptualization was first developed by the author while serving as a member of the Adjunct Faculty of the Marine Corps University in the 1992-1993 period, and was published in INTELLIGENCE: Selected Readings, Book I (Marine Corps University, Academic Year 1992-1993)30 Such a Home Defense force would include a restoration of our public health infrastructure including the early warning system, and a national program to recover from our many attacks on our underlying fresh water resources.

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Figure 7: "Core Force" Visualization

Eight Functionalities, Four "Type" CINCS

Each of these eight functionalities should be actualized in corresponding force structure initiatives.

Strategists. Our national Net Assessment capability, and our national as well as our military strategic formulation processes, have broken down.31 They have become bureaucratic exercises of little value to long-term force structure planning. They are weak in part because no one has been willing to challenge the many false assumptions and premises that guide our current force structure decision-making process. We need, at a minimum, a dedicated National Security Strategic Center that has an even mix of representatives from each of the major slices of national power, as well as an even mix between long-term strategic thinkers specializing in each of the four threat classes, and "top 5%" personnel from the military, other elements of the civilian government, state & local law enforcement and public health, and the private sector, with special regard for selected non-governmental and non-profit sectors. This element

25



should report directly to a new Presidential Council but be managed on a day-to-day basis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Domestic Threat. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has improved incrementally in recent years, but needs a great deal more authority and financial support. We need to redirect a substantial portion of the National Guard toward national, state, and local emergency response duties, and to give them the training, equipment, and organization that they require to become extremely effective at dealing with fires, riots, and epidemics, in direct support of the constituted legal authorities being assisted. From communications to medical to civil engineering to public relations to food services, there are valid requirements that demand a "total make-over" for those elements of the National Guard fortunate enough to be selected for this very urgent and honorable aspect of national defense. This force, to include new investments in active duty personnel as a cadre and law enforcement specialists as well, should be under a "type" CINC for Home Front Defense who would also be responsible for Electronic Security and Citizen Education as discussed below, as well as for the national missile defense system as it develops over time.

Force on Force. This is the traditional military, responsible for creating the maximum amount of violence in the smallest possible space—responsible for being able to execute "scorched earth" missions that obliterate entire cities if necessary, that can control significant areas of terrain in order to find and kill exactly the right key personnel threatening the United States with anything from transcontinental missiles to bio-chemical car bombs.. This force must receive all that the RMA can offer it, while also being protected from OOTW missions and other distractions. This force, under the leadership of a specific CINC responsible for the "total war" mission, should take over the bulk of the existing defense funding, and focus exclusively on maintaining its readiness while modernizing aggressively. This force must have air-ground task forces dedicated to specific regions of the world and at least one complete Corps specifically trained for each of the four major terrain types over which major wars might be fought: desert, jungle, mountain, and urban.32 Selected elements of all of the other forces (e.g. small wars, constabulary) would pre-plan and train for specific contingency missions in support of a Major Regional Conflict campaign, and in the event of an MRC, would be chopped at required over to the operational control of the regional CINC who would also receive operational control of force on force elements.

Small Wars. We keep forgetting our history. Both the British and the Americans have learned the same lesson more than once: forces designed for traditional conflicts do not do well in small wars until they have undergone

26



such considerable adaptation as to render them unprepared and ineffective when required to return to traditional warfare. Small wars require a much higher standard of foreign area knowledge and language competency, to name just one significant difference, and are best fought by units trained, equipped, and organized specifically for small wars. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is ideally suited by both its strategic culture and its tactical excellence, to serve as the parent of a force of three division-wing teams optimized for expeditionary operations. This force would be especially skilled at joining international coalitions engaged in peace enforcement operations,33

and in executing violent complex forced entry missions.

Constabulary. The force that fights the small wars is not the force best able to maintain the peace, restore the functions of the failed state, and generally move as quickly as possible toward an exit that has been planned by the original engagement strategy. Constabulary forces require a combination of enormous numbers of civil affairs personnel, very high percentages of military police, engineering, medical, and food service personnel, and considerable communications, intelligence, and liaison personnel. This force must draw on and implement major civilian programs related to water purification and desalination, food purity and distribution, and epidemic conditions. This force must excel at working with and sustaining long-term relations with NGOs—a major challenge where our traditional intelligence and operations leaders have failed completely.34 This force has to fully integrate indigenous personnel into every aspect of its reconstruction of society and the eventual turn-over of authority to indigenous leaders. This force has to provide considerable training in many skill areas, and at the same time needs to plan for a deliberate abandonment of most of its equipment, including communications equipment, as part of "the deal." This force would then return to the Continental United States to reconstitute itself. It should be under CINC SOLIC.

Ground Truth. The average Embassy officer is not trained, equipped, nor suited by nature to go in harm's way on a daily basis. Most of what we need to know in the Third World is not published at all, much less in digital form or in English. Our increasingly complex world requires that we have a force for establishing "ground truth" through direct personal observation, in every clime and place. Such a force, created in the defense attaché mode but with much greater freedom of movement and much deeper mobility and communications support, would integrate overtly assigned liaison officers; "circuit riders" assigned to entire countries or regions and told to stay out of the Embassy and off of the cocktail circuit; and very selective networks of clandestine and covert observers using third party passports or surreptitious entry to obtain their direct "ground truth" observations including sensitive measurements and signatures

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intelligence (MASINT). This force should be under CINC SOLIC, but in keeping with my recommendations for overall intelligence reform there should be a major Clandestine Services Agency (CSA) Station co-located with CINC SOLIC to ensure optimal coordination between these "early warning" observations by warriors focused on rural areas, and the more traditional civilian clandestine espionage activities focused on urban political and economic and military targets.35

Electronic Security. We have a very long way to go before it is truly safe to live and work in cyberspace. Our financial, communications, power, and

35 As documented at length in ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA International Press, 2000), covert action operations above the one-on-one individual level should be transferred to CINC SOLIC; the CIA should be elevated in stature and funding to an analytically-focused National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the existing clandestine service should be spun off to a completely separated Clandestine Service Agency (CSA) that relies exclusively on non-official cover. The CSA would be required to co-locate regional Chiefs of Station and appropriate numbers of field case officers, analysts, and technical specialists with each regional and type CINC.31 The same people that have assured the Vice President that our military is ready for anything will be quick to deny this charge. One memorable "truth-telling" moment occurred at the Ninth Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army, when LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.) set the stage for the conference with hard-hitting remarks about how the past fifty years have left us with a defense decision-making system that has forgotten how to plan, cannot adapt to change, and is incapable of stimulating a serious dialogue. From Joint Vision 2010 to "dominant battlefield awareness," we are burdened with the proverbial naked emperor. As reported in the author's summary of the conference, published as "TAKEDOWN: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation", appearing in Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 98-99) and also in Defense Daily Network at www.defensedaily.com/reports/takedown.htm. 32 The first global survey of warfighting environments actually based on a careful service-level review of where we might actually have to fight in the early years of the 21st Century found that the combat terrain types of the specific countries considered actually fell almost equally divided into each of these four categories: desert, jungle, mountain, and urban. Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World (Marine Corps Combat Command, March 1990).33 There are several excellent works addressing both the incompetencies of the United Nations and the distinction between peacekeeping (passive observation) and peace enforcement (combat operations). Among the foremost scholars in the latter peacekeeping arena are Dr. David Charters in Canada, [email protected] and Professor Hugh Smith in Australia, [email protected]. 34 The one exception would be those operations where General Anthony Zinni was a prominent figure, first as a Marine Corps general on detail to joint task forces in Iraq

28



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transportation infrastructures remain totally exposed and vulnerable for the simple reason that we will not be secure until there is a wholesale conversion of all existing electronic systems to a high level of security that must be embedded from the factories of the components on out.36 This will require three major national initiatives that are not yet being properly discussed in Washington: 1) the definition of minimal mandatory standards for hardware, software, and personnel security in relation to electronic systems and their contents; 2) the imposition of these standards via "due diligence" legislation that requires all enterprises to be compliant within five years, with some systems to be secure within the year; and 3) the complete release of NSA-level encryption to the private sector so that the Internet can be as secure as Presidential communications. This level of security on the Internet is in fact a precursor to enabling the intelligence community as well as corporations to have access to all Relevant Information while still being able to process secrets. The minuscule effort being made today must be supplanted by a trained force responsive to CINC HOME, and electronic security brigades specializing respectively in financial, communications, power, and transportation systems, that are in turn integrated within a nationally distributed "virtual network" of private sector employees, National Guard specialists, and Home Front Force active duty cadre in new consolidated electronic operations centers focused on each of the major systems areas.

Citizen Education. "A Nation's best defense is an educated citizenry." As Senator Boren and David Gergen have noted so clearly,37 we are in fairly desperate circumstances in relation to both policymaker and voter knowledge about the hard realities of the world we live in. A major investment must be made in the "internationalization of education", but even more so, we must find ways to better integrate our increasingly diversified population so as to create a minimal level of social cohesion over time. It is my view that we must restore the draft and require every U.S. citizen to serve for four years, in any combination of years (e.g. 2 + 2 or 1 x 4) between their 18 th and 38th birthdays, with at least basic training and the first year being required before entering

and Somalia, and later as CINC of the U.S. Central Command. The traditional U.S. military and national intelligence approach to NGOs has been to speak platitudes about sanitizing information and not actually doing anything useful. Only the Civil Affairs community has had a glimmer of how to get a two-way information exchange going, and even they are at the beginning of the road. For a very worthy effort that merits respect at the Departmental level, see the report on the joint effort between the 353 rd

Civil Affairs Command (under BGen Sam E. Gibson, USA) and the U.S. Institute of Peace, to engage the NGOs. The first conference, in 1999, resulted in a report, "Taking It To The Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies", at http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/nextlevel.html.

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college. I must go further and in recognition of both the middle-aged immigration increases as well as the longevity increases, and say that we must have an additional draft requiring 2 years of service (at once or in stints of 3-6 months) from all those who are citizens in their 38 th to 58th years and have not served previously. At the same time, we must substantially increase private sector sabbaticals by our field grade officers and selected senior non-commissioned officers. We must, in effect, give true meaning to the concept of "total force" by ensuring that every single citizen has a common foundation of service to the Nation, and that we fully integrate every citizen—to the extent of their capabilities—into our national defense. This educational process does not require that every citizen bear arms—our new national defense force structure will offer many opportunities for those who do not wish to wear a uniform or learn how to kill.

In summary, all but one of these eight functions would be integrated under one of four "type" CINCs that would in turn support the regional CINCs much as the services do today but with a vastly improved focus of effort that assures both air-ground-sea interoperability as well as joint training and doctrine suited to the specific "type" of warfare to be fought. Over time we should convert each of the four Services into one of the type CINCs, or disband them as we downsize administrative capabilities and improve our tooth to tail competency under this new force structure approach. 38

Reordering the Government

At the same time, as Admiral and Ambassador William J. Crowe Jr. has noted, we need to do a much better job of organizing the rest of the government so that it is capable of "forward engagement" using all of the sources of national power.39 This should require, at a minimum, the establishment of Ambassadorial-level appointments to each regional CINC from Commerce, Treasury, the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International Development, and the up-grading of the existing Political Advisor positions from State to Assistant Secretary-equivalents.

A new CINC PEACE, as a "type" CINC, should be established with a small staff in the National Capital Area, close to the Department of State, and able to draw on military command and staff personnel as well as military dollars to ease the transition toward the day when we have proper funding and structure for the non-military elements of national power. Someone like General Colin Powell or Admiral William Crowe Jr. would be ideal candidates to serve as CINC PEACE, with international education, water, food, and public health as the mandated areas of interest,40 and the right to cut across

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bureaucratic boundaries, on behalf of the President, when it makes sense to do so. Eventually, once we have our national security house in order, we will find that a similar restructuring of government is necessary with respect to health, education, interior, and other domestic elements of government responsible for the internal "commonwealth".

CINC WAR CINC SOLIC CINC PEACE CINC HOMEForce on Force Small Wars State/USIA Domestic Threat

Constabulary Peace Corps Electronic SecurityGround Truth Economic Aid Citizen Education

Figure 8: Reconstitution of Force Structure

We cannot itemize all elements of this transformed national security force, but let us reflect for just a moment on what kind of global naval force structure might be required, and under what strategic premises.

In my world view, three elements of naval capability are vital to our future: first, the ability to deliver incremental increases in force or food anywhere in the world within 24, 48, and 72 hours for expeditionary and constabulary forces, followed by a full Army-Air Force Corps within the week to four weeks; second, the ability to fulfill all manner of tasks while keeping a very low non-intrusive logistics footprint "from the sea"; and third, quite plainly, to serve as the global foundation for the full range of our national power, around the world, to include service as mobile communications "nodes" for coalition and relief operations.

ACTUAL ACTUAL PLANNED NEEDEDU.S. Navy Ship Type 1987 Navy 1998 Navy 2010 Navy 2010 Navy

Ballistic Submarines 37 18 14 15Attack Submarines 102 65 50 50Troop/Attack Submarines 0 0 0 15Aircraft Carriers (Blue Water) 14 12 12 8Aircraft Carriers (Littoral Ops) 0 0 0 4Battleships 3 0 0 2Cruisers 36 29 27 36Destroyers 69 50 73 59Expediters (Modified DDs) 0 0 0 25

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Frigates 115 38 16 33Amphibious Warfare Ships 63 40 36 36Patrol Craft/Brown Water Ops 6 13 14 75Mine Warfare Ships 22 16 26 20Combat Logistics Ships 56 39 18 18Mobile Logistics Ships 19 19 9 9Fleet Support Ships 24 11 7 7Strategic Auxiliaries 6 1 7 5Other (AGF-LCC) 14 11 9 9Assistance Ships (Large) 0 0 0 8Assistance Ships (Small) 0 0 0 8Hospital Ships (Large) 2 2 2 3Hospital Ships (Small) 0 0 0 5

USMC Focus (%) 11% 11% 11% 14%Littoral Focus (%) 5% 9% 13% 31%

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TOTAL SHIPS 588 364 320 450

Figure 9: Transformation of the U.S. Navy for the 21st Century

Figure 9 above provides a detailed look at what a transformed U.S. Navy would look like if we got serious about an agile41 global security strategy—highlights of this new naval paradigm include a partial allocation of submarines to troop insertion duties; a reengineering and dedication of four carriers to amphibious and vertical short take off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft; restoration of two battleships to provide affordable fire support for OOTW; preservation of all destroyers while rapidly converting twenty-five of the Spruance class destroyers to the air-capable DDH version; broader distribution of our forces afloat; the creation of 75 deep/brown water patrol ships; and the creation of a 24-ship humanitarian assistance fleet.42

For the rest of the force restructuring, below, in very crude fashion, are some of the features of each of the ten force structure components of a new national security "total force."

CINCWAR Force on ForceExisting strategic nuclear forces, drawn down as appropriate, but modernizedFour Army-Air Force Corps of 3 division-wing teams each (12 & 12)Strategic mobility (black and gray) to move one corps in four weeks43

CINCSOC Small WarsComplete absorption of the U.S. Marine Corps, without dilution of its Congressionally-mandated character or culture including uniformsImplementation of the 450-ship Navy (rapid response, littoral squadrons)Creation of two active/ four Reserve foreign area combat support brigades44

ConstabularyFive active and five Reserve constabulary task forcesImplementation of the 450-ship Navy (humanitarian assistance slice)Ground TruthTen Reserve foreign area specialist companies45

Ten Reserve ground sensor /relay communications platoons (covert capable)CINCPEACE State/USIA

1000 additional foreign service/foreign information officers100 new consular/open source information posts46

Peace Corps10,000 new Peace Corps volunteers per yearImplementation of Peace Corps information assistance programEconomic Aid10 new water, food, and medicine projects each year (2 within USA)Digital Marshall Plan for the Third World

CINCHOME Domestic Threat50 National Guard Brigades, each with fire, riot, engineer, and medical battalions that train with state & local counterparts and also do international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

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National missile defense for New York and Washington as soon as possibleAbsorption of the U.S. Coast Guard, without dilution of its characterElectronic Security50 National Guard Electronic Security Centers50 National Guard Electronic Security Battalions, with specialist companiesCitizen EducationUniversity of the Republic47

Universal Draft/National Defense Fellowship Program

Figure 10: Major Components of Four "Type" Commands

The above approach to managing how we train, equip, and organize our varying force structures to deal with four distinct threat challenges wipes out, in one grand "Goldwater-Nicols"-style revolution, all of the negatives of the existing Service "stovepipe" acquisition systems and the cultures that go with them. This should be the focus of the National Security Act of 2001.Budgeting for National Security

There is no question but that the existing DoD budget must be both preserved and increased. Few would appear to disagree that it must be increased by $40 billion dollars a year, many would agree on $60 billion a year, and some would go so far as to advocate an increase of $100 billion a year.48

Where there is no agreement, in part because there has not yet been a serious discussion of the threat, the strategy, and the force structure in terms that would be acceptable to Senator Nunn's opening guidance, is on what we need to buy. Throwing more money at the existing RMA and the wish lists of the vendors supporting the services, is irresponsible.

This review has sought to answer Senator Nunn's explicit guidance by analyzing the threat, changing the strategy to address this complex threat, and determining the force structure needed to create four forces after next, comprised of eight distinct force packages under four "type" CINCs.

The next two tables summarize in a very general way both recommended and minimalist changes that would be needed in order to implement the strategy and create the additional force structure recommended by this review.49

We should be increase Program 50 by at least $40B a year while increasing the Program 150 budget by at least $10B a year.

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Program 50 Increases Program 150 IncreasesMilitary Personnel +3.0 Peacekeeping Personnel +1.0Operations & Maintenance +5.0 Operations & Maintenance +2.0Procurement (Current Force) +10.0 Economic Aid (Short Term) +2.0Procurement (Future Force) +10.0 Economic Aid (Long Term) +3.0RDT&E +7.0 RDT&E +2.0All dollar amounts in billions per year; increases above Figure 10 adjustments.

Figure 11: Recommended Increases in National Security Budget

However, if we have to implement this new strategy and effect these recommended force structure changes from within our existing budgets, then Figure 12 outlines a straight-forward redirection of $20 billion a year from within the existing Program 50 budget--$10 billion a year for creating the "iii" military force structure including the 450-ship Navy, and $10 billion a year for the conflict deterrence and peacekeeping elements of Program 150. 50 Ideally we should do both, since much of what we have planned now is both unaffordable and ineffective against the real-world threat.

Program 50 Modifications Program 150 IncreasesKill 2+/JV 2010 -5.0 Digital Marshall Plan +2.0Kill Missile Defense -3.0 Global Coverage Network +2.0Kill new attack sub -2.0 Increase State Operations +1.0Kill fancy TacAir -5.0 Double AID projects +2.0Kill CVN & DD21 -5.0 Peace Corps times five +1.0Build 450 Ship Navy +5.0 USIA + Culture +1.0Home Front Force +2.0 International Education +1.0Constabulary Force +2.0Ground Truth Force +0.1TOTAL Net Reduction -10.0 Total Net Increase +10.0All dollar amounts in billions per year.

Figure 12: Minimal Mandatory Budget Adjustments

Conclusion

Both the RMA and the so-called defense transformation movements have failed. The 2+ MRC strategy has failed. Our security environment demands a Home Front Force; a Peace Force; a Ground Truth, Small Wars and Constabulary Force; and a dedicated strategic nuclear and conventional War Force that is not frittered away on OOTW.

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We require a National Security Act of 2001. This strategy, and the attendant force structure, are achievable within six years from where we are today, but will not be achievable as readily if we delay because the U.S. Navy is decommissioning ships as we speak—we must put a stop to their dismantling of our submarine, destroyer, and frigate capabilities because it is the U.S. Navy, as CINC PEACE, that will have the greatest burden to bear in support of CINC SOLIC (U.S. Marine Corps) and CINC WAR (U.S. Army). We must give CINC HOME (the U.S. Air Force) the financial resources—and culturally-powerful incentives—with which to rapidly reconfigure itself into an effective Home Front Defense that fully integrate and respects the needs and concerns of our state & local and private sector partners in our "total war" environment.

If we adopt a 1+iii strategy and implement the recommendations of this review, America will enter the 21st Century with a national security architecture well-suited to our needs and agile—able to fight and win in any clime or place.Summary of Findings

Threat

The threat facing America in the 21st Century is both domestic and foreign—as foreseen by our Founding Fathers and provided for in the Constitution. Domestically we face issues with respect to water conservation and replenishment, public health infrastructure decline, a failure to internationalize education, and very high vulnerability of our critical electronic infrastructure. Overseas the threat consists of four distinct warrior classes—the high-tech state actor; the low-tech violent non-state actor; the low-tech and general non-violent displaced person and refugees; and the high-tech state and non-state actors engaged in economic espionage and electronic attack. The global environment is highly unstable, with massive water scarcity and ethnic fault lines combining to create failed states, complex emergencies, food scarcity, massive genocide and refugee movements, modern plagues, and other atrocities (child soldiers, left-over landmines)—these in turn have given rise to a class of "rogue warriors" that benefits from misplaced humanitarian assistance and the black markets that emerge around instability and failed states.

Strategy

A national security strategy appropriate to the global interests of the one remaining superpower—and the one true champion of democracy and

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human rights—must integrate a global intelligence strategy; an interoperability strategy that recognizes the vital roles of the private sector and non-governmental organizations as well as less complex states; a force structure strategy that makes deliberate trade-offs between military and non-military instruments of power, between active and reserve force structure alternatives, and between government versus overt private sector responsibilities; and a home front defense strategy that fully integrates domestic, electronic, missile, and coastal defense capabilities. It must address all four of the threat classes, and can be called the 1+iii strategy.

Force Structure

The service-based approach to force structure, and the 2+ Major Regional Conflict strategy, have combined to render America's military both unready for traditional war, and unsuited for operations other than war. The Revolution in Military Affairs has corrupted our acquisition decision-making to the point that we have created a strategic deficit in both interoperability with allies and coalition partners, and in our access to external Relevant Information. At the same time, non-military force structure has atrophied and is unable to fulfill its vital national security missions including conflict deterrence through preventive diplomacy and economic assistance.

The new force structure appropriate to the changed strategy can be conceptualized as a "core force" with common global mobility, communications, and logistics services, and eight distinct national security functionalities that must be fulfilled by a predominantly military structure and culture: Strategists, Domestic Threat, Force on Force, Small Wars, Constabulary, Ground Truth, Electronic Security, and Citizen Education.

While under the operational command for four regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC), this new force structure is probably best created and sustained by a conversion of the services into four "type" CINCs, each responsible for one of the four warrior classes: a CINC WAR, responsible for sustaining a strategic nuclear and conventional force that is always fully ready for a Major Regional Conflict; a CINC SOLIC responsible for sustaining three distinct capabilities for Small Wars, Constabulary Operations, and Ground Truth operations; a CINC PEACE, possibly double-hatted as Secretary of State but more probably operating as a Presidential program manager and charged with revitalizing our preventive diplomacy and economic assistance programs but in relation to a regionally-based forward engagement strategy for conflict deterrence; and a CINC HOME responsible for sustaining National Guard forces operating under the legal authority of their respective Governors,

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electronic security, and citizen education including two drafts and a national fellowship program for field-grade officers, operational oversight of the U.S. Coast Guard, and development of the national missile defense.

Budget

The 1+iii strategy and related force structure, to be fully effective and rapidly implemented, requires at least a $40 billion a year increase for traditional defense (Program 50) and at least a $10 billion a year increase for the non-military elements of national security (Program 150) .51 Staying within the existing budget is not recommended. However, if mandated to do so, modifications can be achieved within

36 Winn Schwartau must be regarded as the overt father of information warfare, and the Patrick Henry of warning about our vulnerabilities to electronic espionage and attack. Apart from his earliest novel, Terminal Compromise and his testimony to Congress on 27 June 1991, his book INFORMATION WARFARE: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (Thunders Mouth Press, 1994) and his sponsorship of InfoWarCon, mark him as an original. His most recent book, CYBERSHOCK: Surviving Hackers, Phreakers, Identity Thieves, Internet Terrorists and Weapons of Mass Disruption (Thunders Mouth Press, 2000), popularizes this topic for the public. A few others, such as Dr. Jay Keyworth, former Science & Technology Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, and specialists within the U.S. Intelligence Community, were also conscious and active in the late 1980's and early 1990's. All the others jumped on the wagon after Schwartau got it moving down the public trail. He deserves much more credit than he has received.37 David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins, Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); see especially David L. Boren, "Introduction: The Context and the Challenge" (Chapter 1), and David Gergen, "The Media and International Relations and Foreign Policy" (Chapter 20).38 As discussed in note 24.39 Supra, note 37, in "Foreword", William Crowe provides a thoughtful "capstone" on the role and responsibilities of the United States in national security and foreign affairs, on the fact that neither our security nor our prosperity are assured, and on the need for to focus on rebuilding our domestic infrastructure while reordering the government. He says "A reappreciation of government is also in order. Relations between the federal government and business, and with state and local governments, are still to be satisfactorily tuned. … The right level of spending on national security and the conduct of diplomacy must be reached. … And finally, we have to create a more constructive information media, and to provide our youth—kindergarten through doctorate—the best education in the world." Latter words on page xi.40 The difference between the United Nations and CINC PEACE is that CINC PEACE would be focused exclusively on U.S. interests and concerns, and would work closely with the Secretary of State to strike a balance between U.S. funding and demands of the United Nations structure, and deliberate peacekeeping actions by CINC PEACE in alliance with a wide variety of other state and non-state actors.

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the existing budget by diverting $20 billion a year from Program 50 and using $10 billion of this to create the "iii" part of the 1+iii force structure, with the other $10 billion a year going to reinforce Program 150. A National Security Act of 2001 is required—on-going decommissioning of naval vessels will make any delay more expensive.

41 This word, "agile", is now completely identified with David M. Abshire, and is discussed at length in "United States Global Policy: Toward an Agile Strategy", in David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins, Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st

Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) and as reprinted from the original publication in Washington Quarterly (Spring 1996), pages 41-61. Dr. David Abshire, a graduate of West Point, has been a consistent champion of strategic thinking at the Presidential level.42 A complete discussion of this needed future naval force is provided in the author's "Muddy Waters, Rusting Buckets: A Skeptical Assessment of U.S. Naval Effectiveness in the 21st Century", accepted for publication by the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, withdrawn and published at www.defensedaily.com/reports/gonavy.htm (17 November 1999) and also in word version at www.oss.net/Papers/white/EE21.rtf. 43 Strategic mobility for military manpower is not really an issue—as one wise person whose name I cannot recall has pointed out, there is more than enough commercial air capability to move an entire corps around the world, one simply has to temporarily nationalize all U.S. flag carriers. Strategic mobility for heavy equipment is much more challenging, and it is here that major investments must be made.44 Each brigade would have a battalion for each of the following mission area specialties, and would be able to field an expeditionary landing team (ELT) consisting of one platoon or company from each battalion maintaining each of these capabilities in the reserve with foreign area and language-qualified personnel: military police, intelligence, civil affairs, combat engineering, judge advocate, public affairs, supply, and medical.45 As a general rule, the foreign area specialty units in the Reserve would be under the operational and administrative command of the specific regional CINC that they are intended to support. The regional CINC would be their advocate before the Joint Requirements Board, and would protect them from being abused by Service or Type CINCs still obsessing on having shooters instead of thinkers.46 The author has examined information collection flows in three Embassies where he served, and come to the conclusion that most governments operate on 2% of the available foreign language information. The biggest problem is that the only people with money to buy information overseas are the spies—we need to return to the original concept of foreign service personnel as overt information collectors, but we must give them the resources they need to do the job properly. In addition to ON

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http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/gonavy.htm



Endnotes

INTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, this aspect of national security is covered in depth in the author's second graduate thesis, "Strategic and Tactical Information Management for National Security", University of Oklahoma MPA, 1987.47 The University of the Republic would bring together, on the basis of merit, mid-career and senior leaders across all sectors of the nation, and in this manner create "cohorts" whose informal ties will reinforce the extended concept of national intelligence in the 21st Century able to implement a national knowledge strategy that in turn contributes directly to both national security and national competitiveness. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 12 of ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA International Press, 2000), available from www.amazon.com. 48 The best of these references is Goure, Daniel and Jeffrey M. Ranney, with a Foreword by James R. Schlesinger, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millenium (CSIS, 1999); a variety of papers by Andrew Krepinevich and others from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, at www.csbaonline.org are also very rich in content.49 Both sets of recommendations have been cross-walked with the recommendations of others and validated by retired Office of Management and Budget (OMB) senior officers with a deep understanding of Program 50 and Program 150.50 Broad budget figures are not provided in relation to Small Wars because the U.S. Marine Corps budget, with some increases from selected Army, Navy, and Air Force budgets, would comprise the majority of this budget. As it transitions to becoming the largest element of CINC SOLIC's "type" command, the USMC would retain its distinctive culture and expand by having first choice of selection from those applying for transfer from the down-sized Force on Force elements of each of the other three services. The U.S. Coast Guard would transfer from the U.S. Department of Transportation to CINC HOME, but retain all of its roles and missions in relation to transportation and commerce, including drug interdiction and port security.51 Staying within the existing budget is not recommended. However, if mandated to do so, modifications can be achieved within the existing budget as shown in Figure 12.

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