THEORY AND METHOD OF INTL INTEGRATION

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Theory and Method in the Study of

International Integration

JAME S A. CAPORASO

I N many ways the study of international integrationis in what Thomas Kuhn has called the pre-paradigm stage of the develop-ment of science.1 This stage is characterized by disagreement on the entitiesto be studied and the definitions, concepts, and indicators to be employed.Controversy is widespread even on the simplest of issues and, what is morediscouraging, this controversy does not take place in a theoretical-methodo-logical context which facilitates its resolution. There is a general lack of com-mon standards by which to evaluate knowledge, decision-rules to interpretevidence, and criteria to measure progress. Thus, what constitutes advancefor one school may mean retreat for another, and efforts to exchange viewsand harmonize aims frequently only serve to further define existing cleavages.Given this disagreement on broad philosophical issues it should not be sur-prising that research efforts and presentations of "evidence" have had littlecompelling impact in altering theoretical convictions. It is also no accidentthat the two most promising efforts to date are not presentations of data butare attempts to fashion a generally acceptable framework within which toevaluate evidence. Leon Lindberg has urged the adoption of a systems per-spective which would harmonize a variety of research efforts and would, aswell, make findings roughly comparable.2 Joseph Nye has suggested that wemust "disaggregate" the concept of integration before we can meaningfully

JAMES A. CAPORASO is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illi-nois. The author gratefully wishes to acknowledge the support of the Northwestern University ResearchCommittee for providing funds for research assistance. Special thanks are due to Kathy Schwering forassistance in the data-collection phase of this effort. Kenneth Janda, Thomas Milbuia, and Alan Pelow-

ski provided helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this article.1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1962).2 Leon N. Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System: Notes toward the Construction

of a Model," Journal of Com mon Market Studies, June 1967 (Vol. 5, No. 4), pp. 344-387.

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THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2 2 9

answer the important questions facing us.31 have already indicated how com-plementary Lindberg's and Nye's suggestions are, and I feel that implementa-tion of their suggestions would aid in making research findings touch basewith one another and thus impart to evidence its proper multiplying effect.4

I. T H E STATE OF INTEGRATION IN TH E EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO MM UNITY

How integrated is the European Economic Community (EEC) today?How does this compare with the level of integration before the EEC cameinto existence? This seems to be a fundamental question and one that needsto be answered before the more complex theoretical issues are treated. Forexample, before one can ask whether the formation of the EEC has had any

effect on the level of integration of the six member states, one must be able todescribe the level of integration at a number of different points in time.

The literature on regional integration in Western Europe offers a rich varietyof arguments concerning trends in the integration or disintegration f the sixmember states. One can divide this literature into at least three classes: i)studies dealing with transactions between units, 2) studies dealing with atti-tudes and opinions of the unit members, and 3) those dealing with thegrowth of political institutions. This gross classification is surely subject to

elaboration, but classification is useful because it avoids the confusion of usinga single label to cover a host of distinct processes.By 1967 trade between Common Market countries had doubled and in some

cases nearly tripled since the initiation of the EEC. Even if one expressestrade figures in terms of percentage of total trade turnover, one will find thatCommon Market partners account for the majority of each member's totaltrade.5 Carl Friedrich, criticizing the relative acceptance (RA) index usedby Karl Deutsch and his associates to measure transactions, has noted that the

"actual" statistics show that "intercommunity trade has increased much morerapidly in the past decade than has trade with outsiders."8 This conclusionis sharply challenged by Karl Deutsch and his associates who argue that avariety of transaction measures, including trade, indicate that European in-tegration has slowed down.7 European integration probably reached a peakduring 1957-1958 and perhaps much earlier for trade in particular (1948-1951). While Deutsch and his associates recognize that absolute increases have

3 Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement,"International Organi-zation, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855-880.

4 James A. Caporaso and Alan L. Pelowski, "Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis," American Political Science Review, June 1971, forthcoming.

3 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold,Europe's Wotdd-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in theEuropean Community (Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall,1970), p. 29.

0 Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 38.7 Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germ any and the We stern Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on

European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribncr's Sons, 1967), p. 219.


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occurred since the EEC came into existence, they argue that these increasesare expected "from mere random probability." They utilize die RA indexdeveloped by Deutsch and I. Richard Savage to take account of these abso-lute increases and to derive scores which express levels of integration in terms

of departures from a null model.8

Research on mass and elite attitudes toward integration has been less con-troversial. Jacques-Rene Rabier, director of die Press and Information Serviceof die European Communities, has presented evidence from opinion pollsconducted du rin g 1952 and 1962. The figures for 1962 show m arked increasesin favorable attitudes toward Europe.9 A more recent study, suggested bythe Press and Information Service, but, significantly, carried out under odierprofessional auspices, comes up widi extremely favorable reactions toward die

formation of a "United States of Europe." Results ranged from a low of 60percent favorable in Belgium and Italy to a high of 75 percent in Luxem-bourg. These figures become even more astonishing if one discounts the largenumber^of people who did not respond.10 Similarly, Ronald Inglehart, pre-senting survey data on the attitudes of die younger generation in France,the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), die Netherlands, and dieUnited Kingdom, has come to die conclusion diat "European integrationmay have moved into full gear onlysince 1958."11

That mass attitudes toward past activities of the EEC and future possibili-ties for federation are favorable does not seem to be disputed. However, whenone attempts either to assess die influence of odier variables (such as die crea-tion and operation of die EEC) on attitudes or, conversely, to assess the im-pact of changing attitudinal patterns on transactions or political institutions,many difficulties emerge. Donald Puchala has attempted to show diat, al-diough diere is a generally high level of support for die EEC, thissupport is not generalized into support for political union.12 Using surveydata collected for 1957 and 1962, Pucha la has observed diat "increasing ap-proval for the Common Market did not generally coincide widi increasingsupp ort for political federation on die Co ntinent between 1957 and 1962 "13

8 For the details of working out the RA index, in addition to some of its mathematical properties,see I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model o the Gross Analysis of TransactionFlows," Econometrica, July i960 (Vol. 28, No. 3), pp. 551-572.

8 Jacques-Rene Rabier, L'Injormation des europeens et I'integration de I'Europe (No. 10) (Brussels:Instirut d'etudes europeennes, Universite libre de Bruxelles, February 1965), p. 38.

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1 3 Ibid., p. 53.


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This has led him to conclude that, attitudinally at least, economic integrationand political federation were quite distinct processes. Similarly, Roger Cobband Charles Elder have noted the general noncongruence of indicators ofintegration and call into question the relations between transactions and mass

perceptions."While most observers concede progress in economic integration, the picture

of political integration is much less optimistic. The defeat of British applica-tion for entry in to the E EC in 1963, the agricu ltural crisis of 1965-1966 andthe subsequent Luxembourg agreements, Charles de Gaulle's second "no" tothe U nited K ing dom in 1967, the increased impo rtance of the Com mittee ofPermanent Representatives in the decisionmaking process,15 and the generallyattenuated role of the Commission of the European Communities all point to

this conclusion.The optimism which argued that an unobtrusive series of limited steps would

eventually lead to political union has been eclipsed by a new pessimism whichfears that past progress toward integration may have brought the EEC to anew equilibrium point far removed from both the model of the jealous nation-state and the authoritative supranational organization. In short, by success-fully segregating economic rewards from cultural and political preferencesthe new community system has now made it possible for Europeans to enjoy

the fruits of a large market and customs union while at the same time sacri-ficing neither cultural identity nor political autonomy. Discussion of the com-mission as an embryonic federal executive has all but ceased and scholars in-creasingly view it in its administrative capacity. In a provocative analysis ofthe administrative-political role of the EEC commission David Coombes hascome to the conclusion that the commission's role has evolved toward thatof a classic bureaucracy.16 To state the pessimism more strongly, the fear isthat the EEC will become little more than an intergovernmental secretariatdedicated to implementing the details of the common agricultural policy.

This picture contrasts sharply with the conclusions reached by WilliamFisher and Carl Friedrich. Both scholars, working independently and em-ploying very different techniques, have come to similar conclusions. Fisher,defining political integration as the growth of the decisionmaking capacity

1 4 Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Comm unity: A Regional and Global Study (NewYork: H olt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 138.

1 5 Although the Committee of Permanent Representatives is not specifically mentioned in the TreatyEstablishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty), it has come to occupy a central role

in the community decisionmaking machinery. It is a delegate body for the Council of Ministers, im-parting day-to-day administrative continuity to the irregular council sessions and preparing the work forits meetings. It also acts as a clearinghouse for commission proposals and is in this sense akin to an"early warning system," alerting the nationally minded council to any possible supranational maneuverson the part of the commission.

1 6 David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Comm unity: A Portrait of the Comm is-sion of the E.E.C. (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications [in cooperation with Political and EconomicPlanning], 1970), p. 327.


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of political institutions at the community level, has reached the conclusionthat the E EC w en t throu gh th ree distinct stages of gro w th, 1958-1961, 1961-1962, and 1962-1964." On the other hand, Friedrich's approach is to examinein some depth the processes of formal and informal community formation

across a broad spectrum of social life. He has examined the activities of busi-ness associations, agricultural groups, labor unions, and the academic com-munity. His conclusion is that in some respects Europe can be viewed as anemerging nation in the midst of a "federalizing" process.

The above discussion indicates at least four sources of confusion in the argu-ment over the extent of European integration. These have to do with thegeneric nature of the integration process, the types of scoring proceduresutilized, the nonsubstitutability of indicators, and the types of theoretical in-

ferences drawn from available data. The first problem arises when we usethe same term to describe a process that has a set of distinctive components,as with political, economic, and attitudinal integration. The second ariseswhen the methods used to operationalize and score variables lead to differentdescriptive and theoretical conclusions. The third source of confusionthenonsubstitutability of indicatorscomes into play when one takes for grantedthe relationship between several components of integration and thus substi-tutes indicators of one component for indicators of another. The fourth area

of disagreement, a result of differences in interpretation of substantive theory,arises because different observers will never draw precisely the same conclu-sions from the same set of data. In this sense all theory is "empirically under-determined."

I suggest these four problem areas with the hope that a recognition of themmay be the first step toward a resolution of some of the problems facing us.A theory of integration must grapple with these four problems for the sim-ple reason that any one of them can alter its conclusions. The failure to under-

stand the source of the conclusions of a theory inevitably results in contro-versy. While this controversy generally assumes the form of substantive theory(point four), it may in fact be an unrecognized version of point one, two, orthree. In this article I have chosen to focus specifically on some of the theo-retical and methodological problems involved in the measurement and scor-ing of international transactions. This is not to suggest that the other threeare less important; rather, it is a recognition that an adequate treatment ofall of them is a task beyond the scope of this article.

II. PROBLEMS OF MEASU REME NT AND SCORING

Clearly, it is not possible to determine whether the EEC is more integratedtoday than it was in 1957-1958 on purely descriptive and technical grounds.

1 7 William E. Fisher, "An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigmo Political Integration," Inter-national Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), p. 273.


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Given the lack of a pure, i.e., theoretically neutral, observation language astraightforward descriptive approach simply does not provide the necessarycriteria for a disciplined solution of the problem: "What scoring procedureought one to use in measuring international integration?" A variety of strate-

gies are possible. Assum ing that one has chosen some transactional measure ofintegration such as trade, one could utilize any scoring procedure from abso-lute trade values to some index of relative trade, e.g., the relative acceptanceindex. What follows is, therefore, an attempt to answer a descriptive questionas well as an attempt to provide a theoretical and methodological rationalefor making defensible choices from a set of competing procedures for measur-ing integration.

The problem centers on the appropriate scoring procedure to express trans-

action data between nations. Deutsch's and Savage's relative acceptance indexexpresses interdependence between nations in terms of a score which reflectsthe extent to which the transactions between them deviate from chance.18

Basically, the model works as follows: Any two countries transact a certainquantity of trade with one another and with the world. If country A exports10 percent of the world's total exports and country B imports 10 percent ofthe world's imports, it is "expected" that country B will receive 10 percentof country A's exports. If country B received no more than this, countries

A and B would not be considered integrated according to the model. Th isfollows from the assumption of origin-destination independence which assertsthat trade is distributed only in terms of the respective shares of each coun-try's imports and exports. Substantive factors, such as geographic proximity,cultural affinities, and historical ties, are treated as exogenous variables. Themodel is null in the sense that it is based solely on the laws of probabilityand in that it is primarily departures from the model that are interesting.Deutsch and Savage correctly point out that computation of RA scores should

be only a first step in analysis. After departures from the model have beenisolated, substantive variables should be introduced to explain their occur-

rence.19

The RA index is valuable because it provides us with a "contextually de-fined" measure of interaction and controls for the gross size effects of trade.20

If th e total trade of country A increases by 15 percent and its trade w ith Bincreases by 15 percent, Deutsch argues that we do not think of A and B asmore integrated. Their respective shares of each other's markets have re-mained the same.

1 8 Savage and Deutsch, Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 551.1 9 Ibid., p. 552.20 Hayward Alker, Jr., and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic

Area, 1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence,Vol. 6 of International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 290.


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The formula for computing the RA index is:

in which- i < RAij < oo .

Aij refers to the actual trade between two countries and Eu refers to theirexpected trade. By allowing expected trade to enter into the computation ofthe RA index both absolute trade levels and trends are controlled. (Trendsare viewed as increases or decreases in the mean level of world or regionaltrade.)21

The RA index is interesting to us because its use is tied to a particular sub-stantive controversy with respect to European integration. On the basis of RAscores Karl Deutsch and his associates have presented evidence to show thatEuropean integration has come to a halt:

European integration has slowed since the mid-1950's, and it has stopped orreached a plateau since 1957-58. In the 1957-58 period, Europe reached thehighest level of structural integration that it has ever had.22

The authors add that:There are, to be sure, absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal cor-

respondence and the exchange of students, but all this can be accounted for bythe effects of prosperity and the general increase in the level of these activitiesin the 1950's and early 1960's. There have been no increases in integration inregard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from mere ran-dom probability and increase in prosperity in the countries concerned.23

These findings concerning the leveling-off of European integration since1957-1958 have been criticized by Ronald Inglehart as well as others.24 Ingle-hart has noted that "far from finding a stagnation of integrative processes

since 1958, I would argue that, in some respects, European integration mayhave moved into full gear onlysince 1958."25 Lindberg has noted that he andErnst Haas have similarly argued that "it is since 1957 that integration hasmade its greatest strides."26

This disagreement is not in itself disturbing. Conflict over theory maylead to "crucial tests" which may produce change, cognitive reshuffling, andtheoretical refinement. For the most part, however, parties to the controversyhave failed to meet one another on common ground. Inglehart has made a

2 1 Paul Sm oker , "A Ti m e Ser ies Analys is of Sino -Indian R ela t io ns" (Pap er presented a t the SecondInterna t ional Peace Research Associa tion Conference , Tal lbe rg , Swed en, June 1719, 19 67 ) , p . 3 .

2 2 Deutsch e t a l . , p . 218.2 3 Ib id . , p . 219 .2 4 I n g l e h a r t , American Political Science Review, Vol . 6 1 , No. 1 , p . 9 1 . See a lso Fisher, International

Organization, Vol . 23 , No. 2 , p . 273.2 6 Ing leha r t , American Political Science Review, Vol . 61 , N o . 1 , p . 91 .2 6 L i n d b e rg , Journal of Comm on Market Studies, Vol . 5 , No. 4 , p . 344.


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serious attempt to deal with the RA index but he has criticized so many ofDeutsch's findings in terms of his own political socialization data that it isimpossible to identify the locus of the disagreement. Do the differences arisefrom the respective variations in data (socialization data versus transactional

data) , from different scoring procedures (the RA index versus simple per-centage data), or purely from differences in interpretation?

This controversy highlights four important problems of general interest forthe social sciences. The first problem is the lack of criteria by which to assessevidence. In the absence of such criteria it is impossible to evaluate opposingarguments and, likewise, it becomes difficult to assess progress toward thesolution of the problem. Both Inglehart and Deutsch present persuasive cases:Deutsch says we must control for size; Inglehart says we must not penalize

nations just because they account for a large proportion of world trade. Whilethese arguments appeal to our sense of plausibility and reasonableness, theyare not necessarily desirable in terms of theory construction. In addition, wedo not assess the arguments in terms of identical and explicit standards.

The second problem arises because the controversy is carried on outside ofa common mutually accepted theoretical framework. The underlying assump-tion of Deutsch's model is one of scarcity. There is a certain amount of inte-gration to be divided among various countries. The RA index is based on a

"share of the pie" model. The total size of the pie does not increase; only theallocations to individual countries change. Inglehart's notion of integrationseems to be based on an expanding pie model.27 Not only may the respectiveportions of the pie change but the total size may also increase or decrease.Adopting Inglehart's assumptions it is possible to imagine four or five regionsof the world becoming more integrated whereas this is very improbable withthe RA index.28

2 7 Sec Ronald Inglehart and Robert Schoenbcrgcr, "Communications and Political Mobilization: De-velopment o a European Orientation in Great Britain, France, and Italy" (Paper delivered at the an-nual American Political Science Association Convention, Washington, 1968), especiallypp. 2-6 .

2 8 T he assumption here is that the world is composed of only four or five regions. The RA indextechnically is not based on perfect zero-sum assumptions in the sense that increases in integration be-tween any two actors must be canceled out elsewhere in the system. However, it is based on assumptionsthat may be described as "highly competitive." For example, imagine a trading system of three actors(A , B, and C) . Imagine that A's RA score with B increases. It is technically possible for A's RA scorewith C to increase also. Roughly, the conditions under which this ca n occur require: 1) an approximateequality of actor A's raw trade in imports an d exports with actors B and C; 2) an approximately equalincrease of A's imports and exports with B and C; and 3) A's increases with B and C must be greaterthan the increases between B and C.

A rough idea o the empirical competitiveness o the RA score is provided by our data. W e have a

three-actor system, West Germany, the EEC, and the world. If the RA score has no scarcity biases, w eshould expect West Germany's trade (measured in RA scores) with the EEC and the world to be un-correlated. In fact, West Germany's exports to the EEC and to the world correlate at - .836 and importscorrelate at -.960. Thus, despite the fact that West Germany's total trade increased with both the EECand the world, the RA scores for trade with these tw o systems are negatively related.

I am grateful to Raymond Duvall of Northwestern University for working out the mathematicalproperties of the RA index as well as providing simulated data on the behavior of this index in a varietyof international trade systems.


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The third problem raised by the controversy over measures of integrationinvolves the utilization of different data by Deutsch and Inglehart. As men-tioned previously Deutsch's data is derived primarily from transaction flows,particularly trade, while Inglehart's data is obtained through survey research

and reflects an attempt to measure loyalty to European symbols and institu-tions.29 Ideally, substantive findings will be invariant with respect to differentmethods of data collection, provided that the data attempts to get at the samething. There is as yet little evidence to indicate whether attitudinal integra-tion (community of loyalties and sentiment) is part of a general construct of"integration" or whether it is distinct. Our very common notions of culturallag suggest that attitudes, loyalties, etc., may follow transactional integrationby quite long periods of time. If this is the case or if shifts in attitudes occur

before transactional integration, it may not be fair to criticize results basedon one kind of data by referring to results based on other kinds of data.30

A final problem results from the fact that, by and large, RA scores havebeen treated as empirical findings rather than as scores to be used in testsof substantive theory. Savage and Deutsch explicitly pointed out this dangerwhen they formulated the RA index.51 Despite this there has been a generaltendency to replace tests of substantive hypotheses with presentation of tablesof distributions of RA scores. Such tables may give us an indication of the

extent to which trading patterns deviate from a random model but we aregiven no clue as to the substantive variables which might account for thesedepartures. The test of a substantive hypothesis suggested by Steven Bramsis the only one I know of in which RA scores were entered as data.32

III. T H E R ELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND MEASUREMENT

The above discussion indicates that resolution of the problems involved inmeasuring integration is unlikely unless we simultaneously focus on problemsof theory and measurement. Unfortunately, the inseparability of these tworealms is seldom recognized at all and, even if superficially acknowledged,is rarely taken seriously in the actual conduct of research operations.33 Opera-tionalism has left social scientists under the illusion that concepts will be

2 9 Deutsch actually utilizes five streams of evidence including survey research an d content analysis.However, Deutsch bases his strongest conclusions on trade data and other measures of "structural inte-gration." See Deutsch et al., pp. 218-220.

3 0 Joseph S. Nye, in his brilliant article, "Comparative Regional Integration: Conceptan d Measure-ment," International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 855-880, persuasively argues that political inte-gration may not only be different from economic and social integration but political integration itselfmay include several distinct components.

3 1 Savage and Deutsch, Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 552.3 2 Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," American Political Science Re-

view, December 1966 (V ol. 60, No. 4) , pp.880-898.8 3 See, for example, Hubert M . Blalock, Jr., "The Measurement Problem: A Gap between the Lan-

guages of Theory and Research," in Hubert M . Blalock and Ann B. Blalock, eds., Methodology in SocialResearch (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 5-27.


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theoretically significant if they are precisely defined and measured. But whileoperationalism was fairly successful in providing criteria for precise, inter-subjective concepts, it was not nearly as successful in terms of leading to theo-retical terms with broad scope. The present controversy concerning the level

of European integration can never be resolved with respect to research andmeasurement considerations alone, just as an exclusive focus on theory or de-scriptive argument is futile. Yet, the argument has been carried out in justthese terms as if some self-evident descriptive answer were waiting there to befound by the straightforward application of some neutral measurement lan-guage.

Every research method carries a theoretical bias in its assessment of reality.If countries are considered more integrated when the value of their trade in-

creases, then integration is viewed in terms of growth characteristics. If theRA index is used, then integration is viewed in terms of changes in preferen-tial behavior. Most of the methods used to measure international integrationfrom absolute trade figures and percentage scores to measures which controlfor national income and the RA indexfrequently argue that these controlterms are needed since they neutralize factors that otherwise would lead toartifactual results. But what is artifactual is far from a settled matter. One willprobably want to control for increases in trade due to inflation, but whether

one wants to control for changes due to higher gross national product (GNP),increased growth rates, or general increases in the level of world trade is byno means a closed matter. There is simply no extratheoretical solution to theproblem.

We mentioned that the RA index could be roughly thought of as a zero-sum measure whereby increases or decreases in integration between any twoactors would probably be offset elsewhere by changes with other actors.Deutsch's communication perspective leads him to view integration in terms

of the relative density of communication flows, i.e., transactions. There arethus two areas in which one must attempt to introduce controls, betweenmembers of some integrating system and third parties and between the supra-national system and its component units, in this case nation-states. Thus, it isimportant to note not only that integration has reached a plateau with respectto diird members but also that there has been a relative decline in interna-tional life compared with the intensity of domestic activity and transactions.34

In contrast to this view of integration which stresses that the development

of domestic and supranational systems are distinctive, even competitive, con-cerns other authors choose to view integration as a process of mingling andblending activity and institutions at different levels. Lindberg and StuartScheingold have discussed in some detail how the institutional system of the

3 4 Karl W. Dcutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," Political Studies, June i960(Vol. 8, No. 2), pp. 147-155.


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European community involves a symbiotic relationship between national andsupranational elements. The thrust of their analysis is that it is no longerfruitful to view com munity and national systems as antagonistic or in termsof one replacing the other. The involvement and co-optation of national elites,

the utilization of national channels, and the preservation of national politicalstructures, far from posing a threat to integration at the supranational level,may actually reinforce it.35

There is nothing necessarily right or wrong with any of these assumptions.However, assumptions should be made explicit and their consequences mustbe taken into account. There are a variety of examples from other fields tosupport either of these approaches. Analogues to a theory of integration basedon an "expanding pie" model are provided by the notion of the cooperative

game, by theories of political development which stress total growth of sys-tem characteristics such as the capacity of the political system to control andcommand societal resources, and by notions of power such as provided byTalcott Parsons.36 Analogues to Deutsch's theory are provided by the zero-sumgame, by the problem of distribution in a scarce economy, and by the phe-nomenon of relative deprivation.

In brief, the argument here is that procedures have implications for theoryand vice versa. A theoretical bias inheres in each method and each theoretical

perspective suggests certain practical research operations. The dilemma whichwe wish to avoid has two facets. One facet is a narrow operationalism in whicheach measurement operation defines a separate concept. Such an approach,in which the domains of indicators and concepts are coextensive, sacrificesthe deductive power of concepts in favor of precision. The other facet is theassumption that the language of measurement is neutral with respect to theoryand can therefore be applied without attention to its consequences.

IV . CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE VA LIDITY OF SCORING PROCEDURES

My argument has been that the crux of the problem of measuring integra-tion is the lack of criteria by which to assess the state of integration. I offertwo criteria both of which are based on the belief that what is involved hereis really a question of validity. These two criteria are 1) the convergence be-tween one particular scoring procedure and others in attempting to measurethe same construct and 2) the differential predictive and explanatory capacity

of a variety of different scoring procedures for the same raw variable. The3 5Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 32, 37. See also the excellent articles on the preparation of commu-

nity decisions at the national level by Theodor Holtz, Pierre Gerbert, Marco Olivetti, Guy de Muyser,and Robert De Bruin in La Decision dans Us Communautes europeennes (Brussels: Presses universitairesde Bruxelles, 1969).

3 6 Parsons's conception of power is one that is seen as infinitely expandable depending upon thenumber of functional contexts in which it operates. See "On the Concept of Political Power," in TalcottParsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 297-355.


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THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2 39

former criterion utilizes the notions of both reliability and validity especiallyas formulated by Donald Campbell and Donald Fiske.3' The latter borrowsfrom a variety of sources but especially from the literature of constructvalidity.38

Convergence

The criterion of convergence is satisfied when, in the attempt to measurea construct, a variety of independent methods arrive at similar results. Theindependence of methods is crucial here in distinguishing validity from re-liability.39 William Scott has correctly argued that "it is prudent to intercorre-late quite different instrument types,if their correspondence is to be attrib-uted primarily to common content."40 To the extent that a particular method

produces results which are artifactual these results will tendnot to agree withthose derived from highly different measurement techniques. Thus, givenaset of scoring techniques, we will place more confidence in those which showhighest agreement with all others, ceteris paribus. To the extent that none ofthe various scoring procedures displays significant(in the nonstatistical sense)overlap we must conclude either that each technique tapsa different con-struct, that the construct is not unidimensional, or that a substantial portion ofthe variance results from variance in the methods and not from variance inthe substantive variables thatwe are attempting to measure.

The construct of interest here is "economic integration," particularly theeconomic integration of West Germany into die European Economic Com-munity. Two indicators have been selected to measure this construct: WestGerman imports from and exports to EEC countries. Four different scoringtechniques have been applied to these two indicators.41 Each of the scoringprocedures is treated as a separate method.

The four scoring procedures are as follows: i) Raw data for imports andexports is used. This technique doesnot control for internal economic growth,total growth of trade in the world or region, or for West Germany's changingshare of EEC and world markets. 2) Preoccupation ratios are used.42 A pre-occupation ratio (PR) is a measure of relative integration. It assesses the

3 7 Donald T. Campbell and Donald Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin, March 1959 (Vol. 56, No. 2), pp. 81-105.

3 8 Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological Tests," Psychological Bulletin,May 1955 (Vol. 52, No. 3 ), p p. 281-302.

39 Campbell and Fiske, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 83.4 0 William A. Scott, "Attitude Measurement," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The

Handbook, of Social Psychology, Vol. 2: Research Methods (2nd cd.; Reading, Mass: Addison-WesleyPublishing Co., 1968), p. 254.4 1 This results in a "multimethod matrix," a variant on the Campbell-Fiske theme. Technically, there

are four methods and one trait since imports and exports are viewed as indicators of the same construct.W e thus expect high interindicator correlationsand are not concerned here with discriminant validity.

42 James V. Toscano, "Transaction Flow Analysis in Metropolitan Areas: Some Preliminary Explora-tions," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Phila-delphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp . 102-103.


13/26

24O INTERNATIONA L ORGANIZATION

amount of integration between two units by controlling for integration withsome third unit. For example, we can express West Germany's economic in-tegration into the EEC according to the following simple formula:

I (EEC)PR = T~i TJT 0 = imports)

I (world)in which the strength of West Germany's linkages to the EEC is gauged inrelation to its ties with the rest of the world. This technique controls for grosssize effects such as an increase in the total volume of trade which one countrytransacts with the world. 3) The relative acceptance index, previously de-scribed, is used. This technique controls not only for an exporting country'sshare of the world market but also for the importing country's share of the

import market.43

4) Bruce Russett's "chooser-chosen" method is used. Russettis interested in the relative impact of a country's trade on political processesin other countries. He assumes that "the political effects of trade are subjectto decreasing marginal returns?" The impact of country j on country i ismeasured according to the formula:

IIIY,

in which Tu equals the total exports plus imports between two countries (or

a country and a region) i and j and Y equals the total national income ofcountry i.45

One way to assess convergence is to evaluate the degree of correlation be-tween independent methods. The following matrix presents the correlationsobtained between four methods and two indicators (imports and exports) ofthe same construct. The import-export data is distributed longitudinally over35 points in tim e from 1958 to 1966 us ing quarter-years as the basic observa-tion point. (See table 1.)

As we would expect, most of the coefficients are very high. The correlationsof the RA indices, especially the RA index of exports, are generally lowerthan the others. One way to express the notion of convergence more accu-rately is to add all the columns in the matrix and rank each method/indicatorscore according to its average intercorrelation (table 2). The method whichproduces the highest average intercorrelation may be thought of as possessing

4 3 Karl Deutsch points out that i two countries double their shares o world trade "while the averagetrade of the rest of the world remains unchanged, and if their mutual trade were proportional to theirrespective shares in world trade," then the total flow of trade between these two countries will increasefourfold. See Deutsch et al., p. 228.

4 4 Bruce M. R ussett, " 'Regional' Trad ing Patterns, 1938 -196 3,"International Studies Quarterly, De-cember 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 4), p. 362.

4 5 This technique is not stricdy comparable to the other three because it introduces a new term (Y)and because it considers imports and exports in a combined way rather than separately. The assumptionhere is that the impact of EEC trade on West Germany can be treated roughly as West German im-ports from the EEC and West Germany's impact on the EEC treated comparable to West German ex-ports to Common Market countries.


14/26

THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2 4 I

the "greatest convergence" and the least unique method variance. In this sensewe would also have confidence that the method is a most valid one.

TABLE I. WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE E EC: CONVERGENCE

OF FOUR SCORING PROCEDURES

Procedure

Method 1ImportsExports

Method 2

ImportsExports



Method 1

Imports

1.000

(-955)

936796

557-509

833777

Exports

1.000

.884913

421

-329

830. 78 .

Method Q

Imports

1.000

(.798)

.740

-679

834765

Exports

1.000

.308-.169

736.688

Method 3 Method 4

Imports Exports Imports Exports

1.000

(- .980) 1.000

.486 - 4 2 5 1 -ooo4 '7 --357 (-964) ' o o o

N O T E : The figures in parentheses are reliability coefficients. Pearson's r is used. N = 3 5 .

TA B L E 2. CONVERGENCE T E S T OF THE FOUR SCORING PROCEDURES

ScoringProcedure

Method iImportsExports

Method 2Imports

Exports

Method 3Imports

Exports


X =

XPr =

Method i

Imports

I.OOO

955

C

C

CO

O

r

557- 5 0 9

833

777

.621

859

Exports

9551.000

.884

913

421

-329

.830

.78.

636

873

Method 2

Imports

936

.884

1.000

798

.740

- 6 7 9

834765

.611

.841

Exports

7969'3

7981.000

.308-.169

736.688

.581.786

Method 3

Imports

557421

740.308

1.000

-.980

.486

.417

.278

Exports

-509- 3 2 9

-679-.169

-.9801.000

-425

- 3 5 7

-492

Method 4

Imports

C

O

C

C

834

736

486

-425

1.000

.964

C

O

O C

C

Exports

777.781

765.688

41 7

-357

964

1.000

576

795

NOTE: XPr refers to the mean of the purified correlation coefficient. It is equal to the average inter-corrdation coefficient omitting the two RA scores. Pearson's r is used. N=35.


15/26

242 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The average correlation for all methods except the RA method appears tobe quite high especially if we consider that the low RA scores are includedin the composite scores. The XPr ("average purified correlation") indicateshow much higher these correlationsare when calculated without the RA co-

efficients. Table 3 ranks these methods in terms of the strength of the inter-indicator correlation.

TABLE 3. RANKINGS OF METHODS BY AVERAGE INTERINDICATOR CORRELATION

Inter indica tor Correlation Composite Score*

1. Method 1, indicator 2 .6362. Method 1, indicator 1 .621

, - . . . . . ~ 1 Merhnd 1 -629. Method 2, indicator 1 .611 'M e t h o d

'4. Method 4, indicator 1 .608 2. Method 2 .5965. Method a, indicator 2 .581 3. Method 4 .592

-.107

5. Method 2, indicator 2 .581 3. Method 46. Method 4, indicator 2 .576 4 Method 37. Method 3, indicator 1 .2788. Method 3, indicator 2 -4 92

a Exports and imports combined.

The highest scores are produced by method i, indicators i and 2 (.621 and.636). Method 2, indicator 1 rank s second w ith .611, then method 4, indicator1 with .608, and method 2, indicator 2 with .581. The RA method has the low-est average intercorrelation with exportsand the second lowest with imports.It is striking to note that the highest composite score (considering exportsandimports combined) is yielded by the raw data on exports and imports, a valueof .629. Method 2, the preoccupation ratio, is close behind with a combinedscore of .596. Russett's method is next (.592), and the RA index is the leastconvergent with an index of -.107.40

Perhaps a bivariate correlation matrix cannot giveus the information weneed. For example, two bivariate correlations (rAB, rBC) may be high in-ternally and yet rAC will be low. Any two variables (A and C) may sharevariance with a construct by virtue of common variation with a third variable(B).47 Factor analysis may help us with this problem. Table 4 presents theresults of an orthogonal rotation.

4 0 I hasten to add that this does not invalidate the RA index although it does decrease our confi-dence in it. The criterion o convergence could be looked upon as a kind o "halfway house" for validity.In principle, though, any construct should be amenable to measurement through a variety of methods.If, after exhaustive attempts to find other techniques sensitive to the same variance as the RA index,th e RA index still stands alone, we would be tempted to draw the conclusion that the variance is dueto special properties of the method. (In this line of reasoning, in particular with respect to the view ofconvergence as a "halfway house," I am indebted to Thomas Milburn, professor of social psychology,DePaul University.)

4 7 On this point see Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis (Princeton, N.J: D. VanNostrand Co., 1954), pp.5-6.


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THEORY AND M E T H O D INT INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2 4 3

TA B L E 4. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF M UL TIP LY SCORED INTEGRATION DAT A

Scoring Procedure Facto r i Factor 2

Method 1Imp ort s .881 .371Exports .954 .181

Method 2

Impo rts .809 .558Expor ts .919 .035

Method 3

Imports .256 .955Exports --158 --986

Method 4Imp ort s .881 .285Exports .855 .222

Percentage variance 61.161 3 -939

NOTE: The loadings in this table are for the rotated matrix.

All variables have high loadings on factor i except imports and exportsmeasured by die RA mediod (.256 and -.158). This factor explains over61percent of die variance in die correlation matrix. Also, on factor 2 die twoRA scores behave very differendy from the odier variables. Imports load at.955 and exports at -.986. These two variables define die second factor andaccount for most of die variance. A ldiough it is true diat die two RA variablesshow strong loadings in the opposite direction, diis is not necessarily incon-sistent widi die interpretation diat diey are bodi tapping the same dimension.If die RA index is sensitive to changes in preferential behavior, it would besensitive to bodi positive and negative changes.

This supports our interpretation of die correlation matrix diat die RA indexis least convergent widi odier mediods.It also suggests diat die RA mediodmay be sensitive to a dimension of integration different than diat tappedbyodier scoring procedures. Theoretically,we may diink of factor i as measur-ing economic integration where integration includes growth characteristicsin die individual country, die region, and die world. Factor 2 may be sensi-tive only to changes in preferential behavior, what Deutsch calls "structuralbehavior." It probably is not sensitive to size-effect changes, volume changes,

and growdi variations.Deutsch's view of integration comes close to Kennedi Boulding's idea of

structural growdi/8 Odier views of integration which stress die growdi of4 8 Kenneth Boulding has developed a threefold typology of growth: simple growth, population growth,

and structural growth. Simple growth and structural growth are relevant for our purposes. Bouldingthinks of simple growth as "the growth or decline of a single variable or quantity by accretion or de-


17/26


structures and functions at the suprasystem level are more directly concernedwith the "mere effects of size and prosperity," i.e., simple growth. The growthof political structures, institutions, and functions at one level (e.g., the EEC)may leave patterns of political activities and capacities at the nation-state level

quite undisturbed. Indeed, it may even encourage further growth of theseindividual nation-states.

While the evidence here suggests that raw data, preoccupation ratios, andthe Russett method may all be valid techniques for scoring transaction data,there are two caveats we should mention. First, convergent validity is ex-tremely impressive when one has great confidence in one of the measuresbeforehand. In the absence of this confidence one must accept commonalityof multiple measurements as the only acceptable evidence. The risk of circu-

larity here is decreased to the extent that the methods are independent. Sec-ond, as Johan Galtung has stated,

"the proof of the pudding is in the eating," i.e., what can be explained andpredicted from the data collected is the important thing, not how much "con-sistency" tiiere is between forms of data collection with perhaps no theoreticalreason for consistency at all between them.49

Construct Validity

The question arises as to whether a set of methods can yield consistent re-sults and still be invalid. One interpretation is that the three methods whoseresults converge are contaminated (e.g., by method variance) in the samedirection. The only uncontaminated method in this case would be the RAindex and its unique noncontamination would explain its lonely nonconver-gence. In order for this argument to be acceptable the nonconvergent method(the RA index) should have greater predictive ability (according to a theory)than the convergent methods. This brings us directly to our second criterion,

the predictive and explanatory capacity of various measures. This approach ispletion" ("Toward a General Theory of Growth," in Joseph John Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan,eds., Population Theory and Policy: Selected Readings [Glencoe, 111: Free Press, 1 95 6], p . 109 ). Struc-tural growth, on the other hand, consists not of a scale or volume change but of a change in the com-plexity of a system or in the relationships of the parts of the system to one another. We notice a strik-ing parallel between this concept and Deutsch's conception of integration as reflected in the RA index:

This index thus measures by how many more or fewer percent these two countries deal with oneanother than they could be expected to do according to random probability and the mere size oftheir total foreign trade. The RA index separates, therefore, the actual results of preferential be-havior and structural integration from the mere effects of the size and prosperity of countries.[Deutsch et al, p. 220.] :

I do not, however, mean to imply that Deutsch's concept of integration and Boulding's idea of struc-tural growth are identical. Boulding's notion of structural growth also includes changes in system com-plexity in which the system may gain new components without these additions being offset elsewhere inthe system. This kind of growth is epigenetic in Etzioni's sense. See Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis ofPolitical Communities at the International Level,"American Journal of Sociology, January 1963 (Vol.68 , No. 4), pp. 407-421.

4 9 Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York: Columbia University Press,IQ67)> P- i27- This quote should be seen in light of a position on which Galtung was commenting; itis not necessarily his own position.


18/26


straightforward: "To make clear the meaning of a concept is to set forth thelaws within which it occurs."50 Thus, we can simply embody the alternativelyscored data in the same substantive propositions and ask what the explanatoryimport of each is. This approach to validation, unlike the convergence ap-

proach, immediately raises considerations about the structure of science andthe laws in terms of which it is composed. The construct validation approachsimultaneously involves the validation of a construct and a theory. The ra-tionale of this approach is concisely summarized by Helen Peak:

The essence of the approach to validation through testing predictions fromtheory may be stated briefly. The meaning of any measured process is givennot only by a description of operations used in isolating it from other processesand in assigning some index of quantity but also by knowledge of its influence

on o ther processes and their influence on it. . . . Th is involves all the problemsof formulating theory, deducing consequences, and testing the deductions un-der conditions of controlled observation.51

It will be convenient to apply this test in four steps: i) specifying the con-cept, 2) embedding the concept in a theory, 3) deducing testable theoremsfrom it, and 4) presenting and evaluating the evidence. The concept of inter-est here is economic integration and the theory with which we will be dealingis that of "spillover." According to this theory the greatest amount of spill-

over is expected from the least technical sectors. It is expected that integrationin technical sectors will remain more or less isolated while integration in non-technical areas will generate effects in other sectors.52 We deal with the thirdstep of our test, deducing testable theorems, by selecting two sectors withinthe EEC, transport and agriculture, as examples of technical and nontechni-cal integration. According to the theory more spillover will occur between ourmeasures of economic integration and political integration in agriculture, anontechnical sector of the EEC, than in transport, a technical sector.53

A word should be mentioned concerning the operationalization of thevariable political integration. Political integration is viewed as the emergenceand development of political structures and activities around supranationalunits. Thus, the EEC can be said to become more integrated as it acquiresdecisionmaking capabilities, the power to make binding decisions, the powerto implement these decisions, and the power to adjudicate disputes betweenmember states. We can thus utilize decisions, regulations, recommendations,

5 0 Cronbach and Mcehl, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 290.5 1

Helen Peak, "Problems of Objective Observation," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, cds., Re-search Methods in the Behavorial Sciences ( N e w York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 288-289.

5 2 This is almost th e opposite relationship from the one suggested by David Mitrany in his A Word-ing Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (Chi-cago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

6 3 There is no space to fully defend the selection of these tw o sectors here. Briefly, I considered theextent to which different groups were involved in the issue area, th e extent to which autonomy is givento experts, th e degree of involvement of key political decisionmakers in the decisions of the sectors, andthe degree of problem-solving versus purely political (e.g., satisfying group interests) activity.


19/26


and other indicators of the political activity of the Commission and the Coun-cil of Ministers of the European Communities to measure integration. Anycomposite indices which are formed on the basis of these indicators can bethought of as "institutional output scores" as suggested by William Fisher.54

The following procedure was utilized. There are basically four communityinstitutions empowered to make decisions that have some political and legalforce in the EEC: The Council of Ministers of the European Communities,the Commission of the European Communities, the Court of Justice of theEuropean Communities, and the European Parliament. Both the Council ofMinisters and the Commission of the European Communities have the powerto issue regulations, decisions, directives, and recommendations; the EuropeanParliament can submit questions to the commission and the council although

the Rome Treaty provides no legal basis for submitting questions to the coun-cil.55 The following list explains the differences between the four types ofaction:

1) Court communicationsthese are letters and other information concern-ing a case which the court receives and sends out.

2) Court judgmentsjudgments are true judicial acts resulting from con-sideration of alleged infractions of community laws. Judgments of the Courtof Justice are directly enforceable in all member states.

3) Court rulingsrulings of the court are, for the most part, procedural innature and concern the manner in which a case is litigated.

4) Court decisionsdecisions are preliminary in nature and usually concerninterpretation of the Rome Treaty or acts of community institutions.

5) Number of new cases considered by the courtthis indicator is intendedto reflect the volume of new legal activity undertaken by the court.

6) Parliamentary questionsthe number and kind of written questionssubmitted by the members of the European Parliament to members of the

Council of Ministers or the Commission of the European Communities.7) Council regulationsthese do not differ in legal status from regulations

of the Commission of the European Communities. However, in substantiveterms, their content is different; they usually apply to more general, politicalconcerns than commission regulations which are usually reserved for "thosetechnical areas in which the principles and the general policy have been de-fined in the Treaty."56

8) Council informationthis indicator reflects the amount of internal (to

the EEC) communication which takes place between the Council of Ministersof the European Communities and EEC institutions, especially the Economicand Social Committee.

5 4 Fi she r, International Organization, Vol . 23 , No. 2 , p . 273.5 5 M u r r a y F o r s y t h , " T h e P a r l i a m e n t o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s , "Political and Economic Planning,

March 1964 (V o l . 30 , N o . 478 ) , p . 52 .5 6 L e o n N . L i n d b e rg , The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (S t an fo rd , Calif:

.S tanford U nivers i ty Press , 19 63) , p . 35 .


20/26


9) Commission regulationsregulations have general scope,are binding inall respects, and are directly applicable in all member states. Regulations aredistinct in terms of the generality of their scope and the immediacy of theirapplication, i.e., they are directly applicable and do not have to pass through

the administrative apparatus of member states.57

10) Commission directives and decisionsdirectives are obligatory withrespect to the goals they assign but leave to the agencies in question the choiceof the means to carry out these goals.53 Decisions are binding but do not pos-sess the general scope of regulations. They become individual in the sensethat they designate a destination.59

11. Council and commission recommendationsrecommendationsare notlegally binding and only reflect the wishes of the issuing institutions.60

12. Delegations and foreign missions received by the EECthis is a crudemeasure of the level of diplomatic involvement of the EEC and its participa-tion in external affairs.

13. Expenditures of the European Development Fundthis is a measureof the extent to which the EEC allocates the resources to development projectsin other countries.

The intensity of activity of these institutions was observed over a period often years (1958-1967) at three-month intervals to obtain an index of the politi-cal development of the community. Thus, we are presented with a time-series distribution of data over 40 points (10 years x 4 intervals per year).One way of gauging the development of integration would be to examinethe growth or decline of each of these indicators over the 40 points in time.

After observing the number of regulations, decisions, etc., in each intervalwe correlated each of the indicators to see which of them formed homoge-neous sets, standardized the data by transforming the raw scores into standardscores, and added the unweighted indicators together to form composite in-dices of political integration. On the basis of correlation analysis and subse-quent factor analysis we derived one composite index for political integrationin agriculture and transport and four for political activity in all issue areascombined. The way in which we arrived at our decisionmaking index mayhelp to illustrate the general logic of this procedure.

The general measurement model employed hereis the "additive-responsemodel."61 This model assumes that each of a correlated set of indicators "re-flects" a portion of the concept and that, therefore, one can add these indica-tors to form a composite measure which is less fallible than any single indica-tor. The following correlation matrix givesan idea of how homogeneous (andthus how additive) our indicators of political integration are.

5 7 Dusan Sidjanski, L'Originalite des Commtinautes europeennes et la repartition de lews pouvoirs(Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1961), p. 25.

6 8 Sidjanski, p. 25.5 9 Ibid.e Ibid.6 1 See Scott in Lindzey and Aronson, p. 254.


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TABLE 5. COMPOSITE MEASURE OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Indicator

1. Parliamentary questions2. Council regulations3. Council information4. Commission regulations5. Commission directives6. Commission recommendations

1

1.000

679*509* 3 3 2 * 5 2 8 *

.408*

2

1.000

.466*

.710*553*.420*

Indicator

3

1.000.221723*548*

4

1.000

369* '73

5

1.000

.690*

6

1.000

N O T E : Values statistically significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk. N = 4 O .

The first thing to note is that almost all the indicators are highly correlated,i.e., there is a great deal of shared variation which is statistically significant.Yet, there are hints that there may be subgroupings w ithin the total correlatedset, e.g., council regulations have a very high correlation with both parlia-mentary questions (-\-.6yg) and commission regulations (+.710) while com-mission recommendations correlate at +.690 with commission directives.There appear to be complex, multivariate relationships here with which abivariate correlation matrix is not equipped to deal. Factor analysis may helpus discover some of these more subtle relationships.62 The following factorstructure offers interpretations of the data that were barely hinted at in thecorrelation matrix:

TA B L E 6. FACT OR ANA LYSIS OF INDICATORS OF ALL POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN T H E

EEC

Indicator

1. Court communications

2. Cou rt j udgm ents3. Court rulings4. Court decisions5. Court new cases6. Parliam entary questions7. Council regulations8. Council informa tion9. Commission regulations10. Commission directives and decisions11. Council and commission recommendations

12. Delegations and foreign missions received by EEC13. Expenditures of Europea n Development F undPercentage variance

Factor i

572

.822

.06435'832.202.163

765.112.684.226

.201.182

27-709

Factor 2

552

- . 0 1 8- . 2 0 4

.025340.689.908294.819.467349

.029350

21.410

Factor 3

- .241

043-.508- .102- .225-.418- .129

- 3 3 7.205

-309- .701

- .801-745

18.175

N O T E : The loadings in this table are for the rotated matrix.6 2 Factor analysis is a multivariate technique particularly helpful in determining whether a given set

of data (the data may be correlation coefficients) contains one, two, or "n" sets of organized properties.In short, it is very useful when one wants to dimensionalize an array of data.


22/26


The factor structure reinforces the suggestion that all indicators of politi-cal integration do not belong to the same dimension. It seems clear thatfactor 1 represents a rule-adjudication dimension. Thi s dimens ion is definedby communications of the court, judgments of the court, and new cases

brought before the court. Indicators 8 and 10 (council information and com-mission directives and decisions), also part of this factor, probably reflect thebeginnings of implementive activity in the EEC. The fact that two "adminis-trative" indicators are part of the same dimension as the activity of the courtmay reflect the relatively low level of structural differentiation existing in thecommunity today.

The interpretation of the second factor is clearer. Indicators 6, 7, and 9(parliamentary questions, council regulations, and commission regulations)define this factor. We remember that council and commission regulations arelegally binding and have the force of real community law. In addition, theyare directly enforceable in all member states. We thus label this factor ourrulemaking dimension. The procedure from here was to standardize theseindicators and add them together to form a composite index of politicaldecisionmaking.

The above propositions will be tested through a correlation analysis. Beforeturning to this evidence, however, it should be made clear just what it is thetheory "expects." First, we expect higher absolute correlations between method1 (raw data) and our dependent variables. We expect lower correlations withmethods 2, 3, and 4. This is because the theory on which the empirical test isbased is not grounded in assumptions about scarcity or relative share of themarket. We postulate a relationship between economic and political integra-tion which is not concerned with the "share" of a particular country's tradewith a particular region. If West Germany increases its trade with the EECby 15 percent and with the rest of the world by 30 percent, we still expectthe hypothesized spillover processes to occur. Second, the theory suggests thatwe are interested in the difference in the respective coefficients of strategicsets of variables in addition to their absolute values. In other words, we areinterested in which predictor variable is most discerning among our integra-tion measures for agriculture and transport. Correlations may be high forboth agriculture and transport but this by itself would neither confirm thetheory nor validate any of the scoring procedures. Table 7 presents evidencefor our hypotheses.

T he first thin g to no te is that m ethod 1 does yield very high correlationsas predicted. Method 2 also produces high correlations but methods 3 and 4both are lower. A useful summarizing measure is the mean intervariable cor-relation (XVr) which is presented in the right-hand portion of the matrix.T he h ighest predictive capacity is given by me thod 1, variables 1 and 2. Again


23/26

2 5 O INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

TA B L E 7. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF MULTIPLY SCORED IMPORT-EXPORT

D ATA AND MEASURES OF POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION

Scoring Procedure



Method 3

ImportsExports


.886

.889

.834

.821

.428-358

.728

.661

2

743.620

653442

397-.424

556503

3

705

793

707873

254-139

.656

637

Variable

4

.824

.871

.783

.862

33O

-239

739.666

5

.717.770

695777

304- . 2 1 8

.629

.631

6

.487

577

532

679

.216- . 11 0

536598

7

.809.788

775.708

445

-390

.611

.562

8

374322

453.284

379-.362

365333

X V r

693704

.680

.681

344- . 2 8 0

603

574

NOTE: Variables i through 8 are identified as follows: i ) political integration within the agriculturalsector of the EEC; 2) political integration within the transport sector of the EEC; 3) total political inte-gration in the EEC. Variables 4-6 are based on the Almond-Coleman output functions of a politicalsystem, adjudication, rulemaking, and external affairs, respectively. Each of these is a measure of the

degree to which the institutions of the EEC perform these functions; 7) functional (trade) integrationin agriculture; 8) functional integration in transport. The political integration measures are based onpolitical activities of four institutions: the Court of Justice of the European Communities; the Councilof Ministers and the Commission of the European Communities; and the European Parliament. In allthere were fourteen indicators of political integration on which ou r final measures here are based. Func-tional integration in agriculture is simply a composite score of trade in food, beverages, and tobaccobetween the six. Functional integration in transport was measured by five indicators, two of them basedon railroad activity between the six, two on inland waterway shipping, and one on tourism. Again,Pearson's r is used and N = 3 5 .

closely behind is method 2 with .680 and .681 for imports and exports, re-spectively. Russett's technique ranks third with .603 and .574, and the RAmethod ranks last with the lowest predictive power, .344 and -.280, for im-ports and exports. It is interesting to note that the outcomes of this predic-tive test exactly parallel thoseof the convergence test. It will be recalled therethat method 1 ranked first, just barely above method2. Here method 1 ranksfirst but again the difference between methods 1 and 2 is negligible. Methods3 and 4 are ranked in the same order as in the convergence test. This "match-

ing up " of predictive and convergence tests is in itself evidence of a kind of"convergent" validity.

A Further Test of the Hypothesis

But let us move on to a specific test of the major hypothesis that import-export measures will correlate higher with measuresof political and func-


24/26

THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2 51

tional integration in agriculture than in transport. Table 8 presents the resultsof this test.

TAB LE 8 . CORRELATION OF MU LTI PLY SCORED IMPORT-EXPORT DA TA W IT H

POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN AGRICULTURE AND TRANSPORT

ScoringProcedure

Method iImportsExports




PoliticalIntegration

(agriculture)

.886

.889

C

C

C

.428- 3 5 8

.728

.661

Poli t icalIn teg ra t ion( t r anspor t )

743.620

.658442

397-.424

55653

Difference

+'43+ .269

+.176+379

+031-.066

+ .172+158

t-value

2.313-8i

2.239-79

0.02

-0.47

C

C

ID

C

Significanceat .05 level*

YesYes

YesYes

NoNo

NoNo

NOTE: Pearson's r is used. N = 3 5 .0 Significance calculations are for one-tailed tests.

We are now interested in the difference between coefficients. We can seethat methods 1 and 2 produce the greatest spread between the correlationswith agricultural and transport integration. A more rigorous way of assessingthis spread would be to test for the significance of the difference between thecorrelations for agriculture and transport. We can do this by utilizing the

standard formula for testing the significance of differences between noninde-pendent correlations:. l / ( N - 3 ) ( i + r )

t = (rxy - i.r) V , " xf 2(.I r w 2 _ r x ,2 - r a y

2 + 2 r w r r zr)

Table 8 also presents the t-values and indicates whether or not they aresignificant at the .05 level. The first two methods (raw data and preoccupa-tion ratios) yield t-values which are significant. Exports, measured by method2, have the h ighest t-value, 9.79. M ethod 1 ran ks second w ith t-values of 2.31and 3.81. Russett's method ranks third and the RA m ethod ran ks fourth.Again, this ranking roughly corresponds with the results of our tests of con-vergent validity. T he on ly exception is the reversal of methods 1 and 2. T hestability of our results over three tests gives us some confidence in the validityof the first two scoring procedures.


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V. CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this article has been to suggest a means by whichwe may settle the particular methodological dispute in question. It has not

been my intent to "prove" or "disprove" the worth of a particular scoring pro-cedure such as the RA index. The two criteria suggested, convergence andpredictive capacity, seem to be two helpful criteria which are generally ac-cepted as sound methodological tools by the scientific community. Theyshould help to provide a broad common ground on which to base a fruitfulexchange of ideas and perhaps to lessen the "dialogue of the d e a f qua litywhich is so much a result of different (or im plicit) criteria for evaluation.Convergence is really a specific application of the general scientific mandate

that inquiry be intersubjective and yield findings invariant with respect to themethod employed. We recall that three of the methods (raw score, preoccu-pation ratios, and Russett's method) are highly convergent. In interpreting theprocess of integration the notion of construct validity is very helpful. We havehypothesized that the process measured by the three convergent methods isone of "simple growth" in which growth is thought of as a general (i.e., aver-age) increase in the value of a variable. We think of growth models as largelyconcerned with increases in the capacity or frequency of a variable. Non-

growth models may be concerned only with the distribution of an existingcapacity. Perhaps the RA index would be fruitful for such a model. It seemsthat for integration, however, it is precisely the growth of the capacity of anew system (the suprasystem) to build new structures and perform new func-tions that is important. We are generally interested in monotonic increasesand not in structural changes. The essence of an integrative relationship issystem growth, the creation and development of new behavioral patterns, notthe reallocation of existing ones.

We have hypothesized that if we were measuring "simple growth" our mea-sures should behave in certain specified ways. The theory is capable of pre-dicting substantial portions of the variance as well as ranking the differentscoring procedures in terms of predictive capacity. The most convincing casewas made when our methods were set up competitively to test the hypothesisabout differential rates of spillover for agriculture and transport. The resultsof this test have reinforced our confidence in the previous two tests and haveprovided independent evidence of the validity of our first two scoring proce-

dures. This test has required precise measurement and clarity, demanding notonly h igh co rrelations bu t also the ability to ascertain differential spilloverrates in the two issue contexts. In this regard we should note that method 4(Russett's technique) has not satisfied the requirements of this test althoughit did meet the requirements of the other two tests.

I want to emphasize that no inference has been drawn with respect to the


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RA index in general. The validity of a measure is theoretically situational.In this particular theory the RA index has proven to be less valid. We shouldnote that the way in which we measured our political integration variablemay have stacked the case against the RA index. Political integration was

measured in absolute, not in relative, terms. It is possible to measure politicalintegration in the European Economic Community as a proportion of worldpolitical integration. Perhaps the RA index would fare better with a variablemeasured in this fashion.63

Conventional wisdom seems to accept a period of descriptive history as anecessary forerunner to theory building. However, the thrust of this articlehas been that no unequivocal answer is provided by descriptive language tothe question, "Is Europe more integrated?" All descriptive categories were

seen as theory-laden. Turning to theoretical language has had the benefit ofsupplying criteria but has not been without its problems.Perhaps one final plea may be entered. The argument is frequently heard

that gross size effects must be controlled in the study of integration for, ifthey are not, results will occur which are strictly artifactual. My positionhas been that what is or is not artifactual cannot be answered by themethod (every method is artifactual) but by whether the method makes sensein term s of the theory . The re is no self-fulfilling prophecy h ere. The re

is plenty of room for falsification, and each method allows many possibilitiesfor its own invalidation.While convergent validation suffers from the absence of an established

standard by which to evaluate progress, construct validation suffers from theimpoverished state of theory in the social sciences. One needs valid constructsin order to build theories, but accepted theories are needed to validate con-structs. Both techniques run the risk of circularity but both, fortunately, haveredeeming qualities. Salvation for convergent validity comes through use of"maximally different methods." In the case of construct validity the achieve-ment of high predictive capacity in a theory-deficient world makes the con-struct and its measurement operations all the more credible.

6 3 Similarly, I have pointed out how this problem poses a limitation on the conclusions drawn byWilliam Fisher in his test of Deutsch's theory of integration. See James Caporaso, "Fisher's Test ofDeutsch's Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration: A Research Note," International Organization,

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THEORY AND METHOD OF INTL INTEGRATION

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