University of Glasgow

The 'Zinoviev Letter' CaseAuthor(s): Natalie GrantSource: Soviet Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Oct., 1967), pp. 264-277Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/149401 .

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THE 'ZINOVIEV LETTER' CASE

'... a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cold calculation. ..' (Ramsay MacDonald-215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 47).

I RECENT publicity with regard to the 'Zinoviev letter' suggests the need to re-examine this controversial case. The circumstances under which the document appeared are well known. The British Labour government, upon receiving a copy of a 'letter'-or, more precisely, a set of instructions-to the 'British Communist Party', bearing the signature of Zinoviev, accepted the document as an authentic Comintern communi- cation. Zinoviev denied he had signed the instructions, and the Moscow government took the position that the document had been forged. The matter became a political issue, and public opinion now ascribes the Labour government's defeat in the general election of 29 October 1924 to the effect upon the British voters of the 'Zinoviev letter'.

Most non-communist historians agreed with the Soviet opinion that the 'Zinoviev letter' was a forgery. The identity of the forger, however, and his motives remained an open question for many years. Today, fresh evidence has come to public notice. Mrs. Alexis Belgardt (Bellegarde), a lady of Russian origin residing in England, has stepped forward as a witness to the actual forging of the 'Zinoviev letter'.1 She tells us that Russian exiles, with whom 'anti-Bolshevism was almost a religion', forged the 'letter', convinced that it 'could only do damage to the Bolsheviks'. 'A proposition, from whatever source, that might discredit the Soviet Union, and ruin the developing rapprochement of the "workers' republic" with Britain, was bound to be attractive.' She names the exiles: her own husband, Alexis Belgardt; her brother Zhemchuzhni- kov; 'a Lithuanian friend called Edward Friede', and two other friends, Aleksander Gumanski and Sergei Druzhelovski. She explains that the 'letter was manufactured in Berlin', but states she is unable to identify the intermediary who acted between the Berlin 'emigre cell' and the British authorities. She thinks, however, that this may have been Vladimir Orlov, also an exile and 'a close friend of Gumanski'.

Many newspapers-among them The Sunday Times and The New York Times, as well as the communist Pravda (Moscow), L'Humanitd (Paris), Morning Star (London) and New Age (Delhi)-greeted the Belgardt statements as a sensational revelation. Yet little of what Mrs. Belgardt told The Sunday Times had not been said before. In I926, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs listed as forgers almost all the men she names and implied that they were connected with the 'Zinoviev letter' case.2 In fact, the Soviet presentation of the actual forging and Mrs. Belgardt's account have impressively much in common. This should in no way be interpreted as casting doubt upon her veracity or her integrity. The similarity only reinforces the surprise one feels at learning that the clear-cut version supported by Mrs. Belgardt and communist sources cannot withstand closer scrutiny.

Moscow authors stress to this day that 'anti-communism' was the main culprit in the 'Zinoviev letter' case,3 and Mrs. Belgardt confirms the 'passionate anti-Bolshevism' of the forgers. But the cloak-and-dagger vision of'White Guard' counter-revolution- aries circulating forgeries to hurt 'the communists' is dispelled on examination.

1 The Sunday Times, I8 December 1966. 2 Antisovetskie podlogi. Istoriyafal'shivok; faksimile i kommentarii (M. 1926). 3 Pravda, 25 December I966.

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265

II The 'Zinoviev letter' acquires proper perspective only if examined against the

political background of the period when it appeared. In studying this background, two distinct approaches to international affairs must be considered, the Moscow communist approach and that of the outside world. Several contradictory traits mark Moscow analysis of international relations as these relations existed in 1924. Wishful thinking on the one hand and exaggeration of the dangers presented by anti-com- munism on the other characterized this analysis. A point to consider is also the conflict within the Soviet leadership, which was then torn between the desire to undermine capitalism, as a step towards world revolution, and the need for political recognition and capitalist support in order to remain in power.

The Russian economy, destroyed by civil war and 'war communism', could be regenerated only through large-scale investment. Since the Soviet Union lacked the means to provide capital for investment, it had to turn to foreign sources for loans and credits. 'Trade depends upon credit, and in the absence of credit, on cash. Soviet resources in both respects are limited', said Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in December I924.4

In Europe, two countries could supply economic assistance to Moscow: Germany and Britain.5 Germany, like Russia, was an outcast in the European community of peoples. Neither belonged to the League of Nations and neither, therefore, was bound by international obligations arising from membership of the League. Close ties, sealed by the Rapallo Treaty of 1922, united the two outlaws.

No such link existed between Britain and the Soviet Union. Trade with Russia could only be done with the Soviet government or government-directed groups, and a British-Soviet trade agreement had been signed in March 1921. The agreement was sometimes viewed as a tacit recognition of the Soviet government by Britain, but it meant little without formal recognition. In Soviet eyes, the agreement failed to create the conditions indispensable for the development of normal economic relations. To put it differently, British business hesitated to grant credits to a government with no official standing.

So long as Germany remained an outcast, the Soviet government could count upon full German cooperation. Indeed, Berlin-Moscow rapprochement had attained significant proportions by 1924. Reporting to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said: 'the friendly relations of the USSR with Germany are founded on the extremely strong economic need of these two countries for each other'.6 There were factors, however, which endangered the continuation of German-Soviet economic cooperation. The occupation of the Ruhr early in 1923 and the unsolved reparations problem brought Germany to the brink of economic disaster. In Chicherin's evaluation 'so-called capitulation before France in the Ruhr problem ... as well as... the extremely acute domestic crisis' marked the end of 1923 in the history of Germany. The economic crisis limited Germany's value as a source of financial and industrial aid to Russia. Moscow's concern over the German situation was increased by talk in Europe of Germany's possible economic disintegration and hints that Germany might become a British or French industrial colony. The Soviet Union could not, therefore, depend entirely on German credits and had to seek economic aid elsewhere.

Economic considerations were not alone in governing Soviet foreign policy. Hopes for immediate world revolution had not been quite abandoned. With revolution in

4 I79 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 678.

5 In France hostility towards Moscow late in 1923 was too great for the Soviet government to consider Franco-Soviet economic rapprochement in the immediate future.

6 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (M. I963), vol. VII, p. 494.

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mind, Moscow opposed any stabilization of the Versailles system and all factors which promised solution to the economic and social difficulties experienced by individual countries. British Labour, which proclaimed socialism, evolution and progress, was prominent among the factors which could lead the way to such solutions.

At this point in history, on 22 January 1924, a Labour government took office in Britain. The Moscow leaders defined this government as 'a bourgeois imperialist government... made up of the leaders of the Second International'.7 To Moscow, the accession of British Labour to power, while indicating the probable establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet government and Britain, signified at the same time a serious reinforcement of the enemy camp. With a Labour government in Britain, the Second International and its socialist doctrine could assume an importance threatening to the 'socialism' preached by Moscow. The Communist International had to remain 'the champion of the proletarian masses'.

There was no doubt that to a certain extent Moscow was correct in its evaluation of the dangers to communism inherent in the Labour government and what it stood for. A current of disillusionment had swept over Europe following the war. Problems had arisen in connection with Germany, the Soviet Union, economic conditions and colonial questions. Many voices in Europe welcomed the Labour government, saying it might bring a new era of advance, reorganization and improvement. The Mac- Donald government 'was hailed by all the supporters of the Second International as a "bloodless revolution" and the opening of a new era for the working class'.8 Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, believed in the League of Nations and planned to renovate country-to-country relations in Europe. The 'rays of democratic socialism' would shed their light far into the distance.

The British Labour programme contained a clause providing for the recognition of the Soviet Union by Britain and, as expected, on i February I924, some days after the Labour government had taken office, Britain granted de jure recognition to the Soviet government. Shortly after, a conference was called to discuss British-Soviet relations, which observers saw as a possible step towards loans and credits to Moscow.

The Anglo-Soviet Conference met on I April. It held out hopes for a liquidation of the past, agreement on mutual obligations and peaceful and profitable relations in the future. In Britain, enthusiasm for the conference was meagre. The Prime Minister himself was fully conscious of specific Soviet traits and the complexities involved in negotiating with Moscow.

Obstacles to successful negotiation soon made themselves felt. They touched upon a wide field, which included treaties, bondholders and confiscated property. From Moscow's standpoint the main difficulty remained the Labour government's inability to grant a loan even had Labour desired to do so. Conservatives controlled the banks, and response to suggestions in business circles was cool. Some businessmen argued that there was no reason for Englishmen to want 'to trade with Russia at present, except upon the same basis with which you deal with an extremely wild country, where you may take goods to the sea-shore, and swap them for other goods. . . .'9 For Moscow, meanwhile, 'words without cash' were useless,10 and the communist leadership con- sidered that Labour had 'proved the falsity of its claim to be custodian of the interests of the working class by its shameful support of the bondholders and bankers against the workers and peasants of Russia'.11

7 The Communist International (Moscow), December 1924-January I925, p. 88, from a resolution adopted by the Fifth World Congress of the Comintern.

8 Ibid. February 1925, p. 13. 9 I76 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 3044. 10 Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace. Pages from the diary of Viscount D'Abernon

(Berlin, 1920-26) (London, 1929), vol. II, p. iI8. 11 The Communist International, February I925, p. 43.

THE 'ZINO VIE V 266

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In June I924, the inability of the conference to bring concrete results became clear. On 5 August it was reported that the trade negotiations had broken down.12 The following day, none the less, after intense manoeuvring by a small group of Labour leaders, two treaties were signed. The suddenness with which the treaties were con- cluded and their questionable effectiveness caused a stir in the House of Commons. The treaties meant 'singularly little'. They were 'an agreement to make an agreement'. Hints were dropped that blackmail had been used to force the Labour delegates at the conference to affix their signatures to meaningless documents, merely in order to create the illusion that a British-Soviet agreement had been reached.

In addition to his interest in bringing order into British-Soviet relations, Mac- Donald hoped to regularize Germany's status in Europe. On I6 July 1924 an Allied Conference met on the German problem. It became the force which led to the regeneration of German economy. By the same token, it transformed Germany into a welcome partner for the Soviet Union, re-establishing the possibilities for German- Soviet cooperation and reducing the value to Moscow of British loans and credits. On the other hand, MacDonald's efforts had brought Germany into the Western orbit, and Moscow viewed with disfavour his move towards closer relations with the United States. Chicherin pronounced 'the imperialist Anglo-American bloc' to be an 'extremely important negative factor in world politics. .... It is the work of the British conservatives, but their plans have been fully put into practice only recently, under the Labour Government. ..'13

Even more dangerous to German-Soviet association seemed to be MacDonald's intention to introduce Germany into the League of Nations. In Soviet analysis, outlined by Chicherin, entrance into the League of Nations signified 'abandonment of an independent policy and subordination to the policy of Entente powers. It is in this manner also that we evaluate the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations. By the force of things, Germany may thereupon be drawn into combinations where it will become the opponent of the USSR... '14

By the summer of 1924 the MacDonald government had become in communist definition 'the strongest and most open government of bourgeois class dictatorship in modem British history',15 and this opinion was not mellowed by MacDonald's plans for the establishment of a wider arbitration system in international relations through the so-called 'Geneva Protocol'. This project-the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes-which MacDonald ardently promoted, had been elaborated with a view to possible Soviet aggression. The Protocol provided for arbitration principles and banned secret pacts and bilateral agreements, procedures in international intercourse which Soviet statesmell found advisable and profitable to the Soviet Union. Conservatives in England, for other reasons, also opposed the Geneva Protocol, and political circles in Europe expressed the opinion that a Conser- vative government in Britain would refuse to accept the Protocol.

MacDonald obstructed communist plans in domestic questions too. The British Communist Party regarded its admission to the Labour Party as a major task con- fronting the communists. The Communist Party of Britain must continue the struggle for affiliation to the Labour Party, declared the Fifth Congress of the Comintern.16 Instead of meeting this objective halfway, the MacDonald leadership opposed the affiliation whenever possible. In fact, some days before the appearance of the 'Zinoviev letter', at the annual Labour conference of 1924, MacDonald succeeded in carrying

12 I76 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 2741. 13 Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. VII, p. 493. 14 Ibid. p. 496. 15 The Communist International, February 1925, p. I3. 16 Ibid. December I924-January 1925, p. 90.

H

LETTER' CASE 267

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'the expulsion of Communist ... elements' and in having an instruction 'to refuse to sanction Communist candidates' in the elections sent 'to all Labour organizations'.17

III In the late summer of 1924, when Soviet dissatisfaction with Labour had reached its

peak, British political society was disturbed by an event which at first appeared of minor significance. Responsibility for this incident lay with the British communist publication Workers' Weekly. The communist version, as presented a year after the event, reads as follows:

In the Workers' Weekly last year, on the Anniversary of the Great War, an appeal to the Fighting forces was published, which said: 'Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, definitely let it be known that neither in the class war nor in a military war will you turn your guns on your fellow workers, but will use your arms on the side of your own class. Refuse to fight for profits. Turn your weapons on your oppressors....'

The Workers' Weekly ran two special anti-militarist issues for which the Editor (J. R. Campbell) was arrested. The Labour Government was forced, however, by the general indignation of the Labour Movement, to release Comrade Campbell. The release of Comrade Campbell provoked great indignation in capitalist circles.18

The Workers' Weekly carried the 'appeal' on 25 July I924, some days before the London press reported that the Anglo-Soviet conference had failed. On 5 August, 'the editor, Mr. J. R. Campbell, appeared before the Magistrate ... on a charge under the Incitement to Mutiny Act. When a week later the case came up for a second hearing counsel for the prosecution announced that no evidence would be offered, because it had been represented that the object of the article in question was not to seduce men in the fighting forces from their allegiance, but that it was a comment on armed forces being used by the State for the suppression of industrial disputes. Mr. Campbell's release was followed by a statement in the Workers' Weekly that the withdrawal of the charge was made by the Labour government under strong pressure from Labour members. The Conservative Press naturally made the most of this. ... .19

Most striking in this account of the so-called 'Campbell case' is the Workers' Weekly's statement that the withdrawal of the charges had political implications. At a time when British Labour was negotiating with Moscow, the suggestion that Labour Party members were intervening to cover communist 'sedition' could only embarrass the Labour government and hurt these negotiations. The persistence with which, throughout the Campbell case, the Communist Party focused public attention upon Communist 'sedition' and implied that the Labour party was only too ready to cover this activity, is remarkable. The Labour government's discomposure at this persistence could not have escaped the Communists. The sudden Communist decision to sell the Workers' Weekly outside the House of Commons, 'a place ... it had never been seen before this agitation took place',20 reveals the same effort to attract attention to com- munist 'sedition'. Not a moment had been lost by the Communists in again attracting attention to the case at Campbell's discharge on 13 August. Albert Inkpin of the CP's Political Bureau immediately issued a statement declaring that the withdrawal of the charge was made on the sole responsibility of the Labour government, under severe

17 Ibid. February I925, p. 20. 18 From a roneoed publication attached to a factory newspaper distributed in Scotland, I4

August I925, 'The Communist Party on Trial; J. R. Campbell's Defence' (London, CPGB, 1925), p. 27.

19 Sir Frederick Maurice, Haldane 1915-1928. The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, K. T., O.M. (London, I939), p. I68.

20 177 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 618.

THE 'ZINOVIEV 268

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pressure from such well-known members of Parliament as George Lansbury, who had volunteered to give evidence on Campbell's defence of justification, James Maxton, A. A. Purcell, John Scurr and many others. The publication of the statement in the Daily Herald brought it to the notice of circles which it could not have reached had it merely appeared in the Workers' Weekly. The party was furnishing direct evidence of Labour-Communist collusion and political manipulation of the law, which was bound to strike a mortal blow at the Labour government.

The impression that the communists were consciously conducting a campaign against MacDonald is further reinforced by the Communist Party's next move.

The Attorney-General explained in the House of Commons his reasons for the withdrawal of the charge. He said that the text of the article had come from another publication, and that Campbell was neither the editor nor a member of the Political Bureau.21 He cited a source which seemed reliable (James Maxton).22 The Workers' Weekly stepped in once again and re-opened the case when the first excitement had somewhat simmered down. The communists contradicted every statement made by the Attorney-General. The Workers' Weekly was quoted as saying: 'The article on which the charge was based was not cut out of another publication.... It was a cold, deliberate statement of the party position, inserted by the editor, James Ross Campbell, who is a responsible member of the Political Bureau.'23

Faced with this evidence, one finds it difficult to resist the temptation of attributing the crisis in British politics to conscious communist provocation. At the time, leading statesmen expressed this opinion. Herbert Morrison said that he did not believe the Workers' Weekly article had been written 'to spread sedition among the army' but that it 'probably had the political purpose of embarrassing the Labour party and the Labour Government'.24 In Morrison's words the Communist Party vied with the Conservatives 'as to how far they could injure the Government upon this matter'.

On 23 August the communists brought concern in conservative ranks to a climax. The Workers' Weekly wrote: 'Perhaps for the first time in England's fair island history has the course of justice in the Law Courts been changed by outside political forces into a triumph for the working classes over the capitalist classes, not by scoring a legal success, but by a plain revolutionary victory.'25 The intent was obvious. Few readers would miss the implication. The Labour Government was doomed. The party was fulfilling the instructions issued in Moscow by the Fifth Congress of the Communist International. The Communist Party of Britain, said the Comintern, must 'struggle against MacDonald's so-called "labour government" '.26 'It is the task of the Com- munist International and its section, the Communist Party of Great Britain, to rescue the working class from the reactionary leadership now dominating it. .... In this struggle against the betrayals by the Labour Party, the leadership devolves upon the Communist Party of Britain. Already a serious fermentation is taking place within the broad masses who are discontented with the reactionary Labour Party leader- ship. . . '27

With the communists attacking Labour on the one side, and Labour's political rivals seizing every pretext and opportunity for attack irrespective of their background on the other, the Labour leaders lost all presence of mind and further contributed towards creating an image of administrative incompetence, service to the communists, and manipulations of British law for political purposes.

21 Ibid. col. 9. 22 Ibid. cols. 602-4. 23 Ibid. col. 589. 24 Ibid. col. 659. 25 Ibid. col. 584. 26 Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v dokumentakh 1919-1932, ed. by Bela Kun (M. 1933), p. 412. 27 The Communist International, December 1924-January 1925, p. 90.

LE TTER' CASE 269

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270 THE 'ZINO VIEV

The Labour government's defeat in the House of Commons (8 October) on a vote of censure concerning its conduct in the 'Campbell case' was caused by a campaign directed from start to finish by the Communist Party of Great Britain. No 'White Guards' were involved.

IV In early October observers viewing Labour's prospects in the general election of

29 October found them discouraging. 'I think we shall be out before the winter', wrote Viscount Haldane28 and, some days earlier, Beatrice Webb noted in her diary that this 'ends the episode of a Labour Government, and by Xmas, at any rate, we shall be out of office'.29

History should never be written 'in the light of after events', declared Baldwin in 1928, when he discussed the 'Zinoviev latter' case, and he was absolutely correct. The atmosphere in England in those early weeks of October 1924 must be clearly visualized in order to understand the 'Zinoviev letter's' significance. In Baldwin's words, 'Parliament had just been dissolved; the country was just entering upon a General Election. Two events had occurred quite recently which had perturbed the country a good deal and shattered the faith of a great many of the electors that the then Labour Government could handle difficult situations with firmness and with some continuity of purpose, and the two cases were the Campbell case and the Russian Treaty.'30 'For weeks prior to that election there had been, owing to what was known of the Russian Treaty . . . a distinct atmosphere of hostility to Russia.'31 There is no doubt that MacDonald's understanding of the electors' doubts regarding the Labour Govern- ment's firmness in dealing with communist issues played a dominant role in the 'Zinoviev letter' case.

The 'letter', dated I5 September 1924, reached the British Foreign Office on o1

October 1924, two days after the government's defeat in the House of Commons and the day after the dissolution of parliament, when Labour's fate in the general elections could already be predicted. Contemporaries agree that the 'letter' appeared in the form of a transcript. The original was never received. 'I have come across no one who has alleged that he has seen the original of that letter', said Ramsay MacDonald.32 Western analysts of the 'letter' give little attention to the tongue in which it was written. Yet this is a point of some importance. Did the British Foreign Office receive the document written in English or in Russian? A Russian text appeared in Soviet sources.33 This text reads smoothly. Not so the English text. The comments affixed to the English text by an investigating British Trade Union delegation to Russia34 stress the absurdities contained in the text. Applied to the Russian, these comments seem irrelevant.

Compared with Comintem documents of the period, the 'letter' follows with accuracy the pronouncements of the Communist International. In June-July 1924 the fifth congress of this organization passed a resolution addressed specifically to the Communist Party of Great Britain. The resolution instructed the British Communists to struggle against the MacDonald government, 'clearly explaining to the masses its bourgeois nature', to attach particular significance to the 'creation of ties with the

28 Maurice, op. cit. p. I68. 29 Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1924-32, ed. by M. Cole (London, 1956), p. 44. 30 215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 59. 31 The Times, 5 March 1928. 32 215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 52. 33 Antisovetskie podlogi . . ., p. 45-47. 34 The 'Zinoviev' letter. Report of Investigation by British Delegation in Russia for the Trades

Union Congress General Council, November-December 1924 (TUC General Council, 1925), pp. 8-IO.

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colonies', 'to the question of militarism . . ., to disarmament, to the attitude of Britain towards the Soviet Union', and to devote special attention 'to the creation of factory and plant cells'. Elaborating on 1922 Comintern decisions, the Fifth Congress in another resolution stated that 'transition from simple propaganda' to concrete military work must take place as rapidly as possible in all countries. 'A most urgent task' for communist unions of youth was 'creating cells in bourgeois armies'.35

The 'Zinoviev letter' merely restates these instructions in other words, applying them to concrete problems. The 'letter' brings up 'the attitude of Britain towards the Soviet Union' and the need 'to organize a campaign of disclosure of the foreign policy of MacDonald'. It speaks of'the activities of British Imperialism in the Middle and Far East', and of 'ties with the colonies' and finally discusses cells in munitions factories and military store depots, stressing the importance of 'creating cells in bour- geois armies.

Careful adherence to Comintern instructions in a document purporting to be from the Communist International is not surprising. A forger naturally aims at accuracy and strives to manufacture a paper resembling the authentic material. But here we come to an inconsistency. The Comintern instructions just cited were released in 1925,36 some months after the appearance of the 'Zinoviev letter'. By what miracle did the 'White Guard' counter-revolutionaries who forged the 'letter' in Berlin and with whom 'anti-communism was a religion', obtain access in September I924 to a Comintern paper published in 1925?

Several questions arise in connection with the text of the 'letter'. We know from MacDonald that 'the ordinary means of detecting forgeries, similarities of handwriting and so on' were impossible37 because the 'letter' was a transcript. It therefore carried no actual signature. Yet Mrs. Belgardt, our witness to the forging of the 'letter', describes the efforts of Edward Friede who forged Zinoviev's signature 'copying from a facsimile of the great man's hand on a party circular'. What happened to the signature forged by Edward Friede? Where is the Belgardt 'original'? Was the 'Zinoviev letter', the 'copy' that we know, manufactured by another forger? Were the Belgardts merely a decoy, intended to draw attention away from the real authors of the 'letter'?

The British Foreign Office assumed the 'letter' to be authentic and to have come from Russia. 'This copy of a letter came from the most trusted agent of the F.O. in Moscow', writes Beatrice Webb.38 Her words find confirmation in a hint dropped by Joynson-Hicks, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, who stated that 'reasons of safety to individual life' made disclosure of the source's name impossible.39 Where could disclosure of his name endanger the source's life, unless he resided in the Soviet Union?

The peregrinations of the 'Zinoviev letter' upon its arrival in the Foreign Office have by now been exhaustively examined. The consensus of opinion seems to be that the Northern Department of the Foreign Office received the letter on I4 October. The following day, the Northern Department sent the letter to the Prime Minister who was away from London. Officials, meanwhile, examined the letter and concluded that it was authentic. The Premier's reply instructed the Foreign Office to publish it at once should it prove authentic. The officials drafted a note of protest to the Soviet government and on 2I October forwarded the draft to MacDonald for approval. They received his answer on the morning of 24 October, on the day the Daily Mail

35 Kommunisticheskii Internatsional . .., p. 457. 36 The Communist International, December 1924-January I925. 37 215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 52. 38 Beatrice Webb's Diaries . . ., p. 49. 39 I79 H.C. Deb. 5S. col. 3II.

LE TTER' CASE 271

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obtained another copy of the 'letter' from an outside source. The officials released their copy with their note to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Rakovsky for publication that same night. They knew that the Daily Mail would carry the text of its 'letter' the next morning. The British officials released the 'letter' in order 'to protect the Foreign Office from... the political attack which it knew was to be made upon it through the "Daily Mail" and other newspapers next morning', explained MacDonald.40 Proof was to be given that communist subversion could be handled with energy by a govern- ment accused of weakness in the Campbell case. In the words of MacDonald, publi- cation 'ought to have stopped the attacks on us, as Sir Eyre Crowe [of the Foreign Office] assumed it would because this proved that the Zinoviev letter had been handled with great expedition and with firmness that was evident'.41 The note to Rakovsky and the release of the 'Zinoviev letter', believed to be authentic, were, therefore, motivated by a desire to show 'firmness' and to correct the impression produced on public opinion in the Campbell case. After all, the Labour government was facing a general election.

In those early years of confrontation with communism as a system, the British Foreign Office had no special reason to doubt the authenticity of the 'Zinoviev letter'. Rakovsky's 'categorical' statement in his Note of 25 October 1924 to the British government42 that the 'letter' was an 'obvious forgery' loses much of its forcefulness when one lears, as did the British Foreign Office, that the main piece of evidence in Rakovsky's note is false. The only factual 'error' which Rakovsky cited and which- following Soviet historians-Western scholars often advance,43 concerned the use of the term 'Third Communist International'. The Communist International is never identified as 'Third Communist International', said the Note, as there never has been any First or Second Communist International. Five days before the date on the 'Zinoviev letter', the Soviet press had carried an 'Appeal of the Executive Committee of the Comintem and the Executive Bureau of the Profintern to the Workers and Working Women of all Countries'. The appeal, which may be found in Izvestiya of 10 September 1924, bore the signature of 'The Executive Committee of the III Communist International'.

Misstatements with regard to the 'Zinoviev letter' occur in many communist sources. The People's Cominissariat of Foreign Affairs referred to the 'Zinoviev letter' as having started 'the flood of forged documents of various character'.44 Shapurji Saklatvala, MP for Battersea North, echoed the thesis in I928. He declared the 'letter' to be 'the first forgery'.45 Forged or not, the 'Zinoviev letter' was by no means the first such document to reach the West. European intelligence services had been receiving Comintem 'instructions' almost identical in style and form for some time past. Simultaneously with the 'Zinoviev letter', a document on 'Balkan' affairs circulated among intelligence officials in Europe.46 This letter, containing instructions to communists in the Balkans, was dated 7 August 1924, i.e. it preceded the 'Zinoviev letter' by about a month. There seems little doubt that both documents were produced by the same author. The Balkan letter used the term 'III Communist International', and the transcribed signatures of Zinoviev and Kuusinen had the same peculiar traits.

40 2I5 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 50. 41 The Times, 5 March I928. 42 Antisovetskie podlogi . . ., pp. 49-50. 43 From Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (London and New York, 1930), vol. II,

p. 494, to Andrew Rothstein who, as recently as 12 December I966, asserted (in the Morning Star) that 'Third Communist International' 'had not been employed for years' when it appeared in the 'letter'.

44Antisovetskie podlogi . ., p. I . 45 2i5 H.C. Deb. 55s. col. 84. 46 U.S. N.A. 86I, OOB/225, 2I August 1924.

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The two documents spoke of a communist party 'military section', and their style had much in common. Was the 'Balkan letter' also manufactured by 'White Guards' Belgardt and Zhemchuzhnikov in Berlin or was there another forger who had read the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern less than two months after they had been approved?

The 'Zinoviev letter' reached the British Foreign Office from at least three other sources. Today, we know that wholesale confirmation of a secret document purporting to come from communist circles is in itself a symptom calling for caution, since it may indicate a plant. Experience in this respect was lacking in 1924. Minor differences in the text of two transcripts also meant little. Officials in the twenties were fully aware that discrepancies could appear in a single authentic document when published in two separate communist periodicals. The text of a document in Pravda did not always correspond to the same text in the Berlin Rote Fahne. Experts made allowances for errors in hurried transcription or translation of secret documents from the Soviet Union. Only in 1928, after the exposure of numerous political forgers, did an 'amazed' Ramsay MacDonald 'discover' how many forgeries had come into his possession.47

V The abundance of political forgeries which circulated in 1924-25 on problems

relating to Soviet Russia is striking. Soviet leaders placed the blame for these forgeries on 'imperialist reaction', 'White Guards' and counter-revolutionaries, and upon the intelligence services of capitalist countries.

The accuracy of these assertions is doubtful. The background of the forged material often disproves this Soviet analysis. David Dallin, an eminent Russian Menshevik, offered a more perceptive evaluation of the 'forgery' phenomenon. He said that fabrications 'in the form of secret documents and fabrications in the form of public information' appeared during the First World War. After the war, 'Russia alone remained tightly closed: there was neither ... freedom of communication, nor free- dom of newspaper reports, nor . . . was there an independent press. Demand gave birth to offer. Need-to production ..... Business and political interest in Soviet Russia exists in thousands of spots on the globe.'48

Leading political figures in the twenties note the difficulty of obtaining information on Russia. 'I have always been interested to read . . . about various countries in Europe, but when I have seen paragraphs, speeches and letters about what is taking place in Soviet Russia, experience has taught me that they are not to be relied on. Whether it be in one direction or in another direction, the degree of animosity and prejudice has been so great that it has been impossible to get any authentic information from that part of the world', said Arthur Ponsonby, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.49

When there is no channel for accurate data, when borders are closed, when censor- ship reigns, nothing but fabrication can be expected, explained David Dallin.50

The notorious 'Trust', a bogus 'anti-Soviet' organization directed by the Soviet secret service, also served as a channel for the circulation of false reports. 'Trust' agents supplied foreign intelligence officials with doctored information containing both accurate and inaccurate data. Moscow 'could easily combine truth with inven- tion .... The plausibility of the information impressed foreigners to a considerable degree, and they became convinced of the absolute reliability of their source.'51

47 215 H.C. Deb. Ss. co]. 51.

48 Sotsialisticheskii vestnik (Berlin), 15 July 1928. 49 I76 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 3013. 50 Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, 15 July 1928. 51 Ibid. 2i March 1928.

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The identity of the source from which the British Foreign Office obtained the 'Zinoviev letter' has never been revealed to the public. MacDonald admitted his unwillingness to try and ascertain who had 'helped in the forgery'. He was apparently under the impression that investigation might lead to embarrassment and he feared that the Labour Party would encounter 'libels for which apologies will have to be given or damages paid'.52 Yet even today objective study of the role of certain persons in England, including, perhaps, some MPs of the period, might lead to unexpected results. The sources which produced 'the letter' had 'previously been tested and found to be absolutely reliable'.53 Obviously the British government which continued to utilize their services could not accept the Soviet proposal to submit the 'Zinoviev letter' to a court of arbitration. We are therefore faced with a list of names of alleged forgers, mentioned by Soviet officials, by Baldwin and by other contemporaries, including Mrs. Belgardt.

Several sources cite identical names. In 1926, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs implied that a group of forgers in Germany, including Druzhelovski, Guman- ski, H. Siewert, V. Orlov and A. Belgardt, had forged the 'Zinoviev letter'. To these names Chicherin later added Zhemchuzlmikov, Patsyurkovsky (Paci6rkowski) and Schreck.

In 1928, Baldwin spoke of a 'gallant crowd' of forgers and named 'Druzhilovsky (Druzhelovski), Zhemtchevzhnikov (Zhemchuzhnikov), Pantziukovsky (Paci6r- kowski), Bernstein alias Henry Lawrence alias Lorenzo and Schreck' among persons who had 'a right to claim the honour' of forging the 'letter'.54

In I966, Mrs. Belgardt repeats the names of A. Belgardt, Zhemchuzhnikov, Dru- zhelovski, Orlov and Gumanski. She adds Edward Friede. The persons she names were all either related or socially connected.

A strange bond unites all but one or two of the men on her list and on that of the People's Commissariat. With few exceptions, they were in later years either exposed as having worked for Soviet services or were discovered to have maintained close ties with Soviet agents.

In importance Sergei Druzhelovsky heads the list. His Soviet connections were first uncovered in Berlin where he had organized 'a clever system of double provocation'.55 After imprisonment in Germany and Estonia and complete exposure both as a forger and as a Soviet agent, Druzhelovsky made his way into the Soviet Union in I926. A year later, in I927, he appeared in the role of defendant in a Moscow 'show trial' where he discoursed at length on the forgery workshops operated by the White Guards and 'foreign intelligence'. The court sentenced him to death, and the Soviet press announ- ced his execution.

Aleksandr Gumansky, whom Mrs. Belgardt describes as the 'motivating force throughout' the forging of the 'Zinoviev letter', headed an elaborate espionage organization with headquarters in Berlin and branch offices in Paris, London and Central European and Baltic points. Arrested and released in 1924-25 by the German authorities he was brought to trial in 1929 on charges of espionage.56 Although working for the Soviet government he supplied information to British and French intelligence services.

Vladimir Orlov in I918-20 was attached as an examining magistrate to the Cheka in Russia where he performed duties hardly acceptable to a non-communist. His closest associate Pavlonovsky (alias Sumarokov, alias Yakshin, alias Karpov) entered

52 The Times, 9 March I928. 53 215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 90. 54 Ibid. col. 63. 55 Dni (Berlin), 23 March 1928. 56 The New York Times, 24 March I929.

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Germany with a Soviet diplomatic passport, and in 1924 was working for the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.57 Aleksandr von Rossman, Orlov's secretary, collaborated with Gumansky and was brought to trial together with Gumansky by the German autho- rities.

The ties maintained with communist organizations by all these men give a puzzling quality to their activity as political forgers engaged in the manufacture of communist documents. Their readiness to claim the 'honour' of forging the 'Zinoviev letter' adds to the bizarre traits of this group. Orlov boasted of his involvement in the forging of the 'letter'.58 So did Gumansky, who told friends an order had been placed for the 'letter' by 'British' quarters.

A Chinese wall separates Soviet Russia and the outside world, while 'turbid underground streams' run between Soviet secret service and forgery workshops in Paris and Berlin, commented David Dallin. These streams 'pollinate' European news agencies and make their way into the highest official circles. And when the true value of the information they supply is exposed, opinion in Europe decides that the communists are alone in producing accurate information on the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the self-incrimination tendency peculiar to the Berlin group, other persons have gained publicity as forgers of the 'Zinoviev letter'. Two men were mentioned in Leipzig, in early 1928, at the trial ofJohann Anton Schreck, accused of revealing German military secrets. Witnesses at the trial supplied colourful evidence on Schreck's activity. He was said to have brought explosives into Switzerland for the use of Italian anarchists. He was said to have forged documents and to have collaborated with Dr. E. Paciorkowski, alias Berger, in forging the 'Zinoviev letter'.59 This story may explain the presence of both names in Baldwin's and Chicherin's lists. A connection existing between Edward Paciorkowski and Polish intelligence services contributed to confirm Soviet assertions that Polish circles had manufactured the 'letter'.

Communist sources occasionally suggest other forgers. L'Humanite states that the 'letter' emanated from a Berlin office operating under Colonel Walther Nicolai and had been forged by Baron Uexkuell, a 'White Guard' from the Baltic. In this, L'Humanite supports the version proposed in the 940os by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn.60 The background of Colonel Nicolai, head of German intelligence in World War I, gives food for thought because he was an ardent promoter of German-Soviet rapprochement.

More names were whispered in the twenties (Dombrowski-Riczewski, and others). They included persons active in politics, in newspaper work and in intelligence. Some were in Western Europe, others in the Baltic States. Rumour had it that a newspaper- man of some renown who wrote under the pen-name of 'Argus' was involved in the case. A Russian social-democrat in exile, close to several politically suspect organiza- tions, was also mentioned. The list is long but far from complete.

Throughout the twenties, Soviet sources linked the forgers to Polish intelligence. In an interview given in Russia on 27 October 1924, two days after the publication in England of the 'letter', Zinoviev pointed his finger at circles connected with Polish counter-intelligence.61 Quick response marks all communist reactions to the 'Zinoviev letter'. On 25 October 1924, the day following the British note, Rakovsky, without prior consultation with his superiors in Moscow, proved able to conclude that the

57 The Times, 2 July 1928; Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, 15 July I928. 58 The New York Times, 7 July 1929. 59 Die Rote Fahne (Berlin), 29 January I928. 60 Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy (Boston, I946), p. I40. 61 Antisovetskie podlogi . . ., p. 53. L'Humanite' also solved the mystery of the 'Zinoviev letter'

with rapidity. On 27 October 1924 it accused the 'White Russians'.

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276 THE 'ZINOVIEV

document transmitted by the note had been forged. He took the liberty of passing judgement on a communication purporting to come from the Comintern, a 'separate' institution which he himself declared should be distinguished from the Soviet govern- ment and, in a conversation with Louis Fischer,62 also blamed the Poles for the forgery.

Today, Polish intelligence is no longer mainly responsible for the forgery in Soviet eyes. The guilt has completely shifted to the 'British'. Soviet sources are specific: the 'central figure' in the forgery was an 'agent of British intelligence', and the blame for the 'Zinoviev letter' must be imputed to 'anti-communism'.63

VI In a post factum analysis of the 'Zinoviev letter', Ramsay MacDonald stated that

there had been 'a conspiracy .... Possession of the letter by outside people was estab- lished and also a determination on their part to use the letter for political purposes....

'What is clear is that outside the Foreign Office there was knowledge of the Zino- vieff letter and that knowledge was being used dishonestly to stampede the British public against the Government . . .The important point was not the authenticity of the document but the use to which the document was put.'64

The purpose of the 'Zinoviev letter' lies precisely in the use to which the document was put.

With the conspirators who launched the document, intention to use it to defeat the Labour government in the election played a minor role. The 'letter' mentions the Anglo-Soviet treaties as concluded and discusses the campaign against their ratification. The 'letter' came after the furore of the Campbell case. Ergo, the fate of the Labour government, as we know, had already been sealed. The 'letter' received tremendous publicity which may have stimulated some anti-Labour sentiment and may have influenced the vote of 'old ladies' who needed an extra push to vote against Labour. It did not alter the course of the election.

Instead, the 'letter' served to mask the role which British communists had played in causing the defeat of Labour. In this respect, the 'letter' proved of no small benefit to the Communist Party and, on the rebound, to Moscow. It confused evaluation of Soviet political objectives. The Campbell affair receded into the background. Today, the Campbell case barely receives a few lines in accounts of the British elections while the 'Zinoviev letter' has become a dominating issue.

The 'letter' brought conflict and suspicion into British political circles. Insinuations that the Conservatives had ordered and knowingly used an obviously forged docu- ment to achieve a political end undermined their prestige in the eyes of the British public and blackened the Conservative image. Faith in Labour declined. 'The idol of the Left and the respected leader of the Right in the Labour Movement', Ramsay MacDonald, suddenly became a 'bungling', ineffectual figure, who 'floundered about badly' and showed signs of neurosis.65 As Communist leaders expressed it, 'whether he had overreached himself in the zeal of his anti-communist propaganda or acted with deliberate intent, whether he had let himself be fooled by his permanent officials or not, is of no importance save from the point of view of the psychology of Mac- Donald. What matters is that the responsibility for the document . . . rests with him. . . 66

Nor was the 'letter' limited in its effect to the sullying of British political parties. 62 The Soviets in World Affairs, p. 495. 63 Pravda, 23 December I966. 64 The Times, 5 March I928. 65 Beatrice Webb's Diaries . ., vol. II, p. 45. 66 The Communist International, February I925, p. 23.

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Innuendoes besmirched the British Foreign Office and stirred doubts regarding the loyalty and integrity of Foreign Office officials. A Communist Party communique contained a direct accusation against these officials for doing a dirty job to destroy the Anglo-Soviet treaties. Even more harm was inflicted upon the British intelligence service. Ideas that 'a great cesspool of secret service work' was playing havoc with 'decent public life' originated in the 'Zinoviev letter' case. The 'letter' served to attack the intelligence services as making relations with foreign countries dependent 'upon the statements and reports of men who are in the very essence of their trade pro- fessional cheats and liars'.67

Although the 'letter' played no significant role in the elections, the results of which were determined by the Campbell case and other issues, the long-range effect produced by the controversy over the 'Zinoviev letter' cannot be ignored. The 'letter' destroyed MacDonald's ambitious programme for the reconstruction of Europe. No longer would the 'rays of democratic socialism' shed their light toward peoples oppressed by imperialism. Safe from arbitration, and with their security re-established the com- munists could once again use Germany to build up the Soviet state. The blow inflicted to British international effort and British-American collaboration could permit a respite in Soviet dealings with Britain, a country reinstated as Soviet enemy No. I. The next step on the Soviet programme was business with the United States.

The 'Zinoviev letter' continues to render services to the communist cause. Brought into focus at every opportunity, it is used to prove the existence of 'anti-communist' intrigue and the falseness of 'anti-communist' reports to 'millions of persons through- out the world'. As Pravda says, 'every honest individual finding ... in one or another publication a newspaper "canard" regarding a communist-planned "plot", will say with conviction: "Attention, here is another forgery." '68

NATALIE GRANT

Stanford, California

67 215 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 75. 68 Pravda, 23 December I966.

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