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Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace
Intaek HANAssociate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace [email protected]
I. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Cyberspace
II. Cyber Threats
III. National Strategies
IV. International Cooperation
V. Building Blocs for Cyber Peace
I. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Cyberspace
- Expansion of cyberspace
- Growing dependence- Cyber anarchy
- “Next battle space”
- Only India, China, and the Philippines had adoption below 10%- Global 40%, USA 60%
Broadband Adoption: Asia-Pacific
II. Cyber Threats
- Types & methods
- Trends & distribution
- Characteristics
- South Korean experience
Types
- Cyber war, cyber terror, cyber sabotage, cyber espionage, cyber crime, hacktivism
Methods
- Hacking, malware, DDoS- Chipping, nano machines, electronic jamming, EMP
Trends & Distribution
- Threats are increasing by time & across the board
- More threats originate in Asia-Pacific than in any other region
- Frequency of threats varies by country
- 42% of observed attacks originated in APAC, 35% in Europe, 21% in North/South America, and 1.5% in Africa
Characteristics- Attackers are numerous & anonymous, domestic
& foreign, and state as well as non-state
- Attacks are low-cost, instantaneous, asymmetric, and borderless
- Usually no direct physical damage or casualties
-> Difficult to identify, attribute, detect & retaliate
South Korean Experience
- Chronology of major incidents
January 25, 2003July 7, 2009March 4, 2011April 2011
III. National Strategies
- Defense, offense, deterrence, prevention
- National strategies are expensive and ineffective; they can be also inappropriate
- Obstacles to cyber deterrence
IV. International Cooperation
- Obstacles to International Cooperation
- Determinants of Security DilemmaOffense-Defense BalanceOffense-Defense Distinction
- Security Dilemma in Cyberspace* Additional complication: Non-state actors
Capacity Building
- Can improve national strategies
- Indirectly mitigates security dilemma if combined with confidence building
- Also a responsibility
Confidence Building- Communication
ex. Hotline- Constraints
ex. No first use, no civilian target, no cross-domain escalation
- Transparencyex. Unilateral declaration or exchange of information
- Verificationex. Inspection
Confidence Building (continued)
- Limitation in cyber space
- Additional complication: Non-state actors
Norm Building
- Rewriting the traditional law of war to apply to cyber conflict
- Traditional law of warApplies to interstate conflict as carried out by uniformed armed forces between two or more states
- New norm must also “fit” with extant norm
Parting Thoughts
- The best defense may still be good old diplomacyTraditional diplomacyCyber public diplomacy
- Can cyber war be a lesser evil than kinetic war?
- Why no al Qaeda-led cyber war yet?
Threats and Countermeasures in Cyberspace
Intaek HANAssociate Research Fellow, Jeju Peace [email protected]