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Transcript of Thesis for Printing
TheEuropeanUnion:
ADemocraticallyDeficientSupranationalBody?
Name:HansvanDeursen,UCU
StudentNumber:3984109
Tutor:RosemaryOrr
ThesisSupervisor:Dr.FrancescoMaiolo,UCU
SecondReader:External
Date:20/08/2016
CourseCode:UCSSCRES32
ECTS:15
WordCount:13212
2
Acknowledgments
TherehavebeenmanytimesthatIgaveup,andwithoutthehelpofthosearoundme,I
wouldnothavebeenabletopickmyselfupandgetthisthesisdone.Therearetherefore
somepeopleIhavetomention,aswithoutthem,therewouldnothavebeenathesisto
readinthefirstplace.Firstandforemost,LieslHildaAliceZiegler.Withoutyourincessant
trust,emotionalsupport,andlove,IdonotknowwhereIwouldhavefoundtheinspiration
tokeeponwriting.Secondly,RosemaryOrr.Infaceofalltheinstitutionalchallenges,you
havebeenabletoguidemethroughtotheend.
Thankyouboth.
3
ListofAbbreviations
- CAP:CommonAgriculturalPolicy
- CFSP:CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy
- CoE:CouncilofEurope
- CT:ConstitutionalTreaty
- EC:EuropeanCouncil
- ECB:EuropeanCentralBank
- ECHR:EuropeanCourtonHumanRights
- ECJ:EuropeanCourtofJustice
- ECSC:EuropeanCoalandStealCommunity
- EDC:EuropeanDefenceCommunity
- EEC:EuropeanEconomicCommunity
- EMU:EuropeanMonetaryUnion
- EP:EuropeanParliament
- EPC:EuropeanPoliticalCommunity
- EU:EuropeanUnion
- IGC:IntergovernmentalConference
- JHA:JusticeandHomeAffairs
- MP:MemberofParliament
- QMV:QualifiedMajorityVoting
- SEA:SingleEuropeanAct
- SWIFT:SocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancialTelecommunication
- TEU:TreatyonEuropeanUnion
- TFEU:TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion
- US:UnitedStatesofAmerica
- WEU:WestEuropeanUnion
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Introduction
SincetheestablishmentoftheEuropeanUnionin1993andtheintroductionofthe
Euroin2002,theEuropeancountrieshavebeeninterconnectedonahithertounprecedented
level.Noothergroupofcountries isas interdependentasthecountriesthatmakeupthe
European Union today: national borders have all but disappeared, a joint European
democracyhasbeenestablished,andtherehasevenbeenanattemptatdraftingaEuropean
constitution– eventually culminating in the2007Treatyof Lisbon. Indoing so, individual
member states have increasingly transferred political and economic powers to the
supranational European Union, which has now assumed many functions that we have
traditionallyattributedtoademocraticnation-state.Thisprocessisadirectconsequenceof
the member states’ efforts since the Schuman declaration of 1950 that proposed the
EuropeanCoalandSteelCommunitytofurtherEuropeanintegration.
These66yearsofEuropeanintegrationhavebeenmarked,withitsupsanddowns,by
anunparalleleddegreeofeconomicprosperityformostWesternEuropeans.Fromtoday’s
point of view, it has therefore become difficult to imagine the post Second World War
rationaleforincreasedEuropeancooperation(Borrogan2).Thecombineddevastationofthe
FirstandSecondWorldWarhadleftEurope“inshambles”(Frieden259).Theoncedominant
Europeancontinenthadbeenreducedtoashadeofwhatithadbeen,withGDPpercapita
lessthan75%of1939levelsamongthecontinentalallies–suchasFranceandtheUnited
Kingdom (Ibid 261). The aftermath of the Second World War made European leaders
thereforeunderstandablydetermined toavoid suchdestruction in future. In sodoing the
preventionofwarbecamethedrivingforceforEuropeanintegration,as“warbetweenFrance
andGermany[hadtobecome]notmerelyunthinkable,butmateriallyimpossible”(Appendix
C). Today, however, this unity has become a given, and the primary goal of European
integration:toavoidfuturewars,afadingmemory.Thisisevidencedbyeuroscepticssuchas
GeertWilders,whoemphasisethatthefearofwarisa“lietheelitestellthepopulation”to
frightenthemintofurtherEuropeanintegration(PartyforFreedom10).1Nonetheless,the
fearofanotherwarandtheneedforeconomicrecoverywerethedrivingforcesforEuropean
1Originaltext:“Anderskrijgenweoorlog–liegendeelites”
5
integration,anditcanbearguedthatinthispursuit,Europehasbeensuccessful(Borrogan
2).
Regardless,thedecadesfollowingtheSchumandeclarationwitnessedacontinuous
processofenlargementandincreasingcooperation.Fromsixmembersin1951theEuropean
Uniontodayhasexpandedtoastaggering28memberstates.AlthoughtheEuropeanproject
has largelybeensuccessful,as ithashelpedcreateeconomicprosperityandpeace, ithas
been far from unproblematic. Especially in recent years the European Union has been
increasinglycriticisedonseveralfronts:thefreedomofmovement,itsinefficienttreatment
of the euro crisis, the apparent choice of technocracy over democracy, and its lack of
solidarityinfaceoftherefugeecrisis(Ibid).Moregenerally,thereisanoveralldiscontentwith
thecurrentconfigurationoftheEuropeanUnionanditslackoflegitimacy,asGuyVerhofstadt
notedinhisConclusionsoftheECmeetingfollowingtheBrexit(EuropeanParliament).This
trendbecamepainfullyclearforthefirsttimein2005,withtherejectioninFranceandthe
Netherlandsoftheconstitutional treaty, itgainedmomentumwiththefinancialcrisisand
subsequenteurocrisis,andhascometoanewheadearlierthisyearwiththeso-calledBrexit.
Althoughovertimetheproblemshavevaried,theystemfromanunderlyingcause:thenature
oftheintegrationprocess.WhatistheEuropeanUnionreally:asupranationalbodyorgroup
ofsovereignstatesthatworkcloselytogether?Theanswertothatisconvoluted,andopinions
differ,as“thereisnouniversalagreementaboutwhattheEuropeanUnionisoroughttobe,
and[there]neverhasbeen”(Peterson17).IfthereisnoconsensusonwhattheEuropean
Unionisinitsessence,therewillalwaysbeconflictonhowtheUnionissupposedtodealwith
crisesandevolveingeneral.
Oneareainwhichthisissueisparticularlyapparent,istheattempttodemocratisethe
EuropeanUnion.Sincethe1980sscholarshavearguedthattheEuropeanUnionsuffersfrom
a“democraticdeficit”(Hix,ThePoliticalSystem155).Althoughthereisnostraightforward
definitionofthisterm,itsignifiesthattheamountofpowerstransferredtothesupranational
Union,mostnotablywiththeMaastrichttreatyof1993,hasnotbeenmatchedbyanincrease
initsdemocraticlegitimacy–oritisatleastnotperceivedassuch(Ibid68).Consequently,
theaverageEuropeancitizen feelsdisconnected frompolicymakingon the supranational
level. This despite attempts, such as the Lisbon Treaty, to create amore democratic and
transparentUnion.ThecurrentconfigurationoftheEuropeanUnionhasthusbeencalledinto
question, along with the nature of its democracy. This raises the question whether a
6
supranationalbodysuchastheEuropeanUnioncanevenbedemocratic,theanswertowhich
hingesonouraprioriconceptionsofwhattheEuropeanUnionisinitsessence.Iwilltherefore
proceed in this thesis toanswer thequestion: towhatextent can theEuropeanUnionbe
consideredasupranationalpoliticalbodywithademocraticdeficit?
ToanswerthisquestionthisthesiswillfirstbrieflygooverthereasonsforEuropean
integration and how it has evolved over the years; subsequently, the functioning of the
EuropeanUnionasweknowittodaywillbediscussedthroughananalysisoffiveofitsmajor
institutions: the European Parliament (EP), the European Council (EC), the Council, the
Commission,andtheEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ);thisisfollowedbyanexaminationof
theEuropeanUniontodeterminewhetheritisasupranationalbodyoratightcooperation
ofsovereignstates;lastly,thedemocracy,orlackthereof,willbeconsidered.Inordertoaid
me in this endeavour Iwill rely on secondary sources andmake use of the fundamental
treatiesoftheEuropeanUnion:theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)
andtheTreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU).
The last few months have shown, in light of the Brexit, that this topic is more
significantthaneverbefore.TheEuropeanUnionisfacedwithcrisesleft,right,andcentre,
anditdoesnotseemtohaveanadequateresponse.Questionsontheessentialnatureofthe
EuropeanUnionandtheextenttowhichitrepresentsitscitizens,arethereforeparamount.
WithoutathoroughunderstandingofthesefundamentaltenetsoftheEuropeanUnion,we
cannotproceedtoimproveit.AlthoughthisismostcertainlynotthefirstcrisistheEuropean
projecthasfaced,itisundoubtedlyoneofthemostfundamentalones.InthewordsofGuy
Verhofstadt:“EithertheUnionwillchange(…)oritwilldie”(EuropeanParliament).Whatis
lefttobedone,isdeterminehowwearetochangeit.
7
1. TheHistoryofEuropeanIntegration
InordertodefinethenatureoftheEuropeanUniontodayandanalyseitsdemocratic
deficit, it is importanttoknowhowandwhytheEUgottowhere it isnow,andwhatthe
drivingforcesforintegrationwere.Althoughwehaveseenageneralincreaseinthedegree
ofcooperationbetweenthevariousmemberstatesovertheyears,thecompetingideasthat
give shape to this process have remained similar: supranationalism versus
intergovernmentalism(Dehousse22).Moreover,eachmemberstate,beingsovereign,hasto
haveasayinthisprocess,andaseachofthenow28membershasadifferentviewonthe
“pace and scope” of European integration, every step has involved difficult negotiations
(Lelieveldt 23). Consequently, themanner inwhich the EU evolved over the years, is the
productofacarefulbalancingactbetweenthismultitudeofcompetingideasthatarestill
relevanttoday.UnderstandingthepathofEuropeanintegrationisthususefulinanyattempt
atanalysingtheproblemsitfacestoday.
This chapterwill analyse the reasons for (increased) European integrationand the
treatiesthatformalisedit.
FromWartoCooperation
The Europe that we know today is most assuredly a direct consequence of the
devastatingeffectsof theSecondWorldWar,asoutlinedabove,but the ideaofaunified
Europewasnotnewatthetime.IntheinterwaryearstheadvocatesofamoreunifiedEurope
were“legion,”andseveralattemptsatincreasedcooperationweremade,mostnotablywith
thePan-EuropeanUnionin1923–amovementthatstillexiststoday(Urwin5).ThisUnion,
which includedmany influential figuressuchasKonradAdenauerandGeorgesPompidou,
however,failedtoachieveanypracticalresults,whichisrepresentativeoftheotherattempts
atthetimeaswell:therewastalkbutlittleeffectiveaction.Moreover,thepersistingeffects
of the economic crisis, the rise of fascism, and the resulting focus on national defence,
ensuredthatEuropeanintegrationwasnevera“serioustopicofdiscussion”formost(Ibid7).
Nonetheless,theideapersisted,andtheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWarproved
“fertileground” for the ideaofEuropean integration tobecomereality (Lelieveldt4).The
reasonforthis isthreefold.Firstly,theSecondWorldWarhad instilledadetermination in
European leaders that, “war may never break out again between the European people”
8
(Konrad Adenauer Foundation 14). Although this provided an important impetus, and
definitelycreatedmuchgoodwillamongtheEuropean leaders for thenotionofEuropean
integration,economicrecoverywasaseconddrivingforceforincreasedcooperation.Atthe
time,theEuropeaneconomieswereindirestraits,andinfaceofthenewSovietthreat,a
strongEurope,includingGermany,becameimperative,asaweakEuropecouldbecomeeasy
preytoSovietambitions.Thirdly,therealityofthepost-warworldwasthateachindividual
Europeancountrywasbutamiddlingpoweratbest.Topreserveitsglobalcompetitiveness,
theEuropeancountrieshadtocooperate(Dinan,EverCloserUnion2).Or,asWimKok,former
Dutchprimeminister,described it: “Europeancountriesbetterhang togetheror theywill
hang separately” (17). It was under these circumstances that European leaders, such as
WinstonChurchill,calledfora“UnitedStatesofEurope”(Zurich).
Thisconsensusatthetime,thatEuropeancooperationwasthesolewayforward,may
suggest in retrospect that the subsequent treaties of Paris in 1951 and Rome in 1957,
establishingtheECSCandEECrespectively,weremerelogicaloutcomesofasetofvariables.
However,nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.Theinternationalpoliticallandscapemay
have been conducive of change, but this change still required significant effort. The first
decadeoftheEuropeanprojectwasthereforecharacterisedbya“periodoftrialanderror”
eventuallyresultingintheECSCandEEC(Dehousse22).
TheFoundingDecade(1948-1958)
The Congress of Europe inMay 1948 is a “landmark” in the history of European
integration aswe know it today, and is alsowhere it finds its origins (Walton 738; Ash).
Although few practicalmatterswere agreed to at this conference, it served to show the
attendants’commitmenttoaunifiedEurope,andwasthustobecometheimpetusforthe
eventualUnion tocome.However,alreadyat this conference, the first fissures started to
appear between those countries who desired a constitutional federation and those who
wantedanintergovernmentalunion,whichhascharacterisedtheintegrationprocesssince.
Nevertheless,what followedwasa seriesof treaties, agreements, andplansproposingor
creatinginstitutionthatwouldgovernatthesupranationallevel(AppendixA).
9
ThefirstpracticalattemptsatunifyingEuropeweretheestablishmentoftheOEEC,
whichpromotedfreetradeandregulatedthereconstructionofEurope,andtheCoE,2which
wascreatedtopromotedemocraticvaluesacrossEurope.Althoughbothorganisationswere
inclusive,with17and10membersrespectively,beingintergovernmentalistbodies,neither
inspiredunity.EspeciallybecausetheformerwascreatedattheUS’insistence,andthelatter
“burdened by unanimity” (Phinnemore 14; Rittberger 687).Moreover, the CoEmembers
couldbe“exemptedfromdecisions[thatwere]founddifficult”(Ibid).Understandably,those
whohadadvocatedaconstitutionalapproachweredisappointedbythis.Asaconsequence,
the Shuman declaration followed short after. In this declaration Schuman proposed that
France,Germany,andanyotherwillingnation(s)would“pool”theircoalandsteelproduction
(AppendixB).The reason for thiswas that coalandsteelare important rawmaterials for
wagingwar,whichhadservedGermanywell inthepast,poolingthemwouldthusdiffuse
such tensions andprovide security (Rittberger 687). The independent, supranationalHigh
Authority would preside over this community, aided by the Council of Ministers. The
independenceofthesebodieswouldbesafeguardedbyaCourtandaCommonAssembly.
Interestingly,thisinstitutionalset-upstillpersistsafterafashionintheEUtoday,whichisa
testament to its durability (Ibid 674). Eventuallywhat is now known as ‘the Six’: France,
Germany,Italy,andtheBenelux,joinedthiscommunitybysigningtheTreatyofParisin1951.
Thesuccessofthisinitialforayintosectorialsupranationalismcoupledwithaheating
upof theColdWarstartedto“accelerate”the integrationprocesswiththeagreementto
create a European army under the EDC (Dehousse 23). Before this treaty could even be
ratified,aplanforapoliticalcommunitygoverningforeignpolicy,theEPC,wasalsoproposed,
whichwouldcomplementtheaforementioneddefencecommunity.Bothinstitutionswould
bemodelledafter theECSC.Notevenadecadehadpassedsince theendof thewarand
already European countrieswerewilling to transfer their sovereignty in twomajor policy
areas (Lelieveldt 11).However, inwhatwas to become the first setback in thehistory of
European integration, the French national assembly did not ratify the EDC treaty, thus
scrappingbothproposed institutions (Moravcsik,TheChoice forEuropep.86).Despite,or
perhapsbecauseof,thisinitialfailureEuropeanpoliticiansquicklyrallied.Barelyayearafter
rejectionoftheEDCandEPCtheSixcametogetherinMessinaanddecidedthataEuropean
2NottoconfusewiththeEuropeanCouncilorCouncilofMinisters
10
unity“shouldbefirstofallachievedintheeconomicsphere”(MessinaDeclaration).Tothat
endtheTreatyofRomewasdraftedandagreedtoin1957.Thistreatycreatedacustomunion
calledtheEECandanucleardevelopmentcommunitycalledEuratomtofacilitateunityon
economicterms.TheEECeventuallybecametheframeworkforEuropeanintegration,and
shaped Europe aswe know it today, as it set out to establish freemovements of goods,
services,persons,andcapitalamongtheSix(Lelieveldt11).Furthermore,commonpolicies
wouldbepursued inareassuchas transport,commerce,andagriculture (Gilbert53).The
institutionalframeworkforthesenewlyformedsupranationalcommunitieswerelargelythe
same as those in the ECSC. Themost significant alteration, however, was that the EEC’s
equivalentoftheHighAuthority,theCommission,was limitedintheextentof itspowers.
Althoughitcouldstillmakelegislativeproposals,thesehadtobeapprovedbythecouncilof
ministers,amethodwestillseetoday(Lelieveldt11).
Withthefoundingdecadedrawingtoaclosethreesupranationalcommunitieshad
beenestablished:theECSC,theEEC,andEuratom.Despitethisapparentproductivity, the
agreementswere the subjectofmuch contestation. The various interestsof the Sixwere
difficulttoalign,andsovereigntywasnotaneasythingtorelinquish,asevidencedbythe
short-livedEDC,whichwouldalsobecomeproblematicinlateryears.Thefoundingcountries
hadgonefromanintergovernmentalistattitudetoaconstitutionalone,butwhenbothfailed,
theysettledforafunctionalistapproach:gradualintegrationthroughcooperationinspecified
policyareas(Dehousse23).Nonetheless,perhapsthemostnotableachievementofthisera
was symbolic, as the “dream” of European integration had become a reality (Konrad
AdenauerFoundation12).
ConsolidatingtheCommunity
ThedecadethatfollowedtheTreatyofRomewasmostlycharacterisedby internal
disagreements and a consolidation of the community model created in the 50s. This is
perhapsnotentirelysurprising,asthegoalsoftheEECwereambitious,thatwhichhadbeen
agreeduponrequiredtimetotakeeffect,andthemembersofthecommunityhaddiverging
interpretationsonEurope’sfuture(Phinnemore16).
ThedisagreementsbetweentheSixinthedecadeaftertheestablishmentoftheEEC
concernedthenatureofEuropeanintegration,andhasshapeditsince.TheFrenchpresident,
DeGaulle,feared“encroachmentsonFrenchsovereignty”whereasothermemberswanted
11
tointensifyEuropeancooperation(Dehousse24).However,theEEC’sinstitutionshadbeen
created with great care, as the subsequent crises would point out, with the Council of
MinistersastheintergovernmentalistcheckonthesupranationalCommission.Attemptsto
alterthatdynamicwouldthereforenotcometofruition.TheFouchetplanof1961isonesuch
attempt,commissionedbydeGaulleitadvocatedamoreintergovernmentalistapproachto
Europeanunion,butfailedduetofearsofFrenchhegemonyamongtheBeneluxcountries
(Gilbert 69). Similarly, efforts by Commission president Hallstein in 1964, to endow the
GeneralAssemblyandCommissionwithitsownbudgetarypowers,enrageddeGaulle,asit
infringedonFrenchsovereignty(Ibid80-1).Theupsetwassogreat,thatitledtothe“empty
chair crisis” with the French delegation refusing to attend council meetings for nearly 6
months (CVCE “TheEmptyChairCrisis”). This crisis came toa closewith the Luxembourg
Compromise, allowing countries in the Council a veto power even though officially the
decision-makingprocesswasbyQMV(Ibid).Thismadeunanimityvotingbydefault,ifnotby
treaty,thedominantforceintheCouncil,and,insodoing,reassertedintergovernmentalist
controloversupranationalistproceedings(Urwin136).
Although this may have been a victory for France and intergovernmentalism, a
concurrent,andunexpected,developmentwastakingplaceintheECJthatshowsanopposing
trend.ChargedwithsafeguardingtheTreatyofRome,theECJhassinceitsinceptionasserted
much control over the direction of the integration process by interpreting this treaty
constitutionallyratherthan“employing[a]traditionalinternationallawmethodology”(Stein
1). In doing so, the ECJ became a driving force for federalism rather than
intergovernmentalism(MaduroandAzoulai70).Thisbecamemostevidentintwolandmark
casesestablishingdirecteffectin1963,allowingindividualsto“invoke”Europeanlegislation
over the head of national jurisprudence, and primacy in 1964, which signifies thatwhen
nationallawconflictswithEUlawthelatterprevails(Lelieveldt12).Thismovecompensated
for the Luxembourg compromise by reaffirming the importance of supranationalism.
Interestingly,therehavebeenonly“smallpocketsofresistance”againstit,despitethefact
thatitclearlyinfringesonnationalsovereignty(Weiler,“AQuietRevolution”524).
TheLuxembourgcompromiseandthetwoECJrulingsmayhavebeen“paradoxical”,
but they strengthened the EEC’s institutional framework, as both supranationalist and
intergovernmentalist views on European union became entrenched in it (Dehousse 25).
12
Despitedifficulties,thisprovedadefiningmomentforEuropeanintegrationastheTreatyof
Romewasgivenpracticalshape.
TowardsMaastrichtandLisbon
Althoughasignificantamountoftimeseparatesthecompletionofthecustomunion
in1968and theMaastricht treaty in1993,Maastrichtwouldbecome the firstbig change
since.AftertheconsolidationoftheEEC,inspiteofhighhopesthatDeGaulleleavingoffice
wouldopenupnewvistas for integration,aperiodof “eurosclerosis”began tobogdown
Europeanintegration(Dinan,EverCloserUnion56-9;Dinan,OriginsandEvolution170).This
optimism did appear, at first, to be correct,with longstanding disputes, such as the CAP
funding and increased powers for the Assembly, being resolved. Additionally, the EEC
successfully negotiated trade agreements, proposed a common monetary system, and
formalised themeetings of the heads of state in the EC – still an important European
institution today (Dinan, Ever Closer Union 70; Dinan, Origins and Evolution 170).
Nonetheless,unanimityvotinginthecouncil,whichbecamepracticeaftertheLuxembourg
compromise, three successive enlargements, and a weak commission complicated the
decision-makingprocess.Toaddtothat,theeconomicboomthathadcharacterisedpost-war
EuropecametoanendwiththeonsetoftheFirstOilcrisis,andwithit,thenationalfocus
shifted to thedomestic rather than the supranational (Dinan, EverCloserUnion70). This
became evident from the advent of leaders sceptical of European integration, such as
MitterandandThatcher,whichtarnishedcommunitysolidarity(Wood49).Inlightofallthis,
pundits feared for a disintegration of the EEC. A sentiment thatwas exacerbated by the
cancellationofthe25thanniversaryoftheTreatyofRome,towhichthepresidentoftheEP,
PietDankert,tellinglyremarkedthattheCommunitywaslike“afeeblecardiacpatientwhose
condition issopoorthathecannotevenbedisturbedbyabirthdayparty”(Holman2). In
otherwords,itwascleartoEuropeanleadersthatintheearly80stheEuropeanprojectwas
indireneedofinstitutionalreformandanewimpetus.
ThedefiningmomentforthisbecametheECmeetingatFontaineblueinJune1984.
Mitterand,infaceofhisdisastrousdomesticpolicy,wasdeterminedtoachieveasuccesson
the international scene, and, as Francewas to assumepresidencyof the EC in 1984, this
seemed the right moment. At the time, European decision-making had continually been
stalled by Thatcher’s insistence that theUK’s financial contribution to the EEC had to be
13
reassessed.Mitteranddid just that,whichhelpedcreatea favourablepolitical climate for
further steps towards European integration (Wood 49). This combined with impending
Mediterranean enlargement, a European-wide trend towards deregulation and enhanced
competitiveness,andamore“assertive”parliamentbackedbythepopularvote,clearedthe
way for renewed institutional reform (Dinan, An Ever Closer Union 87). In the words of
commissionerChristopherTugendhat,“thefeelingoficebreakingupandspringapproaching”
becamemoreprevalent(Ibid70).So,withtheleadersofthethreemajorEuropeancountries,
Thatcher,Mitterand,andKohl,onthesamepageattheECinFontainbleu,theECcouldset
theCommissiontowork(Wood50).
Under the auspices of Mitterand’s former Finance Minister Jacques Delors the
Commissionwasdeterminedto finaliseaEuropeansinglemarketby1992.Witheven the
Thatchergovernmentonboard,agovernmentgenerallyscepticaloffurtherintegration,quick
headwaycouldbemade,asasinglemarketeffectivelyderegulatedtheEuropeanmarketby
takingawaytradebarriers,whichwastothelikingoftheconservatives(Phinnemore19).This
wasformalisedsoonafterwiththeSEAagreeduponatanIGCin1985.Althoughmanypro-
integrationistsweredisappointedbythelimitedscopeoftheSEA,asitwasseenasmerely
moreofthesame,itcreatedgreatpotentialforpolicy“spill-over;”simultaneously,itwasnot
toohardtoswallowforgovernmentsscepticaloffurtherintegration(Dehousse26-7;Dinan,
Origins and Evolution 229; Phinnemore 19). Nonetheless, it became clear that the scant
institutional changesThatcherallowed for in theSEA, suchasmoreQMV inexchange for
trade liberalisation,were not sufficient to accommodate the imminent reality of a single
market(Wood52).Ideasthathadformerlybeenregarded“moribund,”suchasacommon
competitionpolicy,morecoordinated foreignpolicy, judicialcooperation,andamonetary
union,revivedasaconsequenceofthismove(Dinan,OriginsandEvolution229).TheSEAwas
thus promising, but talk of a Europeanunion still encounteredmuch resistance, andwas
regardedbymanyas“rhetoric”ratherthanreality(Phinnemore20).Thisdespitethefactthat
theSEAclearlystateditsintentionto“transformrelationsasawholeamongtheStatesinto
aEuropeanUnion”(SEA1)
Nonetheless, in light of the subsequent, and unexpected, fall of the communist
regimes in Eastern Europe, and with German unification at hand, a more political union
became viable, as the unified Germany had to be securely embedded in the European
framework (Dehousse 27). Consequently, two IGCs were convened in 1990 and 1991 in
14
MaastrichttonegotiateaTreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU).Themostnotableoutcomehereof
wasprobablytheEMUandtheintroductionofasinglecurrency,butitalsointendedtoreform
the European institutions and extend its “scope” (Phinnemore 20). Although a complete
politicalunionwasnotachieved,withso-called“highpolitics,”suchasforeignpolicy-making,
remainingfirmlyinthehandsoftheindividualmemberstates,thepowersofsupranational
institutions,suchastheEP,weregreatlyexpanded(Ibid).
The TEU set forth a three pillar system that combined would form the EU: the
EuropeanCommunities3,aCFSP,andacommonpolicyonJHA.Thefirstpillarrepresentedthe
supranationalEuropeanbodies,whichwouldundergosignificantchanges,bothinstitutionally
andinthebroadeningoftheirpowers.TheEPwasmostaffectedbythis,mostnotablywith
theintroductionofcodecision,aprocedurethatprovidedtheEPequalpowersinlegislative
approvalastheCouncil;thepowertoapproveorrejectthecommission;andbybroadening
the rangeof topics inwhich theyneeded tobe consulted (AppendixC;CVCE “Maastricht
Treaty”).However,themosttellingchangewasperhapsasmallone,asthewordeconomic
wastakenoutoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunity.InsodoingtheEuropeanCommunity’s
scopewasextendedbeyondthatofeconomiccooperation,nowincludingareassuchassocial
policy, education, public health, and the creation of a European citizenship – provided it
abidedbytheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Moreover,anindependentECBwasestablishedtotake
chargeofthefusionofEuropeaneconomicpolicy,whichwasrequiredforthesinglecurrency
that would be introduced in 2002. The second and third pillar of the EU were
intergovernmentalistinnature;theycoverthecreationofacommon–notsingular–foreign
policyandaddresstheissuesarisingfromfreedomofmovementinasinglemarket,suchas
crimeandasylumpolicy,respectively(Ibid).Allinall,thisdepictsanintegrationprocessof
“bitsandpieces,”becausethoughtheeconomicintegrationfollowedadefinite“blueprint,”
assetoutbyJacquesDelorsandpresidedoverbytheECB,thepoliticalintegrationlackeda
clear“philosophy”(Curtin,“TheConstitutionalStructure”17-8).Thisisevidentfromthefact
that,dependingonthepolicyarea,therewouldbeadifferentapproachtodecision-making,
eithersupranationalor intergovernmental innature,andeachwithdifferent roles for the
variousinstitutions(Phinnemore21).
3TheEuropeanCommunitiesare:theEEC,theECSC,andEuratom
15
Consequently, unlike the period following the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of
Maastrichtdidnotusherinadecadeofconsolidation.Onthecontrary,thefollowingyears
witnessedtwoIGCs inAmsterdam,1997,andNice,2001,amendingtheEUasset forth in
Maastricht.Both IGCs focusedonreviewingwhathadbeenagreeduponandamending it
wherenecessary.InAmsterdamthefocuswasondistillingmoredemocraticprinciplesinthe
EU,suchastheinclusionofhumanrightsandtransferringaspectsoftheJHApolicytothe
supranational EC (EU “AConstitution for Europe”; Cini 24). The IGC inNicewasprimarily
focusedontheimpendingenlargementofanothertwelvememberstates,andtherequired
institutionalreformstoaccommodateit.Thismainlyinvolvedareassessmentofthevotingin
theCouncil,thenumberofdelegatespercountryintheEP,andadecreaseinthenumberof
commissioners. Although seemingly straightforward, this proved a difficult task, as the
enlargement had the potential to significantly alter the distribution of power in the EU
betweenthesmallerandlargerstates.Tothatend,abalancehadtobestruckbetweenthe
degreeofempowermentofthesmallercountriesandthedegreeofrestrictiononthelarger
oneswhilstmaintaining an effective decision-making process (Dehousse 28-9).With both
partiesseekingtomaximisetheirabilitytoexertinfluenceonthedecision-makingprocess,
and the fact thatone institutionalalteration in theexistingbalanceofpower requiredan
adjustmentelsewhere,madethisanarduousprocessthatledtomuchcriticism(Ibid;Moberg
280-1). Nonetheless, after a fashion, Nice and Amsterdam did prepare the EU for
enlargement,buttheirimportancewasnotintheinstitutionalchangesthatwereenacted,
butrathertheineffectualnatureofthereformprocess(Dinan,EverCloserUnion172).The
lackoftransparencyoftheIGCs,aggravatedbythesheernumberofamendmentsthathad
beenproposedsinceRome,andtheconstantstrivebetweensmallerandlargercountriesfor
relativepower,signalledthatadifferentapproachwasrequired(Ibid).
Thisdifferent approachwouldbeembodiedby theConstitutionalConvention that
rapidlysucceededtheNicetreatyin2001.Theresultofthisconvention,theCTof2004,was
generallyheraldedasagreatimprovement:themyriadofexistingtreatiesanddocuments
wouldbemergedintoone,itwouldsimplifyanddemocratisetheEU,itwouldgivetheEUa
legalpersonality,anditwouldgetridofthepillarsystem(Dinan,EverCloserUnion181-2;
Church,Phinnemore35).But,itwastonoavail,asitwasrejectedbyreferendainFranceand
the Netherlands in 2005, a stinging blow as both were part of the original Six founding
memberstates.Severalreasonshavebeenattributedtothisdefeat,suchasafailureofthe
16
conventionto involvethepopulation, fears,spurredbyeurosceptics, thattheconstitution
wasanattemptatcreatingaEuropeansuperstate,andgeneraldiscontentofthosepeople
whofeltdisconnectedfromEuropeanpolitics(Ibid;Dehousse33).Nevertheless,thesituation
lefttheEUinapickle,asthestatusquo,whichmanystillregardedasunacceptableinlightof
theenlargement,wasmaintained.Asaconsequence,theEUmemberstatesorganisedanew
IGCinLisbontodiscusshowtheEUwouldbereformedinlightoftheConstitutionalfailure.
ThisresultedintheTreatyofLisbonin2008,whichcontained“mostofthetechnicalreforms
proposedundertheCT,”butwithouttheconstitutionallanguage(Dougan622).Theresulting
institutionalframeworkistheonethatisstillineffecttoday,andwillthereforebediscussed
incloserdetailinthefollowingchapter.
Inshort,thehistoryoftheEuropeanUnioniseverythingbutuncontested.Everystep
oftheintegrationprocesssawfiercedebatesandrequiredagreatwillingnesstocompromise
fromall participants. Despite these efforts, however, important changeswere onlymade
possibleinlightofthepoliticalclimateatthetime–theaftermathofWorldWarIIisprobably
the most notable example hereof. Nonetheless, the scope of the European integration
processhasslowlydevelopedfromacoalandsteelcommunity,toacustomunion,andfinally
to a “quasi-constitutional” single market union with a single currency that encompasses
multiplepolicyareasnolongerlimitedtotheeconomicsphere(Dehousse39).Thismayimply
a linear process of steadily increasing cooperation, but it is interesting to note that the
questionsweaskourselvestodaywithregardtothefutureoftheEUareallbutnew.Take
theCToftheearly21stcentury,itmayhaveseemeda“grandioseproject”andanewexciting
stepintheEuropeanintegrationprocessatthetime,butthatneglectsthefactthattherehad
alreadybeena similar constitutionaldebate in the50s (Watt).Moreover, the reasons for
integrationandthegoalsofthevariouscountrieshaveremainedrelativelystableovertime.
Larger states, with the notable exception of Germany, generally favour integration on
intergovernmentalist terms, and smaller states generally prefer a supranational union.
Today’s problems may thus be different, but the way in which they are dealt with has
remainedlargelythesame.
17
2. TheInstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion
Formany countries in today’sworld there is a clearly defined territory and set of
peoplethatmakeupthestate.Insuchcasesthereisnorealneedtothinkoverlymuchonthe
institutionsthatactuallyconstitutesuchanationasastate,becausethoughtheseinstitutions
mightdisappear,thenationwillliveon.TheEUisadifferentstory;itdoesnothaveaclearly
definedterritory,astherecentBrexitpointsout,noraclearlydefinedpopulationthatbelongs
toit.TheEUthereforereliesheavilyonitsinstitutionsforitscontinuedexistence,without
them,therewouldnotbeanEU,becausetheEUisacollectionofnation-statesratherthan
oneinitsownright.Inotherwords,athoroughunderstandingofthescope,workings,and
powersofeachinstitutioniscriticalinanyattempttounderstandwhattheEUisinitsessence,
andinthepursuitofestablishingwhetherithasademocraticdeficit.
Thereareseven institutions thatmakeuptheEU:TheEP, theEC, theCouncil, the
Commission,theECJ,theECB,andtheCourtofAuditors.Thischapterwillfocusonthefirst
five,astheseinstitutionscontainthethreebranchesofgovernment,afterafashion,thatare
foundinmostWesterndemocraciestoday:thelegislative,theexecutive,andthejudiciary.
Eachinstitution’stasksandpowerswillbrieflybeexplainedwiththehelpoftheTFEUand
TEU.
TheEuropeanParliament
TheEPisarguablyoneofthemostpowerfulinstitutionsoftheEUtoday;itistheonly
institutionthatisdirectlyelectedbytheEuropeanpopulationandisalsotheinstitutionthat
hasundergonethegreatestchangesinceitsinceptionin1950(Peterson124-5;TEUarticle
10).ThereasonsforthiscontinualincreaseinthepoweroftheEPistwofold.Firstly,itisnoted
intheTEUthat“thefunctioningoftheEUshallbefoundedonrepresentativedemocracy”
(article10).TheonlyEuropeaninstitutionthatembodiesthatarticlefullyistheEP,so,inthe
eyes of the drafters of the successive treaties, increasing the powers of the EP was the
simplestwaytoaddresstheallegeddemocraticdeficitwithinthecurrentconfigurationofthe
Union (Shackleton145). Secondly, a strongparliament is in linewithEurope’sdemocratic
traditions,andisthereforerelativelyeasytoagreeto(Ibid125-6).Thereareelectionsevery
fiveyears,whenEuropeancitizenscanvoteonrepresentativesfromtheirowncountrywho
areeachmembersofEuropeanparties.ThetotalamountofMPs intheEP is751andare
18
allocatedtoeachcountrybasedonpopulationsize,withamaximumof96andaminimumof
6representativespercountry.
Themain roleof theEP isoutlined in theTEUas follows: it “shall, jointlywith the
Council, exercise legislative andbudgetary functions (…) exercise (…) political control and
consultation(…)[and]electthePresidentoftheCommission”(article14).Thisjointlegislative
procedure,calledcodecisionortheordinarylegislativeprocedure,signifiesthateverypiece
oflegislature,in85definedpolicyareas,needstobeapprovedbyboththeCouncilandthe
EP(AppendixC).Ifone,orboth,institution(s)donotagree,orcannotcometoaconclusion
thatsatisfiestheEP,theCouncil,andtheCommission, itwillnotbeadopted(TFEUarticle
294).
ThepowersoftheEPhavethusincreasedextensivelyovertheyears–withanotable
accelerationaftertheintroductionoftheSEA–fromanadvisorybodythatcouldonlycensure
the High Authority in the 50s to a “strong” co-legislator on par with the Council today
(Rittberger701).Althoughprotocol1ontheroleofnationalparliamentsintheEUallowsfor
nationalparliamentstoobjecttoEUlegislature,providingitdoesnotabidebytheprinciples
ofsubsidiarity,muchpowerhasbeentransferredfromthenationalparliamentstotheEP
(article3).ThisbecamemostevidentstraightaftertheTreatyofLisbonenteredintoforce
withtheEP’srejectionoftheSWIFTagreement(Traynor).WiththisdecisiontheEPdefied
theCommission, theCouncil, thememberstates’nationalgovernments,andWashington,
whichfirmlyestablishedtheimportoftheEPinEUpoliticstoday.Thiswasfurtherhighlighted
by the US’ response, showing more respect towards the EP than before, as Joe Biden
advocatedtherevisedSWIFTagreementintheEPhimself,which,toeveryone’srelief,passed
(Biden;Pop).
TheEuropeanCouncil
DespitethefactthattheEChasexistedsince1974,ithasonlybecomeaformallegal
entitywiththeTreatyofLisbon,whichmarkeditasaEUinstitution(Peterson52;TEUarticle
13).Since its inceptiontheEChaswieldedasignificantdegreeofpower,which isadirect
consequenceofitsverynature,asitiscomprisedofthememberstates’headsofgovernment
(TEUarticle15).TheEChasthereforeanunmatcheddegreeof“politicalauthority”compared
totheotherinstitutions,becauseitsdecisionsaremadebyconsensus,unlesswhenotherwise
19
indicatedinthetreaties,bythemostinfluentialexecutivesoftheEU(Lewis142;TEUarticle
15).
TheECmeetsatleasttwiceeverysixmonthsinprivateandundertheauspicesofthe
ECpresident,currentlyDonaldTusk,whositsforatermof2,5years(TEUarticle15).Themain
tasksoftheECarebroadandextensive,asitischargedwith“providingtheUnionwiththe
necessaryimpetusforitsdevelopment[and]definingthe[EU’s]generalpoliticaldirections
andpriorities(…)[without]exercisinglegislativefunctions.”(TEUarticle15).Moreover,the
ECoutlinestheEU’s“strategicinterests”anddeterminesthe“goalsandguidelinesfor”the
EU’sforeignandsecuritypolicy(TEUarticle15,26;TFEUarticle68,222).Inthis,theECand
theCouncilsupersedeindividualgovernmentleaders,astheseleadersaretoconsulttheEC
and/orCouncilon“anymatterof[common]foreignandsecuritypolicy”beforeactingonit
alone(TEUarticle32).Inotherwords,theECsetstheEU’spoliticalagendaandkeepsthings
movingforward(EC“SettingtheEU’sPoliticalAgenda”).
For as long as full executive power will not be unequivocally transferred to the
supranationalbodiesoftheEU,theECwillremainanindispensablepartoftheEUdecision-
makingprocess.Thisdespite,orperhapsbecauseof,itsintergovernmentalnature,because
inacollectiveofstates, littlecanbedonewithouttheconsentofthehighestexecutiveof
eachsovereigncountry.TheEChasbolsteredthisimageseveraltimesinthecrisesthathave
beset the EU in the last decennium. Take the financial crisis of 2008. The then rotating
presidencywasinthehandsofPresidentSarkozywhoconvenedanECmeetingnearlyevery
monthtoprovideanadequateresponsetothebankruptcyofLehmanBrothers(Schoutheete
65).NootherEUinstitutioncouldhavedoneso.
TheCouncil
Duetoitshigh-profilecharactertheECgetsmuchmoreattentioninthemediathan
theCouncil–alsosometimesreferredtoastheCouncilofMinisters–butit istheCouncil
wheremuchoftheworkactuallytakesplace(Lelieveldt59).AlthoughtheCouncilisalluded
to as a single unit in most of the literature, it actually has many varying configurations
dependingonthepolicyarea.Essentially,“theCouncilconsistsofarepresentativeofeach
MemberStateatministeriallevelwhomaycommitthegovernment”toaparticulardecision
(TEU article 16). This is why the Council is sometimes referred to as an institutional
“chameleon,”becausenooneministerialofficialcanmakedecisionsonallpolicyareas,which
20
means the configuration of the Council is not fixed (Curtin 81). This constantly shifting
configurationcouldcauseinstability,so“consistency”intheCouncil isprovidedforbythe
GeneralAffairsCouncil,whichiscomposedoftheforeignministersoftheMemberStates,
and the President of the Council, a position that rotates every half a year between the
MemberStates(TEUarticle16).
The first task of the Council, as described in the section on the EP, is that of co-
legislator.In85policyareasithasasharedlegislativefunctionwiththeEPandinafewitis
thesolelegislator(Lelieveldt59;TEUarticle16).However,theCouncilalsofulfilsasecond
importantfunction,namelythatofexecutiveforCFSPdecisions.TheCouncil,initsForeign
Affairs configuration, is presided over not by the Council’s president, but by a specially
appointedHighRepresentative.TogetherwiththisHighRepresentative“theForeignAffairs
Council (…) elaborates the Union’s external action (…) laid down by the EC;” thus giving
practicalshapetothedirectionsetoutbytheECto,forinstance,sanctionRussiaorcombat
terrorism (Ibid article 16; Lelieveldt 59-60). TheHigh Representative subsequently enacts
thesedecisionsontheinternationalsceneincooperationwiththepresidentoftheECand
Commission. (TEU article 15, 18, 27). Although the High Representative’s appointment is
different from that of the other Commissioners, he or she fulfils the function of a Vice
PresidentoftheCommission(TEUarticle18).
Initsdecision-makingprocesstheCouncilmakesuseofQMV–amajoritybeing55%
oftheCouncilmembersrepresentingatleast65%oftheEUpopulationwithcertaindefined
blockingminorities–,whichhastodaybecomethedefaultvotingprocedure(Lewis148;TEU
article16;TFEUarticle238).AlthoughthelegislativesideoftheCouncilispublic,theexecutive
tasksareconcludedbehindcloseddoors(Lelieveldt60). In itsvariousdealingstheCouncil
representstheinterestsoftheMemberStates’governmentsandcooperatescloselywiththe
EP,EC,andCommission;itthereforehasanimportantroleinbothlegislativeandexecutive
functions(Ibid62).
TheCommission
Inaway,theCommissioncanberegardedasthegovernmentoftheEU,asitisthe
onlyexecutivepowerintheEUthatdoesnotrepresenttheinterestsoftheindividualMember
States,as theCouncilandtheECdo. Instead, its responsibility is to“promotethegeneral
interestof theUnionandtakeappropriate initiatives to thatend” (TEUarticle17).This is
21
underlinedbythefactthateachCommissionerhastoswearanoathtoonlyrepresentthe
interestoftheUnion,notthatoftheMemberStatefromwhichheorsheoriginates(Ibid
article17;TFEU245;Lelieveldt62).Unlikeanationalgovernment,theCommissionersarenot
electedbythepeople,rather,eachMemberStates’governmentputsforwardoneoftheir
senior officials. The governments do this in cooperation with the President of the
Commission,whointurnisselectedbytheECandapprovedbytheEP.OncetheCommission
hasbeenputtogether,itrequiresthefinalapprovaloftheEPtostartitswork(TEUarticle
17).
TheCommissionhasseveraltasks,themost importantofwhichisprobablythatof
legislative initiative,meaning that “legislativeactsmayonlybeadoptedon thebasisof a
Commissionproposal”inallareasexceptforCFSP(TEUarticle17,27).Onceaproposalhas
beenmade,theordinarylegislativeprocedurewillstart;theCommissionshallmanagethis
legislativeprocessandnegotiatebetweentheCouncilandEPwhennecessary,actingasan
“honestbroker”(TFEUarticle294;Peterson119).Theimplementationoftheproposalsthat
areultimatelyadoptedistheresponsibilityoftheCommission,asisthe“correctapplication
of community law” in general (TEU article 17; Lelieveldt 64). In this latter pursuit, the
Commissionhasthepowertosanctionstateornon-stateactorsandbringacasebeforethe
ECJ(TFEUarticle124;Lelieveldt64).Outsideoftheseinternallyorientedcompetences,the
Commissionalsohasaroleinexternalrelations,beinganimportantEUexecutivetheycan
representtheEUatimportantIGCs,forinstance(Egeberg127).Thisrolewasbolsteredinthe
TreatyofLisbonbytheincorporationoftheHighRepresentativeintotheframeworkofthe
Commission,eventhoughheorshestillreportstotheCouncil.
All put together the Commission seems an immensely powerful organisation,
assumingmany tasksusuallyattributed toanationalexecutivegovernment,which iswhy
manyhaveoftenvieweditwithsuspicion(Ibid136;Lelieveldt60).Inreality,however,the
Commissionlivesina“worldmadeexclusivelyofpaper,”asithasnomeans,otherthanthe
consentoftheMemberStates,to“dictatebindinglegislation”(Lelieveldt60).Nonetheless,it
remainsthe“principledesignerandmanagerofEUpolicy”despitepressuresexertedonit
fromtheEC,theCouncil,andtheEP.
22
TheEuropeanCourtofJustice
Wheretheexecutiveandlegislativefunctionsaredividedoveravarietyofinstitutions,
thejudiciaryislocatedinasingleinstitution:theECJ–alsoreferredtoastheCourtofJustice
(Lelieveldt 73). Unlike the other institutions the main task of the ECJ is relatively
straightforward,thoughcomprehensive,asthey“shallensurethatintheinterpretationand
applicationoftheTreatiesthelawisobserved”(TEUarticle19).TheECJshall“ruleonactions
broughtbyaMemberState,aninstitution,oranaturalorlegalperson[and]givepreliminary
rulings,attherequestsofcourtsortribunalsoftheMemberStates,ontheinterpretationof
Unionlaworthevalidityofactsadopted”(Ibid;TFEUarticle267).TheECJcanthusrulein
threetypesofsituations:whenchallengingthelegislativeactsofanEUinstitution,when“the
Commissionconsiders thataMemberStatehas failed to fulfilanobligation,”andwhena
MemberStates’courtasksforaninterpretationofEUlaw(TFEUarticle258,263,267).Inthe
lattersituationtheECJ’srulinghasprimacyoverthenationalcourts(TEU/TFEU“Declaration
ConcerningPrimacy”)
As pointed out before, the ECJ can be regarded as one of the most successful
supranational institutions of the EU; it has “no rival as the most effective supranational
judicialbodyinthehistoryoftheworld,”hasbeenacriticalactor intheharmonisationof
Europeanlaw,andhassobecomeadrivingforceforEuropeanintegrationonfederalterms
(StoneSweet18;MaduroandAzoulai70;Peterson11).AlthoughMemberStatesandnational
courtsdonotalwaysagreewiththeinterpretationofEUlawbytheECJ,oftenaccusingitof
“judicialactivism,”theyhaveovertheyearsfalleninlinewithitsdecisions,whichhasmade
itapowerful“toolinadvancing”Europeanintegration(Kapsis174-5).Nonetheless,ithasits
limitations,mainlybecauseitsscopedoesnotincludeCFSPandcriminalmatters,and,likethe
Commission, only exists in virtue of the Member States’ cooperation, as they have no
enforcementtoolsoftheirown(Lelieveldt75).
23
Inbrief,theinstitutionalframeworkoftheEUisset-upsoastotryanddividethethree
branchesofpowerasequallyaspossibleoverboththesupranationalandintergovernmental
institutions.TheEPrepresentsEuropeancitizensdirectly,andtheECandCouncilrepresent
theMemberStates’governments,whoare“themselvesdemocraticallyaccountableto”their
owncitizens(TEUarticle10). It isthisattemptthatmakestheEUsuchacomplexpolitical
body.ThelegislativeisembodiedbytheEPandtheCouncil;theexecutivepowersaredivided
overtheEC,theCouncil,andtheCommission;andthejudicialisfirmlylocatedintheECJ.
Thisshowsthatthevariousgovernmentsdowanttocooperate,evenifthatmeansa
transferofpowers to supranational institutions,butonly if there is an intergovernmental
check or ‘get-out-of-jail-for-free card’ available simultaneously. Because, despite the
“incremental” institutional changeover theyears,withmorepowersbeing transferred to
institutions such as the EP and Commission, there is still always the potential for their
decisions tobeblockedby the intergovernmentalaspectsof theEU (Peterson16).This is
perhapsbestevidencedintimesofcrisis,whenimportantdecisionsandcommitmentsneed
tobemadequicklytoensureanadequateresponse.Althoughotherinstitutionsmighthave
thecompetencestoact,itismostoftenstilltheECthatmakesthemostimportantdecisions,
astheyalonehavetheauthoritythatisrequired.Moreover,theECJandCommissionwield
muchpower,butcanonlydosoinvirtueoftheMemberStates’cooperation,astheyhaveno
enforcementpowerontheirown.Additionally,theEP,arguablythemostsupranationalof
theinstitutionsasitisdirectlyelectedbytheEuropeanpopulation,ischeckedbytheCouncil.
Inotherwords,everyinstitutionwiththesolepurposetofurthertheUnion’sinterests,
has an intergovernmentalist check, to ensure that its decisions do not infringe on state’s
sovereignty.Althoughthismayseemaroundaboutandineffectivewayofconductingpolitics
andahalf-heartedcommitmenttointegrationatbest,itisthiscarefulbalancingactthatgot
theEUtowhereitistodayinthefirstplace:“integrationthroughdeliberation”(Eriksen25).
However, it is also at the root of some of the EU’s greatest failings: its alleged lack of
transparencyand legitimacy, thedegreeof technocracy,and its inability toadaptquickly.
Nonetheless, in spite of this adversity, the EU’s institutional frameworkworks quitewell
overall,thisisparticularlyclearfromthe“waryinterdependence”oftheCouncilandEPasco-
legislators(Hayes-Renshaw88).
24
3. ASupranationalorIntergovernmentalUnion
In the previous chapters the integration process and the current institutional
configurationoftheEUhasbeendiscussed.Basedontheconclusionshereof,thisthesiswill
now proceed to discuss the nature of the EU and whether it is supranational or
intergovernmental.Althoughtheanswertothisquestionmayseemstraightforward,asthe
EU,inmanyrespects,clearlysupersedesthenational,thepreviouschaptershavepointedout
that this is not necessarily the case. Over the years, intergovernmentalists and people
favouring a supranational Union have vied for dominance, often resulting in hard fought
compromises.Thishasledtothecuriousbalanceintheinstitutionalframeworktoday.
InordertodeterminewhethertheEUsuffersfromtheallegeddemocraticdeficititis
importanttoanalysetheextenttowhichtheEUhasactuallybecomeasupranationalbody,
andonwhattermsthathasoccurred.Agroupofcountriesthatcooperateinanumberof
policyareaswithoutlettingdemocraticsupranationalbodiestakedecisionsontheirbehalf,
can hardly be called a democracy. Such a cooperation can therefore not suffer from a
democraticdeficitinthefirstplace.AlthoughtherealityoftheEUisfarmorecomplicated
thansketchedinthisexample,itisimportanttothinkon,asthemannerinwhichwedescribe
orinterprettheEU,informsusastowhatitis.EspeciallybecausetheEUhasverycarefully
setupitsinstitutionstobothadvancetheEU’sinterestsandmakesurethesedonotinfringe
onthecountries’sovereignty.Thischapterwillthereforeexplorewhetherwecanconsider
theEUasupranationalpoliticalbodybylookingattheoriesofintegration,themostimportant
ofwhichare:federalism,intergovernmentalism,andneofunctionalism.
TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration
BeforeexpoundingonthetheoriesofEuropeanintegration, it is importanttonote
thateachtheoryisnotanattempttoexplainthefullEuropeanproject.AsIhavepointedout
before, the EU is a multifaceted organisation incorporating both intergovernmental and
supranationalaspectsthatcanprobablyonlybefullyexplainedbyasetoftheoriesexplaining
bitsandpieces(Rosamund,“TheorisingtheEU”87).Nonetheless,thetheorieswechooseto
explainEuropeanintegrationwiththemselvesarenarrativesofthesocialrealitytheytryto
describe(Jackson73).Thesetheoriesthereforedomorethansimplydescribeandexplain,
rather,theybreathelifeintotheobject.ThisringsespeciallytruefortheEU,as,unlikewith
25
nationalgovernments, there isnopre-existingagreeduponsingularentity that isEurope.
Simplyput,ifthereisaclearlyobservableobject,sayacat,thereislittleissueindescribing
orexplainingit,asthemind-objectdivideisnotbreached;but,thefurtherwemoveaway
fromthecat,themorewehavetorelyon“tacit”assumptionsaboutwhatwesee,andthese
assumptionsareinformedbytheory(Wendt5).Thetheoriesdescribedherearenottheonly
theoriesonEU integration,buttheyarethemostcommonones,astheyaremostclosely
linkedtotheintentionsofthevariousnationalleadersinsettinguptheEU.
The most well-known theory with regard to European integration is probably
federalism. This theory describes a system that divides authority between regional and
centralactors(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration24).ThecentralactorinEurope
would be regarded as supranational. The regional actor is leftmostly intact, but confers
certain responsibilities previously agreed upon to centralised institutions. This theory is
naturallyappealingtopro-integrationistsinEurope,asitallowsforunitywithouttarnishing
Europe’sinnatediversity(Ibid23).AfederalstatewouldleavetheEUmemberstatesadegree
ofautonomyandevensovereignty–somethingthatallstatesareunwillingtoforego–but
with a powerful unitary actor superseding the various states. Although there is no real
templateforafederalstate,EuropeanintegrationistsoftenlookattheUSAforapractical
example.Inthatspirit,someintegrationist,especiallyatthetimeofconstitutionaldebates,
have suggested that Europe needs its own Philadelphia (Castiglione 31). Nevertheless,
attempts to pursue federalism in the EU,most notably by trying to constitutionalise the
Union,havefailed,andthoughtheEUisdefinitelynotamereInternationalOrganisation,it
lackstherequiredunityforaFederationaswell.Nonetheless,talkofaPoliticalUnionhave
“reignited” in light of the Van Rompuy reports, which called for “strongmechanisms for
democratic legitimacyandaccountability (...) [that] shouldoccurat the levelatwhich the
decisionsaretaken”(Laffan386;VanRompuy16).
Attheothersideofthetheoreticspectrumthereis(liberal) intergovernmentalism.
Thistheorymarksthenation-stateasthemost importantactor intheintegrationprocess,
despitetheemergenceofvarioussupranationalentities(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropean
Integration130).Byemphasisingtheroleofthenation-state,thistheorypostulatesthatthe
EUmemberstatesworktogetherwhentheirnationalinterestsalign,thattheycontinuously
“bargain forpower” relative tooneanother,and that theyactively setup“incentives” to
ensure“interstatecommitments”(Moravscik,TheChoiceforEurope3).Asadescriptionof
26
thefunctioningoftheEU,thereismuchtobesaidforthistheory,asitisindeedtruethatthe
mostimportantdecisionstodayarestillmadebynationalleaders.Forinstance,thetreaties
establishingtheEUweresetupatIGCsandtheECisarguablythemostimportantagenda-
setteroftheEUtoday(Schoutheete64).Moreover,thesupranationalinstitutionsthathave
beenestablished,existinvirtueoftheMemberStateswhoestablishedthem.However,the
fact that this theory disregards the influence that supranational bodies can exercise
independentofthevariousMemberstates,hasbeenheavilycontested,especiallyinlightof
thepivotal role theECJhasplayed in thepastasadriving force forEuropean integration
(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration146).
Thelasttheorytobediscussedinthissectionisneofunctionalism.Thistheorywasfirst
proposedbyErnstHaasin1958andprovides“acausalexplanationofthedevelopmentofEU
institutions” (Sandholtz 28). Rather than focus on the role of nation-states, as
intergovernmentalism does, neofunctionalism’s focus is on the role of supranational
institutionsandnon-stateactors (Jensen53).Neofunctionalism’smaincontributionto the
field is the concept of policy spill-over. This term signifies that when several countries
cooperateinonenarrowlydefinedpolicyarea,itcreates“pressuresinneighbouringpolicy
areas,”whichsubsequentlyspursfurtherintegration(Ibid54).This“incrementalprocess”will
eventuallyleadtopoliticalcooperationandthecreationofsupranationalbodies,whichwill
in turn lead to more competences being transferred to the supranational (Ibid 63). The
transitionfromtheECSCtotheEECisperhapsthebestexampleofthistheory,ascooperation
intheareaofcoalandsteelmadeitdesirabletocooperateinotherareasaswell.Eventually
suchaccumulativeintegrativetendencieswouldleadtoan“evercloserUnionbetweenthe
peopleofEurope”(TheTreaties“Preamble”).Nonetheless,neofunctionalismwasabandoned
inthe70s,whenitbecameclearthatindividualmemberstatesretainedmuchinfluencein
spiteofthedegreeofintegration,butithasbecomerelevantagainaftertheintroductionof
theSEAandthesubsequentMaastrichttreaty.
The essence of the EU is not something that is set in stone, but rather
somethingthatisopentotheinterpretationofthepeoplethatareinchargeofexecutingthe
sometimesambiguousprovisionslaiddowninthetreaties.Consequently,thewayinwhich
thesepeople theorise thenatureofEuropean integration, isofcritical importance.This is
perhapsbestdepictedbytheunexpecteddevelopmentoftheECJ.Thepowerfulrolethatthe
ECJ has todaywas not envisioned as suchby the drafters of the Treaty of Rome.On the
27
contrary,theintentionwastocreatea“relativelyweak”court(Dinan,OriginsandEvolution
171).Thepowerithasaccruedovertheyears,isaconsequenceofits“ownjurisprudence”
andthus,byextension,thewayinwhichthejudgesconceiveofEuropeanintegration(Ibid).
Interestingly, Weiler suggests that it is this development that could have caused the
eurosclerosis of the late 70s (“Does Europe Need” 291-2). The realisation that a strong
European judiciary definitively committed Member States to legislation passed at the
Community level, made national leaders wary of it, which resulted in Member States’
insistenceinbeingabletoblockthemakingofthis“supreme”legislation(Ibid).Thiscauseda
shifttowardsamoreintergovernmentalistviewofEuropeanintegration,asnationalleaders
wanted to make sure that their governments had the final say. To the extent that
Neofunctionalismwasregardedas“obsoleteintheEuropeansetting”in1976byoneofits
founders Ernst Haas (208). Nonetheless, not even 15 years later Haas rescinded this
statementwhentheintegrationprocesswasspurredbytheSEAandMaastrichttreaty,which
showsagaintheimportanceofthewayinwhichtheEuropeanintegrationprocessisframed.
TheEUtodaycontainsboththeinstitutionstobesupranationalandthosethatwould
make it intergovernmental. Combined these institutions represent the three branches of
government.Arguably,theintergovernmentalistinstitutionsaresomewhatstrongerthanthe
supranationalones,withtheexecutiveECbeingthemainagenda-setteroftheEU;but,itis
exactly the EC that has been one of the main contributors to furthering the non-
intergovernmentalistsidesoftheEU(Schoutheete65).Moreover,thesupranationalaspects
of the Union may be checked by intergovernmental ones, but in general the national
governmentsletthesupranationalinstitutionsdotheirjob,withtheECJasacaseinpoint.
TheECJhasbeenheavilycriticisedforitsjudicialactivisminassertingprimacyovernational
courts,butcourtsandgovernmentsseemtohaveaccepteditandevenhelpenforceit,asthe
ECJisdependentonthemtoenforcetheirrulings(Kapsis174-5).Thesupranationalismwe
seetodayintheEUisaconsequence,foralargepart,ofEuropeanintergovernmentalism,in
otherwords,supranationalismiswhattheEuropean“statesmakeofit”(Wendt377).Inthis
respect,theEUcanthereforeberegardedasasupranationalbody,becausethoughthereis
anambiguous institutional framework, currently it is this framework that seems to foster
supranationalism.Theonlycaveatis,thatMemberStateshaveleftthemselvesaget-out-of-
jail-for-free card, by setting up certain safeguards to make sure there cannot be severe
infringementsontheirsovereignty.
28
4. TheEUandDemocraticDeficit
Having established that the EU is more than just a collaboration of states and is
actuallya“quasi-constitutional”supranationalbody, it is timetodiscuss towhatextent it
suffersfromtheso-called“democraticdeficit”(Peterson39;Marquand64).Democracyhas
becomeequatedintheWesternworldwithgoodgovernance,andisevenarequirementfor
country to become a Member State of the EU (TEU article 2, 21). The accusation of a
democraticdeficitisthereforeaseriousone,andonethatimmediatelyraisesthequestion
whathavingademocraticdeficitactuallymeans.Asaforementioned,there isnoclearcut
answertothisquestion((Gilbert)534).Despitethis“vagueness,”however,ithasbecomea
catchphraseforEuroscepticsacrossthecontinent,whohavebeenontheriseforthepast15
years(Millar).ThishasrecentlycometoanewheadwiththeBrexit,andhasheightenedfears
inotherEuropeancountries,suchastheNetherlandsandFrance,forarespectiveNexitor
Frexit(Lyons).Inotherwords,inlightofthisseeminglyexistentialcrisis,thereismorethan
everaneedtoanalysewhatismeantwiththisdemocraticdeficit,inorderfortheEUtotry
andcountertheEuroscepticmovementthathasbesetit.
Thischapterwillthereforefirstbrieflyexpoundontheactualproblembyanalysing
whatismeantwhenpeoplesaytheEUsuffersfromademocraticdeficit.Inanswertothat,
these claims will be set against the current constellation of the EU, as described in the
previouschapters,andagainstaspectsweexpecttoseeinacontemporarydemocracy.To
conclude,thischapterwillattempttogobeyondtheideaofademocraticdeficit.
DefiningaDemocraticDeficit
Thenotionofademocraticdeficitinmoderndemocracies,isanewone,andwasused
forthefirsttimeinlightofEUintegrationspecifically.Althoughthetermwascoinedinthe
late70s,itgainedmomentuminthe80swhenmorepowerswerebeingconferredontothe
EC(Marquand64).Morerecently,aidedbythevaguenessoftheterm,ithasbeenalmost
appropriated by far right Eurosceptics across the continent (Millar). The term inherently
suggestsalackofdemocracy,andtheabsenceofademocracynaturallyimpliesthattheEU
hasbecomesomekindofdictatorship.Thisbecomesevidentwhen listening topoliticians
suchasGeertWildersandMarielePensayingthat“theEUisamonster(…)force-feedingus
29
massimmigration”4andpromisingthattheywill“fightagainstthedictatorshipofBrussels”5
(Wilders; Le Pen). However, the actual thrust of the term, democratic deficit, is that the
transferofpowers to supranationalbodieshasnotbeenmatchedbyanequalamountof
democraticrepresentation,accountability,legitimacy,andtransparency(Hix,What’sWrong
67-8). This lineof argumentusually followswith fivepoints to substantiate it. Firstly, the
executivebranchhasgainedpower,intheCouncil,EC,andCommission,relativetothatof
thenationalparliaments,whocannolongerrestraintheirrespectiveexecutives(Schmidt1-
2).Secondly,thistransferisnotsatisfactorilycompensatedforbytheEPwhois,depending
on the policy area, at bestmerely on parwith the executives in the Council in terms of
legislativepower(Hix“ThePoliticalSystem”177).Thirdly,thereisno“politicalcontestation,”
astheparliamentaryelectionsthatoccurevery5yearsdonotelecttheEuropeanexecutive,
which means that citizens’ preferences are secondary in EU decision-making, being only
applicabletothelegislative(Follesdal556-7).Fourthly,despiteattemptstodemocratisethe
EU,itisstillviewedas“undemocratic;”itsinstitutionsarenotwhatEUcitizensareusedto
anditissimply“toodistant”fromthevoters(Magnette293;Hix,What’sWrong70-1).Fifthly,
Europeans are not against European integration in general, just not in its current
configuration;thesentimentis insteadthatthepolicy-makingoftodaydoesnotrepresent
thewillofthepeopleanddoesnotservethemeither(Verhofstadt;Hix,ThePoliticalSystem
178).
Althougheachofthesepointsdeservesattention,astheyhighlightpotential issues
within thedemocratic fabricof theEU.Therehasbeenvehementdisagreementas to the
veracityoftheseclaims.Mostnotableamongthosewholeadsthechargeagainstthiscritique
isMoravcsik.Accordingtohim,andothers,Europeandecision-makingbyandlargeabidesby
Westernnotionsofwhatoughttoconstituteawell-functioningdemocracy(Moravcsik,“Is
there a Democratic Deficit” 337-8). Moravcsik also questions the degree to which this
particularnotionofdemocracy,whichisappliedtoWesterndemocraticnation-states,canbe
transferredsuccessfullytoInternationalOrganisationssuchastheEU;hethereforeurgeshis
readersto“calibrate(…)democraticmetrics(…)tocheckifthecurrentarrangementsarethe
best feasible under real-world politics” (Ibid). By this he means that certain aspects of
supranational politics are bound to remain problematic. For instance, from the sheer
4Originaltext:“deEU,hetmonster(…)duwtonsdemassaimmigratie(…)doordestrot”5Originaltext:“Luttercontreladictaturedel’Europe”
30
multinational scope of the EU it must almost inadvertently follow that it is a distant
institution,andwherenationalpolitiesareabletodrawoncommonhistorytofosternational
cohesion,theEUislacking(Moravcsik“TheEUain’t”38).
Thisnotwithstanding,thefivepointsarguingthattheEUhascometosufferfroma
democraticdeficitseema“damningcritique”ofthecurrentfunctioningoftheEU(Hix,What’s
Wrong72).Althoughthereisprobably,tovaryingdegrees,truthtomostoftheseclaims,itis
worth to consider themcloselybeforeaccepting themas true. Thenotion that European
integrationhasrenderednationalparliamentstoothless,thattheEPdoesnotcoverthesame
amount of executive censure, and that, consequently, the executives can no longer be
checkedthewayitwasdonebeforeEuropeanintegration,raisestheissueofaccountability
inEUpolitics(Katz55).However,thiscriticismassumesthatnationalparliamentswere“in
control” before, which is untrue, as “parliaments have always been dominated by” the
executivebranch(Hix,What’sWrong72-3).Moreover,althoughnationalparliamentscannot
really callout theCommissionon itspolicy-making– something that theEPcando– the
government representatives in the Council and EC are still accountable to their various
nationalparliaments,and thus theirpopulation.Although the introductionofQMV in the
Councilhasdecreasedthisinfluenceofnationalparliaments,itisinexactlythesepolicyareas,
thattheEPhasbeenelevatedtoco-legislator,thusmaintaininganappropriateamountof
accountability(Ibid).ThenotionthattheEUsuffersfromalackoftransparency,isaproblem
thatmostpeoplewouldagreewith;however,howopaqueistheEUdecision-makingprocess
really? All conclusions, treaties, and other documents are available online, and most
discussions in the EP and Council can even be watched via a live stream. This level of
transparencyis“goldstandard”andnotevenmatchedbymostnationalgovernments(Ibid).
Lastly,theclaimthattheaveragevoterisnotbeingrepresentedinthepolicy-makingatthe
Europeanlevel,isalsodifficulttobelieveinlightoftheextensiveinstitutionalframework.For
anypolicytopass,itneedstogothroughastringentsetofinstitutionalchecks-and-balances,
theapprovaloftheCommission,theCouncil,andtheEPisrequired;anylegislationmustthus
bebroadlycarried,oritwillnotpass(Hix,ThePoliticalSystem179).Furthermore,anypiece
of legislation issubject to judicial reviewbybothnationalcourtsandtheECJ (Hix,What’s
Wrong75).Theargumentsforademocraticdeficitarethereforenotasdamningastheyfirst
appear.
31
Havingsaidthat,therearetwopointstopickupon.Firstandforemost,thecritique
thattheEUdoesnothaveanelectedexecutive.Inmostelectionsitisthelegislativebranch
thatweelect,but fromthat, the legislativechoosesandendorses thegovernment,which
makestheexecutive“dependentonthelegislative”foritscontinuedexistence(Kreppel170).
This processdoesnotoccur at the EU level, and though itmay seema small aspectof a
democratic system, it is criticalone,as itprovidespolitical contestation,whichgrants the
population an important modicum of influence on the agenda setting process. In
parliamentaryelections,weprimarilyvoteonpartiesandpeoplebecauseoftheirideasand
plansforthecountry,andwehopetheycanputtheminpracticebybecominganexecutive.
Politicalpartiesthenadjustorprofilethemselvesaccordingly.Onthisfront,theEUmaywell
beaproceduralrepresentationaldemocracy,butsubstantively,thereareseverelimitations
duetothepersistingissueofanunelectedexecutive,whichplaysintothepeople’sideathat
theCommissionersare“unelected(…)unaccountabletechnocrats”(Peterson96).Asecond
partofthecritiquetopickuponistheEU’slackoftransparency.Asaforementioned,theEU
hasdonemuchtoremedythisissuealready,mostnotablybyprovidingaccesstoalmostall
theimportantdocumentsoftheEUonline.However,suchtransparencyneglectsthathaving
athoroughpoliticalgroundingisalmostaprerequisiteinunderstandingtheEUasabodyof
politicalrepresentation.Sodespitethetransparency,nothinghaschangedabouttheinherent
complexity of the EU. This complexitymay be understandable, in light of the integration
processandthecontinualcontestationofsupranationalandintergovernmentalforces,butit
doesnotspeaktothepeople’simagination,nordoesithaverecognisablefeaturesfromthe
respectiveMemberStates’owndemocracies–withthesoleexceptionoftheEP.TheEUmay
thusbetransparent,butitisstillnotaccessibleforthepeopleitpurportstogovern,aseven
the most engaged intellectually grounded citizens experience difficulty in trying to
understandit.
All in all, the EU possesses all the institutional components for a procedural
representativedemocracy,becauseitenjoys:aseparationofpowers,electionsevery5years,
andchecks-and-balanceson“theexerciseofpower”(Hix,What’sWrong85;Moravcsik,“Is
ThereaDemocraticDeficit”338).Theproblemliesinamoresubstantiveissue;asEuropean
citizensarebarelyincludedinthepolicy-makingprocessonthesupranationallevel.Thishas
twomaincauses:thereisnoperceivedlegitimatesupranationalexecutiverepresentingall
Europeansdue toa lackofpolitical contestationand theEU’sdemocratic institutionsare
32
inaccessible to many Europeans because of their complexity (Bellamy 82-3). There may
thereforebealimitedsubstantivedemocraticdeficit,butitisdefinitelynotasextensiveas
manywouldhaveusbelieve.Thisconclusionthereforeautomaticallyleadsustothequestion
to what extend we can compare International Organisations such as the EU to national
democraciesasweknowthem.ThisthesismayhaveestablishedthattheEUisasupranational
bodywitha“quasi-constitutional”foundation,butitdefinitelylackstherequiredunityand
pooledsovereigntyforanation-stateorfederation;itisthereforeremarkablethattheEUis
stillexpectedtoliveuptothesamedemocraticmarkers(Dehousse39).Thatisabitlikerating
afishonitsabilitytoclimbatree.Inthisfashion,MoravcsikhasquestionedwhethertheEU
hasademocraticdeficitatall,arguingthatthereissufficientdemocraticlegitimacyforthe
amountofpowerstransferredtotheEU(“TheEUain’t”45;“IsthereaDemocraticDeficit”
338).Nonetheless,inanalysingthedemocraticstateoftheEU,theredoseemtobecertain
substantivelimitations,meaningthatthereisademocraticdeficit,toanextent.
MovingBeyondaDemocraticDeficit
TheissueofaEuropeandemocraticdeficitiscertainlyprofound,especiallyforaUnion
that is established on democratic principles and that prides itself on these very same
principles(TEUarticle2).However,thisanalysisdoesnotgofarenough,asthisdemocratic
deficit ismerelysymptomaticofanunderlyingproblem,whichisthatofpoliticaldirection
andwhattheEUisinitsessencetoday.Althoughthelattercanbeapproximatedthroughan
analysisofthefoundingTreatiesoftheEU,seechapters2and3,theambiguityandget-out-
of-jail-for-freecardswithinthesetreatiesleavemuchopentotheinterpretationofthepeople
executingthem.TheEU’s“democraticdeficit”isthereforereallyabout“thenature,functions,
and goals of the EU” rather than the extent towhich democracy has been instilled in its
institutions (Majone 27). Amongst other things, this becomes evident from the academic
debateontheEU’sdemocraticdeficitintheprevioussection.Moravcsikcontendsthatthere
isnodemocraticdeficitatall,whereasHixarguesthattheEUlackspoliticalcontestationand
isthereforedemocraticallydeficient(“TheEUain’t”45;Hix,What’sWrong85).Forthemost
part,theyagree,buttheirdifferingconclusionshingeontheiraprioriassumptionsaboutthe
natureoftheEUtoday,andwhatthe“end-point”oftheintegrationprocessis(Schmidt267).
In thepast thisambiguityhasservedtheEUwell,becauseenoughroomwas left forpro-
33
integrationiststohopeforaUnitedStatesofEurope;andsufficientrestrictionswereputin
placetopacifythosewaryofanything“beyondthenation-state”(Ibid).
However, we are currently at a point in history – one that was arguably already
reachedadecadeago–wherethevaguenesshasbecomecounter-productive,asthevacuum
intheexplanatoryframeworkoftheEUhaspermittedEuroscepticstofillthevoid.Thereis
therefore need for clarification, a good concerted answer from Europe and theMember
States’nationalgovernmentsastowhereweareandwherewearegoing.IfEuropeansdo
notknowwhattheycan,orshould,expectfromtheEU,subsequentreformsarelikelytofail,
irrespectiveoftheirquality.ClarifyingtheessenceoftheEU,anditsultimatedestination,is
thereforeparamounttothelongevityoftheEU(Ibid).Overtheyearstherehavebeenmany
suggestionsforpotentialalternativesrangingfromaregulativeUnion,toviewingtheEUasa
regionalstatethatgoverns“forandwiththepeople,”tothatofafederalstate(Majone28;
Schmidt268;Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration23).Whattherightsystemwould
be,isnotformetodecideatthismoment,butthatthecurrentconfigurationoftheEUneeds
tobeclarifiedandreconsidered,isclear.
Insummary,thecritiqueofademocraticdeficitintheEUisallbutnew,buthasinthe
past15yearsgainedinprominence.Althoughthetermdoesnothaveadefinitionassuch,it
generallyindicatesthattheincreaseofcompetencesattheUnionlevelhavenotgonehand-
in-handwithanincreaseinitsdemocraticstructures.TherearefivecharacteristicsoftheEU
generally associated with this democratic deficit: the power of the legislative national
parliaments has been eroded and that of the executives been increased by European
integration, the EP is tooweak tomake up for this asymmetry, EU policies are generally
regardedasnot representativeof thewishesof theaverageEuropeancitizen, there isno
executivecontestationintheEU,andtheEUsuffersfromalackoftransparency.Apartfrom
thelasttwo,thesecritiques,thoughnoteworthy,arebasedonmisconceptionsofthecurrent
configurationoftheEU.Toanextent,thisisthereforeindicativeofasubstantivedemocratic
deficit; however, can theEU, a “quasi-constitutional” supranationalorganisation reallybe
judgedondemocraticmarkersintendedforanation-statewithoutbeingone(Dehousse39)?
Inanycase,theissueofademocraticdeficit,thoughserious,onlyseemstobethesymptom
ofanunderlyingproblemthatisfarmoreserious,asthereisnoagreementamongtheEU
MemberStatesorinstitutionsastowhattheEUisorwhereitwillgo.Whetheryouconsider
34
theEUashavingademocraticdeficitisthusinpartdependentonyourinterpretationofits
inherent nature. Without clarity on this crucial point, it will be difficult to advance the
Europeanproject.
35
5. Conclusion
To determinewhether the EU is a supranational political bodywith a democratic
deficitthisthesisexploredthehistoryofEuropeanintegration,theinstitutionalframework,
supranationalityandintergovernmentalism,andconcludedwithanexaminationofthestate
oftheEU’sdemocracy.
Unlike what we may think, the history of European integration was not a linear
progressionofincreasingintegrationwiththeultimategoalofaUnitedStatesofEuropein
mind.Onthecontrary,though“incremental,”Europeanintegrationhaslargelybeenamessy
processofcontendingviewsonthefutureofEurope,andsohaditsupsanddowns(Dehousse
39). The reason that Europe is a “quasi-constitutional” political body today, is a direct
consequence of a great willingness of national leaders to compromise and the political
climateattimesofbigchanges(Ibid).Interestingly,however,thediscussionsthatEuropeans
havetodaywhenspeakingofEurope’sfuturefollowsimilarpatternstothoseof60yearsago,
and are largely centred around supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism. This is
perhapsbestevidencedbytheconstitutionaldebateofthe50sandtheearly21stcentury.
Overtheyears,thisdichotomousprocesshasledtoaninterestinginstitutionalframework
thatbothtriestoadvanceEurope’sinterestsingeneralwhilesimultaneouslytryingtoprotect
MemberStates’sovereignty.
In this institutional framework the three branches of government: the legislative,
executive, and judiciary are divided over five of the EU’s seven institutions. The EP,
Commission,andECJ,representthesupranationalaspectsoftheEU,andtheECandCouncil
the intergovernmentalist ones. The result is a complex set of powers attributed to every
institution,apartfromtheECJ,tomakesurethateachcankeeptheotherincheck.Inthis
manner,theEPandCouncilare,forinstance,co-legislators.Mostpoliciescannotpasswithout
the consent of both these institutions. This shows that there is awillingness to pool the
decision-makingprocess,butonlytoadegree,asthereareintergovernmentalchecks,or‘get-
out-of-jail-for-freecards,’availableforwhenaMemberStateisoftheopinionapolicywould
infringesignificantlyontheirsovereignty.
TheEUtodaythereforepossessesboththeinstitutionstobeanintergovernmental
andsupranationalUnion.Ingeneral, itappearsthattheintergovernmentalinstitutionsare
slightly better developed than the supranational ones, withmore “political authority” to
36
make important, far-reaching decisions (Lewis 142). Nonetheless, it has been these very
institutions that have built the EU as we know it today, including those aspects where
sovereigntyhasbeentransferredtothesupranational.Toaddtothat,thevariousMember
Statesevenenforcethedecisionsofsupranationalinstitutions,eveniftheydonotagreewith
them,asoftenhappenswiththeECJ’sdecisions(Kapsis174-5).Thisambiguityintheset-up
oftheEU’sinstitutionsthereforeallowsforadegreeofinterpretationintermsofwhatthe
scopeofeachinstitutionreallyis.Inlightofthis,theEUcanberegardedasasupranational
body,becauseitisinvirtueofthisambiguousinstitutionalframeworkthatsupranationalism
isallowedtothrive.Assuch,theintergovernmentalfeaturesoftheUnioncanbeunderstood
assafeguards,ifyouwill,toensuretheintegrityoftherespectivenation-states.
ThisbringsthisthesistotheissueofwhethertheEUhasademocraticdeficitornot.
Overall, it seems that the EU fulfils the requirements ofwhatwould usually constitute a
democracyintoday’sworld:thereisaseparationofpower,electionseveryfiveyears,anda
multitude of checks-and-balances for the “exercise of power” (Hix, What’s Wrong 85;
Moravcsik “Is There a Democratic Deficit” 338). What it lacks, however, is executive
contestation,meaningthatthe inclusionofthepopulation’svoice intheagenda-setting is
severely limited. Moreover, though strides have been made in making the EU a more
transparentplace,itlacksaccessibilitytotheaverageEuropean.Whatwesee,therefore,isa
political body that contains all the institutions for a well-functioning democracy, called
procedural,butnotonewheretheexecutivedecision-makingisnecessarilyrepresentativeof
thegoverned,anaspectofsubstantivedemocracy.
Having said that, it is interesting that we expect the EU to fulfil the democratic
requirementsusuallyattributedtoanation-state.Indeed,Moravscikhascontendedthatin
thecontemporarypoliticalrealitytheEUdoesnotsufferfromademocraticdeficitatall,as
thelegitimacytransferredtotheEUisappropriateforitscompetences(“TheEUain’t”45).I
argue that suchdifferences stem fromamore seriousproblem thanademocraticdeficit,
namely,aninabilitytocometoa“universalagreement”concerningthemostbasicessence
oftheEU.SolongasthereisnoclarityconcerningwheretheEUis,andwhereit isgoing,
discontentwiththeEUwillcontinuetogrow,irrespectivewhattheEUdoestoreform.
Inconclusion,theEUcantoanextendberegardedasasupranationalpoliticalbody.
AlthoughtheEU’sinstitutionsdonotbetrayademocraticdeficit,substantivelythereisalack
ofpoliticalcontestationandaccessibility,whichexcludesthepopulation fromshapingthe
37
agenda-settingoftheUnion.Thisanalysisis,however,contingentonmyinterpretationofthe
scopeandessenceoftheEU’sinstitutions,asputforthinthisthesis.
38
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AppendixA:TimelineofEuropeanIntegration(Cini13-38;“EverCloserUnion”71)
- 1948March:TreatyofBrussels
- 1948April:creationoftheOEEC
- 1948May:TheHagueCongressofEurope
- 1949May:CouncilofEuropecreated
- 1950May:ShumanPlanproposed
- 1950October:EDCproposed
- 1951April:TreatyofParisagreeingtocreatetheECSC
- 1952May:TreatyonEDCsigned
- 1952July:ECSCestablished
- 1953March:DraftTreatyontheEPCadopted
- 1954August:AssembleeNationalerejectsEDC
- 1954October:WEUestablished
- 1955June:MessinaDeclaration
- 1957March:TreatyofRome
- 1958January:EECandEurotomestablished
- 1961July:TheFouchetplanproposed
- 1963February:VanGendenLoosvNederlandseBelastingenestablishingdirecteffect
- 1964July:CostavsENELestablishingprimacy
- 1965June:Empty-chaircrisis
- 1968July:CustomUnioncompleted
- 1970October:ReportonEMUpublished
- 1973January:Denmark,Ireland,andtheUKjoin
- 1973October:OilCrisisstarts
- 1974April:Britishgovernmentrenegotiatesmembershipterms
- 1974September:formationoftheEuropeanCouncil
- 1979March:EuropeanMonetarySystemestablished
- 1979June:FirstEPelections
- 1981January:GreeceJoins
- 1982February:Greenlandleaves
- 1984June:Fontainebleausummit
- 1985March:SingleMarketagreedupon
45
- 1986January:PortugalandSpainjoin
- 1987July:SEAtakeseffect
- 1991December:MaastrichtECagreestotheTEU
- 1992February:TEUsigned
- 1993November:EUestablished
- 1995January:Austria,Finland,andSwedenjoin
- 1997October:TreatyofAmsterdamsigned
- 2001February:TreatyofNicesigned
- 2002January:IntroductionoftheEuro
- 2002February:InauguralplenarysessionoftheEuropeanConvention
- 2004May: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,Malta,
Poland,Slovakia,andSloveniajointheEU
- 2004October:theCTissigned
- 2005May:FrancerejectstheCT
- 2005June:TheNetherlandsrejectstheCT
- 2005June:ECannouncesapauseintheratificationoftheCT
- 2007January:BulgariaandRomaniajointheEU
- 2007December:TreatyofLisbonsigned
- 2008June:IrishelectoraterejectTreatyofLisbon
- 2009December:TreatyofLisbonentersintoforce
46
AppendixB:ExcerptsfromtheSchumanDeclaration(Schuman,1950)
Worldpeacecannotbesafeguardedwithoutthemakingofcreativeeffortsproportionateto
thedangerswhichthreatenit.(…)Europewillnotbemadeallatonce,oraccordingtoasingle
plan.Itwillbebuiltthroughconcreteachievementswhichfirstcreateadefactosolidarity.
The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old
oppositionofFranceandGermany.Anyactiontakenmustinthefirstplaceconcernthesetwo
countries.With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken
immediatelyononelimitedbutdecisivepoint.ItproposesthatFranco-Germanproductionof
coalandsteelasawholebeplacedunderacommonHighAuthority,withintheframework
ofanorganizationopentotheparticipationoftheothercountriesofEurope.Thepoolingof
coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common
foundationsforeconomicdevelopmentasafirststepinthefederationofEurope,andwill
changethedestiniesofthoseregionswhichhavelongbeendevotedtothemanufactureof
munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in
productionthusestablishedwillmake itplain thatanywarbetweenFranceandGermany
becomesnotmerelyunthinkable,butmateriallyimpossible.Thesettingupofthispowerful
productiveunit,opentoallcountrieswillingtotakepartandboundultimatelytoprovideall
themembercountrieswiththebasicelementsofindustrialproductiononthesameterms,
willlayatruefoundationfortheireconomicunification.(…)Bypoolingbasicproductionand
by institutinganewHighAuthority,whosedecisionswillbindFrance,Germanyandother
membercountries,thisproposalwillleadtotherealizationofthefirstconcretefoundation
of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. To promote the
realizationoftheobjectivesdefined,theFrenchGovernmentisreadytoopennegotiations
onthefollowingbases.ThetaskwithwhichthiscommonHighAuthoritywillbechargedwill
bethatofsecuring intheshortestpossibletimethemodernizationofproductionandthe
improvementofitsquality;thesupplyofcoalandsteelonidenticaltermstotheFrenchand
Germanmarkets,aswellastothemarketsofothermembercountries;thedevelopmentin
common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement of the living
conditionsofworkersintheseindustries.(…)Incontrasttointernationalcartels,whichtend
toimposerestrictivepracticesondistributionandtheexploitationofnationalmarkets,and
tomaintainhighprofits,theorganizationwillensurethefusionofmarketsandtheexpansion
47
ofproduction.Theessentialprinciplesandundertakingsdefinedabovewillbethesubjectof
atreatysignedbetweentheStatesandsubmittedfortheratificationoftheirparliaments.(…)
ThecommonHighAuthorityentrustedwiththemanagementoftheschemewillbecomposed
of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation. A
chairmanwillbechosenbycommonagreementbetweenthegovernments.TheAuthority's
decisionswillbeenforceableinFrance,Germanyandothermembercountries.Appropriate
measureswillbeprovidedformeansofappealagainstthedecisionsoftheAuthority.(…)
TheinstitutionoftheHighAuthoritywill innowayprejudgethemethodsofownershipof
enterprises.Intheexerciseofitsfunctions,thecommonHighAuthoritywilltakeintoaccount
thepowersconferredupontheInternationalRuhrAuthorityandtheobligationsofallkinds
imposeduponGermany,solongastheseremaininforce.
48
AppendixC:TheOrdinaryLegislativeProcess(Shackleton137)