The Winners and Losers from the Great Reflation and... · Spring 2014 . Global Macro Strategy ....
Transcript of The Winners and Losers from the Great Reflation and... · Spring 2014 . Global Macro Strategy ....
Spring 2014
Global Macro Strategy
David Zervos Chief Market Strategist [email protected]
+1 212 323 7586
Jefferies LLC
The Winners and Losers from the
Great Reflation
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
0
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4
6
8
10
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'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14
FED ECB BOE BOJ BOC RBA PBOC SNB SRB RBI
The single most important driver for ALL global asset prices is the aggressive and unprecedented moves in global central bank balance sheets.
2
Source: NCBs through both Bloomberg and Haver Source: Bloomberg
Total Assets of Major Central Banks ($ Trillion) US Monetary Base ($T)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
'75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10
QE3
QE2
QE1
Operation Twist
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Since 2008 there has been quite a lot of divergence in central bank aggressiveness.
3
Total Asset Levels of Major Central Banks Central Bank Total Assets as a % of GDP
For Both, Source: National Central Banks: balance sheets and GDP figures
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
550%
1/08 1/09 1/10 1/11 1/12 1/13 1/14
Ind
exed
Val
ue
s in
Nat
ion
al C
urr
ency
, 20
08
=1
00
%
BOE BOJ FED ECB SNB BOC
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
'08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13
BOE BOJ FED ECB SNB PBOC
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The story for the last 15 months has been the BoJ’s commitment to catch up, and the ECB’s reluctance to stay the course. This has played itself out aggressively in EURJPY and the relative outperformance of the Nikkei vs EStoxx. This trend will likely continue throughout 2014.
4
Source: Bloomberg
EURJPY Currency Change of Nikkei and Estoxx (Aug. 2012=100%)
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
140%
150%
160%
170%
180%
190%
8/12 11/12 2/13 5/13 8/13 11/13 2/14
Nikkei Euro Stoxx90
100
110
120
130
140
150
8/12 10/12 12/12 2/13 4/13 6/13 8/13 10/13 12/13 2/14
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
As we look across developed markets inflation remains subdued, but Japanese inflation is finally starting to look more “normal”. Who would have thought Japanese inflation would running ABOVE US, Italian, French and German inflation in 2014!!!! If QE is actually applied with the correct it works just fine!!
5
Source: OECD, NCBs, Bloomberg
World Inflation (YoY %)
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
'01 '03 '05 '07 '09 '11 '13
US Germany Japan UK France Italy Canada
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
GDP growth has been accelerating nicely in the US, Japan, and the UK. Is it any coincidence that these are the countries with the deepest commitment to central bank balance sheet expansion!
6
Source: OECD, NCBs, Bloomberg
Real GDPs (Jan 2008 = 100)
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
1/08 7/08 1/09 7/09 1/10 7/10 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 7/13
US France Germany Japan Italy UK
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Short term real interest rates provide the best indication of the stance of monetary policy. Ex-post real short rates have moved sharply lower since the crisis, but they are on the rise except in Japan. Ex-ante real short rates have a similar pattern. Overall real rates remain in “the highly accommodative zone” across most developed markets. The sad exception to all this is the periphery of Europe!
7
Real Rates of Developed Countries
Real Rates, Source: Bloomberg (2yr yields – 2 Year Annualized Headline CPI) Implied Real, Source: Bloomberg (5yr yields – Breakeven Inflation)
5 Year Implied Real Yields
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
'00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12 '14US Germany Japan UK France Italy
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1/07 7/07 1/08 7/08 1/09 7/09 1/10 7/10 1/11 7/11 1/12 7/12 1/13 7/13 1/14
US Germany Japan UK France Italy
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
As long as real rates fall enough - policy becomes accommodative, inflation rises and unemployment falls…in other words QE WORKS!!!! But if real rates are not pushed low enough, unemployment and disinflation problems remain. That was the problem in Japan for 20 years and it’s the current problem in the periphery of Europe. Complicating the employment picture however are changes in the participation rate. Central bankers can never really be sure if there is truly slack in the economy or if there are structural and demographic issues in play.
8
Source: Bloomberg
Unemployment Rates (%) Participation Rate (%)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
'91 '94 '97 '00 '03 '06 '09 '12
US Germany Japan Italy France UK
45
50
55
60
65
70
'70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10
US Germany Japan Italy France UK
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
But based on what we know about the US from the FOMC’s summary of economic projections (SEP). FOMC sees A LOT of slack in the US economy – even at equilibrium at the end of 2016. How else could you explain these forecasts?
9
Source: Federal Reserve Bank
Target federal funds rate at year-end 2014 2015 2016 Longer run
Sept
Mean 0.40 1.25 2.26 3.93
Median 0.25 1 2 4
Dec
Mean 0.34 1.06 2.18 3.88
Median 0.25 0.75 1.75 4
December 2013
FOMC SEP (Midpoint of Central tendencies) 2014 2015 2016 Longer
run
Change in real GDP 3 3.2 2.9 2.3
Unemployment rate 6.45 5.95 5.5 5.5
PCE inflation 1.5 1.75 1.9 2
September 2013
FOMC SEP (Midpoint of Central tendencies) 2014 2015 2016 Longer
run
Change in real GDP 3 3.25 2.9 2.35
Unemployment rate 6.6 6.05 5.65 5.5
PCE inflation 1.55 1.8 1.85 2
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
'90 '93 '96 '99 '02 '05 '08 '11
GDP, ex-Govt Govt (additive) Govt (subtractive)
But as much as the Fed sees slacks, the private sector has performed remarkably well post crisis.
10
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Real GDP of Govt and non-Govt Sectors (YoY, %) US Real GDP, by Component (YoY %)
Cumulative Annualized GDP Figures Private Sector Nominal GDP from 1990-2007 = 5.4% Private Sector Nominal GDP from 2010-2014 = 5.1% Private Sector Real GDP from 1990-2007 = 3.0% Private Sector Real GDP from 2010-2014 = 3.2%
US Avg. Real GDP from 1990-2007 = 3.0% from 2010-2014 = 2.2%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
'90 '93 '96 '99 '02 '05 '08 '11
Govt Ex-Govt
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The FOMC looks like it will be taking some significant longer term inflation risks in order to unwind slack associated with a falling participation rate. And the BoJ finally looks like is will apply QE in such a way as to keep risk free real rates low and negative. But the Europeans are just flailing in the wind. The ECB got it right in the beginning of the crisis, but since the summer of 2012 they have let the trade weighted Euro appreciate sharply. The ECB is making the same “relative” mistake the Japanese made during their lost decades. That is why they have high real rates, a weak economy, a strong currency, strong bond markets and weak equity markets! It’s a tragic mistake!
11
Source: Bloomberg, ECB
Trade-Weighted 20-Country Euro NEER
90
95
100
105
110
115
'09 '10 '11 '12 '13
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Looking ahead, there are surely long term developed market inflation risks associated with all of this monetary expansion. And while breakeven inflation rates suggest these risks are minimal, Gold still prices in some serious long term inflation dislocations. So far though the breakevens seem to winning the battle! But there is no question, over the long run, the developed market central banks are taking significant risks with long term inflation stability.
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Source: Bloomberg
Inflation Adjusted Gold Prices (indexed to 1983) Fed 5y5y Breakeven (%)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
'70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10
Inflation Ajusted Gold Prices $ (LHS) US YOY Inflation % (RHS)
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
6/99 12/00 6/02 12/03 6/05 12/06 6/08 12/09 6/11 12/12
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Near term, as developed market central banks push the printing press pedal to the metal, force risk taking and generate increased real growth potential, EMG will become the weak link - remember the last time US rates started to rise, a US recovery took and Japan went on a devaluation tear by using a combination of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.
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For Both, Source: National Central Banks: balance sheets and GDP figures
Japan’s Fiscal Expansion Post the 1995 Yen Lows Dollar/Yen & Japan’s Monetary-Base
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
80
100
120
140
160
'90 '92 '94 '96 '98
USDJPY (LHS) Japan Montary Base 12MMA (RHS, NSA ¥10 Bln)
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
'92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98
USDJPY (LHS)1988-1994 'Avg Annual Gov't Spending/GDP' (RHS)1995-2001 Avg 'Annual Gov't Spending/GDP' (RHS)
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
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It did not end well for EMG. And take a look at the relative value of SPX to MXEF - EMG looks VERY expensive!!
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Source: Bloomberg, MXEF is a free float weighted emerging market equity index.
SPX/MXEF Ratio (1988=1)
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
'88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12 '14
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Here are the winning and losing assets in the great reflation.
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There Are Two Types of Assets
Non-Printable • Equity Capital • Real Estate • Commodities • Distressed Fixed-Income Assets
Printable • Cash • Low-Yielding Fixed Income Instruments
In a world where the developed market central banks drive risk-free real rates lower, and the portfolio balance channel forces risk taking, two things can happen. The risk-taking generates innovation, technological advance, productivity gains, real returns on capital, real growth and job creation; or, the risk taking does generates no innovation, no technological advance, no productivity gains, no real returns on capital, no real growth and no job creation. Folks who believe in the former – the lovers - should own equity capital, real estate, and distressed assets. Folks who believe in the latter – the haters - should own commodities such as precious metals. No one should own printable assets - anyone who does so will be in the “loser” camp.
Winners Losers
• Nikkei • S&P • DAX • Real Estate • Distressed Fixed-Income Assets
• Cash • Low Coupon Bonds • Emerging Market Assets
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Our favorite way to play the great reflation has evolved through time. In general we have always recommended at “long/long” strategy. For every 100m of risk assets (ie SPX), we would hedge with 100k/01 in 2s, duu’s, blues or chartreuse. For 2014 we are fully risk-on. No more levered fixed income hedges in the front-end. It’s time for just Spoos and Q’s!!!
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2010, SPX & 2s
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies: -Using weightings of $100K/01 for every $100m in equities. Glossary: SPX is the S&P 500…. DUU’s refers to Schatz futures contracts …. Blues are blue (3 yrs out) Eurodollar futures contracts …. Chartreuse is blue and green (2 and 3 yrs out) Eurodollar future contracts
2011, SPX & DUU’s
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10 11/10 1/11-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
1/11 3/11 5/11 7/11 9/11 11/11 1/12
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1/12 3/12 5/12 7/12 9/12 11/12 1/130%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1/13 3/13 5/13 7/13 9/13 11/13 1/14
2012, SPX & Blues 2013, SPX & Chartreuse
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The Fed backstop is fully in place, QE has worked its magic and US equities do not look expensive.
17
Source: Bloomberg, Fed, Jefferies.
Total US Equity Market Cap/GDP Real Value of US Equities (in 2013 dollars)
0
250
500
750
1,000
1,250
1,500
1,750
2,000
2,250
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
'27 '37 '47 '57 '67 '77 '87 '97 '07
DOW (LHS) SPX (RHS)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
'27 '32 '37 '42 '47 '52 '57 '62 '67 '72 '77 '82 '87 '92 '97 '02 '07 '12
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Meet the new bubble….same as the old bubble.
18
Source: Bloomberg.
Adjusted Nasdaq Composite Index (Jan 1990 = 100%)
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
'90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13
GDP Adjusted CPI Adjusted
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The most important lesson from the CORRECT implementation of QE is that the US is NOT Japan.
19
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies.
US Equities and Japan Equities Performance
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280
Months from Peak
S&P Peak to Present Nikkie Peak to Present Nasdaq Peak to Present
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The greatest monetary policy mistake since the 1930s took place in Japan, from 1990 to 2013.
20
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies.
US Price Levels (1980=100) Japan Price Levels (1980=100)
US GDP Japan GDP
0
50
100
150
200
250
'80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12CPI (1980=100) 2.5% Annual Inflation
100
150
200
250
300
350
'80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12 '14CPI (1980=100) 3% Annual Inflation
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
'80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12GDP (1980=$2,730B) 6% Nominal GDP YoY
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
'80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12
GDP (1980 = 250T ¥) 3.5% Nominal GDP YoY
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Sadly, Japan relied on fiscal policy expansion instead of monetary policy expansion to spur a recovery….that clearly did not work out very well.
21
Source: Bloomberg,.
Government Gross Debt/GDP Levels (%)
0
50
100
150
200
250
'81 '84 '87 '90 '93 '96 '99 '02 '05 '08 '11 '14
Japan USA France UK Spain Canada Germany Mexico Austrailia China
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The bottom line is that we have seen some amazing benefits from QE when it is appropriately applied. However, like any pain medication, the benefits are very much upfront and the costs are much long term. What are some of these long term costs:
22
1. Financial instability/bubbles
2. Losses on the balance sheet
3. Inability to extract reserves and control short rates on the exit
4. Unhinging of long term inflation expectations
5. Income and wealth distribution skews
All of these are serious issues for the long run, but the most worrisome one is the income distribution skews. We are likely to see much more political instability in the US over the long run as QE continues to widen these skews. Let’s look at a few charts on the negative distributional consequences of US QE.
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
A worrisome trend developing.
23
Source: Bloomberg, US Census.
US Gini Coefficient
0.33
0.35
0.37
0.39
0.41
0.43
0.45
0.47
'47 '50 '53 '56 '59 '62 '65 '68 '71 '74 '77 '80 '83 '86 '89 '92 '95 '98 '01 '04 '07 '10
Tightening Fed Monetary Policy (noted from 1954 and after) US Gini Coefficient
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Income has stayed the same for the upper class, but has fallen for the middle and lower-tier earners.
24
Source: US Census.
US Cumulative Real Income Increases since 1967, by Income Cohort
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
'68 '72 '76 '80 '84 '88 '92 '96 '00 '04 '08 '12
Tightening Fed Monetary Policy (noted from 1954 and after) Cohort of Bottom 40% Earners: Mean Income Cohort of Top 40% Earners: Mean Income
Cohort of middle 20% of Earners: Mean Income Cohort of Top 5% Earners: Mean Income
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The wealth distribution has also widened sharply.
25
Source: US Census, Fed., Jefferies.
US Household Nominal Wealth Growth Since 1989 by Cohort
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
'89 '93 '97 '01 '05 '09
25-49.9 50-74.9 75-89.9 90-100 All Households & NPOs
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
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Big house, low rate - small house, high rate.
26
Source: Five Bridges Advisors, Sept ‘13.
Average Original Loan Size ($K) by Net Coupon(%) (Fannie & Freddie 30-yr, Conforming and Non-Conforming)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 7.00 7.50
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
Recently the jumbo-mortgage rate has dipped below the conventional mortgage rate.
27
Source: MBA and Bankrate.com.
US 30-yr Mortgage Rates
-2.00
-1.80
-1.60
-1.40
-1.20
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
'98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 '10 '12
Spread (Conventional-Jumbo, RHS, %) 30-Year Jumbo Rate (%, LHS) BankRate.com 30-Year Fixed (%, LHS)
Global Macro Strategy Jefferies LLC
David Zervos – Chief Market Strategist – [email protected] - +1 212 323 7586
The structure of the US mortgage market is the culprit behind these distributional asymmetries. A fixed rate mortgage combined with a house price collapse is a toxic structure. The biggest problem for the US has been the inability of those in the lower income quintiles to refinance. The Fed should have thought more clearly about these distributional issues back in 2009!!
28
Source: Fed, SCB, RBA, BoE
Effective Outstanding Mortgage Rates (%)
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
'06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14
US UK Sweden Australia
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
'77 '82 '87 '92 '97 '02 '07 '12
US
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David Zervos Chief Market Strategist [email protected]
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Ryan Siegal Analyst, FI Strategy
[email protected] +1 212 323 7649