Thinking About Centralization , Politicization, and Bureaucratic Control
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Transcript of Thinking About Centralization , Politicization, and Bureaucratic Control
Thinking About Centralization, Politicization, and Bureaucratic Control
Andrew RudalevigeDept. of Political Science
Dickinson College
Presidential Power-lessness Neustadt (1990)
“Presidential weakness was the underlying theme [in 1960]…. Weakness is still what I see.”
Moe (1985) So… what can
presidents do to help themselves?
Politicization Centralization
Defining Terms Centralization
Shift of function from staff units further from the president (in departments) to those closer (in the EOP)
“centralized” are those whose only constituent is the president himself
Normally, organizationally proximate to the president
Defining Terms Politicization
putting the appointment power to “systematic use” in “infiltrating the bureaucracy as a means of promoting political responsiveness” (Moe)
Politicization:Real Loyalty, Texas-style
“I want real loyalty. I want someone who will kiss my ass in Macy’s window and stand up and say, ‘Boy, wasn’t that sweet!’”
Caro 2002, 129
Contextualizing Presidential Choice
Does President Want to Act?
No:No Centralization or Politicization
Yes
AdministrativeAction
StatutoryAction
White House Dept/Agency White House Dept/Agency
Congress Interest GroupsCongress Interest Groups
Centralization and Politicization: So Happy Together?
Moe’s implied logic: do everything at once, until “congruence” with presidential incentives and resources is reached. Presidents “readily embrace
politicization and centralization because they have no attractive alternatives.”
There are costs associated with each: given fixed managerial budget, president can only afford so much of each Centralization
The Ollie North effect (monitoring); Political costs (especially decline of success in
Congress); Loss of EOP administrative efficiency (Krause
2004)
Politicization Difficulty of finding appropriate appointees Competence costs Political costs
Instead: Exchanging Complements?
So - if centralization and politicization are substitutes - are there conditions under which presidents will choose one strategy over the other? And, if they occur in different policy
areas, but simultaneously, could they be substitutes but look like complements?
And, could they occur sequentially? cf. Bush II Department of Education
1 2 3 40
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Values by Year of Term
% political SES
% political appts (x10)
Centralization
Perc
enta
ge
Inde
x of
Cen
traliz
atio
n
0 1 2 3
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Impact of Selected Variables on Centralization
Pol pct SES
Manage
New
Distance from Rules
Complex
Level of Centralization
Pct I
mpa
ct, S
hift
from
10t
h to
90t
h Pe
rcen
tile
Total Appointee Percentage
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 1.05 1.15
Percent Employees Appointed
Prob
abili
ty P
ropo
sal F
orm
ulat
ion
Com
plet
ely
Cen
traliz
ed
Unified Government Divided Government
Senate-confirmed Appointee Percentage
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65Percent Appointed
Prob
abili
ty P
ropo
sal F
orm
ulat
ion
Com
plet
ely
Cen
traliz
ed
Unified Government Divided Government
Percentage SES Appointed
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
Percent Appointed
Prob
abili
ty P
ropo
sal F
orm
ulat
ion
Com
plet
ely
Cen
traliz
ed
Unified Government Divided Government
Ramifications Need to think about relationship
and tradeoffs between policymaking choices: what does an appointment “buy” you?
The notion of “bureaucratic control” itself: brings our focus to earlier stage of bureaucratic involvement in policy
Other things to think about Is politicization necessarily prior,
and exogenous, to centralization? Use of simultaneous equation models
Control for policy areas or types of agencies?