TheRightToWorldHeritage Lynn Meskell

8/20/2019 TheRightToWorldHeritage Lynn Meskell

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THE RIGHT TO

WORLD HERITAGE

ynn Meskell


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T

e year 2012 marked

the

40th anniversary of

UNESCO s

1972 Convention

Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. It is

currently the only international instrument we have for safeguarding the

world s heritage. However, as I go

on

to describe,

the

Convention

is

experiencing

a crisis on several fronts- financial, organizational and political- that threaten its

mission and its effectiveness to protect and preserve.

I take

UNESCO

as

the

centrepiece of this paper because

the

organization

simultaneously represents the aspirations of an international community, the

limitations of world government, concerns for minority protection and rights,

notions of the global good and, of course, the driving force behind world heritage.

It still surprises me that archaeologists have not paid more detailed attention to

UNESCO

since

it

catalyzes so many of

the

issues

at

the forefront

of

our discipline.

Yet, it stands as a kind of cipher that can be read as having everything,

and

at the

same time nothing, to

do

with archaeology. I found myself drawn

to

this paradox,

while inherently aware of my own caricatured sketches of the organization, and

how limited my knowledge was of institutional process, and so I embarked upon

ethnographic work and b ecame an official observer at World Heritage Committee

meetings.

In theory, UNESCO constitutes the arena where archaeology reaches worldwide

attention and yet archaeologists themselves are largely invisible in the political

processes, governance, and public profile of

the

organization. Despite the many

valid critiques of World Heritage List, the recognition and value that inscription

bestows is still desi;ed deeply by almost all the nations

of

the world, regardless of

political or religious affiliation, economic status, or historical trajectory. That fact,

in itself, offers a powerful lens onto the potentials of something called heritage in

political, cultural, economic,

and

spiritual terms.

As archaeologists, we typically presume that the power to confer heritage

rights

and

recognition largely resides with UNESCO s Paris Headquarters.

Today,

there

are

less than 70 people working at the World Heritage Centre and their

funding is close to negligible. In fact, an inter-governmental body and part of the

United Nations, it is the signatory states that are the most powerful decision makers

T

I

RIGHT T O WORLD HERITA

Io

in the world heritage system. States parties have most to gain in the geopolitical

machinations and voting blocs that have emerged

in

the last few years. Not only

do nations garner international and national prestige, financial assistance and

benefit from heightened public awareness, tourism and economic

development-

they leverage heritage for strategic economic and political trade-offs for military,

religious, and geographical advantage.

UNESCO may have been forged on the liberal principles of diplomacy,

tolerance and development after the devastation of WWII, but today statist agendas

have come to eclipse substantive considerations of both global heritage a nd local

communities. Like other vested stakeholders, archaeologists are often ignorant to

the power alignments and pacting in force, finding themselves bystanders in the

outcomes

of

heritage making. Educating ourselves

is

key, and becoming more

effective facilitators for vulnerable communities, but perhaps also seizing on the

potentials of this international forum for advancing th e recognition

and

rights of

others.

So

in

light

of

these larger structural processes, I ask how are e mergent rights

to the past being presented, promoted and

prevented

by particular actors

internationally? In this paper, I draw from rece nt develo pments involving UNESCO s

recognition of Palestine,

the

ensuing United States financial withdrawal,

the

crisis

in Mali,

and

the

continued challenges

to

indigenous authority by state parties on

the World Heritage Committee. Indeed,

one

of UNESCO s millennium challenges

was the very issue of sovereignty

in

an increasingly transnational world an d

in

the

face of indigenous claims and rights that often conflict with nation states. Yet, the

structural failures to foreground minority rights, indigenous perspectives and to

implement chang e within the World Heritage system are all underwritten by nation-

state desires, colonial alignments and new imperialisms.

UNESCO

is

an intergovernmental organization guided by international

relations aimed at fostering peace,

humanitarianism

and inter-cultural

understanding, which developed out of the universalist aspirations for global

governance envisaged by the League of Nations (Singh 2011, Stoczkowski 2009,

Valderrama 1995). It remains committed to the modernist princip,les of progress

and development and subscribes to the liberal principles of diplomacy, tolerance

and development. Established after the end of World War

in

the wake o f devastation

and atrocity, UNESCO s central task was to promote peace and change the minds

of men primarily through education and promotion of cultural diversity and

understanding. Not surprisingly, the work was focused on education, universities


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and libraries, and

internationalism-not

archaeology. It is often said throughout

UNESCO that the E for education) comes first. But given this history of recognition

and reconciliation, the long-standing ethos of cultural diversity, and protection of

minority lifeways,

it

s not surprising that

UNESCO has

emerged

as

the only structural

avenue to global governance and promo tion

of

cultural heritage. Within the United

Nations,

UNESCO

may not be

as

powerful as high profile international peacekeeping,

environmental initiatives or development programmes; instead, it is perceived as

the cultura l arm, the visionary agency, and the ideas factory for the larger

organization (Pavone 200B).

Within

UNESCO

is the World Heritage Centre

that was

established in 1992 to

act as the secretariat or the focal point and coordinator for all matters related to

the 1972 Convention. That Convention is

an

intergovernmental agreement operating

for 40 years

with

strong consensus and near universal membership. There are 195

signatories to the Convention. And from those nations are drawn the 21 members

of the World Heritage Committee: they are elected at a General Assembly and

serve a four-year term. That committee is the most powerful player within World

Heritage and those 21 states parties are charged with implementin g the Convention.

Members must all be signatory nations

to

the World Heritage Convention and

their representatives are now dominated by state-appointed ambassadors and

politicians, rather than archaeological or ecological experts. Currently, there

are

9Bl sites on the World Heritage List, more than three-quarters of them cultural

sites.

Unlike the employees

of

the World Heritage Centre, members of the World

Heritage Committee are state representatives and are thus free to pursue their

own national interests, maximize their power, push their economic self-interest,

and minimize their transaction costs (Pavone 2008:

7). These

national imperatives

and econo mic nee essities are more bin ding t han any ethic al norms. Ann ual

Committee meetings are becoming more like market-places where the nations of

the world address each other at great length, but by procedures tha t ensure genuine

dialogue is ruled

out

(Hoggart 2011: 99). Given the economic interests at stake

and the presumed prestige inscription on the List bestows, states parties are

increasingly insisting upon nominating properties that, in the opinion

of

the

IUCN

and

ICOMOS,

do not appear to warrant global recognition. Unsurprisingly, there is

a strong correlation between the countries represented on the Committee and the

location of properties nominated.

THE Itl GI tT TO \\ O RLO HLRITAGE?

From 1977 to 2005, in 314 nominations, 42 per cent benefitted those countries

with Committee members during their mandate.

This

is striking when one considers

that

the 21 Committee members comprise only 11 per cent

of

the total number

of

signatories (UNESCO 2011: 6). And you will find

that

the same small subset of

countries rotates on and off the Committee every few years, so the Committee

has

never

been

a true representation of the United Nations.

Moreover, during the last three World Heritage Committee sessions, I have

witnessed a kind of revolution, leading some to predict the death of he Convention.

There are the mounting challenges to the expert opinions of ICOMOS and the

IUCN,

the increasing and overt politicization

of

the Committee, and

UNESCO s

fiscal crisis exacerbated by the US financial withdrawal (Meskell 2012). I have

witnessed the geopolitical machinations within the Committee and the

excessive

lobbying

by

nominating

nations. The

pacting

between certain blocs,

the

maintenance of colonial connections, the continued attacks on the advisory bodies,

and the over-turning of almost all conservation recommendations is a kind of

revolutionary politics. All

of

this reveals a dissatisfaction with the processes

of

inscribing and conserving World Heritage-of countries wanting not to be judged,

but

rather listing many more sites, regardless of conservation, authenticity and

outstanding value (labadi 2013) .. and archaeologists too have long been sceptical

about the transparency and legitimacy

of

these indices.

But let me turn

to

one radical step

that

UNESCO

has

taken recently, one

example of positive action after decades of failed attempts- the recognition of

Palestine.

The

UN and

UNESCO

have actively supported Palestine

for

many decades,

from the establishment in 1949 of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

for

Palestine Refugees in the Near

East,

to granting observer status to the Palestine

liberation Organization in the 1970, and attempts in the early 1990s

to

admit

Palestine

as

a full member (Valderrama 1995: 246).

In

2011, the vote

to

extend

UNESCO

membership

to

Palestine was

passed

107

to

14, with

52

abstentions.

The

United States, Israel, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany were among those

who opposed, while Brazil, Russia, India China, and South Africa all voted in favour.

The latter forms a politico-economic coalition known

as

BRICS (Claudi 2011, Meskell

2014),

an

acronym coined at Goldman

Sachs for

those nations at a similar stage of

newly advanced economic development who distance themselves from the older-

styled developed G8 countries.


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The recognition of Palestine underscores one of UNESCO s stated millennium

challenges - addressing the issue of sovereignty

in

an increasingly transnational

world, most notably

in

the face of minority claims and rights that often conflict

with nation state agendas. This is increasingly pressing

when we

examine the

inclusion and managemen t of indigenous heritage places and practices within

the

World Heritage arena. I

want

to look now at the brilliantly conceived World Heritage

Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts (WHIPCOE), proposed first in Australia in

2000 and sadly quashed in Helsinki a year later (Logan 2013, Meskell 2013a). This

then

is a story of a radical, yet failed attempt to craft a global indigenous council

of experts within UNESCO, an organization founded on nation-state sovereignty.

The initiative was taken in response to concerns voiced

by

indigenous peoples

about

their lack of involvement

in the

development and implementation of laws,

policies

and plans for the protection of their knowledge, traditions and cultural

values

that

apply

to

their ancestral lands, within or comprising sites now desig nated

as World Heritage properties.

In

World Heritage meetings during 2001, there seemed to be widespread

support and even enthusiasm for the initiative. A representative from the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights presented

the

history and position of indigenous

issues within the greater UN system. Representatives of ICOMOS, ICCROM and the

IUCN

offered overviews of their mandates, structures, processes, activities, and

existing working relationships and interaction with indigenous people. From those

meetings, numerous suggestion s were made for possible roles for

WHIPCOE

within

the World Heritage process. These included ensuring

full

consultation with local

people; strengthening the

management

of existing sites; promoting intangible

cultural heritage and traditional knowledge; and assisting with crafting manageme nt

guidelines and participation

in

the nomination and evaluation of sites (WHIPCOE

2001). A council

might afford opportunities for training, specifically sharing

successful indigenous site

management

approaches and practices between groups

internationally. Numerous follow-up meetings were held, letters of evaluation

requested from states parties, but the decision to formalize WHIPCOE was deferred

again and again.

Not surprisingly, the United States was resistant, claiming that they already

had a clearly defined legal relationship to indigenous peoples that would render

it inappropriate for us

to

submit such lists without consulting them .

This

would

prove both a convenient and ironic deflection

in

retrospect given that the United

Nations was impelled

to

a mission a decade later to evaluate

the

scope of

T HE RIGH T T O W O RLD HERI T A G E

infringement of basic human rights accorded to Native Americans in the US. It is

another example of one country s defense of their territorial sovereignty, its

resistance to international jurisdiction and internal minority self-determination,

and its attempts to limit the scope of a progressive global initiative.

While

the

position of

the

US

may be entirely predictable given its historic

relationships with native peoples and antipathy towards the

UN

system (Pavone

2008; Hoggart 2011),

the

scale of the French objections were excessive. First,

France objected to the institutionalization of a council on legal, practical and

financial grounds. Second,

they

claimed the issue of indigenous

people was

adequately covered within the UN system through the UN Economic and Social

Council and the establishment of a permanent forum on indigenous Issues. They

expressed concern over jurisdiction, participation

and

authority.

Yet,

their key

indictment was the problem of sovereignt y. France s position was that indigenous

issues should be resolved in the framework of the Rules and Procedures of the

States Parties concerned . France then recalled Resolution 2000/56 of the

UNHCR

that encourages governments to establishn tion l committees and not intern tion l

organs.

The position

of

France and

the

US

espouses an internal national solution:

one

that speaks to a kind of already established tolerance at home. Wendy Brown has

argued that such appeals work to overtly block the pursuit of equality or freedom.

Tolerance shores up troubled orders of power, repairs

state

legitimacy, glosses

trou bled universal isms, and provides cover for imperialism. Such mobilizations

can in fact legitimize racist

state

violence.

France may seem historically removed from indigenous affairs, yet there re

sizeable groups within their borders who are considered indigenous, such as the

Bretons and also the Basques. Notably, France has

not

ratified the International

labor Organization Convention on indigenous people, nor has the United States.

It is estimated that at least half of the European countries do

not

involve local

stakeholders in

the

preparation of their Tentative lists for

UNESCO

and at least

two-thirds draft t heir lists without any public consultation (Zacharias 2010: 323).

The possibility

of

an advisory council of indigenous experts crossing

national lines in solidarity over one nation s properties, even though they would

have had to be nominated in the first instance by states parties, was deemed

intolerable. The moment

for

connection

and

a powerful global alliance of

indigenous representatives had passed: dashed

by two

nations whose constitutions

are founded upon liberty and equality.


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CON1EXT

Standing back from these events, it becomes clearer

that UNESCO s

universal

heritage goals are frustrated and impeded the interests of nations that cannot be

called to account, since

UNESCO is

underpinned by the desire for consensual and

diplomatic solutions within

the

wider

UN

structure, thus by

the

organization s

very definition and mandate. Perhaps there

is

a more fundamental divide too:

the

possibilities for indigenous collaboration across state lines are complicated by

particular local cultures, national legal framings, histories of oppression, and

relationships with the state. These fraught specificities, while unifying

in

sentiment,

can also impinge upon implementing international processes and legislation.

Whether one

is

talking about Universal Human Rights or World Heritage, these

seemingly global elements (universal and world) remain stymied by statism.

Considering the future possibility of a global indigenous network to advise

on World Heritage, no one denies that there is a considerable and growing body of

shared expertise, successful mana gement strategies, and alternative understandings

of heritage and he ritage connections across natural and cultural properties. As the

continued desire for such a network underscores, webs of indigenous interaction

may be proliferating, so too

the

traffic in ideas and findings. Yet,

the

impossibilities

of actual instrumentalization are

what

I find compelling. How can organizations

like UNESCO

be

empowered to

not

only endorse, but to execute rights-based

strategies, much like they moved

on

Palestinian recognition and sovereignty-

albeit

after

many

decades

of

campaigning? What

structurally

impedes

this

progression? The short answer is the bounds of the Convention, which is

in

itself

a treaty that can have no third-party effect unless this is clearly intended

by

States

Parties and consented to by third state s. And while Palestinian recognition was

acceptable internationally, states are

still very

resistant to

the

insertion of indigenous

authority and over-sight, intra-nationally, within their own natural and cultural

.

properties.

Assistant Director-General for Culture of UNESCO, Francesco Bandarin (2007:

193) has indirectly questioned the hegemony of statist structures, by asking whether

the heritage that lies outsid e the jurisdiction of states parties might be supported

indirectly, by establishing links with other international legal tools, or developing

partnerships with institutions and organizations expressed by civil society? This

opens the door for potential non-state party support and site nomination, but it

remains to be seen if such properties would

be

inscribed and un der the auspices of

the nation?

It

may

be

possible to imagine this process, yet it rather confou nds the

underlying structure of the United Nations.

THI:

R

IG HT TO WORLD HeRI fAGl:

Thinking creatively, th ere may b e oth er ways

to

incorporate indigenous heritage

expertise while bypassing state control. I recently spoke with a number of senior

officials at UNESCO headquarters about human rights, specifically indigenous rights

and those

of connected communities around World Heritage properties. Given

that there is now in force a Declaration for

the

Rights of Indigenous People (United

Nations General Assembly 2007), ratified

by

some 150 nations, surely there could

be some provision within the mechanism of the 1972 Convention

to

make nations

accountable

if

groups were being forcibly relocated, marginalized or persecuted,

or even excluded from

the

socio-economic benefits

of

their own heritage places.

ThiS. have real consequences for indigenous groups and their rights to

restitution and self-determination.

Some officials felt that states parties would never allow such discussion at

the heritage forums, and would immediately suppress the invocation o f the rights

charter in terms

of national heritage. Yet, the most senior UNESCO officials

suggested that there might be a route to holding states accountable to the larger

when sites are being nominated. Indeed,

there

are more rigorous

provIsions now

to

determine

whether states

parties include all the relevant

stakeholders, working closely and equitably with communities an d sharing benefits.

So voting to remove a World Heritage site already inscribed on the list may be

impossible on the grounds of harmful

treatment

to communities and would not

be supported

by

states parties. However, in theory, it may be possible ot to inscribe

a new site if affected communities were marginalized or

not

properly consulted.

This

was the argument

put

forward by Australia ICOMOS in 2001: without free,

proper, and informed consent (FPIC) sites could not be nominated (Disko 2010,

Hales

et

al. 2012, see also Ween 2012).

The failures of WHIPCOE and its aftermath is a prime example of the

powerlessness o f

UNESCO

and its officers, no matter how well meaning. As

UN

correspondent linda Fasulo (2009) put

it,

There are people out there who think

the UN has that kind of power and insidious influence, and the truth is the exact

opposite; the UN is too weak, not too strong. As a second tier of the organization,

UNESCO is

no different.

It

is even more complicated. And that is where I will draw

in

my

final example,

the

2012 uprising in Mali and

the

destruction of world heritage

properties by rebels.

The most poignant example of

the

financial and political disasters facing

the

World Heritage programme

and

its powerlessness to intervene in the politics of

preservation erupted in front of our eyes during the 2012 Committee sessions in


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St Petersburg with the destruction

in

Mali. On June 28,

the

World Heritage

Committee discussed the failures of an earlier treaty, The Hague Convention for

the

Protection of Cultural Property in

the

Event of Armed Conflict (1954),

that

115

states parties have ratified, including Mali in 1961.

ICOMOS

proposed

that

Timbuktu be immediately placed on

the

World Heritage

in Danger List. Two days later, Director-General Bokova publicly called for a halt to

the destruction. It was as if the public spectacle of the international meetings

themselves further escalated the violations. Eleonora Mitrofanova, the World

Heritage Committee Chairperson, described the destruction as tragic news for us

all and, even more so for

the

inhabitants of Timbuktu who have cherished and

preserved this monu ment over more than seven centuries. On July 1, Mali addressed

the Committee and appealed for assistance, but gave little outline of how

UNESCO

could effectively respond in the face of ongoing rebel attacks. And while Committee

members were eager

to

find a solution, they were quickly frustrated by their inability

to act or offer concrete solutions on the ground. Some delegations complained

that such inaction called into question the Committee s integrity, yet most of their

time was spent drafting a statement of condemnation. France quipped that they

were not addressing a state party, so could be fairly sure

that the

perpetrators

would

not

be reading the declaration or following it. Undaunted, the German

ambassador called for o ne minute s silence, saying we have lost a child, we have

lost a parent today.

Deliberations over the situation in

Mali

and

the

draft declaration continued

the following day. Committee members wrangled for hours over wording like

rehabilitation and reconstruction and were plagued

by

problems of translation

between

the

English and French terms for safegu ardin g . All of this was captured

fleetingly

on

vast screens with bilingual track-changes

documents

running

concurrently. Chairperson Mitrofanova posed the more uncomfortable questions:

When could UNESCO send a mission? Realistically it would be unsafe to do so

now. Given the budgetary constraints, who exactly

will

pay for such promises of

reconstruction? The Indian ambassador imputed that UNESCO lacked both the

mandate and

the

capacity

to

take any action

in

Mali.

We cannot do this .. he international community has to do things at the

request of the st te community .. we re getting into dangerous terrain.

In the end it was left to Mitrofanova

to

recapitulate

UNESCO s

economic and

political predicament:

TH

E RIGHT T O

WORL

HERITAGE

All

we have are computers, papers and pens .. you re dealing with bandits

and criminals and we only have paper and pens. The international community

at this time has not set up specific actions and effective measures, which

those who take human

life

and destroy cultural heritage have, the call to

reason does not always produce

the

best outcome with these people.

Perhaps the spokesman for the Ansar Dine insurgents rather nailed the point:

God is

unique:

he told reporters. All of this is

h r m

(or forbidden

in

Islam). We

are

all

Muslims. UNESCO is

what?

Here I am reminded of Fasulo s assertion that

we have a fundamental misunderstanding of organizations like UNESCO, fearing

them to be too strong, rather than too weak to be effective.

As

one former US

ambassador put it, there is no such thing as the

UN,

just 192 countries with different

agendas

and

a whole collection of civil servants who work there. We can also

say,

following Singh, that good intentions aside, this is still an elite vision of the world

and ready to be exploited for various political expediencies. And who listens to

this vision?

UNESCO

spends a great deal of time and resources producing various

iterations of its education, science, communication, and culture ideals but much

less on connecting them to

the

everyday world of practice.

I think it

is

important to note, however, that at the present moment, powerful

Western nations on the World Heritage Committee are willing to extend offers of

help and their own brand of expertise to a country like

Mali,

on a state-to-state

basis, yet UNESCO does

not

have the financial capacity or legislative mandate to

intervene. Remember too that many of those nations acted positively

to

recognize

Palestine and supported the inscription

of the

Church

of the

Nativity. But man y

of

those same states parties remain reluctant to embrace a network of indigenous

experts who could effectively address and attend to problems in their own countries

and indeed globally. It is easier to mobilize support for international injustice, for

over-turning regimes with whom

we

do not

sympathize,

to

criticize heritage

practices that do not accord to pre-determined Western models of conservation-

rather than acknowledge otherness and other knowledgesat home. Sovereign states

are indeed resentful. And regardless of UNESCO s

own

desires for structural

transformation, successful

in

the case of Palestine,

not in

the case of WHIPCOE,

those successes turn on the voting power of signatory nations, nbt bureaucrats

and programme officers in Paris. And as

the

US financial withdrawal underlines,

UNESCO s mission and global capacity is precariousat best, premised on the whims

of powerful, wealthy nations like the

US,

Russia and China. These are all daunting

facts for archaeologists, especially

those

working hard to support local, indigenous


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and minority constituencies from the bottom up,

only

to

see

that heritage trumped

by

global processes on a scale heretofore unimagined.

Right from its beginnings at the close of World War II, in

the

wake of violence,

devastation and intolerance, a situation largely unchanged

to

this day,

UNESCO

would always live in the best of times and the worst of times. Poised between the

impossible expectations

of

its charter and

the

abysmal realities

it

had to confront

daily, an elusive hope in the midst

of

multilateral conflict and confrontation, where

poverty, hunger, disease and oppression had first claims on the minds of men in

most parts of the world (Preston, Herman, and Schiller 1989: 5). Cultural heritag e

has been part of that elusive

hope

for a better world for the past 40 years, and as

the UNESCO

tries to educate

the

world,

we

as archaeologists have to educate

ourselves to the political economies at work in our research, at our sites, our

host

nations and amongst our many communities.

REFERENCES

Bandarin, F. 2007, World Heritage: Challenges for the Millennium. Paris:

UNESCO.

Claudi, I.B., 2011,

The

New

Kids on

the Block: BRICs in the World Heritage Committee,

MA

Thesis,

Department of Political

Science,

University of Oslo, Norway.

Disko,

S.,

2010, World Heritage

Sites

in Indigenous Peoples Territories:

Ways

of

Ensuring

Respect for Indigenous Cultures, Values and Human Rights, in D. OffenhauBer,

W.

Zimmerli, and M.-T. Alberts (eds.), World Heritage and Cultural Diversity,

Cottbus: German Commission for

UNESCO,

pp. 167-77.

Fasulo,

l. 2009, An Insider's Guide to the UN, New

Haven: Yale

University

Press.

Hales, R.J., J. Rynne, C Howlett,

J.

Devine and V Hauser, 2012, Indigenous Free Prior

Informed Consent: A Case for Self-determination in World Heritage Nomination

Processes, International Journal

of

Heritage Studies:

1-18.

Hoggart,

R.,

2011, An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Withi, Piscataway,

NJ:

Transaction.

Kersel,

M.M. and

C Luke,

2012, A

Crack

in the Diplomatic Armor:

The

United States

and the Palestinian Authority's Bid for

UNESCO

Recognition, Journal of Field

Archaeology 37: 143-44.

Labadi, S., 2013, UNESCO, Cultural Heritage and Outstanding Universal

Value,

Walnut

Creek,

CA:

AltaMira

Press.

Logan, W., 2013, Australia, Indigenous Peoples and World Heritage from Kakadu to

Cape York: State

Party

Behaviour under the World Heritage Convention, Journal

of

Social Archaeology 13.

THE RIGH

T

TO WORLD

HERITAGE

Meskell,

l.

M 2012 Th R h

.

' e

us

to Inscribe: Reflections on the 35th

Session

of the

World Heritage Committee,

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